La Bugal V Ramos

*
G.R. No. 127882. January 27, 2004.
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,

represented by its Chairman F’LONG MIGUEL M.
LUMAYONG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, PONCIANO
BENNAGEN, JAIME TADEO, RENATO R.
CONSTANTINO, JR., F’LONG AGUSTIN M. DABIE,
ROBERTO P. AMLOY, RAQIM L. DABIE, SIMEON H.
DOLOJO, IMELDA M. GANDON, LENY B. GUSANAN,
MARCELO L. GUSANAN, QUINTOL A. LABUAYAN,
LOMINGGES D. LAWAY, BENITA P. TACUAYAN,
minors JOLY L. BUGOY, represented by his father
UNDERO D. BUGOY, ROGER M. DADING, represented by
his father ANTONIO L. DADING, ROMY M. LAGARO,
represented by his father TOTING A. LAGARO, MIKENY
JONG B. LUMAYONG, represented by his father MIGUEL
M. LUMAYONG, RENE T. MIGUEL, represented by his
mother EDITHA T. MIGUEL, ALDEMAR L. SAL,
represented by his father DANNY M. SAL, DAISY
RECARSE, represented by her mother LYDIA S. SANTOS,
EDWARD M. EMUY, ALAN P. MAM
_______________
* EN BANC.
149
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 149

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos
PARAIR, MARIO L. MANGCAL, ALDEN S. TUSAN,

AMPARO S. YAP, VIRGILIO CULAR, MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN, JULIA REGINA CULAR, GIAN CARLO
CULAR, VIRGILIO CULAR, JR., represented by their
father VIRGILIO CULAR, PAUL ANTONIO P.
VILLAMOR, represented by his parents JOSE VILLAMOR
and ELIZABETH PUA-VILLAMOR, ANA GININA R.
TALJA, represented by her father MARIO JOSE B. TALJA,
SHARMAINE R. CUNANAN, represented by her father
ALFREDO M. CUNANAN, ANTONIO JOSE A. VITUG III,
represented by his mother ANNALIZA A. VITUG, LEAN D.
NARVADEZ, represented by his father MANUEL E.
NARVADEZ, JR., ROSERIO MARALAG LINGATING,
represented by her father RIO OLIMPIO A. LINGATING,
MARIO JOSE B. TALJA, DAVID E. DE VERA, MARIA
MILAGROS L. SAN JOSE, SR,, SUSAN O. BOLANIO,
OND, LOLITA 1
G. DEMONTEVERDE, BENJIE L.
NEQUINTO, ROSE LILIA S. ROMANO, ROBERTO S.
VERZOLA, EDUARDO AURELIO C. REYES, LEAN
LOUEL2 A. PERIA, represented by his father ELPIDIO V.
PERIA, GREEN FORUM PHILIPPINES, GREEN
FORUM WESTERN VISAYAS, (GF-WV),
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER
(ELAC), PHILIPPINE KAISAHAN TUNGO SA
KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN 3
AT REPORMANG
PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN), KAISAHAN TUNGO SA
KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT REPORMANG
PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN), PARTNERSHIP FOR
AGRARIAN REFORM and RURAL DEVELOPMENT
SERVICES, INC. (PARRDS), PHILIPPINE
PARTNERSHIP FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES IN THE RURAL AREAS, INC.
(PHILDHRRA), WOMEN’S LEGAL BUREAU (WLB),
CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, INC. (CADI), UPLAND DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTE (UDI), KINAIYAHAN FOUNDATION, INC.,
SENTRO NG ALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL
(SALIGAN), LEGAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
_______________
1 Appears as “Nequito” in the caption of the Petition by “Nequinto” in

the body. (Rollo, p. 12.)
2 As appears in the body of the Petition. (Id., at p. 13.) The caption of
the petition does not include Louel A. Peria as one of the petitioners but
the name of his father Elpidio V. Peria appears therein.
3 Appears as “Kaisahan Tungo sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at
Repormang Pansakahan (KAISAHAN)” in the caption of the Petition by
“Philippine Kaisahan Tungo sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang
Pansakahan (KAISAHAN)” in the body. (Id., at p. 14.)
150
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CENTER, INC. (LRC), petitioners, vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS,

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS,
DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU
(MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES; EXECUTIVE4
SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.,
respondents.
Judicial Review; Requisites.—When an issue of

constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) The
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) A personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An actual case or controversy
means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.—An actual case or
controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical
questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; “Legal standing” or locus
standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged,
alleging more than a generalized grievance.—“Legal standing” or
locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged,
alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Unless
a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by
the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
_______________
4 Erroneously designated in the Petition as “Western Mining Philippines

Corporation.” (Id., at p. 212.) Subsequently, WMC (Philippines), Inc. was
renamed “Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation.” (Id., at p. 778.)
151
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 151
Same; Same; As the case involves constitutional questions, this

Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in
interest, but with whether they have legal standing.—The present
action is not merely one for annulment of contract but for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioners allege that public
respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the FTAA, which they submit is unconstitutional. As
the case involves constitutional questions, this Court is not
concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in interest, but
with whether they have legal standing. As held in Kilosbayan v.
Morato: x x x. “It is important to note . . . that standing because of
its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different
from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain
parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy
concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
[”] (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
328 [1985]) Standing is a special concern in constitutional law
because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question in standing
is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 [1962].)
Same; Same; The third requisite for judicial review should not
be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be
raised immediately after the execution of the state action
complained of—that the question of constitutionality has not been
raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be
raised later.—Misconstruing the application of the third requisite
for judicial review—that the exercise of the review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity—WMCP points out that the petition was filed
only almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not
raised at the earliest opportunity. The third requisite should not be
taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised
immediately after the execution of the state action complained of.
That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is
not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A
contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional,
would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper
party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.
Same; Prohibition; Words and Phrases; Prohibition is a
preventive remedy; While the execution of the contract itself may be
fait accompli, its implementation is not.—Prohibition is a
preventive remedy. It seeks a
152
judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the

commission of an act perceived to be illegal. The petition for
prohibition at bar is thus an appropriate remedy. While the
execution of the contract itself may be fait accompli, its
implementation is not. Public respondents, in behalf of the
Government, have obligations to fulfill under said contract.
Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on
the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The repercussions of the issues in
this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the national
economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and
compelling circumstances to justify resort to the Supreme Court in
the first instance.—The repercussions of the issues in this case on
the Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well
as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling
circumstances to justify resort to this Court in the first instance. In
all events, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal
standing when paramount public interest is involved. When the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
National Economy and Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; The first
sentence of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, embodies the
Regalian doctrine or jura regalia; Introduced by Spain into these
Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State’s power of
dominium, which is the capacity of the State to own or acquire
property.—The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian
doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this
feudal concept is based on the State’s power of dominium, which is
the capacity of the State to own or acquire property. In its broad
sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal rights, or those rights
which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it
refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a
subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights
enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign. The
theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally
held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to
others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions,
the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King
was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true
and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The
theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural
fruit of conquest.
Same; Same; The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land
but also to “all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of
the earth.”—The Philippines having passed to Spain by virtue of
discovery and conquest, earlier Spanish decrees declared that “all
lands were held from the
153
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 153
Crown.” The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to
“all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth.”
Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of natural
resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an abundant source
of revenue to finance its wars against other nations. Mining laws
during the Spanish regime reflected this perspective.
Same; Same; Unlike Spain, the United States considered
natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and saw fit
to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit
minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral
lands; The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore,
differ in one essential respect—under the Regalian theory, mineral
rights are not included in a grant of land by the state while under
the American doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of
land by the government.—Unlike Spain, the United States
considered natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals
and saw fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore
and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private
mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of
private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could
exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals
within his property. Thus, earlier jurisprudence held that: A valid
and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in
accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States,
has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and
exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the
location. x x x x x x. The discovery of minerals in the ground by one
who has a valid mineral location, perfect his claim and his location,
not only against third persons but also against the Government. x x
x. [Italics in the original.] The Regalian doctrine and the American
system, therefore, differ in one essential respect. Under the
Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant of land
by the state; under the American doctrine, mineral rights are
included in a grant of land by the government.
Same; Same; Concession System; Words and Phrases; Under the
concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural
resource within a given area—the concession amounts to complete
control by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource, for
it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.—Section 21 also made possible
the concession (frequently styled “permit,” “license” or “lease”)
system. This was the traditional regime imposed by the colonial
administrators for the exploitation of natural resources in the
extractive sector (petroleum, hard minerals, timber, etc.). Under the
concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural
resource within a given area. Thus, the
154
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over

the country’s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary
rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. In
consideration for the right to exploit a natural resource, the
concessionaire either pays rent or royalty, which is a fixed
percentage of the gross proceeds.
Same; Same; Same; As adopted in a republican system, the
medieval concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal overtones and
ownership of the land is vested in the State.—The 1935 Constitution
adopted the Regalian doctrine, declaring all natural resources of the
Philippines, including mineral lands and minerals, to be property
belonging to the State. As adopted in a republican system, the
medieval concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal overtones and
ownership of the land is vested in the State.
Same; Same; Same; Nationalization; Objectives of
Nationalization; The nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country was one of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention.—The
nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country was one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention. The nationalization of the natural
resources was intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino
posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension to the country of foreign control through
peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to avoid making the
Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent
danger to its internal security and independence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parity Amendments; The swell of
nationalism that suffused the 1935 Constitution was radically
diluted when in November 1946, the Parity Amendment, which
came in the form of an “Ordinance Appended to the Constitution,”
was ratified in a plebiscite.—The swell of nationalism that suffused
the 1935 Constitution was radically diluted when on November
l946, the Parity Amendment, which came in the form of an
“Ordinance Appended to the Constitution,” was ratified in a
plebiscite. The Amendment extended, from July 4, 1946 to July 3,
1974, the right to utilize and exploit our natural resources to
citizens of the United States and business enterprises owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States.
The Parity Amendment was subsequently modified by the 1954
Revised Trade Agreement, also known as the Laurel-Langley
Agreement, embodied in Republic Act No. 1355.
Same; Same; Service Contracts; The Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972 (Presidential Decree No. 87); Words and
Phrases; The Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 signaled
a transformation from the concession system to the exploration for
and production of indigenous
155
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 155
petroleum through “service contracts”; “Service contracts” is a term

that assumes varying meanings to different people, and it has
carried many names in different countries, like “work contracts” in
Indonesia, “concession agreements” in Africa, “production-sharing
agreements” in the Middle East, and “participation agreements” in
Latin America.—The promulgation on December 31, 1972 of
Presidential Decree No. 87, otherwise known as THE OIL
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1972 signaled
such a transformation. P.D. No. 87 permitted the government to
explore for and produce indigenous petroleum through “service
contracts.” “Service contracts” is a term that assumes varying
meanings to different people, and it has carried many names in
different countries, like “work contracts” in Indonesia, “concession
agreements” in Africa, “production-sharing agreements” in the
Middle East, and “participation agreements” in Latin America. A
functional definition of “service contracts” in the Philippines is
provided as follows: A service contract is a contractual arrangement
for engaging in the exploitation and development of petroleum,
mineral, energy, land and other natural resources by which a
government or its agency, or a private person granted a right or
privilege by the government authorizes the other party (service
contractor) to engage or participate in the exercise of such right or
the enjoyment of the privilege, in that the latter provides financial
or technical resources, undertakes the exploitation or production of
a given resource, or directly manages the productive enterprise,
operations of the exploration and exploitation of the resources or the
disposition of marketing or resources.
Same; Same; Same; It has been opined, though, that, in the
Philippines, the concept of a service contract, at least in the
petroleum industry, was basically a concession regime with a
production-sharing element.—Ostensibly, the service contract
system had certain advantages over the concession regime. It has
been opined, though, that, in the Philippines, our concept of a
service contract, at least in the petroleum industry, was basically a
concession regime with a production-sharing element.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution maintained the Filipino-only policy in the enjoyment
of natural resources, it also allowed Filipinos, upon authority of the
Batasang Pambansa, to enter into service contracts with any person
or entity for the exploration or utilization of natural resources.—On
January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos proclaimed
the ratification of a new Constitution. Article XIV on the National
Economy and Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935
Constitution with regard to Filipino participation in the nation’s
natural resources. Section 8, Article XIV thereof provides: While
Section 9 of the same Article maintained the Filipino-only policy in
the enjoyment of natural resources, it also allowed Filipinos, upon
authority of the Batasang Pambansa, to enter into service contracts
156
with any person or entity for the exploration or utilization of

natural resources.
Same; Same; Same; Conspicuously absent in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or
leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization
of natural resources—by such omission, the utilization of
inalienable lands of public domain through “license, concession or
lease” is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.—The 1987
Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine. The first sentence of
Section 2, Article XII states: “All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.” Like
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, the 1987 Constitution, in
the second sentence of the same provision, prohibits the alienation
of natural resources, except agricultural lands. The third sentence
of the same paragraph is new: “The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.” The constitutional policy of the State’s “full
control and supervision” over natural resources proceeds from the
concept of jura regalia, as well as the recognition of the importance
of the country’s natural resources, not only for national economic
development, but also for its security and national defense. Under
this provision, the State assumes “a more dynamic role” in the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development,
or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization
of inalienable lands of public domain through “license, concession or
lease” is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Under the 1987 Constitution, the State itself may
undertake the operation of a concession or enter into joint ventures.
—Having omitted the provision on the concession system, Section 2
proceeded to introduce “unfamiliar language”: The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Consonant with the State’s
“full supervision and control” over natural resources, Section 2
offers the State two “options.” One, the State may directly
undertake these activities itself; or two, it may enter into
coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned-
by such citizens.
157
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 157
Same; Same; Same; Limitations on Technical or Financial

Assistance Agreements.—Although Section 2 sanctions the
participation of foreign-owned corporations in the exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources, it imposes certain
limitations or conditions to agreements with such corporations. First,
the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in behalf of the State,
may enter into these agreements, and only with corporations. By
contrast, under the 1973 Constitution, a Filipino citizen, corporation
or association may enter into a service contract with a “foreign
person or entity.” Second, the size of the activities: only large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization is allowed. The term
“large-scale usually refers to very capital-intensive activities.” Third,
the natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the intent being to limit
service contracts to those areas where Filipino capital may not be
sufficient. Fourth, consistency with the provisions of statute. The
agreements must be in accordance with the terms and conditions
provided by law. Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for
entering into such agreements. The agreements must be based on
real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the
country. Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary
stipulations for the promotion of the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources. Seventh, the notification
requirement. The President shall notify Congress of every financial
or technical assistance agreement entered into within thirty days
from its execution. Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the
1973 Constitution referred to “service contracts for financial,
technical, management, or other forms of assistance” the 1987
Constitution provides for “agreements . . . involving either financial
or technical assistance.” It bears noting that the phrases “service
contracts” and “management or other forms of assistance” in the
earlier constitution have been omitted.
Same; Same; Same; Modes by Which the State May Explore,
Develop and Utilize Natural Resources.—The State, being the
owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization
thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four
modes: The State may directly undertake such activities. (2) The
State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens. (4) For the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
Except to charge the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR
with performing researches and surveys, and a passing mention of
government-owned or controlled corporations, R.A. No. 7942 does
not specify how the State should go about the first mode. The third
mode, on the other hand, is governed by Republic Act No.
158
7076 (the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991) and other

pertinent laws. R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the
second and fourth modes.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Production Sharing
Agreements,” “Co-Production Agreements,” and “Joint Venture
Agreements,” Explained.—Mineral production sharing, co-
production and joint venture agreements are collectively classified
by R.A. No. 7942 as “mineral agreements.” The Government
participates the least in a mineral production sharing agreement
(MPSA). In an MPSA, the Government grants the contractor the
exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract area
and shares in the gross output. The MPSA contractor provides the
financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for
the agreement’s implementation. The total government share in an
MPSA is the excise tax on mineral products under Republic Act No.
7729, amending Section 151 (a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended. In a co-production agreement (CA), the
Government provides inputs to the mining operations other than
the mineral resource, while in a joint venture agreement (JVA),
where the Government enjoys the greatest participation, the
Government and the JVA contractor organize a company with both
parties having equity shares. Aside from earnings in equity, the
Government in a JVA is also entitled to a share in the gross output.
The Government may enter into a CA or JVA with one or more
contractors.
Same; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 279; There is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from
taking effect on a date other than—even before—the 15-day period
after its publication; Where a law provides for its own date of
effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200.—
It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a
law from taking effect on a date other than—even before—the 15-
day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own
date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O.
No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence, of the phrase “unless it is
otherwise provided” in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200,
therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own
date of effectivity. What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and
what due process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera,
is the publication of the law for without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia
legis n[eminem] excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Same; Same; Same; From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O.
No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v. Tuvera, this
Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its
publication in the
159
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 159
Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.—While the effectivity clause of

E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for
its invalidation since the Constitution, being the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation,” is deemed written in
the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Tañada held,
mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O.
No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for
publication “either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines,” finds suppletory application.
It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in
the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987. From a reading then of
Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v.
Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective
immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette on August
3, 1987.
Same; Same; Same; The convening of the first Congress merely
precluded the exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino—it
did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.
—That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first
Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino issued E.O. No.
279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative
powers under the Provisional Constitution. Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states: SEC. 6. The
incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers
until the first Congress is convened. The convening of the first
Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by
President Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had
previously enacted. There can be no question, therefore, that E.O.
No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted, statute.
Same; Same; It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of
constitutions that the instrument must be so construed as to give
effect to the intention of the people who adopted it; Following the
literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-
owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be
limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only.—It is a cardinal
rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must
be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the people who
adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself,
and the apparent meaning of the words is to be taken as expressing
it, except in cases where that assumption would lead to absurdity,
ambiguity, or contradiction. What the Constitution says according to
the text of the provision, therefore, compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Accordingly, following
the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-
owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited
to “technical” or “financial” assistance only.
160
Same; Same; The management or operation of mining activities

by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service
contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to eradicate.—As priorly pointed out, the
phrase “management or other forms of assistance” in the 1973
Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows
only “technical or financial assistance.” Casus omisus pro omisso
habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. As
will be shown later, the management or operation of mining
activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of
service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to eradicate.
Same; Same; Service Contracts; If the Constitutional
Commission intended to retain the concept of service contracts under
the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old
terminology (“service contracts”) instead of employing new and
unfamiliar terms (“agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance”).—As earlier noted, the phrase “service
contracts” has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s Article on
National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to
retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution,
it could have simply adopted the old terminology (“service
contracts”) instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms
(“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance”).
Such a difference between the language of a provision in a revised
constitution and that of a similar provision in the preceding
constitution is viewed as indicative of a difference in purpose. If, as
respondents suggest, the concept of “technical or financial
assistance” agreements is identical to that of “service contracts,” the
CONCOM would not have bothered to fit the same dog with a new
collar. To uphold respondents’ theory would reduce the first to a
mere euphemism for the second and render the change in
phraseology meaningless. An examination of the reason behind the
change confirms that technical or financial assistance agreements
are not synonymous to service contracts. [T]he Court in construing
a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in
light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.
Same; Same; Same; The insights of the proponents of the U.P.
Law Draft are instructive in interpreting the phrase “technical or
financial assistance.”—It appears that Proposed Resolution No. 496,
which was the draft Article on National Economy and Patrimony,
adopted the concept of
161
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 161
“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance”

contained in the “Draft of the 1986 U.P. Law Constitution Project”
(U.P. Law draft) which was taken into consideration during the
deliberation of the CONCOM. The former, as well as Article XII, as
adopted, employed the same terminology, x x x The insights of the
proponents of the U.P. Law draft are, therefore, instructive in
interpreting the phrase “technical or financial assistance.”
Same; Same; Same; The U.P. Law draft proponents viewed
service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial
ownership of the country’s natural resources to foreign owned
corporations.—The U.P. Law draft proponents viewed service
contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial
ownership of the country’s natural resources to foreign owned
corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these natural
resources—and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries—service
contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose,
explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. Foreigners, not
Filipinos, became the beneficiaries of Philippine natural resources.
This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional
ideal of nationalization of natural resources, with the Regalian
doctrine, and on a broader perspective, with Philippine sovereignty.
Same; Same; Same; The replacement of “service contracts” with
“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance,”
as well as the deletion of the phrase “management or other forms of
assistance,” assumes greater significance when note is taken that the
U.P. Law draft proposed other equally crucial changes that were
obviously heeded by the CONCOM; In light of the deliberations of
the CONCOM, the text of the Constitution, and the adoption of
other proposed changes, there is no doubt that the framers
considered and shared the intent of the U.P. Law proponents in
employing the phrase “agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance.”—The proponents nevertheless acknowledged
the need for capital and technical know-how in the large-scale
exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources—the
second paragraph of the proposed draft itself being an admission of
such scarcity. Hence, they recommended a compromise to reconcile
the nationalistic provisions dating back to the 1935 Constitution,
which reserved all natural resources exclusively to Filipinos, and
the more liberal 1973 Constitution, which allowed foreigners to
participate in these resources through service contracts. Such a
compromise called for the adoption of a new system in the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources in the
form of technical agreements or financial agreements which,
necessity, are distinct concepts from service contracts. The
replacement of “service contracts” with “agreements . . . involving
either technical or financial assistance,” as well as the deletion of
the phrase “management or other forms of assistance,” assumes
greater significance when note is taken that the
162
U.P. Law draft proposed other equally crucial changes that were
obviously heeded by the CONCOM. These include the abrogation of
the concession system and the adoption of new “options” for the
State in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources. The proponents deemed these changes to be more
consistent with the State’s ownership of, and its “full control and
supervision” (a phrase also employed by the framers) over, such
resources. In light of the deliberations of the CONCOM, the text of
the Constitution, and the adoption of other proposed changes, there
is no doubt that the framers considered and shared the intent of the
U.P. Law proponents in employing the phrase “agreements . . .
involving either technical or financial assistance.”
Same; Same; Same; Loose statements of some of the
Commissioners in the CONCOM do not necessarily translate to the
adoption of the 1973 Constitution provision allowing service
contracts.—While certain commissioners may have mentioned the
term “service contracts” during the CONCOM deliberations, they
may not have been necessarily referring to the concept of service
contracts under the 1973 Constitution. As noted earlier, “service
contracts” is a term that assumes different meanings to different
people. The commissioners may have been using the term loosely,
and not in its technical and legal sense, to refer, in general, to
agreements concerning natural resources entered into by the
Government with foreign corporations. These loose statements do
not necessarily translate to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution
provision allowing service contracts.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; When an
administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the
administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is
the courts that finally determine what the law means.—WMCP cites
Opinion No. 75, s. 1987, and Opinion No. 175, s. 1990 of the
Secretary of Justice, expressing the view that a financial or
technical assistance agreement “is no different in concept” from the
service contract allowed under the 1973 Constitution. This Court is
not, however, bound by this interpretation. When an administrative
or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law; and the administrative
interpretation, of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means.
Same; Same; Same; The President may enter into FTAAs with
foreign-owned corporation in the exploitation of our natural
resources.—In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the
President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned corporations is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-
Filipinos. As Commissioner Villegas emphasized,
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VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 163
the provision is “very restrictive.” Commissioner Nolledo also

remarked that “entering into service contracts is an exception to the
rule on protection of natural resources for the interest of the nation
and, therefore, being an exception, it should be subject, whenever
possible, to stringent rules.” Indeed, exceptions should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provision rather than the exception.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Republic
Act No. 7942); With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court
finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes
service contracts.—With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court
finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
“financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts
that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to
the fundamental law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The underlying assumption in all
some of the provisions of R.A. No. 7942 is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a
service contract; By allowing foreign contractors to manage or
operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the above-cited
provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to these contractors,
leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.—The
underlying assumption in all these provisions is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign
contractor in a service contract. Furthermore, Chapter XII of the Act
grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining
rights that it grants contractors in mineral agreements (MPSA, CA
and JV). Parenthetically, Sections 72 to 75 use the term
“contractor,” without distinguishing between FTAA and mineral
agreement contractors. And so does “holders of mining rights” in
Section 76. A foreign contractor may even convert its FTAA into a
mineral agreement if the economic viability of the contract area is
found to be inadequate to justify large-scale mining operations,
provided that it reduces its equity in the corporation, partnership,
association or cooperative to forty percent (40%). Finally, under the
Act, an FTAA contractor warrants that it “has or has access to all
the financing, managerial, and technical expertise . . . .” This
suggests that an FTAA contractor is bound to provide some
management assistance—a form of assistance that has been
eliminated and, therefore, proscribed by the present Charter. By
allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of
the mining operation, the above-cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942
have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with
nothing but bare title thereto.
164
Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisions of R.A. No. 7942 Violative

of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.—In sum, the Court
finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: (1) The proviso in Section
3 (aq), which defines “qualified person,” to wit: Provided, That a
legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a
qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit,
financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing
permit. (2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of
an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a
financial or technical assistance agreement; (3) Section 33, which
prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical
assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms
and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement;
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and
technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral
production-sharing agreement; Section 37, which prescribes the
procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical
assistance agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of
financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which
allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance
agreements; Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the
contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section
81, which provide for the Government’s share in a financial and
technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for
incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said
contractors;
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the parts of the statute are so
mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could
not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them.—When the parts of the statute are so
mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could
not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them.
Same; International Law; Treaties; Equal Protection Clause;
The annulment of the FTAA would not constitute a breach of the
Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments between
the Philippine and Australian Governments, for the decision herein
invalidating the subject FTAA forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines, and the equal protection clause guarantees that such
decision shall apply to all contracts belonging to the same class,
hence, upholding rather than violating, the “fair and
165
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 165
equitable treatment” stipulation in said treaty.—The invalidation of

the subject FTAA, it is argued, would constitute a breach of said
treaty which, in turn, would amount to a violation of Section 3,
Article II of the Constitution adopting the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. One of
these generally accepted principles is pacta sunt servanda, which
requires the performance in good faith of treaty obligations. Even
assuming arguendo that WMCP is correct in its interpretation of the
treaty and its assertion that “the Philippines could not . . . deprive
an Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable
treatment by invalidating [WMCP’s] FTAA without likewise
nullifying the service contracts entered into before the enactment of
RA 7942 . . .,” the annulment of the FTAA would not constitute a
breach of the treaty invoked. For this decision herein invalidating
the subject FTAA forms part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The equal protection clause guarantees that such decision shall
apply to all contracts belonging to the same class, hence, upholding
rather than violating, the “fair and equitable treatment” stipulation
in said treaty.
Same; Statutory Construction; A constitution is not to be
interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable—and
unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided
—courts are not to give words a meaning that would lead to absurd
or unreasonable consequences and a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.—One other
matter requires clarification. Petitioners contend that, consistent
with the provisions of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President may enter into agreements involving “either technical or
financial assistance” only. The agreement in question, however, is a
technical and financial assistance agreement. Petitioners’
contention does not lie. To adhere to the literal language of the
Constitution would lead to absurd consequences. As WMCP
correctly put it: x x x such a theory of petitioners would compel the
government (through the President) to enter into contract with two
(2) foreign-owned corporations, one for financial assistance
agreement and with the other, for technical assistance over one and
the same mining area or land; or to execute two (2) contracts with
only one foreign-owned corporation which has the capability to
provide both financial and technical assistance, one for financial
assistance and another for technical assistance, over the same
mining area. Such an absurd result is definitely not sanctioned
under the canons of constitutional construction. [Italics in the
original.] Surely, the framers of the 1987 Charter did not
contemplate such an absurd result from their use of “either/or.” A
constitution is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or
the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if
possible, should be avoided. Courts are not to give words a meaning
that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences and a
literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results. That
166
is a strong argument against its adoption. Accordingly, petitioners’

interpretation must be rejected.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
National Economy and Patrimony; Statutory Construction; It

could not have been the object of the framers of the Charter to limit
the contracts which the President may enter into, to mere
“agreements for financial and technical assistance; The
Constitution has not prohibited the State from itself exploring,
developing, or utilizing the country’s natural resources, and, for
this purpose, it may, enter into the necessary agreements with
individuals or entities in the pursuit of a feasible operation.”—The
majority would cite the emphatic statements of Commissioners
Villegas and Davide that the country’s natural resources are
exclusively reserved for Filipino citizens and that, according to
Commissioner Villegas, “the deletion of the phrase ‘service contracts’
(is the) first attempt to avoid some of the abuses in the past regime
in the use of service contracts to go around the 60-40 arrangement.”
These declarations do not necessarily mean that the Government
may no longer enter into service contracts with foreign entities. In
order to uphold and strengthen the national policy of preserving
and developing the country’s natural resources exclusively for the
Filipino people, the present Constitution indeed has provided for
safeguards to prevent the execution of service contracts of the old
regime, but not of service contracts per se. It could not have been
the object of the framers of the Charter to limit the contracts which
the President may enter into, to mere “agreements for financial and
technical assistance.” One would take it that the usual terms and
conditions recognized and stipulated in agreements of such nature
have been contemplated. Basically, the financier and the owner of
know-how would understandably satisfy itself with the proper
implementation and the profitability of the project. It would be
abnormal for the financier and owner of the know-how not to
assure itself that all the activities needed to bring the project into
fruition are properly implemented, attended to, and carried out.
Needless to say, no foreign investor would readily lend financial or
technical assistance without the proper incentives, including fair
returns, therefor. The Constitution has not prohibited the State
from itself exploring, developing, or utilizing the country’s natural
resources, and, for this purpose, it may, I submit, enter into the
necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of a
feasible operation.
Same; Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers;
While I cannot ignore an impression of the business community that
the Supreme Court is wont, at times, to interfere with the economic
decisions of Congress and the government’s economic managers, I
must hasten to add, however, that in so voting as above, I have not
been unduly overwhelmed by that perception.—Just a word. While I
cannot ignore an impression of the busi-
167
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 167
ness community that the Court is wont, at times, to interfere with

the economic decisions of Congress and the government’s economic
managers, I must hasten to add, however, that in so voting as
above, I have not been unduly overwhelmed by that perception.
Quite the contrary, the Court has always proceeded with great
caution, such as now, in resolving cases that could inextricably
involve policy questions thought to be best left to the technical
expertise of the legislative and executive departments.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

Moot and Academic Issues; I believe that the Court should
dismiss the Petition on the ground of mootness—a decision on the
constitutionality issue should await the wisdom of a new day when
the Court would have a live case before it.—With due respect, I
believe that the Court should dismiss the Petition on the ground of
mootness. I submit that a decision on the constitutionality issue
should await the wisdom of a new day when the Court would have
a live case before it. The nullity of the FTAA is unarguably
premised upon the contractor being a foreign corporation. Had the
FTAA been originally issued to a Filipino-owned corporation, we
would have had no constitutionality issue to speak of. Upon the
other hand, conveyance of the FTAA to a Filipino corporation can be
likened to the sale of land to a foreigner who subsequently acquires
Filipino citizenship, or who later re-sells the same land to a Filipino
citizen. The conveyance would be validated, as the property in
question would no longer be owned by a disqualified vendee. Since
the FTAA is now to be implemented by a Filipino corporation, how
can the Court still declare it unconstitutional? The CA case is a
dispute between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto)
both claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP. So
regardless of which side eventually wins, the FTAA would still be in
the hands of a qualified Filipino company.
National Economy and Patrimony; Statutory Construction; If
the intention of the drafters were strictly to confine foreign
corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing more,
their language would have been unmistakably restrictive and
stringent.—First, the drafters’ choice of words—their use of the
phrase “agreements x x x involving x x x technical or financial
assistance”—does not absolutely indicate the intent to exclude other
modes of assistance. Rather, the phrase signifies the possibility of
the inclusion of other activities, provided they bear some reasonable
relationship to and compatibility with financial or technical
assistance. If the intention of the drafters were strictly to confine
foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing
more, I am certain that their language would have been
unmistakably restrictive and stringent. They would have said, for
example: “Foreign corporations are prohibited from providing
management or other forms of assistance,” or words to that effect.
The conscious avoidance of restrictive wording bespeaks an intent
168

not to employ—in an exclusionary, inflexible and limiting manner—

the expression “agreements involving technical or financial
assistance.”
Same; Same; Service Contracts; The present Constitution still
recognizes and allows service contracts (and has not rendered them
taboo), albeit subject to several restrictions and modifications aimed
at avoiding the pitfalls of the past.—Second, I believe the foregoing
position is supported by the fact that our present Constitution still
recognizes and allows service contracts (and has not rendered them
taboo), albeit subject to several restrictions and modifications aimed
at avoiding the pitfalls of the past. Below are some excerpts from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (Concom),
showing that its members discussed “technical or financial
agreements” in the same breath as “service contracts” and used the
terms interchangeably.
Same; Same; Same; In the minds of the commissioners, the
concept of technical and financial assistance agreements did not
exist at all apart from the concept of service contracts duly modified
to prevent abuses—“technical and financial agreements” were
understood by the delegates to include service contracts duly
modified to prevent abuses.—The foregoing is but a small sampling
of the lengthy discussions of the constitutional commissioners on the
subject of service contracts and technical and financial assistance
agreements. Quoting the rest of their discussions would have taken
up several more pages, and these have thus been omitted for the
sake of brevity. In any event, it would appear that the members of
the Concom actually had in mind the Marcos era service contracts
that they were familiar with (but which they duly modified and
restricted so as to prevent abuses), when they were crafting and
polishing the provisions dealing with financial and/or technical
assistance agreements. These provisions ultimately became the
fourth and the fifth paragraphs of Section 2 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Put differently, “technical and financial
assistance agreements” were understood by the delegates to include
service contracts duly modified to prevent abuses. Since the drafters
were referring only to service contracts to be granted to foreigners
and to nothing else, this fact necessarily implies that we ought not
treat the idea of “agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance” as having any significance or existence apart from
service contracts. In other words, in the minds of the commissioners,
the concept of technical and financial assistance agreements did not
exist at all apart from the concept of service contracts duly modified
to prevent abuses.
Same; Same; Same; Current business practices often require
borrowers seeking huge loans to allow creditors access to financial
records and other data, and probably a seat or two on the former’s
board of directors, or at least some participation in certain
management decisions that may have an impact on the financial
health or long-term viability of the debtor,
169
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 169
which of course will directly affect the latter’s capacity to repay its
loans.—Tantamount to closing one’s eyes to reality is the insistence
that the term “agreements involving technical or financial
assistance” refers only to purely technical or financial assistance to
be rendered to the State by a foreign corporation (and must perforce
exclude management and other forms of assistance). Nowadays,
securing the kind of financial assistance required by large-scale
explorations, which involve hundreds of millions of dollars, is not
just a matter of signing a simple promissory note in favor of a
lender. Current business practices often require borrowers seeking
huge loans to allow creditors access to financial records and other
data, and probably a seat or two on the former’s board of directors;
or at least some participation in certain management decisions that
may have an impact on the financial health or long-term viability of
the debtor, which of course will directly affect the latter’s capacity to
repay its loans. Prudent lending practices necessitate a certain
degree of involvement in the borrower’s management process.
Same; Same; Same; If the Supreme Court closes its doors to
international realities and unilaterally sets up its own concepts of
strict technical and financial assistance, then it may unwittingly
make the country a virtual hermit—an economic isolationist—in the
real world of finance.—Given the modern-day reality that even the
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) do
not lend on the basis merely of bare promissory notes, but on some
conditionalities designed to assure the borrowers’ financial viability,
I would like to hear in an Oral Argument in a live, not a moot, case
what these international practices are and how they impact on our
constitutional restrictions. This is not to say that we should bend our
basic law; rather, we should find out what kind of FTAA provisions
are realistic vis-à-vis these international standards and our
constitutional protection. Unless there is a live FTAA, the Court
would not be able to analyze the provisions vis-à-vis the
Constitution, the Mining Law and these modern day lending
practices. I mentioned the WB and the IMF, not necessarily because
I agree with their oftentimes stringent policies, but because they set
the standards that international and multinational financial
institutions often take bearings from. The WB and IMF are akin
(though not equivalent) to the Bangko Sentral, which all Philippine
banks must abide by. If this Court closes its doors to these
international realities and unilaterally sets up its own concepts of
strict technical and financial assistance, then it may unwittingly
make the country a virtual hermit—an economic isolationist—in the
real world of finance.
Constitutions; Statutory Construction; The commissioners fully
realized that their work would have to withstand the test of time,
that the Charter, though crafted with the wisdom born of past
experiences and lessons painfully learned, would have to be a living
document that would answer the needs of the nation well into the
future.—I believe that the
170
Concom did not mean to tie the hands of the President and restrict
the latter only to agreements on rigid financial and technical
assistance and nothing else. The commissioners fully realized that
their work would have to withstand the test of time; that the
Charter, though crafted with the wisdom born of past experiences
and lessons painfully learned, would have to be a living document
that would answer the needs of the nation well into the future.
Thus, the unerring emphasis on flexibility and adaptability.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Mandamus and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, Edgar DL Bernal, Ingrid
Rosalie L. Gorre and Emily L. Manuel for petitioners.
Ma. Paz G. Luna for petitioner David de Vera, et al.
Magistrado A. Mendoza for petitioner KAISAHAN.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Factoran and Associates Law Office; Belo, Gozon,
Elma, Parel,
Asuncion and Lucila; and Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento,
Arroyo & Chua for private respondent WMC (Phils.).
Mario C.V. Jalandoni co-counsel for WMC (Phils.).
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The present petition for mandamus and prohibition

5
assails
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise
known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along
with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued
pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a
corporation organized under Philippine laws.
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon
6
C. Aquino
issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the
DENR Secretary to
_______________
5 An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration,

Development, Utilization and Conservation.
6 Authorizing the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
Negotiate and Conclude Joint Venture, Co-Production, or Production-
171
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 171

accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned

corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary,
the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In
entering into such proposals, the President shall consider
the real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the
development and use of local scientific and technical
resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or
agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-
scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those
proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources
exploration, development, and utilization involving a
committed capital in a single mining unit project of at least
Fifty Million Dollars
7
in United States currency (US
$50,000,000.00).
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved R.A. No. 7942 to “govern the exploration,
development,
8
utilization and processing of all mineral
resources.” R.A. No. 7942 defines9 the modes of mineral
agreements for mining operations,10
outlines the procedure
11
for their filing
12
and approval, assignment/transfer
13
and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions 14
govern financial or technical assistance agreements. 15
The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors
16 17
and
grants them certain rights, including timber, water and
ease-
_______________
Sharing Agreements for the Exploration, Development and Utilization

of Mineral Resources, and Prescribing the Guidelines for such
Agreements and those Agreements involving Technical or Financial
Assistance by Foreign-Owned Corporations for Large-Scale Exploration,
Development and Utilization of Minerals.
7 Exec. Order No. 279 (1987), sec. 4.
8 Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995), sec. 15.
9Id., sec. 26 (a)-(c).
10 Id., sec. 29.
11 Id., sec. 30.
12 Id., sec. 31.
13 Id., sec. 32.
14 Id., ch. VI.
15 Id., secs. 27 and 33 in relation to sec. 3 (aq).
16 Id., sec. 72.
17 Id., sec. 73.
172

18 19
ment rights, and the right to possess explosives. Surface
owners, occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from
preventing holders of mining 20
rights from entering private
lands and concession areas. A procedure
21
for the settlement
of conflicts is likewise provided for. 22 23
The Act24restricts the Conditions for exploration, quarry
and other permits. It25 regulates the transport, sale and
processing of minerals, and promotes the development 26
of
mining communities, science and mining 27
technology, and
safety and environmental protection.
The government’s
28
share in the agreements is 29
spelled out
and allocated,
30
taxes and fees are imposed, 31incentives
granted. Aside from penalizing certain acts, the law
likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation, 32
revocation
and termination of agreements and permits.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on
March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two
newspapers
33
of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took
effect.
Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or
on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA
with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South
Cotabato,34 Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.
_______________
18 Id., sec. 75.

19 Id., sec. 74.
20 Id., sec. 76.
21 Id., ch. XIII.
22 Id., secs. 20-22.
23 Id., secs. 43, 45.
24 Id., secs. 46-49, 51-52.
25 Id., ch. IX.
26 Id., ch. X.
27 Id., ch. XI.
28 Id., ch. XIV.
29 Id., ch. XV.
30 Id., ch. XVI.
31 Id., ch. XIX
32 Id., ch. XVII.
33 Section 116, R.A. No. 7942 provides that the Act “shall take effect
thirty (30) days following its complete publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines.”
34 WMCP FTAA, sec. 4.1.
173
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 173

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos

issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s.
1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by
DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20,
1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a
letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR
stop35
the implementation of R.A. No, 7942 and DAO36 No. 96-
40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act
thereon. The DENR, 37
however, has yet to respond or act on
petitioners’ letter.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition
and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the
petition, 100 FTAA applications had already 38
been filed,
covering an area of 8.4 million hec-tares, 64 of which
applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations
covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by
39
a
fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction:
x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No.

96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign owned corporations to
explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner
contrary to Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution;
II
x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order

No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows the taking of private property
without the determination of public use and for just compensation;
_______________
35 Rollo, p. 22.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. The number has since risen to 129 applications when the petitioners
filed their Reply. (Rollo, p. 363.)
39 Id., at p. 22.
174

III

unconstitutional in that it violates Sec. 1, Art. III of the
Constitution;
IV

unconstitutional in that it allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as
well as fully foreign owned corporations of the nation’s marine
wealth contrary to Section 2, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution;

unconstitutional in that it allows priority to foreign and fully foreign
owned corporations in the exploration, development and utilization
of mineral resources contrary to Article XII of the Constitution;
VI

unconstitutional in that it allows the inequitable sharing of wealth
contrary to Sections [sic] 1, paragraph 1, and Section 2, paragraph
4[,] [Article XII] of the Constitution;
VII
x x x in recommending approval of and implementing the

Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the
President of the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining
Corporation Philippines,
40
Inc. because the same is illegal and
unconstitutional.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on

any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or
Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null
and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other
similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional
and null and void; and
_______________
40 Id., at pp. 23-24.
175
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 175

(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance

Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, 41
Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
Impleaded as public respondents are Ruben Torres, the

then Executive Secretary, Victor O. Ramos, the then DENR
Secretary, and Horacio Ramos, Director of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau of the DENR. Also impleaded is private
respondent WMCP, which entered into the assailed FTAA
with the Philippine Government. WMCP is owned by WMC
Resources International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), “a wholly owned
subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings
Limited, a publicly listed42 major Australian mining and
exploration company.” By WMCP’s information, 43
“it is a
100% owned subsidiary of WMC LIMITED.”
Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners’ contentions,
argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been
met and that the petition does not comply with the criteria
for prohibition and mandamus. Additionally, respondent
WMCP argues that there has been a violation of the rule on
hierarchy of courts.
After petitioners filed their reply, this Court granted due
course to the petition. The parties have since filed their
respective memoranda.
WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated
September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001
WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
(Sagittarius),
44
a corporation organized under Philippine
laws. WMCP was subsequently 45
renamed “Tampakan
Mineral Resources Corporation.” WMCP claims that at
least 60% of the equity of Sagittarius is owned by Filipinos
and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is 46
owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company.
It further claims that by such sale and transfer of shares,
“WMCP47 has ceased to be connected in any way with
WMC.”
_______________
41 Id., at pp. 52-53. Emphasis and italics supplied.

42 WMCP FTAA, p. 2.
43 Rollo, p. 220.
44 Id., at p. 754.
45 Vide Note 4.
46 Rollo, p. 754.
47 Id., at p. 755.
176

By virtue of such sale and transfer,

48
the DENR Secretary, by
Order of December 18, 2001, approved the transfer and
registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to
Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto) to the Office of 49 the
President which upheld it by Decision of July 23, 2002. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Office50
of the President by Resolution of 51November 12, 2002,
Lepanto filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals. Incidentally, two other petitions for review related
to the approval of the transfer and registration of the FTAA
52
to Sagittarius were recently resolved by this Court.
52
to Sagittarius were recently resolved by this Court.
It bears stressing that this case has not been rendered
moot either by the transfer and registration of the FTAA to
a Filipino-owned corporation or by the non-issuance of a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction to
stay the above-said
53
July 23, 2002 decision of the Office of
the President. The validity of the transfer remains in
dispute and awaits final judicial determination. This
assumes, of course, that such transfer cures the FTAA’s
alleged unconstitutionality, on which question judgment is
reserved.
WMCP also points out that the original, claimowners of
the major mineralized areas included in the WMCP FTAA,
namely, Sagittarius, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and
Southcot Mining
54
Corporation, are all Filipino-owned
corporations, each of which was a holder of an approved
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 761-763.

49 Id., at pp. 764-776.
50 Id., at pp. 782-786.
51 Docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 74161.
52 G.R. No. 153885, entitled Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v.
WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd., et al., decided September 24,
2003, 412 SCRA 101 and G.R. No. 156214, entitled Lepanto Mining
Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd., WMC (Philippines),
Inc., Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation and
Sagittarius Mines, Inc., decided September 23, 2003.
53 Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, invoked by private
respondent, states, “The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall
direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.”
54 WMCP’s Reply (dated May 6, 2003) to Petitioners’ Comment (to the
Manifestation and Supplemental Manifestation), p. 3.
177
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 177

awarded in 1994, albeit their respective

55
mineral claims were
subsumed in the WMCP FTAA; and that these three
companies are the same companies that consolidated their
interests in56 Sagittarius to whom WMC sold its 100% equity
in WMCP. WMCP concludes that in the event that the
FTAA is invalidated, the MPSAs of the three corporations
would be revived and the 57
mineral claims would revert to
their original claimants.
These circumstances, while informative, are hardly
significant in the resolution of this case, it involving the
validity of the FTAA, not the possible consequences of its
invalidation.
Of the above-enumerated seven grounds cited by
petitioners, as will be shown later, only the first and the last
need be delved into; in the latter, the discussion shall dwell
only insofar as it questions the effectivity of E.O. No. 279 by
virtue of which order the questioned FTAA was forged.
Before going into the substantive issues, the procedural

questions posed by respondents shall first be tackled.
Requisites For Judicial Review
When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can

exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are present:
(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;

(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and
(4) The 58constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case.
_______________
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 WMCP’s Reply (dated May 6, 2003) to Petitioners’ Comment (to the
Manifestation and Supplemental Manifestation), p. 4.
58 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506
(1994); National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171
SCRA 657 (1989); Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392
(1980).
178

Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not

present.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
“(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.” The power of judicial review,
therefore, is limited
59
to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate 60or ripe .for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the61 decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.
62
The power does
not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions 63and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as 64
a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged,
65
alleging
more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges “such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends 66
for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional
rights by 67the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing.
Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them
are La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and
indigenous
_______________
59 Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, supra.

60 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996).
62 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections, 262
SCRA 492 (1996).
63 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
64 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81, 100
(2000); Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, supra; People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937).
66 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra.
67 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila, 21 SCRA 449 (1967).
179
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 179

people’s cooperative organized under Philippine laws

representing a community actually affected by the 68
mining
activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as
other residents of 69areas also affected by the mining
activities of WMCP. These petitioners have standing to
raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they
allege a personal and substantial injury. They 70
claim that
they would suffer “irremediable displacement” as a result of
the implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to
conduct mining activities in their area of residence. They
thus meet the appropriate case requirement as they assert
an interest adverse to that of respondents who, on the other
hand, insist on the FTAA’s validity.
In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also
have standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by
authority of which the FTAA was executed.
Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being
strangers to the FTAA, cannot 71
sue either or both
contracting parties to annul it. In other words, they
contend that petitioners are not real parties in interest in an
action for the annulment of contract.
Public respondents’ contention fails. The present action is
not merely one for annulment of contract but for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioners allege that public respondents
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
the FTAA, which they submit is unconstitutional. As the
case involves constitutional questions, this Court is not
concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in
interest, but with whether
72
they have legal standing. As held
in Kilosbayan v. Morato:
x x x. “It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different
from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party in interest or has
_______________
68 Petitioners Roberto P. Amloy, Raqim L. Dabie, Simeon H. Dolojo, Imelda

Gandon, Leny B. Gusanan, Marcelo L. Gusanan, Quintal A. Labuayan,
Lomingges Laway, and Benita P. Tacuayan.
69 Petitioners F’long Agustin M. Dabie, Mario L. Mangcal, Alden S. Tusan,
Sr. Susuan O. Bolanio, OND, Lolita G. Demonteverde, Benjie L. Nequinto, Rose
Lilia S. Romano and Amparo S. Yap.
70 Rollo, p. 6.
71 Id., at p. 337, citing Malabanan v. Gaw Ching, 181 SCRA 84 (1990).
72 246 SCRA 540 (1995).
180

capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed

towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as
well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.[”] (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 [1985])
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in
some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. Hence, the question in standing is
whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 [1962].)
As earlier stated, petitioners meet this requirement.

The challenge against the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7942 and DAO No. 96-40 likewise fulfills the requisites of
justiciability. Although these laws were not in force when
the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their
validity is ripe for adjudication.
The WMCP FTAA provides:
14.3 Future Legislation
Any term and condition more favourable to Financial & Technical

Assistance Agreement contractors resulting from repeal or amendment of
any existing law or regulation or from the enactment of a law, regulation
or administrative order shall be considered a part of this Agreement.
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40

contain provisions that are more favorable to WMCP, hence,
these laws, to the extent that they are favorable to WMCP,
govern the FTAA.
In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain
provisions apply to pre-existing agreements.
SEC. 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights.

—x x x That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share in
mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on
incentives of this Act shall immediately govern and apply to a
mining lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor
indicates his intention to the secretary in writing not to avail of said
provisions x x x Provided, finally,
181
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 181

That such leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or

technical assistance agreements shall comply with the applicable
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
As there is no suggestion that WMCP has indicated its

intention not to avail of the provisions of Chapter XVI of
R.A. No. 7942, it can safely be presumed that they apply to
the WMCP FTAA.
Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for
judicial review—that the exercise of the review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity—WMCP points out that the
petition was filed only almost two years after the execution
of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity.
The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the
question of constitutionality must be raised immediately
after the execution of the state action complained of. That
the question of constitutionality has not been raised before
is not73 a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise
unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the
mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to
challenge the same.
Propriety of Prohibition and Mandamus
Before the effectivity in July 1997 of the Revised Rules of

Civil Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 65 read:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any

tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant
to desist from proceeding in the action or matter specified therein.
74
Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks a judgment
ordering the defendant to desist from continuing
75
with the
commission of an act perceived to be illegal.
_______________
73 People v. Vera, supra.

74 Militante v. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 318 (2000).
75 Ibid.
182

The petition for prohibition at bar is thus an appropriate

remedy. While the execution of the contract itself may be
fait accompli, its implementation is not. Public respondents,
in behalf of the Government, have obligations to fulfill
under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from
fulfilling such obligations on the theory that the contract is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
The propriety of a petition for prohibition, being upheld,
discussion of the propriety of the mandamus aspect of the
petition is rendered unnecessary.
Hierarchy of Courts
The contention that the filing of this petition violated the

rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The rule
has been explained thus:
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower

court that should initially pass upon the issues of a case. That way,
as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn
of all but the important legal issues or those of first impression,
which are the proper subject of attention to the appellate court. This
is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the
administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the
hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give a party
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this
Court’s primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only
where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
such invocation. We held in People v. Cuaresma that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that

petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It
is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to pre
183
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 183

76
vent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket x x x. [Emphasis

supplied.]
The repercussions of the issues in this case on the

Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as
well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and
compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in
the first instance.
In all events, this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements
of an actual case or legal
77
standing when paramount public
interest is involved. When the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public,
78
this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure.
II
Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 did not take effect
because its supposed date of effectivity came after President
Aquino had already lost her legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution.
And they likewise claim that the WMC FTAA, which was
entered into pursuant to E.O. No. 279, violates Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution because, among other
reasons:
(1) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more

than mere financial or technical assistance to the
State in the exploitation, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, and even permits foreign owned
companies to “operate and manage mining
activities.”
(2) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend both
technical and financial assistance, instead of “either
technical or financial assistance.”
To appreciate the import of these issues, a visit to the

history of the pertinent constitutional provision, the
concepts contained therein, and the laws enacted pursuant
thereto, is in order.
Section 2, Article XII reads in full:
_______________
76 Cruz v. Secretary, of Environment and Natural Resources, 347

SCRA 128 (2000), Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion. [Emphasis supplied.]
77 Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA
568 (1993).
78 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra.
184

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements
may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In case of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
The Spanish Regime and the Regalian Doctrine

The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian
doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into these
Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State’s power of
dominium, which79 is the capacity of the State to own or
acquire property.
_______________
79 J. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A

Commentary 1009 (1996).
185
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 185

In its broad sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal rights, or
those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In
Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over
anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad.
These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the
sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was
originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted
out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain
conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of
law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands,
and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were
held. The theory of jura regalia
80
was therefore nothing more than a
natural fruit of conquest.
The Philippines having 81

passed to Spain by virtue of
discovery and conquest, earlier Spanish82 decrees declared
that “all lands were held from the Crown.”
The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also
to “all natural
83
wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth.”
_______________
80 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra,

Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion.
81 Id., Puno, J., Separate Opinion, and Panganiban, J., Separate
Opinion.
82 Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 US 449, 53 L.Ed. 595 (1909).
For instance, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias proclaimed:
We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories,
and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us,
or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will
that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored
to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what
to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for
public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled,
taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future
and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
83 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 (1988). It has been

noted, however, that “the prohibition in the [1935] Constitution against
alienation by the state of mineral lands and minerals is not properly a
part of the Regalian doctrine but a separate national policy designed to
186

Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of natural

resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an
abundant84
source of revenue to finance its wars against other
nations. Mining85 laws during the Spanish regime reflected
this perspective.
_______________
conserve our mineral resources and prevent the state from being
deprived of such minerals as are essential to national defense.” (A.
Noblejas, Philippine Law on Natural Resources 126-127 [1959 ed.], citing
V. Francisco, The New Mining Law.)
Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, citing A. Noblejas, Philippine Law on
Natural Resources 6 (1961). Noblejas continues:
Thus, they asserted their right of ownership over mines and minerals or
precious metals, golds, and silver as distinct from the right of ownership of the
land in which the minerals were found. Thus, when on a piece of land mining
was more valuable than agriculture, the sovereign retained ownership of mines
although the land has been alienated to private ownership. Gradually, the right
to the ownership of minerals was extended to base metals. If the sovereign did
not exploit the minerals, they grant or sell it as a right separate from the land.
(Id., at p. 6.)
85 In the unpublished case of Lawrence v. Garduño (L-10942, quoted in

V. FRANCISCO, Philippine Law on Natural Resources 14-15 [1956]), this
Court observed:
The principle underlying Spanish legislation on mines is that these are subject
to the eminent domain of the state. The Spanish law of July 7, 1867, amended
by the law of March 4, 1868, in article 2 says: “The ownership of the substances
enumerated in the preceding article (among them those of inflammable nature),
belong[s] to the state, and they cannot be disposed of without the government
authority.”
The first Spanish mining law promulgated for these Islands (Decree of
Superior Civil Government of January 28, 1964), in its Article I, says: “The
supreme ownership of mines throughout the kingdom belong[s] to the crown and
to the king. They shall not be exploited except by persons who obtained special
grant from this superior government and by those who may secure it thereafter,
subject to this regulation.”
Article 2 of the royal decree on ownership of mines in the Philippine Islands,
dated May 14, 1867, which was the law in force at the time of the cession of
these Islands to the Government of the United States, says: “The ownership of
the substances enumerated in the preceding article (among them those of
inflammable nature)
187
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 187

The American Occupation and The Concession

Regime
By the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded

“the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands” to the
United States. The Philippines was hence governed by
means of organic acts that were in the nature of charters
serving as86 a Constitution of the occupied territory from 1900
to 1935. Among the principal organic acts of the
Philippines was the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, more
commonly known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, through
which the United States Congress assumed the
87
administration of the Philippine Islands. Section 20 of said
87
administration of the Philippine Islands. Section 20 of said
Bill reserved the disposition of mineral lands of the public
domain from sale. Section 21 thereof allowed the free and
open exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral
deposits not only to citizens of the Philippine Islands but to
those of the United States as well:
Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the
Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and
purchase, and the land on
_______________
belongs to the state, and they cannot be disposed of without an authorization

issued by the Superior Civil Governor.”
Furthermore, all those laws contained provisions regulating the manner of
prospecting, locating and exploring mines in private property by persons other
than the owner of the land as well as the granting of concessions, which goes to
show that private land did not include, without express grant, the mines that
might be found therein.
Analogous provisions are found in the Civil Code of Spain determining the
ownership of mines. In its Article 339 (Article 420, New Civil Code)
enumerating properties of public ownership, the mines are included until
specially granted to private individuals. In its article 350 (Art. 437, New Civil
Code) declaring that the proprietor of any parcel of land is the owner of its
surface and of everything under it, an exception is made as far as mining laws
are concerned. Then in speaking of minerals, the Code in its articles 426 and
427 (Art. 519, New Civil Code) provides rules governing the digging of pits by
third persons on private-owned lands for the purpose of prospecting for
minerals.
86 Atok Big-Wedge Mining Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 261 SCRA 528
(1996).
87 Ibid.
188

which they are found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the

United States or of said Islands: Provided, That when on any lands
in said Islands entered and occupied as agricultural lands under the
provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been
found, the working of such mineral deposits is forbidden until the
person, association, or corporation who or which has entered and is
occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said
Islands such additional sum or sums as will make the total amount
paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits are
located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the
same as mineral claims.
Unlike Spain, the United States considered natural

resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and saw fit
to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and
exploit minerals in public
88
lands, and to grant patents to
private mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership
over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws
then prevailing could exclude other persons, even
89
the State,
from exploiting
90
minerals within his property. Thus, earlier
jurisprudence held that:
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up

in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United
States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present
and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive
right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of
the location. x x x.
x x x.
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid
mineral location, perfect his claim and his location, not only against
third persons but also against the Government. x x x. [Italics in the
original.]
The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore,

differ in one essential respect. Under the Regalian theory,
mineral rights are not included in a grant of land by the
state; under the American doctrine, mineral 91
rights are
included in a grant of land by the government.
_______________

Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion.
89 Ibid.
90 McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia, 42 Phil. 749 (1922).
91 NOBLEJAS, supra, at p. 5.
189
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 189

Section 21 also made possible the92 concession 93

(frequently
styled “permit,” “license” or “lease”) system. This was the
traditional regime imposed by the colonial administrators
for the exploitation of natural resources in the 94
extractive
sector (petroleum, hard minerals, timber, etc.).
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a
direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting
95
a
particular natural resource within a given area. Thus, the
concession amounts to complete control by the
concessionaire over the country’s natural resource, for it is
given exclusive and plenary rights 96
to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction. In consideration for the
right to exploit a natural resource, the concessionaire either
pays rent97or royalty, which is a fixed percentage of the gross
proceeds.
Later statutory enactments by the legislative bodies set
up in the Philippines
98
adopted the contractual99 framework of
the concession. For instance, Act No. 2932, approved on
August 31, 1920, which provided for the exploration,
location, and lease of lands containing petroleum and other 100
mineral oils and gas in the Philippines, and Act No. 2719,
approved on May 14, 1917, which provided for the leasing
and development of coal lands 101
in the Philippines, both
utilized the concession system.
_______________
92 V.M.A. Dimagiba, Service Contract Concepts in Energy, 57 PHIL.

L. J. 307, 313 (1982).
93 P.A. Agabin, Service Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles?, in II
DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE 1986 U.P. Law Constitution Project 3.
94 Id., at pp. 2-3.
95 Id., at p. 3.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 An Act to Provide for the Exploration, Location and Lease of Lands
Containing Petroleum and other Mineral Oils and Gas in the Philippine
Islands.
100 An Act to Provide for the Leasing and Development of Coal Lands
in the Philippine Islands.
101 Agabin, supra, at p. 3.
190
The 1935 Constitution and the Nationalization

of Natural Resources
By the Act of United States Congress of March 24, 1934,

popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the People
of the Philippine
102
Islands were authorized to adopt a
constitution. On July 30, 1934, the Constitutional
Convention met for the purpose of drafting a constitution,
and the Constitution subsequently drafted 103
was approved by
the Convention on February 8, 1935. The Constitution
was submitted to 104
the President of the United States on
March 18, 1935. On March 23, 1935, the President of the
United States certified that the Constitution conformed
substantially with the provisions 105
of the Act of Congress
approved on March 24, 1934. On May 14, 106
1935, the
Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people.
The 1935 Constitution adopted the Regalian doctrine,
declaring all natural resources of the Philippines, including
mineral
107
lands and minerals, to be property belonging to the
State. As adopted in a republican system, the medieval
concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal 108
overtones and
ownership of the land is vested in the State.
Section 1, Article XIII, on Conservation and Utilization
of Natural Resources, of the 1935 Constitution provided:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the

public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established
_______________
102 People v. Linsangan, 62 Phil. 646 (1935).

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Atok Big-Wedge Mining Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.
108 BERNAS, S.J., supra, at pp. 1009-1010, citing Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48
SCRA 372 (1972).
191
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 191

under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of

public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
The nationalization and conservation of the natural

resources of the country was one of the fixed and dominating
109
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention. One
delegate relates:
There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor

of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates of the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the
Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was
continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming
the Regalian doctrine.
The adoption of the principle of state ownership of the natural
resources and of the Regalian doctrine was considered to be a
necessary starting point for the plan of nationalizing and
conserving the natural resources of the country. For with the
establishment of the principle of state ownership of the natural
resources, it would not be hard to secure the recognition of the
power of the State to 110control their disposition, exploitation,
development or utilization.
The nationalization of the natural resources was intended

(1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to
serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent
the extension to the country of foreign control through
peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to avoid making the
Philippines a source of international conflicts with the
consequent danger
111
to its internal security and
independence.
_______________
109 II J. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 592

(1949).
110 Id., at pp. 600-601.
111 Id., at p. 604. Delegate Aruego expounds: At the time of the framing
of the Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital had been known to be
rather shy. Filipinos hesitated as
192

The same Section 1, Article XIII also adopted the concession

system, expressly permitting the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources. Grants, however,
were limited to Filipinos or entities at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The swell of nationalism that suffused the 1935
Constitution was radically diluted when on November l946,
the Parity Amendment, which came in the form of an
“Ordinance Appended to the
_______________
a general rule to invest a considerable sum of their capital for the

development, exploitation, and utilization of the natural resources of the
country. They had not as yet been so used to corporate enterprises as the
peoples of the West. This general apathy, the delegates knew, would mean
the retardation of the development of the natural resources, unless foreign
capital would be encouraged to come in and help in that development.
They knew that the nationalization of the natural resources would
certainly not encourage the investment of foreign capital into them. But
there was a general feeling in the Convention that it was better to have
such development retarded or even postponed altogether until such time
when the Filipinos would be ready and willing to undertake it rather than
permit the natural resources to be placed under the ownership or control
of foreigners in order that they might be immediately developed, with the
Filipinos of the future serving not as owners but at most as tenants or
workers under foreign masters. By all means, the delegates believed, the
natural resources should be conserved for Filipino posterity.
The nationalization of natural resources was also intended as an
instrument of national defense. The Convention felt that to permit
foreigner to own or control the natural resources would be to weaken the
national defense. It would be making possible the gradual extension of
foreign influence into our politics, thereby increasing the possibility of
foreign control. x x x.
Not only these. The nationalization of the natural resources, it was
believed, would prevent making the Philippines a source of international
conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and
independence. For unless the natural resources were nationalized, with
the nationals of foreign countries having the opportunity to own or control
them, conflicts of interest among them might arise inviting danger to the
safety and independence of the nation. (Id., at pp. 605-606.)
193
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 193

112
Constitution,” was ratified in a plebiscite. The Amendment
extended, from July 4, 1946 to July 3, 1974, the right to
utilize and exploit our natural resources to citizens of the
United States and business enterprises owned or controlled,
113
directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States:
Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article Thirteen, and

section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during
the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the
President of the Philippines with the President of the United States
on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and
thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation,
development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of
public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the
United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in
the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed
upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations
owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
The Parity Amendment was subsequently modified by the

1954 Revised Trade Agreement, also known as the Laurel-
114
Langley Agreement, embodied in Republic Act No. 1355.
_______________
112 Palting v. San Jose Petroleum Inc., 18 SCRA 924 (1966); Republic
v. Quasha, 46 SCRA 160 (1972).
113 Atok Big-Wedge Mining Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
supra.
114 Article VI thereof provided:
1. The disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of all agricultural,

timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces and of sources of potential energy,
and other natural resources of either Party, and the operation of public utilities,
shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the other Party and to all
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by
citizens of such other Party in the same manner as to and under the same
conditions imposed upon citizens or corporations or associations owned or
controlled by citizens of the Party granting the right.
194

The Petroleum Act of 1949 and

The Concession System
115
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 387, also known as the
Petroleum Act of 1949, was approved on June 18, 1949. The
Petroleum Act of 1949 employed the concession system for
the exploitation of the nation’s petroleum resources. Among
the kinds of concessions it sanctioned were exploration and
exploitation concessions, which respectively granted to116
the
concessionaire
117
the exclusive right to explore for or
develop petroleum within specified areas.
Concessions may be granted only to duly qualified
118
persons who have sufficient finances, organization,
118
persons who have sufficient finances, organization,
resources, technical compe-
_______________
2. The rights provided for in Paragraph 1 may be exercised x x x in the

case of citizens of the United States, with respect to natural resources in
the public domain in the Philippines, only through the medium of a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines and at least 60%
of the capital stock of which is owned and controlled by citizens of the
United States x x x.
3. The United States of America reserves the rights of the several
States of the United States to limit the extent to which citizens or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
Philippines may engage in the activities specified in this article. The
Republic of the Philippines reserves the power to deny and of the rights
specified in this Article to citizens of the United States who are citizens of
States, or to corporations or associations at least 60% of whose capital
stock or capital is owned or controlled by citizens of States, which deny
like rights to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations
which are owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines x x x.
115 An Act to Promote the Exploration, Development, Exploitation, and
Utilization of the Petroleum Resources of the Philippines; to Encourage
the Conservation of such Petroleum Resources; to Authorize the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to Create an Administration Unit
and a Technical Board in the Bureau of Mines; to Appropriate Funds
therefor; and for other purposes.
116 Rep. Act No. 387 (1949), as amended, art. 10 (b).
117 Id., art. 10 (c).
118 Id., art. 5.
195
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 195

tence, and skills

119
necessary to conduct the operations to be
under-taken.
Nevertheless, the Government
120
reserved the right to
undertake such work itself. This proceeded from the theory
that all natural deposits or occurrences of petroleum or
natural gas in public and/or
121
private lands in the Philippines
belong to the State. Exploration and exploitation
concessions did not confer upon the concessionaire
ownership over the petroleum lands and petroleum
122
deposits. However, they did grant concessionaires the right
122
deposits. However, they did grant concessionaires the right
to explore, develop, exploit, and utilize them for123the period
and under the conditions determined by the law.
Concessions were granted at the complete risk of the
concessionaire; the Government did not guarantee the
existence 124of petroleum or undertake, in any case, title
warranty.
Concessionaires were required to submit information as
maybe required by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including reports of geological and 125
geophysical 126examinations, as well
127
as production reports.
Exploration and exploitation concessionaires were also
required to submit work programs.
_______________
119 Id., art. 31. The same provision recognized the rights of American
citizens under the Parity Amendment:
During the effectivity and subject to the provisions of the ordinance appended to
the Constitution of the Philippines, citizens of the United States and all forms
of business enterprises owned and controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens
of the United States shall enjoy the same rights and obligations under the
provisions of this Act in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions
imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned
or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
120 Id., art. 10.

121 Id., art 3.
122 Id., art. 9.
123 Ibid.
124 Rep. Act No. 387 (1949), as amended, art. 8.
125 Id., art. 25.
126 Id., art. 47.
127 Id., art. 60.
196

Exploitation concessionaires, in 128

particular, were obliged to
pay an annual exploitation tax, the object of which is to
induce the concessionaire to actually produce petroleum,
and not simply 129
to sit on the concession without developing
or exploiting it. These concessionaires were also bound to
pay the Government royalty, which was not less than 12
1/2% of the petroleum produced and saved, less 130
that
consumed in the operations of the concessionaire. Under
Article 66, R.A. No. 387, the exploitation tax may be
credited against the royalties so that if the concessionaire
shall be actually producing enough
131
oil, it would not actually
be paying the exploitation tax.
Failure to pay132 the annual exploitation tax for two
consecutive years, or the royalty due to the133Government
within one year from the date it becomes due, constituted
grounds for the cancellation of the concession. In case of
delay in the payment of the taxes or royalty imposed by the
law or by the concession, a surcharge
134
of 1% per month is
exacted until the same are paid.
As a rule, title rights to all equipment and structures
that the concessionaire placed on the land belong 135
to the
exploration or exploitation concessionaire. Upon
termination of such concession,
136
the concessionaire had a
right to remove the same.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was
tasked with carrying out the provisions of the law, through
the Director of Mines, who acted 137under the Secretary’s
immediate supervision and control. The Act granted the
Secretary the authority to inspect any operation of the
concessionaire and to examine all the books
_______________
128 Id., art. 64. Article 49, R.A. No. 387 originally imposed an annual
exploration tax on exploration concessionaires but this provision was
repealed by Section 1, R.A. No. 4304.
129 Francisco, supra, at p. 103.
131 Francisco, supra, at p.103.
132 Rep. Act No. 387 (1949), as amended, art. 90 (b) 3.
133 Id., art. 90 (b) 4.
134 Id., art. 93-A.
135 Id., art. 93.
136 Ibid.
197
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 197

and accounts pertaining to operations
138
or conditions related
to payment of taxes and royalties.
The same law authorized the Secretary to create 139
an
Administration Unit and a Technical Board. The
Administration Unit was charged, inter140 alia, with the
enforcement of the provisions of the law. The Technical
Board had, among other functions, the duty to check on the
performance of concessionaires and to determine whether
the obligations imposed by the Act 141and its implementing
regulations were being complied with.
Victorio Mario A. Dimagiba, Chief Legal Officer of the
Bureau of Energy Development, analyzed the benefits and
drawbacks of the concession system insofar as it applied to
the petroleum industry:
Advantages of Concession. Whether it emphasizes income tax or

royalty, the most positive aspect of the concession system is that the
State’s financial involvement is virtually risk-free and
administration is simple and comparatively low in cost.
Furthermore, if there is a competitive allocation of the resource
leading to substantial bonuses and/or greater royalty coupled with a
relatively high level of taxation, revenue accruing to the State
under the concession system may compare favorably with other
financial arrangements.
Disadvantages of Concession. There are, however, major
negative aspects to this system. Because the Government’s role, in
the traditional concession is passive, it is at a distinct disadvantage
in managing and developing policy for the nation’s petroleum
resource. This is true for several reasons. First, even though most
concession agreements contain covenants requiring diligence in
operations and production, this establishes only an indirect and
passive control of the host country in resource development. Second,
and more importantly, the fact that the host country does not
directly participate in resource management decisions inhibits its
ability to train and employ its nationals in petroleum development.
This factor could delay or prevent the country from effectively
engaging in the development of its resources. Lastly, a direct role in
management is usually necessary in order to obtain a knowledge of
the international petroleum industry which is important to an
appreciation of 142
the host country’s resources in relation to those of
other countries.
_______________
138 Id., art. 106.

139 Id., art. 95.
140 Ibid.
141 Rep. Act No. 387 (1949), as amended, art. 95 (e).
142 Dimagiba, supra, at p. 315, citing Fabrikant, Oil Discovery and
Technical Change in Southeast Asia, Legal Aspects of Production
Sharing
198

Other liabilities of the system have also been noted:
x x x there are functional implications which give the concessionaire

great economic power arising from its exclusive equity holding. This
includes, first, appropriation of the returns of the undertaking,
subject to a modest royalty; second, exclusive management of the
project; third, control of production in the natural resource, such as
volume of production, expansion, research and development; and
fourth, exclusive responsibility for downstream operations, like
processing, marketing, and distribution. In short, even if nominally,
the state is the sovereign and owner of the natural resource being
exploited, it has been shorn of all elements of control over such
natural resource because of the exclusive nature of the contractual
regime of the concession. The concession system, investing as it does
ownership of natural resources, constitutes a consistent
inconsistency within the principle embodied in our Constitution that
natural resources belong to the State and shall not be alienated, not
to mention the fact that the concession was the bedrock 143
of the
colonial system in the exploitation of natural resources.
Eventually, the concession system failed for reasons

explained by Dimagiba:
Notwithstanding the good intentions of the Petroleum Act of 1949,

the concession system could not have properly spurred sustained oil
exploration activities in the country, since it assumed that such a
capital-intensive, high risk venture could be successfully
undertaken by a single individual or a small company. In effect,
concessionaires’ funds were easily exhausted. Moreover, since the
concession system practically closed its doors to interested foreign
investors, local capital was stretched to the limits. The old system
also failed to consider the highly sophisticated technology and
expertise required,
144
which would be available only to multinational
companies.
A shift to a new regime for the development of natural
resources thus seemed imminent.
_______________
Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry, pp. 101-102, sections

13C.24 and 13C.25 (1972).
144 Dimagiba, supra, at p. 318.
199
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 199

Presidential Decree No. 87, The 1973 Constitution

and the Service Contract System
The promulgation145on December 31, 1972 of Presidential

Decree No. 87, otherwise known as THE OIL
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1972
signaled such a transformation. P.D. No. 87 permitted the
government to explore for and 146produce indigenous
petroleum through “service contracts.”
“Service contracts” is a term that assumes varying
meanings to different people, and it has carried many
names in different countries, like “work contracts” in
Indonesia, “concession agreements” in Africa, “production-
sharing agreements” in the Middle147
East, and “participation
agreements” in Latin America. A functional definition of
“service contracts” in the Philippines is provided as follows:
A service contract is a contractual arrangement for engaging in the

exploitation and development of petroleum, mineral, energy, land
and other natural resources by which a government or its agency,
or a private person granted a right or privilege by the government
authorizes the other party (service contractor) to engage or
participate in the exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the
privilege, in that the latter provides financial or technical resources,
undertakes the exploitation or production of a given resource, or
directly manages the productive enterprise, operations of the
exploration and exploitation
148
of the resources or the disposition of
marketing or resources.
In a service contract under P.D. No. 87, service and
technology are furnished by the service contractor for149which
it shall be entitled to the stipulated service fee. The
contractor must be technically competent and financially
capable 150to undertake the operations required in the
contract.
_______________
145 Amending Presidential Decree No. 8 issued on October 2, 1972, and

Promulgating an Amended Act to Promote the Discovery and Production
of Indigenous Petroleum and Appropriate Funds Therefor.
146 Pres. Decree No. 87 (1972), sec. 4.
148 M. Magallona, Service Contracts in Philippine Natural Resources,
9 WORLD BULL. 1, 4 (1993).
150 Id., sec. 4.
200

Financing is supposed to be provided by the 151

Government to
which all petroleum produced belongs. In case the
Government is unable to finance petroleum exploration
operations, the contractor may furnish services, technology
and financing, and the proceeds of sale of the petroleum
produced under the contract shall be the source of funds for
payment of the152service fee and the operating expenses due
the contractor. The contractor shall undertake, manage
and execute petroleum operations, subject to the
government 153
overseeing the management of the
operations. The contractor provides all necessary services
and technology and the requisite financing, performs the
exploration work obligations, and assumes all exploration
risks such that if no petroleum
154
is produced, it will not be
entitled to reimbursement. Once petroleum in commercial
quantity is discovered, the contractor
155
shall operate the field
on behalf of the government.
P.D. No. 87 prescribed156minimum terms and conditions for
every service contract. It also granted the contractor
certain privileges, including
157
exemption from taxes and
payment of tariff duties, and permitted the repatriation of
158
capital and retention of profits abroad.
158
capital and retention of profits abroad.
Ostensibly, the service contract system
159
had certain
advantages over the concession regime. It has been
opined, though, that, in
_______________
151 Id., sec. 6.

152 Id., sec. 7.
153 Id., sec. 8.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
157 Id., sec. 12.
158 Id., sec. 13.
159 Dimagiba draws the following comparison between the service
contract scheme and the concession system: In both the concession
system and the service contract scheme, work and financial obligations
are required of the developer. Under Republic Act No. 387 and
Presidential Decree No. 87, the concessionaire and the service contractors
are extracted certain taxes in favor of the government. In both
arrangements, the explorationist/developer is given incentives in the form
of tax exemptions in the importation or disposition of machinery,
equipment, materials and spare parts needed in petroleum operations.
201
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 201

the Philippines, our concept of a service contract, at least in

the petroleum industry, was basically
160
a concession regime
with a production-sharing element. On January 17, 1973,
then President Ferdinand E. 161Marcos proclaimed the
ratification of a new Constitution. Article XIV on the
_______________
The concessionaire and the service contractor are required to keep in their
files valuable data and information and may be required to submit needed
technological or accounting reports to the Government. Duly authorized
representatives of the Government could, under the law, inspect or audit the
books of accounts of the contract holder.
In both systems, signature, discovery or production bonuses may be given by
the developer to the host Government. The concession system, however, differs
considerably from the service contract system in important areas of the
operations. In the concession system, the Government merely receives fixed
royalty which is a certain percentage of the crude oil produced or other units of
measure, regardless of whether the concession holder makes profits or not. This
is not so in the service contract system. A certain percentage of the gross
production is set aside for recoverable expenditures by the contractor. Of the net
proceeds the parties are entitled percentages of share that will accrue to each of
them.
In the royalty system, the concessionaire may be discouraged to produce more
for the reason that since the royalty paid to the host country is closely linked to
the volume of production, the greater the produce, the more amount or royalty
would be allocated to the Government. This is not so in the production sharing
system. The share of the Government depends largely on the net proceeds of
production after reimbursing the service contractor of its recoverable expenses.
As a general rule, the Government plays a passive role in the
concession system, more particularly, interested in receiving royalties from
the concessionaire. In the production-sharing arrangement, the Government
plays a more active role in the management and monitoring of oil operations
and requires the service contractor entertain obligations designed to bring more
economic and technological benefits to the host country. (Dimagiba, supra, at
pp. 330-331.)

161 The antecedents leading to the Proclamation are narrated in
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 55 (1973):
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which
was amended by Resolution No. 4, of said body,adopted on June 17, 1967,
calling a convention to propose amend
202

National Economy and Patrimony contained provisions

similar to the 1935 Constitution with regard to Filipino
participation in the nation’s natural resources. Section 8,
Article XIV thereof provides:
Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession,
or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
While Section 9 of the same Article maintained the Filipino-

only policy in the enjoyment of natural resources, it also
allowed Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang
Pambansa, to enter into service contracts with any person or
entity for the exploration or utilization of natural resources.
_______________
ments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as

amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August
24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to
said convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Convention
began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was
in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29,
1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73,
submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor, as well as
setting the plebiscite for such ratification on January 15, 1973. On
January 17, 1973, the President issued Proclamation No. 1102 certifying
and proclaiming that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention “has been ratified by an overwhelming
majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come
into effect.”
203
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 203

Sec. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or

utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be
limited to citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang
Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations or associations to enter into service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with
any person or entity for the exploration, or utilization of any of the
natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance are
hereby recognized as such. [Emphasis supplied.]
The concept of service contracts, according to one delegate,

was borrowed from the methods followed by India, Pakistan
and especially Indonesia
162
in the exploration of petroleum
and mineral oils. The provision allowing such contracts,
according to another, was intended to “enhance the proper
development of our natural resources since Filipino citizens
lack the needed capital and technical know-how which are
essential in the proper exploration, development 163
and
exploitation of the natural resources of the country.”
The original idea was to authorize the government, not
private entities,
164
to enter into service contracts with foreign
entities. As finally approved, however, a citizen or private
entity could be allowed by the 165
National Assembly to enter
into such service contract. The prior approval of the
National Assembly 166
was deemed sufficient to protect the
national interest. Notably, none of the laws allowing
service contracts were passed by the Batasang Pambansa.
Indeed, all of them were enacted by presidential decree.
On March 13, 1973, shortly after the ratification of the
new Constitution,167 the President promulgated Presidential
Decree No. 151. The law allowed Filipino citizens or
entities which have
_______________
162 BERNAS, S.J., supra, at p. 1016, Note 28, citing Session of

November 25, 1972.
163 Agabin, supra, at p. 1, quoting Sanvictores, The Economic
Provisions in the 1973 Constitution, in Espiritu, 1979 Philconsa Reader
on Constitutional and Policy Issues 449.
164 BERNAS, S.J., supra, at p. 1016, Note 28, citing Session of
November 25, 1972.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Allowing Citizens of the Philippines or Corporations or Associations
at least Sixty Per Centum of the Capital of which is Owned by such
Citizens to Enter into Service Contracts with Foreign Persons, Corpora
204

acquired lands of the public domain or which own, hold or

control such lands to enter into service contracts for
financial, technical, management or other forms of
assistance with any foreign persons or entity for the
exploration,
168
development, exploitation or utilization of said
lands. 169
Presidential Decree No. 463, also known as THE
MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT DECREE OF
1974, was enacted on May 17, 1974. Section 44 of the decree,
as amended, provided that a lessee of a mining claim may
enter into a service contract with a qualified domestic or
foreign contractor for the exploration, development and
exploitation of his claims and the processing and marketing
of the product thereof. 170
Presidential Decree No. 704 (THE FISHERIES
DECREE OF 1975), approved on May 16, 1975, allowed
Filipinos engaged in commercial fishing to enter into
contracts for financial, technical or other forms of assistance
with any foreign person, corporation or entity for the
production, storage, marketing
171
and processing of fish and172
fishery/aquatic products. Presidential Decree No. 705
(THE REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES), approved on May 19, 1975, allowed “forest
products licensees, lessees, or permitees to enter into service
contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance . . . with any foreign person or entity for
the exploration, development,
173
exploitation or utilization of
the forest resources.”
_______________
tions for the Exploration, Development, Exploitation or Utilization of

Lands of the Public Domain, Amending for the purpose certain provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
169 Providing for A Modernized System of Administration and
Disposition of Mineral Lands and to Promote and Encourage the
Development and Exploitation thereof.
170 Revising and Consolidating All Laws and Decrees Affecting Fishing
and Fisheries.
172 Revising Presidential Decree No. 389, otherwise known as The
Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines.
205
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 205

Yet another law allowing service contracts, this time for 174
geothermal resources, was Presidential Decree No. 1442,
which was signed into law on June 11, 1978. Section 1
thereof authorized the Government to enter into service
contracts for the exploration, exploitation and development
of geothermal resources with a foreign contractor who must
be technically and financially capable of undertaking the
operations required in the service contract.
Thus, virtually the entire range of the country’s natural
resources—from petroleum and minerals to geothermal
energy, from public lands and forest resources to fishery
products—was well covered by apparent legal authority to
engage in the direct participation or involvement of foreign
persons or corporations (otherwise disqualified) in the
exploration and 175utilization of natural resources through
service contracts.
The 1987 Constitution and Technical or

Financial Assistance Agreements
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, Corazon C.

Aquino took the reins of power under a revolutionary
government. On March17625, 1986, President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional
Constitution, more popularly referred to as the Freedom
Constitution. By authority of the same Proclamation, the
President created a Constitutional Commission (CONCOM)
to draft a new constitution, which took
177
effect on the date of
its ratification on February 2, 1987.
The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine.
The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII states: “All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife,
_______________
174 An Act to Promote the Exploration and Development of Geothermal
Resources.
175 Magallona, supra, at p. 6.
176 Declaring a National Policy to Implement the Reforms Mandated by
the People, Protecting their Basic Rights, Adopting a Provisional
Constitution, and Providing for an Orderly Transition to a Government
under a New Constitution.
177 CONST., art. XVIII, sec. 27; De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602
(1987).
206

flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by

the State.”
Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, the 1987
Constitution, in the second sentence of the same provision,
prohibits the alienation of natural resources, except
agricultural lands.
The third sentence of the same paragraph is new: “The
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.” The constitutional policy of the State’s “full
control and supervision” over natural resources proceeds
from the concept of jura regalia, as well as the recognition of
the importance of the country’s natural resources, not only
for national economic development,
178
but also for its security
and national defense. Under this provision, the State
assumes “a more dynamic role” in the exploration, 179
development and utilization of natural resources.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural
resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable
lands of public domain through “license, concession 180
or lease”
is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Having omitted the provision on the concession system, 181
Section 2 proceeded to introduce “unfamiliar language”:
The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Consonant with the State’s “full supervision and control”

over natural
182
resources, Section 2 offers the State two
“options.” One, the State may directly undertake these
activities itself; or two, it
_______________
178 Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., 240

SCRA 100 (1995).
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 J. Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers 812
(1995).
182 Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., supra.
207
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 207

may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-

sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities at
least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
A third option is found in the third paragraph of the
same section:
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural

resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
While the second and third options are limited only to

Filipino citizens or, in the case of the former, to corporations
or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned
by Filipinos, a fourth allows the participation of foreign-
owned corporations. The fourth and fifth paragraphs of
Section 2 provide:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
Although Section 2 sanctions the participation of foreign-

owned corporations in the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources, it imposes certain
limitations or conditions to agreements with such
corporations.
First, the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in behalf
of the State, may enter into these agreements, and only with
corporations. By contrast, under the 1973 Constitution, a
Filipino citizen, corporation or association may enter into a
service contract with a “foreign person or entity.”
Second, the size of the activities: only large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization is allowed. The
term “large-scale
183
usually refers to very capital-intensive
activities.”
_______________
183 III Records of the Constitutional Commission 255.
208

Third, the natural resources subject of the activities is

restricted to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the
intent being to limit service contracts 184
to those areas where
Filipino capital may not be sufficient.
Fourth, consistency with the provisions of statute. The
agreements must be in accordance with the terms and
conditions provided by law.
Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for entering
into such agreements. The agreements must be based on
real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of
the country.
Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary
stipulations for the promotion of the development and use of
Seventh, the notification requirement. The President
shall notify Congress of every financial or technical
assistance agreement entered into within thirty days from
its execution.
Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the 1973
Constitution referred to “service contracts for financial,
technical, management, or other forms of assistance” the
1987 Constitution provides for “agreements . . . involving
either financial or technical assistance.” It bears noting that
the phrases “service contracts” and “management or other
forms of assistance” in the earlier constitution have been
omitted.
By virtue of
185
her legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution, President Aquino, on July 10, 1987, signed
into law E.O. No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures in
the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, development and utilization of minerals. The
omission in the 1987 Constitution of the term “service
contracts” notwithstanding, the said E.O. still referred to
them in Section 2 thereof:
Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization

of natural resources, including renewal applications and
applications for approval of operating agreements and mining
service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and may be
approved x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]
_______________
184 Id., at pp. 355-356.

185 Const. (1986), art. II, sec. 1.
209
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 209

The same law provided in its Section 3 that the “processing,

evaluation and approval of all mining applications . . .
operating agreements and service contracts . . . shall be
governed by Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations. . . .”
As earlier stated, on the 25th also of July 1987, the
President issued E.O. No. 279 by authority of which the
subject WMCP FTAA was executed on March 30, 1995.
On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A.
No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the Act “shall
govern the exploration, development, utilization, and
processing of all mineral resources.” Such declaration
notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually cover all
the modes through which the State may undertake the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources.
The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is
accorded the primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it
may undertake these activities through four modes:
(1) The State may directly undertake such activities.

(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization
of natural resources by Filipino citizens.
(4) For the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils, the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations
186
involving technical or
financial assistance.
Except to charge the Mines and Geosciences Bureau

187
of the
DENR with performing researches and surveys, and a
passing mention
188
of government-owned or controlled
corporations, R.A.
_______________

Puno, J., Separate Opinion.
187 Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995), sec. 9.
188 SEC. 82. Allocation of Government Share.—The Government share
as referred to in the preceding sections shall be shared and allocated in
accordance with Sections 290 and 292 of Republic Act No. 7160 other
210

No. 7942 does not specify how the State should go about the
first mode. The third mode,189
on the other hand, is governed
by Republic Act No. 7076 (the People’s Small-Scale
190
Mining
Act of 1991) and other pertinent laws. R.A. No. 7942
primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes.
Mineral production sharing, co-production and joint
venture agreements are collectively191classified by R.A. No.
7942 as “mineral agreements.” The Government
participates the least in a mineral production sharing
agreement (MPSA).
192
In an MPSA, the Government grants
the contractor the exclusive right 193
to conduct mining
operations
194
within a contract area and shares in the gross
output. The MPSA contractor provides the financing,
technology, management and 195
personnel necessary for the
agreement’s implementation. The total government share
in an MPSA is the excise 196
tax on mineral products under
Republic Act No. 7729, amending Section 151 197
(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
_______________
wise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In case the

development and utilization of mineral resources is undertaken by a
government-owned or controlled corporation, the sharing and allocation
shall be in accordance with Sections 291 and 292 of the said Code.
189 An Act Creating A People’s Small-Scale Mining Program and for
other purposes.
190 Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995), sec. 42.
191 Id., secs. 3 (ab) and 26.
192 “Contractor” means a qualified person acting alone or in consortium
who is a party to a mineral agreement or to a financial or technical
assistance agreement. (Id., sec. 3[g].)
193 “Contract area” means land or body of water delineated for purposes
of exploration, development, or utilization of the minerals found therein.
(Id., sec. 3[f].)
194 “Gross output” means the actual market value of minerals or
mineral products from its mining area as defined in the National Internal
Revenue Code (Id., sec. 3[v]).
195 Id., sec. 26 (a).
196 An Act Reducing Excise Tax Rates on Metallic and Non-Metallic
Minerals and Quarry Resources, amending for the purpose Section 151 (a)
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
197 Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995), sec. (80).
211
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 211

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 211
198
In a co-production agreement (CA), the Government
provides inputs to199 the mining operations other than the
mineral resource, while in a joint venture agreement
(JVA), where the Government’s enjoys the greatest
participation, the Government and the JVA contractor
organize200
a company with both parties having equity
shares. Aside from earnings in equity, the Government 201
in
a JVA is also entitled to a share in202the gross203output. The
Government may enter into a CA or JVA with one or
more contractors. The Government’s share in a CA or JVA
is set out in Section 81 of the law:
The share of the Government in co-production and joint venture

agreements shall be negotiated by the Government and the
contractor taking into consideration the: (a) capital investment of
the project, (b) the risks involved, (c) contribution to the project to
the economy, and (d) other factors that will provide for a fair and
equitable sharing between the Government and the contractor. The
Government shall also be entitled to compensations for its other
contributions which shall be agreed upon by the parties, and shall
consist, among other things, the contractor’s income tax, excise tax,
special allowance, withholding tax due from the contractor’s foreign
stockholders arising from dividend or interest payments to the said
foreign stockholders, in case of a foreign national, and all such other
taxes, duties and fees as provided for under existing laws.
All mineral agreements grant the respective contractors the

exclusive right to conduct mining operations and to extract
204
all mineral resources found in the contract area. A
“qualified person” may enter into205
any of the mineral
agreements with the Government. A “qualified person” is
any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a

corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or
authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with technical
and financial capability to undertake mineral resources
development and duly registered in accor-
_______________
198 Id., Sec. 26 (b).

199 “Mineral resource” means any concentration of minerals/rocks with
potential economic value. (Id., sec. 3[ad].)
200 Id., sec. 26 (c).
201 Ibid.
202 Id., sec. 3 (h).
203 Id., sec. 3 (x).
204 Id., sec. 26, last par.
205 Id., sec. 27.
212

dance with law at least sixty per centum (60%) 206 of the capital of
which is owned by citizens of the Philippines x x x.
The fourth mode involves “financial or technical assistance

agreements.” An FTAA is defined as “a contract involving
financial or technical assistance for large-scale exploration,
207
development, and utilization of natural resources.” Any
qualified person with technical and financial capability to
undertake large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources in the Philippines may enter
into such agreement
208
directly with the Government through
the DENR. For the purpose of granting an FTAA, a
legally organized foreign-owned corporation (any
corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative duly
registered in accordance with law in which less 209
than 50% of
the capital is owned
210
by Filipino citizens) is deemed a
“qualified person.”
Other than the difference in contractors’ qualifications,
the principal distinction between mineral agreements and
FTAAs is the maximum contract 211
area to which a qualified
person may hold or be granted. “Large-scale” under R.A.
No. 7942 is determined by the
_______________
206 Id., sec. 3 (aq).

207 Id., sec. 3 (r).
208 Id., sec. 33.
209 Id., sec. 3 (t).
210 Id., sec. 3 (aq). Id., sec. 3 (aq).
211 The maximum areas in cases of mineral agreements are prescribed
in Section 28 as follows:
SEC. 28. Maximum Areas for Mineral Agreement.—The maximum area that a
qualified person may hold at any time under a mineral agreement shall be:
(a) Onshore, in any one province—
(1) For individuals, ten (10) blocks; and

(2) For partnerships, cooperatives, associations, or corporations, one
hundred (100) blocks.
(b) Onshore, in the entire Philippines—
(1) For individuals, twenty (20) blocks; and

(2) For partnerships, cooperatives, associations, or corporations, two
hundred (200) blocks.
(c) Offshore, in the entire Philippines—
(1) For individuals, fifty (50) blocks;
213
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 213

size of the contract area, as opposed to the amount invested

(US$50,000,000.00), which was the standard under E.O.
279. 212
Like a CA or a JVA, an FTAA is subject to negotiation.
The Government’s contributions, in the form of taxes, in an
FTAA is identical to its contributions in the two mineral
agreements, save that in an FTAA:
The collection of Government share in financial or technical

assistance agreement shall commence after the financial or
technical assistance agreement contractor has fully recovered its
pre-operating
213
expenses, exploration, and development expenditures,
inclusive.
III
Having examined the history of the constitutional provision

and statutes enacted pursuant thereto, a consideration of
the substantive issues presented by the petition is now in
order.
_______________
(2) For partnerships, cooperatives, associations, or corporations five

hundred (500) blocks; and
(3) For the exclusive economic area, a larger area to be determined by
the Secretary.
The maximum areas mentioned above that a contractor may hold

under a mineral agreement shall not include mining/quarry areas under
operating agreements between the contractor and a
claimowner/lessee/permittee/licensee entered into under Presidential
Decree No. 463.
On the other hand, Section 34, which governs the maximum area for
FTAAs provides:
SEC. 34. Maximum Contract Area.—The maximum contract area that
may be granted per qualified person, subject to relinquishment shall be:
(a) 1,000 meridional blocks onshore;
(b) 4,000 meridional blocks offshore; or
(c) Combinations of (a) and (b) provided that it shall not exceed the
maximum limits for onshore and offshore areas.
212 Id., sec. 33.
213 Id., sec. 81.
214

The Effectivity of Executive Order No. 279
Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force when
the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come into effect.
E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President
Aquino on July 25, 1987, two 214
days before the opening of
Congress on July 27, 1987. Section 8 of the E.O. states
that the same “shall take effect immediately.” This
provision, according
215
to petitioners, runs counter to Section 1
of E.O. No. 200, which provides:
SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general216
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. [Emphasis supplied.]
On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could

have only taken effect fifteen days after its publication at
which time Congress had already convened and the
President’s power to legislate had ceased.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the validity
of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners Association of the
Philippines v. Factoran, supra. This is of course incorrect for
the issue in Miners Association was not the validity of E.O.
No. 279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82 which were issued
pursuant thereto.
Nevertheless, petitioners’ contentions have no merit.
It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that
prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than—
even before—the 15-day period after its publication. Where
a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such date
prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is
the very essence, of the phrase “unless it is otherwise
provided” in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No.
_______________
214 Kapatiran v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988).

215 Providing for the Publication of Laws either in the Official Gazette
or in a Newspaper of General Circulation in the Philippines as a
Requirement for their Effectivity.
216 Section 1, E.O. No. 200 was subsequently incorporated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 as Section 18,
Chapter 5 (Operation and Effect of Laws), Book 1 (Sovereignty and
General Administration).
215
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 215

200, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide

for its own date of effectivity.
What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what 217 due
process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera, is
the publication of the law for
without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim “ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat.” It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require
its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since
the Constitution, being the fundamental, paramount and 218
supreme law of the nation,” is deemed
219
written in the law.
Hence, the due process clause, which, so Tañada held,
mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8
of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200
which provides for publication “either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,”
finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that 220
E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette
on August 3, 1987.
From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section
1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court holds
that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its
publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
That such effectivity took place after the convening of the
first Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino
issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly
exercising legislative
221
powers under the Provisional
Constitution. Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution explicitly states:
SEC. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise

legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
_______________
217 136 SCRA 27 (1985).

218 Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 267
SCRA 408 (1997).
219 CONST., art. 3, sec. 1.
220 83 O.G. (Suppl.) 3528-115 to 3528-117 (August 1987).
221 Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., supra.
216

The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the

exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did not
prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.
There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is
an effective, and a validly enacted, statute.
The Constitutionality of the WMCP FTAA
Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be
limited to “technical or financial assistance” only. They
observe, however, that, contrary to the language of the
Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully
foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than
mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it
permits WMCP 222to manage and operate every aspect of the
mining activity.
_______________
222 Petitioners note in their Memorandum that the FTAA: x x x

guarantees that wholly foreign owned [WMCP] entered into the FTAA in
order to facilitate “the large scale exploration, development and
commercial exploitation of mineral deposits that may be found to exist
within the Contract area.” [Section 1.1] As a contractor it also has the
“exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize, process and dispose of all
mineral products and by-products thereof that may be derived or produced
from the Contract Area.” [Section 1.3] Thus, it is divided into an
“exploration and feasibility phase” [Section 3.2 (a)] and a “construction,
development and production phase.” [Section 3. 2 (b).]
Thus, it is this wholly foreign owned corporation that, among other
things:
(a) operates within a prescribed contract area [Section 4],

(b) opts to apply for a Mining Production Sharing Agreement [Section
4.2],
(c) relinquishes control over portions thereof at their own choice
[Section 4.6],
(d) submits work programs, incurs expenditures, and makes reports
during the exploration period [Section 5],
(e) submits a Declaration of Mining Feasibility [Sections 5.4 and 5.5],
(f) during the development period, determines the timetable, submits
work programs, provides the reports and
217
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 217

Petitioners’ submission is well-taken. It is a cardinal rule in

the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must
be so construed as 223
to give effect to the intention of the people
who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the
constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words is
to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where that
assumption 224 would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or
contradiction. What the Constitution says according to the
text of the provision, therefore, compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate
225
that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Accordingly, following the literal text of the
Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-owned
corporations in the large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils
should be limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance
only.
WMCP nevertheless submits that the word “technical” in
the fourth paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. No. 279
encompasses a ‘broad number of possible226services,” perhaps,
“scientific and/or technological in basis.” It thus posits that
it may also well include “the area of management or
operations . . . so long as such assistance requires specialized
knowledge or skills, and are related to the exploration, 227
development and utilization of mineral resources.”
_______________
determines and executes expansions, modifications, improvements

and replacements of new mining facilities within the area [Section
6],
(g) complies with the conditions for environmental protection and
industrial safety, posts the necessary bonds and makes
representations and warranties to the government [Section 10.5].
The contract subsists for an initial term of twenty-five (25) years from the date
of its effectivity [Section 3.1] and renewable for a further period of twenty-five
years under the same terms and conditions upon application by private
respondent [Section 3.3]. (Rollo, pp. 458-459.)
223 H. C. Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of

the Laws § 8.
224 Ibid.
225 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Association, 31 SCRA 413
(1970).
226 Rollo, p. 580.
227 Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
218

This Court is not persuaded. As priorly pointed out, the

phrase “management or other forms of assistance” in the
1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution,
which allows only “technical or financial assistance.” Casus
omisus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration
228
must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. As will be shown later, the
management or operation of mining activities by foreign
contractors, which is the primary feature of service
contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to eradicate.
Respondents insist that “agreements involving technical
or financial assistance” is just another term for service
contracts. They contend that the proceedings of the
CONCOM indicate “that although the terminology ‘service
contract’ was avoided [by the Constitution], the concept it
represented was not.” They add that “[t]he concept is
embodied in the phrase 229
‘agreements involving financial or
technical assistance.’” And point out how members of the
CONCOM referred to these agreements as “service
contracts.” For instance:
SR. TAN. Am I correct in thinking that the only difference

between these future service contracts and the past
service contracts under Mr. Marcos is the general law to
be enacted by the legislature and the notification of
Congress by the President? That is the only difference, is
it not?
MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.
SR. TAN. So those are the safeguards?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. There was no law at all governing
service contracts before. 230
SR. TAN. Thank you, Madam President. [Emphasis
supplied.]
WMCP also cites the following statements of Commissioners

Gascon, Garcia, Nolledo and Tadeo who alluded to service
contracts as they explained their respective votes in the
approval of the draft Article:
_______________
228 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657; 5 SCRA 684 (1962);

Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, 371
SCRA 196 (2001).
229 Rollo, p. 569.
230 III Record of the Constitutional Commission pp. 351-352.
219
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 219

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, I vote no primarily because of

two reasons: One, the provision on service contracts. I felt that if we
would constitutionalize any provision on service contracts, this
should always be with the concurrence of Congress and not guided 231
only by a general law to be promulgated by Congress. x x x.
[Emphasis supplied.]
x x x.
MR. GARCIA. Thank you.
I vote no. x x x.
Service contracts are given constitutional Iegitimization in
Section 3, even when they have been proven to be inimical to the
interests of the nation, providing as they do the legal loophole for
the exploitation of our natural resources for the benefit of foreign
interests. They constitute a serious negation of Filipino control on
the use and disposition of the nation’ natural resources,
232
especially
with regard to those which are nonrenewable. [Emphasis
supplied.]
xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. While there are objectionable provisions in the
Article on National Economy and Patrimony, going over said
provisions meticulously, setting aside prejudice and personalities
will reveal that the article contains a balanced set or provisions. I
hope the forthcoming Congress will implement such provisions
taking into account that Filipinos should have real control over our
economy and patrimony, and if foreign equity is permitted, the
same must be subordinated to the imperative demands of the
national interest.
x x x.
It is also my understanding that service contracts involving
foreign corporations or entities are resorted to only when no Filipino
enterprise or Filipino-controlled enterprise could possibly undertake
the exploration or exploitation of our natural resources and that
compensation under such contracts cannot and should not equal
what should pertain to ownership of capital. In other words, the
service contract should not be an instrument to circumvent the basic
provision, that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources
should be truly for the benefit233
of Filipinos.
Thank you, and I vote yes. [Emphasis supplied.]
x x x.
MR. TADEO. Nais ko lamang ipaliwanag ang aking boto.
Matapos suriin ang kalagayan ng Pilipinas, ang saligang
suliranin, pangunahin ang salitang “imperyalismo.” Ang ibig
sabihin nito ay ang
_______________
231 V Record of the Constitutional Commission 844.

232 Id., at p. 841.
233 Id., at p. 842.
220

sistema ng lipunang pinaghaharian ng iilang monopolyong

kapitalista at ang salitang “imperyalismo” ay buhay na buhay sa
National Economy and Patrimony na nating ginawa. Sa
pamamagitan ng salitang “based on,” naroroon na ang free trade
sapagkat tayo ay mananatiling tagapagluwas ng hilaw na sangkap
at tagaangkat ng yaring produkto. Pangalawa, naroroon pa rin
ang parity rights, ang service contract, ang 60-40 equity sa natural
resources. Habang naghihirap ang sambayanang Pilipino,
ginagalugad naman ng mga dayuhan, ang ating likas na yaman.
Kailan man ang Article on National Economy and Patrimony ay
hindi nagpaalis sa pagkaalipin ng ating ekonomiya sa kamay ng
mga dayuhan. Ang solusyon sa suliranin ng bansa ay dalawa
lamang: ang pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa at ang
national industrialization. Ito ang tinatawag naming pagsikat ng
araw sa Silangan. Ngunit ang mga landlords and big businessmen
at ang mga komprador ay nagsasabi na ang free trade na ito, ang
kahulugan para sa amin, ay ipinipilit sa ating sambayanan na ang
araw ay sisikat sa Kanluran. Kailan
234
man hindi puwedeng sumikat
ang araw sa Kanluran. I vote no. [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court is likewise not persuaded.

As earlier noted, the phrase “service contracts” has been
deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s Article on National
Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to
retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973
Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old
terminology (“service contracts”) instead of employing new
and unfamiliar terms (“agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial assistance”). Such a difference
between the language of a provision in a revised
constitution and that of a similar provision in the preceding
constitution
235
is viewed as indicative of a difference in
purpose. If, as respondents suggest, the concept of
“technical or financial assistance” agreements is identical to
that of “service contracts,” the CONCOM would not have
bothered to fit the same dog with a new collar. To uphold
respondents’ theory would reduce the first to a mere
euphemism for the second and render the change in
phraseology meaningless.
An examination of the reason behind the change
confirms that technical or financial assistance agreements
are not synonymous to service contracts.
_______________
234 Id., at p. 844.

235 Vide Cherey v. Long Beach, 282 NY 382, 26 NE 2d 945, 127 ALR
1210 (1940), cited in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §79.
221
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 221

[T]he Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the

object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words
236
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.
As the following question of Commissioner Quesada and

Commissioner Villegas’ answer shows, the drafters intended
to do away with service contracts which were used to
circumvent the capitalization (60%-40%) requirement:
MS. QUESADA. The 1973 Constitution used the words

“service contracts.” In this particular Section 3, is there a
safeguard against the possible control of foreign interests
if the Filipinos go into co-production with them?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. In fact, the deletion of the phrase
“service contracts” was our first attempt to avoid some of
the abuses in the past regime in the use of service
contracts to go around the 60-40 arrangement. The
safeguard has been introduced—and this, of course can
be refined—is found in Section 3, lines 25 to 30, where
Congress will have to concur with the President on any
agreement entered into between a foreign-owned
corporation and the government involving technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, 237
development and utilization of natural resources.
In a subsequent discussion, Commissioner Villegas allayed

the fears of Commissioner Quesada regarding the
participation of foreign interests in Philippine natural
resources, which was supposed to be restricted to Filipinos.
MS. QUESADA. Another point of clarification is the phrase

“and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.” In the 1973
Constitution, this was limited to citizens of the
Philippines; but it was removed and substituted by “shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State.”
Was the concept changed so that these particular
resources would be limited to citizens of the Philippines?
_______________
236 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, 325
(1991).
237 III Record of the Constitutional Commission 278.
222

Or would these resources only be under the full control and
supervision of the State; meaning, noncitizens would have access to
these natural resources? Is that the understanding?
MR. VILLEGAS. No, Mr. Vice-President, if the Commissioner
reads the next sentence, it states:
Such activities may be directly undertaken by the State, or it may enter

into co-production, joint venture, production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens.
So we are still limiting it only to Filipino citizens.

x x x.
MS. QUESADA. Going back to Section 3, the section suggest
that:
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources . . . may be directly undertaken by the State, or it may
enter into coproduction, joint venture, production-sharing
agreements with . . . corporations or associations at least sixty
percent of whose voting stock or controlling interest is owned by
such citizens.
Lines 25 to 30, on the other hand, suggest that in the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, the
President with the concurrence of Congress may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations even for technical or
financial assistance.
I wonder if this part of Section 3 contradicts the second part. I
am raising this point for fear that foreign investors will use their
enormous capital resources to facilitate the actual exploitation or
exploration, development and effective disposition of our natural
resources to the detriment of Filipino investors. I am not saying that
we should not consider borrowing money from foreign sources.
What I refer to is that foreign interest should be allowed to
participate only to the extent that they lend us money and give us
technical assistance with the appropriate government permit. In
this way, we can insure the enjoyment of our natural resources by
our own people.
MR. VILLEGAS. Actually, the second provision about the
President does not permit foreign investors to participate. It is only
technical or financial assistance—they do not own anything—but
on conditions that have to be determined by law with the
concurrence of Congress. So, it is very restrictive.
If the Commissioner will remember, this removes the possibility
for service contracts which we said yesterday were avenues used in 238
the previous regime to go around the 60-40 requirement.
_______________
238 Id., at pp. 316-317.
223
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 223

The present Chief Justice, then a member of the CONCOM,

also referred to this limitation in scope in proposing an
amendment to the 60-40 requirement:
MR. DAVIDE. May I be allowed to explain the proposal?

MR. MAAMBONG. Subject to the three-minute rule, Madam
President.
MR. DAVIDE. It will not take three minutes.
The Commission had just approved the Preamble. In the
Preamble we clearly stated that the Filipino people are sovereign
and that one of the objectives for the creation or establishment of a
government is to conserve and develop the national patrimony. The
implication is that the national patrimony or our natural resources
are exclusively reserved for the Filipino people. No alien must be
allowed to enjoy, exploit and develop our natural resources. As a
matter of fact, that principle proceeds from the fact that our natural
resources are gifts from God to the Filipino people and it would be a
breach of that special blessing from God if we will allow aliens to
exploit our natural resources.
I voted in favor of the Jamir proposal because it is not really
exploitation that we granted to the alien corporations but only for
them to render financial or technical assistance. It is not for them to
enjoy our natural resources. Madam President, our natural
resources are depleting; our population is increasing by leaps and
bounds. Fifty years from now, if we will allow these aliens to exploit
our natural resources, there will be no more natural resources for
the next generations of Filipinos. It may last long if we will begin
now. Since 1935 the aliens have been allowed to enjoy to a certain
extent the exploitation of our natural resources, and we became
victims of foreign dominance and control. The aliens are interested
in coming to the Philippines because they would like to enjoy the
bounty of nature exclusively intended for Filipinos by God.
And so I appeal to all, for the sake of the future generations, that
if we have to pray in the Preamble “to preserve and develop the
national patrimony for the sovereign Filipino people and for the
generations to come,” we must at this time decide once and for all
that our natural
239
resources must be reserved only to Filipino citizens.
Thank you. [Emphasis supplied.]
The opinion240
of another member of the CONCOM is
persuasive and leaves no doubt as to the intention of the
framers to eliminate service contracts altogether. He writes:
_______________
239 III Record of the Constitutional Commission 358-359.

240 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
224

Paragraph 4 of Section 2 specifies large-scale, capital-intensive,

highly technological undertakings for which the President may
enter into contracts with foreign-owned corporations, and
enunciates strict conditions that should govern such contracts. x x x.
This provision balances the need for foreign capital and
technology with the need to maintain the national sovereignty. It
recognizes the fact that as long as Filipinos can formulate their own
terms in their own territory, there is no danger of relinquishing;
sovereignty to foreign interests.
Are service contracts allowed under the new Constitution? No.
Under the new Constitution, foreign investors (fully alien-owned)
can NOT participate in Filipino enterprises except to provide: (1)
Technical Assistance for highly technical enterprises; and (2)
Financial Assistance for large-scale enterprises.
The intent of this provision, as well as other provisions on
foreign investments, is to prevent the practice (prevalent in the
Marcos government)241 of skirting the 60/40 equation using the cover
of service contracts. [Emphasis supplied.]
242
Furthermore, it appears that Proposed Resolution No. 496,
which was the draft Article on National Economy and
Patrimony, adopted the concept of “agreements . . .
involving either technical or financial assistance” contained
in the “Draft of the 1986 U.P. Law Constitution Project”
(U.P. Law draft) which was taken243into consideration during
the deliberation of the CONCOM. The for-
_______________
241 J. Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated 924-
926 (1990).
242 Resolution to Incorporate in the New Constitution an Article on
National Economy and Patrimony.
243 The Chair of the Committee on National Economy and Patrimony,
alluded to it in the discussion on the capitalization requirement:
MR. V ILLEGAS. We just had a long discussion with the members of the team
from the UP Law Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained
here which we adopted from the UP draft is “60 percent of voting stock.” (III
Record of the Constitutional Commission 255.)
Likewise, in explaining the reasons for the deletion of the term

“exploitation”:
MR. V ILLEGAS. Madam President, following the recommendation in the UP

draft, we omitted “exploitation” first of all because it is believed to be
subsumed under “development” and secondly because it has a derogatory
connotation. (Id., at p. 358.)
225
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 225

mer, as well as Article XII, as adopted, employed the same

terminology, as the comparative table below shows:
DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED ARTICLE XII

UP LAW RESOLUTION NO. OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION 496 OF THE CONSTITUTION
PROJECT CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION
Sec. 1. All Sec. 3. All lands Sec. 2. All
lands of the public of the public domain, lands of the
domain, waters, waters, minerals, public domain,
minerals, coal, coal, petroleum and waters, minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, coal, petroleum,
other mineral oils, all forces of potential and other
all forces of energy, mineral oils, all
potential energy, fisheries,forests, forces of potential
fisheries, flora flora and fauna, and energy, fisheries,
and fauna and other natural forests or timber,
other natural resources are owned wildlife, flora and
resources of the by the State. With fauna, and other
Philippines are the exception of natural resources
owned by the agricultural lands, are owned by the
State. With the all other natural State. With the
State. With the all other natural State. With the
exception of resources shall not exception of
agricultural be alienated. The agricultural
lands, all other exploration, lands, all other
natural resources development, and natural resources
shall not be utilization of natural shall not be
alienated. The resources shall be alienated. The
exploration, under the full exploration,
development and control and development, and
utilization of supervision of the utilization of
natural resources State. Such activities natural resources
shall be under the may be directly shall be under
full control and undertaken by the the full control
supervision of the State, or it may and supervision
State. Such enter into co- of the State. The
activities may be production, joint State may
directly venture, production- directly
undertaken by sharing agreements undertake such
the state, or it with Filipino citizens activities or it
may enter into co- or corporations or may enter into co-
production, joint associations at least production, joint
venture, sixty percent of venture, or
production whose voting stock or production-
sharing controlling interest sharing
agreements with is owned by such citi- agreements with
Filipino citizens Filipino citizens,
or corporations or or corporations or
associations sixty associations at
percent of whose least sixty per
voting stock or centum of whose
controlling capital is owned
interest is owned by such citizens.
by such citizens Such agreements
for a period of not may be for a
more than period not ex-
twenty-five years,
renewable for not
more than
twenty-five years
226

and under zens. Such ceeding twenty-five years,
such terms agreements shall renewable for not more

such terms agreements shall renewable for not more
and be for a period of than twenty-five years,
conditions twenty-five years, and under such terms and
as may be renewable for not conditions as may be
provided by more than provided by law. In case of
law. In case twenty-five years, water rights for irrigation,
as to water and under such water, supply, fisheries, or
rights for terms and industrial uses other than
irrigation, conditions as may the development of water
water be provided by power, beneficial use may
supply, law. In cases of be the measure and limit
fisheries, or water rights for of the grant. The State
industrial irrigation, water shall protect the nation’s
uses other supply, fisheries marine wealth in its
than the or industrial uses archipelagic waters,
development other than the territorial sea, and
of water development for exclusive economic zone,
power, water power, and reserve its use and
beneficial beneficial use enjoyment exclusively to
use may be may be the Filipino citizens.
the measure measure and limit
and limit of of the grant.
the grant.
The The Congress The Congress may, by
National may by law allow law, allow small-scale
Assembly small-scale utilization of natural
may by law utilization of resources by Filipino
allow small- natural resources citizens, as well as
scale by Filipino cooperative fish farming,
utilization of citizens, as well as with priority to
natural cooperative fish subsistence fishermen
resources by farming in rivers, and fish-workers in rivers,
Filipino lakes, bays, and lakes, bays, and lagoons.
citizens. lagoons.
The The President The President may

National with the enter into agreements
Assembly, concurrence of with foreign owned
may by two- Congress, by corporations involving
thirds vote special law, shall either technical or
of all its provide the terms financial assistance for
members by and conditions large-scale explo
special law under which a
provide the foreign-
terms and
conditions
under which
a foreign-
a foreign-
owned corpo
227
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 227

ration may owned ration, development, and

enter into corporation utilization of minerals,
agreements may enter petroleum, and other mineral
with the into oils according to the general
government agreements terms and conditions provided
involving with the by law, based on real
either government contributions to the economic
technical or involving growth and general welfare of
financial either the country. In such
assistance for technical or agreements, the State shall
large-scale financial promote the development and
exploration, assistance for use of local scientific and
development, large-scale technical resources.
or utilizat exploration, [Emphasis supplied.] The
ion of development, President shall notify the
natural and Congress of every contract
resources. utilization of entered into in accordance
[Emphasis natural with this provision, within
supplied.] resources. thirty days from its execution.
[Emphasis
supplied.]
The insights of the proponents of the U.P. Law draft are,

therefore, instructive in interpreting the phrase “technical
or financial assistance.”
In his position paper entitled Service Contracts: Old Wine
in New Bottles?, Professor Pacifico A. Agabin, who was a
member of the working group that prepared the U.P. Law
draft, criticized service contracts for they “lodge exclusive
management and control of the enterprise to the service
contractor, which is reminiscent of the old concession
regime. Thus, notwithstanding the provision of the
Constitution that natural resources belong to the State, and
that these shall not be alienated, the service contract system
244
renders nugatory the constitutional provisions cited.” He
elaborates:
Looking at the Philippine model, we can discern the following ves-

tiges of the concession regime, thus:
_______________
244 Id., at p. 12.
228

1. Bidding of a selected area, or leasing the choice of the area to

the interested party and then negotiating the terms and conditions
of the contract; (Sec. 5, P.D. 87)
2. Management of the enterprise vested on the contractor,
including operation of the field if petroleum is discovered; (Sec. 8,
P.D. 87)
3. Control of production and other matters such as expansion
and development; (Sec. 8)
4. Responsibility for downstream operations—marketing,
distribution, and processing may be with the contractor (Sec. 8);
5. Ownership of equipment, machinery, fixed assets, and other
properties remain with contractor (Sec. 12, P.D. 87);
6. Repatriation of capital and retention of profits abroad
guaranteed to the contractor (Sec. 13, P.D. 87); and
7. While title to the petroleum discovered may nominally be in
the name of the government, the contractor has almost unfettered
control over its disposition and sale, and even the domestic
requirements of the country is relegated to a pro rata basis (Sec. 8).
In short, our version of the service contract is just a rehash of the
old concession regime x x x. Some people have pulled an old rabbit
out of a magician’s hat, and foisted it upon us as a new and
different animal.
The service contract as we know it here is antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources restated in the
same article of the [1973] Constitution containing the provision for
service contracts. If the service contractor happens to be a foreign
corporation, the contract would also run counter to the
constitutional provision on nationalization
245
or Filipinization, of the
exploitation of our natural resources. [Emphasis supplied. Italics
in the original.]
Professor Merlin M. Magallona, also a member of the

working group, was harsher in his reproach of the system:
x x x the nationalistic phraseology of the 1935 [Constitution] was

retained by the [1973] Charter, but the essence of nationalism was
reduced to hollow rhetoric. The 1973 Charter still provided that the
exploitation or development of the country’s natural resources be
limited to Filipino citizens or corporations owned or controlled by
them. However, the martial law Constitution allowed them, once
these resources are in their name, to enter into service contracts
with foreign investors for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance. Since foreign investors have the capital
resources, the actual exploitation and development, as well as the
effective disposition, of the country’s natural resources, would be
under
_______________
245 Id., at pp. 15-16.
229
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 229

their direction, and control, relegating the Filipino investors to the

role of second-rate partners in joint ventures.
Through the instrumentality of the service contract, the 1973
Constitution had legitimized at the highest level of state policy that
which was prohibited under the 1973 Constitution, namely: the
exploitation of the country’s natural resources by foreign nationals.
The drastic impact of [this] constitutional change becomes more
pronounced when it is considered that the active party to any service
contract may be a corporation wholly owned or foreign interests. In
such a case, the citizenship requirement is completely set aside,
permitting foreign corporations to obtain actual possession,
246
control,
and [enjoyment] of the country’s natural resources. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Accordingly, Professor Agabin recommends that:
Recognizing the service contract for what it is, we have to expunge it

from the Constitution and reaffirm ownership over our natural
resources. That is the only way we can exercise effective control over
our natural resources.
This should not mean complete isolation of the country’s natural
resources from foreign investment. Other contract forms which are
less derogatory to our sovereignty and control over natural resources
—like technical assistance agreements, financial assistance
[agreements], co-production agreements, joint ventures, production-
sharing—could still be utilized and adopted without violating
constitutional provisions. In other words, we can adopt contract
forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership
over natural resources, and where the foreign entity is just a pure
contractor247 instead of the beneficial owner of our economic
resources. [Emphasis supplied.]
Still another member of the working group, Professor

Eduardo Labitag, proposed that:
2. Service contracts as practiced under the 1973 Constitution should

be discouraged, instead the government may be allowed, subject to
authorization by special law passed by an extraordinary majority to
enter into either technical or financial assistance. This is justified by
the fact that as presently worded in the 1973 Constitution, a service
contract gives full control over the contract area to the service
contractor, for him to work, manage and dispose of the proceeds or
production. It was a subterfuge to
_______________
246 M. Magallona, Nationalism and Its Subversion in the Constitution 5, in II

DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE 1986 U.P. Law Constitution Project.
230

248
get around the nationality requirement of the constitution.
In the annotations on the proposed Article on National

Economy and Patrimony, the U.P. Law draft summarized
the rationale therefor, thus:
5. The last paragraph is a modification of the service contract

provision found in Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution as
amended. This 1973 provision shattered the framework of
nationalism in our fundamental law (see Magallona, “Nationalism
and its Subversion in the Constitution”). Through the service
contract, the 1973 Constitution had legitimized that which was
prohibited under the 1935 constitution—the exploitation of the
country’s natural resources by foreign nationals. Through the
service contract, acts prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law were
recognized as legitimate arrangements. Service contracts lodge
exclusive management and control of the enterprise to the service
contractor, not unlike the old concession regime where the
concessionaire had complete control over the country’s natural
resources, having been given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit
a particular resource and, in effect, having been assured of
ownership of that resource at the point of extraction (see Agabin,
“Service Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles”). Service contracts,
hence, are antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our
natural resources, as well as the constitutional provision on
nationalization or Filipinization of the exploitation of our natural
resources.
Under the proposed provision, only technical assistance or
financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for
large-scale activities. These are contract forms which recognize and
assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural resources since
the foreign entity is just a pure contractor and not a beneficial
owner of our economic resources. The proposal recognizes the need
for capital and technology to develop our natural resources without
sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such resources by the
safeguard of a special law which requires two-thirds vote of all the
members of the Legislature. This will ensure that such agreements
will be debated upon exhaustively and thoroughly
249
in the National
Assembly to avert prejudice to the nation. [Emphasis supplied.]
The U.P. Law draft proponents viewed service contracts

under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial
ownership of the
_______________
248 E. Labitag, Philippine Natural Resources: Some Problems and

Perspectives 17 in II DRAFT PROPOSAL of the 1986 U.P. Law
Constitution Project.
249 I Draft Proposal of the 1986 U.P. Law Constitution Project 11-13.
231
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 231

country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations.

While, in theory, the State owns these natural resources—
and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries—service contracts
actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore
for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. Foreigners, not
Filipinos, became the beneficiaries of Philippine natural
resources. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with
the constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural
resources, with the Regalian doctrine, and on a broader
perspective, with Philippine sovereignty.
The proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for
capital and technical know-how in the large-scale
exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources—the second paragraph of the proposed draft itself
being an admission of such scarcity. Hence, they
recommended a compromise to reconcile the nationalistic
provisions dating back to the 1935 Constitution, which
reserved all natural resources exclusively to Filipinos, and
the more liberal 1973 Constitution, which allowed foreigners
to participate in these resources through service contracts.
Such a compromise called for the adoption of a new system
in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources in the form of technical agreements or financial
agreements which, necessity, are distinct concepts from
service contracts.
The replacement of “service contracts” with “agreements .
. . involving either technical or financial assistance,” as well
as the deletion of the phrase “management or other forms of
assistance,” assumes greater significance when note is taken
that the U.P. Law draft proposed other equally crucial
changes that were obviously heeded by the CONCOM.
These include the abrogation of the concession system and
the adoption of new “options” for the State in the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources. The proponents deemed these changes to be more
consistent with the State’s ownership of, and its “full control
and supervision” (a phrase also employed by the framers)
over, such resources. The Project explained:
3. In line with the State ownership of natural resources, the State

should take a more active role in the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources, than the present practice of
granting licenses, concessions, or leases—hence the provision that
said activities shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. There are three major schemes by which the State could
undertake these activities: first, directly
232

by itself; second, by virtue of co-production, joint venture,

production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations
or associations sixty percent (60%) of the voting stock or controlling
interests of which are owned by such citizens; or third, with a
foreign-owned corporation, in cases of large-scale exploration,
development, or utilization of natural resources through agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance only. x x x.
At present, under the licensing concession or lease schemes, the
government benefits from such benefits only through fees, charges,
ad valorem taxes and income taxes of the exploiters of our natural
resources. Such benefits are very minimal compared with the
enormous profits reaped by theses licensees, grantees,
concessionaires. Moreover, some of them disregard the conservation
of natural resources and do not protect the environment from
degradation. The proposed role of the State will enable it to a
greater share in the profits—it can also actively husband its natural
resources and engage in developmental programs that will be
beneficial to them.
4. Aside from the three major schemes for the exploration,
development, and utilization of our natural resources, the State
may, by law, allow Filipino citizens to explore, develop, utilize
natural resources in small-scale. This is in recognition of the plight
of marginal fishermen, forest dwellers, gold panners, and others
similarly situated who exploit
250
our natural resources for their daily
sustenance and survival.
Professor Agabin, in particular, after taking pains to

illustrate the similarities between the two systems,
concluded that the service contract regime was but a
“rehash” of the concession system. “Old wine in new bottles,”
as he put it. The rejection of the service contract regime,
therefore, is in consonance with the abolition of the
concession system.
In light of the deliberations of the CONCOM, the text of
the Constitution, and the adoption of other proposed
changes, there is no doubt that the framers considered and
shared the intent of the U.P. Law proponents in employing
the phrase “agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance.”
_______________
250 Id., at pp. 9-11. Professor Labitag also suggests that: x x x. The
concession regime of natural resources disposition should be discontinued.
Instead the State shall enter into such arrangements and agreements like
co-production, joint ventures, etc. as shall bring about effective control
and a larger share in the proceeds, harvest or production. (Labitag,
supra, at p. 17.)
233
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 233

While certain commissioners may have mentioned the term

“service contracts” during the CONCOM deliberations, they
may not have been necessarily referring to the concept of
service contracts under the 1973 Constitution. As noted
earlier, “service contracts” is a 251
term that assumes different
meanings to different people. The commissioners may
have been using the term loosely, and not in its technical
and legal sense, to refer, in general, to agreements
concerning natural resources entered into by the
Government with foreign corporations. These loose
statements do not necessarily translate to the adoption of
the 1973 Constitution provision allowing service contracts.
It is true that, as shown in the earlier quoted portions of
the proceedings in CONCOM, in response to Sr. Tan’s
question, Commissioner Villegas commented that, other
than congressional notification, the only difference between
“future” and “past” “service contracts” is the requirement of
a general 252law as there were no laws previously authorizing
the same. However, such remark is far outweighed by his
more categorical statement in his exchange with
Commissioner Quesada that the draft article “does not
permit foreign investors to participate” in the nation’s
natural resources—which was exactly what service contracts 253
did—except to provide “technical or financial assistance.”
In the case of the other commissioners, Commissioner
Nolledo himself clarified in 254
his work that the present charter
prohibits service contracts. Commissioner Gascon was not
totally averse to foreign participation, but favored stricter
restrictions 255in the form of majority congressional
concurrence. On the other hand, Commis-
_______________
251 Vide Note 147.

252 Vide Note 230. The question was posed before the Jamir
amendment and subsequent proposals introducing other limitations.
Comm. Villegas’ response that there was no requirement in the 1973
Constitution for a law to govern service contracts and that, in fact, there
were then no such laws is inaccurate. The 1973 Charter required similar
legislative approval, although it did not specify the form it should take:
“The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such
citizens . . . to enter into service contracts . . . .” As previously noted,
however, laws authorizing service contracts were actually enacted by
presidential decree.
253 Vide Note 238.
254 Vide Note 241.
255 Vide Note 231.
234

sioners Garcia and Tadeo may have veered to the extreme

side of the spectrum and their objections may be interpreted
as votes against any foreign participation in our natural
resources whatsoever. 256
WMCP cites 257
Opinion No. 75, s. 1987, and Opinion No.
175, s. 1990 of the Secretary of Justice, expressing the
view that a financial or technical assistance agreement “is
no different in concept” from the service contract allowed
under the 1973 Constitution. This Court is not, however,
bound by this interpretation. When an administrative or
executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement
of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law; and the
administrative interpretation, of the law is at best advisory,
for it is
258
the courts that finally determine what the law
means.
In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the
President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned
corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. As
Commissioner 259
Villegas emphasized, the provision is “very
restrictive.” Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that
“entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule
on protection of natural resources for the interest of the
nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be
260
subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules.” Indeed,
260
subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules.” Indeed,
exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants and all
doubts should be resolved261in favor of the general provision
rather than the exception.
With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds
that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
“financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the
1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as
service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
_______________
256 Dated July 28, 1987.

257 Dated October 3, 1990.
258 Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 (1992).
259 Vide Note 238.
261 Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956).
235
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 235

Section 33, which is found under Chapter VI (Financial or

Technical Assistance Agreement) of R.A. No. 7942 states:
SEC. 33. Eligibility.—Any qualified person with technical and

financial capability to undertake large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources in the Philippines
may enter into a financial or technical assistance agreement directly
with the Government through the Department. [Emphasis
supplied.]
“Exploration,” as defined by R.A. No. 7942,
means the searching or prospecting for mineral resources by

geological, geochemical or geophysical surveys, remote sensing, test
pitting, trenching, drilling, shaft sinking, tunneling or any other
means for the purpose of determining the existence, extent,
quantity
262
and quality thereof and the feasibility of mining them for
profit.
A legally organized foreign-owned
263
corporation may be
granted an exploration permit, which vests it with the
right 264
to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified
265
areas, i.e., to enter, occupy and explore the same.
Eventually, the foreign-owned corporation, as such
permittee, may apply 266
for a financial and technical
assistance agreement.
“Development” is
the work undertaken to explore and prepare an ore body or a

mineral deposit for hiring, including 267
the construction of necessary
infrastructure and related facilities.
“Utilization”
268
“means the extraction or disposition of
minerals.” A stipulation that the proponent shall dispose
of the minerals and byproducts produced at the highest
price and more advantageous terms and conditions as
provided for under the implementing rules and269
regulations
is required to be incorporated in every FTAA.
_______________
262Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995), sec. 3 (q).

263 Id., sec. 3 (aq).
264 Id., sec. 20.
265 Id., sec. 23, first par.
266 Id., sec. 23, last par.
267 Id., sec. 3 (j).
268 Id., sec. 3 (az).
269 Id., sec. 35 (m).
236

A foreign-owned/controlled corporation 270

may likewise be
granted a mineral processing permit. “Mineral processing”
is the milling, beneficiation or upgrading of ores or minerals
and rocks or by similar271
means to convert the same into
marketable products.
An FTAA contractor makes a warranty that the mining
operations shall be conducted in accordance with the 272
provisions of R.A. No. 7942 and its4 implementing rules
and for work programs and minimum expenditures and
273
commitments. And it obliges itself to furnish the
273
commitments. And it obliges itself to furnish the
Government records of geologic, accounting,
274
and other
relevant data for its mining operation.
“Mining operation,” as the law defines it, means mining
activities involving exploration,
275
feasibility, development,
utilization, and processing.
The underlying assumption in all these provisions is that
the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources, just
like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
Furthermore, Chapter XII of the Act grants foreign
contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that
it grants
276
contractors in mineral agreements (MPSA, CA and
JV). Parenthetically,
_______________
270 Id., secs. 3 (aq) and 56.

271 Id., sec. 3 (y).
272 Id., sec. 35 (g).
273 Id., sec. 35 (h).
274 Id., sec. 35 (1).
275 Id., sec. 3 (af).
276 SEC. 72. Timber Rights.—Any provision of the law to the contrary
notwithstanding, a contractor may be granted a right to cut trees or
timber within his mining areas as may be necessary for his mining
operations subject to forestry laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That
if the land covered by the mining area is already covered by exiting
timber concessions, the volume of timber needed and the manner of
cutting and removal thereof shall be determined by the mines regional
director, upon consultation with the contractor, the timber
concessionaire/permittee and the Forest Management Bureau of the
Department: Provided, further, That in case of disagreement between the
contractor and the timber concessionaire, the matter shall be submitted
to the Secretary whose decision shall be final. The contractor shall
perform reforestation work within his mining area in accordance with
forestry laws, rules and regulations. [Emphasis supplied.]
SEC. 73. Water Rights.—A contractor shall have water rights for
mining operations upon approval of application with the appropriate gov
237
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 237

Sections 72 to 75 use the term “contractor,” without

distinguishing between FTAA and mineral agreement
contractors. And so does “holders of mining rights” in
Section 76. A foreign contractor may even convert its FTAA
into a mineral agreement if the economic
_______________
ernment agency in accordance with existing water laws, rules and

regulations promulgated thereunder: Provided, That water rights already
granted or vested through long use, recognized and acknowledged by local
customs, laws and decisions of courts shall not thereby be impaired:
Provided, further, That the Government reserves the right to regulate
water rights and the reasonable and equitable distribution of water
supply so as to prevent the monopoly of the use thereof. [Emphasis
supplied.]
SEC. 74. Right to Possess Explosives.—A contractor/exploration
permittee shall have the right to possess and use explosives within his
contract/permit area as may be necessary for his mining operations upon
approval of an application with the appropriate government agency in
accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder: Provided, That the Government reserves the right to
regulate and control the explosive accessories to ensure safe mining
operations. [Emphasis supplied.]
SEC. 75. Easement Rights.—When mining areas are so situated that
for purposes of more convenient mining operations it is necessary to build,
construct or install on the mining areas or lands owned, occupied or
leased by other persons, such infrastructure as roads, railroads, mills,
waste dump sites, tailings ponds, warehouses, staging or storage areas
and port facilities, tramways, runways, airports, electric transmission,
telephone or telegraph lines, dams and their normal flood and catchment
areas, sites for water wells, ditches, canals, new river beds, pipelines,
flumes, cuts, shafts, tunnels, or mills the contractor, upon payment of
just compensation, shall be entitled to enter and occupy said mining areas
or lands. [Emphasis supplied.]
SEC. 76. Entry into Private Lands and Concession Areas.—Subject to
prior notification, holders of mining rights shall not be prevented from
entry into private lands and concession areas by surface owners,
occupants, or concessionaires’ when conducting mining operations
therein: Provided, That any damage done to the property of the surface
owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations
shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the
implementing rules and regulations: Provided, further, That to
guarantee such compensation, the person authorized to conduct mining
operation shall, prior thereto, post a bond with the regional director based
on the type of properties, the prevailing prices in and around the area
where the mining operations are to be conducted, with surety or sureties
satisfactory to the regional director. [Emphasis supplied.]
238

viability of the contract area is found 277 to be inadequate to

justify large-scale mining operations, provided that it
reduces its equity in the corporation, partnership, 278
association or cooperative to forty percent (40%).
Finally, under the Act, an FTAA contractor warrants
that it “has or has access to 279all the financing, managerial,
and technical expertise . . . .” This suggests that an FTAA
contractor is bound to provide some management assistance
—a form of assistance that has been eliminated and,
therefore, proscribed by the present Charter.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all
the aspects of the mining operation, the above-cited
provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to
these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare
title thereto.
Moreover, the same provisions, whether by design or
inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60%-40% capitalization requirement for
corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
In sum, the Court finds the following provisions of R.A.
No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines

“qualified person,” to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall

be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an
exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or
mineral processing permit.
280
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and
obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as
said section applies to a financial or technical
assistance agreement;
_______________
277 Id., sec. 39, first par.

278 Id., sec. 39, second par.
279 Id., sec. 35 (e).
280 SEC. 23. Rights and Obligations of the Permittee.—x x x. The
permittee may apply for a mineral production sharing agreement, joint
venture agreement, co-production agreement or financial or technical
assistance agreement over the permit area, which application shall be
granted if the permittee meets the neces
239
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 239

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a

contractor in a financial or technical assistance
agreement;
281
(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and
conditions for every financial or technical assistance
agreement;
_______________
sary qualifications and the terms and conditions of any such

agreement: Provided That the exploration period covered by the
exploration period of the mineral agreement or financial or technical
assistance agreement.
281 SEC. 35. Terms and Conditions.—The following terms, conditions,
and warranties shall be incorporated in the financial or technical
assistance agreement, to wit:
(a) A firm commitment in the form of sworn statement, of an amount

corresponding to the expenditure obligation that will be invested
in the contract area: Provided, That such amount shall be subject
to changes as may be provided for in the rules and regulations of
this act;
(b) A financial guarantee bond shall be posted in favor of the
Government in an amount equivalent to the expenditure
obligation of the applicant for any year;
(c) Submission of proof of technical competence, such as, but not
limited to, its track record in mineral resource exploration,
development, and utilization; details of technology to be employed
in the proposed operation; and details of technical personnel to
undertake the operation;
(d) Representations and warranties that the applicant has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for entering into
the agreement;
(e) Representations and warranties that the contractor has or has
access to all the financing managerial and technical expertise and,
if circumstances demand, the technology required to promptly and
effectively carry out the objectives of the agreement with the
understanding to timely deploy these resources under its
supervision pursuant to the periodic work programs and related
budgets, when proper, providing an exploration period up to two
(2) years, extendible for another two (2) years but subject to
annual review by the Secretary in accordance with the
implementing rules and regulations of this Act, and further,
subject to the relinquishment obligations;
(f) Representations and warranties that, except for payments for
dispositions for its equity, foreign investments in local enterprises
which are qualified for repatriation, and local supplier’s credits
and such other generally accepted and permissible financial
schemes for raising funds for valid business purposes, the
contractor
240

282
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial
and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into
a mineral production-sharing agreement;
_______________
shall not raise any form of financing from domestic sources of

funds, whether in Philippine or foreign currency, for conducting
its mining operations for and in the contract area;
(g) The mining operations shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations;
(h) Work programs and minimum expenditures commitments;
(i) Preferential use of local goods and services to the maximum
extent practicable;
(j) A stipulation that the contractors are obligated to give preference
to Filipinos in all types of mining employment for which they are
qualified and that technology shall be transferred to the same;
(k) Requiring the proponent to effectively use appropriate anti-
pollution technology and facilities to protect the environment and
to restore or rehabilitate mined out areas and other areas affected
by mine tailings and other forms of pollution or destruction;
(l) The contractors shall furnish the Government records of geologic,
accounting, and other relevant data for its mining operation, and
that book of accounts and records shall be open for inspection by
the government;
(m) Requiring the proponent to dispose of the minerals and byproducts
produced under a financial or technical assistance agreement at
the highest price and more advantageous terms and conditions as
provided for under the rules and regulations of this Act;
(n) Provide for consultation and arbitration with respect to the
interpretation and implementation of the terms and conditions of
the agreements; and
(o) Such other terms and conditions consistent with the Constitution
and with this Act as the Secretary may deem to be for the best
interest of the State and the welfare of the Filipino people.
282 SEC. 39. Option to Convert into Mineral Agreement.—The

contractor has the option to convert the financial or technical assistance
agreement to a mineral agreement at any time during the term of the
agreement, if the economic viability of the contract area is found to be
inadequate to justify large-scale mining operations, after proper notice to
the Secretary as provided for under the implementing rules and regula-
241
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 241

283
(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral
processing permit to a contractor in a financial and
technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void
as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and
cannot stand on their284
own:
(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term “contractor,”
insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance
agreement. 285
Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract
area in a financial
286
or technical assistance agreements;
Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or
technical assistance agreements;
_______________
tions; Provided, That the mineral agreement shall only be for the
remaining period of the original agreement.
In the case of a foreign contractor, it shall reduce its equity to forty
percent (40%) in the corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative.
Upon compliance with this requirement by the contractor, the Secretary
shall approve the conversion and execute the mineral production-sharing
agreement.
283 SEC. 56. Eligibility of Foreign-owned/-controlled Corporation.—A
foreign owned/-controlled corporation may be granted a mineral
processing permit.
284 SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in and for purposes of this
Act, the following terms, whether in singular or plural, shall mean:
xxx
(g) “Contractor” means a qualified person acting alone or in consortium who
is a party to a mineral agreement or to a financial or technical assistance
agreement.
285 SEC. 34. Maximum Contract Area.—The maximum contract area

that may be granted per qualified person, subject to relinquishment shall
be:
(a) 1,000 meridional blocks onshore;

(b) 4,000 meridional blocks offshore; or
(c) Combinations of (a) and (b) provided that it shall not exceed the
maximum limits for onshore and offshore areas.
286 SEC. 36. Negotiations.—A financial or technical assistance

agreement shall be negotiated by the Department and executed and
approved by the President. The President shall notify Congress of all
financial or technical assistance agreements within thirty (30) days from
execution and approval thereof.
242

287
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and
evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement
proposals; 288
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or
technical assistance
289
agreements;
Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of
financial or technical assistance agreements;
290
Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the
290
Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the
contractor in an FTAA; 291
The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which
provide for the Government’s share in a financial and
technical assistance agreement; and
_______________
287 SEC. 37. Filing and Evaluation of Financial or Technical

Assistance Agreement Proposals.—All financial or technical assistance
agreement proposals shall be filed with the Bureau after payment of the
required processing fees. If the proposal is found to be sufficient and
meritorious in form and substance after evaluation, it shall be recorded
with the appropriate government agency to give the proponent the prior
right to the area covered by such proposal: Provided, That existing
mineral agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements and
other mining rights are not impaired or prejudiced thereby. The
Secretary shall recommend its approval to the President.
288 SEC. 38. Term of Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement.—A
financial or technical assistance agreement shall have a term not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years to start from the execution thereof,
renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.
289 SEC. 40. Assignment/Transfer.—A financial or technical assistance
agreement may be assigned or transferred, in whole or in part, to a
qualified person subject to the prior approval of the President: Provided,
That the President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical
assistance agreement assigned or converted in accordance with this
provision within thirty (30) days from the date of the approval thereof.
290 SEC. 41. Withdrawal from Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement.—The contractor shall manifest in writing to the Secretary
his intention to withdraw from the agreement, if in his judgment the
mining project is no longer economically feasible, even after he has
exerted reasonable diligence to remedy the cause or the situation. The
Secretary may accept the withdrawal: Provided, That the contractor has
complied or satisfied all his financial, fiscal or legal obligations.
291 SEC. 81. Government Share in Other Mineral Agreements.—
x x x.
243
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 243

292
Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in
FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent
and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements,
or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not
pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus 293
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.
There can be little doubt that the WMCP FTAA itself is a
service contract.
Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP “the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilise[,] process and
dispose of all Minerals products and by-products 294
thereof
that may be produced from the Contract Area.” The FTAA
also imbues WMCP with the following rights:
_______________
The Government share in financial or technical assistance agreement shall

consist of, among other things, the contractor’s corporate income tax, excise tax,
special allowance, withholding tax due from the contractor’s foreign
stockholders arising from dividend or interest payments to the said foreign
stockholder in case of a foreign national and all such other taxes, duties and
fees as provided for under existing laws.
The collection of Government share in financial or technical assistance
agreement shall commence after the financial or technical assistance
agreement contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating expenses,
exploration, and development expenditures, inclusive.
292 SEC. 90. Incentives.—The contractors in mineral agreements, and

financial or technical assistance agreements shall be entitled to the
applicable fiscal and non-fiscal incentives as provided for under Executive
Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987: Provided, That holders of exploration permits may register with
the Board of Investments and be entitled to the Fiscal incentives granted
under the said Code for the duration of the permits or extensions thereof:
Provided, further, That mining activities shall always be included in the
investment priorities plan.
293 Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 496 (1967).
294 Vide also WMCP FTAA, sec. 10.2 (a).
244

(b) to extract and carry away any Mineral samples from

the Contract area for the purpose of conducting tests
and studies in respect thereof;
(c) to determine the mining and treatment processes to
be utilized during the Development/Operating
Period and the project facilities to be constructed
during the Development and Construction Period;
(d) have the right of possession of the Contract Area,
with full right of ingress and egress and the right to
occupy the same, subject to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 512 (if applicable) and not
be prevented from entry into private lands by
surface owners and/or occupants thereof when
prospecting, exploring and exploiting for minerals
therein;
x x x
(f) to construct roadways, mining, drainage, power

generation and transmission facilities and all other
types of works on the Contract Area;
(g) to erect, install or place any type of improvements,
supplies, machinery and other equipment relating to
the Mining Operations and to use, sell or otherwise
dispose of, modify, remove or diminish any and all
parts thereof;
(h) enjoy, subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations and the rights of third Parties, easement
rights and the use of timber, sand, clay, stone, water
and other natural resources in the Contract Area
without cost for the purposes of the Mining
Operations;
x x x
(l) have the right to mortgage, charge or encumber all

or part of its interest and obligations under this
Agreement, the plant, equipment and infrastructure
and the Minerals produced from the Mining
Operations;
295
x x x.
All materials, equipment, plant and other installations
erected or placed on the Contract Area remain the property
of WMCP, which has the right to deal with and remove such
items within
296
twelve months from the termination of the
FTAA.
Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the FTAA, WMCP shall
provide [all] financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.” The
mining company binds itself to “perform all Mining
Operations . . . providing all necessary services,
_______________
295 WMCP, sec. 10.2.

296 Id., sec. 11.
245
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 245

297
technology and financing in connection therewith,” and to
“furnish all materials, labour, equipment and other
installations that may 298
be required for carrying on all
Mining Operations.” WMCP may make expansions,
improvements and replacements of the mining facilities and
may add such new299 facilities as it considers necessary for the
mining operations.
These contractual stipulations, taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that
properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit
of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987
Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they
spring must be struck down.
In arguing against the annulment of the FTAA, WMCP
invokes the Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments between the Philippine and Australian
Governments, which was signed in Manila on January 25,
1995 and which entered into force on December 8, 1995.
x x x. Article 2 (1) of said treaty states that it applies to investments

whenever made and thus the fact that [WMCP’s] FTAA was entered
into prior to the entry into force of the treaty does not preclude the
Philippine Government from protecting [WMCP’s] investment in
[that] FTAA. Likewise, Article 3 (1) of the treaty provides that “Each
Party shall encourage and promote investments in its area by
investors of the other Party and shall [admit] such investments in
accordance with its Constitution, Laws, regulations and investment
policies” and in Article 3 (2), it states that “Each Party shall ensure
that investments are accorded fair and equitable treatment.” The
latter stipulation indicates that it was intended to impose an
obligation upon a Party to afford fair and equitable treatment to the
investments of the other Party and that a failure to provide such
treatment by or under the laws of the Party may constitute a breach
of the treaty. Simply stated, the Philippines could not, under said
treaty, rely upon the inadequacies of its own laws to deprive an
Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment
by invalidating [WMCP’s] FTAA without likewise nullifying the
service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA 7942 such
as those mentioned in PD 87 or EO 279.
_______________
297 Id., sec. 10.1 (a).

298 Id., sec. 10.1 (c).
299 Id., sec. 6.4.
246

This becomes more significant in the light of the fact that

[WMCP’s] FTAA was executed not by a mere Filipino citizen, but by
the Philippine Government itself, through its President no less,
which, in entering into said treaty is assumed to be aware of the
existing Philippine laws on service contracts over the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources. The execution of
the FTAA by the Philippine Government assures the Australian
Government that 300
the FTAA is in accordance with existing
Philippine laws. [Emphasis and italics by private respondents.]
The invalidation of the subject FTAA, it is argued, would

constitute a breach of said treaty which, in turn, would
amount to a violation of Section 3, Article II of the
Constitution adopting the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. One of these
generally accepted principles is pacta sunt servanda, which
requires the performance in good faith of treaty obligations.
Even assuming arguendo that WMCP is correct in its
interpretation of the treaty and its assertion that “the
Philippines could not . . . deprive an Australian investor
(like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by
invalidating [WMCP’s] FTAA without likewise nullifying
the service contracts entered into before the enactment of
RA 7942 . . .,” the annulment of the FTAA would not
constitute a breach of the treaty invoked. For this decision
herein invalidating the subject
301
FTAA forms part of the legal
302
system of the Philippines. The equal protection clause
guarantees that such decision shall apply to all contracts
belonging to the same class, hence, upholding rather than
violating, the “fair and equitable treatment” stipulation in
said treaty.
One other matter requires clarification. Petitioners
contend that, consistent with the provisions of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President may enter into
agreements involving “either technical or financial
assistance” only. The agreement in question, however, is a
technical and financial assistance agreement.
_______________
300 Rollo, pp. 563-564.

301 Civil Code, Art. 8.
302 Const., Art III, Sec. 1.
247
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 247

Petitioners’ contention does not lie. To adhere to the literal

language of 303the Constitution would lead to absurd
consequences. As WMCP correctly put it:
x x x such a theory of petitioners would compel the government

(through the President) to enter into contract with two (2) foreign-
owned corporations, one for financial assistance agreement and
with the other, for technical assistance over one and the same
mining area or land; or to execute two (2) contracts with only one
foreign-owned corporation which has the capability to provide both
financial and technical assistance, one for financial assistance and
another for technical assistance, over the same mining area. Such
an absurd result is definitely not sanctioned under the canons of
304
304
constitutional construction. [Italics in the original.]
Surely, the framers of the 1987 Charter did not contemplate

such an absurd result from their use of “either/or.” A
constitution is not to be interpreted as demanding the
impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable305
or absurd
consequences, if possible, should be avoided. Courts are
not to give words a meaning that would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequences and a literal interpretation is to 306
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.307
That is a strong argument against its adoption.
Accordingly, petitioners’ interpretation must be rejected.
The foregoing discussion has rendered unnecessary the
resolution of the other issues raised by the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court
hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:
(a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq),

(b) Section 23,
(c) Section 33 to 41,
(d) Section 56,
(e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and
_______________
303 Vide Note 223.

304 Rollo, p. 243.
305 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra.
306 Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Inc. v. Lingad, 30
SCRA 248 (1969).
307 Ibid.
248

(f) Section 90.
(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and

Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996
which are not in conformity with this Decision, and
(3) The, Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and WMC Philippines, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Carpio,

Corona, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., Please see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, I join J. Panganiban’s separate
opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I join Mr. Justice
Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., I join Justice Panganiban in
his separate opinion.
Azcuna, J., I take no part—one of the parties was a
client.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioners, in the instant petition for prohibition and

mandamus, assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7942, otherwise also known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, as well as its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 279, by
the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining
Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). WMCP is owned by
WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings
Limited, a publicly-listed major Australian mining and
exploration company.
The premise for the constitutional challenge is Section 2,
Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
249
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 249

“All lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wild life, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. x x x.
“x x x x x x x x x.
“The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
“The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision within thirty days
from its execution.”
After a careful reading of the provisions of Republic Act No.

7942, I join the majority in invalidating the following
portions of the law: a) Section 3 (aq) which considers a
foreign-owned corporation itself qualified, not only to enter
into financial or technical assistance agreements, but also
for an exploration or mineral processing permit; b) Section
35 (g), (l), (m) which state the rights and obligations of a
foreign-owned corporations pursuant to its “mining
operations”; and c) Section 56 which provides that foreign-
owned or controlled corporations are eligible to be granted a
mineral processing permit.
The ponencia, so eloquently expressed and so well
ratiocinated, would also say that the Philippine Mining Act
and its implementing rules or decrees contain provisions
which, in effect, authorize the Government to enter into
service contracts with foreign-owned corporations, thereby
granting beneficial ownership over natural resources to
foreign contractors in violation of the fundamental law.
Thus, it would strike down Sections 3 (aq), 23, 33 to 41, 56,
81, and 90 of the statute and related sections in DAO 96-40.
The FTAA executed between the Government and WMCP is
being invalidated for being in the nature of a service
contract. The ponencia posits
250

that the adoption of the terms “agreements x x x involving

either technical or financial assistance” in the 1987
Constitution, in lieu of “service contracts” found in the 1973
Charter, reflects the intention of the framers to disallow the
execution of service contracts with foreign entities for the
exploration, development, exploitation and utilization of the
country’s natural resources.
The proposition is one that I, most respectfully, cannot
fully share. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission do not disclose, in any evident manner, such
intention on the part of the drafters, viz.:
“MR. JAMIR. Yes, Madam President. With respect to the

second paragraph of Section 3, my amendment by
substitution reads: THE PRESIDENT MAY ENTER
INTO AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN-OWNED
CORPORATIONS INVOLVING EITHER TECHNICAL
OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE-SCALE
EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT AND
UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
ACCORDING TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
PROVIDED BY LAW.
“x x x
“MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. Will
Commissioner Jamir answer a few clarificatory
questions?
“MR. JAMIR. Yes, Madam President.
“MR. SUAREZ. This particular portion of the section has
reference to what was popularly known before as service
contracts, among other things; is that correct?
“MR. JAMIR. Yes, Madam President.
“MR. SUAREZ. As it is formulated, the President may
enter into service contracts but subject to the guidelines
that may be promulgated by Congress?
“MR. JAMIR. That is correct.
“MR. SUAREZ. Therefore, the aspect of negotiation and
consummation will fall on the President, not upon
Congress?
“MR. JAMIR. That is also correct, Madam President.
“MR. SUAREZ. Except that all of these contracts, service or
otherwise must be made strictly in accordance with
guidelines prescribed by Congress?
1
“MR. JAMIR. That is also correct.”
_______________
251
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 251

The significance of the change in the terminology is clarified

in the following exchanges during the deliberations:
“SR. TAN. Am I correct in thinking that the only difference

between these future service contracts and the past
service contracts under Mr. Marcos is the general law to
be enacted by the legislature and the notification of
it not?
“MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.
“SR. TAN. So those are the safeguards.
“MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, there2
was no law at all governing
service contracts before.”
The Constitutional Commission has also agreed to include

the additional requirement that said agreements must be
“based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country.” Upon the suggestion of then
Commissioner Davide, the scope of “these service contracts”
has likewise been limited to large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils. The then Commissioner, explains: “And
so, we believe that we should really, if we want to grant
service contracts at all, limit the same to only those
particular
3
areas where Filipino capital may not be sufficient
x x x.”
The majority would cite the emphatic statements of
Commissioners Villegas and Davide that the country’s
natural4 resources are exclusively reserved for Filipino
citizens and that, according to Commissioner Villegas, “the
deletion of the phrase ‘service contracts’ (is the) first attempt
to avoid some of the abuses in the past regime in the use of5
service contracts to go around the 60-40 arrangement.”
These declarations do not necessarily mean that the
Government may no longer enter into service contracts with
foreign entities. In order to uphold and strengthen the
national policy of preserving and developing the country’s
natural resources exclusively for the Filipino people, the
present Constitution indeed has provided for safeguards to
prevent the execution of service contracts of the old regime,
but not of service contracts per se. It could
_______________
2Id., p. 352.
3Id., p. 355.
4 Decision, pp. 69-71.
5Id., p. 69.
252

not have been the object of the framers of the Charter to

limit the contracts which the President may enter into, to
mere “agreements for financial and technical assistance.”
One would take it that the usual terms and conditions
recognized and stipulated in agreements of such nature
have been contemplated. Basically, the financier and the
owner of know-how would understandably satisfy itself with
the proper implementation and the profitability of the
project. It would be abnormal for the financier and owner of
the know-how not to assure itself that all the activities
needed to bring the project into fruition are properly
implemented, attended to, and carried out. Needless to say,
no foreign investor would readily lend financial or technical
assistance without the proper incentives, including fair
returns, therefor.
The Constitution has not prohibited the State from itself
exploring, developing, or utilizing the country’s natural
resources, and, for this purpose, it may, I submit, enter into
the necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the
pursuit of a feasible operation.
The fundamental law is deemed written in every
contract. The FTAA entered into by the government and
WMCP recognizes this vital principle. Thus, two of the
agreement’s whereas clauses provide:
“WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines provides in Article XII, Section 2 that all lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other natural
resources are owned by the State, and that the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State; and
“WHEREAS, the Constitution further provides that the
Government may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals.”
The assailed contract or its provisions must then be read in

conformity with abovementioned constitutional mandate.
Hence, Section 10.2 (a) of the FTAA, for instance, which
states that “the Contractor shall have the exclusive right to
explore for, exploit, utilize, process, market, export and
dispose of all minerals and products and by-products thereof
that may be derived or produced from the Contract Area
and to otherwise conduct Mining Operations in the Contract
Area in accordance with the terms and conditions hereof,
253
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 253

must be taken to mean that the foregoing rights are to be

exercised by WMCP for and in behalf of the State and that
WMCP, as the Contractor, would be bound to carry out the
terms and conditions of the agreement acting for and in
behalf of the State. In exchange for the financial and
technical assistance, inclusive of its services, the Contractor
enjoys an exclusivity of the contract and a corresponding
compensation therefor.
Except as so expressed elsewhere above, I see, therefore,
no constitutional impairment in the enactment of Republic
Act No. 7942, as well as its implementing rules, and in the
execution by the Government of the Financial and
Technical Agreement with WMCP; and I so vote
accordingly.
Just a word. While I cannot ignore an impression of the
business community that the Court is wont, at times, to
interfere with the economic decisions of Congress and the
government’s economic managers, I must hasten to add,
however, that in so voting as above, I have not been unduly
overwhelmed by that perception. Quite the contrary, the
Court has always proceeded with great caution, such as now,
in resolving cases that could inextricably involve policy
questions thought to be best left to the technical expertise of
the legislative and executive departments.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of (1) RA 7942

(The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), (2) its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO]
96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995, by and between
the government and Western Mining Corporation (Phils.),
Inc. (WMCP).
Crux of the Controversy
The crux of the controversy is the fact that WMCP, at the

time it entered into the FTAA, was wholly owned by WMC
Resources International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), which in turn
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining
Corporation Holdings, Ltd., a publicly listed major
Australian mining and exploration company.
254

Petitioners thus argue that the FTAA was executed in

violation of Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Allegedly, according to the fourth paragraph thereof,
FTAAs entered into by the government with foreign-owned
corporations are limited to agreements involving merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The FTAA in question
supposedly permits the foreign contractor to manage and
control the mining operations fully, and is therefore no
different from the “service contracts” that were prevalent
under the martial law regime, and that are now disallowed
by Section 2 of Article XII of the present Constitution.
On January 23, 2001, all the shares of WMC in WMCP—
according to the latter’s Manifestation subsequently filed
with this Court—had been sold to Sagittarius Mines, Inc., in
which 60 percent of the equity is Filipino-owned. In the
same Manifestation, the Court was further informed that
the assailed FTAA had likewise been transferred from
WMCP to Sagittarius.
The well-researched ponencia of esteemed justice
Conchita Carpio-Morales nevertheless declares that the
instant case has not been rendered moot by the FTAA’s
transfer to and registration in the name of a Filipino-owned
corporation, and that the validity of that transfer remains
1
in
dispute and awaits final judicial determination. It then
proceeds to decide the instant case on the assumption that
WMCP remains a foreign corporation.
Controversy Now Moot
With due respect, I believe that the Court should dismiss

the Petition on the ground of mootness. I submit that a
decision on the constitutionality issue should await the
wisdom of a new day when the Court would have a live case
before it.
The nullity of the FTAA is unarguably premised upon
the contractor being a foreign corporation. Had the FTAA
been originally issued to a Filipino-owned corporation, we
would have had no con-
_______________
1 That is, the Court of Appeals’ resolution of the petition for review—
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 74161 and lodged by Lepanto Consolidated
Mining—of the Decision of the Office of the President, which upheld the
Order of the DENR secretary approving the transfer to, and the
registration of the FTAA in the name of, Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
255
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 255

stitutionality issue to speak of. Upon the other hand,

conveyance of the FTAA to a Filipino corporation can be
likened to the sale of land to a foreigner who subsequently
acquires Filipino citizenship, or who later re-sells the same
land to a Filipino citizen. The conveyance would be
validated, as the property in question
2
would no longer be
owned by a disqualified vendee.
Since the FTAA is now to be implemented by a Filipino
corporation, how can the Court still declare it
unconstitutional? The CA case is a dispute between two
Filipino companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto) both claiming
the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP. So
regardless of which side eventually wins, the FTAA would
still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company.
Furthermore, there being no more justiciable
controversy, the plea to nullify the Mining Law has become
a virtual petition for declaratory relief, 3over which the
Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction.
At bottom, I rely on the well-settled doctrine that this
Court does not decide constitutional
4
issues, unless they are
the very lis mota of the case.
Not Limited to Technical or Financial Assistance

Only
At any rate,5 following the literal text of the present

Constitution, the ponencia limits to strict technical or
financial only the assistance to be provided to the State by
foreign-owned corporations for the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
mineral oils. Such assistance may not
_______________
2 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari, G.R. No. 133250,

July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152; May 6, 2003, 403 SCRA 1, and November
11, 2003, 415 SCRA 403.
3 United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. v. Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems, 353 SCRA 782, March 7, 2001; In Re:
Saturnino V. Bermudez, 145 SCRA 163, October 24, 1986; Darnoc Realty
Development Corp. v. Ayala Corp., 202 Phil. 865; 117 SCRA 538,
September 30, 1982; De la Llana v. Alba, 198 Phil. 1; 112 SCRA 294,
March 12, 1982.
4 Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 44, February 1, 2001; Lalican
v. Hon. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485; 276 SCRA 518, July 31, 1997; Ty v.
Trampe, 321 Phil. 103; 250 SCRA 500, December 1, 1995; People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56, November 16, 1937.
5 Par. 4, Sec. 2 of Art XII.
256

include “management or other forms of assistance” or other

activities associated with the “service contracts” of the past
unlamented regime. Precisely, “the management or
operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is
the primary feature of service contracts, was x x x the evil
that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to
eradicate.”
Again, because of the mootness problem, it would be risky
to take a definitive position on this question. The Court
would be speculating on the contents of the FTAA of a
prospective foreign company. The requirements of “case and
controversy” would be lacking. Suffice it to say, at this point,
that the issue even in a live case is not quite that easy to
tackle.
First, the drafters’ choice of words—their use of the
phrase “agreements x x x involving x x x technical or
financial assistance”—does not absolutely indicate the
intent to exclude other modes of assistance. Rather, the
phrase signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other
activities, provided they bear some reasonable relationship
to and compatibility with financial or technical assistance.
If the intention of the drafters were strictly to confine
foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and
nothing more, I am certain that their language would have
been unmistakably restrictive and stringent. They would
have said, for example: “Foreign corporations are prohibited
from providing management or other forms of assistance,” or
words to that effect. The conscious avoidance of restrictive
wording bespeaks an intent not to employ—in an
exclusionary, inflexible and limiting manner—the
expression “agreements involving technical or financial
assistance.”
Second, I believe the foregoing position is supported by
the fact that our present Constitution still recognizes and
allows service contracts (and has not rendered them taboo),
albeit subject to several restrictions and modifications aimed
at avoiding the pitfalls of the past. Below are some excerpts
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
(Concom), showing that its members discussed “technical or
financial agreements” in the same breath as “service
contracts” and used the terms interchangeably:
“MR. JAMIR: Yes, Madam President. With respect to the

second paragraph of Section 3, my amendment by
substitution reads:
257
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 257

THE PRESIDENT MAY ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS

WITH FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS
INVOLVING EITHER TECHNICAL OR FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE-SCALE EXPLORATION,
DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES ACCORDING TO THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS PROVIDED BY LAW.
MR. VILLEGAS: The Committee accepts the amendment.
Commissioner Suarez will give the background x x x.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President x x x.
MR. JAMIR: Yes, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ: This particular portion of the section has
reference to what was popularly known before as service
contracts, among other things, is that correct?
MR. JAMIR: Yes, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is formulated, the President may enter
into service contracts but subject to the guidelines that
may be promulgated by Congress?
MR. JAMIR: That is correct.
MR. SUAREZ: Therefore, that aspect of negotiation and
consummation will fall on the President, not upon
Congress?
MR. JAMIR: That is also correct, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ: Except that all of these contracts, service or
otherwise, must be made strictly in accordance with
guidelines prescribed by Congress?
MR. JAMIR: That is also correct.
MR. SUAREZ: And the Gentleman is thinking in terms of a
law that uniformly covers situations of the same nature?
MR. JAMIR: That is 100 percent correct x x x
x x x x x x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: The amendment has been accepted by
the Committee. May we first vote on the last paragraph?
MR. GASCON: Madam President, that is the point of my
inquiry x x x Commissioner Jamir had proposed an
amendment with regard to special service contracts which
was accepted by the Committee. Since the Committee has
accepted it, I would like to ask some questions x x x As it
is proposed now, such service contracts will be entered
into by the President with the guidelines of a general law
on service contracts to be enacted by Congress. Is that
correct?
MR. VILLEGAS: The Commissioner is right, Madam
President.
258

MR. GASCON: According to the original proposal, if the

President were to enter into a particular agreement, he
would need the concurrence of Congress. Now that it has
been changed by the proposal of Commissioner Jamir in
that Congress will set the general law to which the
President shall comply, the President will, therefore, not
need the concurrence of Congress every time he enters
into service contracts. Is that correct?
MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.
MR. GASCON: The proposed amendment of Commissioner
Jamir is in direct contrast to my proposed amendment, so
I would like to object and present my proposed
amendment to the body x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. GASCON: Yes, it will be up to the body. I feel that the
general law to be set by Congress as regards service
contract agreements which the President will enter into
might be too general or since we do not know the content
yet of such a law, it might be that certain agreements will
be detrimental to the interest of the Filipinos. This is in
direct contrast to my proposal which provides that there
be effective constraints in the implementation of service
contracts. So instead of a general law to be passed by
Congress to serve as a guideline to the President when
entering into service contract agreements, I propose that
every service contract entered into by the President
would need the concurrence of Congress, so as to assure
the Filipinos of their interests with regard to the issue in
Section 3 on all lands of the public domain. My
alternative amendment, which we will discuss later,
reads: THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL ENTER INTO
SUCH AGREEMENTS ONLY WITH THE
CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF ALL
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SITTING
SEPARATELY x x x
MR. BENGZON: The reason we made that shift is that we
realized the original proposal could breed corruption. By
the way, this is not just confined to service contracts but
also to financial assistance. If we are going to make every
single contract subject to the concurrence of Congress—
which, according to the Commissioner’s amendment is
the concurrence of two-thirds of Congress voting
separately—then (1) there is a very great chance that
each contract will be different from another; and (2) there
is a great temptation that it would breed corruption
because of the great lobbying that is going to happen.
And we do not want to subject our legislature to that. x x
x.
MR. GASCON: But my basic problem is that we do not
know as of yet the contents of such a general law as to
how much con-
259
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 259

straints there will be in it. And to my mind, although the

committee’s contention that the regular concurrence from
Congress would subject Congress to extensive lobbying, I
think that is a risk we will have to take since Congress is a
body of representatives of the people whose membership will
be changing regularly as there will be changing
circumstances every time certain agreements are made. It
would be best then to keep in tab and attuned to the interest
of the Filipino people, whenever the President enters into
any agreement with regard to such an important matter as
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources or service
contracts, the people’s elected representatives should be on
top of it x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. OPLE: Madam President, we do not need to suspend
the session. If Commissioner Gascon needs a few minutes,
I can fill up the remaining time while he completes his
proposed amendment. I just wanted to ask Commissioner
Jamir whether he would entertain a minor amendment to
his amendment, and it reads as follows: THE
PRESIDENT SHALL SUBSEQUENTLY NOTIFY
CONGRESS OF EVERY SERVICE CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
GENERAL LAW. I think the reason is, if I may state it
briefly, as Commissioner Bengzon said, Congress can
always change the general law later on to conform to new
perceptions of standards that should be built into service
contracts. But the only way Congress can do this is if
there were a notification requirement from the Office of
the President that such service contracts had been
entered into, subject then to the scrutiny of the Members
of Congress. This pertains to a situation where the service
contracts are already entered into, and all that this
amendment seeks is the reporting requirement from the
Office of the President. Will Commissioner Jamir
entertain that?
MR. JAMIR: I will gladly do so, if it is still within my power.
MR.VILLEGAS: Yes, the Committee accepts the
amendment.
x x x x x x x x x
SR. TAN: Madam President, may I ask a question? x x x
Am I correct in thinking that the only difference between
these future service contracts and the past service
contracts under Mr. Marcos is the general law to be
enacted by the legislature and the notification of
it not?
MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.
260

SR. TAN: So those are the safeguards.

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. There was no law at all governing
service contracts before. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. SARMIENTO: Maybe we can simplify my proposed
amendment, so that it will read: IT SHALL BE THE
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROMOTE, DEVELOP
AND EMPLOY LOCAL SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES x x x.
MR. DAVIDE: Could it not be properly accommodated
either in the Article on Declaration of Principles and
State Policies or in the Article on Human Resources
because it would not be germane to the Article on
National Economy and Patrimony which we are now
treating?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think the intention here, if I understand
the amendment to the amendment, is to make sure that
when these technical and scientific services are rendered
by foreigners there would be a deliberate attempt to
develop local talents so that we are not forever dependent
on these foreigners. Am I right?
MR. DAVIDE: So it is in relation to the service contracts? x
x x Can it not be stated that the general law providing for
service contracts shall give priority to the adjective of
Commissioner Sarmiento’s amendment? It should be in
the law itself.
MR VILLEGAS: That is why it says, ‘IT SHALL BE THE
POLICY OF THE STATE’ immediately following the
statement about Congress.
x x x x x x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: Does Commissioner Gascon insist on
his proposed amendment?
MR. GASCON: I objected to that amendment and after
listening to it again, I feel that I still object on basic
principles, that every service contract to be entered into
by the President should be with the concurrence of
Congress. I had earlier presented a proposed amendment
of ‘CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF ALL
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS,’ but at this point in
time, perhaps to simplify choices, since basically the
proposal of Commissioner Jamir is to set a general law
with regard to service contracts, my proposal is to require
concurrence of Congress every time a service contract is
to be made.
THE PRESIDENT: That is clear now. So can we proceed to
vote?
261
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 261

MR. NOLLEDO: x x x Madam President, I have the

permission of the Acting Floor Leader to speak for only
two minutes in favor of the amendment of Commissioner
Gascon x x x x With due respect to the members of the
Committee and Commissioner Jamir, I am in favor of the
objection of Commissioner Gascon. Madam President, I
was one of those who refused to sign the 1973
Constitution, and one of the reasons is that there were
many provisions in the Transitory Provisions therein
that favored aliens. I was shocked when I read a
provision authorizing service contracts while we, in this
Constitutional Commission, provided for Filipino control
of the economy. We are, therefore, providing for
exceptional instances where aliens may circumvent
Filipino control of our economy. And one way of
circumventing the rule in favor of Filipino control of the
economy is to recognize service contracts. As far as I am
concerned, if I should have my own way, I am for the
complete deletion of this provision. However, we are
presenting a compromise in the sense that we are
requiring a two-thirds vote of all the Members of
Congress as a safeguard. I think we should not mistrust
the future Members of Congress by saying that the
purpose of this provision is to avoid corruption. We
cannot claim that they are less patriotic than we are. I
think the Members of this Commission should know that
entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule
on protection of natural resources for the interest of the
nation, and therefore, being an exception it should be
subject whenever possible, to stringent rules. It seems to
me that we are liberalizing the rules in favor of aliens.
I say these things with a heavy heart, Madam President.
I do not claim to be a nationalist, but I love my country.
Although we need investments, we must adopt safeguards
that are truly reflective of the sentiments of the people and
not mere cosmetic safeguards as they now appear in the
Jamir amendment. (Applause) x x x.”
The foregoing is but a small sampling of the lengthy

discussions of the constitutional commissioners on the
subject of service contracts and technical and financial
assistance agreements. Quoting the rest of their discussions
would have taken up several more pages, and these have
thus been omitted for the sake of brevity. In any event, it
would appear that the members of the Concom actually had
in mind the Marcos era service contracts that they were
familiar with (but which they duly modified and restricted
so as to prevent abuses), when they were crafting and
polishing the provisions
262

dealing with financial and/or technical assistance

agreements. These provisions ultimately became the fourth
and the fifth paragraphs of Section 2 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Put differently, “technical and financial
assistance agreements” were understood by the delegates to
include service contracts duly modified to prevent abuses.
I respectfully submit that the statements of
Commissioner Jose Nolledo, quoted above, are especially
pertinent, since they refer specifically to service contracts in
favor of aliens. From his perspective, it is clear to me that
the Concom discussions in their entirety had to do with
service contracts that might be given to foreign-owned
corporations as exceptions to the general principle of
Filipino control of the economy.
Commissioner Nolledo sums up these statements by
saying: “We are, therefore, providing for exceptional
instances where aliens may circumvent Filipino control of
our economy. And one way of circumventing the rule in favor
of Filipino control of the economy is to recognize service
contracts. As far as I am concerned, if I should have my own
way, I am for the complete deletion of this provision.
However, we are presenting a compromise in the sense that
we are requiring a two-thirds vote of all the Members of
Congress as a safeguard. x x x x x x x x x. I think the
Members of this Commission should know that entering into
service contracts is an exception to the rule on protection of
natural resources for the interest of the nation, and therefore,
being an exception it should be subject whenever possible, to
stringent rules. It seems to me that we are liberalizing the
rules in favor of aliens. x x x.”
Since the drafters were referring only to service contracts
to be granted to foreigners and to nothing else, this fact
necessarily implies that we ought not treat the idea of
“agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance” as having any significance or existence apart
from service contracts. In other words, in the minds of the
commissioners, the concept of technical and financial
assistance agreements did not exist at all apart from the
concept of service contracts duly modified to prevent abuses.
Interpretation of the Constitution

in the Light of Present-Day Realities
Tantamount to closing one’s eyes to reality is the insistence

that the term “agreements involving technical or financial
assistance”
263
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 263

refers only to purely technical or financial assistance to be

rendered to the State by a foreign corporation (and must
perforce exclude management and other forms of
assistance). Nowadays, securing the kind of financial
assistance required by large-scale explorations, which
involve hundreds of millions of dollars, is not just a matter
of signing a simple promissory note in favor of a lender.
Current business practices often require borrowers seeking
huge loans to allow creditors access to financial records and
other data, and probably a seat or two on the former’s board
of directors; or at least some participation in certain
management decisions that may have an impact on the
financial health or long-term viability of the debtor, which of
course will directly affect the latter’s capacity to repay its
loans. Prudent lending practices necessitate a certain degree
of involvement in the borrower’s management process.
Likewise, technical assistance, particularly in certain
industries like mining and oil exploration, would likely be
from the industry’s leading players. It may involve the
training of personnel and some form of supervision and
oversight with respect to the correct and proper
implementation of the technical assistance. The purpose is
to ensure that the technical assistance rendered will not go
to waste, and that the lender's business reputation and
successful track record in the industry will be adequately
safeguarded. Thus the technical assistance arrangements
often necessarily include interface with the management
process itself.
The mining industry is in the doldrums, precisely
because of lack of technical and financial resources in our
country. If activated properly, the industry could
meaningfully contribute to our economy and lead to the
employment of many of our jobless compatriots. A hasty and
premature decision on the constitutionality of the herein
FTAA and the Philippine Mining Act could unnecessarily
burden the recovery of the industry and the employment
opportunities it would likely generate.
Oral Argument Needed
Given the modern-day reality that even the World Bank

(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not
lend on the basis merely of bare promissory notes, but on
some conditionalities designed to assure the borrowers’
financial viability, I would like to hear in an Oral Argument
in a live, not a moot, case what these
264

international practices are and how they impact on our

constitutional restrictions. This is not to say that we should
bend our basic law; rather, we should find out what kind of
FTAA provisions are realistic vis-à-vis these international
standards and our constitutional protection. Unless there is
a live FTAA, the Court would not be able to analyze the
provisions vis-à-vis the Constitution, the Mining Law and
these modern day lending practices.
I mentioned the WB and the IMF, not necessarily
because I agree with their oftentimes stringent policies, but
because they set the standards that international and
multinational financial institutions often take bearings
from. The WB and IMF are akin (though not equivalent) to
the Bangko Sentral, which all Philippine banks must abide
by. If this Court closes its doors to these international
realities and unilaterally sets up its own concepts of strict
technical and financial assistance, then it may unwittingly
make the country a virtual hermit—an economic isolationist
—in the real world of finance.
I understand that a live case, challenging the Mining
Law and an FTAA relevant thereto, is pending before the
Second Division of this Court, where it is docketed as G.R.
No. 157882 (Dipdio Earth Savers Multi-Purpose Association
v. Hon. Elisea Gozun). Can we not consolidate that case with
the current one, call an Oral Argument, and then decide the
matter more definitively? During the Oral Argument, I
believe that the Court should invite as amici curiae (1) a
lawyer versed in international finance like retired Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, (2) a representative of the Banker’s
Association of the Philippines, and (3) a leader of the
University of the Philippines Law Constitution Project.
Constitutional Interpretation and the

Vagaries of Contemporary Events
Finally, I believe that the Concom did not mean to tie the
hands of the President and restrict the latter only to
agreements on rigid financial and technical assistance and
nothing else. The commissioners fully realized that their
work would have to withstand the test of time; that the
Charter, though crafted with the wisdom born of past
experiences and lessons painfully learned, would have to be
a living document that would answer the needs of the nation
well into the future. Thus, the unerring emphasis on
flexibility and adaptability.
265
VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 265

Commissioner Joaquin Bernas stressed that he voted in

favor of the Article, “because it is flexible enough to allow
future 6legislators to correct whatever mistakes we may have
made.” Commissioner Felicitas Aquino noted that “unlike
the other articles of this Constitution, this article whether
we like it or not would have to yield to flexibility and
elasticity which inheres in the interpretation of this
provision. Why? Precisely because the forces
7
of economics
are dynamic and are perpetually in motion.” 8
Along the same line, the Court, in Tañada v. Angara,
stressed the need to interpret the Constitution to cover
“refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding
events”:
“x x x. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of

contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even
future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters
that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels
but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events.”
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Petition granted.
Notes.—The provision of Article 9 of Administrative

Order No. 57 that “all such leases or agreements shall be
converted into production sharing agreements” could not
possibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of
the Government that all existing mining leases and
agreements are automatically converted into production-
sharing agreements, as the use of the term “production-
sharing agreement” implies negotiation between the
Government and the applicants, if they are so minded.
(Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Factoran, Jr.,
240 SCRA 100 [1995])
It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines
whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest
opportunity—the earliest opportunity to raise a
constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a
competent court that can resolve the same, such that, “if it is
not raised in the pleadings, it cannot
_______________
6Id., p. 840.
7Ibid.
8 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997.
266

Estate of the Late Juliana Diez Vda. de Gabriel vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial,
it cannot be considered on appeal.” (Matibag vs. Benipayo,
380 SCRA 49 [2002])
——o0o——
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*

G.R. No. 127882. January 27, 2004.

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 149

PARAIR, MARIO L. MANGCAL, ALDEN S. TUSAN,

1 Appears as “Nequito” in the caption of the Petition by “Nequinto” in

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CENTER, INC. (LRC), petitioners, vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS,

Judicial Review; Requisites.—When an issue of

4 Erroneously designated in the Petition as “Western Mining Philippines

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 151

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

Same; Same; As the case involves constitutional questions, this

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 153

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 155

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

petroleum through “service contracts”; “Service contracts” is a term

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

with any person or entity for the exploration or utilization of

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 157

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

Same; Same; Same; Limitations on Technical or Financial

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

7076 (the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991) and other

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 159

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.—While the effectivity clause of

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

Same; Same; The management or operation of mining activities

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance”

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 163

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

the provision is “very restrictive.” Commissioner Nolledo also

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisions of R.A. No. 7942 Violative

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 165

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

equitable treatment” stipulation in said treaty.—The invalidation of

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

is a strong argument against its adoption. Accordingly, petitioners’

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

National Economy and Patrimony; Statutory Construction; It

VOL. 421, JANUARY 27, 2004 167

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos