Res +39,+s +2006+8+of+8
Res +39,+s +2006+8+of+8
Res +39,+s +2006+8+of+8
Page 133 (
Rules for setting Distribution Wheeling Rates
First Entry Point
VOLTAGE REGULATION
Target probability of voltage violation 4%
(pV")
Performance Neatlv below tar 'et Probabilitv of volta'e violation 'reater than or eoual to 6%
Tar"el not achieved Probabilit I of voltage violation between )IX, and 6(H,
Performance a~ Dcr eXDcctation Probabilitv of vo1ta"c violation on or bctween or eaual to 3% and 5%
Tar"et exceeded Probabilitv of voltaQe violation between 2% and 3'1"
Tar"et "reatly exceeded Probability of voita"e violation le~s than or equal to 2%
....(lJJ
Rules for setting Distrihution Wheeling Rates
First Entry Point
The methodology that will be used to establish the penalty levels is as follows:
(d) The ERC will calculate the total revenue allocation for the GSL scheme.
In accordance with Section B2.1.3(b) , this allocation will be calculated
as 0.5 % of the annual revenue requirement. Penalty levels will be
constant for the whole of the Third Regulatory Period, these will be based
on the annual revenue requirement for Regulatory Year 2012 (the start of
the period).
(e) Based on the data submitted by the Regulated Entities and the
performance targets established for each index, the ERC will assess the
likely number of instances in a year that each of the performance target
levels will be exceeded. For example, the number of customers likely to
have faults exceeding the target time duration (GSL3) during Regulatory
Year t would be nGSL3.
(f) By allocating the same weighting to all the proposed GSL indices, the
revenue allocation will be made per index. For example, the revenue
allocated to the GSL3 measure would be :
PenGSL3 = GSL3Rev
nGSL3
B3.3 Adapting revenue requirements
An additional allowance will be made over and above the annual revenue requirement for
each Regulated Entity, to cover the anticipated average amount that would be payable
towards the GSL scheme. While this allowance will not be pmt of the annual revenue
requirement (which is calculated based on the building blocks), it will be added to the annual
revenue requirement for each Regulatory Year during the Third Regulatory Period for the
purposes of calculating the smoothing factor and setting the initial price cap that will apply
for the Third Regulatory Period.
Regulated Entities who manage to perform better than forecasted against the GSL will be
allowed to retain the savings on the extra revenue allowance. Conversely, those Regulated
Entities that payout more penalties than forecast, will bear the additional cost, up to a
maximum of 0.5% of thc annual revenue rcquiremcnt for a Regulatory Year.29
This intention of the 0.5% of the annual revenue requirement allowance is to allow
Regulated Entities the option of incurring additional expenditure to avoid penalty situations,
or to remain revenue neutral if they maintain cun.ent petformance levels.
B4 Excluded events
There are a number of external events which can have a substantial impact on the actual
petformance of Regulated Distribution Systems against petformanee indices, but that are
predominantly outside the control of Regulated Entities. The ERe will allow these events to
be excluded from the statistics used to calculate network or service performance.
Events of which the impact on the peIformance of a Regulated Distribution System will
generally be excluded are:
• supply inten.uptions made at the request of a customer;
• load shedding due to a shortfall in generation;
• supply interruptions caused by a failure of the transmission network;
• excessive distribution voltage regulation caused by voltage levels at the transmission
supply points falling outside the boundaries described in the Philippine Grid Code;3o
• supply intcrruptions caused by a failure of a transmission connection asset, but only to
the extent that the interruptions were not due to inadequate planning of transmission
connections; and
• widespread supply interruptions due to rare and extreme events which were not
reasonably able to be foreseen, or if thcy could be foreseen, for which the impact could
still not be effectively mitigated even if appropriate responses were provided.
A Regulated Entity wishing to exclude the impact of a cettain event from the calculation of
the service performance incentive scheme would need to provide the ERe with the
following:
• a detailed description of the nature of the event for which an exclusion is sought and the
reasons justifying the exclusion of the event, including the provision of suppotting
evidence;
• cvidence of the impact of the event on the Regulated Distribution System reliability
perfOlmance, for each of the measures adversely affected;
• a description of the steps that the Regulated Entity took to mitigate against or respond to
the events; and
• evidence that the Regulated Entity was unable to further mitigate against the impact of
the event.
29 If this value is exceeded, the cap of 3% of the annual revenue requirement for the performance incentive
scheme could be breached .
.10Section 3.2.3.4 of the Philippine Grid Code (R.A. 9136) prescribes the RMS value of the long-duration
voltage to be ensured at any (transmission) Connection Point by the Grid Owner and System Operator to be
r
greater than 95% but less than 105% of the nominal (transmission) voltage level.
The ERC \vill adopt the 2.5 beta approach, developed by the Institute for Elccttical and
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) to identify major event days.3!
Further tests will be applied to detennine the main cause(s) for the major event days,
isolating, where appropriate, the underlying event and formally classing it as "severe".
These tests include assessing the nature and rarity of an event, the ability to foresee and
prepare for an event, the ability of distribution companies to mitigate the effects of an event,
and the reaction of Regulated Entities after the event.
If after this consideration the ERe approves the classification of an event as extreme, the
impact of the event on the petformance indices would be excluded from the performance
statistics used as part of the performance incentive scheme.
BS Information disclosure
The third component of the performance incentive scheme is the measurement and
disclosure of further performance data. From the third regulatory period, Regulated Entities
will be required to measure the performance of each Regulated Disttibution System against
the following indices:
Network performance indices
• momentary average interruption frequency index (MAIH);
• frequency of tripping events per 100 circuit-km;
Service performance indices
• average time to respond to queries and complaints;
• average time to reconnect a service after payment of all dues.
The information has to be collected and supplied to the ERC on a monthly basis. In addition
to the monthly figures, the cumulative performance total against each index must also be
provided, from the start of the corresponding calendar year ti1l the end of the month for
which each index was measured.
The ERe intends to annually publicize the information disclosure data for all Regulated
Distribution Systems .
.11 IEEE Power Engineering Society. (2004, May). IEEE Std I366TM - 2003. IEEE Guide for Electric Power
Distribution Reliability Indices. New York, USA.
rN
Rules for setting Distribution \Vheeling Rates
First Entry Point
APPENDIX C
CRITERIA FOR REGULATORY RESET EXPERTS
The main categOlies for which Regulatory Reset Experts will be retained by the ERC are
listed below, with the experience and qualifications required for individual experts working
on each category. These experience levels and qualifications may not necessary all lie in a
single expert, but rather in a team, or in a group of one or more expel1s working on a
category. Any individual making up part of such a team or group of Regulatory Reset
Experts working on a category, should have qualifications in one or more of the areas listed,
and have experience in one or more of the aspects listed against that particular category.
The requirements noted below are not intended to prevent a Regulatory Reset Expert from
using the support of analysts, administrative or other supporting staff in the provision of
services to the ERC in terms of the DWRG and it is not required or expected that such
supporting staff should have the experience or qualifications noted below. However, a
Regulatory Reset Expert shall review all the outputs from such supporting staff and accept
full professional responsibility for such outputs. All infOlTIlation and reports provided by a
Regulatory Reset Expert to the ERC shall be presented by the Regulatory Reset Expert in
his/her own name and capacity.
Asset valuation
Have experience in:
• Appraising electricity network plant and equipment, and land and buildings, within
the Philippines using a fair value methodology;
• Valuing electricity distribution network assets, in an overseas jUlisdiction, using an
optimized replacement cost valuation methodology; and
• Assisting regulated entities and/or regulators in overseas jurisdictions in reviewing or
determining regulatory asset bases used for the purposes of incentive or performance
based regulatory arrangements.
Have qualifications in (see below):
• Engineering;
• Accounting; and
• Business or Commerce.
Distribution system design. construction, maintenance and operation, load flow modelling
and distribution network benchmark service pcrrormance
Have experience in:
• Electricity network load flow modc11ing;
• Design, construction and maintenance of electTicity distTibution networks, including
project cost estimation, project planning, cost control and network constraint
elimination;
• McasUling and monitoring electricity network performance;
• DesIgn and/or augmentation of electricity networks for reduced lme losses; and
()
Rule, tor Scuing Di~(nbullOn Whcchng Rale, Page 141 (
~
\
Rules for setting Distribution Wheeling Rates
First Entry Point
Notwithstanding the above, the ERC may decide to appoint a Regulatory Reset Expert who
does not comply with these requirements for professional qualifications, where it has been
proven to the satisfaction of the ERC that the Reset Expert has marc than 10 years
demonstrable professional experience in the relevant discipline that is directly relevant to the
service to be rendered. In such a case the ERC will communicate the decision in advance to
the affected Regulated Entity or Entities, providing the supporting information on the
experience of the intended Regulatory Reset EXpet1 and why this appointment is considered
appropriate for the task to be performed.
/)
Rules for Selling [)islriblltion Wheeling Rates \~
\ . Pagc142 (,
•
Rules for setting Distribution Wheeling Rates
First Entry Point
APPENDIXD
OPTIMIZA TlON PRINCIPLES
For the purposes of Section 4.8.6, the following optimization principles will be applied when
undertaking the optimizing of the re-valuation of the Regulatory Asset Base.
nt. Background
The intention of optimization when valuing a distribution network is to ensure that
the network would use the most cost-efficient design that would provide the
required service potential. In theory such a state could only be achieved if an
approach is followed that completely disregards the design and configuration of the
existing asset base. However, such an approach would be cost intensive and is
likely to result in variable and inconsistent outcomes and also does not reflect the
constraints that an existing network impose on new network developments.
The form of optimization applied here uses the existing network as the starting
point for the valuation. A series of optimization tests must be systematically
applied to the whole network to identify stranded assets, excess capacity and over-
engineering. Where necessary, the network is notionally redesigned to provide an
optimized network.
Optimization is to be undcttaken after the replacement cost (RC) distribution
network has been determined. The output from this process is the optimized
replacement cost (OR C).
Thc base ru1cs for establishing the optimized network arc that it should:
(A) provide a quality of supply similar to that which currently exists, except where
this exceeds the approved standard quality of supply ctiteria; and
(B) have a capacity similar to that of the existing network, except where this
exceeds allowed future load growth.
Optimization consists of fi ve stages:
1) excluding stranded assets;
2) optimizing the configuration of the network;
3) optimizing the capacity of elements in the network;
4) optimizing network engineering; and
5) optimizing stores and spares.
The determination of indexed historical costs, replacement costs or modem
equivalent replacement costs for existing individual network components is not
part of the optimization process. This shall be done prior to calculating the RC.
standard lives. The situation may therefore arise where the use of a lower cost asset
is avoided because of such life cycle cost analysis. In such cases, a general
description of the analysis and assumptions used should be included in the valuation
repOt1.
In undertaking life cycle cost analyses to detelmine the most efficient design, the
following may be taken into account:
(a) the capital and operating costs over the life of the asset;
(b) other costs that are incurred by the Regulated Entity as a result of
the use of the asset; and
(c) the cost of losses to the extent that these are caused by the
existing load and the allowed future load growth.
D3. Constraints on Optimization
The optimization process shall be carried out subject to the following constraints:
a) the potential level of service of the optimized network shall not exceed that of
the existing network, and the performance of any part of the optimized
network shall not exceed the Regulated Entities disclosed quality of supply
criteria, unless nonstandard contracts with customers exist that require the
Regulated Entity to provide an enhanced quality of supply;
b) the location of points of connection to other networks should be assumed to
be fixed. However, where a point of connection can be bypassed and replaced
with a more cost-efficient network arrangement, then that point of connection
shall be deleted for valuation purposes;
c) the location and number of connection points to consumers should be
assumed fixed;
d) the optimized network should only use the voltage levels used on the existing
network; and
e) the existing geographic boundaries of the Regulated Entity's supply area
should be assumed to be fixed.
D4. The Process of Optimization
Optimization of the network shall be undertaken on a systematic basis. The
optimization process must examine the existing network and determine whether a
more cost-efficient design could meet the required quality of supply criteria
throughout the allowed planning period. Optimization shall be undet1aken
systematically across the network and shall include, in particular, the following
network components:
a) points of connection to other networks;
b) substation's and primary distribution switching stations;
d) subtransmission lines and primary distribution circuits;
e) high voltage distribution feeders; and
f) the low voltage disttibution system.
32 For the purposes of optimIzation, sub-transmission assets are detlned as those assets used on Regulated
Distribution Systems to connect transmission and distribution substations. It does not include those assets
owned by Regulated Entities to directly connect large consumers to the transmission network.
33 A primary distribution circuit is a distribution voltage circuit used for transporting
electricity to other circuits at the samc or lower distribution voltage levels. In general, but
not always, primary dlstnbutIOn Circuits Willnot be used for the direct supply of clectncity
«
to customers or for the direct supply of dlstnbution transfo~s that fee ';bw voltage
network. / j
Page 148