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 Aristotle’s Human Virtue and Yorùbá Worldview of Ọmọlúàbí: an Ethical-Cultural
Interpretation

Bosede Adefiola Adebowale

olusegunbosede@gmail.com

&

Folake Onayemi
fonayemi02yahoo.com

Department of Classics
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Abstract
This paper gives an interpretative ethical-cultural analysis of the Aristotelian concepts of virtue
in ancient Greece and Ọmọlúàbí in Yorùbá worldview through the four cardinal virtues of
prudence, justice, courage and temperance. Generally, virtue and vices are common
terminologies in ethical theories. They constitute significant principles or rules for moral actions.
Virtues are ways of describing the habit of following those principles and rules. However,
Aristotle, rather than explaining right or wrong in terms of rules, appraises the human
characteristics through actions that make a person virtuous, enabling him to act ethically or
acceptably under different circumstances that cannot be covered by rules or principle. Aristotle
developed a significant description of human virtue in two of his texts, the Nicomachean Ethics
and the Eudemian Ethics and reached several conclusions on what it means for a person to be
virtuous. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes virtue as qualities needed to live
morally and to achieve the overall purpose in life- happiness. He maintains that striking a
balance between a deficiency and an excess of a trait is important. He considers virtue as a state
of being which abets a person to live according to reason. Aristotle’s virtue relates to the Yorùbá
ideology of ọmọlúàbí the philosophical and cultural concept used to describe someone of good
and virtuous nature. An ọmọlúàbí is expected to display and exhibit great virtues and values
translating the core moral conduct in Yorùbá culture, such as: humility, good-naturedness,
bravery, good will and diligence among others.

Key words: Ọmọlúàbí, Aristotelian, Yorùbá, Virtue, Cardinal Virtues

Introduction
In the history of moral philosophy, the concept of virtue is one of the most fundamental
theories because it has to do with the ability to judge actions with regards to appropriate
actions at a given time. The theory of virtue started in the pre-Socratic era, but earnest debate
commenced with Socrates, who questioned the values and beliefs of fellow philosophers,

1
especially, the Sophists on the issues relating to virtue. The theory became significantly
advanced by Plato, but made more elaborate by Aristotle. The Greek word for virtue, αρετή
(arête), which means moral excellence, gives the indication that the primary concern of ancient
Greek philosophers on ethics was the good life for humans. From the Greek notion of the good
life for human comes from the concept of eudaimonia which literally means well-being, but
often translated as happiness. However, with Aristotelian ethics, the major interest became
what humans should pursue in order to achieve this happiness. The debate on the theory of
virtue did not end with Aristotle, but continued to be a major philosophical theme of later
philosophers such as the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics. Stedman (2011:57) claims that
“Aristotelian thought was preserved by Arab scholars during the so-called Dark Ages” and was
later “rediscovered by Christian thinkers during the High Middle Ages” and incorporated into
Christian moral theology, particularly by Thomas Aquinas. Today, virtue ethics survives and
persists as the “dominant approach in Western moral philosophy” (Hursthouse, 2007:1). The
term ‘virtue’ is derived from the Latin word ‘virtus’ which is the personification of the Roman
god, Virtus, which connotes manliness, honour, and worthiness of reverential respect. Guthrie
(1960:154) explains virtue as:

A state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean

relative to ourselves, determined by a rational principle and
in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it.

Rand (1961) defines virtue as the “act by which we gain/and or keep virtues” and identifies
certain virtues such as justice, pride, integrity and honesty. According to Rand, virtue must be
justified in terms of the requirements of life and happiness. The Yorùbá term that most describe
the theory of virtue ethics is Ọmọlúàbí, a Yorùbá word ethically used to describe a person of
good character. The concept of Ọmọlúàbí signifies courage, humility, respect, strength, worth,
moral excellence, wisdom, as well as moral goodness. The objective of this paper is to give an
interpretative ethical-cultural analysis of Aristotelian and Yorùbá concepts of virtue and
Ọmọlúàbí.
The Aristotelian Concept of Human Virtue
Aristotle gives a detail account of virtue in two of his works, the Nicomachean Ethics and the
Eudemian Ethics. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes virtue as qualities which

2
human beings need in order to live morally and to achieve the overall purpose in life,
eudaimonia- happiness. Aristotle sees happiness as the chief goal in human life and added that it
is only when people display virtuous qualities that they could enjoy happiness. Aristotle adds
that these qualities are necessary for man’s development as a social being, and maintains that
striking a balance between a deficiency and an excess of a trait is important. Aristotle views
virtue as a state of being which abets a person to live according to reason. To Aristotle, human
virtue is that which makes humans perform their characteristic action well and this is uniquely
essential to being human, that is living a human life in accordance with reason, which is the state
of character and is connected with a person’s response to pleasure and pains under various
situations.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, the virtuous man knows the best course of action to
take and feels only pleasure without pain for taking this action. Human virtue, to Aristotle, is the
state of the human soul that makes a person to choose the right actions, at the right times and for
the right reasons. In other words, a virtuous man is able to respond to different situations at
various times in the right way as a result of his soul being in a particular state. Therefore, virtue
to Aristotle is an overall property of a virtuous man and whatever action he takes is pleasurable
to him. Aristotle declares:
For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is
said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to
the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also
in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in
general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men
their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are
not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find
pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous
actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as
in their own nature (Nichomacean Ethics, Book 1).

He further explains:

… the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by
nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are
pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious
charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have
said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even
good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting
justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and

3
 similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in
themselves pleasant (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1).

Aristotelian ethics emphasizes moral virtues as the basis for the common good and considers
these as the habit of right desire which leads to moderation. He posits that a balance must be
maintained between deficiency and excess not only in relation to habits that affect the body, but
also habits that contribute to the development of virtues, hence he declares:

First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be
destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength and of
health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of
sensible things); exercise either excessive or defective destroys the strength,
and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount
destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and
increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and
courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears
everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a
coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger
becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and
abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every
pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage,
then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1104a11-26.)

Aristotle reiterates that virtue in itself is of no value if virtuous actions are not performed
(Furley, 1999). After all, the concept of virtue is the concept that makes the one possessing it to
be virtuous; just as the virtue of a knife is to cut and the virtue of a teacher is to teach. It is then
that a virtuous person can be considered as being morally good or upright. Aristotle opines that
there are two types of virtues, intellectual and moral virtues and explains how each of these
virtues is acquired and maintained. To him, intellectual virtue owes its birth and growth to
teaching and this requires experience and time, moral virtue, on the other hand, comes about as a
result of habit. Aristotle claims that none of the moral virtues come by nature; because nothing
that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. He emphasises this point with the
following analogy:
For instance, the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot
be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by
throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to
move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in

4
 one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then,
nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are
adapted by nature to receive them and are made perfect by habit.
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire
the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the
case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing
that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before
we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but
the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the
case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we
can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by
building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become
just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by
doing brave acts (Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a).

Aristotle claims that virtue is not to be studied for the sake of knowing what virtue is but to
become good, otherwise it will not be profitable.

The Yorùbá Concept of Ọmọlúàbí

Ọmọlúàbí is the philosophical and cultural concept used by the Yorùbá to describe someone of
good and virtuous nature. In relation to social virtues, the Yorùbá have been described as
“virtuous, loving and kind” (Johnson, 1921:101). The Yorùbá, like the Greeks, use the concept
of ọmọlúàbí as standard which determines the morality and immorality of an act in the society.
Generally, when the Yorùbá describe someone as an ọmọlúàbí, it is an indication that the
individual is well mannered, and cultured. He or she must be a person of honour, who has self-
respect and accords others self-respect and esteem. Awoniyi (1983) describes the word
‘ọmọlúàbí’ as a word that combines all virtues. The Yorùbá believe that virtue helps one to
acquire and put into proper use skill, knowledge and wisdom in order to improve not just one’s
lot but also the lot of the society. Thus, an ọmọlúàbí must ever be ready to give to his community
not only in words but also in deeds and in action.
The Yorùbá, like Aristotle, believe that certain virtues are inherent in every human but
one still has to cultivate many other virtuous qualities to qualify as an ọmọlúàbí, hence the
saying: Ká bí ẹni, kò tó ká tún ara ẹni bí – being born is not sufficient as nurturing oneself
(authors’ translation). At this point, it is important to analyse how the Yorùbá come about the
word, Ọmọlúàbí.

5
 The word Ọmọlúàbí has been analysed in different ways; for instance, Fayemi (2009:
167) considers it as a compound word constituted of suffixes and refers to it as an adjectival
Yorùbá phrase and breaks it down thus:
ọmọ + tí + Olú + ìwà + bí. Literally translated and separated, ọmọ means
child, tí means that or which, olú-ìwà means the chief or master of Ìwà
(character), bí means born. When combined, omolúàbí translates as “the baby
begotten by the chief of ìwà.” Such a child is thought of as a paragon of
excellence in character (Fayemi, 2009: 167).

From the above, an ọmọlúàbí is expected to display and exhibit great virtues and values
translating the core moral conduct in Yorùbá culture such as humility, good-naturedness,
bravery, good will, diligence among others. According to Abiodun (1983: 14), an ọmọlúàbí is
described as “someone who has been well brought up or a person who is highly cultured.” It is
not uncommon for the Yorùbá to describe someone as cultured - ọmọlúàb́i, or as uncultured -
ọmọ lásán. When the Yorùbá describe someone as an ọmọ lásán - uncultured, such an individual
is considered as not being socially integrated or is a misfit or is a cultural deviant within a given
social setting or social organisation (Oyeneye and Shoremi, 1997: 253).
Oluwole (2007:12) considers the word ọmọlúàbí as an interrogative phrase in another
semantic thought to reflect Yorùbá cultural value of good characters by rendering ọmọlúàbí in a
manner that reflects this phrase, ọmọ tí ó ní ìwà bí, meaning a child whose character takes
after..., but sees it as an incomplete sentence. In order to make this a complete sentence that will
give a complete meaning, she raises the question: ọmọ tí ó ní ìwà bí tani? - a child whose
character takes after who? Oluwole (2007) then completes the interrogative phrase by harping
ọmọlúàbí as “ọmọ tí ó ní ìwà bí ẹni tí a kọ́, tí ó sì gba ẹ̀kọ́” meaning a person acting as someone
that is well nurtured and readily lives by the training and educational principles received. She
rendered the concept of ọmọlúàbí in three unified descriptions as follow:
Ọmọ tí ó ní‘wà bí – a person who behaves like...
Ẹni tí a kọ́ – someone properly nurtured
Tí ó si gba ẹ̀kọ́ - and who behaves accordingly (Oluwole, 2007:13).

Abiodun follows the same trend as Oluwole in describing who an ọmọlúàbí is; and describes an
ọmọlúàbí “as someone who has been well brought up or a person who is highly cultured”
(1983:14). Facetiously, some Yorùbá harp ọmọlúàbí as “Ọmọ tí Núà bí,” meaning a child
begotten by Noah. The import of this phrase relates to the attitude and character of Noah as

6
recorded in the Holy Scriptures, where Noah is described as a self-sacrificing obedient servant of
God, hardworking, brave, and respectful. Noah is also regarded as a man of intelligence who has
good will for others, not only by words of mouth but also by his actions.
The list of virtues emphasised by the Yorùbá in the concept of ọmọlúàbí cannot be
exhausted because they are varied and many. For an individual, then to be referred to as an
ọmọlúàbí irrespective of his or her religious affiliation, such an individual must have exhibited
some of the traits and characteristics considered as ọmọlúàbí as described by Abimbola
(1975:390) such as; respect, truth, bravery, good will, intelligence, hardwork, character, and
spoken words. Adagbada (2014) defines ọmọlúàbí as a good and dependable person, who stands
above board at all times. Oyerinde (1991) states the attributes of ọmọlúàbí as including:
respect for old age, loyalty to one’s parents and local traditions,
honesty in all public and private dealings, sociability, courage
... and many other qualities necessary for keeping together the
large centres of the population, characteristic of Yorùbá people.

The above descriptions and many other underlying principles associated with the concept of
ọmọlúàbí as conceived by the Yorùbá may incline to perfectionism as observed by Akinboye
(2015) but Fayemi and Macaulay-Adeyelure, as cited by Akinboye (2015), caution that an
“ọmọlúàbí is not a flawless superhero or an unalloyed character, fashioned with no impurities.”
He is like everyone else, fallible and imperfect. However, the man of good character is expected,
not just to embrace all these qualities but also to exhibit them.

The Four Cardinal Virtues

Plato, while discussing the character of a good city-state in the Republic, identifies four cardinal
virtues with the faculties of man, declaring that people in an ideal city will be “wise, brave,
temperate and just” (427e; 435b). He associates temperance with all classes, but primarily
associates with the producing classes, the farmers and craftsmen, and with the animal appetites,
to whom no special virtue was assigned; fortitude, he assigns to the warrior class and to the
spirited element in man; prudence is attributed to the rulers and to reason, while justice stands
outside the class system and divisions of man, and rules the proper relationship among the three
of them.
Aristotle (Rhetoric, 1366b1) identifies the forms of virtue as justice, courage,
temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence and wisdom. The

7
Roman philosopher and statesman Cicero, in line with the Platonic classification of virtue, limits
the list to four virtues. To Cicero, virtue has four parts namely: wisdom (prudentia), justice,
courage, and temperance (De Inventione, II).
The word ‘cardinal’ is derived from the Latin word cardo, which means hinge. The term
cardinal virtues literally mean those virtues on which all other moral behaviour depends. These
virtues are not considered to be just good in themselves but a mean to an end. Cardinal virtues
then refer to these virtues as being fundamentally important. There are four principal moral
virtues referred to as the cardinal virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance. These
cardinal virtues are interconnected and serve as practical principles guiding everyday life and
covering a large part of the realm of human life perfected by habit. The cardinal virtues imply the
qualities of full humanity: strength, courage, capacity, worth, manliness, moral excellence, as
well as moral goodness. Russell (1982: 343) considers the four cardinal virtues as a guide to the
practice of moral duties and conformity of life to the practical law; uprightness, and rectitude.
Thus, the cardinal virtues are there to help man realise active and moral life by the exercise of
practical reasoning.
Generally, ethics is concerned with action and in order to act morally, there is a need for
investigation and deliberation followed by a decision and the corresponding right action. In other
words, ethics is concerned with volition and action. Prudence serves as the standard of volition
and action; but the standard of prudence is the ipsa res - the thing itself. Meaning that the
decision made prudently shapes human free actions when it becomes a reality.
The word Prudence is known in Classical Greek as phronesis and is derived from Latin
word prudentia contracted from providentia meaning foresight, wisdom, good judgment or
sagacity. Prudence refers to ability to exercise self-control by the use of reason. In Classical
antiquity, prudence is considered not just as one of the cardinal virtues but also as first and
mother of all the other cardinal virtues of fortitude, justice, and temperance (Pieper, 1965:3). A
man can only be regarded as good only if he is prudent, for only a prudent man can be just, brave
and temperate. The ancient Greeks considered prudence in three different perspectives in
connection to other virtues. They view it as the cause, the measure, and form of all virtues.
Pieper (1965:6-7) explains how prudence is the “cause” of the other virtues as follow:
.... There may be a kind of instinctive governance of instinctual
craving, but only prudence transform this instinctive governance
into the virtue of temperance. Virtue is a “perfected ability” of

8
 man as a spiritual person; and justice, fortitude and temperance,
as “abilities” of the whole man, achieve their “perfection” only
when they are founded upon prudence, that is to say upon the
perfected ability to make right decisions. Only by means of this
perfected ability to make good choices are instinctive
inclinations towards goodness exalted into spiritual core of
man’s decisions, from which truly human acts arise.

It can be deduced from the above that prudence is the virtue that guides the judgment of
conscience. Aristotle considers this as the most important of the virtues for it is with the help of
this virtue that one can practically apply basic moral principles to other virtues.
Prudence is also described as the “measure” of justice, of fortitude, and of temperance
because it provides a model of ethically good action. Pieper (1965:7) illustrates this with the
work of art, he asserts that the work of “art is true and real” only when it corresponds to the
pattern of its prototype in the mind of the artist,” in the same way the free action of man is good
if it corresponds to the “pattern of prudence.” The third way in which prudence is described is in
terms of form. In the Greek philosophical concept, the word ‘form’ is used to explain the specific
characteristic of a thing that makes it what it is. Considering prudence in this sense infers that
prudence bestows upon other virtues the form of its innermost essence, that is, its specific
character as a virtue.
The Aristotelian idea of prudence can be traced back to Socrates and Plato. Faure
(2013:47) asserts that Aristotle regards prudence as an intellectual virtue, a disposition to truth
and reason. Aristotle considers prudence as the most important of the virtues that must be
obtained; to him attaining prudence as virtue is a must because other virtues, especially, courage
require judgment to be made and for that reason he refers to prudence as practical wisdom.
Aristotle explains that the virtue of prudence is the ability to reflect rightly about the right thing
to do and how it affects not just oneself but others as well by making judgment through practical
wisdom.
Fortitude is another of the cardinal virtues derived from the Latin word fortitudo; it is also
termed courage, forbearance, strength, and endurance. Fortitude can also be described as the ability
to confront uncertainty and intimidation. It is often used interchangeably with courage. Fortitude is
the virtue that enables man to remain steadfast in the pursuit of his goal and ensures firmness in
difficulty as well as overcoming fear, including fear of death. Fortitude, according to Pieper
(1965:17), “presupposes vulnerability” and justifies his supposition that “without vulnerability,

9
there is no possibility of fortitude.” According to Pieper, because an angel is not vulnerable he
cannot be said to be brave. To be brave actually implies the ability to suffer injury, and since man is
by nature vulnerable, there is the need for him to be brave. Pieper (1965:17) asserts that all fortitude
has reference to death and stands in the presence of death; it is the readiness to die.
Aristotle uses the word courage interchangeably for the virtue of fortitude and asserts that a
courageous man is one that maintains a balance between cowardice and rashness. He declares:

For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand
his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who
fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and
similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from
none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every
pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and
courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by
the mean (Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b, 15 – 20).

Here Aristotle combines the virtue of courage (fortitude) with temperance. To him, courage is
holding a mean position between feelings of confidence and fear. The courageous fear mentioned
by Aristotle is not that of fear of evil things, such as disgrace or punishment for the law, rather,
according to him, courageous fear refers to “confidence and fear concerning the most fearful
thing, death, and especially the most potentially beautiful form of death, death in the battle
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1115a). At the same time, Aristotle maintains that sometimes not everyone
feels the need to fear, even fear of terror, but endures fears and feels confidence in a rational way
for the sake of what is beautiful. He declares that people who have excessive fearlessness would
be mad and remarks that “rash people, those with excessive confidence, are generally cowards
putting on a brave face.” He talks about the courage of citizen soldiers as true courage. To him,
citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers because of the penalties imposed on them by the laws and
the reproaches they would otherwise incur, and because of the honours they win by such action;
and therefore those peoples seem to be bravest among whom cowards are held in dishonour and
brave men in honour ((Nicomachean Ethics, 1115b -1117a).
The next of the cardinal virtue is temperance. Temperance is from the Latin word
temperantia meaning moderation, it is also known as restraint; discretion and the ability to
exercise self-control. Temperance has been described as a virtue by religious thinkers,
philosophers and even psychologists. It is generally characterised as the control over excess and

10
expressed through characteristics such as chastity, modesty, humility, prudence, self-control,
forgiveness and mercy. In line with this description, Green (2011:769) defines Temperance as
“moderation or voluntary self-restraint” and Schwarzer (2012:127-128) describes temperance as
“what an individual voluntarily refrains from doing.” Schwarzer further describes this restraint as
including:
restraint from retaliation in the form of non-violence, and forgiveness,
restraint from arrogance in form of humility and modesty, restraint
from excesses such as splurging in the form of prudence, and restraint
from excessive anger or craving for something in the form of calmness
and self-control (2012:128).

Aristotle explains temperance as a mean with regards to pleasures (Niemiec, 2013:15). With
Aristotle’s notion, temperance can be said to be geared toward governing crave for sensible
pleasure, such as food, alcohol, sex and the like. Aristotle sees man as a rational animal and feels
that man needs temperance in order to govern his animal nature. Aristotle believes that if a man
cannot moderate his desires, it will be impossible for him to act rightly, or give to others what
they deserve. It will also be impossible to overcome adversity.
Justice, the fourth of the cardinal virtues, is from the Greek word dikaiosyne meaning
righteousness and the Latin word iustitia meaning fairness. While prudence governs human
actions; fortitude and temperance together tame human’s irascibility and appetites. Justice deals
with human rights and obligations towards oneself and other people. Justice denotes giving to
others their due respect and fulfilling the obligation owe them. Justice refers to the ability and
willingness to mete out exact justice to everyone, even oneself, in every relation of life, in
thought, word and action.
Aristotle devotes Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics to justice and describes justice in
two related senses; general justice and particular justice. Aristotle explains general justice as
virtue expressed in relation to other people. Here, Aristotle believes that a just man deals
properly and fairly with others; he will not lie, cheat or take undue advantage of others but will
rather give what is owed to them. In the case of particular justice, Aristotle defines this as a
justice that has to do with people getting what is proportional to their worth or merit. In other
words, particular justice is giving to people what they deserve according to the circumstance.
Aristotelian concept of justice has it that an educated judge is needed in order to apply just
decisions in relation to a particular case. Justice is considered by Aristotle as the only virtue

11
thought to be “another’s good,” because it is related to one’s neighbour and does what is
advantageous to another.
The four cardinal virtues work together to make a man virtuous. Prudence recognises what
is good and direct the doing of it and avoidance of evil. Justice on its part ensures that honour,
obligations and duties are given to whom it is due. Both prudence and justice help man to see
what he must do while fortitude gives him the strength to see it through and temperance assists
man to maintain a balance. Temperance gives man the needed and necessary self-control in order
to forgo short-term pleasures so as to pursue long-term goals, fortitude is the virtue that sees man
through to the end, either failure or success.
The Aristotelian virtuous man is one who is able to maintain a mean with respect to all the
bad passions and actions, a mean between extreme and deficiency. To Aristotle, it is normal to
feel pains, pity, fear, pleasure and so on, in either too great or too little measure. Aristotle believes
that both extremes should be avoided but opines that in order to have these feelings at the right
times, towards the right people as well as for the right motive and in the right way, a balance must
be maintained between the extreme and deficiency, which is the mean, the hallmark of virtue. To
Aristotle, there is no virtue without a vice, the table below, provided by Akinboye (2015), shows
some Aristotelian virtues and vices and the mean, representing virtue:
Table of Aristotelian Virtues and Vices
Excess (Badness) Mean (Virtue) Defect (Badness)
Irascibility Gentleness Spiritless-ness
Rashness Courage Cowardice
Shamelessness Modesty Diffidence
Profligacy Temperance Insensitiveness
Envy Righteous Indignation Malice
Prodigality Liberality Meanness
Boastfulness Sincerity Self-depreciation
Flattery Friendliness Surliness
Subservience Dignity Stubbornness
Luxuriousness Hardiness Endurance
Vanity Greatness of Spirit Smallness of Spirit

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Extravagance Magnificence Shabbiness
Rascality Wisdom Simplicity

From the table above, Aristotle sees a virtuous man as one whose habits chooses the mean in
regard to what is good as determined reason and which can only be understood by a man of
wisdom.
All other virtues hinge on the four cardinal virtues. For instance, if a person finds himself
in a tight spot and under severe pressure, if he lacks courage, he would lie, or do things contrary
to justice. Simon (1986:128) asserts that a man who hates dishonesty can become dishonest if his
lack of courage leaves him no option than to become dishonest. Courage, in this instance, does
not imply a lack of fear but the right kind of fear, fear to do evil. Courage, thus, recognises and
maintains the truth even under the most trying situation. The ability to maintain integrity under
the most difficult circumstance is the exhibition of fortitude and application of practical wisdom.

The Yorùbá Concepts of Virtue and Ọmọlú́àbí́

The virtue emphasised by the Yorùbá concept of ọmọlúàbí are many and varied; this is due to the
fact that the Yorùbá society is dynamic. The Yorùbá expect a person to be above board always in
regard to the acceptable virtues regardless of corruption and rottenness around the person. The
Yorùbá are cultured people who take the issues of morality as the most important aspect of
human life. Many Yorùbá scholars and writers have described an ọmọlúàbí in various ways. The
long list of qualities and principles provided by these scholars cannot be exhausted. For instance,
Rao (2008) supplies a list of characteristics of character that is expected of a morally upright
individual, such as honesty, trustworthiness, fairness, respect, integrity, responsibility,
competence, and tact. Parenthetically, these characteristics are what describe an ọmọlúàbí as
listed by Abimbola (1975: 389-393) such as; ọ̀rọ̀ sísọ (spoken word), ìtẹríba (respect), inú rere
(having a good mind towards others), òtítọ́ (truth), ìwà (good character), akínkanjú (bravery), iṣẹ́
(hard work), and ọpọlọ pípé (intelligence). Of all these qualities, however, Abimbola (1975:393)
considers ìwà (good character) as the essence of being, and that man’s character is what can be
used to characterise his life especially in ethical terms. Good character is described as “the
inherent complex of attributes that determine a person’s moral and ethical actions and reactions”
(Rao, 2008). It is little wonder then that the Yorùbá always say that ìwàlẹwà ọmọ èniyàn,

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meaning character is the beauty of a person. Even in a poem recited by pupils in the 1970s and
1980s from J. F. Odunjo’s Alawiye, the import of good character is stressed; the poem goes thus:
Tọ́jú ìwà rẹ
Tọ́jú ìwà rẹ, ọ̀rẹ́ mi!
Ọlá a má ṣílọ n’ílé ẹni,
Ẹwà a sì má ṣì l’ára ènìà,
Olówó òní ń di olòṣì b’ó d’ọ̀la
Òkun l’ọlá, òkun ni’gbì ọrọ̀,
gbogbo wọn l’ó ń ṣí lọ n’ílé ẹni;
ṣùgbọ́n ìwà ní ḿ bá ‘ni dé sàréè,
owó kò jẹ́ ǹkan fún ‘ni,
ìwà l’ẹwà ọmọ ènìà.
Bí o lówó bí ò kò ní ’wà ńkọ́,
Tani jẹ́ f’inú tán ọ bá ọ ṣeun rere?
Tàbí bí ó sì ṣe obìrin rọ̀gbọ̀dọ̀, bí ó bá jìnà sí’wà tí ẹ̀dá ń fẹ́,
Tani jẹ́ fẹ́ ọ s’ílé bí aya?
Tàbí bí o jẹ́ oníjíbítí ènìà,
Bí o tilẹ̀ mọ̀ ìwé àmọ̀dájú,
Tani jẹ́ gbé’ṣé ajé fún ọ ṣe?
Tọ́jú ìwà rẹ ọ̀rẹ́ mi,
Ìwà kò sí ẹ̀kọ́ d’ègbé,
Gbogbo aiyé ní ń fẹ́’ni t’ó jẹ́ rere (Odunjo, 1970:8).

Take care of your manners, my friend!

Honours sometimes desert our homes,
And beauty sometimes fades
The rich today may be poor tomorrow.
Honour is like the sea, the wave of wealth is like the sea
It can escape from our homes
But manners accompany us to the grave
Money means nothing to humanity.
Manners are the beauty of humanity.
If you have money but no manners,
Who will repose confidence in you?
Or if you are a very buxom, beautiful woman
But you lack the behaviour which people like,
Who will ever take you into his house as a wife?
Or if you swindle people, and you are highly educated,
Who will ever trust you with monetary affairs?
Take care of your manners, my friend.
Without manners, education is of no value,
The whole world loves someone with good behaviour (Ogunbowale, 1970:165-166).

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From the above poem, good character is really the essence of a person, and without it, all other
virtues amount to nothing. It also shows that a man of good character is a man of integrity. The
Yorùbá value a man that can be trusted and depended on as reflected in the poem.
The Yorùbá use various proverbs, folklore, and oral poetry to transmit the different
qualities and virtues expected of an ọmọlúàbí. For the Yorùbá proverbs is a horse on which
words ride, and through these proverbs, the Yorùbá convey their innermost feelings of a
particular situation as well as giving needed advice on the need to cultivate and practice certain
virtues. For instance, while a man of valour is valued and appreciated rashness is considered as
foolishness, hence the saying: “Mọ̀’jà mọ̀’sá là ń mọ akínkanjú, ẹni mọ ìjà tí ò mọ̀ sá, irú wọn ní
bóogun lọ.” Meaning: he who fights and knows when to run is the one known to be brave
whereas he who fights and does not know when to run will never fight another battle. With this
proverb, the Yorùbá, like Aristotle, show that a balance must be maintained between bravery and
rashness and must not be confused with cowardice. A brave person will not unnecessarily
endanger his life in order to be considered brave.
The virtue of respect as conceived by the Yorùbá cannot be over emphasised. The
Yorùbá believe that honour should be given to whom it is due, for that they often say: ìka tí ó bá
tọ́ sí imú ni a fi ń re’mú, which literally means ‘it is the befitting finger that is used to pick the
nose.’ The Yorùbá cultural ideology of ọmọlúàbí also stresses the importance of hard work. The
Yorùbá ọmọlúàbí is not lazy; he is rather industrious and diligent. The Yorùbá believe that a
virtuous person will never depend on others or steal from others, but rather engage in hard
labour.
Sadly today, focusing on the trend of current political, religious and social-economic in
many African communities, including the Yorùbá community, most of the virtues discussed have
become lost gems. This is especially true in the case of character - iwa, which the Yorùbá refer to
as ọba àwúre– king of success. The prosperity, popularity and affluence of people of negative
character in the society thus bring to the fore the question of whether moral virtue is still relevant
in our contemporary society as it was during the time of Aristotle and as conceived by the
traditional Yorùbá society. The much valued and cherished traditions have been made stale by
avant-gardism and a ruthless desire for affluent and recognition. The good moral conducts like
truthfulness, hard work, temperance, justice and respect have been eroded by vices such as lies,
laziness, corruption, cowardice, injustice, and what the Yorùbá call àfojúdi - insolence. Vices are

15
seen as prudence while moral virtues are considered as profligacy. The moral corruption in the
society has been attributed not just to the individual but also to Western civilisation. Whatever is
responsible for the moral degeneration that has enveloped the society, it is not too late to revive
the lost moral virtues so as to revive the African/Yorùbá culture of Ọmọlúàbí.
This paper is of the opinion that the virtues of an individual are the virtue of the
community. In order to recapture the lost virtues and make a reconnection to the Yorùbá
traditional concept of ọmọlúàbí, this paper proposes that the moral virtues approved by Aristotle
and replicated in the concept of ọmọlúàbí should be re-embraced and re-incorporated into the
school curricula at all level. In reviving the culture of ọmọlúàbí in our contemporary society,
Ogundeji (2009) emphasises the use of mother tongue as a means to achieving the goal. In line
with this suggestion, this paper also proposes that parents, guardians and teachers should wake
up to their responsibilities of inculcating into their wards the moral nuggets that are imperative in
achieving a society of well grounded and positive values.

Conclusion
From the discussion, it is glaring that the Yorùbá cultural concept of ọmọlúàbí is reflected in the
moral virtues of Aristotle. The four cardinal virtues work together to make an individual
virtuous. Prudence recognises what is good and direct the doing of it and avoidance of evil.
Justice ensures that honour, obligations and duties are given at the appropriate time. Temperance
gives man the needed and necessary self-control in order to forgo short-term pleasures so as to
pursue long-term goals. Fortitude sees man through to the end. Virtues, from both Aristotle and
Yorùbá perceptions, differentiate man from animal, because man has the ability to reason and
use their power of reason to distinguish between right and wrong, just and unjust, as well as
performing good deeds. Man is endowed with a sense of judgment, thus, man can acquire moral
virtues through determination and regular practice by making use of his power of judgment.

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