EDGARDO A.

GAANAN, petitioner, (f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical
vs. School;
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as mass media;
the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was

The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told
the petitioner.
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10,
1983, pp. 2-12).
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed
at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to
problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5). the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged
appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one
enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the
assault. appellate court. On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in
nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been
without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was
increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together
used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is
with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel
covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the
case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the
following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco
Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term
Technical High School;
"device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to
listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club; and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.

(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Bosco Technical High School;
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or
against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as
later; a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
 It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely
penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.
wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone
other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as
party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete
We rule for the petitioner.
set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of
a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a
issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party or end.
The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the
conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping"
use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar,
the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in
withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew
order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard
secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller
Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
against the listener's.

In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra
heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter
what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms
overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to
communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various
results. stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful
ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase
"any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as xxx xxx xxx
would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in
with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the
devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of
a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will
line" be a device or arrangement under the law? ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience
that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization,
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the
electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603,
 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is
pp. 180-181). entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made
possible by special amendment which Your Honor may
introduce.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that
is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment
to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being would be less possible with the amendment than without it,
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment
for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. would only consist of government testimony as against the
testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they
would have the right, and the government officials and the
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit
person in fact would have the right to tape record their
does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place
conversation.
within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the
other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening
as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the
case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138): government. Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this
provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the
court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may
credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these
cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a
cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go
telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension
with the peace offices.
telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may
complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred. (Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12,
1964).
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead
of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is xxx xxx xxx
no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for
the same purpose. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these
of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is
conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could
included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an
falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if
extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale
you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of
behind the rule:
what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the
evidence is not very much. Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false
the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be
limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of
Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private
Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The conversations which later on will be used in court.
purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro,
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp.
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather
183-184).
evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the
telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion
of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated
more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone
August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
conversation.
violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act. SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents. ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

KAPUNAN, J.: CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1 ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng
hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil
case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung
transcript reads as follows: hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am. CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo. ako.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon. CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.3
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
akin makakahingi. petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m. INFORMATION

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on committed as follows:
your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko. jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko. unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit
alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa. Contrary to law.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon. Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa. MARIANO M. CUNETA

Asst. City Fiscal
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May
3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged
do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.4 xxx xxx xxx

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of
June 19, 1989. Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not
appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover,
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that: for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the
parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5 within the purview of this bill or outside?

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision of Republic to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without
party other than those involved in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the the authorization of all the parties.
substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts
charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of
secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10 Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose;
We disagree. Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or
would lead to an injustice. 12 Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where
a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain
however otherwise described. any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all used against him, I think it is unfair.
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute xxx xxx xxx
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of (Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200. a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done secretly.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.
persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us
with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964) against petitioner.

xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share
or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely
to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation"
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill
quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication
between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was
neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, This angered Lingan, who said: O, di ilagay mo diyan.[14] Petitioner Navarro retorted: Talagang ilalagay
respondents. ko.[15] The two then had a heated exchange.[16] Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo
yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo.[17] Petitioner Navarro replied: Ah, ganoon?[18]
DECISION
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left
MENDOZA, J.: eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro
gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.[19]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated December 14,
1994, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang
1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him naghamon.[20] He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante
to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon.[21] He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the made him sign his name on the blotter.[22] Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was
victim, Enrique Ike Lingan, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.[23]

The information against petitioner alleged Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took
Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and,
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a injuries.[24]
member of the Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in and the deceased.[25] The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging his head against the
concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
which directly caused his death.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and
Enrique Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Lingan: Im here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. Im out of the problem.
Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After
the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage ....
and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and
took a picture.[2] Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .

At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just
and demanded to know why he took a picture.[3] Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. Im the number one loko sa media. Im the
my job.[4] Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.[5] best media man. . . .
When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his
companions.[6] Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing
loko ka!
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on
duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Lingan: Im brave also.
Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo,
to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.[7] Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho
lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen
minutes.[8] Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?[9] Petitioner
Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, Ano, Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong
uutasin na kita?[10] maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.

At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate.[11] Petitioner Navarro replied: Walang press, press, mag-
sampu pa kayo.[12] He then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
Jalbuena and Lingan.[13]
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba! post-mortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced
in the course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige. eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the head
(Exh. E). Certainly, these injuries could not have resulted from Lingans accidental fall.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
(Sounds of a scuffle)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON
daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD
kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A
Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS
yan. FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.

Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) The appeal is without merit.
was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his
head on the concrete.[26] First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was
a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated: conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.[27] Trial courts, which have the
opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying,
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence.[28] In the instant
this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of
create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible. Jalbuena.

The defenses evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether
strength of the prosecutions evidence. the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the
affirmative. The law provides:
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to
make false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
brought him harm or injury. communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries. however otherwise described:

Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latters falling down on the preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
concrete pavement head first. record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
The Court of Appeals affirmed: or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
We are far from being convinced by appellants aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
conflicting versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial courts factual in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
conclusions to have better and stronger evidentiary support.
....
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellants aggression does not
impair the probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
proving his innocence, appellants unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
the same motivation that led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged him to a fist fight.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.[29] Since
.... the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.
On the other hand, appellants explanation as to how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be
accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingans injuries as shown in the
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court
was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed WITNESS:
to belong.[30] In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording;[31]
that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;[32] and that the speakers on the tape were It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
petitioner Navarro and Lingan.[33] A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the
tape presented by the prosecution. Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and small, sir.
Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the
latter getting the worst of it. Q How about this findings No. 4?

Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued a medical A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
certificate,[34] dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
Post Mortem Findings:
A Same cause, sir.
= Dried blood, forehead & face
Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
A Same thing, sir.
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it doctor?
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left
WITNESS:
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
FISCAL:
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death:
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cerebral concussion and Shock, will you explain it?

= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog naalog ang utak or jarring of the brain, sir.

= BLOW ON THE HEAD Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?

Dr. Yamamoto testified: A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.

Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
blood from the forehead?
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
A Yes, sir.
A It is possible, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?
A May be, sir.
A Possible, sir.
Q How about shock?
FISCAL:
A Yes, sir.
 However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities
FISCAL: are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The
offense in this case was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their
Which of these two more likely to cause death? public functions.[43]

WITNESS: The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the
penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating
Shock, sir. circumstances and one aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.[44]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate
Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock? penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.[45]
A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, sir.
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with
.... current jurisprudence.[46]

FISCAL: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner
Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Could a bumping or pushing of ones head against a concrete floor have caused shock? 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

WITNESS: SO ORDERED.

Possible, sir.

How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?

A Possible, sir.[35]

The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the
handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.

Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner
Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party,
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone.[36] The provocation must be sufficient and should
immediately precede the act.[37] People v. Paga, 79 SCRA 570 (1977).37 To be sufficient, it must be
adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in
gravity.[38] And it must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the
provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused.[39]

In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner,
constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso,[40] we appreciated this mitigating circumstance
in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him
with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner
Navarro.

Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of
petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to
kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty
that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is
consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.[41] In People v. Castro,[42]
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was
appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,
vs. IT IS SO ORDERED.20
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated February
DECISION 6, 2006.23 Thus:

DEL CASTILLO, J.: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."1 IT IS SO ORDERED.24

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
01473.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Factual Antecedents
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to
Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of
Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the
to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of
the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that reads:
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and
1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the
for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN- respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit
and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ SO ORDERED.32
property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on Issues
June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their employees and Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that
the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents I.
be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.14 THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF
THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction.17 They also
clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18 II.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS
portion of the said Order reads: OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan III.
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at
the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2- BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road. CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
 of the Civil Code covers business offices
IV.
where the public are excluded
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES
OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF therefrom and only certain individuals
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33
are allowed to enter.
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2)
whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit. Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:
Petitioners’ Arguments
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to
privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even xxxx
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
provision.37 This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that residence of another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular
inspection conducted by the court.39 Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
Respondents’ Arguments business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to
privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations,
impleaded in this case.43 or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by
society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
Our Ruling application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The Petition is meritorious. The "reasonable expectation of

privacy" test is used to determine
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the
which the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
alone."47 conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent circumstances surrounding the case.54
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there
is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would
be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against
residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62
With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that: impleaded.

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records
operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus
on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of
but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners. the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when
that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed
setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to
revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made to extend the merge.
view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would
violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55 corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we
find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution
cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional
injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no indication of any SO ORDERED.
grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive
writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former."57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the
building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in
order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing
of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the
video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care,60 and