People v.

Jaime Quisay December 10, 1999

Facts: A 3-year-old girl was found dead in a canal. Accused was the last person seen with the
little girl. He was charged with rape with homicide. He put forth the defense that he was with
the girl but she ran away and fell into the canal as an exempting circumstance (“Any person
who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault
or intention of causing it.”Par. 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code).

Held: Guilty. The physical evidence failed to support the version of accused-appellant that the
victim Ainness Montenegro fell accidentally into the canal. The victim had bruises only on the
sex organ, sides of the neck, etc.
The fact that no perineal laceration was found on the genital of the victim does not dispel a
finding of rape. The slightest degree of penetration of the pudenda by a male sex organ suffices
to consummate the crime of rape. Jurisprudence is well-settled to the effect that for rape to be
consummated, rupture of the hymen is not necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina sustain
a laceration, especially when the victim is a young girl.
The crime subject matter of the instant appeal was committed before the death penalty law,
Republic Act No. 7659 became effective so the penalty for the complex crime of rape with
homicide should only be reclusion perpetua.

Miranda vs Tuliao GR No. 158763 March 31, 2006

FACTS:
March 08, 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered I Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela.
September 1999, SP02 Mardeal was arrested. April 27, 2001, he executed a sworn confession
and identified petitioners Jose Miranda, SP03 Ocon, SP03 Dalmacio , a certain Boyet dela Cruz
and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the death of Vicente Buazon and Elizar
Tualiao. Judge 6, 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint
order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the Court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of the State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.
Issue: Whether or not being in the custody of law is under the jurisdiction of the court?
Held: Being in the custody of law is not necessarily being under the jurisdiction of the court. One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment
to quash a warrant.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.

Variance Doctrine

Can the petitioners be convicted thereof, considering that it was not charged in the information?

The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved
is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the
conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER FOR A PERSON TO BE DISCHARGED AS

A STATE WITNESS?
1. The discharge must be WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED sought to be a
state witness

2. There is ABSOLUTE NECESSITY for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;

3. There is NO OTHER DIRECT EVIDENCE AVAILABLE for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

4. The testimony of said accused can be SUBSTANTIALLY CORROBORATED in its

material points;

5. Said accused DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE MOST GUILTY; and

6. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving MORAL
TURPITUDE.

Double Jeopardy

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information
under any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea
was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part
the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver
offense.

WHAT IS JEOPARDY AND WHAT IS THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

> Jeopardy is the peril in which a person is placed when he is regularly charged
with a crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try him

> The rule on double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the
case is terminate either by conviction or acquittal, or in any other manner without the
consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense
WHAT ARE THE 2 KINDS OF JEOPARDY?
1. That no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense
2. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE ACCUSED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
1. A first jeopardy must have validly attached prior to the second
2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information or is an attempt to commit the
offense or a
frustration thereof

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE FIRST JEOPARDY TO ATTACH?

1. There is a valid complaint or information
2. Court of competent jurisdiction
3. Arraignment
4. Plea
5. The defendant is acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed or terminated without his
express consent

N.B: The judgment should not only be final and executory but also be promulgated
before there could be a valid jeopardy.

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOREGOING RULE?

> There are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even
if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused—
1. If there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him, and
2. Where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the
accused’s right to speedy trial
A CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN MAKATI. THE CASE WAS FILED IN PASAY.
WHEN THE PROSECUTION REALIZED THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN FILED IN MAKATI, IT FILED THE CASE IN MAKATI. CAN THE ACCUSED INVOKE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the court in Pasay has no jurisdiction, therefore, the accused was in no danger of being
placed in jeopardy
> The first jeopardy didn’t validly attach

FOR PURPOSES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY, WHEN IS A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

VALID?
> A complaint or information is valid if it can support a judgment of conviction
> If the complaint or information is not valid, it would violate the right of the accused
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
> If he is convicted under this complaint or information, the conviction is null and void
and hence there is no first jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH QUALIFIED THEFT. X MOVED TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF

INSUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION. THE CASE WAS DISMISSED. SUBSEQUENTLY,
THE PROSECUTION FILED A CORRECTED INFORMATION. CAN X PLEAD DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy didn’t attach because the first information was not valid

X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT. DURING THE TRIAL, THE PROSECUTION WAS
ABLE TO PROVE ESTAFA. X WAS ACQUITTED OF THEFT. CAN X BE
PROSECUTED FOR ESTAFA LATER WITHOUT PLACING HIM IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes
> For jeopardy to attach, the basis is the crime charged in the complaint or information,
and the one proved at the trial
> In this case, the crime charged in the first information was theft. X was therefore placed
in jeopardy of being convicted of theft. Since estafa is not an offense which is included
or necessarily includes theft, X can still be prosecuted for estafa without placing him in double
jeopardy
THE ESTAFA CASE AGAINST C WAS DISMISSED BUT THE DISMISSAL
CONTAINED A RESERVATION OF THE RIGHT TO FILE ANOTHER ACTION. CAN
ANOTHER ESTAFA CASE BE FILED AGAINST X WITHOUT PLACING HIM IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> Yes
> To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated

> This means that there must have been either a conviction or acquittal, or an
unconditional dismissal of the case
> A provisional dismissal, such as this one, doesn’t validly terminate the first jeopardy

NOTE: in the second kind of jeopardy, the first jeopardy can validly only be terminated either by
conviction or acquittal and not by the dismissal of the case without the express consent of the
accused.

X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT. ON THE DAY OF THE TRIUAL, THE PROSECUTOR AND
THE WITNESSES FAILED TO APPEAR. COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED MOVED TO
DISMISS THE CASE. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE PROVISIONALLY.
SUBSEQUENTLY X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT AGAIN. CAN X INVOKE JEOPARDY?
> No, the case was dismissed upon motion of counsel for the accused, so it wasn’t
dismissed without the express consent
> Moreover, the dismissal was only provisional, which is not a valid termination of the first
jeopardy
> In order to validly terminate the jeopardy, the dismissal must have been unconditional
X WAS CHARGED WITH SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES. ON HIS MOTION, THE CASE
WAS DISMISSED DURING TRIAL. ANOTHER CASE FOR ASSAULT UPON A
PERSON IN AUTHORITY WAS FILED AGAINST HIM. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy wasn’t terminated through either conviction, acquittal, or dismissal
without the express consent of X
> The first case was dismissed upon the motion of X himself
> Therefore, he cannot invoke double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT. DURING TRIAL, THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT
THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WAS ACTUALLY ESTAFA. WHAT SHOULD THE JUDGE DO?
> The judge should order the substitution of the complaint for theft with a new one charging
estafa
> Upon filing of the substituted complaint, the judge should dismiss the original complaint. If it
appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR A VALID SUBSTITUTION OF A COMPLAINT OR

INFORMATION?
1. No judgment has been rendered
2. The accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included in the offense charged
3. The accused will not be placed in double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE. ON THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL, THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO APPEAR. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO SPEEDY TRIAL. X WAS LATER
CHARGED WITH MURDER. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy was not validly terminated
> The judge who has not dismissed the case on the ground of violation of the right of X
to speedy trial committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case after the
prosecution failed to
appear once
> This is not a valid dismissal because it deprives the prosecution of due process

> When the judge gravely abuses the discretion in dismissing a case, the dismissal is
not valid
Therefore, X cannot invoke double jeopardy

DISTINGUISH ACQUITTAL AND DISMISSAL

> Acquittal is a discharge after a trial, or an attempt to have one, upon the merits. It
is always on the merits. The accused is acquitted because the evidence doesn’t show
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
> On the other hand, dismissal is when the case is terminated otherwise upon the
merits thereof, as when the dismissal is based on the allegation that the court has no
jurisdiction, either upon the subject matter or the territory, or that the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient, or upon any ground that doesn’t decide the merits of
the issue as to whether the accused is
or isn’t guilty of the offense charged

WHEN IS A DISMISSAL OF THE CASE, EVEN WITH EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE

ACCUSED, EQUIVALENT TO AN ACQUITTAL, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A BAR TO
A SECOND JEOPARDY?
> For a dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal
> As a general rule, dismissal upon motion of the accused or his counsel negates the
application of double jeopardy because the motion of the accused amounts to an express
consent
> However, such a dismissal even with the express consent of the accused may
constitute a bar to double jeopardy in the following cases
1. Where there is insufficiency of evidence given by the prosecution to support the
charge against him
2. Where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the
accused’s right to speedy trial

> Consequently, the dismissal amounts to an acquittal and would bar a second jeopardy
in the cases below

1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates
as an acquittal
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial
of his right to a speedy trial, which is in effect a failure to prosecute

WHAT IS MEANT BY NOLLE PROSEQUI? IS IT THE SAME AS AN ACQUITTAL?

> It is the discontinuance of a criminal procedure by the prosecuting officer, with the consent
of the owner
> A nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he is
called on to plead is not equivalent to an acquittal and doesn’t bar a subsequent prosecution for
the same
offense
> It is not a final disposition of the case
> Rather it partakes of the nature of a non-suit or discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves the
matter in the same condition in which it was before the commencement of the prosecution

MAY THE COURT DISMISS THE CASE ON MOTION NOLLE PROSEQUI?

> The trial court may dismiss a case on a motion nolle prosequi if the accused is not
brought to trial within the prescribed time and is deprived of his right to speedy trial or
disposition of the case on
account of unreasonable or capricious delay caused by the prosecution
> People v. Espidol doctrine

WHY IS THERE A REQUIREMENT FOR IT TO BE CAPRICIOUS AND

UNREASONABLE?
> There are some delays of the prosecution which are not capricious and unreasonable
> It may be caused by some other valid reasons—prejudicial question, new evidence or
witnesses, etc.

WHEN A CASE IS DISMISSED UPON MOTION OF THE ACCUSED, MAY HE STILL BE

PROSECUTED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE?
> While there have been conflicting rulings of the SC, the prevailing doctrine is that the
accused can still be prosecuted for the same offense if he moves to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, or insufficiency of complaint or information because he is deemed to have
waived his right against a second jeopardy, or that he is estopped from maintaining that the
court had no
jurisdiction or that the complaint wasn’t sufficient

WHEN WILL DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF THE FIRST CASE NOT BAR A SECOND
JEOPARDY?
1. The dismissal must be sought by the defendant personally or through his counsel

2. Such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an
acquittal

BEFORE THE PROSECUTION COULD FINISH PRESENTING EVIDENCE, THE

ACCUSED FILED A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. THE COURT GRANTED THE MOTION
AND DISMISSED THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION. CAN THE ACCUSED BE PROSECUTED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
AGAIN?
> Yes. There was no double jeopardy because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction
in dismissing the case even before the prosecution could finish presenting evidence
> It denied the prosecution of its right to due process. Because of this, the dismissal is null
and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy

THE PROSECUTOR FILED AN INFORMATION AGAINST X FOR HOMICIDE.

BEFORE X COULD BE ARRAIGNED, THE PROSECUTOR WITHDREW THE
INFORMATION WITHOUT NOTICE TO X. THE PROSECUTOR THEN FILED AN
INFORMATION AGAINST X FOR MURDER. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, there was no arraignment yet under the first information
> Therefore, the first jeopardy didn’t attach. The withdrawal or dismissal of the case
before arraignment is not a bar to the filing of a new information for the same offense.
> There is no double jeopardy where there is yet no arraignment
> A nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he
pleads is not equivalent to an acquittal and doesn’t bar a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense

IF THE ACCUSED FAILS TO OBJECT TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE

FILED BY THE PROSECUTION, IS HE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE
DISMISSAL? CAN HE STILL INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, silence doesn’t mean consent to the dismissal
> If the accused fails to object or acquiesces to the dismissal of the case, he can still invoke
double jeopardy, since the dismissal was
still without his express consent.
> He is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy if he expressly consents to
the dismissal

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER. THE PROSECUTION MOVED TO DISMISS THE

CASE. COUNSEL FOR X WROTE THE WORDS “NO OBJECTION” AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND SIGNED IT. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
LATER ON?
> No, X is deemed to have expressly consented to the dismissal of the case when his
counsel wrote “no objection” at the bottom of the motion to dismiss
> Since the case was dismissed with his express consent, X cannot invoke double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER. AFTER THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED ITS

EVIDENCE, X FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. THE COURT DISMISSED THE
CASE. THE PROSECUTION APPEALED? CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, X cannot invoke double jeopardy
> The dismissal was upon his own motion so it was with his express consent
> Since the dismissal was with his express consent, he is deemed to have waived his right
against double jeopardy
> The only time when a dismissal, even with the express consent of the accused, will bar a
double jeopardy is if it is based either on insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to
speedy trial
> These are not grounds invoked by X so he cannot claim double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE. X MOVED TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE
COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION. BELIEVING IT HAD NO JURISDICTION, THE JUDGE
DISMISSED THE CASE. SINCE THE COURT, IN FACT, HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE, THE PROSECUTION FILED ANOTHER CASE IN THE SAME COURT. CAN X
INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, X is estopped from claiming that he was in danger of being convicted during the
first case, since he had himself earlier alleged that the court had no jurisdiction
X WAS CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE. THE COURT, BELIEVED IT HAD NO JURISDICTION,
MOTU PROPIO DISMISSED THE CASE. THE PROSECUTION APPEALED, CLAIMING
THAT THE COURT, IN FACT HAD JURISDICTION. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes, when the trial court has jurisdiction but mistakenly dismisses the complaint or
information on the ground of lack of it, the dismissal wasn’t at the request of the accused,
the dismissal is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH RAPE. X MOVED TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT

THE COMPLAINT WAS INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE LEWD
DESIGNS. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE. LATER, ANOTHER CASE FOR
RAPE WAS FILED AGAINST X. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, X is estopped from claiming that he could have been convicted under the first complaint
> He himself moved for the dismissal on the ground that the complaint was insufficient
> He cannot change his position and now claim that he was in danger of being
convicted under the complaint

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER, ALONG WITH THREE OTHER PEOPLE. X WAS
DISCHARGED AS A STATE WITNESS. CAN X BE PROSECUTED AGAIN FOR THE
SAME OFFENSE?
> It depends
> As a general rule, an order discharging an accused as state witness amounts to an
acquittal, and he is barred from being prosecuted again for the same offense
> However, if he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his
sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge, he can be prosecuted again

CAN A PERSON ACCUSED OF ESTAFA BE CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF

BP22 WITHOUT PLACING HIM IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes. Even if the same transaction is involved, the same act may violate two or more
provisions of criminal law and the prosecution under one will not bar the prosecution under
another
> Where 2 different laws defines 2 crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other

X INSTALLED A JUMPER CABLE WHICH ALLOWED HIM TO REDUCE HIS ELECTRICITY

BILL. HE WAS PROSECUTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED FOR A
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION OF A
DEVICE. CAN HE STILL BE PROSECUTED FOR THEFT?
> No, under the second type of jeopardy, when an act is punished by law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under one will bar a prosecution under the other
> The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available as long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same
acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under the statute

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY? WHEN CAN THE

ACCUSED BE CHARGED WITH A SECOND OFFENSE WHICH NECESSARILY
INCLUDES THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE FORMER COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION?
> The conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information
under any of the
following circumstances:
o The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act
or omission constituting the former charge
o The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after
a plea was entered in the former complaint or information
o The plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor or
offended party except if the offended party fails to appear at arraignment

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT?

> Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
indicted for the second offense.

X WAS CHARGED WITH FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. THERE WAS NOTHING TO

INDICATE THAT THE VICTIM WAS GOING TO DIE. X WAS ARRAIGNED. BEFORE
TRIAL, THE VICTIM DIED. CAN X BE CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE?
> It depends.
> If the death of the victim can be traced to the acts of X, and the victim didn’t contribute to
his death with his negligence, X can be charged with homicide
> This is a supervening fact
> But if the act of X wasn’t the proximate cause of death, he cannot be charged with homicide

X WAS CHARGED WITH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE AND

WAS ACQUITTED. THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM APPEALED THE CIVIL ASPECT OF
THE JUDGMENT. X CLAIMS THAT THE APPEAL WILL PLACE HIM IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. IS X CORRECT?
> No, there was no second jeopardy. What was elevated on appeal was the civil aspect of
the case, not the criminal aspect.
> The extinction of criminal liability whether by a prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy
doesn’t carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged
X IN A CRIMINAL CASE WAS SENTENCED AND REQUIRED TO PAY CIVIL
LIABILITY. CAN THE OFFENDED PARTY APPEAL THE CIVIL LIABILITY?
> Yes, if there would be appeal for a criminal case, it must pertain solely on the civil liability.
> An appeal with regard the criminal aspect would violate the accused’s right against
double jeopardy.
> The reason why the offended party can appeal the civil aspect is that double jeopardy only
attaches to the criminal aspect and not the civil aspect. The victim or offended party in the
criminal case
is the State while in its civil aspect, the private offended party.

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER AND WAS ACQUITTED. CAN THE PROSECUTION
APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL?
> No, the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal, since it would place the accused in
double jeopardy.
> A judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals
> Even if the decision of acquittal was erroneous, the prosecution cannot still appeal
the decision as it would put the accused in double jeopardy.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IS FINAL AND

UNAPPEALABLE WHETHER IT HAPPENS AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL OR BEFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS

WHEN CAN THE PROSECUTION APPEAL DESPITE THE DISMISSAL OR

TERMINATION OF THE CASE?
> As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea
of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, an attempt
or frustration thereof, or one which necessarily includes or is included in the previous
offense.
> However, the prosecution may appeal the order of dismissal in the following instances:

1. If the dismissal of the first case was made upon motion or with the express consent of the
defendant, unless the grounds are insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to speedy
trial
2. If the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of
the merits of the case,
3. And the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE APPEAL OF THE ACCUSED?

> If the accused appeals, he waives his right against double jeopardy
> The case is thrown wide open for review and a penalty higher than that of the original
conviction could be imposed upon him

WHAT SHOULD THE ACCUSED DO IF THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION TO QUASH
ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> He should plea not guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy
> In case of conviction, he should appeal from the judgment on the ground of double jeopardy

CAN AN ACCUSED RAISE THE DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN CONTEMPT

PROCEEDINGS?
> No, jeopardy doesn’t attach. Remember the requisites for jeopardy. Jeopardy only
attaches in criminal proceedings.

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner was accused for the crime of child abuse under several information
filed against him. No bail was recommended by the prosecution but he still filed separate
application for bail on the different cases charged against him. The trial court granted the
application in all of the cases in the condition, among others, that the approval of the bail bonds
shall be made only after arraignment to ensure his presence at it and for the trial to proceed
even if he becomes absent during the course.

ISSUE: W/N right to bail may only be invoked after arraignment.

HELD: The trial court is wrong in its theory that there should be an arraignment first before bail
could be granted. In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash the information against
him. If the motion to quash was granted, then an arraignment would not be needed anymore.
The trial court could even ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment by granting bail
and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings under Rule 114 Sec 2(b) requiring
the presence of the accused whenever required and under Rule 116 Sec 1(b) requiring the
accused to appear at the arraignment.

In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. This pronouncement should be
understood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as
a motion to quash the information filed against him. It was explained that to condition the grant
of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to
choose between: (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held; and (2) foregoing the filing of
a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This
would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not
necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application
for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even
prior to arraignment
PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO ​G.R. NO. 167710, JUNE 5, 2009
Doctrine: Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia,
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings,
to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived.
The accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from
promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence
at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.

Soliven vs. Makasiar GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988 [167 SCRA
394]

FACTS:

The case at bar is a petition raised by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest.

The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
if any, to determine probable cause. Soliven vs. Makasiar
Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally" convinced him that the judge is
solely responsible to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when the warrant of arrest was issued. Soliven vs. Makasiar

HELD:

No.

The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the respondent judge. Soliven vs. Makasiar

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

What the Constitution requires is that the issuing judge must satisfy himself first with the criteria
in finding probable cause. And to satisfy himself doesn't mean to he is required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Constitution mandates that he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause. Soliven vs. Makasiar

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

PAROLE EVIDENCE

The "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written
instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of
the parties' written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties
cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which, to all purposes, would
alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to
have been waived and abandoned

CRESPO V MOGUL

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However,
Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later date to
afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the
arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig
Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal
and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The
accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA
dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under
orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of
a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same
is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case
maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm,
modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may
direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be
filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the
instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court

HEARSAY DOCTRINE

The rule against hearsay is in Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible in court. Court decisions cannot be
based on hearsay except in certain situations. Lawyers confronted with hearsay evidence
should object as a matter of course.