It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . .

unjustly accused, convicted and

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994 imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of
FELICITO BASBACIO, ​petitioner, unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed
vs. such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is
not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, ​respondent. Petitioner brought this petition for review on ​certiorari​. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No.
7309, however, provides for review by ​certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat
the petition as a special civil action for ​certiorari​ under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under
MENDOZA, ​J.: sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of
which he was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was
7309, which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he
accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released. contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his
imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the
and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga,
accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently
declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.
a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were
sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted
cancelled. on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by
the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment,
construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released
had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "​unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned."
court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of
The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that
the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."​1 The of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant,
claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for
denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages.​2 In one
sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt
blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the
convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported.​3 In such
guilty." a case to pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial
court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of
innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the
prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"​4 so is the presumption of The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in
innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there
innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is
doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an
is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case: unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not ​necessarily an
unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize
that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the
presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist.​5 negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his
co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the ​manner of his and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that.
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way
he did not commit the crime, but that does into it.
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that
"unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct
to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have committed
the innocence of the accused. any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to
show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on
judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in ​In re Rafael C​. which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and
Climaco​ ​6​ applies: Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26,
1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the two defendants to an
In order that a judge may be held liable for ​knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where
be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is ​contrary to law or ​is not was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as the
supported by the evidence​, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to record shows — nothing but part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .
do an injustice . . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between
he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon
diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had
service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his
cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of
legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing
be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very
clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the
accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must
have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then
imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the
accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful.
Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less
than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily
unjust.