Rommel Jacinto Dantes SILVERIO, Petitioner, vs. Republic of The Philippines, Respondent. G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 J. Corona

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ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.


G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
J. CORONA

FACTS:

Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as
female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.

However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is
denied.
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan, respondent
G.R. No. 166676, 12 September 2008
J. QUISIMBING
FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth but while growing up developed secondary male characteristics and eventually
diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). Further alleges that she had clitoral
hypertrophy in her early years, at age six, after an ultrasound, it was discovered that she had
small ovaries but at 13 years old, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had diminished,
stopped growing and had no breast or menses. For all intents and purposes, as well as in
disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim, respondent presented Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a medical certificate stating that
respondent, is genetically female but her body secretes male hormones, has two organs of which
the female part is undeveloped.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered
his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

RTC granted respondent’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.

RULING:

No. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex
anatomy.Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It
is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to
show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents
position and his personal judgment of being a male.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced
and the consequences that will follow. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry
in his birth certificate from female to male.
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,vs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

J. CHICO-NAZARIO

FACTS:
Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony
in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without
the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they parted ways and
lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and
its entry on file.
Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of
their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

RULING:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar
of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This
certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence,
petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is
no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license
in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day
period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage.An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner — which they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest — will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover,
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All solemnizing officer needs to know
is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
Article 53 of the Civil Code which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the
parties’ states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage since all the elements in Article 53 are present in the case at bar.

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