456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

*
G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Double

Jeopardy; Parties; Both the accused and the prosecution may
appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the
accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy; The
offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to
their right to civil liability.—Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus: “Any party may
appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy.” Clearly, both the accused and the
prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may
do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty. On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal
the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the
accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the
offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of
the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
Same; Same; Same; Well-established is the principle that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an
appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail, on the
rationale that the appellant loses his standing in court when he
absconds.—Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle
that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio,
dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail.
The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “The Court of Appeals may
also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal.” This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose
their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender
or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are deemed to have
waived their right to seek judicial relief. Moreover, this doctrine
applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal,
but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise: “x x x.
When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment
and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting
in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel
appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision

of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x
x”
Same; Same; Same; An accused who has escaped and refused
to surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to have abandoned
his appeal rendering the judgment against him final and
executory.—As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is
explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which we quote: “A judgment of conviction may, upon
motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially
or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.” In the
case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him
has become final and executory.
Same; Same; Independent Civil Actions; The 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution—it is only the civil liability of
the accused arising from the crime charged that is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action.—At the outset, we must
explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified
what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
x x x Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that
is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by
execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to
the employee.
Same; Same; Same; The 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of
reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed
separately from criminal actions—what is deemed instituted in
every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts.
—It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of
reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed
separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred
to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain
“separate, distinct and independent” of any criminal prosecution
based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such
revision and omission: 1. The right to bring the foregoing actions
based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal
prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein. 2.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil

action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action. 3. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission. What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution
is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil
liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-
delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action
is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may—subject to the
control of the prosecutor—still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
Same; Same; Subsidiary Civil Liability; Parties; The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly
declare that, strictly speaking, the employers are not parties to the
criminal cases instituted against their employees; While employers
may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s
lawyers, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.—In its Memorandum, petitioner
cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because “in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s employer
did not interpose an appeal.” Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any
single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an
appeal in such circumstances is not possible. The cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in
effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in
the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the
present case, the former cannot act independently on their own
behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An employer’s appeal would violate
the employee’s right against double jeopardy since the judgment
against the latter could become subject to modification without his
consent.—An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a
waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy
and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court.
The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the, appellant.
This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a
sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to
increase or reduce the penalty it imposed. If the present appeal is
given course, the whole case against the accused-employee
becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
that which has already been imposed by

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would
thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment
against him could become subject to modification without his
consent. We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why
the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail.
It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without
violating his right against double jeopardy.
 Same; Same; Same; An accused, by fleeing, exhibits contempt
of the authority of the court and places himself in a position to
speculate on his chances for a reversal.—By fleeing, the herein
accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and
placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice,
but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such
conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of
the appellate court. Consequently, the judgment against an
appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities becomes final and executory.
Same; Same; Same; The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on subsidiary liability—Articles 102 and 103—are deemed written
into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.—
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are
subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their
employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. The provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability—Articles 102 and
103—are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which
they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
Same; Same; Same; To allow employers to dispute the civil
liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court;
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding
and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.—In the
absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person
who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of
a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability. To allow
employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case
would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them
to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without
the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an
employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but
also with

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 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be

separated from that of the employee.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites.—Before the employers’
subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some
kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the
execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency. The resolution of these issues need not be done in a
separate civil action. But the determination must be based on the
evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and
freely present. Such determination may be done in the same
criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and
civil, has been pronounced; and in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Same; Same; Same; There is only one criminal case against
the accused-employee, and a finding of guilt has both criminal and
civil aspects—it is the height of absurdity for this single case to be
final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former;
Where the civil liability of the accused-employee has become final
and enforceable by reason of his flight, then his employer’s
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
—According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that
while the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be
imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction
should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case
into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee. The
untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has
both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for
this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but
not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the
conviction of the former. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is
incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become
final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil
liability.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process.—As to the argument that
petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to
and dependent upon the employee’s

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso

facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and
upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his
employer’s subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence. It
should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy
of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such
exercise. Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied
with.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; It can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived the
employer of the right to appeal.—After a judgment has become
final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the
proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. In fact, petitioner
admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in
the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the
employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right
to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be
said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Peter H. Santiago for petitioner.
     Ramon M. Nisce collaborating counsel for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the people.
     Romulo Rivera and Benjamin Z. De Leon, Jr. private
prosecutors.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the
judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The
employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by
filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the
primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one
single decision that has become final and executory.
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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

The Case
1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule
2
45 of
the Rules of Court,
3
assailing the March 29, 2000 and the
March 27, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59390. Petitioner’s appeal from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was
dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:

“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion 4 to dismiss is

GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED.”

The second Resolution

5
denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this

wise:

“On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang]

was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to
six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:

‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of

P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of
P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for
one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity
 for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of
P300,000.00 as moral damages;
‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of
P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for
three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum
of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees[;]

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 9-28.

2 Id., pp. 30-34. Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred in
by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Division chair) and Edgardo P. Cruz
(member).
3 Id., pp. 36-37.
4 CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34.
5 Annex “G” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 115-124.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00

as indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as
funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical
expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00
per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral
damages;
‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of P170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover
future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical
expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as
moral damages;
‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as
medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and
P25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical
expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss
earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00;
 to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as
‘h. hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctor’s fees, P1,000.00
for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical
expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual
damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for
hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual
damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as
moral damages;
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of
the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as
actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle;
to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as
actual damages’;

“The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the

insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become
final and executory.
“Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large.
It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps
bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial
court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf
of accused.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

“Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of

appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the
trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9,
1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioner’s] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be
excused from filing [respondents’] brief on the ground that the
OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases
on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of
May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private
6
prosecutor
filed the instant motion to dismiss.” (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied
the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against
the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an
employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed
in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be
to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and
the award of civil liability became final and executory.
Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employer’s subsidiary liability.
7
Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

_______________

6 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 31-33.

7 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 24, 2002, upon
this Court’s receipt of respondent’s Memorandum signed by Assistant
Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega and Roman G. del Rosario and
Associate Solicitor Elizabeth Victoria L. Medina. Petitioner’s
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Ramon M. Nisce, was received by the Court
on April 9, 2002.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

“A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully

participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused.
“B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of
Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay8 v. Adil (164
SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.”

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an

adjunct to Item A.
The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal

from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the
judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has
not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter
had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal
takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.

Appeals in Criminal Cases

Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states thus:

“Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy.”

Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a

criminal case, but the government may do so only if the9
accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.
Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground
that the10 accused should have been given a more severe
penalty. On the other hand, the

_______________

8 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 8; Rollo, p. 200.

9 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (2001, 9th revised
edition), p. 502.
10 Ibid.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect

to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right
to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties
should have the same right to 11 appeal as much of the
judgment as is prejudicial to them.

Appeal by the Accused

Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss
an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail.
The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

“The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or

motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail12or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal.”

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose

their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they
surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they 13are
deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused
who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does
so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly
explains the principle in this wise:

“x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his

arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia
proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against
him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at
large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this 14Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure]. x x x”

_______________

11 People v. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252, August 1, 1934.

12 This is substantially the same as the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
13 People v. Del Rosario, 348 SCRA 603, December 19, 2000.
14 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 540.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless

they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or
are otherwise arrested 15 within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek
relief from 16the court, as they are deemed to have waived
the appeal.

Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is
explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

“A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be

modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation.”

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped

and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he
is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, 17
the
judgment against him has become final and executory.

Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary
civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:

“In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,

tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
“Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging
therein, or for

_______________

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., citing People v. Mapalao, 274 Phil. 354; 197 SCRA 79, May 14, 1991.
17 People v. Enoja, 378 Phil. 623; 321 SCRA 7, December 17, 1999.

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Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect
to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach
in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees.”

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to

employers, according to Article 103 which reads:

“The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article

shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.”

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now

address the main issue raised by petitioner.

Civil Liability Deemed Instituted

in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

“When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the

recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
“x x x      x x x      x x x”

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action;
that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute18 it separately, or institutes it
prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer under

_______________

18 Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity (2000 ed.), pp.

211-212.

469
 VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 469
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by

execution on the basis
19
of the judgment of conviction meted
out to the employee.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement
of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal 20
actions. Thus, the civil
actions referred to in Articles 32,

_______________

19 Id., p. 212.
20 “ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

“(1) Freedom of religion;

“(2) Freedom of speech;
“(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
“(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
“(5) Freedom of suffrage;
“(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
“(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken
for public use;
“(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
“(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
“(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
“(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
“(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
“(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
“(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
“(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
“(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;
 “(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced

470

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

21 22 23
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain
“separate, distinct and independent” of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the

Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal
prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

_______________

by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,

except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
“(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and
“(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

“In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence:
“The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
“The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute.”
21 “ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.”
22 “ART. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses
or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the
city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.”
23 “ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)”

471

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 471

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a

separate civil action arising from the crime charged
does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover
24
more than once for the same act or
omission.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is

the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se
(civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising
from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact,
even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party may—subject to the control of the
prosecutor—still intervene in the criminal action, 25
in order
to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised
Penal Code, which states that “[e]very 26
person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a
party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the
outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be
accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion—including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is
not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed
solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive
list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to
it, because “in all th[o]se cases,
27
the accused’s employer did
not interpose an appeal.” Indeed, petitioner cannot cite
any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely
because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
 The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties 28to the criminal cases instituted against
their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact

_______________

24 Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity, supra, p. 214.

25 Id., pp. 214-215.
26 Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
27 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 13; Rollo, p. 205.
28 Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, July 31,
1956.

472

472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.

While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the
former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but
can only defend the accused.

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-
employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the
judgment reviewed as a whole. 29 These intentions are
apparent from its30 Appellant’s Brief filed with the CA and
from its Petition before us, both of which claim that the
trial court’s
31
finding of guilt “is not supported by competent
evidence.”
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a
waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render
judgment as law and justice dictate,
32
whether favorable or
unfavorable to the, appellant. This is the risk involved
when the 33 accused decides to appeal a sentence of
conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower34
court
and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case
against the accused-employee becomes open to review. It
thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has
already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out
to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right
against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him
could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why
the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by
jumping bail. It is

_______________

29 CA Rollo, pp. 66-108.

30 Rollo, pp. 9-28.
31 Appellant’s Brief, p. 14; CA Rollo, p. 84.
32 Lontoc v. People, 74 Phil. 513, December 29, 1943.
33 People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, December 9, 1999.
34 Lontoc v. People, supra; United States v. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83, January
7, 1902. See also §11 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

473

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 473

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without

violating his right against double jeopardy.

Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing
the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail 35
and thereby made the
judgment of the court below final. Having been a fugitive
from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have
waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction36is now final
and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc ruled:

“There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived

even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of
them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused.
He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case
has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to
have waived his right
37
to appeal from the judgment rendered
against him. x x x.”

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the

authority of the court and placed himself in a position to
speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he
kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
38
hoped to render
the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is
intolerable and 39does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court.
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who
escapes and who refuses to surrender 40
to the proper
authorities becomes final and executory.
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right
to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee;
that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and
that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now
final.

_______________

35 Francisco, Criminal Procedure (1996, 3rd ed.), p. 520.

36 73 Phil. 366, October 31, 1941.
37 Id., p. 369, per Abad Santos, J.
38 Francisco, Criminal Procedure, supra, p. 520.
39 Ibid.
40 People v. Enoja, supra.

474

474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner
now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this 41
Court in Miranda42
v. Malate Garage
43
& Taxicab, Inc.,
Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive
to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal
cases against their employees. By participating in the
defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these
leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on
subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic
tenet they have laid down—that an employer’s liability in a
finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers
are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities
44
of
their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability
—Articles 102 and 103—are deemed written into 45
the
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable. Thus,
in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-
employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction
46
should bind the person who is subsidiarily
liable. In effect and implication, the stigma
47
of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify 48
or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By
the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employ-

_______________

41 Supra at note 28.

42 158 SCRA 57, February 23, 1988.
43 164 SCRA 494, August 18, 1988.
44 Lagazon v. Reyes, 166 SCRA 386, October 18, 1988.
45 Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, supra.
46 Martinez v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1, May 13, 1948.
47 Ibid.
48 Yusay v. Adil, supra; Pajarito v. Señeris, 87 SCRA 275, December 14,
1978.

475

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 475

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

ees without the latter’s consent would also result in

improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to
its amount. The liability of an 49employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted,
however, there must be adequate evidence establishing
that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the
execution against
50
the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a
separate civil action. But the determination must be based
on the evidence that the offended party and the employer
may fully and freely present. Such determination may be
done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s
51
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced; and in a
hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the
employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the
defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its
liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains
subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employee’s conviction has attained finality, then
the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness
dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the
proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for
jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In
effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for
itself; and second, for its accused-employee.

_______________

49 Lagazon v. Reyes, supra; Miranda P. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,

supra.
50 Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula, 156 SCRA 779, December 22, 1987.
51 Ibid.

476

476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There

is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A
finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the
height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the
accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become
final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become
immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing
that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent
on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due
process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is
the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon
the employee’s criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latter’s
insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not
only his primary civil liability, but also his 52
employer’s
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.
It should be stressed that the right to appeal
53
is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed 54
by the
provisions of law authorizing such exercise. Hence, 55
the
legal requirements must be strictly complied with.

_______________

52 Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Martinez v. Barredo, supra.

53 Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466, July 11, 2002.
54 Oro v. Judge Diaz, 361 SCRA 108, July 11, 2001; Mercury Drug Corp.
v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 902; 335 SCRA 567, July 13, 2000; Ortiz v.
Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 708, December 4, 1998.
55 Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, June 14, 1996; Del Rosario v. Court of
Appeals, 241 SCRA 553, February 22, 1995.

477

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 477

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the

rules on appeal as merely harmless 56
and trivial
technicalities that can be discarded. 57
Indeed, deviations
from the rules cannot be tolerated. In these times when
court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such
rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity,
58
so
as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
then the former has the correlative 59
right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-
employee, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was
deprived of due process. It might have lost 60 its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it
can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not
the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC
Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only
after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of
petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that
there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the
employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner
that “[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from
Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner,
being then operated by petitioner’s driver, Napoleon Roman, 61
figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.”
Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a
finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the
discharge of his duties.

_______________

56 Casim v. Flordeliza, 374 SCRA 386, January 23, 2002.

57 People v. Marong, 119 SCRA 430, December 27, 1982.
58 Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, supra.
59 Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50,
November 28, 1996.
60 Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, supra.
61 Petition for Review, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10; Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
2; Rollo, p. 194.

478

478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Litonjua vs. Fernandez

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the

assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 Petition denied, assailed resolutions affirmed.

Notes.—While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the

enforcement of the employer’s subsidiary liability in the
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, execution against the employer must not
issue as just a matter of course—it behooves the court, as a
measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employer’s liability.
(Yonaha vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 [1996])
A final judgment rendered in a civil case absolving the
defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.
(Bordador vs. Luz, 283 SCRA 374 [1997])

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