Bernadette L.

Adasav
V
Cecile V. Abalos
GR no. 168617 February 19, 2007
FACTS:
Abalos filed a two complaints against Adasa for Estafa thru falsification of commercial documents by a private
individual. Adasa entered an unconditional plea of not guilty and filed a petition for review in the DOJ. The DOJ
reversed the prosecutor’s resolution and ordered the withdrawal of the case
Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed the petition for review but
the DOJ denied the motion. The trial court issued an order granting petitioner’s “Motion to Withdraw Information”
and dismissing the case.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. the CA reversed the dismissal of the trial court claiming
that that sec. 7 of DOJ circular no. 70 expressly prohibits the secretary of justice from taking cognizance of a
petition for review filed after the accused has already been arraigned.
Dissatisfied by the CA’s ruling, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to petitioner’s petition for review despite
having been filed after the latter had already been arraigned
HELD:
Yes, in this case, an administrative rule of procedure, is that when a statute is clear and unambiguous,
interpretation need not be resorted to. Since sec. 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ
to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is
necessary.
Section 7: If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition SHALL NOT
be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned.
The petition is denied and the CA’s ruling is affirmed
IFURUNG VS CARPIO-MORALES

GR NO 232131

April 24, 2018

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, in propria persona, seeks a declaration from the court that
section 8 (3) in relation to section 7 of RA 6670 also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, is unconstitutional for being an
outright transgression of section 11, in relation to sec. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution and all individual
respondents as de facto Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman, respectively, and all these positions are vacant.

Petitioner raised in this petition is of transcendental importance since this court’s ruling will finally determine the
correct term and tenure of the Ombudsman and his Deputies and settle the matter as to the constitutionality of sec. 8(3) of
RA 6670.

Petitioner alleges that assailed provision which gives the newly appointed Ombudsman and his deputies the
appointment to a full term of seven years, is constitutionally affirm. And also, that the successor to the positions of the
Ombudsman and deputies should serve only the unexpired term of the predecessor.

He claims that Ombudsman Morales should have ceased to hold office on Feb. 1, 2015 considering that the
ubexpired term of the supposed fourth seven-year term ended in that date, thus, the respondent has been holding the
position in a de facto capacity since Feb. 2, 2015 up to present and with the other respondent deputies.
 Respondent, through the office of the Solicitor’s General, claim that the petitioner failed to appreciate the verbal
legis approach to constitutional construction. Respondents allege that the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution
reveal their intent to grant the ombudsman and his deputies the same rank and salary as the Chairman and members of the
Constitutional Commission but not by the staggered term.

Issue: whether Sec. 8(3) of RA 6670 is constitutional.

Held:

Yes.

Under Sec. 7. Term of Office – The Ombudsman and his deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall serve for a
term of seven years without reappointment.

Sect. 8 Removal; Filing of Vacancy - (3) In case of vacancy in the office of the ombudsman due to death. Resignation,
removal or permanent disability of the incumbent imbudsman, the overall deputy shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a
concurrent capacity until a new ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full term. In case the overall deputy cannot
assume the role of the acting ombudsman, the President may designate any of the deputies, or the Special prosecutor, as
Acting Imbudsman.

Sec. 11. The ombudsman and his deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall
not be qualifies to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
 Contrary to the position of the petitioner, sec. 11, Art. XI by itself is clear and can stand on its own. This can only
mean that it was the intent of the framers that the appointment to the positions of the ombudsman and deputies, whether
it be for the expired or unexpired term of the predecessor, shall always be for a full term of seven years, Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction the where the law does not distinguish,
the court should not distinguish.

On the similarity between the Ombudsman and the deputies , and the chairman and the members of the
constitutional commission pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. XI, it is only with the reference to “salary” and “rank” that the
ombudsman and his deputies should be similar to the latter. Thus, rules on term are not included contrary to what
petitioner claims.

The court rules that the petitioner has miserably failed to prove that Sec. 8(3) of RA 6670 transgresses the
provisions of the 1987 Cinstitution.
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY vs.
GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 188866 October 19, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) and respondent Green Asia Construction & Development Corporation
were parties to a contract for a road network/storm drainage project with a contract price of ₱130,595,337.40. The
stipulations in the contract include the contract price, the mode of payment, advance payment, and the progress payment.

Green Asia sent a letter to PEZA invoking PD No. 1594 and claiming for price escalation in the amount of ₱
9,860,169.58. This claim was denied by PEZA which was anchored on Section 8, PD 1594, requiring proof of the increase or
decrease in construction cost due to the direct acts of the government. Alleging that Green Asia failed to present proof, PEZA
denied the claim for price escalation. Several demand letters and another claim for price escalation was sent by Green Asia
but PEZA maintains its stand that Green Asia failed to present proof.

Green Asia sent to the Office of the President (OP) a letter seeking affirmative resolution of its claim against PEZA. After
summary proceedings, the OP decided in favor of Green Asia. The OP’s reason for granting Green Asia’s claim was that
proof of increase in relevant construction prices due to the direct acts of the government was not required by law, before a
price escalation may be invoked citing Item 6, Cl 12.1 of the IRR of PD 1594. It held that PD 454, a prior enactment on
government infrastructure projects, authorized price escalation and that "direct acts of the government" included increases in
the prices of gasoline, fuel oil and cement. It was, therefore, not necessary to actually show that the prices of those
commodities increased because of the direct acts of the government.

CA sustained the OP Decision but modified the computation of price escalation.

ISSUE:
Whether Presidential Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of construction materials was due
to the direct acts of the government before a price escalation is granted in this payment dispute in a construction contract

HELD:

No. The Court sustained the assailed Decision.

Since the two presidential decrees (1594 and 454) are in pari materia, there is a need to construe them together.
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object,
or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so construed
and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
PD 454 which was enacted prior to PD 1594, was where the phrase "direct acts of the government" was explained to
cover the increase of prices during the effectivity of a government infrastructure contract. The phrase was first used in
Republic Act (RA) No. 1595, which was amended by PD 454. The latter amended R.A. No. 1595 by supplying the meaning of
the phrase "direct acts of the government" and expressly including the increase of prices of gasoline within the coverage of
that phrase. Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase without supplying a contrary or different definition, the
definition provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 was deemed adopted by the later decree. Thus, proof of an increase in fuel
and cement price and a subsequent increase in the cost of labor and relevant construction materials during the contract
period are considered a compliance with the IRR requirements for a claim for price escalation.

The appellate court was, thus, correct in granting respondent’s claim for payment of price escalation, and the assailed
Decision must be upheld.
ROSARIO VALERA VS TUASON

GR NO L-1276

April 30, 1948

Facts:

A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace of Lagayan over which Judge Paredes presided.
Finding himself disqualified by reason of relationship to one of the parties to try the case, he transferred it to the justice of
the peace of La Paz, nearest municipality to Lagayan. The latter justice proceeded with the trial and gave judgment for the
plaintiff and returned of the case with his decision to the justice of the peace of Lagayan. New Justice of the peace had been
appointed for Lagayan, the respondent. The defendants moved for a new trial impeaching the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace of La Paz and found the challenge well founded, declared the judgement null and void and ordered the case
reset. The justice ground for unvalidating the decision is that “the designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try
and decide a given case, when the justice having jurisdiction t hear, try and decide the same disqualifies himself, is not in
law given to the disqualifying justice but ‘to the judge of the district’ who shall designate the nearest justice of the peace.”
(Sec. 211 of the Rev. Admin. Code) He believes that the circular (sec. 73 of the code of the civil procedure) of the secretary
of justice of January 17. 1940, of which the case was transferred, is legally wrong. Justice Caniza, sustained the annulment
of the proceedings of the Justice of the Peace of La Paz and the latter’s decision but on the different ground. He said that it
is the Rules of Court which have abrogated the last-named section.
Issue:

Whether the circular of the Secretary of Justice of January 17, 1940 pursuance to the case that was transferred, is
legally wrong.

Held:

Sec. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may be said to apply to disqualifications under sec. 8 of that act while Sec.
211 of the Revised Admin. Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure. Both
provisions can stand together.

A special law is not regarded as having been amemded or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or
alter is manifest. Generalia Specialibus non derogant. Harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two
laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the
legislature.

Judge Ceniza’s opinion that the Rules of Court have replaced and absorbed Sec. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
clearly erroneous. There is less reason to hold that this Section has been impliedly repealed by the Rules of Court than that
it has been abrogated by Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code for authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of
substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court which concern “pleading, practice
admission and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of the law therein.”
ARMANDO BARCELLANO VS DOLORES BANAS
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation
PONENTE: PEREZ
FACTS:
Respondent Dolores Banās, an heir of Bartolome Banās owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In
1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando Barcellano. The heirs of Banās
contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem the property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was
also mention that the Banās heirs failed to give the amount required by medina for them to redeem the lot. Action to redeem the property was filed before
the RTC. It denied the petition on the ground that the Banās heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period provided in article 1623 of
NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC decision to deny the Banās heirs of their right of legal redemption is valid
HELD:
The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the Banās heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The decision
was based on the provisions of article 1623 NCC. A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and pleadings
submitted by the parties showed that there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of 30 days within which the
right of legal redemption may be exercised does not exist.
In this case, the law was clear. A written notice by the vendor is mandatory.
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty
G.R. No. 14205 (September 30, 1919)

FACTS:
The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal
revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an
act of Congress in 1913. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally
collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. On the
other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private
charter.

ISSUE:
W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter.

HELD:
No. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a
private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts
and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. A
general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have
modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. Where
the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an
exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
Lichauco vs. Apostol
G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922)

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. It now desires to
import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the
Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No.
21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at
Pnom-Pehn. Legislations involved in the case:
Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code – prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign country
Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code – Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden
Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3052 – Bringing of animals imported from foreign
countries into the Philippine Islands
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052, has been repealed by the implication in
Sec. 1770.
HELD:
No. Sec. 1762, as amended, is of a general nature, while Sec. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made
the subject of legislation in Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. 1762 and it
must be considered as a special qualification of Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full
force and effect, being a special law having special contingency not dealt within Sec. 1762, which extends merely
to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum.
People vs Garcia
No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950)

FACTS:
The lower court, ignoring the Appellant’s minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of the RPC by
reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to “be committed to the custody or care of a public or private,
benevolent or charitable institution,” instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy.
The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which
provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.”

ISSUE:
W/N the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of Art. 68, par. 2 of the RPC.

HELD:
Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it now stands and Art. 80 as amended. There is no
incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the
maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and
reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same statute are
never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997)

FACTS:
An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a
notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. China
Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that “foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of any court. Respondent Bank
states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood firm on the policy.

ISSUES:
W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made
applicable to a foreigner.

HELD:
Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424
was enacted during a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has
already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the
financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of
the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil
Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952)

FACTS:
Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304, sought to compel
Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec.
2 of RA 304, which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by
the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than two per
centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended
however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. The lower court
sustained Respondent company.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company.

HELD:
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it
may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, “at not
more than two per centum per annum for ten years.”, the interest to be charged, that the verb phrase is
mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the
value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can
be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be
made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate
is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the
acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds.” In other words, acceptance
or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.
G.R. No. 42317 September 21, 1934
THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Manila Electric Company against the Public
Service Commission, that judgment be rendered declaring null and void said commission's order
contained in its letter to the petitioner, dated July 24, 1934, whereby it directed said petitioner to
desist from enforcing the following measure or regulation:
“A customer who does not have any outstanding sufficient deposit with the company to
guarantee his account for electric service and who is disconnected for non-payment of bills,
shall not be reconnected unless the bills in arrears are paid and a deposit to guarantee future
accounts is made. The deposit shall be equal to the amount of the approximate consumption for
two months. It shall bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent a year, and shall be refunded at the end
of one (1) year, if the customer has promptly paid all electric bills rendered during that period.”

Issue:
1.) whether there is a presumption that the measures or rules adopted by public service
companies are unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary.
2. whether or not the Public Service Commission is authorized to require the petitioner
Manila Electric Company to submit the measure or regulation under consideration to it for approval
before enforcing the same, and to pay the corresponding registration fees.
Held:
1. Subsection (c) of section 16 of Act No. 3108, otherwise known as the Public Service Law,
did not show or in any other provision of the same Act establishes or discloses the presumption that
the measures or regulations adopted by public service companies are unjust, unreasonable and
arbitrary. That public service companies holding certificates of public convenience are not required
to prove that the measures or regulations adopted by them, for the validity of which the law requires
no approval by the Public Service Commission, are just and reasonable, unless they are objected to
as unjust and unreasonable
2. That neither are public service companies obliged, nor is the Public Service Commission
authorized to require them, to submit for approval any measure or regulation for the validity of
which the law requires no such approval.
G.R. No. L-41953 February 27, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABEL BINUYA, ET AL., defendants.
CONCEPCION CAPALUNGAN, appellant.

Facts:
Appellant was prosecuted for theft in the justice of the peace court of Laoag, Ilocos Norte.
She pleaded guilty, henced was sentenced to one month and fifteen days of arresto menor. The
judgment of conviction was rendered on November 20, 1933, and on the same date appellant was
committed to the provincial jail. On December 4, 1933, she interposed an appeal to the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and was thereupon released on bail. In the latter court she again
pleaded guilty, whereupon judgment was rendered which required her to pay a fine of twenty pesos,
and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Claiming that she was entitled to have
credited against the subsidiary imprisonment thus imposed, the time she spent in the provincial jail
from November 20 to December 4, 1933, appellant filed a motion in the court below for the purpose
of having her claim recognized. From an order denying such motion, this appeal was taken.

Issue:
Whether the appellant is entitled to have credited against the subsidiary imprisonment.
Held:
In the case at bar it can noticed that the authority relied upon by appellant contemplates a
case where an amendatory code was silent as to a point expressly covered by the original code. In
such a situation, the applicable rule is that in the construction of penal statutes, repeal by
implication is not favored. Hence in this case, the penal code now in force is a complete revision of
the old one and the rule where a statute is revised, or a series of legislative acts on the same subject
are revised and consolidated into one, all parts and provisions of the former act or acts, that are
omitted from the revised act, are repeated. Therefore, order appealed from is affirmed with costs
against the appellant. And what is more, article 367 of the Revised Penal Code expressly repeals the
old Penal Code.