People of the Philippines v. Hon. Martin Villarama and Jaime Manuel, GR. NO.

99287

FACTS:

Jaime Manuel was charged with violation of Section 16, RA 6425, as amended.
The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and
one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos.
That on August 21, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Manuel,
without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.08 of Shabu
wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.

During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued. Then, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private
respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to
change his former plea of “not guilty” to that of “guilty” to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425, as amended. That same day, the Respondent Judge
issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to
the change of plea. On February 18, 1991, private respondent filed his request to plead
guilty to a lesser offense. However, the prosecutor filed his opposition to the request to
plead guilty to a lesser offense on the grounds that the prosecution already rested its
case and the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally
charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution and the valuable
time which the court and the prosecutor had expanded would be put to waste.

However, Respondent judge issued a decision that the accused simply wants to
avail of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. It is conceded though that, as pointed out by
the prosecution that such is a waste of time on the part of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and of the Court, nonetheless, this Court, having in mind Section 2 of Rule 1
which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination if every action and proceeding and also for humanitarian considerations.
It also ruled that the admission of guilt by the accused indicates his submission to the
law and moral disposition on his part to reform. Prosecution filed its Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not Respondent Judge erred in granting private respondents
request to plead guilty to a lesser offense because the request was filed out of
time and the consent thereto of the prosecutor and the offended party was not
obtained?

2. Whether or not Respondent Judge erred in convicting Private Respondent of

the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA 6425, as amended, instead of
the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of the same law, in
view of the absence of a valid change of plea?

RULING:

Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a
multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge
(ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal
proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to
change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof,
provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.

A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the

offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the
aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et
al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc Resolution).
 In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a
lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation,
jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime
charged. In his concurring opinion inPeople v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28,
1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the
rationale of the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the
fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to charge his
former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could
be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason
for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under
which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have
been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.

As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from
the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea.
As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion,
it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all
the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the
interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in
this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections
(i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed by
the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds
of objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility
of conviction of the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high
because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of
the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's
change of plea is improper and irregular.
Article 171 Falsification of public officer

Article 172 Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents

Plea bargaining

Daan vs. Sandiganbayan

Joselito Raniero J. Daan, petitioner

vs.

The Hon. Sandiganbayan

(Fourth Division), respondent

GR Nos. 163972-77

March 28, 2008

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

Nature of the Case:

Certiorari and prohibition

Brief:

Petitioner, accused with the crime of malversation of public funds by falsification,

questions the denial of the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

Facts:

Petitioner, together with Mayor Kuizon were charged for three counts of
malversation of public funds by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period
making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal
hall building of Bato, Leyte. In addition to the charge for malversation, the accused
were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer
or employee.
 In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty
and substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In
the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute
their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of
failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the
proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public
document by a private individual for it will strengthen the cases against the principal
accused, Mayor Kuizon who appears to be the mastermind of these criminal acts.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite
favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent
reason was presented to justify its approval. Likewise, it denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether the lesser offense of falsification of a public document by a private individual

is necessary included in the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer,
hence petitioner may plead guilty to the former.

Actions of the Court:

Office of the Special Prosecutor: Granted

Sandiganbayan: Denied

SC: Granted

Court Rationale:

Yes.

The lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally
charged.

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information
constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included
in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter (Art. 171 vis-a-vis Art. 172).

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following
elements must concur:

(a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;

(c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and

(d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.

Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code has the following elements:

(a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position;

(b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code; and

(c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. In the charge for Falsification
of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by
Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of
his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality
of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, he may plead guilty for rendering account by an
accountable officer instead of malversation of public funds.

Therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case
likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.

Moreover, petitioner is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as
foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local
government funds, not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount
ofP18,860.00 involved in this case.

SC Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and
May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant
petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain.Let records of this case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

Additional Info:

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of
a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.

Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to
said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.

The rule used however the word may in the second sentence of Section 2,
denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused
to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. (Daan vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. NOS. 163972-77 : March 28, 2008)
 Ocampo v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-439, August 20, 1946

Facts: The petitioner was arrested for allegedly pointing out Placido Trinidad as a guerrilla to the
Japanese and for that reason Placido Trinidad was shot to death. No evidence, however, was
presented by the special prosecutor and all he did at the hearing was to recite the contents of
an affidavit and to state further that he 27 more affidavits. Petitioner made an objection stating
that a mere recital is not a evidence and that evidence cannot be considered strong which has
not been subjected to the test of cross-examination. He presented two affidavits, one from
Trinidad’s mother and the other from Trinidad’s uncle, wherein it is stated that Placido Trinidad
was killed by the Japanese because of his having attempted to wrest a revolver from a foreman
in charge of a detail at work under orders of the Japanese and that petitioner had nothing to do
with such killing. The Fourth Division of the th e People’s Court denied petitioner’s petition for
bail.

Issues:
Issues:
1. Whether or not evidence of guilt is strong, or presumption is great.
2. Whether or not, the People’s Court committed grave abuse of discretion by denying
the petition for bail of the petitioner.

Held:

1. No, it is not. “At “At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing that the
case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination
of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in Herras Teehankee Teehankee case, a
matter of judicial discretion. xxx Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil., 362),
it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere
hearsay evidence, evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto. ” The petitioner was not given
the chance to cross-examine cross- examine the prosecutor’s witnesses who provided the affidavits.

2. Yes. As stated in the Herras Teehankee case, Teehankee case, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. The prevailing doctrine in the United States is
that no matter which side bears the burden of proof, the evidence of guilt should be adduced before the
court for a proper determination of its probative force. The court also noted that under the Alabama
statutes upon the hearing of applications for bail, either before or after indictment, the court is not, not
, as according to the practice in England, confined to the written evidence evidence taken down before
the committing magistrate. The court also added “In “In capital case, application for bail calls for
exercise of judicial discretion in determining probability of defendant's guilt which requires
submission of evidence. (Shaw vs. State)”. Furthermore, “Where on a motion to admit to bail after the
indictment, the evidence of the witnesses who testified before the grand jury does not make a prima
facie case against the accused, he is entitled to bail, and it is an error to refuse bail upon the statement
of the district attorney that he has other evidence which he will not disclose for fear of weakening the
state's case. (In ex parte Reynald, 37 Texas, 1.)”. Therefore, the Court concluded that “petitioner no
proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, the Fourth Division of
the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the bail applied for. ” The order
denying the petition was set aside and the respondent court is ordered to hold another hearing for bail.

Shorter version: The evidence of guilt must be strong for the application for bail for capital
offenses to be refused. But in this case, the special prosecutor did not present any evidence but rather
only affidavits. Thus, the court had nothing to base their determination on of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong or not. For that reason, bail must be set for the petitioner.

With regard to Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan: Evidence must first be presented and examined in a
hearing for bail before it can be determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong or not, and if not, for
the amount of bail to be set, because the determination is a matter of judicial discretion. In the case of
Enrile vs Sandiganbayan, there was no hearing for bail because Enrile did not file an application for bail.
The hearing for bail is important in his case because he is being charged with an offense punishable of
reclusion perpetua. Since there was no hearing of bail, the court still had no opportunity to determine
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, with no affirmative determination that the evidence of
guilt is not strong in a case where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua because no hearing
for bail commenced, Enrile must not be granted bail. This is regardless of his medical conditions and him
being not a flight risk.