Subject: PFAM

Doctrine:
Topic: Donation proper nuptias (Art. 82-87, FC)
Subtopic: Requisites for Donation
Digester: ADPG
GR. L-12093 June 29, 1959
ESTANISLAO SERRANO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MELCHOR SOLOMON, defendant-appellee

FACTS:
Ponente: MONTEMAYOR, J.:
1. Petitioner Estanislao Serrano is Alejandria Feliciano’s guardian who took care and
raised her.
2. Defendant Melchor Solomon married Alejandria. On the same day of the marriage but
before the marriage ceremony he executed the alleged deed of donation propter nuptias
(DPN) stipulating that
3. He will donate all his properties to his and Alejandria’s common children.
4. If no children and husband dies first, half the properties will be given to husband’s
siblings and their heirs
5. If no children and wife dies first, half the properties will be given to petitioner, who took
care of wife.
6. Less than nine months after marriage, or rather on March 2, 1949, Alejandria died
without issue. Petitioner commenced action to enforce the terms of the alleged donation
7. Court dismisses the action because the donation is not a DPN, hence this petition
ISSUE:

Whether or not Solomon’s deed of donation is a donation propter nuptias (DPN).

HELD:
NO. Solomon’s deed of donation is not a donation propter nuptias (DPN).
Article 1327 of the Old Civil Code states that “Donations by reasons of marriage are those
bestowed before its celebration in consideration of the same, upon one or both of the spouses”. This
means that for a donation to be a DPN it must be:
o Made before the celebration
o In consideration of the celebration
o In favor of both/one of the spouses
In this case, Solomon’s donation did not fulfill the last 2 requisites. The marriage would have
to be childless and one of the spouses would have to die before the other before the donation would
operate. So, strictly, speaking, the donation may not be regarded as one made in consideration of the
marriage. Moreover, donation was not in favor of Alejandria, the wife, it was in favor of her guardian,
Serrano who acted as her parent and raised her from girlhood to womanhood in the absence of her
father.
Hence, Solomon’s deed of donation is not a donation propter nuptias (DPN).

NOTES:
 It cannot be considered as a donation inter vivos (between the living), because donee Serrano has
not expressly accepted it either in the same instrument or donation or in a separate document as
required by law.
 Same with the donation mortis causa (on the occasion of death), because donor Solomon is still
alive and naturally, even if the donation were otherwise valid, still, the time and occasion have not
arrived for considering its operation and implementation
FULL TEXT:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12093 June 29, 1959

ESTANISLAO SERRANO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MELCHOR SOLOMON, defendant-appellee.

Constante Pimentel for appellant.

Faustino B. Tobia, Eufrecino T. Tagayana, Pedro R. Arce and Emmanuel U. Ujano for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Estanislao Serrano is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Judge Jose
G. Bautista presiding, declaring null and void the supposed donation propter nuptias on which his
complaint was based and dismissing the later upon motion of the defendant. The motion for dismissal
was filed before the hearing but the trial court deferred action upon it until after submission of evidence
by the parties. Said parties entered into a stipulation of facts after which they declined to submit any
other evidence except Exhibit "A", the supposed deed of donation propter nuptias, the translation of
which, for purposes of reference, is reproduced below:

That, I Melchor Solomon, single, Filipino, of legal age, native of the municipality of Sinait,
province of Ilocos Sur and residing at present in Sinait, having decided to get married with the
consent of my parents, brothers, or sisters and relatives, have announced and manifested my
determination and desire to Mr. Estanislao Serrano to whose family the flower I intend to win
belongs, namely Miss Alejandria Feliciano single, born in Hawaii but is actually residing in
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.

This ardent desire favored by good luck and accepted by the noble lady the one concerned, is
to be realized and complied with under agreement or stipulation which affirms, promotes and
vivifies the union. This agreement donating all my exclusive properties in order that we shall
have a basic capital for our conjugal life and in order that there will be ready maintenance and
support of offsprings has come out voluntarily and expontaneously from me, I the very one
concerned.

These which I am donating my exclusive properties because I have honestly acquired the
same with the sweat of my brows and I donate them gladly, to wit . . .;

The referred to properties are donated in accordance with the existing laws of the Philippines
and our children out of the wedlock will be the ones to inherit same inherit same with equal
shares. But if God will not bless our union with any child one half of all my properties including
the properties acquired our conjugal union will be given the (to) my brothers or sisters or their
heirs if I, the husband will die before my wife and if my beloved wife will die before me, one
half of all my properties and those acquired by us will be given to those who have reared my
wife in token of my love to her. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Alejandria Feliciano, whose father went to Hawaii to seek his fortune and who until now resides there,
had been left to her father's friend named Estanislao Serrano who took care of and raised her from
the age 12 until she reached womanhood. On June 21, 1948, defendant Melchor Solomon married
Alejandria. On the same day of the marriage but before the marriage ceremony he executed the
alleged Deed of Donation, Exhibit "A" above reproduced. Less than nine months after marriage, or
rather on March 2, 1949, Alejandria died without issue. Several months thereafter Estanislao Serrano
commenced the present action to enforce and implement the terms of the alleged donation particularly
that portion thereof to the effect that if Alejandria died before her husband Melchor and left no children,
then one half of Melchor's properties and those acquired by him and his wife would be given to those
persons who had raised and taken care of her namely, Estanislao Serrano.

Acting upon the motion for dismissal the trial court found that the donation could not be regarded as a
donation propter nuptias for the reason that though it was executed before the marriage, it was not
made in consideration of the marriage and, what is more important, that the donation was not made
to one or both of the (marriage) contracting parties, but to a third person.

After a careful study of the case, we fully agree with the trial court. Article 1327 of the Old Civil Code
reads:

Art. 1327. Donations by reasons of marriage are those bestowed before its celebration in
consideration of the same, upon one or both of the spouses.

This article was reproduced in the Civil Code under Article 126. Whether we apply Article 1327 for the
reason that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in 1948 before the promulgation of the New Civil
Code in 1950 or whether we apply Article 126 of the New Civil Code the result would be the same.

Was the donation made in considerations of the marriage between Melchor and Alejandria or was it
made consideration of the death of either of them in the absence of any children? True, the Deed of
Donation was executed on the occasion when they married. But, the marriage in itself was not the only
consideration or condition under which terms of the donation would be carried out. The marriage would
have to be childless and one of the spouses would have to die before the other before the donation
would operate. So, strictly, speaking, the donation may not be regarded as one made in consideration
of the marriage.

But assuming for the moment that it was made in consideration of the marriage, still, we have the fact
that the donation was being made not in favor of Alejandria, the wife, but rather in favor of those who
acted as her parents and raised her from girlhood to womanhood in the absence of her father. That
does not place it within the provisions of Article 1327 and Article 126 of the Old Civil Code and the
New Civil Code, respectively. Manresa, in his commentary on Article 1327 of the Civil Code says the
following:

Donations excluded are those (1) made in favor of the spouses after the celebration of
marriage; (2) executed in favor of the future spouses but not in consideration of the marriage;
and (3) granted to persons other than the spouses even though they may be founded on the
marriage (6 M. 232).

Having come to the conclusion that the Deed of Donation does not fulfill the requirements of a
donation propter nuptias and that it might be considered a donation inter vivos, can it be considered
valid and effective? Hardly, because it was never accepted by the donee either in the same instrument
or donation or in a separate document as required by law.

Again, may the donation be regarded a donation mortis causa, and given effect? The answer has to
be in the negative for the reason that this Tribunal has heretofore consistently held that a donation to
take effect after the death of the donor, is equivalent to a disposition or bequest of property by last will,
an it should be executed in accordance with the requisites and strict provisions governing the
execution wills;1 and Exhibit "A" does not fulfill said requirements. Moreover, in the present case, the
donor is still alive and naturally, even if the donation were otherwise valid, still, the time and occasion
have not arrived for considering its operation and implementation.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.