DNC v. Hobbs (Jan. 27, 2020 PDF

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Case: 18-15845, 01/27/2020, ID: 11574519, DktEntry: 123-1, Page 1 of 239
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL No. 18-15845

COMMITTEE; DSCC, AKA
Democratic Senatorial Campaign D.C. No.
Committee; THE ARIZONA 2:16-cv-01065-
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, DLR
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. OPINION
KATIE HOBBS, in her official

capacity as Secretary of State of
Arizona; MARK BRNOVICH, Attorney
General, in his official capacity as
Arizona Attorney General,
Defendants-Appellees,
THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY;

BILL GATES, Councilman; SUZANNE
KLAPP, Councilwoman; DEBBIE
LESKO, Sen.; TONY RIVERO, Rep.,
Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
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Argued and Submitted En Banc March 27, 2019

San Francisco, California
Filed January 27, 2020
Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain, William A. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon*,
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton, Jay S. Bybee,
Consuelo M. Callahan, Mary H. Murguia, Paul J. Watford,
and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;

Concurrence by Judge Watford;
Dissent by Judge O’Scannlain;
Dissent by Judge Bybee
*
Judge Berzon was drawn to replace Judge Graber. Judge Berzon has
read the briefs, reviewed the record, and watched the recording of oral
argument held on March 27, 2019.
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DNC V. HOBBS 3
SUMMARY**
Civil Rights
The en banc court reversed the district court’s judgment

following a bench trial in favor of defendants, the Arizona
Secretary of State and Attorney General in their official
capacities, in an action brought by the Democratic National
Committee and others challenging, first, Arizona’s policy of
wholly discarding, rather than counting or partially counting,
ballots cast in the wrong precinct; and, second, House Bill
2023, a 2016 statute criminalizing the collection and delivery
of another person’s ballot.
Plaintiffs asserted that the out-of-precinct policy (OOP)

and House Bill (H.B.) 2023 violated Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 as amended because they adversely and
disparately affected Arizona’s American Indian, Hispanic,
and African American citizens. Plaintiffs also asserted that
H.B. 2023 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. Finally,
plaintiffs asserted that the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments because they unduly
burden minorities’ right to vote.
The en banc court held that Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, OOP
ballots, and H.B. 2023’s criminalization of the collection of
another person’s ballot, have a discriminatory impact on
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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American Indian, Hispanic, and African American voters in

Arizona, in violation of the “results test” of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Specifically, the en banc court
determined that plaintiffs had shown that Arizona’s OOP
policy and H.B. 2023 imposed a significant disparate burden
on its American Indian, Hispanic, and African American
citizens, resulting in the “denial or abridgement of the right
of its citizens to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(a). Second, plaintiffs had shown that, under the
“totality of circumstances,” the discriminatory burden
imposed by the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 was in part caused
by or linked to “social and historical conditions” that have or
currently produce “an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed
by [minority] and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives” and to participate in the political process.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(b).
The en banc court held that H.B. 2023’s criminalization

of the collection of another person’s ballot was enacted with
discriminatory intent, in violation of the “intent test” of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and of the Fifteenth
Amendment. The en banc court held that the totality of the
circumstances—Arizona’s long history of race-based voting
discrimination; the Arizona legislature’s unsuccessful efforts
to enact less restrictive versions of the same law when
preclearance was a threat; the false, race-based claims of
ballot collection fraud used to convince Arizona legislators to
pass H.B. 2023; the substantial increase in American Indian
and Hispanic voting attributable to ballot collection that was
targeted by H.B. 2023; and the degree of racially polarized
voting in Arizona—cumulatively and unmistakably revealed
that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting
H.B. 2023. The en banc court further held that Arizona had
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not carried its burden of showing that H.B. 2023 would have
been enacted without the motivating factor of racial
discrimination. The panel declined to reach DNC’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Concurring, Judge Watford joined the court’s opinion to

the extent it invalidated Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and
H.B. 2023 under the results test. Judge Watford did not join
the opinion’s discussion of the intent test.
Dissenting, Judge O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Clifton,

Bybee and Callahan, stated that the majority drew factual
inferences that the evidence could not support and misread
precedent along the way. In so doing, the majority
impermissibly struck down Arizona’s duly enacted policies
designed to enforce its precinct-based election system and to
regulate third-party collection of early ballots.
Dissenting, Judge Bybee, joined by Judges O’Scannlain,

Clifton and Callahan, wrote separately to state that in
considering the totality of the circumstances, which took into
account long-held, widely adopted measures, Arizona’s time,
place, and manner rules were well within our American
democratic-republican tradition.
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COUNSEL
Bruce V. Spiva (argued), Marc E. Elias, Elisabeth C. Frost,

Amanda R. Callais, and Alexander G. Tischenko, Perkins
Coie LLP, Washington, D.C.; Daniel C. Barr and Sarah R.
Gonski, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; Joshua L. Kaul,
Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, Wisconsin; for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Andrew G. Pappas (argued), Joseph E. La Rue, Karen J.

Hartman-Tellez, and Kara M. Karlson, Assistant Attorneys
General; Dominic E. Draye, Solicitor General; Mark
Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,
Phoenix, Arizona; for Defendants-Appellees.
Brett W. Johnson (argued) and Colin P. Ahler, Snell &

Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Intervenor-Defendants-
Appellees.
John M. Gore (argued), Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General; Thomas E. Chandler and Erin H. Flynn, Attorneys;
Gregory B. Friel, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Eric S.
Dreiband, Assistant Attorney General; Department of Justice,
CRD–Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus
Curiae United States.
Kathleen E. Brody, ACLU Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix,

Arizona; Dale Ho, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, New York, New York; Davin Rosborough and
Ceridwen Chery, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation,
Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties
Union & American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona.
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OPINION
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
The right to vote is the foundation of our democracy.

Chief Justice Warren wrote in his autobiography that the
precursor to one person, one vote, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), was the most important case decided during his
tenure as Chief Justice—a tenure that included Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Earl Warren, The
Memoirs of Earl Warren 306 (1977). Chief Justice Warren
wrote in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964): “The
right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government.”
Justice Black wrote in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964): “No right is more precious in a free country than that
of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.”
For over a century, Arizona has repeatedly targeted its

American Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens,
limiting or eliminating their ability to vote and to participate
in the political process. In 2016, the Democratic National
Committee and other Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively,
“DNC” or “Plaintiffs”) sued Arizona’s Secretary of State and
Attorney General in their official capacities (collectively,
“Arizona”) in federal district court.
DNC challenged, first, Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, ballots
cast in the wrong precinct (“out-of-precinct” or “OOP”
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policy); and, second, House Bill 2023 (“H.B. 2023”), a 2016

statute criminalizing the collection and delivery of another
person’s ballot. DNC contends that the OOP policy and H.B.
2023 violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as
amended (“VRA”) because they adversely and disparately
affect Arizona’s American Indian, Hispanic, and African
American citizens. DNC also contends that H.B. 2023
violates Section 2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution because it was enacted with
discriminatory intent. Finally, DNC contends that the OOP
policy and H.B. 2023 violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments because they unduly burden minorities’ right to
vote.
Following a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in

favor of Arizona on all claims. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824 (D. Ariz. 2018) (Reagan). DNC
appealed, and a divided three-judge panel of our court
affirmed. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 904 F.3d 686
(9th Cir. 2018) (DNC). A majority of non-recused active
judges voted to rehear this case en banc, and we vacated the
decision of the three-judge panel. Democratic Nat’l Comm.
v. Reagan, 911 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2019).
We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo

and its findings of fact for clear error. Gonzalez v. Arizona,
677 F.3d 383, 406 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). We may
“correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so-
called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that
is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of
law.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Smith v. Salt River Project
Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 591 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Salt River). We review for clear error the district
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court’s overall finding of vote dilution or vote denial in

violation of the VRA. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78; Salt River,
109 F.3d at 591.
Reviewing the full record, we conclude that the district

court clearly erred. We reverse the decision of the district
court. We hold that Arizona’s policy of wholly discarding,
rather than counting or partially counting, out-of-precinct
ballots, and H.B. 2023’s criminalization of the collection of
another person’s ballot, have a discriminatory impact on
American Indian, Hispanic, and African American voters in
Arizona, in violation of the “results test” of Section 2 of the
VRA. We hold, further, that H.B. 2023’s criminalization of
the collection of another person’s ballot was enacted with
discriminatory intent, in violation of the “intent test” of
Section 2 of the VRA and of the Fifteenth Amendment. We
do not reach DNC’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
I. Out-of-Precinct Policy and H.B. 2023
DNC challenges (1) Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, ballots
cast out-of-precinct (“OOP”), and (2) H.B. 2023, a statute
that, subject to certain exceptions, criminalizes the collection
of another person’s early ballot. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-
122, -135, -584; H.B. 2023, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2016), codified as Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H), (I).
Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person

voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or
during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the
voter receives the ballot via mail and either mails back the
voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off
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location. Arizona’s OOP policy affects in-person voting.

H.B. 2023 affects early voting.
We describe in turn Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023.
A. Out-of-Precinct Policy
1. Policy of Entirely Discarding OOP Ballots
Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote-center

or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 840. In counties using the vote-center
system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in
the county. Id. In counties using the precinct-based system,
registered voters may vote only at the designated polling
place in their precinct. Approximately 90 percent of
Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-
based system.
In precinct-based counties, if a voter arrives at a polling

place and does not appear on the voter rolls for that precinct,
that voter may cast a provisional ballot. Id.; Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§§ 16-122, -135, -584. After election day, county election
officials in close elections review all provisional ballots to
determine the voter’s identity and address. If, after reviewing
a provisional ballot, election officials determine that the voter
voted out of precinct, the county discards the OOP ballot in
its entirety. In some instances, all of the votes cast by the
OOP voter will have been cast for candidates and
propositions for which the voter was legally eligible to vote.
In other instances, most of the votes cast by the OOP voter
will have been cast properly, in the sense that the voter was
eligible to vote on those races, but one or more votes for local
candidates or propositions will have been cast improperly.
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In both instances, the county discards the OOP ballot in

its entirety. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 840. That is, the
county discards not only the votes of an OOP voter for the
few local candidates and propositions for which the OOP
voter may have been ineligible to vote. The county also
discards the votes for races for which the OOP voter was
eligible to vote, including U.S. President, U.S. Senator, and
(almost always) Member of the U.S. House of
Representatives; all statewide officers, including Governor,
and statewide propositions; (usually) all countywide officers
and propositions; and (often) local candidates and
propositions.
2. Comparison with Other States
The district court found that Arizona “consistently is at or

near the top of the list of states that collect and reject the
largest number of provisional ballots each election.” Id.
at 856 (emphasis added). The district court’s finding
understates the matter. Arizona is consistently at the very top
of the list by a large margin.
Dr. Jonathan Rodden, Professor of Political Science and

Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University, provided expert reports to the district court. The
court gave “great weight” to Dr. Rodden’s analysis of the
“rates and causes of OOP voting” in Arizona. Id. at 835.
Dr. Rodden reported: “Since 2012, Arizona has clearly
become the national leader in both provisional ballots cast
and especially in provisional ballots rejected among in-person
voters.” Jonathan Rodden, Expert Report (Rodden) at 25.
Dr. Rodden reported that, from 2006 to 2010, between

9 to 13 percent of all in-person ballots cast in Arizona were
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provisional ballots. Id. at 24. In the 2012 general election,

more than 22 percent of all in-person ballots cast were
provisional ballots. Id. In Maricopa County, Arizona’s most
populous county, close to one in three in-person ballots cast
in 2012 were provisional ballots. Id. at 27–28. In the 2014
midterm election, over 18 percent of in-person ballots cast in
the State were provisional ballots. Id. at 25. These numbers
place Arizona at the very top of the list of States in collection
of provisional ballots.
Arizona also rejects a higher percentage of provisional

ballots than any other State. The district court found:
In 2012 alone “[m]ore than one in every five

[Arizona in-person] voters . . . was asked to
cast a provisional ballot, and over 33,000 of
these—more than 5 percent of all in-person
ballots cast—were rejected. No other state
rejected a larger share of its in-person ballots
in 2012.”
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 856 (alterations in original)

(quoting Rodden at 24–25).
One of the most frequent reasons for rejecting provisional

ballots in Arizona is that they are cast out-of-precinct. Id.;
see also Rodden at 26–29. From 2008 to 2016, Arizona
discarded a total of 38,335 OOP ballots cast by registered
voters—29,834 ballots during presidential general elections,
and 8,501 ballots during midterm general elections. Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
As the figure below shows, Arizona is an extreme outlier

in rejecting OOP ballots:
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Rodden at 26. The percentage of rejected OOP votes in

Arizona is eleven times that in Washington, the State with the
second-highest percentage.
The percentage of OOP ballots in Arizona, compared to

all ballots cast, has declined in recent years. But the
percentage of in-person ballots cast, compared to all ballots
cast, has declined even more. See Jonathan Rodden, Rebuttal
Report (Rodden Rebuttal) at 10. As a result, as a percentage
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of in-person ballots between 2008 and 2014, the percentage

of OOP ballots has increased.
3. Reasons for OOP Ballots
Three key factors leading to OOP ballots are frequent

changes in polling locations; confusing placement of polling
locations; and high rates of residential mobility. These
factors disproportionately affect minority voters. Dr. Rodden
summarized:
Voters must invest significant effort in order

to negotiate a dizzying array of precinct and
polling place schemes that change from one
month to the next. Further, Arizona’s
population is highly mobile and residential
locations are fluid, especially for minorities,
young people, and poor voters, which further
contributes to confusion around voting
locations.
Rodden at 2; see also Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 857–58

(discussing these reasons).
a. Frequent Changes in Polling Locations
Arizona election officials change voters’ assigned polling

places with unusual frequency. Maricopa County, which
includes Phoenix, is a striking example. The district court
found that between 2006 and 2008, “at least 43 percent of
polling locations” changed. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 858.
Between 2010 and 2012, approximately 40 percent of polling
place locations were changed again. Id. These changes
continued in 2016, “when Maricopa County experimented
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with 60 vote centers for the presidential preference election

[in March], then reverted to a precinct-based system with
122 polling locations for the May special election, and then
implemented over 700 assigned polling places [for] the
August primary and November general elections.” Id. The
OOP voting rate was 40 percent higher for voters whose
polling places were changed. Id. As Chief Judge Thomas put
it, “the paths to polling places in the Phoenix area [are] much
like the changing stairways at Hogwarts, constantly moving
and sending everyone to the wrong place.” DNC, 904 F.3d at
732 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
White voters in Maricopa County are more likely than

minority voters to have continuity in their polling place
location. Rodden at 60–61. Dr. Rodden wrote that between
the February and November elections in 2012, “the rates at
which African Americans and Hispanics experienced stability
in their polling places were each about 30 percent lower than
the rate for whites.” Id.
b. Confusing Placement of Polling Locations
Some polling places are located so counterintuitively that

voters easily make mistakes. In Maricopa and Pima
Counties, many polling places are located at or near the edge
of precincts. Id. at 50. An example is the polling place for
precinct 222 in Maricopa County during the 2012 election.
Dr. Rodden wrote:
[A] group of 44 voters who were officially

registered to vote in precinct 222, . . . showed
up on Election Day at the Desert Star School,
the polling location for precinct 173. It is
easy to understand how they might have made
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this mistake. Polling place 173 is the local

elementary school, and the only polling place
in the vicinity. It is within easy walking
distance, and is the polling place for most of
the neighbors and other parents at the school,
yet due to a bizarre placement of the [polling
place at the] Southern border of precinct 222,
these voters were required to travel
15 minutes by car (according to [G]oogle
maps) to vote in polling location 222, passing
four other polling places along the way.
Id. at 47–48.
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This map illustrates Dr. Rodden’s point:
Id. at 47.
In 2012, approximately 25 percent of OOP voters lived

closer to the polling place where they cast their OOP ballot
than to their assigned polling place. Id. at 53. Voters who
live more than 1.4 miles from their assigned polling place are
30 percent more likely to vote OOP than voters who live
within 0.4 miles of their assigned polling place. Id. at 54.
American Indian and Hispanic voters live farther from their
assigned polling places than white voters. Id. at 60.
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American Indian voters are particularly disadvantaged. The

district court found: “Navajo voters in Northern Apache
County lack standard addresses, and their precinct
assignments for state and county elections are based upon
guesswork, leading to confusion about the voter’s correct
polling place.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873; Rodden
Second at 52–53.
c. Renters and Residential Mobility
High percentages of renters and high rates of residential

mobility correlate with high rates of OOP voting. Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 857. The district court found that rates of
OOP voting are “higher in neighborhoods where renters make
up a larger share of householders.” Id. Between 2000 and
2010, almost 70 percent of Arizonans changed their
residential address, the second highest rate of any State.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 857; Rodden at 11–12. The
district court found that “[t]he vast majority of Arizonans
who moved in the last year moved to another address within
their current city of residence.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at
857.
The need to locate the proper polling place after

moving—particularly after moving a short distance in an
urban area—leads to a high percentage of OOP ballots.
Dr. Rodden wrote:
An individual who faces a rent increase in one

apartment complex and moves to another less
than a mile away might not be aware that she
has moved into an entirely new precinct—
indeed, in many cases . . . she may still live
closest to her old precinct, but may now be
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required to travel further in order to vote in

her new assigned precinct. Among groups for
whom residential mobility is common,
requirements of in-precinct-voting—as well
as the requirement that they update their
registration with the state every time that they
move even a short distance within a
county—can make it substantially more
burdensome to participate in elections.
Rodden at 11.
The district court found that minority voters in Arizona

have “disproportionately higher rates of residential mobility.”
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. The court found, “OOP
voting is concentrated in relatively dense precincts that are
disproportionately populated with renters and those who
move frequently. These groups, in turn, are
disproportionately composed of minorities.” Id.
4. Disparate Impact on Minority Voters
The district court found that Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding OOP ballots disproportionately affects minority
voters. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 871. During the general
election in 2012 in Pima County, compared to white voters,
the rate of OOP ballots was 123 percent higher for Hispanic
voters, 47 percent higher for American Indian voters, and
37 percent higher for African American voters. Rodden
at 43. During the 2014 and 2016 general elections in Apache,
Navajo, and Coconino Counties, the vast majority of OOP
ballots were in areas that are almost entirely American
Indian. Rodden Rebuttal at 53–54, 58; Jonathan Rodden,
Second Expert Report (Rodden Second) at 22. In all
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likelihood, the reported numbers underestimate the degree of

disparity. Dr. Rodden wrote, “[A]lthough the racial
disparities described . . . are substantial, they should be
treated as a conservative lower bound on the true differences
in rates of out-of-precinct voting across groups.” Rodden
Second at 15 (emphasis in original). The district court found,
“Dr. Rodden credibly explained that the measurement error
for Hispanic probabilities leads only to the under-estimation
of racial disparities.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 838.
Racial disparities in OOP ballots in 2016 “remained just

as pronounced” as in 2012 and 2014. Rodden Second at 3.
For example, the rates of OOP ballots in Maricopa County
“were twice as high for Hispanics, 86 percent higher for
African Americans, and 73 percent higher for Native
Americans than for their non-minority counterparts.”
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 871–72; Rodden Second at 29.
“In Pima County, rates of OOP voting were 150 percent
higher for Hispanics, 80 percent higher for African
Americans, and 74 percent higher for Native Americans than
for non-minorities.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. “[I]n
Pima County the overall rate of OOP voting was higher, and
the racial disparities larger, in 2016 than in 2014.” Id.;
Rodden Second at 33.
The district court found:
Among all counties that reported OOP ballots

in the 2016 general election, a little over 1 in
every 100 Hispanic voters, 1 in every 100
African-American voters, and 1 in every 100
Native American voters cast an OOP ballot.
For non-minority voters, the figure was
around 1 in every 200 voters.
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Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. That is, in the 2016 general

election, as in the two previous elections, American Indians,
Hispanics, and African Americans voted OOP at twice the
rate of whites.
B. H.B. 2023
1. Early Voting and Ballot Collection
Arizona has permitted early voting for over 25 years. Id.

at 839. “In 2007, Arizona implemented permanent no-excuse
early voting by mail, known as the Permanent Early Voter
List (“PEVL”).” Id. Under PEVL, Arizonans may either
(a) request an early vote-by-mail ballot on an election-by-
election basis, or (b) request that they be placed on the
Permanent Early Voter List. See id.; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-
542, -544. Some counties permit voters to drop their early
ballots in special drop boxes. All counties permit the return
of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote
center, or authorized election official’s office. Early voting
is by far “the most popular method of voting [in Arizona].”
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839. Approximately 80 percent
of all ballots cast in the 2016 general election were early
ballots. Id. Until the passage of H.B. 2023, Arizona did not
restrict collection and drop-off of voted ballots by third
parties.
The district court heard extensive testimony about the

number of ballots collected and turned in by third parties. Id.
at 845. A Maricopa County Democratic Party organizer
testified that during the course of her work for the party she
personally saw 1,200 to 1,500 early ballots collected and
turned in by third-party volunteers. These were only a
portion of the total ballots collected by her organization. The
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organizer testified that during the 2010 election the Maricopa

County Democratic Party collected hundreds of ballots from
a heavily Hispanic neighborhood in one state legislative
district alone. A representative of Citizens for a Better
Arizona testified that the organization collected
approximately 9,000 early ballots during the 2012 Maricopa
County Sheriff’s election. A member of the Arizona
Democratic Party testified that the party collected “a couple
thousand ballots” in 2014. Id. A community advocate
testified before the Arizona Senate Elections Committee that
in one election he collected 4,000 early ballots. Id. A
Phoenix City Councilmember testified that she and her
volunteers collected about 1,000 early ballots in an election
in which she received a total of 8,000 votes.
2. Minority Voters’ Reliance on Third-Party Ballot

Collection
The district court found “that prior to H.B. 2023’s

enactment minorities generically were more likely than non-
minorities to return their early ballots with the assistance of
third parties.” Id. at 870. The court recounted: “Helen
Purcell, who served as the Maricopa County Recorder for
28 years from 1988 to 2016, observed that ballot collection
was disproportionately used by Hispanic voters.” Id.
Individuals who collected ballots in past elections “observed
that minority voters, especially Hispanics, were more
interested in utilizing their services.” Id. One ballot collector
testified about what she termed a “case study” demonstrating
the extent of the disparity. In 2010, she and her fellow
organizers collected “somewhere south of 50 ballots” in one
area. The area was later redistricted before the next election
to add the heavily Hispanic neighborhood of Sunnyslope. In
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2012, the organization “pulled in hundreds of ballots, [with

the] vast majority from that Sunnyslope area.”
The district court found that, in contrast, the Republican

Party has “not significantly engaged in ballot collection as a
GOTV [Get Out the Vote] strategy.” Id. The base of the
Republican Party in Arizona is white. Id. Individuals who
engaged in ballot collection in past elections observed that
voters in predominately white areas “were not as interested in
ballot collection services.” Id.
Minority voters rely on third-party ballot collection for

many reasons. Joseph Larios, a community advocate who has
collected ballots in past elections, testified that “returning
early mail ballots presents special challenges for communities
that lack easy access to outgoing mail services; the elderly,
homebound, and disabled voters; socioeconomically
disadvantaged voters who lack reliable transportation; voters
who have trouble finding time to return mail because they
work multiple jobs or lack childcare services; and voters who
are unfamiliar with the voting process and therefore do not
vote without assistance or tend to miss critical deadlines.” Id.
at 847–48 (summarizing Larios’ testimony). These burdens
fall disproportionately on Arizona’s minority voters.
Arizona’s American Indian and Hispanic communities

frequently encounter mail-related problems that make
returning early ballots difficult. In urban areas of heavily
Hispanic counties, many apartment buildings lack outgoing
mail services. Id. at 869. Only 18 percent of American
Indian registered voters have home mail service. Id. White
registered voters have home mail service at a rate over
350 percent higher than their American Indian counterparts.
Id. Basic mail security is an additional problem. Several
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witnesses testified that incoming and outgoing mail often go

missing. Id. The district court found that especially in low-
income communities, frequent mail theft has led to “distrust”
in the mail service. Id.
A lack of transportation compounds the issue.

“Hispanics, Native Americans, and African Americans . . .
are significantly less likely than non-minorities to own a
vehicle, more likely to rely upon public transportation, [and]
more likely to have inflexible work schedules[.]” Id. In San
Luis—a city that is 98 percent Hispanic—a major highway
separates almost 13,000 residents from their nearest post
office. Id. The city has no mass transit, a median income of
$22,000, and many households with no cars. Id. On the
Navajo Reservation, “most people live in remote
communities, many communities have little to no vehicle
access, and there is no home incoming or outgoing mail, only
post office boxes, sometimes shared by multiple families.”
Id. “[R]esidents of sovereign nations often must travel
45 minutes to 2 hours just to get a mailbox.” DNC, 904 F.3d
at 751–52 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). As a result, voting
“requires the active assistance of friends and neighbors” for
many American Indians. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870
(quoting Rodden Second at 60).
The adverse impact on minority communities is

substantial. Without “access to reliable and secure mail
services” and without reliable transportation, many minority
voters “prefer instead to give their ballots to a volunteer.” Id.
at 869. These communities thus end up relying heavily on
third-party collection of mail-in ballots. Dr. Berman wrote
with respect to Hispanic voters:
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[T]he practice of collecting ballots, used

principally in Hispanic areas, ha[s]
contributed to more votes being cast in those
places tha[n] would have been cast without
the practice. . . . That the practice has
increased minority turnout appears to have
been agreed upon or assumed by both sides of
the issue[.] Democrats and Hispanic leaders
have seen reason to favor it, Republicans have
not.
Berman, Expert Reply Report at 8–9. Similarly, LeNora

Fulton, a member of the Navajo Nation and previous Apache
County Recorder, testified that it was “standard practice” in
Apache County and the Nation to vote by relying on non-
family members with the means to travel. Reagan, 329 F.
Supp. 3d at 870.
3. History of H.B. 2023
Before the passage of H.B. 2023, Arizona already

criminalized fraud involving possession or collection of
another person’s ballot. The district court wrote:
[B]allot tampering, vote buying, or discarding

someone else’s ballot all were illegal prior to
the passage of H.B. 2023. Arizona law has
long provided that any person who knowingly
collects voted or unvoted ballots and does not
turn those ballots in to an elections official is
guilty of a class 5 felony. A.R.S. § 16-1005.
Further, Arizona has long made all of the
following class 5 felonies: “knowingly
mark[ing] a voted or unvoted ballot or ballot
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envelope with the intent to fix an election;”

“receiv[ing] or agree[ing] to receive any
consideration in exchange for a voted or
unvoted ballot;” possessing another’s voted or
unvoted ballot with intent to sell; “knowingly
solicit[ing] the collection of voted or unvoted
ballots by misrepresenting [one’s self] as an
election official or as an official ballot
repository or . . . serv[ing] as a ballot drop off
site, other than those established and staffed
by election officials;” and “knowingly
collect[ing] voted or unvoted ballots and . . .
not turn[ing] those ballots in to an election
official . . . or any . . . entity permitted by law
to transmit post.” A.R.S. §§ 16-1005(a)–(f).
The early voting process also includes a
number of other safeguards, such as tamper
evident envelopes and a rigorous voter
signature verification procedure.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 854 (alterations in original)

(internal record citations omitted).
There is no evidence of any fraud in the long history of

third-party ballot collection in Arizona. Despite the extensive
statutory provisions already criminalizing fraud involving
possession or collection of another person’s ballot, and
despite the lack of evidence of any fraud in connection with
third-party ballot collection, Republican State Senator
Don Shooter introduced a bill in February 2011. S.B. 1412,
50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced) (Ariz. 2011),
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/sb1412p.htm.
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Senator Shooter’s bill criminalized non-fraudulent third-

party ballot collection. The district court had no illusions
about Senator Shooter’s motivation. It found:
Due to the high degree of racial polarization

in his district, Shooter was in part motivated
by a desire to eliminate what had become an
effective Democratic GOTV strategy. Indeed,
Shooter’s 2010 election was close: he won
with 53 percent of the total vote, receiving
83 percent of the non-minority vote but only
20 percent of the Hispanic vote.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 879–80.
The state legislature amended Senator Shooter’s bill

several times, watering it down significantly. As finally
enacted, the bill—included as part of a series of election-
related changes in Senate Bill 1412 (“S.B. 1412”)—restricted
the manner in which unrelated third parties could collect
and turn in more than ten voted ballots. S.B. 1412, 50th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (engrossed), Sec. 3 at D (Ariz. 2011),
https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/SB1412/id/233492/Arizona-
2011-SB1412-Engrossed.html. If a third-party ballot
collector turned in more than ten ballots, the collector was
required to provide photo identification. After each election,
the Secretary of State was required to compile a statewide
public report listing ballot collectors’ information. The bill
did not criminalize any violation of its provisions.
When S.B. 1412 became law, Arizona was still subject to

preclearance under the Voting Rights Act. S.B. 1412
therefore could not go into effect until it was precleared by
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or a three-judge
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federal district court. On May 18, 2011, the Arizona

Attorney General submitted S.B. 1412 to DOJ for
preclearance. Arizona Attorney General Thomas Horne,
Effect of Shelby County on Withdrawn Preclearance
Submissions, (August 29, 2013), https://www.azag.gov/opi
nions/i13-008-r13-013. On June 27, 2011, DOJ precleared all
provisions of S.B. 1412 except the provision regulating third-
party ballot collection. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 880.
DOJ sent a letter to Arizona concerning the third-party

ballot collection provision, stating that the information
provided with the preclearance request was “insufficient to
enable [DOJ] to determine that the proposed changes have
neither the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or
membership in a language minority group.” Id. at 880–81.
DOJ requested additional information and stated that it “may
object” to the proposed change if no response was received
within sixty days. Id. at 881.
Instead of responding with the requested information, the

Arizona Attorney General withdrew the preclearance request
for the third-party ballot collection provision. Id. The
Attorney General did so for good reason. According to DOJ
records, Arizona’s Elections Director, who had helped draft
the provision, had admitted to DOJ that the provision was
“targeted at voting practices in predominantly Hispanic
areas.”
The state legislature formally repealed the provision after

receiving the letter from DOJ. Withdrawing a preclearance
request was not common practice in Arizona. Out of
773 proposals that Arizona submitted for preclearance over
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DNC V. HOBBS 29
almost forty years, the ballot collection provision of S.B.

1412 was one of only six that Arizona withdrew. Id.
Two years later, on June 25, 2013, the United States

Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529 (2013). The Court declared unconstitutional the formula
in Section 4(b) of the VRA for determining “covered
jurisdictions,” thereby eliminating preclearance under Section
5 for any previously covered jurisdiction, including Arizona.
On June 19, 2013, Arizona’s Governor had signed a new bill,
H.B. 2305, which entirely banned partisan ballot collection
and required non-partisan ballot collectors to complete
an affidavit stating that they had returned the ballot.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 881; H.B. 2305, 51st Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (engrossed), at Secs. 3 and 5 (Ariz. 2013),
https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/HB2305/id/864002. Violation
of H.B. 2305 was a criminal misdemeanor.
H.B. 2305 “was passed along nearly straight party lines in

the waning hours of the legislative session.” Reagan, 329
F. Supp. 3d at 881. “Shortly after its enactment, citizen
groups organized a referendum effort[.]” Id. They “collected
more than 140,000 signatures”—significantly more than the
required amount—“to place H.B. 2305 on the ballot for a
straight up-or-down [statewide] vote” in the next election. Id.
Arizona law provided that repeal by referendum prevented
the legislature from enacting future related legislation without
a supermajority vote. Moreover, any such future legislation
could only “further[]”—not undercut—“the purposes” of the
referendum. Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C), (14).
“Rather than face a referendum, Republican legislators . . .
repealed their own legislation along party lines.” Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 881. The primary sponsor of H.B. 2305,
then-State Senator Michele Reagan (a future Secretary of
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30 DNC V. HOBBS
State of Arizona and an original defendant in this action),

“admitted that the legislature’s goal [in repealing H.B. 2305]
was to break the bill into smaller pieces and reintroduce
individual provisions ‘a la carte.’” Id.
During the 2015 and 2016 legislative sessions,

Republican legislators again sought to criminalize ballot
collection by third parties, culminating in 2016 in the passage
of H.B. 2023, the measure challenged in this suit. The district
court found that Republican legislators had two motivations
for passing H.B. 2023. First, Republican legislators were
motivated by the “unfounded and often farfetched allegations
of ballot collection fraud” made by former State Senator
Shooter—who had introduced the bill to limit third-party
ballot collection in 2011. Id. at 880 (finding Shooter’s
allegations “demonstrably false”). Second, Republican
legislators were motivated by a “racially-tinged” video
known as the “LaFaro Video.” Id.
The video gave proponents of H.B. 2023 their best and

only “evidence” of voter fraud. During legislative hearings
on previous bills criminalizing third-party collection, the
district court wrote, “Republican sponsors and proponents
[had] expressed beliefs that ballot collection fraud regularly
was occurring but struggled with the lack of direct evidence
substantiating those beliefs.” Id. at 876. In 2014,
Republicans’ “perceived ‘evidence’ arrived in the form of a
racially charged video created by Maricopa County
Republican Chair A.J. LaFaro . . . and posted on a blog.” Id.
The court summarized:
The LaFaro Video showed surveillance

footage of a man of apparent Hispanic
heritage appearing to deliver early ballots. It
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DNC V. HOBBS 31
also contained a narration of “Innuendos of

illegality . . . [and] racially tinged and
inaccurate commentary by . . . LaFaro.”
LaFaro’s commentary included statements
that the man was acting to stuff the ballot box;
that LaFaro did not know if the person was an
illegal alien, a dreamer, or citizen, but knew
that he was a thug; and that LaFaro did not
follow him out to the parking lot to take down
his tag number because he feared for his life.
Id. (alterations in original and internal record citations

omitted). A voice-over on the video described “ballot
parties” where people supposedly “gather en mass[e] and give
their un-voted ballots to operatives of organizations so they
can not only collect them, but also vote them illegally.” Id.
at 876–77.
The district court found, “The LaFaro Video did not show
any obviously illegal activity and there is no evidence that the
allegations in the narration were true.” Id. at 877. The video
“merely shows a man of apparent Hispanic heritage dropping
off ballots and not obviously violating any law.” Id. The
video “became quite prominent in the debates over H.B.
2023.” Id. The court wrote:
The LaFaro video also was posted on

Facebook and YouTube, shown at Republican
district meetings, and was incorporated into a
television advertisement—entitled “Do You
Need Evidence Terry?”—for Secretary
Reagan when she ran for Secretary of State.
In the ad, the LaFaro Video plays after a clip
of then-Arizona Attorney General Terry
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Goddard stating he would like to see evidence

that there has been ballot collection fraud.
While the video is playing, Secretary
Reagan’s narration indicates that the LaFaro
Video answers Goddard’s request for
evidence of fraud.
Id. (internal record citations omitted). The court found,

“Although no direct evidence of ballot collection fraud was
presented to the legislature or at trial, Shooter’s allegations
and the LaFaro Video were successful in convincing H.B.
2023’s proponents that ballot collection presented
opportunities for fraud that did not exist for in-person
voting[.]” Id. at 880.
The district court found that H.B. 2023 is no harsher than

any of the third-party ballot collection bills previously
introduced in the Arizona legislature. The court found:
[A]lthough Plaintiffs argue that the legislature

made H.B. 2023 harsher than previous ballot
collection bills by imposing felony penalties,
they ignore that H.B. 2023 in other respects is
more lenient than its predecessors given its
broad exceptions for family members,
household members, and caregivers.
Id. at 881. In so finding, the district court clearly erred. Both

S.B. 1412 and H.B. 2305 were more lenient than H.B. 2023.
For example, S.B. 1412, which was presented to DOJ for

preclearance, required a third party collecting more than ten
voted ballots to provide photo identification. There were no
other restrictions on third-party ballot collection. There were
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DNC V. HOBBS 33
no criminal penalties. By contrast, under H.B. 2023 a third

party may collect a ballot only if the third party is an official
engaged in official duties, or is a family member, household
member, or caregiver of the voter. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-
1005(H), (I); Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839–40. A third
party who violates H.B. 2023 commits a class 5 felony.
In 2011, the relatively permissive third-party ballot

collection provision of S.B. 1412 was withdrawn from
Arizona’s preclearance request when DOJ asked for more
information. In 2016, in the wake of Shelby County and
without fear of preclearance scrutiny, Arizona enacted H.B.
2023.
II. Section 2 of the VRA
“Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for the

broad remedial purpose of ‘rid[ding] the country of racial
discrimination in voting.’” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,
403 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)). “The Act create[d]
stringent new remedies for voting discrimination where it
persists on a pervasive scale, and . . . strengthen[ed] existing
remedies for pockets of voting discrimination elsewhere in
the country.” Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
When Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was originally

enacted in 1965, it read:
SEC. 2. No voting qualification or

prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision to deny or
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34 DNC V. HOBBS
abridge the right of any citizen of the United

States to vote on account of race or color.
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 391 (citing 79 Stat. 437). “At the time
of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, unlike
other provisions of the Act, did not provoke significant debate
in Congress because it was viewed largely as a restatement of
the Fifteenth Amendment.” Id. at 392. The Fifteenth
Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude,” and it authorizes Congress
to enforce the provision “by appropriate legislation.” U.S.
Const. amend. XV. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) (plurality), the Supreme Court held that the “coverage
provided by § 2 was unquestionably coextensive with the
coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amendment; the
provision simply elaborated upon the Fifteenth Amendment.”
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 392. That is, the Court held that proof of
intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a
violation of Section 2. Id. at 393.
Congress responded to Bolden by amending Section 2,

striking out “to deny or abridge” and substituting “in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of.” Id.
(quoting amended Section 2; emphasis added by the Court);
see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. “Under the amended
statute, proof of intent [to discriminate] is no longer required
to prove a § 2 violation.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 394. Rather,
plaintiffs can now prevail under Section 2 either by
demonstrating proof of intent to discriminate or “by
demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted
in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on color
or race.” Id. That is, a Section 2 violation can “be
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DNC V. HOBBS 35
established by proof of discriminatory results alone.”

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404. The Supreme Court summarized:
“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a
violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect
alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the
‘results test.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added).
A violation of Section 2 may now be shown under either

the results test or the intent test. Id. at 35, 44. In the sections
that follow, we analyze Plaintiffs’ challenges under these two
tests. First, we analyze Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023
under the results test. Second, we analyze H.B. 2023 under
the intent test.
A. Results Test: OOP Policy and H.B. 2023
1. The Results Test
Section 2 of the VRA “‘prohibits all forms of voting

discrimination’ that lessen opportunity for minority voters.”
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d
224, 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45
n.10). As amended in 1982, Section 2 of the VRA provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to

voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention
of the guarantees set forth in section
10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in
subsection (b).
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36 DNC V. HOBBS
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established

if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its
members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives
of their choice.
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (emphases added).
The results test of Section 2 applies in both vote dilution

and vote denial cases. “Vote dilution claims involve
challenges to methods of electing representatives—like
redistricting or at-large districts—as having the effect of
diminishing minorities’ voting strength.” Ohio State
Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir.
2014), vacated on other grounds, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th
Cir. 2014). A vote denial claim is generally understood to be
“any claim that is not a vote dilution claim.” Id. The case
now before us involves two vote-denial claims.
The jurisprudence of vote-denial claims is relatively

underdeveloped in comparison to vote-dilution claims. As
explained by the Fourth Circuit, “[T]he predominance of vote
dilution in Section 2 jurisprudence likely stems from the
effectiveness of the now-defunct Section 5 preclearance
requirements that stopped would-be vote denial from
occurring in covered jurisdictions[.]” League of Women
Voters, 769 F.3d at 239.
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DNC V. HOBBS 37
In evaluating a vote-denial challenge to a “standard,

practice, or procedure” under the “results test” of Section 2,
most courts, including our own, engage in a two-step process.
We first did so, in abbreviated fashion, in Smith v. Salt River
Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District,
109 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997). We later did so, at somewhat
greater length, in Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc). Other circuits have subsequently used a
version of the two-step analysis. See Veasey v. Abbott,
830 F.3d 216, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2016); League of Women
Voters, 769 F.3d at 240 (4th Cir. 2014); Husted, 768 F.3d
at 554 (6th Cir. 2014). Compare Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d
744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We are skeptical about the second
of these steps[.]”).
First, we ask whether the challenged standard, practice or

procedure results in a disparate burden on members of the
protected class. That is, we ask whether, “as a result of the
challenged practice or structure[,] plaintiffs do not have an
equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and
to elect candidates of their choice.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44.
The mere existence—or “bare statistical showing”—of a
disparate impact on a racial minority, in and of itself, is not
sufficient. See Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (“[A] bare
statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial
minority does not satisfy the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.” (emphasis
in original)).
Second, if we find at the first step that the challenged

practice imposes a disparate burden, we ask whether, under
the “totality of the circumstances,” there is a relationship
between the challenged “standard, practice, or procedure,” on
the one hand, and “social and historical conditions” on the
other. The purpose of the second step is to evaluate a
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38 DNC V. HOBBS
disparate burden in its real-world context rather than in the

abstract. As stated by the Supreme Court, “The essence of a
§ 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives” or to
participate in the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47;
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). To determine at the second step
whether there is a legally significant relationship between the
disparate burden on minority voters and the social and
historical conditions affecting them, we consider, as
appropriate, factors such as those laid out in the Senate
Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the VRA. Id.
at 43 (“The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982
amendments elaborates on the nature of § 2 violations and on
the proof required to establish these violations.”); Veasey,
830 F.3d at 244–45.
The Senate Report provides:
If as a result of the challenged practice or

structure plaintiffs do not have an equal
opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their
choice, there is a violation of this section. To
establish a violation, plaintiffs could show a
variety of factors, depending on the kind of
rule, practice, or procedure called into
question.
Typical factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official

discrimination in the state or political
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DNC V. HOBBS 39
subdivision that touched the right of

the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to
participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the

elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or

political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-
single shot provisions, or other voting
practices or procedures that may
enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority
group;
4. if there is a candidate slating

process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied
access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the

minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political
process;
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40 DNC V. HOBBS
6. whether political campaigns have

been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the

minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have

had probative value as part of plaintiffs’
evidence to establish a violation are:
[8.] whether there is a significant lack

of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized
needs of the members of the minority
group.
[9.] whether the policy underlying the

state or political subdivision’s use of
such voting qualification, prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.
S. Rep. No. 97-417 (“S. Rep.”), at 28–29 (1982); see Gingles,

478 U.S. at 36–37 (quoting the Senate Report).
The Senate Committee’s list of “typical factors” is neither

comprehensive nor exclusive. S. Rep. at 29. “[T]here is no
requirement that any particular number of factors be proved,
or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” Id.
“[T]he question whether the political processes are ‘equally
open’ depends on a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past
and present reality.’” Id. at 30. An evaluation of the totality
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DNC V. HOBBS 41
of circumstances in a Section 2 results claim, including an

evaluation of appropriate Senate factors, requires “a blend of
history and an intensely local appraisal[.]” Gingles, 478 U.S.
at 78 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769–70
(1973)). The Senate factors are relevant to both vote-denial
and vote-dilution claims. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (Senate
factors will be “pertinent to certain types of § 2 claims,”
including vote denial claims, but will be “particularly
[pertinent] to vote dilution claims.”).
Our sister circuits have struck down standards, practices,

or procedures in several vote-denial cases after considering
the Senate factors. In Husted, the Sixth Circuit upheld a
district court’s finding that an Ohio law limiting early voting
violated the results test of Section 2. The court wrote,
We find Senate factors one, three, five, and

nine particularly relevant to a vote denial
claim in that they specifically focus on how
historical or current patterns of discrimination
“hinder [minorities’] ability to participate
effectively in the political process.” Gingles,
478 U.S. at 37 (quoting Senate factor five).
All of the factors, however, can still provide
helpful background context to minorities’
overall ability to engage effectively on an
equal basis with other voters in the political
process.
Husted, 768 F.3d at 555. In Veasey, the Fifth Circuit upheld

a district court’s finding that Texas’s requirement that a photo
ID be presented at the time of voting violated the results test.
Veasey, 830 F.3d at 256–64 (considering Senate factors one,
two, five, six, seven, eight, and nine). In League of Women
(42 of 432)
42 DNC V. HOBBS
Voters, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had
clearly erred in finding that the results test had not been
violated by North Carolina’s elimination of same-day
registration, and by North Carolina’s practice of wholly
discarding out-of-precinct ballots. League of Women Voters,
769 F.3d at 245–46 (considering Senate factors one, three,
and nine).
2. OOP Policy and the Results Test
Uncontested evidence in the district court established that

minority voters in Arizona cast OOP ballots at twice the rate
of white voters. The question is whether the district court
clearly erred in holding that Arizona’s policy of entirely
discarding OOP ballots does not violate the “results test” of
Section 2.
a. Step One: Disparate Burden
The question at step one is whether Arizona’s policy of

entirely discarding OOP ballots results in a disparate burden
on a protected class. The district court held that Plaintiffs
failed at step one. The district court clearly erred in so
holding.
Extensive and uncontradicted evidence in the district

court established that American Indian, Hispanic, and African
American voters are over-represented among OOP voters by
a ratio of two to one. See Part II(A), supra. The district court
wrote, “Plaintiffs provided quantitative and statistical
evidence of disparities in OOP voting through the expert
testimony of Dr. Rodden . . . . Dr. Rodden’s analysis is
credible and shows that minorities are over-represented
among the small number of voters casting OOP ballots.”
(43 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 43
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 871. Dr. Rodden reported that

this pattern was consistent over time and across counties.
Based on this evidence, the court found that during the 2016
general election, American Indian, Hispanic, and African
American voters were twice as likely as white voters to vote
out-of-precinct and not have their votes counted. Id. at 872.
Despite these factual findings, the district court held that

Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP ballots does not
impose a disparate burden under the results test. The court
gave two reasons to support its holding.
First, the district court discounted the disparate burden on

the ground that there were relatively few OOP ballots cast in
relation to the total number of ballots. Id. at 872. The district
court clearly erred in so doing.
The district court pointed out that the absolute number of

OOP ballots in Arizona fell between 2012 and 2016. It
pointed out, further, that as a percentage of all ballots cast,
OOP ballots fell from 0.47 percent to 0.15 percent during that
period. Id. The numbers and percentages cited by the district
court are accurate. Standing alone, they may be read to
suggest that locating the correct precinct for in-person voting
has become easier and that OOP ballots, as a percentage of
in-person ballots, have decreased accordingly.
However, the opposite is true. Arizona’s OOP policy

applies only to in-person ballots. The proper baseline to
measure OOP ballots to is thus not all ballots, but all in-
person ballots. The district court failed to point out that the
absolute number of all in-person ballots fell more than the
absolute number of OOP ballots, and that, as a result, as a
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44 DNC V. HOBBS
percentage of in-person ballots, OOP ballots increased rather

than decreased.
Even putting aside the potentially misleading numbers

and percentages cited by the district court and focusing only
on the decline in the absolute number of OOP ballots, the
court clearly erred. As indicated above, the vote-denial
category encompasses all cases that are not vote-dilution
cases. The number of minority voters adversely affected, and
the mechanism by which they are affected, may vary
considerably. For example, if a polling place denies an
individual minority voter her right to vote based on her race
or color, Section 2 is violated based on that single denial.
However, a different analysis may be appropriate when a
facially neutral policy adversely affects a number of minority
voters. Arizona’s OOP policy is an example. We are willing
to assume in such a case that more than a de minimis number
of minority voters must be burdened before a Section 2
violation based on the results test can be found. Even on that
assumption, however, we conclude that the number of OOP
ballots cast in Arizona’s general election in 2016—3,709
ballots—is hardly de minimis.
We find support for our conclusion in several places. The

Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief to our en
banc panel in support of Arizona. Despite its support for
Arizona, DOJ specifically disavowed the district court’s
conclusion that the number of discarded OOP ballots was too
small to be cognizable under the results test. DOJ wrote:
[T]he district court’s reasoning was not

correct to the extent that it suggested that
plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim would fail solely
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DNC V. HOBBS 45
because of the small number of voters

affected. . . .
That is not a proper reading of the statute.

Section 2 prohibits any “standard, practice, or
procedure” that “results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or
color.” 52 U.S.C. 10301(a) (emphasis added);
see also Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 386
(7th Cir. 2016) (Frank II) (“The right to vote
is personal and is not defeated by the fact that
99% of other people can secure the necessary
credentials easily.”). Section 2 safeguards a
personal right to equal participation
opportunities. A poll worker turning away a
single voter because of her race plainly results
in “less opportunity * * * to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives
of [her] choice.” 52 U.S.C. 10301(b).
DOJ Amicus Brief at 28–29. DOJ’s brief appears to treat as

equivalent the case of an individually targeted single minority
voter who is denied the right to vote and the case where a
facially neutral policy affects a single voter. We do not need
to go so far. We need only point out that in the case before us
a substantial number of minority voters are disparately
affected by Arizona’s OOP policy. As long as an adequate
disparate impact is shown, as it has been shown here, and as
long as the other prerequisites for finding a Section 2 violate
are met, each individual in the affected group is protected
under Section 2.
(46 of 432)
46 DNC V. HOBBS
Further, in League of Women Voters, “approximately

3,348 out-of-precinct provisional ballots” cast by African
American voters would have been discarded under the
challenged North Carolina law. 769 F.3d at 244 (quoting the
district court). The district court had held that this was a
“minimal” number of votes, and that Section 2 was therefore
not violated. The Fourth Circuit reversed, characterizing the
district court’s ruling as a “grave error.” Id. at 241.
Finally, in the 2000 presidential election, the official

margin of victory for President George W. Bush in Florida
was 537 votes. Federal Election Commission, 2000 Official
Presidential General Election Results (Dec. 2001), available
at https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm. If
there had been 3,709 additional ballots cast in Florida in
2000, in which minority voters had outnumbered white voters
by a ratio of two to one, it is possible that a different
President would have been elected.
Second, the district court concluded that Arizona’s policy

of rejecting OOP ballots does not impose a disparate burden
on minority voters because Arizona’s policy of entirely
discarding OOP ballots “is not the cause of the disparities in
OOP voting.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. The court
wrote that Plaintiffs “have not shown that Arizona’s policy to
not count OOP ballots causes minorities to show up to vote
at the wrong precinct at rates higher than their non-minority
counterparts.” Id. at 873. Again, the district court clearly
erred.
The district court misunderstood what Plaintiffs must

show. Plaintiffs need not show that Arizona caused them to
vote out of precinct. Rather, they need only show that the
result of entirely discarding OOP ballots has an adverse
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DNC V. HOBBS 47
disparate impact, by demonstrating “a causal connection

between the challenged voting practice and a prohibited
discriminatory result.” Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (emphasis
added). Here, “[t]he challenged practice—not counting OOP
ballots—results in ‘a prohibited discriminatory result’; a
substantially higher percentage of minority votes than white
votes are discarded.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 736 (Thomas, C.J.,
dissenting).
We hold that the district court clearly erred in holding that

Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP ballots does not
result in a disparate burden on minority voters. We
accordingly hold that Plaintiffs have succeeded at step one of
the results test.
b. Step Two: Senate Factors
The question at step two is whether, under the “totality of

circumstances,” the disparate burden on minority voters is
linked to social and historical conditions in Arizona so as “to
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority]
and white voters to elect their preferred representatives” or to
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). The district court wrote that because
in its view Plaintiffs failed at step one, discussion of step two
was unnecessary. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873. The court
nonetheless went on to discuss step two and, after considering
various Senate factors, to hold that Plaintiffs failed at this step
as well. The district court clearly erred in so holding.
At step two, we consider relevant Senate factors. Some

Senate factors are “more important to” vote-denial claims, or
to some vote-denial claims, and others, “[i]f present, . . . are
supportive of, but not essential to” the claim. Gingles, 478 at
(48 of 432)
48 DNC V. HOBBS
48 n.15 (emphasis in original). That is, Senate factors vary in

importance depending on whether a court is dealing with a
vote-dilution or a vote-denial case. The same factors may
also vary in importance from one vote-denial case to another.
We emphasize that the relative importance of the Senate

factors varies from case to case. For example, as we will
describe in a moment, Arizona has a long and unhappy
history of official discrimination connected to voting. Other
States may not have such a history, but depending on the
existence of other Senate factors they may nonetheless be
found to have violated the results test of Section 2.
The district court considered seven of the nine Senate

factors: factor one, the history of official discrimination
connected to voting; factor two, racially polarized voting
patterns; factor five, the effects of discrimination in other
areas on minority groups’ access to voting; factor six, racial
appeals in political campaigns; factor seven, the number of
minorities in public office; factor eight, officials’
responsiveness to the needs of minority groups; and factor
nine, the tenuousness of the justification for the challenged
voting practice.
We analyze below each of these factors, indicating

whether we agree or disagree with the district court’s analysis
as to each. Of the various factors, we regard Senate factors
five (the effects of discrimination in other areas on minorities
access to voting) and nine (the tenuousness of the justification
for the challenged voting practices) as particularly important.
We also regard factor one (history of official discrimination)
as important, as it bears on the existence of discrimination
generally and strongly supports our conclusion under factor
five. Though “not essential,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,
(49 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 49
the other factors provide “helpful background context.”

Husted, 768 F.3d at 555.
i. Factor One: History of Official Discrimination

Connected to Voting
Arizona has a long history of race-based discrimination

against its American Indian, Hispanic, and African American
citizens. Much of that discrimination is directly relevant to
those citizens’ ability “to register, to vote, or otherwise to
participate in the democratic process.” Id. We recount the
most salient aspects of that history.
Dr. David Berman, a Professor Emeritus of Political

Science at Arizona State University, submitted an expert
report and testified in the district court. The court found
Dr. Berman “credible” and gave “great weight to
Dr. Berman’s opinions.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 834.
The following narrative is largely drawn from Dr. Berman’s
report and the sources on which he relied.
(A) Territorial Period
Arizona’s history of discrimination dates back to 1848,

when it first became an American political entity as a United
States territory. “Early territorial politicians acted on the
belief that it was the ‘manifest destiny’ of the Anglos to
triumph in Arizona over the earlier Native American and
Hispanic civilizations.” David Berman, Expert Report
(Berman) at 4. Dr. Berman wrote that from the 1850s
through the 1880s there were “blood thirsty efforts by whites
to either exterminate” Arizona’s existing American Indian
population or “confine them to reservations.” Id. at 5. In
1871, in the Camp Grant Massacre, white settlers “brutal[ly]
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50 DNC V. HOBBS
murder[ed] over 100 Apaches, most of whom were women

and children.” Id. Arizona’s white territorial legislature
passed a number of discriminatory laws, including anti-
miscegenation laws forbidding marriage between whites and
Indians. See James Thomas Tucker et al., Voting Rights in
Arizona: 1982–2006, 17 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 283, 283
n.3 (2008) (Tucker et al., Voting Rights). Dr. Berman wrote:
“By the late 1880s and the end of th[e] Indian wars, the
realities of life for Native Americans in Arizona were
confinement to reservations, a continuous loss of resources
(water, land, minerals) to settlers, poverty, and pressure to
abandon their traditional cultures.” Berman at 5.
White settlers also discriminated against Arizona’s

Hispanic population. Dr. Berman wrote:
Although Hispanics in the territory’s early

period commonly held prominent roles in
public and political life, as migration
continued they were overwhelmed by a flood
of Anglo-American and European
immigrants. While a small group of
Hispanics continued to prosper, . . . most
Hispanics toiled as laborers who made less
than Anglos even though they performed the
same work.
Id. (footnote omitted). Hispanics in Arizona “found it

difficult to receive acceptance or fair treatment in a society
that had little tolerance for people of Latin American
extraction, and particularly those whose racial make-up
included Indian or African blood.” Id. at 5–6 (quoting Oscar
J. Martinez, Hispanics in Arizona, in Arizona at Seventy-
(51 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 51
Five: The Next Twenty-Five Years 88–89 (Ariz. State Univ.

Pub. History Program & the Ariz. Historical Soc’y, 1987)).
Pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended

the Mexican-American War, the United States conferred
citizenship on the approximately 100,000 Hispanics living in
Arizona. In 1909, the Arizona territorial legislature passed a
statute imposing an English language literacy test as a
prerequisite to voter registration. Id. at 10. The test was
specifically designed to prevent the territory’s Hispanic
citizens—who had lower English literacy rates than white
citizens—from voting. Id. At the time, Indians were not
citizens and were not eligible to vote.
In 1910, Congress passed a statute authorizing Arizona,

as a prelude to statehood, to draft a state constitution. Upon
approval of its constitution by Congress, the President, and
Arizona voters, Arizona would become a State. Id. at 11.
Members of Congress viewed Arizona’s literacy test as a
deliberate effort to disenfranchise its Hispanic voters. Id.
The authorizing statute specifically provided that Arizona
could not use its newly adopted literacy test to prevent
Arizona citizens from voting on a proposed constitution. Id.
That same year, Arizona convened a constitutional

convention. Id. at 7. Although Congress had ensured that
Arizona would not use its literacy test to prevent Hispanic
citizens from voting on the constitution, Hispanics were
largely excluded from the drafting process. With the
exception of one Hispanic delegate, all of the delegates to the
convention were white. Id. By comparison, approximately
one-third of the delegates to the 1910 New Mexico
constitutional convention were Hispanic, and one-sixth of the
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52 DNC V. HOBBS
48 delegates to the 1849 California constitutional convention

were Hispanic. Id.
The influence of Hispanic delegates is evident in those

States’ constitutions. For example, New Mexico’s
constitution provides that the “right of any citizen of the state
to vote, hold office or sit upon juries, shall never be
restricted, abridged or impaired on account of . . . race,
language or color, or inability to speak, read or write the
English or Spanish languages.” N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3
(1910). It also requires the legislature to provide funds to
train teachers in Spanish instruction. N.M. Const. art. XII,
§ 8 (1910). California’s constitution required all state laws to
be published in Spanish as well as English. Cal. Const. art.
XI, § 21 (1849).
By contrast, Arizona’s constitution did not include such

provisions. Indeed, two provisions required precisely the
opposite. The Arizona constitution provided that public
schools “shall always be conducted in English” and that
“[t]he ability to read, write, speak, and understand the English
language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office
without the aid of an interpreter, shall be a necessary
qualification for all State officers and members of the State
Legislature.” Ariz. Const. art. XX, §§ 7, 8 (1910).
(B) Early Statehood
(1) Literacy Test
Arizona became a State in 1912. That same year, the

Arizona legislature passed a statute reimposing an English
literacy test—the test that had been imposed by the territorial
legislature in 1909 and that Congress had forbidden the State
(53 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 53
to use for voting on the state constitution. Berman at 11; see

also James Thomas Tucker, The Battle Over Bilingual
Ballots: Language Minorities and Political Access Under the
Voting Rights Act 20 (Routledge, 2016) (Tucker, Bilingual
Ballots). According to Dr. Berman, the statute was enacted
“to limit ‘the ignorant Mexican vote.’” David R. Berman,
Arizona Politics and Government: The Quest for Autonomy,
Democracy, and Development 75 (Univ. of Neb. Press, 1998)
(Berman, Arizona Politics) (quoting letter between prominent
political leaders); Berman at 12.
County registrars in Arizona had considerable discretion

in administering literacy tests. Registrars used that discretion
to excuse white citizens from the literacy requirement
altogether, to give white citizens easier versions of the test,
and to help white citizens pass the test. See also Katzenbach,
383 U.S. at 312 (describing the same practice with respect to
African American citizens in southern States). In contrast,
Hispanic citizens were often required to pass more difficult
versions of the test, without assistance and without error.
Berman, Arizona Politics at 75; see also Berman at 12.
The literacy test was used for the next sixty years. The
year it was introduced, Hispanic registration declined so
dramatically that some counties lacked enough voters to
justify primaries. Berman at 12. One county had recall
campaigns because enough Hispanic voters had been purged
from voting rolls to potentially change the electoral result.
Id. Arizona would use its literacy test not only against
Hispanics, but also against African Americans and, once they
became eligible to vote in 1948, against American Indians.
The test was finally repealed in 1972, two years after an
amendment to the Voting Rights Act banned literacy tests
nationwide. Id.
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54 DNC V. HOBBS
(2) Disenfranchisement of American Indians
In 1912, when Arizona became a State, Indians were not

citizens of Arizona or of the United States. In 1924,
Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act, declaring all
Indians citizens of the United States and, by extension, of
their States of residence. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,
Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b)).
Indian voting had the potential to change the existing

white political power structure of Arizona. See Patty
Ferguson-Bohnee, The History of Indian Voting Rights in
Arizona: Overcoming Decades of Voter Suppression, 47 Ariz.
St. L.J. 1099, 1103–04 (2015) (Ferguson-Bohnee). Indians
comprised over 14 percent of the population in Arizona, the
second-highest percentage of Indians in any State. Id. at 1102
n.19, 1104. Potential power shifts were even greater at the
county level. According to the 1910 Census, Indians
comprised over 66 percent of the population of Apache
County, over 50 percent of Navajo County, over 34 percent
of Pinal County, and over 34 percent of Coconino County.
Id. at 1104.
Enacted under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,

the Indian Citizenship Act should have given Indians the right
to vote in Arizona elections. The Attorney General of
Arizona initially agreed that the Act conferred the right to
vote, and he suggested in 1924 that precinct boundaries
should be expanded to include reservations. Id. at 1105.
However, in the years leading up to the 1928 election,
Arizona’s Governor, county officials, and other politicians
sought to prevent Indians from voting. Id. at 1106–08. The
Governor, in particular, was concerned that Indian voter
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DNC V. HOBBS 55
registration—specifically, registration of approximately 1,500

Navajo voters—would hurt his reelection chances. Id.
at 1107–08. The Governor sought legal opinions on ways to
exclude Indian voters, id., and was advised to “adopt a
systematic course of challenging Indians at the time of
election.” Id. at 1108 (quoting Letter from Samuel L. Pattee
to George W.P. Hunt, Ariz. Governor (Sept. 22, 1928)).
County officials challenged individual Indian voter
registrations. Id. at 1107–08.
Prior to the 1928 election, two Indian residents of Pima

County brought suit challenging the county’s rejection of
their voter registration forms. Id. at 1108. The Arizona
Supreme Court sided with the county. The Arizona
constitution forbade anyone who was “under guardianship,
non compos mentis, or insane” from voting. Ariz. Const. art.
VII, § 2 (1910). The Court held that Indians were “wards of
the nation,” and were therefore “under guardianship” and not
eligible to vote. Porter v. Hall, 271 P. 411, 417, 419 (Ariz.
1928).
Arizona barred Indians from voting for the next twenty

years. According to the 1940 census, Indians comprised over
11 percent of Arizona’s population. Ferguson-Bohnee
at 1111. They were the largest minority group in Arizona.
“One-sixth of all Indians in the country lived in Arizona.” Id.
After World War II, Arizona’s Indian citizens returned

from fighting the Axis powers abroad to fight for the right to
vote at home. Frank Harrison, a World War II veteran and
member of the Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation, and Harry
Austin, another member of the Fort McDowell Yavapai
Nation, filed suit against the State. In 1948, the Arizona
Supreme Court overturned its prior decision in Porter v. Hall.
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56 DNC V. HOBBS
Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456, 463 (Ariz. 1948). Almost

a quarter century after enactment of the Indian Citizenship
Act of 1924, Indian citizens in Arizona had the legal right to
vote.
(C) The 1950s and 1960s
For decades thereafter, however, Arizona’s Indian citizens

often could not exercise that right. The Arizona Supreme
Court’s decision in Harrison v. Laveen did not result in “a
large influx” of new voters because Arizona continued to
deny Indian citizens—as well as Hispanic and African
American citizens—access to the ballot through other means.
Berman at 15.
The biggest obstacle to voter registration was Arizona’s

English literacy test. In 1948, approximately 80 to 90 percent
of Indian citizens in Arizona did not speak or read English.
Tucker et al., Voting Rights at 285; see also Berman at 15. In
the 1960s, about half the voting-age population of the Navajo
Nation could not pass the English literacy test. Ferguson-
Bohnee at 1112 n.88. For Arizona’s Indian—and Hispanic
and African American—citizens who did speak and read
English, discriminatory administration of the literacy test by
county registrars often prevented them from registering. See,
e.g., Berman, Arizona Politics at 75 (“As recently as the
1960s, registrars applied the test to reduce the ability of
blacks, Indians and Hispanics to register to vote.”).
Voter intimidation during the 1950s and 60s often

prevented from voting those American Indian, Hispanic, and
African American citizens who had managed to register.
According to Dr. Berman:
(57 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 57
During the 1960s, it was . . . clear that

more than the elimination of the literacy
test in some areas was going to be
needed to protect minorities. Intimidation
of minority-group members—Hispanics,
African Americans, as well as Native
Americans—who wished to vote was . . . a
fact of life in Arizona. Anglos sometimes
challenged minorities at the polls and asked
them to read and explain “literacy” cards
containing quotations from the U.S.
Constitution. These intimidators hoped to
frighten or embarrass minorities and
discourage them from standing in line to vote.
Vote challenges of this nature were
undertaken by Republican workers in 1962 in
South Phoenix, a largely minority Hispanic
and African-American area. . . . [In addition,]
[p]eople in the non-Native American
community, hoping to keep Native Americans
away from the polls, told them that
involvement could lead to something
detrimental, such as increased taxation, a loss
of reservation lands, and an end to their
special relationship with the federal
government.
Berman at 14–15.
Intimidation of minority voters continued throughout the

1960s. For example, in 1964, Arizona Republicans
undertook voter intimidation efforts throughout Arizona “as
part of a national effort by the Republican Party called
‘Operation Eagle Eye.’” Id. at 14. According to one account:
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58 DNC V. HOBBS
The approach was simple: to challenge voters,

especially voters of color, at the polls
throughout the country on a variety of
specious pretexts. If the challenge did not
work outright—that is, if the voter was not
prevented from casting a ballot (provisional
ballots were not in widespread use at this
time)—the challenge would still slow down
the voting process, create long lines at the
polls, and likely discourage some voters who
could not wait or did not want to go through
the hassle they were seeing other voters
endure.
Id. (quoting Tova Andrea Wang, The Politics of Voter

Suppression: Defending and Expanding Americans’ Right to
Vote 44–45 (Cornell Univ. Press, 2012)).
Compounding the effects of the literacy test and voter

intimidation, Arizona “cleansed” its voting rolls. In 1970,
Democrat Raul Castro narrowly lost the election for
Governor. (He would win the governorship four years later
to become Arizona’s first and only Hispanic Governor.)
Castro received 90 percent of the Hispanic vote, but he lost
the election because of low Hispanic voter turnout.
Dr. Berman explained:
[C]ontributing to that low turnout was “a

decision by the Republican-dominated
legislature to cleanse the voting rolls and have
all citizens reregister. This cleansing of the
rolls erased years of registration drives in
barrios across the state. It seems certain that
many Chicanos did not understand that they
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DNC V. HOBBS 59
had to reregister, were confused by this

development, and simply stayed away from
the polls.”
Id. at 17 (quoting F. Chris Garcia & Rudolph O. de la Garza,

The Chicano Political Experience 105 (Duxbury Press,
1977)).
(D) Voting Rights Act and Preclearance under Section 5
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965. See

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437–446 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314,
10501–10508, 10701, 10702). Under Section 4(b) of the Act,
a State or political subdivision qualified as a “covered
jurisdiction” if it satisfied two criteria. Id. § 4(b). The first
was that on November 1, 1964—the date of the presidential
election—the State or political subdivision had maintained a
“test or device,” such as a literacy test, restricting the
opportunity to register or vote. The second was either that
(a) on November 1, 1964, less than 50 percent of the voting-
age population in the jurisdiction had been registered to vote,
or (b) less than 50 percent of the voting-age population had
actually voted in the presidential election of 1964. Seven
States qualified as covered jurisdictions under this formula:
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Virginia. Determination of the Director of the
Census Pursuant to Section 4(b)(2) of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897-02 (Aug. 7, 1965). Political
subdivisions in four additional States—Arizona, Hawai‘i,
Idaho, and North Carolina—also qualified as covered
jurisdictions. See id.; Determination of the Director of the
of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,505-02 (Nov. 19, 1965).
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60 DNC V. HOBBS
Under Section 4(a) of the VRA, covered jurisdictions

were forbidden for a period of five years from using a “test or
device,” such as a literacy test, as a prerequisite to register to
vote, unless a three-judge district court of the District of
Columbia found that no such test had been used by the
jurisdiction during the preceding five years for the purpose of
denying the right to vote on account of race or color. Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a). Under
Section 5, covered jurisdictions were forbidden from
changing “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting”
unless the jurisdiction “precleared” that change, by either
obtaining approval (a) from a three-judge district court of the
District of Columbia acknowledging that the proposed change
“neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or
(b) from the Attorney General if a proposed change has been
submitted to DOJ and the Attorney General has not
“interposed an objection” within sixty days of the submission.
Id. § 5.
Three counties in Arizona qualified as “covered

jurisdictions” under the 1965 Act: Apache, Coconino, and
Navajo Counties. See Determination of the Director of the
of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897-02, 14,505-02. Those counties
were therefore initially prohibited from using the literacy test
as a prerequisite to voter registration. All three counties were
majority American Indian, and there was a history of high use
of the literacy test and correspondingly low voter turnout.
Berman at 12. However, in 1966, in a suit brought by the
counties against the United States, a three-judge district court
held that there was insufficient proof that a literacy test had
been used by the counties in a discriminatory fashion during
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the immediately preceding five years. See Apache Cty. v.

United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966). The Navajo
Nation had sought to intervene and present evidence of
discrimination in the district court, but its motion to intervene
had been denied. Id. at 906–13.
Congress renewed and amended the VRA in 1970,

extending it for another five years. Voting Rights Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970). Under the
VRA of 1970, the formula for determining covered
jurisdictions under Section 4(b) was changed to add the
presidential election of 1968 to the percentage-of-voters
criterion. Id. § 4(b). As a result, eight out of fourteen
Arizona counties—including Apache, Navajo, and Coconino
Counties—qualified as covered jurisdictions. Tucker et al.,
Voting Rights at 286. Under the 1970 Act, non-covered
jurisdictions were forbidden from using a “test or device,”
such as a literacy test, to the same degree as covered
jurisdictions. The 1970 Act thus effectively imposed a
nationwide ban on literacy tests. Voting Rights Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 201.
Arizona immediately challenged the ban. In Oregon v.

Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970), the Court unanimously
upheld the ban on literacy tests. Justice Black wrote,
In enacting the literacy test ban . . . [,]

Congress had before it a long history of the
discriminatory use of literacy tests to
disfranchise voters on account of their
race. . . . Congress . . . had evidence to show
that voter registration in areas with large
Spanish-American populations was
consistently below the state and national
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averages. In Arizona, for example, only two

counties out of eight with Spanish surname
populations in excess of 15% showed a voter
registration equal to the state-wide average.
Arizona also has a serious problem of
deficient voter registration among Indians.
Two years after the Court’s decision, Arizona finally repealed

its literacy test. Tucker, Bilingual Ballots, at 21.
In 1975, Congress again renewed and amended the VRA.

Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400
(1975). Under the VRA of 1975, the formula for determining
covered jurisdictions under Section 4(b) was updated to add
the presidential election of 1972. Id. § 202. In addition,
Congress expanded the definition of “test or device” to
address discrimination against language minority groups. Id.
§ 203 (Section 4(f)). Pursuant to this amended formula and
definition, any jurisdiction where a single language minority
group (e.g., Spanish speakers who spoke no other language)
constituted more than 5 percent of eligible voters was subject
to preclearance under Section 5 if (a) the jurisdiction did not
offer bilingual election materials during the 1972 presidential
election, and (b) less than 50 percent of the voting-age
population was registered to vote, or less than 50 percent of
the voting-age population actually voted in the 1972
presidential election. Id. §§ 201–203.
Every jurisdiction in Arizona failed the new test. As a

result, the entire State of Arizona became a covered
jurisdiction. Berman at 20–21.
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(E) Continued Obstacles to Voting: The Example of

Apache County
The VRA’s elimination of literacy tests increased political

participation by Arizona’s American Indian, Hispanic, and
African American citizens. However, state and county
officials in Arizona continued to discriminate against
minority voters. Apache County, which includes a significant
part of the Navajo Reservation, provides numerous examples
of which we recount only one.
In 1976, a school district in Apache County sought to

avoid integration by holding a special bond election to build
a new high school in a non-Indian area of the county. See
Apache Cty. High Sch. Dist. No. 90 v. United States, No. 77-
1815 (D.D.C. June 12, 1980); see also Tucker et al., Voting
Rights at 324–26 (discussing the same). Less than a month
before the election, the school district, a “covered
jurisdiction” under the VRA, sought preclearance under
Section 5 for proposed changes in election procedures,
including closure of nearly half the polling stations on the
Navajo Reservation. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep’t of Justice,
to Joe Purcell, Gust, Rosenfeld, Divelbess & Henderson (Oct.
4, 1976). DOJ did not complete its review before the
election. The school district nonetheless held the bond
election using the proposed changes. After the election, DOJ
refused to preclear the proposed changes, finding that they
had a discriminatory purpose or effect. Id. (and subsequent
letters from Assistant Attorney Gen. Drew S. Days III on
May 3, 1977, and June 10, 1977). The school district brought
suit in a three-judge district court, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the election did not violate the VRA.
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The district court found that “[t]he history of Apache

County reveals pervasive and systemic violations of Indian
voting rights.” Apache Cty. High Sch. Dist. No. 90, No. 77-
1815, at 6. The court found that the school district’s behavior
was neither “random[]” nor “unconscious[].” Id. at 14–15.
“Rather, its campaign behavior served to effectuate the
unwritten but manifest policy of minimizing the effect of the
Navajos’ franchise, while maximizing the Anglo vote.” Id.
at 15.
(F) United States v. Arizona and Preclearance during the

1980s and 1990s
During the following two decades, DOJ refused to

preclear numerous proposed voting changes in Arizona. See,
e.g., Goddard v. Babbitt, 536 F. Supp. 538, 541, 543 (D. Ariz.
1982) (finding that a state legislative redistricting plan passed
by the Arizona state legislature “dilut[ed] the San Carlos
Apache Tribal voting strength and divid[ed] the Apache
community of interest”); see also Tucker et al., Voting Rights
at 326–28 (discussing additional examples). In 1988, the
United States sued Arizona, alleging that the State, as well as
Apache and Navajo Counties, violated the VRA by
employing election standards, practices, and procedures that
denied or abridged the voting rights of Navajo citizens. See
United States v. Arizona, No. 88-1989 (D. Ariz. May 22,
1989) (later amended Sept. 27, 1993); see also Tucker et al.,
Voting Rights at 328–30 (discussing the same). A three-judge
district court summarized the complaint:
The challenged practices include alleged

discriminatory voter registration, absentee
ballot, and voter registration cancellation
procedures, and the alleged failure of the
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defendants to implement, as required by

Section 4(f)(4), effective bilingual election
procedures, including the effective
dissemination of election information in
Navajo and providing for a sufficient number
of adequately trained bilingual persons to
serve as translators for Navajo voters needing
assistance at the polls on election day.
United States v. Arizona, No. 88-1989, at 1–2.
Arizona and the counties settled the suit under a Consent

Decree. Id. at 1–26. The Decree required the defendants to
make extensive changes to their voting practices, including
the creation of a Navajo Language Election Information
Program. See id. at 4–23. More than a decade later, those
changes had not been fully implemented. See U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, Department of Justice’s Activities to
Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities 91–92
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04104
1r.pdf (identifying significant deficiencies and finding that
implementation of the Navajo Language Election Information
Program by Apache and Navajo Counties was “inadequate”).
During the 1980s and 1990s, DOJ issued seventeen

Section 5 preclearance objections to proposed changes in
Arizona election procedures, concluding that they had the
purpose or effect of discriminating against Arizona’s
American Indian and/or Hispanic voters. See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Voting Determination Letters for Arizona,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-determination-letters-
arizona (last updated Aug. 7, 2015). Three of these
objections were for statewide redistricting plans, one in the
1980s and two in the 1990s. Id. Other objections concerned
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plans for seven of Arizona’s fifteen counties. Id. (objections

to plans for Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Graham, La Paz,
Navajo, and Yuma Counties).
(G) Continuation to the Present Day
Arizona’s pattern of discrimination against minority

voters has continued to the present day.
(1) Practices and Policies
We highlight two examples of continued discriminatory

practices and policies. First, as the district court found, the
manner in which Maricopa County—home to over 60 percent
of Arizona’s population—administers elections has “been of
considerable concern to minorities in recent years.” Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 871; Berman at 20. During the 2016
presidential primary election, Maricopa County reduced the
number of polling places by 70 percent, from 200 polling
places in 2012 to just 60 polling places in 2016. Berman at
20. The reduction in number, as well as the locations, of the
polling places had a disparate impact on minority voters.
Rodden at 61–68. Hispanic voters were “under-served by
polling places relative to the rest of the metro area,” id. at 62,
and Hispanic and African American voters were forced to
travel greater distances to reach polling places than white,
non-Hispanic voters. Id. at 64–68. The reduction in the
number of polling places “resulted in extremely long lines of
people waiting to vote—some for five hours—and many
people leaving the polls, discouraged from voting by the long
wait.” Berman at 20.
Second, the district court found that Maricopa County has

repeatedly misrepresented or mistranslated key information
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in Spanish-language voter materials. Reagan, 329 F. Supp.

3d at 875 (“Along with the State’s hostility to bilingual
education, Maricopa County has sometimes failed to send
properly translated education[al] materials to its Spanish
speaking residents, resulting in confusion and distrust from
Hispanic voters.”); Berman at 20. In 2012, the official
Spanish-language pamphlet in Maricopa County told
Spanish-speaking voters that the November 6 election would
be held on November 8. Berman at 20. The county did not
make the same mistake in its English-language pamphlet.
Four years later, Spanish-language ballots in Maricopa
County provided an incorrect translation of a ballot
proposition. Id.
(2) Voter Registration and Turnout
Voter registration of Arizona’s minority citizens lags

behind that of white citizens. In November 2016, close to
75 percent of white citizens were registered to vote in
Arizona, compared to 57 percent of Hispanic citizens. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Reported Voting and Registration by
Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for November 2016, tbl. 4b.
Arizona has one of the lowest voter turnout rates in the

United States. A 2005 study ranked Arizona forty-seventh
out of the fifty States. See Ariz. State Univ., Morrison Inst.
for Pub. Policy, How Arizona Compares: Real Numbers and
Hot Topics 47 (2005) (relying on Census data); see also
Tucker et al., Voting Rights at 359. In 2012, Arizona ranked
forty-fourth in turnout for that year’s presidential election.
Rodden at 19.
The turnout rate for minority voters is substantially less

than that for white voters. In 2002, 59.8 percent of registered
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Hispanic voters turned out for the election, compared to

72.4 percent of total registered voters. Tucker et al., Voting
Rights at 359–60 (relying on Census data). In the 2012
presidential election, 39 percent of Arizona’s Hispanic
voting-age population and 46 percent of Arizona’s African
American voting-age population turned out for the election,
compared to 62 percent of Arizona’s white population.
Rodden at 20–21. The national turnout rate for African
Americans in that election was 66 percent. Id. In the 2000
and 2004 presidential elections, turnout of Arizona’s
American Indian voters was approximately 23 percentage
points below the statewide average. Tucker et al., Voting
Rights at 360.
(H) District Court’s Assessment of Factor One
The district court recognized Arizona’s history of

discrimination, but minimized its significance. Quoting
Dr. Berman, the court wrote:
In sum, “[d]iscriminatory action has been

more pronounced in some periods of state
history than others . . . [and] each party (not
just one party) has led the charge in
discriminating against minorities over the
years.” Sometimes, however, partisan
objectives are the motivating factor in
decisions to take actions detrimental to the
voting rights of minorities. “[M]uch of the
discrimination that has been evidenced may
well have in fact been the unintended
consequence of a political culture that simply
ignores the needs of minorities.” Arizona’s
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recent history is a mixed bag of advancements

and discriminatory actions.
Id. at 875–76 (alterations in original).
The fact that each party in Arizona “has led the charge in
discriminating against minorities” does not diminish the legal
significance of that discrimination. Quite the contrary. That
fact indicates that racial discrimination has long been deeply
embedded in Arizona’s political institutions and that both
parties have discriminated when it has served their purposes.
Further, the “mixed bag of advancements and discriminatory
actions” in “Arizona’s recent history” does not weigh in
Arizona’s favor. As Chief Judge Thomas wrote: “Rather,
despite some advancements, most of which were mandated
by courts or Congress [through Section 5 preclearance],
Arizona’s history is marred by discrimination.” DNC,
904 F.3d at 738 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). The “history of
official discrimination” in Arizona and its political
subdivisions “touch[ing] the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate
in the democratic process” is long, substantial, and
unambiguous. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37 (quoting S. Rep.
at 28–29).
The district court clearly erred in minimizing the strength

of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.
ii. Factor Two: Racially Polarized Voting Patterns
Voting in Arizona is racially polarized. The district court

found, “Arizona has a history of racially polarized voting,
which continues today.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 876. In
recent years, the base of the Republican party in Arizona has
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been white. Putting to one side “landslide” elections, in

statewide general elections from 2004 to 2014, 59 percent of
white Arizonans voted for Republican candidates, compared
with 35 percent of Hispanic voters. The district court found
that in the 2016 general election, exit polls “demonstrate that
voting between non-minorities and Hispanics continues to be
polarized along racial lines.” Id. In the most recent
redistricting cycle, the Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission “found that at least one congressional district
and five legislative districts clearly exhibited racially
polarized voting.” Id.
Voting is particularly polarized when Hispanic and white

candidates compete for the same office. In twelve non-
landslide district-level elections in 2008 and 2010 between a
Hispanic Democratic candidate and a white Republican
candidate, an average of 84 percent of Hispanics, 77 percent
of American Indians, and 52 percent of African Americans
voted for the Hispanic candidate compared to an average of
only 30 percent of white voters.
The district court did not clearly err in assessing the

strength of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.
iii. Factor Five: Effects of Discrimination
It is undisputed that “members of the minority group[s]”

in Arizona “bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability
to participate effectively in the political process.” Gingles,
478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep. at 28–29). The district court
found, “Racial disparities between minorities and non-
minorities in socioeconomic standing, income, employment,
education, health, housing, transportation, criminal justice,
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and electoral representation have persisted in Arizona.”

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 876.
The district court made factual findings in four key

areas—education, poverty and employment, home ownership,
and health. The district court concluded in each area that the
effects of discrimination “hinder” minorities’ ability to
participate effectively in the political process.
First, the district court wrote:
From 1912 until the Supreme Court’s decision

in Brown v. Board of Education, segregated
education was widespread throughout Arizona
and sanctioned by both the courts and the state
legislature. In fact, the Tucson Public Schools
only recently reached a consent decree with
the DOJ over its desegregation plan in 2013.
The practice of segregation also extended
beyond schools; it was common place to have
segregated public spaces such as restaurants,
swimming pools, and theaters. Even where
schools were not segregated, Arizona enacted
restrictions on bilingual education. As
recently as 2000, Arizona banned bilingual
education with the passage of Proposition
203.
Arizona has a record of failing to provide

adequate funding to teach its non-English
speaking students. This underfunding has
taken place despite multiple court orders
instructing Arizona to develop an adequate
funding formula for its programs, including a
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2005 order in which Arizona was held in

contempt of court for refusing to provide
adequate funding for its educational programs.
“According to the Education Law Center’s
latest National Report Card that provided data
for 2013, Arizona ranked 47th among the
states in per-student funding for elementary
and secondary education.”
Id. at 874–75 (internal citations omitted).
White Arizonans “remain more likely than Hispanics,

Native Americans, and African Americans to graduate from
high school, and are nearly three times more likely to have a
bachelor’s degree than Hispanics and Native Americans.” Id.
at 868. “[I]n a recent survey, over 22.4 percent of Hispanics
and 11.2 percent of Native Americans rated themselves as
speaking English less than ‘very well,’ as compared to only
1.2 percent of non-minorities.” Id. The district court found
that, due to “lower levels of [English] literacy and education,
minority voters are more likely to be unaware of certain
technical [voting] rules, such as the requirement that early
ballots be received by the county recorder, rather than merely
postmarked, by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.” Id.
Second, Hispanics and African Americans in Arizona live

in poverty at nearly two times the rate of whites. American
Indians live in poverty at three times the rate of whites. Id.
“Wages and unemployment rates for Hispanics, African
Americans, and Native Americans consistently have
exceeded non-minority unemployment rates for the period of
2010 to 2015.” Id. The district court found that minority
voters are more likely to work multiple jobs, less likely to
own a car, and more likely to lack reliable access to
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transportation, id. at 869, all of which make it more difficult

to travel to a polling place—or between an incorrect polling
place and a correct polling place.
Third, the district court found that “[i]n Arizona,

68.9 percent of non-minorities own a home, whereas only
32.3 percent of African Americans, 49 percent of Hispanics,
and 56.1 percent of Native Americans do so.” Id. at 868.
Lower rates of homeownership and correspondingly higher
rates of renting and residential mobility contribute to higher
rates of OOP voting.
Fourth, the district court found that “[a]s of 2015,

Hispanics, Native Americans, and African Americans fared
worse than non-minorities on a number of key health
indicators.” Id. at 868–69. “Native Americans in particular
have much higher rates of disability than non-minorities, and
Arizona counties with large Native American populations
have much higher rates of residents with ambulatory
disabilities.” Id. at 869. “For example, ‘17 percent of Native
Americans are disabled in Apache County, 22 percent in
Navajo County, and 30 percent in Coconino County.’” Id.
“Further, ‘11 percent [of individuals] have ambulatory
difficulties in Apache County, 13 percent in Navajo County,
and 12 percent in Coconino County, all of which contain
significant Native American populations and reservations.’”
Id. (alteration in original). Witnesses credibly testified that
ambulatory disabilities—both alone and combined with
Arizona’s transportation disparities—make traveling to and
between polling locations difficult.

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iv. Factor Six: Racial Appeals in Political Campaigns
Arizona’s “political campaigns have been characterized

by overt [and] subtle racial appeals” throughout its history.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep. at 28–29). The
district court found that “Arizona’s racially polarized voting
has resulted in racial appeals in campaigns.” Reagan, 329
F. Supp. 3d at 876.
For example, when Raul Castro, a Hispanic man,

successfully ran for governor in the 1970s, Castro’s opponent,
a white man, urged voters to support him instead because “he
looked like a governor.” Id. “In that same election, a
newspaper published a picture of Fidel Castro with a headline
that read ‘Running for governor of Arizona.’” Id. In his
successful 2010 campaign for State Superintendent of Public
Education, John Huppenthal, a white man running against a
Hispanic candidate, ran an advertisement in which the
announcer said that Huppenthal was “one of us,” was
opposed to bilingual education, and would “stop La Raza,” an
influential Hispanic civil rights organization. Id. When
Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas, a white man,
ran for governor in 2014, he ran an advertisement describing
himself as “the only candidate who has stopped illegal
immigration.” Id. The advertisement “simultaneously
show[ed] a Mexican flag with a red strikeout line through it
superimposed over the outline of Arizona.” Id. Further,
“racial appeals have been made in the specific context of
legislative efforts to limit ballot collection.” Id. The district
court specifically referred to the “racially charged” LaFaro
Video, falsely depicting a Hispanic man, characterized as a
“thug,” “acting to stuff the ballot box.” Id.
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v. Factor Seven: Number of Minorities in Public Office
The district court recognized that there has been a racial

disparity in elected officials but minimized its importance.
The court wrote, “Notwithstanding racially polarized voting
and racial appeals, the disparity in the number of minority
elected officials in Arizona has declined.” Id. at 877. Citing
an expert report by Dr. Donald Critchlow—an expert whose
opinion the court otherwise afforded “little weight,” id.
at 836—the court wrote, “Arizona has been recognized for
improvements in the number of Hispanics and Native
Americans registering and voting, as well as in the overall
representation of minority elected officials,” id. at 877.
As recounted above, it is undisputed that American

Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens are under-
represented in public office in Arizona. Minorities make up
44 percent of Arizona’s total population, but they hold
25 percent of Arizona’s elected offices. Id. Minorities hold
22 percent of state congressional seats and 9 percent of
judgeships. No American Indian or African American has
ever been elected to represent Arizona in the United States
House of Representatives. Only two minorities have been
elected to statewide office in Arizona since the passage of
the VRA. Arizona has never elected an American Indian
candidate to statewide office. No American Indian, Hispanic,
or African American candidate has ever been elected to serve
as a United States Senator representing Arizona.
Arizona’s practice of entirely discarding OOP ballots is

especially important in statewide and United States Senate
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elections. Some votes for local offices may be improperly

cast in an OOP ballot, given that the voter has cast the ballot
in the wrong precinct. But no vote for statewide office or for
the United States Senate is ever improperly cast in an OOP
ballot. Arizona’s practice of wholly discarding OOP ballots
thus has the effect of disproportionately undercounting
minority votes, by a factor of two to one, precisely where the
problem of under-representation in Arizona is most acute.
The district court clearly erred in minimizing the strength

of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.
vi. Factor Eight: Officials’ Responsiveness to the Needs

of Minority Groups
The district court found that “Plaintiffs’ evidence . . . is

insufficient to establish a lack of responsiveness on the part
of elected officials to particularized needs of minority
groups.” Id. In support of its finding, the court cited the
activity of one organization, the Arizona Citizens Clean
Elections Commission, which “engages in outreach to various
communities, including the Hispanic and Native American
communities, to increase voter participation” and “develops
an annual voter education plan in consultation with elections
officials and stakeholders,” and whose current Chairman is an
enrolled member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe. Id.
The district court’s finding ignores extensive undisputed

evidence showing that Arizona has significantly underserved
its minority population. “Arizona was the last state in the
nation to join the Children’s Health Insurance Program,
which may explain, in part, why forty-six states have better
health insurance coverage for children.” DNC, 904 F.3d
at 740 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). Further, “Arizona’s public
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schools are drastically underfunded; in fact, in 2016 Arizona

ranked 50th among the states and the District of Columbia in
per pupil spending on public elementary and secondary
education.” Id. “Given the well-documented evidence that
minorities are likelier to depend on public services[,] . . .
Arizona’s refusal to provide adequate state services
demonstrates its nonresponsiveness to minority needs.” Id.;
cf. Myers v. United States, 652 F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that the district court clearly erred when it
ignored evidence contradicting its findings).
Further, the district court’s finding is contradicted

elsewhere in its own opinion. Earlier in its opinion, the court
had written that Arizona has a “political culture that simply
ignores the needs of minorities.” Id. at 876 (citation omitted).
Later in its opinion, the court referred to “Arizona’s history
of advancing partisan objectives with the unintended
consequence of ignoring minority interests.” Id. at 882.
The district court clearly erred in finding that this factor

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’s favor.
vii. Factor Nine: Tenuousness of Justification of the

Policy Underlying the Challenged Restriction
The ninth Senate factor is “whether the policy underlying

the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting
S. Rep. at 28). The district court found that Arizona’s policy
of entirely discarding OOP ballots is justified by the
importance of Arizona’s precinct-based system of elections.
The court held:
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Precinct-based voting helps Arizona

counties estimate the number of voters who
may be expected at any particular precinct,
allows for better allocation of resources and
personnel, improves orderly administration of
elections, and reduces wait times. The
precinct-based system also ensures that each
voter receives a ballot reflecting only the
races for which that person is entitled to vote,
thereby promoting voting for local candidates
and issues and making ballots less confusing.
Arizona’s policy to not count OOP ballots is
one mechanism by which it strictly enforces
this system to ensure that precinct-based
counties maximize the system’s benefits.
This justification is not tenuous.
The court misunderstood the nature of Plaintiffs’

challenge. Plaintiffs do not challenge Arizona’s precinct-
based system of voting. Indeed, their challenge assumes both
its importance and its continued existence. Rather, their
challenge is to Arizona’s policy, within that system, of
entirely discarding OOP ballots. The question before the
district court was not the justification for Arizona’s precinct-
based system. The question, rather, was the justification for
Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP ballots.
There is no finding by the district court that would justify,

on any ground, Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP
ballots. There is no finding that counting or partially
counting OOP ballots would threaten the integrity of
Arizona’s precinct-based system. Nor is there a finding that
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Arizona has ever sought to minimize the number of OOP

ballots. The lack of such findings is not surprising given the
extreme disparity between OOP voting in Arizona and such
voting in other states, as well as Arizona’s role in causing
voters to vote OOP by, for example, frequently changing the
location of polling places.
The only plausible justification for Arizona’s OOP policy

would be the delay and expense entailed in counting OOP
ballots, but in its discussion of the Senate factors, the district
court never mentioned this justification. Indeed, the district
court specifically found that “[c]ounting OOP ballots is
administratively feasible.” Id. at 860.
Twenty States, including Arizona’s neighboring States of

California, Utah, and New Mexico, count OOP ballots. Id.;
Cal. Elec. Code §§ 14310(a)(3), 14310(c)(3), 15350; Utah
Code Ann. § 20A-4-107(1)(b)(iii), 2(a)(ii), 2(c); N.M. Stat.
Ann § 1-12-25.4(F); N.M. Admin. Code 1.10.22.9(N). The
district court wrote: “Elections administrators in these and
other states have established processes for counting only the
offices for which the OOP voter is eligible to vote.” Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 861. “Some states, such as New Mexico,
use a hand tally procedure, whereby a team of elections
workers reviews each OOP ballot, determines the precinct in
which the voter was qualified to vote, and marks on a tally
sheet for that precinct the votes cast for each eligible office.”
Id.; see N.M. Admin Code 1.10.22.9(H)–(N). “Other states,
such as California, use a duplication method, whereby a team
of elections workers reviews each OOP ballot, determines the
precinct in which the voter was qualified to vote, obtains a
new paper ballot for the correct precinct, and duplicates the
votes cast on the OOP ballot onto the ballot for the correct
precinct.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 861. “Only the offices
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that appear on both the OOP ballot and the ballot for the
correct precinct are copied. The duplicated ballot then is
scanned through the optical scan voting machine and
electronically tallied.” Id.
Arizona already uses a duplication system, similar to that

used in California, for provisional ballots cast by voters
eligible to vote in federal but not state elections, as well as for
damaged or mismarked ballots that cannot be read by an
optical scanner. Id. The district court briefly discussed the
time that might be required to count or partially count OOP
ballots, but it did not connect its discussion to its
consideration of the Senate factors. The court cited testimony
of a Pima County election official that the county’s
duplication procedure “takes about twenty minutes per
ballot.” Id. The court did not mention that this same official
had stated in his declaration that the procedure instead takes
fifteen minutes per ballot. The court also did not mention
that a California election official had testified that it takes a
very short time to count or partially count the valid votes on
an OOP ballot. That official testified that it takes “several
minutes” in California to confirm the voter’s registration—
which is done for all provisional ballots, in Arizona as well as
in California. Once that is done, the official testified, it takes
one to three minutes to duplicate the ballot.

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.
viii. Assessment of Senate Factors
The district court’s “overall assessment” of the Senate

factors was: “In sum, of the germane Senate Factors, the
Court finds that some are present in Arizona and others are
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not.” Id. at 878. Based on this assessment, the court held that
Plaintiffs had not carried their burden at step two. The
district court clearly erred in so holding. The district court
clearly erred in minimizing the strength in favor of Plaintiffs
of Senate factors one (official history of discrimination) and
seven (number of minorities in public office). Further, the
district court clearly erred in finding that Senate factors eight
(officials’ responsiveness to the needs of minority groups)
and nine (tenuousness of the justification of the policy
underlying the challenged provision) do not favor Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have successfully shown that all of the considered
Senate factors weigh in their favor. Most important, plaintiffs
have shown that the most pertinent factors, five and nine,
weigh very strongly in their favor.
c. Summary

Plaintiffs’ challenge to Arizona’s OOP policy failed under the
results test. We hold that Plaintiffs have carried their burden
at both steps one and two. First, they have shown that
Arizona’s OOP policy imposes a significant disparate burden
on its American Indian, Hispanic, and African American
citizens, resulting in the “denial or abridgement of the right”
of its citizens to vote “on account of race or color.”
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Second, they have shown that, under
the “totality of circumstances,” the discriminatory burden
imposed by the OOP policy is in part caused by or linked to
“social and historical conditions” that have or currently
produce “an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
[minority] and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives” and to participate in the political process.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47; 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
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We therefore hold that Arizona’s OOP policy violates the

results test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
3. H.B. 2023 and the Results Test
Uncontested evidence in the district court established that,

prior to the enactment of H.B. 2023, a large and
disproportionate number of minority voters relied on third
parties to collect and deliver their early ballots. Uncontested
evidence also established that, beginning in 2011, Arizona
Republicans made sustained efforts to limit or eliminate
third-party ballot collection. The question is whether the
district court clearly erred in holding that H.B. 2023 does not
violate the “results test” of Section 2.
a. Step One: Disparate Burden
The question at step one is whether H.B. 2023 results in

a disparate burden on a protected class. The district court
held that Plaintiffs failed at step one. The district court
clearly erred in so holding.
Extensive and uncontradicted evidence established that

prior to the enactment of H.B. 2023, third parties collected a
large and disproportionate number of early ballots from
minority voters. Neither the quantity nor the disproportion
was disputed. Numerous witnesses testified without
contradiction to having personally collected, or to having
personally witnessed the collection of, thousands of early
ballots from minority voters. There is no evidence that white
voters relied to any significant extent on ballot collection by
third parties.
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DNC V. HOBBS 83
The district court recognized the disparity in third-party

ballot collection between minority and white citizens. It
wrote that “[t]he Democratic Party and community advocacy
organizations . . . focused their ballot collection efforts on
low-efficacy voters, who trend disproportionately minority.”
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870. “In contrast,” the court
wrote, “the Republican Party has not significantly engaged in
ballot collection as a GOTV strategy.” Id.
The district court nonetheless held that this evidence was

insufficient to establish a violation at step one. To justify its
holding, the court wrote, “[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs’
circumstantial and anecdotal evidence is insufficient to
establish a cognizable disparity under § 2.” Id. at 868. The
court wrote further:
Considering the vast majority of Arizonans,

minority and non-minority alike, vote without
the assistance of third-parties who would not
fall within H.B. 2023’s exceptions, it is
unlikely that H.B. 2023’s limitations on who
may collect an early ballot cause a meaningful
inequality in the electoral opportunities of
minorities as compared to non-minorities.
Id. at 871.
First, the court clearly erred in discounting the evidence

of third-party ballot collection as merely “circumstantial and
anecdotal.” The evidence of third-party ballot collection was
not “circumstantial.” Rather, as recounted above, it was
direct evidence from witnesses who had themselves acted as
third-party ballot collectors, had personally supervised third-
party ballot collection, or had personally witnessed third-
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party ballot collection by others. Nor was the evidence

merely “anecdotal.” As recounted above, numerous
witnesses provided consistent and uncontradicted testimony
about third-party ballot collection they had done, supervised,
or witnessed. This evidence established that many thousands
of early ballots were collected from minority voters by third
parties. The court itself found that white voters did not
significantly rely on third-party ballot collection. No better
evidence was required to establish that large and
disproportionate numbers of early ballots were collected from
minority voters.
Second, the court clearly erred by comparing the number

of early ballots collected from minority voters to the much
greater number of all ballots cast “without the assistance of
third parties,” and then holding that the relatively smaller
number of collected early ballots did not cause a “meaningful
inequality.” Id. at 871. In so holding, the court repeated the
clear error it made in comparing the number of OOP ballots
to the total number of all ballots cast. Just as for OOP ballots,
the number of ballots collected by third parties from minority
voters surpasses any de minimis number.
We hold that H.B. 2023 results in a disparate burden on

minority voters, and that the district court clearly erred in
holding otherwise. We accordingly hold that Plaintiffs have
succeeded at step one of the results test.
b. Step Two: Senate Factors
The district court did not differentiate between Arizona’s

OOP policy and H.B. 2023 in its discussion of step two.
Much of our analysis of the Senate factors for Arizona’s OOP
policy applies with equal force to the factors for H.B. 2023.
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DNC V. HOBBS 85
Again, we regard Senate factors five (the effects of

discrimination in other areas on minorities access to voting)
and nine (the tenuousness of the justification for the
challenged voting practices) as particularly important, given
the nature of Plaintiffs’ challenge to H.B. 2023. We also
regard factor one (history of official discrimination) as
important, as it strongly supports our conclusion under factor
five. Though “not essential,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,
the other less important factors provide “helpful background
context.” Husted, 768 F.3d at 555.
We do not repeat here the entirety of our analysis of

Arizona’s OOP policy. Rather, we incorporate that analysis
by reference and discuss only the manner in which the
analysis is different for H.B. 2023.
i. Factor One: History of Official Discrimination

Connected to Voting
We recounted above Arizona’s long history of race-based

discrimination in voting. H.B. 2023 grows directly out of that
history. During the Republicans’ 2011 attempt to limit ballot
collection by third parties, Arizona was still subject to
preclearance under Section 5. When DOJ asked for more
information about whether the relatively innocuous ballot-
collection provision of S.B. 1412 had the purpose or would
have the effect of denying minorities the right to vote and
requested more information, Arizona withdrew the
preclearance request. It did so because there was evidence in
the record that the provision intentionally targeted Hispanic
voters. In 2013, public opposition threatened to repeal H.B.
2305 by referendum. If passed, the referendum would have
required that any future bill on the same topic pass the
legislature by a supermajority. Republicans repealed H.B.
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2305 rather than face a referendum. Finally, after the

Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County eliminated
preclearance, Arizona enacted H.B. 2023, making third-party
ballot collection a felony. The campaign was marked by
race-based appeals, most prominently in the LaFaro Video
described above.
As it did with respect to OOP voting, the district court

clearly erred in minimizing the strength of this factor in
Plaintiffs’ favor.
ii. Factor Two: Racially Polarized Voting Patterns
H.B. 2023 connects directly to racially polarized voting

patterns in Arizona. The district court found that “H.B. 2023
emerged in the context of racially polarized voting.” Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 879. Senator Shooter, who introduced the
bill that became S.B. 1412—the predecessor to H.B. 2023—
was motivated by the “high degree of racial polarization in
his district” and introduced the bill following a close, racially
polarized election. Id.

iii. Factor Five: Effects of Discrimination
H.B. 2023 is closely linked to the effects of

discrimination that “hinder” the ability of American Indian,
Hispanic, and African American voters “to participate
effectively in the political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37.
The district court found that American Indian, Hispanic, and
African American Arizonans “are significantly less likely
than non-minorities to own a vehicle, more likely to rely upon
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DNC V. HOBBS 87
public transportation, more likely to have inflexible work

schedules, and more likely to rely on income from hourly
wage jobs.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 869. In addition,
“[r]eady access to reliable and secure mail service is
nonexistent in some minority communities.” Id. Minority
voters in rural communities disproportionately lack access to
outgoing mail, while minority voters in urban communities
frequently encounter unsecure mailboxes and mail theft. Id.
These effects of discrimination hinder American Indian,
Hispanic, and African American voters’ ability to return early
ballots without the assistance of third-party ballot collection.

iv. Factor Six: Racial Appeals in Political Campaigns
The enactment of H.B. 2023 was the direct result of racial

appeals in a political campaign. The district court found that
“racial appeals [were] made in the specific context of
legislative efforts to limit ballot collection.” Id. at 876.
Proponents of H.B. 2023 relied on “overt or subtle racial
appeals,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37, in advocating for H.B.
2023, including the “racially tinged” LaFaro Video, Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 876–77 (characterizing the LaFaro Video
as one of the primary motivators for H.B. 2023). The district
court concluded, “[Senator] Shooter’s allegations and the
LaFaro video were successful in convincing H.B. 2023’s
proponents that ballot collection presented opportunities for
fraud that did not exist for in-person voting.” Reagan, 329
F. Supp. 3d at 880.

strength of this factor in Plaintiff’s favor.
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v. Factor Seven: Number of Minorities in Public Office
Because Arizona’s OOP policy had a particular

connection to the election of minorities to statewide office
and to the United States Senate, we concluded that the factor
of minorities in public office favored Plaintiffs. That
particular connection to statewide office does not exist
between H.B. 2023 and election of minorities. However,
H.B. 2023 is likely to have a pronounced effect in rural
counties with significant American Indian and Hispanic
populations who disproportionately lack reliable mail and
transportation services, and where a smaller number of votes
can have a significant impact on election outcomes. In those
counties, there is likely to be a particular connection to
election of American Indian and Hispanic candidates to
public office.
As it did with respect to OOP voting, the district court

clearly erred in minimizing the strength of this factor in
Plaintiffs’ favor.
vi. Factor Eight: Officials’ Responsiveness to the Needs

of Minority Groups
The district court found that “Plaintiffs’ evidence . . . is

insufficient to establish a lack of responsiveness on the part
of elected officials to particularized needs of minority
groups.” Id. at 877. As discussed above, this finding ignores
extensive evidence to the contrary and is contradicted by the
court’s statements elsewhere in its opinion.

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.
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DNC V. HOBBS 89
vii. Factor Nine: Tenuousness of Justification of the

Policy Underlying the Challenged Restriction
The district court relied on two justifications for H.B.

2023: That H.B. 2023 is aimed at preventing ballot fraud “by
creating a chain of custody for early ballots and minimizing
the opportunities for ballot tampering, loss, and destruction”;
and that H.B. 2023 is aimed at improving and maintaining
“public confidence in election integrity.” Id. at 852. We
address these justifications in turn.
First, third-party ballot collection was permitted for many

years in Arizona before the passage of H.B. 2023. No one
has ever found a case of voter fraud connected to third-party
ballot collection in Arizona. This has not been for want of
trying. The district court described the Republicans’
unsuccessful attempts to find instances of fraud:
The Republican National Lawyers

Association (“RNLA”) performed a study
dedicated to uncovering cases of voter fraud
between 2000 and 2011. The study found no
evidence of ballot collection or delivery fraud,
nor did a follow-up study through May 2015.
Although the RNLA reported instances of
absentee ballot fraud, none were tied to ballot
collection and delivery. Likewise, the
Arizona Republic conducted a study of voter
fraud in Maricopa County and determined
that, out of millions of ballots cast in
Maricopa County from 2005 to 2013, a total
of 34 cases of fraud were prosecuted. Of
these, 18 involved a felon voting without her
rights first being restored. Fourteen involved
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non-Arizona citizens voting. The study

uncovered no cases of fraud perpetrated
through ballot collection.
Id. at 853 (internal citations omitted).
The district court wrote, “[T]here has never been a case

of voter fraud associated with ballot collection charged in
Arizona.” Id. at 852. “No specific, concrete example of
voter fraud perpetrated through ballot collection was
presented by or to the Arizona legislature during the debates
on H.B. 2023 or its predecessor bills.” Id. at 852–53. “No
Arizona county produced evidence of confirmed ballot
collection fraud in response to subpoenas issued in this case,
nor has the Attorney General’s Office produced such
information.” Id. at 853.
Ballot-collection-related fraud was already criminalized

under Arizona law when H.B. 2023 was enacted. Collecting
and failing to turn in someone else’s ballot was already a
class 5 felony. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(F). Marking
someone else’s ballot was already a class 5 felony. Id. § 16-
1005(A). Selling one’s own ballot, possessing someone
else’s ballot with the intent to sell it, knowingly soliciting the
collection of ballots by misrepresenting one’s self as an
election official, and knowingly misrepresenting the location
of a ballot drop-off site were already class 5 felonies. Id.
§ 16-1005(B)–(E). These criminal prohibitions are still in
effect. Arizona also takes measures to ensure the security of
early ballots, such as using “tamper evident envelopes and a
rigorous voter signature verification procedure.” Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 854.
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DNC V. HOBBS 91
The history of H.B. 2023 shows that its proponents had

other aims in mind than combating fraud. H.B. 2023 does not
forbid fraudulent third-party ballot collection. It forbids non-
fraudulent third-party ballot collection. To borrow an
understated phrase, the anti-fraud rationale advanced in
support of H.B. 2023 “seems to have been contrived.” Dep’t
of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).
Second, we recognize the importance of public

confidence in election integrity. We are aware that the
federal bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform,
charged with building public confidence, recommended inter
alia that States “reduce the risks of fraud and abuse in
absentee voting by prohibiting ‘third-party’ organizations,
candidates, and political party activists from handling
absentee ballots.” Building Confidence in U.S. Elections
§ 5.2 (Sept. 2005). We are aware of the recent case of voter
fraud in North Carolina involving collection and forgery of
absentee ballots by a political operative hired by a Republican
candidate. And we are aware that supporters of H.B. 2023
and its predecessor bills sought to convince Arizona voters,
using false allegations and racial innuendo, that third-party
ballot collectors in Arizona have engaged in fraud.
Without in the least discounting either the common sense

of the bipartisan commission’s recommendation or the
importance of public confidence in the integrity of elections,
we emphasize, first, that the Supreme Court has instructed us
in Section 2 cases to make an “intensely local appraisal.”
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78. The third-party ballot collection
fraud case in North Carolina has little bearing on the case
before us. We are concerned with Arizona, where third-party
ballot collection has had a long and honorable history, and
where the acts alleged in the criminal indictment in North
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92 DNC V. HOBBS
Carolina were illegal under Arizona law before the passage

of H.B. 2023, and would still be illegal if H.B. 2023 were no
longer the law.
We emphasize, further, that if some Arizonans today

distrust third-party ballot collection, it is because of the
fraudulent campaign mounted by proponents of H.B. 2023.
Those proponents made strenuous efforts to persuade
Arizonans that third-party ballot collectors have engaged in
election fraud. To the degree that there has been any fraud,
it has been the false and race-based claims of the proponents
of H.B. 2023. It would be perverse if those proponents, who
used false statements and race-based innuendo to create
distrust, could now use that very distrust to further their aims
in this litigation.

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor. This factor either weighs
in Plaintiffs’ favor or is, at best, neutral.
viii. Assessment
The district court made the same overall assessment of the

Senate factors in addressing H.B. 2023 as in addressing
Arizona’s policy of discarding OOP ballots. As it did with
respect to OOP ballots, the court concluded that Plaintiffs had
not carried their burden at step two. Here, too, the district
court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. Contrary to the
court’s conclusion, Plaintiffs have successfully shown that six
of the Senate factors weigh in their favor and that the
remaining factor weighs in their favor or is neutral.
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DNC V. HOBBS 93
c. Summary

Plaintiffs’ challenge to H.B. 2023 failed under the results test.
We hold that Plaintiffs have carried their burden at both steps
one and two. First, they have shown that H.B. 2023 imposes
a disparate burden on American Indian, Hispanic, and African
American citizens, resulting in the “denial or abridgement of
the right” of its citizens to vote “on account of race or color.”
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Second, they have shown that, under
the “totality of circumstances,” the discriminatory burden
imposed by H.B. 2023 is in part caused by or linked to “social
and historical conditions” that have or currently produce “an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives” and to
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
We therefore conclude that H.B. 2023 violates the results

test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
B. Intent Test: H.B. 2023
As indicated above, uncontested evidence in the district

court established that before enactment of H.B. 2023, a large
and disproportionate number of minority voters relied on
third parties to collect and deliver their early ballots.
Uncontested evidence also established that, beginning in
2011, Arizona Republicans made sustained efforts to outlaw
third-party ballot collection. After a racially charged
campaign, they finally succeeded in passing H.B. 2023. The
question is whether the district court clearly erred in holding
that H.B. 2023 does not violate the “intent test” of Section 2.
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1. The Intent Test
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), provides the
framework for analyzing a claim of intentional discrimination
under Section 2. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP
v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016). Under
Arlington Heights, Plaintiffs have an initial burden of
providing “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. Plaintiffs need
not show that discriminatory purpose was the “sole[]” or even
a “primary” motive for the legislation. Id. Rather, Plaintiffs
need only show that discriminatory purpose was “a
motivating factor.” Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added).
“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose

was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.” Id. at 266. “[D]iscriminatory purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including
the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976). Because “[o]utright admissions of impermissible
racial motivation are infrequent[,] . . . plaintiffs often must
rely upon other evidence,” including the broader context
surrounding passage of the legislation. Hunt v. Cromartie,
526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999). “In a vote denial case such as the
one here, where the plaintiffs allege that the legislature
imposed barriers to minority voting, this holistic approach is
particularly important, for ‘[d]iscrimination today is more
subtle than the visible methods used in 1965.’” N.C. State
Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 221 (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 109–478, at 6 (2006)).
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DNC V. HOBBS 95
Arlington Heights provided a non-exhaustive list of

factors that a court should consider. Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 266. The factors include (1) the historical
background; (2) the sequence of events leading to enactment,
including any substantive or procedural departures from the
normal legislative process; (3) the relevant legislative history;
and (4) whether the law has a disparate impact on a particular
racial group. Id. at 266–68.
“Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a

‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind enactment of the
law, the burden shifts to the law’s defenders to demonstrate
that the law would have been enacted without this factor.”
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). In
determining whether a defendant’s burden has been carried,
“courts must scrutinize the legislature’s actual non-racial
motivations to determine whether they alone can justify the
legislature’s choices.” N.C. State Conference of NAACP,
831 F.3d at 221 (emphases in original) (citing Mt. Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728
(1982)). “In the context of a § 2 discriminatory intent
analysis, one of the critical background facts of which a court
must take notice is whether voting is racially polarized.” Id.
“[I]ntentionally targeting a particular race’s access to the
franchise because its members vote for a particular party, in
a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory purpose.”
Id. at 222.
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2. H.B. 2023 and the Intent Test
a. Arlington Heights Factors and Initial Burden of Proof
The district court wrote, “Having considered [the

Arlington Heights] factors, the Court finds that H.B. 2023
was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose.”
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 879. The court then went on to
discuss each of the four factors, but did not attach any
particular weight to any of them. In holding that the
Plaintiffs had not shown that discriminatory purpose was “a
motivating factor,” the district court clearly erred.
We address the Arlington Heights factors in turn.
i. Historical Background
“A historical pattern of laws producing discriminatory

results provides important context for determining whether
the same decisionmaking body has also enacted a law with
discriminatory purpose.” N.C. State Conference of NAACP,
831 F.3d at 223–24; see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267
(“The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes.”). As recounted above, the
Arizona legislature has a long history of race-based
discrimination, disenfranchisement, and voter suppression,
dating back to Arizona’s territorial days. Further, the history
of H.B. 2023 itself reveals invidious purposes.
In addressing the “historical background” factor, the

district court mentioned briefly the various legislative efforts
to restrict third-party ballot collection that had been
“spearheaded” by Senator Shooter, described briefly
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Senator Shooter’s allegations of third-party ballot fraud, and

alluded to the “racially-tinged” LaFaro Video. Reagan, 329
F. Supp. 3d at 879–80. But the district court discounted their
importance. We discuss the court’s analysis below, under the
third Arlington Heights factor.
ii. Sequence of Events Leading to Enactment
“The specific sequence of events leading up to the

challenged decision . . . may shed some light on the
decisionmaker’s purposes.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 267. We recounted above the sequence of events leading
to the enactment of H.B. 2023. The district court
acknowledged this history but again discounted its
importance. We discuss the court’s analysis below, under the
third Arlington Heights factor.
iii. Relevant Legislative History
“The legislative . . . history may be highly relevant,

especially where there are contemporary statements by
members of the decisionmaking body[.]” Id. at 268. The
district court found that legislators voted for H.B. 2023 in
response to the “unfounded and often farfetched allegations
of ballot collection fraud” made by former Senator Shooter,
and the “racially-tinged LaFaro Video.” Reagan, 329
F. Supp. 3d at 880. As Chief Judge Thomas wrote: “Because
there was ‘no direct evidence of ballot collection fraud . . .
presented to the legislature or at trial,’ the district court
understood that Shooter’s allegations and the LaFaro Video
were the reasons the bill passed.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 748
(Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d
at 880) (emphasis in original).
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Senator Shooter was one of the major proponents of the

efforts to limit third-party ballot collection and was
influential in the passage of H.B. 2023. Reagan, 329 F. Supp.
3d at 879. According to the district court, Senator Shooter
made “demonstrably false” allegations of ballot collection
fraud. Id. at 880. Senator Shooter’s efforts to limit ballot
collection were motivated in substantial part by the “high
degree of racial polarization in his district.” Id. at 879. He
was “motivated by a desire to eliminate” the increasingly
effective efforts to ensure that Hispanic votes in his district
were collected, delivered, and counted. Id.
The LaFaro Video provides even stronger evidence of

racial motivation. Maricopa County Republican Chair
LaFaro produced a video showing “a man of apparent
Hispanic heritage”—a volunteer with a get-out-the-vote
organization—apparently dropping off ballots at a polling
place. Id. at 876. LaFaro’s voice-over narration included
unfounded statements, id. at 877, “that the man was acting to
stuff the ballot box” and that LaFaro “knew that he was a
thug,” id. at 876. The video was widely distributed. It was
“shown at Republican district meetings,” “posted on
Facebook and YouTube,” and “incorporated into a television
advertisement.” Id. at 877.
The district court used the same rationale to discount the

importance of all of the first three Arlington Heights factors.
It pointed to the “sincere belief,” held by some legislators,
that fraud in third-party ballot collection was a problem that
needed to be addressed. The district court did so even though
it recognized that the belief was based on the false and race-
based allegations of fraud by Senator Shooter and other
proponents of H.B. 2023. The court wrote: “Shooter’s
allegations and the LaFaro Video were successful in
(99 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 99
convincing H.B. 2023’s proponents that ballot collection

presented opportunities for fraud that did not exist for in-
person voting[.]” Id. at 880.
We accept the district court’s conclusion that some

members of the legislature who voted for H.B. 2023 had a
sincere, though mistaken, non-race-based belief that there had
been fraud in third-party ballot collection, and that the
problem needed to be addressed. However, as the district
court found, that sincere belief had been fraudulently created
by Senator Shooter’s false allegations and the “racially-
tinged” LaFaro video. Even though some legislators did not
themselves have a discriminatory purpose, that purpose may
be attributable to their action under the familiar “cat’s paw”
doctrine. The doctrine is based on the fable, often attributed
to Aesop, in which a clever monkey induces a cat to use its
paws to take chestnuts off of hot coals for the benefit of the
monkey.
For example, we wrote in Mayes v. Winco Holdings, Inc.,

846 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 2017):
[T]he animus of a supervisor can affect an

employment decision if the supervisor
“influenced or participated in the
decisionmaking process.” Dominguez-Curry
[v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t], 424 F.3d [1027,]
1039–40 [(9th Cir. 2017)]. Even if the
supervisor does not participate in the ultimate
termination decision, a “supervisor’s biased
report may remain a causal factor if the
independent investigation takes it into account
without determining that the adverse action
was, apart from the supervisor’s
(100 of 432)
100 DNC V. HOBBS
recommendation, entirely justified.” Staub v.

Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011).
Id. at 1281; see also Poland v. Chertoff , 494 F.3d 1174, 1182
(9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a subordinate . . . sets in motion a
proceeding by an independent decisionmaker that leads to an
adverse employment action, the subordinate’s bias is imputed
to the employer if the plaintiff can prove that the allegedly
independent adverse employment decision was not actually
independent because the biased subordinate influenced or was
involved in the decision or decisionmaking process.”).
The good-faith belief of these sincere legislators does not

show a lack of discriminatory intent behind H.B. 2023.
Rather, it shows that well meaning legislators were used as
“cat’s paws.” Convinced by the false and race-based
allegations of fraud, they were used to serve the
discriminatory purposes of Senator Shooter, Republican
Chair LaFaro, and their allies.
We hold that the district court clearly erred in discounting

the importance of the first three Arlington Heights factors.
We hold that all three factors weigh in favor of showing that
discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in enacting H.B.
2023.
iv. Disparate Impact on a Particular Racial Group
“The impact of the official action[,] whether it ‘bears

more heavily on one race than another,’ may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the
effect of the state action even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
(101 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 101
at 266 (internal citation omitted). As described above,

uncontested evidence shows that H.B. 2023 has an adverse
and disparate impact on American Indian, Hispanic, and
African American voters. The district court found that the
legislature “was aware” of the impact of H.B. 2023 on what
the court called “low-efficacy minority communities.”
It appears that the district court weighed this factor in

favor of showing discriminatory intent as a motivating factor
in enacting H.B. 2023. The court did not clearly err in so
doing.
v. Assessment

Plaintiffs failed to carry their initial burden of proof of
showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor
leading to the enactment of H.B. 2023. We hold that all four
of the Arlington Heights factors weigh in favor of Plaintiffs.
Our holding does not mean that the majority of the Arizona
state legislature “harbored racial hatred or animosity toward
any minority group.” N.C. State Conference of NAACP,
831 F.3d at 233. “But the totality of the circumstances”—
Arizona’s long history of race-based voting discrimination;
the Arizona legislature’s unsuccessful efforts to enact less
restrictive versions of the same law when preclearance was a
threat; the false, race-based claims of ballot collection fraud
used to convince Arizona legislators to pass H.B. 2023; the
substantial increase in American Indian and Hispanic voting
attributable to ballot collection that was targeted by H.B.
2023; and the degree of racially polarized voting in
Arizona—“cumulatively and unmistakably reveal” that
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102 DNC V. HOBBS
racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting

H.B. 2023. Id.
b. Would H.B. 2023 Otherwise Have Been Enacted
At the second step of the Arlington Heights analysis,

Arizona has the burden of showing that H.B. 2023 would
have been enacted without racial discrimination as a
motivating factor. Because the district court held that
Plaintiffs had not carried their initial burden, it did not reach
the second step of the Arlington Heights analysis.
Although there is no holding of the district court directed

to Arlington Heights’ second step, the court made a factual
finding that H.B. 2023 would not have been enacted without
racial discrimination as a motivating factor. The court
specifically found that H.B. 2023 would not have been
enacted without Senator Shooter’s and LaFaro’s false and
race-based allegations of voter fraud. The court wrote, “The
legislature was motivated by a misinformed belief that ballot
collection fraud was occurring, but a sincere belief that mail-
in ballots lacked adequate prophylactic safeguards as
compared to in-person voting.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at
882. That is, members of the legislature, based on the
“misinformed belief” created by Shooter, LaFaro, and their
allies and serving as their “cat’s paws,” voted to enact H.B.
2023. See Poland, 494 F.3d at 1182. Based on the court’s
finding, we hold that Arizona has not carried its burden of
showing that H.B. 2023 would have been enacted without the
motivating factor of racial discrimination.
(103 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 103
c. Summary

Plaintiffs failed to establish that H.B. 2023 violates the intent
test of Section 2 of the VRA. A holding that H.B. 2023
violates the intent test of Section 2 necessarily entails a
holding that it also violates the Fifteenth Amendment.
III. Response to Dissents
We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleagues.

For the most part, our response to their contentions is
contained in the body of our opinion and needs no
elaboration. Several contentions, however, merit a specific
response.
A. Response to the First Dissent
Our first dissenting colleague, Judge O’Scannlain, makes

several mistakes.
First, our colleague contends that H.B. 2023 does not

significantly change Arizona law. Our colleague writes:
For years, Arizona has restricted who may

handle early ballots. Since 1992, Arizona has
prohibited anyone but the elector himself
from possessing “that elector’s unvoted
absentee ballot.” 1991 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch.
310, § 22 (S.B. 1390) (West). In 2016,
Arizona enacted a parallel regulation, H.B.
(104 of 432)
104 DNC V. HOBBS
2023 (the “ballot-collection” policy),

concerning the collection of early ballots.
Diss. Op. at 116–117 (emphases added).
Our colleague appends a footnote to the first sentence in

the passage just quoted:
The majority’s effort to deny history can

easily be dismissed. Maj. Op. 104–105. As
Judge Bybee’s dissent ably recounts, not only
Arizona but 21 other states have restricted
early balloting for years. Bybee, J. Diss. Op.
157–158.
Our colleague fails to recognize the distinction between

“unvoted” and “voted” ballots. Contrary to our colleague’s
contention, H.B. 2023 is not “a parallel regulation” to already
existing Arizona law. Under prior Arizona law, possession of
an “unvoted absentee ballot” was forbidden. Arizona law in
no way restricted non-fraudulent possession of voted absentee
ballots (absentee ballots on which the vote had already been
indicated). Unlike our colleague, the district court recognized
the distinction. It wrote:
Since 1997, it has been the law in Arizona

that “[o]nly the elector may be in possession
of that elector’s unvoted early ballot.” A.R.S.
§ 16-542(D). In 2016, Arizona amended
A.R.S. § 16-1005 by enacting H.B. 2023,
(105 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 105
which limits who may collect a voter’s voted

or unvoted early ballot.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839 (emphases added). H.B.

2023 for the first time forbade non-fraudulent collection of
voted ballots. It was not a “parallel regulation.” It was a
fundamental change in Arizona law.
Second, our colleague repeats the potentially misleading

numbers and percentages of OOP voting recounted by the
district court. Our colleague writes:
Only 0.47 percent of all ballots cast in the

2012 general election (10,979 out of
2,323,579) were not counted because they
were cast out of the voter’s assigned precinct.
[Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d] at 872. In 2016,
this fell to 0.15 percent (3,970 out of
2,661,497). Id.
Diss. Op. at 122–123. Our colleague, like the district court,

see Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872, fails to mention that, as
a percentage of all in-person ballots, OOP ballots increased
between 2012 and 2016.
Third, our colleague quotes from a sentence in a footnote

in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gingles. Based on that
sentence, he insists that “substantial difficulty electing
representatives of their choice” is the governing standard for
the Section 2 results test in the case before us. Our colleague
writes:
[In Gingles], the Court observed that “[i]t is

obvious that unless minority group members
(106 of 432)
106 DNC V. HOBBS
experience substantial difficulty electing

representatives of their choice, they cannot
prove that a challenged electoral mechanism
impairs their ability ‘to elect.’” Gingles,
478 U.S. at 48 n.15 (quoting 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(b)) (emphasis added).
Diss. Op. at 124 (emphasis in original). He later writes:
Given the lack of any testimony in the record

indicating that the ballot-collection policy
would result in minority voters
‘experienc[ing] substantial difficulty electing
representatives of their choice,’ Gingles,
478 U.S. at 48 n.15, the district court did not
clearly err[.]
Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
Our colleague fails to distinguish between a vote dilution

case and a vote denial case. As we noted above, a vote
dilution case is one in which multimember electoral districts
have been formed, or in which district lines have been drawn,
so as to dilute and thereby diminish the effectiveness of
minority votes. Vote denial cases are all other cases,
including cases in which voters are prevented from voting or
in which votes are not counted. Gingles was a vote dilution
case, and the case before us is a vote denial case. Our
colleague fails to quote the immediately preceding sentence
in the Gingles footnote, which makes clear that the Court was
addressing vote dilution cases. The Court wrote, “In
recognizing that some Senate Report factors are more
important to multimember district vote dilution claims than
(107 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 107
others, the Court effectuates the intent of Congress.” Gingles,

478 U.S. at 48 n.15 (emphasis added).
The standard in a vote denial case is different, as

recognized by DOJ in its amicus brief in this case, and in
League of Women Voters where the Fourth Circuit struck
down a state statute that would have prevented the counting
of OOP ballots in North Carolina without inquiring into
whether the number of affected ballots was likely to affect
election outcomes. See 769 F.3d at 248–49. As we noted
above, there may be a de minimis number in vote denial cases
challenging facially neutral policies or law, but the 3,709
OOP ballots in our case is above any such de minimis
number.
Citing our en banc decision in Gonzalez, our colleague

contends that our case law does not differentiate between vote
denial and vote dilution cases. But the very language from
Gonzalez that he quotes belies his contention. We wrote in
text:
[A] § 2 challenge “based purely on a showing

of some relevant statistical disparity between
minorities and whites,” without any evidence
that the challenged voting qualification causes
that disparity, will be rejected.
Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 405. We then appended a footnote,

upon which our colleague relies:
This approach applies both to claims of vote

denial and of vote dilution. [Smith v. Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power
(108 of 432)
108 DNC V. HOBBS
Dist., 109 F.3d 586,] 596 n.8 [(9th Cir.

1997)].
Id. at 405 n.32. The quoted language makes the obvious

point that in both vote denial and vote dilution cases, we
require evidence of a causal relation between a challenged
voting qualification and any claimed statistical disparity
between minority and white voters. However, this language
does not tell us that the predicate disparity, and its effect, are
the same in vote denial and vote dilution cases.
B. Response to the Second Dissent
Our second dissenting colleague, Judge Bybee, writes “to

make a simple point: The Arizona rules challenged here are
part of an ‘electoral process that is necessarily structured to
maintain the integrity of the democratic system.’” Diss. Op.
at 142 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441
(1992)). We respectfully disagree. There is nothing in
Arizona’s policy of discarding OOP votes or about H.B. 2023
that is necessary “to maintain the integrity” of Arizona’s
democratic system.
Our colleague writes, further, “Parties of all stripes should

have an equal interest in rules that are both fair on their face
and fairly administered.” Id. at 144. Our colleague
misunderstands the purpose of the VRA’s results test of
Section 2. The results test looks past the facial fairness of a
law to its actual results.
We take these two points in turn.

(109 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 109
1. Integrity of Arizona’s Democratic System
First, our colleague uses his “simple point” to justify

Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023 on the ground that they
are necessary to protect the integrity of Arizona’s system.
Our colleague argues that eliminating Arizona’s OOP

policy will “lower[] the cost to voters of determining where
they are supposed to vote, but only as to presidential, U.S.
Senate, and statewide races,” and will have “its own
consequences.” Id. at 151, 153. To illustrate those
consequences, our colleague imagines a voter from Tuscon
who votes in Phoenix. Based on his imagined voter, he posits
“two predictable ways” in which future elections in Arizona
will be “skew[ed]” if OOP votes are counted for the elections
in which the voter is entitled to vote. Id. at 152. Because his
imagined voter cares only about national elections, that voter
“may vote with impunity in the wrong precinct.” Id. at 152.
This will result, first, in “overvalu[ing]” national elections,
and, second, in “undervalu[ing]” local elections. Id.
Our colleague speculates that Arizona’s OOP policy will

result in voters either finding the right precinct, or voting by
mail. He writes:
Under Arizona’s current OOP rule, a voter,

having gone to the trouble of going to a
precinct to vote in person and suffering the
indignity of having to fill out a provisional
ballot, is less likely to make the same mistake
next year. A voter who has had a ballot
disqualified is more likely to figure out the
correct precinct next time—or, better yet, sign
up for the convenience of early voting, a
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110 DNC V. HOBBS
measure that avoids the conundrum of OOP

altogether.
Id. at 155.
Our colleague’s speculation leads him to predict that

Arizona’s OOP policy will lead to increased in-precinct
voting. There is nothing in the record that remotely supports
our colleague’s predicted consequences. Instead, the record
clearly shows the opposite. Arizona’s OOP policy has been
in place since at least 1970. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 840.
The record shows that, despite its long-standing policy,
Arizona has consistently had by far the highest rate of OOP
voting of any State—in 2012, eleven times greater than the
second-place State. See Figure 6, supra at 13; see also
Rodden at 26 (describing OOP voting as a “persistent
problem” in Arizona).
Contrary to our colleague’s speculation, OOP voters are

unlikely ever to discover the “indignity” of having their
provisional ballots discarded. Our colleague quotes from an
Arizona statute requiring county recorders to establish a
“method” by which a voter casting a provisional ballot be
notified that his or ballot was not counted, and giving a
reason why it was not counted. Diss. Op. at 155 n.9.
However, there is nothing in the record showing that county
recorders have in fact established, or followed, such a
“method.” Instead, there was uncontradicted testimony in the
district court by OOP voters that they were not directed to
their proper polling place and were never told that their vote
would not be counted if cast out of precinct. See Reagan,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 858 (finding that poll workers neither
directed OOP voters to the correct precinct nor told voters
that OOP ballots would be discarded).
(111 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 111
The persistence of OOP voting is unsurprising given the

actions of Arizona. Arizona changes polling places with
extraordinary frequency, and often locates them in
inconvenient and misleading places. This produces a high
rate of OOP voting, particularly in urban areas and
particularly for voters with high rates of residential mobility.
The uncontested result is that minority voters cast OOP votes
twice as often as white voters.
Our colleague further argues that H.B. 2023 is an

appropriate measure to protect against voter fraud. He begins
by pointing out that many States forbid third-party ballot
collection. Diss. Op. at 158–160. But a simple numerical
comparison with other states fails to take into account, as the
VRA says we must, the particular geography, ethnic patterns,
and long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona.
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78 (a Section 2 analysis requires “a
blend of history and an intensely local appraisal”). Evidence
in the record shows that third-party ballot collection has long
had a unique role in Arizona, given the large numbers of
Hispanic and American Indian voters who have unreliable or
non-existent in-home mail service, who have unreliable
means of transportation, who live long distances from polling
places, and who have long-standing cultural traditions of
ballot collection. Evidence in the record shows that Arizona
has never, in its long history of third-party ballot collection,
found a single case of fraud.
Our colleague also argues that Arizona should not ignore

the recommendation of the report of the bipartisan
commission, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections (2005).
Diss. Op. at 161–164. This is a reasonable argument, but it
has limited force when applied to Arizona. Forbidding third-
party ballot collection protects against potential voter fraud.
(112 of 432)
112 DNC V. HOBBS
But such protection is not necessary, or even appropriate,

when there is a long history of third-party ballot collection
with no evidence, ever, of any fraud and such fraud is already
illegal under existing Arizona law. Such protection is
undesirable, even illegal, when a statute forbidding third-
party ballot collection produces a discriminatory result or is
enacted with discriminatory intent. The commission was
concerned with maintaining “confidence” in our election
system, as indicated by the title of its report. If there is a lack
of confidence in third-party ballot collection in Arizona, it is
due to the fraudulent, race-based campaign mounted by the
proponents of H.B. 2023.
Finally, our colleague points to third-party ballot

collection fraud perpetrated by a Republican political
operative in North Carolina. Id. at 164–166. Our colleague’s
argument ignores the different histories and political cultures
in Arizona and North Carolina, and puts to one side as
irrelevant the long and honorable history of third-party ballot
collection in Arizona. The argument also ignores the fact that
Arizona had long had statutes prohibiting fraudulent handling
of both unvoted and voted ballots by third parties, even
before the enactment of H.B. 2023. The actions of the North
Carolina Republican operative, if performed in Arizona,
would have been illegal under those statutes. H.B. 2023 does
not forbid fraudulent third-party ballot collection. Such fraud
is forbidden by other provisions of Arizona law. H.B. 2023
forbids non-fraudulent third-party ballot collection.
2. Rules that Are Fair on Their Face
Second, our colleague defends Arizona’s OOP policy and

H.B. 2023 as “rules that are . . . fair on their face.” Id. at 144.
The results test of Section 2 of the VRA is based on the
(113 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 113
understanding that laws that are “fair on their face” can, as in

this case, produce discriminatory results. Indeed, Congress
added the results test to the VRA precisely to address laws
that were fair on their face but whose result was unfair
discrimination.
Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023 both fail the results
test. The result of Arizona’s OOP policy is that twice as
many minority ballots as white ballots are thrown away.
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 2023, third-party ballot
collectors, acting in good faith, collected many thousands of
valid ballots cast by minority voters. White voters rarely
relied on third-party ballot collection. The result of H.B.
2023 is that many thousands of minority ballots will now not
be collected and counted, while white ballots will be largely
unaffected.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that Arizona’s OOP policy violates the results

test of Section 2. We hold that H.B. 2023 violates both the
results test and the intent test of Section 2. We hold that H.B.
2023 also violates the Fifteenth Amendment. We do not
reach Plaintiffs’ other constitutional challenges.
We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

(114 of 432)
114 DNC V. HOBBS
WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join the court’s opinion to the extent it invalidates

Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and H.B. 2023 under the
results test. I do not join the opinion’s discussion of the
intent test.
O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, with whom CLIFTON,

BYBEE, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
We have been asked to decide whether two current

Arizona election practices violate the Voting Rights Act or
the First, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.1 Based on the record before us and
1
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a State from adopting
an election practice that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in

relevant part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of
the people peaceably to assemble.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees: “No State shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV.
The Fifteenth Amendment ensures that the right “to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XV.
(115 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 115
relevant Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the

answer to such question is clear: they do not. The majority,
however, draws factual inferences that the evidence cannot
support and misreads precedent along the way. In so doing,
it impermissibly strikes down Arizona’s duly enacted policies
designed to enforce its precinct-based election system and to
regulate third-party collection of early ballots.
I respectfully dissent.
Given the abundant discussion by the district court and

the en banc majority, I offer only a brief summary of the
policies at issue here and discuss the district court’s factual
findings as pertinent to the analysis below.
Arizona offers voters several options: early mail ballot,

early in-person voting, and in-person Election Day voting.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan (“DNC”), 329 F. Supp.
3d 824, 838 (D. Ariz. 2018).
Since at least 1970, Arizona has required that in-person

voters “cast their ballots in their assigned precinct and has
enforced this system by counting only those ballots cast in the
correct precinct.” Id. at 840. A voter who arrives at a
precinct in which he or she is not listed on the register may
cast a provisional ballot, but Arizona will not count such
ballot if it determines that the voter does not live in the
(116 of 432)
116 DNC V. HOBBS
precinct in which he or she voted. Id. For shorthand, I refer

to this rule as Arizona’s “out-of-precinct” or “OOP” policy.
Most Arizona voters, however, do not vote in person on

Election Day. Id. at 845. Arizona law permits all registered
voters to vote early by mail or in person at an early voting
location in the 27 days before an election. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§§ 16-121(A), 16-541(A), 16-542(D). All Arizona counties
operate at least one location for early in person voting. DNC,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 839. Rather than voting early in person,
any voter may instead request an early ballot to be delivered
to his or her mailbox on an election-by-election or permanent
basis. Id. In 2002, Arizona became the first state to make
available an online voter registration option, which also
permits voters to enroll in permanent early voting by mail.
Id. Voters who so enroll will be sent an early ballot no later
than the first day of the 27-day early voting period. Id.
Voters may return early ballots in person at any polling place,
vote center, or authorized office without waiting in line or
may return their early ballots by mail at no cost. Id. To be
counted, however, an early ballot must be received by
7:00 p.m. on Election Day. Id.
For years, Arizona has restricted who may handle early

ballots.2 Since 1992, Arizona has prohibited anyone but the
elector himself from possessing “that elector’s unvoted
absentee ballot.” 1991 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 310, § 22 (S.B.
2
The majority’s effort to deny history can easily be dismissed. Maj.
Op. 104–105. As Judge Bybee’s dissent ably recounts, not only Arizona
but 21 other states have restricted early balloting for years. Bybee, J. Diss.
Op. 157–158.
(117 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 117
1390) (West). In 2016, Arizona enacted a parallel regulation,

H.B. 2023 (the “ballot-collection” policy), concerning the
collection of early ballots.3 DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839.
Under the ballot-collection policy, only a “family member,”
“household member,” “caregiver,” “United States postal
service worker” or other person authorized to transmit mail,
or “election official” may return another voter’s completed
early ballot. Id. at 839–40 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-
1005(H)–(I)).
In April 2016, the Democratic National Committee, the

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the
Arizona Democratic Party (together, “DNC”) sued the State
of Arizona to challenge the OOP policy and the ballot-
collection policy. The district court denied DNC’s motions
to enjoin preliminarily enforcement of both polices, and DNC
asked our court to issue injunctions pending appeal of such
denials. After expedited proceedings before three-judge and
en banc panels, our court denied the motion for an injunction
against the OOP policy but granted the parallel motion
against the ballot-collection policy. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of
State’s Office, 840 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(mem.) (per curiam); Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office
(Feldman III), 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The
Supreme Court, however, stayed our injunction against the
ballot-collection policy and the OOP and ballot-collection
policies functioned in usual fashion. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s
Office v. Feldman, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (mem.).
3
While the majority refers to the legislation as “H.B. 2023,” I prefer
to call it the ballot-collection policy by which it is commonly known and
will do so throughout the dissent.
(118 of 432)
118 DNC V. HOBBS
In 2017, the district court proceeded to the merits of

DNC’s suit. In May 2018, after a ten-day bench trial, the
district court issued a decision supported by thorough
findings of fact and conclusions of law. DNC, 329 F. Supp.
3d at 832. The district court found that DNC failed to prove
any violation of the Voting Rights Act or the United States
Constitution and issued judgment in the state’s favor. Id.
at 882–83.
DNC timely appealed, and a three-judge panel of our

court affirmed the decision of the district court in its entirety.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan (“DNC”), 904 F.3d 686
(9th Cir. 2018), vacated by order granting rehearing en banc,
911 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.). But today, the en banc
panel majority reverses the decision of the district court and
holds that the OOP and ballot-collection policies violate § 2
of the Voting Rights Act and that the ballot-collection policy
was enacted with discriminatory intent in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment.
II
The first mistake of the en banc majority is disregarding

the critical standard of review. Although the majority recites
the appropriate standard, it does not actually engage with it.4
Maj. Op. 8–9. The standard is not complex. We review de
novo the district court’s conclusions of law, but may review
4
As the majority admits, we review the district court’s “overall
finding of vote dilution” under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act only for clear
error. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (emphasis added);
Maj. Op. 8–9. The majority quotes an elaboration of this standard by the
Supreme Court in Gingles. Maj. Op. 8–9. But the Court in Gingles
actually held that the district court’s ultimate finding was not clearly
erroneous. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80.
(119 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 119
its findings of fact only for clear error. Navajo Nation v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
The majority’s disregard of such standard and, thus, our

appellate role, infects its analysis of each of DNC’s claims.
The demanding clear error standard “plainly does not entitle
a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact
simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the
case differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Rather, we may reverse a finding
only if, “although there is evidence to support it, [we are] left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). To do otherwise “oversteps the
bounds of [our] duty under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
52(a)” by “duplicat[ing] the role of the lower court.” Id.
at 573. As explained in Parts III and IV, I fail to see how on
the record before us one could be “left with a definite and
firm conviction” that the district court erred.
III
DNC first contends that Arizona’s policies violate § 2 of

the Voting Rights Act. A district court’s determination of
whether a challenged practice violates § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act is “intensely fact-based”: the court assesses the
“totality of the circumstances” and conducts “a ‘searching
practical evaluation of the past and present reality.’” Smith
v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvements & Power Dist.
(“Salt River”), 109 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986)). Thus,
“[d]eferring to the district court’s superior fact-finding
(120 of 432)
120 DNC V. HOBBS
capabilities, we review only for clear error its ultimate

finding of no § 2 violation.” Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
In relevant part, § 2 provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to

voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State . . . in a
manner which results in a denial or
abridgment of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or
color . . . .
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established

if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State . . . are not
equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (emphasis added). “The essence of a § 2

claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles,
478 U.S. at 47. To determine whether a practice violates § 2,
courts employ a two-step analysis. See Ohio Democratic
Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 637 (6th Cir. 2016); Veasey v.
Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016); Frank v. Walker,
768 F.3d 744, 754–55 (7th Cir. 2014); League of Women
(121 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 121
Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir.
2014).
The first step is asking whether the practice provides

members of a protected class “less ‘opportunity’ than others
‘to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.’” Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380, 397 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting
52 U.S.C. § 10301). In other words, the challenged practice
“must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a
protected class.” League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 240
(emphasis added). To prevail at step one, the plaintiff
therefore “must show a causal connection between the
challenged voting practice and [a] prohibited discriminatory
result.” Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (alteration in original)
(quoting Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs Voter
Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also
Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F.3d at 638. If a discriminatory
burden is established, then—and only then—do we consider
whether the burden is “caused by or linked to ‘social and
historical conditions’ that have or currently produce
discrimination against members of the protected class.”
League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 240 (quoting Gingles,
478 U.S. at 47).
The majority agrees that this two-step analysis controls

but mistakenly applies it. According to the majority, DNC
has shown that the OOP policy and the ballot-collection
policy fail at both steps—and, presumably, that the district
court clearly erred in finding otherwise. Under an
appropriately deferential analysis, however, DNC cannot
prevail even at step one: it has simply failed to show that
either policy erects a discriminatory burden.
(122 of 432)
122 DNC V. HOBBS
As to the facially neutral OOP policy, DNC argues,

erroneously, that wholly discarding, rather than partially
counting, ballots that are cast out-of-precinct violates § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act because such policy imposes a
discriminatory burden on minority voters related to Arizona’s
history of discrimination. The district court, quite properly,
found that DNC failed to carry its burden at step one—that
the practice imposes a discriminatory burden on minority
voters—for two reasons. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873.
First, the district court determined that DNC failed to

show “that the racial disparities in OOP voting are practically
significant enough to work a meaningful inequality in the
opportunities of minority voters as compared to non-minority
voters.” Id. Thus, it ruled that DNC failed to show that the
precinct-based system has a “disparate impact on the
opportunities of minority voters to elect their preferred
representatives.” Id. at 872. To the contrary, the district
court made the factual finding that out-of-precinct “ballots
represent . . . a small and ever-decreasing fraction of the
overall votes cast in any given election.” Id.
Furthermore, the district court determined that “the

burdens imposed by precinct-based voting . . . are not severe.
Precinct-based voting merely requires voters to locate and
travel to their assigned precincts, which are ordinary burdens
traditionally associated with voting.” Id. at 858. Indeed, the
numbers found by the district court support such conclusion.
Only 0.47 percent of all ballots cast in the 2012 general
election (10,979 out of 2,323,579) were not counted because
(123 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 123
they were cast out of the voter’s assigned precinct. Id. at 872.
In 2016, this fell to 0.15 percent (3,970 out of 2,661,497). Id.
And of those casting ballots in-person on Election Day,
approximately 99 percent of minority voters and 99.5 percent
of non-minority voters cast their ballots in their assigned
precincts. Id. Given that the overwhelming majority of all
voters complied with the precinct-based voting system during
the 2016 election, it is difficult to see how the district court’s
finding could be considered clearly erroneous. See also
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198
(2008) (plurality opinion) (discussing “the usual burdens of
voting”). And it further ruled that DNC “offered no evidence
of a systemic or pervasive history of minority voters being
given misinformation regarding the locations of their
assigned precincts, while non-minority voters were given
correct information” to suggest that the burden of voting in
one’s assigned precinct is more significant for minority voters
than for non-minority voters. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873.
As Judge Ikuta explained in her now-vacated majority

opinion for the three-judge panel:
If a challenged election practice is not

burdensome or the state offers easily
accessible alternative means of voting, a court
can reasonably conclude that the law does not
impair any particular group’s opportunity to
“influence the outcome of an election,” even
if the practice has a disproportionate impact
on minority voters.
DNC, 904 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted) (quoting Chisom,

501 U.S. at 397 n.24). The “bare statistic[s]” presented may
indeed show a disproportionate impact on minority voters,
(124 of 432)
124 DNC V. HOBBS
but we have held previously that such showing is not enough.

Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (“[A] bare statistical showing of
disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not satisfy
the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.” (emphasis in original)). A court
must evaluate the burden imposed by the challenged voting
practice—not merely any statistical disparity that may be
shown. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 2 in Gingles
suggests the same. There, the Court observed that “[i]t is
obvious that unless minority group members experience
substantial difficulty electing representatives of their choice,
they cannot prove that a challenged electoral mechanism
impairs their ability ‘to elect.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15
(emphasis added) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)).
Furthermore, because “[n]o state has exactly equal
registration rates, exactly equal turnout rates, and so on, at
every stage of its voting system,” it cannot be the case that
pointing to a mere statistical disparity related to a challenged
voting practice is sufficient to “dismantle” that practice.
Frank, 768 F.3d at 754; see also Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595.
The majority, however, contends that “the district court

discounted the disparate burden on the ground that there were
relatively few OOP ballots cast in relation to the total number
of ballots.” Maj. Op. 43. In the majority’s view, the district
court should have emphasized that the percentage of in-
person ballots that were cast out-of-precinct increased, thus
isolating the specific impact of the OOP policy amongst in-
person voters bound by the precinct-system requirements.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, however, the legal

review at hand does not require that we isolate the specific
challenged practice in the manner it suggests. Rather, at step
one of the § 2 inquiry, we only consider whether minority
voters “experience substantial difficulty electing
(125 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 125
representatives of their choice,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,

“based on the totality of circumstances,” 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(b).5 Although the majority would like us to believe
that the increasing percentage of in-person ballots cast out-of-
precinct demonstrates that minorities are disparately
burdened by the challenged policy, the small number of
voters who chose to vote in-person and the even smaller
number of such voters who fail to do so in the correct precinct
demonstrate that any minimal burden imposed by the policy
does not deprive minority voters of equal opportunities to
elect representatives of their choice. A conclusion otherwise
could not be squared with our determination that a mere
statistical showing of disproportionate impact on racial
minorities does not satisfy the challenger’s burden. See Salt
River, 109 F.3d at 595. If such statistical impact is not
sufficient, it must perforce be the case that the crucial test is
5
The majority correctly asserts that Gingles was a vote dilution not
vote denial case. However, it incorrectly claims the standard in a vote
denial case is different and, without stating such standard, it simply
concludes that the 3,709 ballots cast out of precinct in the 2016 general
election in Arizona is more than any “de minimis number” below which
there is no Section 2 violation, without ever revealing what such minimum
threshold might be. Maj. Op. 107. The majority cites League of Women
Voters, a vote denial case, to reach this conclusion. See 769 F.3d at
248–49. Yet, in that case, the Fourth Circuit relies on Gingles throughout
to determine that the same analysis applies to vote denial and vote dilution
cases. Id. at 238–40. Earlier in its opinion, the majority itself uses
Gingles as the standard for analyzing a § 2 violation in a vote denial case.
Maj. Op. 37. The distinction the majority attempts to draw fails because,
contrary to what the majority implies, “a § 2 challenge based purely on a
showing of some relevant statistical disparity between minorities and
whites, without any evidence that the challenged voting qualification
causes that disparity, will be rejected,” Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383,
495 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “[t]his
approach applies both to claims of vote denial and vote dilution.” Id. at
495 n. 32.
(126 of 432)
126 DNC V. HOBBS
the extent to which the practice burdens minority voters as

opposed to non-minority voters. But the en banc majority
offers no explanation for how or why the burden of voting in
one’s assigned precinct is severe or beyond that of the
burdens traditionally associated with voting.
The majority argues that there may be a “de minimis

number” below which no § 2 violation has occurred.6 Maj.
Op. 44. But we know from our own precedent that “a bare
statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial
minority does not satisfy the § 2 . . . inquiry.” Salt River,
109 F.3d at 595 (emphasis in original). And Chisom makes
clear that § 2 “claims must allege an abridgment of the
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of one’s choice.” 501 U.S. at 398 (emphasis
in original). As such, the inquiry must require consideration
of both the scope of the burden imposed by the particular
policy—not merely how many voters are impacted by it—and
the difficulty of accessing the political process in its entirety.
Thus, it cannot be true, as the majority suggests, that

simply showing that some number of minority voters’ ballots
were not counted as a result of an individual policy satisfies
step one of the § 2 analysis for a facially neutral policy.
Second, the district court made the factual finding that

“Arizona’s policy to not count OOP ballots is not the cause
6
As Judge Ikuta explained, “an election rule requiring voters to
identify their correct precinct in order to have their ballots counted does
not constitute a ‘disenfranchisement’ of voters.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 730
n.33; see also id. at 724 n.27.
(127 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 127
of [any identified] disparities in OOP voting.” DNC, 329 F.

Supp. 3d at 872. According to the OOP policy that is
challenged by DNC, a ballot is not counted if it is cast outside
of the voter’s assigned precinct. And the district court
pointed to several factors that result in higher rates of out-of-
precinct voting among minorities. For example, the district
court found that “high rates of residential mobility are
associated with higher rates of OOP voting,” and minorities
are more likely to move more frequently. Id. at 857, 872.
Similarly, “rates of OOP voting are higher in neighborhoods
where renters make up a larger share of householders.” Id. at
857. The precinct-system may also pose special challenges
for Native American voters, because they may “lack standard
addresses” and there may be additional “confusion about the
voter’s correct polling place” where precinct assignments
may differ from assignments for tribal elections. Id. at 873.
“Additionally”, the district court found, Arizona’s “changes
in polling locations from election to election, inconsistent
election regimes used by and within counties, and placement
of polling locations all tend to increase OOP voting rates.”
Id. at 858.
But the burden of complying with the precinct-based

system in the face of any such factors is plainly
distinguishable from the consequence imposed should a voter
fail to comply. Indeed, as the district court found, “there is
no evidence that it will be easier for voters to identify their
correct precincts if Arizona eliminated its prohibition on
counting OOP ballots.” Id. Although “the consequence of
voting OOP might make it more imperative for voters to
correctly identify their precincts,” id., such consequence does
not cause voters to cast their ballots out-of-precinct or make
it more burdensome for voters to cast their ballots in their
assigned precincts.
(128 of 432)
128 DNC V. HOBBS
The majority goes astray by failing to recognize the

distinction between the burden of complying and the
consequence of failing to do so. In fact, the majority
undercuts its own claim by citing the same host of reasons
identified by the district court as the reasons why a minority
voter is more likely to vote out-of-precinct. Maj Op. 14–19.
All the factors the majority seizes upon, however, stem from
the general requirement that a voter cast his or her ballot in
the assigned precinct—not the policy that enforces such
requirement. The importance of such distinction is made
clear by the relief that DNC seeks: DNC does not request that
Arizona be made to end its precinct-based system or to assign
its precincts differently, but instead requests that Arizona be
made to count those ballots that are not cast in compliance
with the OOP policy.7 Removing the enforcement policy,
however, would do nothing to minimize or to extinguish the
disparity that exists in out-of-precinct voting.
Consider another basic voting requirement: in order to

cast a ballot, a voter must register. If a person fails to
register, his or her vote will not count. Any discriminatory
result from such a policy would need to be addressed in a
7
The majority suggests that DNC challenges only “Arizona’s policy,
within that system, of entirely discarding OOP ballots” as opposed to
counting or partially counting them. Maj. Op. 78. But this is not a
compromise position: there is no difference between counting and
partially counting a ballot cast out-of-precinct. Counting an OOP ballot
would entail evaluating the ballot to determine on which issues the person
would have been qualified to vote in his or her assigned precinct and
discarding the person’s votes as to issues on which he or she would not
have been qualified to vote. Certainly, the majority isn’t suggesting that
a person would ever be allowed to vote on issues which he or she would
not have been eligible to vote even in the assigned precinct. It is difficult
to discern any other possible meaning for what the majority refers to as
entirely “counting” out-of-precinct ballots.
(129 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 129
challenge to that policy itself. For example, if minorities are

underrepresented as a segment of registered voters, perhaps
they could challenge some discriminatory aspect of the
registration system. But they surely could not prevail by
challenging simply the state’s enforcement of the registration
policy by refusing to count unregistered voters’ ballots.
Minorities in a jurisdiction may very well be
underrepresented as members of the registered electorate, but
the discrepancy between the protected class as a segment of
the general population and as a segment of the registered
voting population would not require that a state permit
unregistered voters to cast valid ballots on Election Day.
Similarly, the fact that a ballot cast by a voter outside of

his or her assigned precinct is discarded does not cause
minorities to vote out-of-precinct disproportionately. But
DNC does not challenge the general requirement that one
vote in his or her precinct or take issue with the assignment
of precinct locations—the very requirements that could lead
to a disproportionate impact. It may indeed be the case in a
precinct-based voting system that a state’s poor assignment
of districts, distribution of inadequate information about
voting requirements, or other factors have some material
effect on election practices such that minorities have less
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice as a result
of the system. But, in the words of the majority, DNC’s
challenge “assumes both [the] importance and [the] continued
existence” of “Arizona’s precinct-based system of voting.”
Maj. Op. 78. Instead, DNC challenges only Arizona’s
enforcement of such system. Thus, even if there were a
recognizable disparity in the opportunities of minority voters
voting out-of-precinct, it would nonetheless not be the result
of the policy at issue before us.
(130 of 432)
130 DNC V. HOBBS
I reject the suggestion implicit in the majority opinion that

any facially neutral policy which may result in some
statistical disparity is necessarily discriminatory under step
one of the § 2 inquiry. We have already held otherwise. Salt
River, 109 F.3d at 595. And the majority itself concedes that
“more than a de minimis number of minority voters must be
burdened before a Section 2 violation based on the results test
can be found.” Maj. Op. 44. Furthermore, I fail to see how
DNC—and the majority—can concede the importance and
continued existence of a precinct-based system, yet argue that
the enforcement mechanism designed to maintain such
system is impermissible.
Because DNC has failed to meet its burden under step one
of the Voting Rights Act § 2 inquiry—that the district court’s
findings were clearly erroneous—our analysis of its OOP
claim should end here.
As to the facially neutral ballot-collection policy, DNC

argues, erroneously, that it violates § 2 because there is
“extensive evidence” demonstrating that minority voters are
more likely to have used ballot-collection services and that
they would therefore be disproportionately burdened by
limitations on such services. Specifically, DNC relies on
anecdotal evidence that ballot collection has
disproportionately occurred in minority communities, that
minority voters were more likely to be without home mail
delivery or access to transportation, and that ballot-harvesting
efforts were disproportionately undertaken by the Democratic
Party in minority communities. And, DNC claims, such
(131 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 131
burden is caused by or linked to Arizona’s history of

discrimination.
The district court, quite properly, rejected such argument,

making the factual finding that DNC failed to establish at step
one that the ballot-collection policy imposed a discriminatory
burden on minority voters. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 866,
871. Once again, the question is whether such finding was
clearly erroneous. Salt River, 109 F.3d at 591.
The district court found broadly that the non-quantitative

evidence offered by DNC failed to show that the ballot-
collection policy denied minority voters of “meaningful
access to the political process.” DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d
at 871. As Judge Ikuta observed, to determine whether the
challenged policy provides minority voters “less opportunity
to elect representatives of their choice, [we] must necessarily
consider the severity and breadth of the law’s impacts on the
protected class.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 717.
But no evidence of that impact has been offered. “In fact,

no individual voter testified that [the ballot-collection
policy’s] limitations on who may collect an early ballot
would make it significantly more difficult to vote.” DNC,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 871 (emphasis added). Anecdotal
evidence of how voters have chosen to vote in the past does
not establish that voters are unable to vote in other ways or
would be burdened by having to do so. The district court
simply found that “prior to the [ballot-collection policy’s]
enactment minorities generically were more likely than non-
minorities to return their early ballots with the assistance of
third parties,” id. at 870, but, once again, the disparate impact
(132 of 432)
132 DNC V. HOBBS
of a challenged policy on minority voters is insufficient to

establish a § 2 violation, see Salt River, 109 F.3d at 594–95.
The majority simply does not address the lack of evidence

as to whether minority voters have less opportunity than non-
minority voters now that ballot collection is more limited.
Instead, the majority answers the wrong question by pointing
to minority voters’ use of ballot collection in the past. The
majority offers no record-factual support for its conclusion
that the anecdotal evidence presented demonstrates that
compliance with the ballot-collection policy imposes a
disparate burden on minority voters—a conclusion that must
be reached in order to satisfy step one of the § 2 inquiry—let
alone evidence that the district court’s contrary finding was
“clearly erroneous.”
Given the lack of any testimony in the record indicating

that the ballot-collection policy would result in minority
voters “experienc[ing] substantial difficulty electing
representatives of their choice,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,
the district court did not clearly err in finding that, “for some
voters, ballot collection is a preferred and more convenient
method of voting,” but a limitation on such practice “does not
deny minority voters meaningful access to the political
process.” DNC¸ 329 F. 3d Supp. at 871.
The district court further found that the ballot-collection

policy was unlikely to “cause a meaningful inequality in the
electoral opportunities of minorities” because only “a
relatively small number of voters have used ballot collection
services” in the past at all. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870–71.
And, the district court noted, DNC “provided no quantitative
(133 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 133
or statistical evidence comparing the proportion that is

minority versus non-minority.” Id. at 866. “Without this
information,” the district court explained, “it becomes
difficult to compare the law’s impact on different
demographic populations and to determine whether the
disparities, if any, are meaningful.” Id. at 867. Thus, from
the record, we do not know either the extent to which voters
may be burdened by the ballot-collection policy or how many
minority voters may be so burdened.
Nonetheless, the district court considered circumstantial

and anecdotal evidence offered by DNC and determined that
“the vast majority of Arizonans, minority and non-minority
alike, vote without the assistance of third-parties who would
not fall within [the ballot-collection policy’s] exceptions.”
Id. at 871. DNC—and the majority—argue that such finding
is not supported by the record, but, given the lack of
quantitative or statistical evidence before us, it is difficult to
conclude that such finding is clearly erroneous. The district
court itself noted that it could not “speak in more specific or
precise terms” given the sparsity of the record. Id. at 870.
Drawing from anecdotal testimony, the district court
estimated that fewer than 10,000 voters used ballot-collection
services in any election. Id. at 845. Drawing even “the
unjustified inference that 100,000 early mail ballots were
collected” during the 2012 general election, the district court
found that such higher total would nonetheless be “relatively
few early voters” as compared to the 1.4 million early mail
ballots returned or 2.3 million total votes cast. Id. at 845.
The majority further argues that the district court erred in
“discounting the evidence of third-party ballot collection as
merely ‘circumstantial and anecdotal’” Maj. Op. 83. But the
district court did nothing of the sort. To the contrary, the
district court considered whether the ballot-collection policy
(134 of 432)
134 DNC V. HOBBS
violated § 2 by making these estimates—and even generous

estimates—from the anecdotal evidence offered. And the
district court’s subsequent conclusion that the limitation of
third-party ballot collection would impact only a “relatively
small number of voters,” id. at 870, is clearly plausible on
this record, see Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573.
The majority also argues that the total number of votes

affected is not the relevant inquiry; the proper test is whether
the number of ballots collected by third parties surpasses any
de minimis number. Maj. Op. 84. But we already know “that
a bare statistical showing” that an election practice has a
“disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not
satisfy” step one of the § 2 inquiry. Salt River, 109 F.3d at
595 (emphasis in original). And, even if such impact were
sufficient, the record offers no evidence from which the
district court could determine the extent of the discrepancy
between minority voters as a proportion of the entire
electorate versus minority voters as a proportion of those who
have voted using ballot-collection services in the past. DNC,
329 F. Supp. 3d at 866–67.
As Judge Bybee keenly observed in a previous iteration

of this case (and indeed in his dissent in this case), “[t]here is
no constitutional or federal statutory right to vote by absentee
ballot.” Feldman III, 843 F.3d at 414 (Bybee, J., dissenting)
(citing McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi.,
394 U.S. 802, 807–08 (1969)); accord Bybee, J. Diss.
Op. 156. Both today and in the past, Arizona has chosen to
provide a wide range of options to voters. But Arizona’s
previous decision to permit a particular mechanism of voting
does not preclude Arizona from modifying its election system
(135 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 135
to limit such mechanism in the future so long as such

modification is made in a constitutional manner. And, in fact,
Arizona’s modification here was made in compliance with
“the recommendation of the bipartisan Commission on
Federal Election Reform.” DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 855.
Without any evidence in the record of the severity and
breadth of the burden imposed by this change to the ballot-
collection policy, we cannot be “left with the definite and
firm conviction” that the district court erred in finding that
DNC failed to show that the policy violated § 2. See
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573; see also Salt River, 109 F.3d
at 591.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that

DNC has satisfied its burden at step one of the § 2 Voting
Rights Act inquiry, I would not reach step two. I therefore do
not address the majority’s consideration of the so-called
“Senate Factors” in determining whether the burden is “in
part caused by or linked to ‘social and historical conditions’
that have or currently produce discrimination against
members of the protected class.” League of Women Voters,
769 F.3d at 240 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47). These
factors—and the majority’s lengthy history lesson on past
election abuses in Arizona—simply have no bearing on this
case. Indeed, pages 47 to 81 of the majority’s opinion may
properly be ignored as irrelevant.
IV
DNC also contends that the ballot-collection policy

violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States
(136 of 432)
136 DNC V. HOBBS
Constitution.8 To succeed on a claim of discriminatory intent

under the Fifteenth Amendment, the challenger must
demonstrate that the state legislature “selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979). Because discriminatory intent “is a pure question of
fact,” we again review only for clear error. Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287–88 (1982).
“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
The district court concluded that the ballot-collection

policy did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment because it
made the factual finding that the legislature “was not
motivated by a desire to suppress minority voters,” although
“some individual legislators and proponents of limitations on
ballot collection harbored partisan motives” that “did not
permeate the entire legislative process.” DNC, 329 F. Supp.
3d at 879, 882 (emphasis added). Instead, “[t]he legislature
was motivated by . . . a sincere belief that mail-in ballots
lacked adequate prophylactic safeguards as compared to in-
person voting.” Id. at 882. In analyzing DNC’s appeal from
such finding, the majority, once again, completely ignores our
demanding standard of review and instead conducts its own
8
The Fifteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce its
guarantee that the right “to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . by
appropriate legislation.” U.S. Const. amend. XV. Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act is such legislation. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536
(2013).
(137 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 137
de novo review. Maj. Op. 93. Our duty is only to consider

whether the district court clearly erred in its finding that the
ballot-collection policy was not enacted with discriminatory
intent. See Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573. And “to be
clearly erroneous, a decision must . . . strike [a court] as
wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead
fish.” Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d
500, 502 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc.
v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)).
The majority therefore fails to offer any basis—let alone

a convincing one—for the conclusion that it must reach in
order to reverse the decision of the district court: that the
district court committed clear error in its factual findings.
Given the failure of the majority to conduct its review in the
proper manner, I see no reason to engage in a line-by-line
debate with its flawed analysis. Rather, it is enough to note
two critical errors made by the majority in ignoring the
district court’s determinations that while some legislators
were motivated by partisan concerns, the legislature as a body
was motivated by a desire to enact prophylactic measures to
prevent voter fraud.
First, the majority fails to distinguish between racial

motives and partisan motives. Even when “racial
identification is highly correlated with political affiliation,”
a party challenging a legislative action nonetheless must show
that racial motives were a motivating factor behind the
challenged policy. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473
(2017) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243
(2001)). Nonetheless, the majority suggests that a legislator
motivated by partisan interest to enact a law that
(138 of 432)
138 DNC V. HOBBS
disproportionately impacts minorities must necessarily have

acted with racially discriminatory intent as well. For
example, the district court noted that Arizona State Senator
Don Shooter was, “in part motivated by a desire to eliminate
what had become an effective Democratic [Get Out The
Vote] strategy.” DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 879. The majority
simply concludes that such finding shows racially
discriminatory intent as a motivating factor. But the
majority’s unsupported inference does not satisfy the required
showing. And the majority fails to cite any evidence
demonstrating that the district court’s finding to the contrary
was not “plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety.” Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574.
Second, in defiance of Supreme Court precedent to the

contrary, the majority assumes that a legislature’s stated
desire to prevent voter fraud must be pretextual when there is
no direct evidence of voter fraud in the legislative record. In
Crawford, the Court rejected the argument that actual
evidence of voter fraud was needed to justify the State’s
decision to enact prophylactic measures to prevent such
fraud. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195–96 . There, the Court
upheld an Indiana statute requiring in-person voters to present
government-issued photo identification in the face of a
constitutional challenge. Id. at 185. Although “[t]he record
contain[ed] no evidence of [voter] fraud actually occurring in
Indiana at any time in its history,” the Supreme Court
nonetheless determined that the State had a legitimate and
important interest “in counting only the votes of eligible
voters.” Id. at 194, 196; see also id. at 195 nn.11–13 (citing
“fragrant examples of” voter fraud throughout history and in
recent years). Given its interest in addressing its valid
(139 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 139
concerns of voter fraud, Arizona was free to enact

prophylactic measures even though no evidence of actual
voter fraud was before the legislature. Yet the majority does
not even mention Crawford, let alone grapple with its
consequences on this case.
And because no evidence of actual voter fraud is required

to justify an anti-fraud prophylactic measure, the majority’s
reasoning quickly collapses. The majority cites Senator
Shooter’s “false and race-based allegations” and the “LaFaro
video,” which the district court explained “showed
surveillance footage of a man of apparent Hispanic heritage
appearing to deliver early ballots” and “contained a narration
of [i]nnuendos of illegality . . . [and] racially tinged and
inaccurate commentary by . . . LaFaro.” DNC, 329 F. Supp.
3d at 876 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
The majority contends that although “some members of the
legislature who voted for H.B. 2023 had a sincere, though
mistaken, non-race-based belief that there had been fraud in
third-party ballot collection, and that the problem needed to
be addressed,” a discriminatory purpose may be attributable
to all of them as a matter of law because any sincere belief
was “created by Senator Shooter’s false allegations and the
‘racially tinged’ LaFaro video.” Maj. Op. 99. The majority
claims that these legislators were used as “cat’s paws” to
“serve the discriminatory purposes of Senator Shooter,
Republican Chair LaFaro, and their allies.” Maj. Op. 100.
Yet, the majority’s reliance on such employment
discrimination doctrine is misplaced because, unlike
employers whose decision may be tainted by the
discriminatory motives of a supervisor, each legislator is an
independent actor, and bias of some cannot be attributed to all
members. The very fact that some members had a sincere
belief that voter fraud needed to be addressed is enough to
(140 of 432)
140 DNC V. HOBBS
rebut the majority’s conclusion. To the contrary, the

underlying allegations of voter fraud did not need to be true
in order to justify the “legitimacy or importance of the State’s
interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters.”
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196. And the majority provides no
support for its inference of pretext where there is a sincere
and legitimate interest in addressing a valid concern. Maj.
Op. at 97–100. Instead, the majority accepts the district
court’s finding that some legislators “had a sincere, non-race-
based belief that there was fraud” that needed to be
addressed. Nevertheless, unable to locate any discriminatory
purpose, it simply attributes one to them using the
inapplicable “cat’s paw doctrine.” Maj. Op. 99. Such
argument demonstrates the extraordinary leap in logic the
majority must make in order to justify its conclusion.
Let me restate the obvious: we may reverse the district

court’s intensely factual determination as to discriminatory
intent only if we determine that such finding was clearly
erroneous. Thus, even if the majority disagrees with the
district court’s finding, it must demonstrate that the evidence
was not “plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety.” Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574. Perhaps if the
majority had reminded itself of our appellate standard, it
would not have simply re-weighed the same evidence
considered by the district court to arrive at its own findings
on appeal.
The district court properly determined that neither

Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor its ballot-collection
policy violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth
(141 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 141
Amendment to the Constitution.9 In concluding otherwise,

the majority misperceives the inquiry before us and fails to
narrow the scope of its review, instead insisting on acting as
a de novo trial court. That, of course, is not our role.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the district court

and must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
BYBEE, Circuit Judge, with whom O’SCANNLAIN,

CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting:
The right to vote is the most fundamental of our political

rights and the basis for our representative democracy. “No
right is more precious” because it is a meta-right: it is the
means by which we select “those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live.” Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). “Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Id. Almost as
fundamental as the right to vote is the need for the electorate
to have confidence in the rules by which elections are
conducted.
9
Because the majority concludes that the OOP policy and the ballot-
collection policy violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, it does not reach DNC’s
claim that such policies also violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. I will not belabor such claims here; for
these purposes, it is sufficient to say that—for many of the reasons and
based on much of the evidence cited above—I would also conclude that
neither practice violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
(142 of 432)
142 DNC V. HOBBS
I write separately to make a simple point: The Arizona

rules challenged here are part of an “electoral process that is
necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the
democratic system.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441
(1992).1 The Constitution entrusts the “Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections” to state legislatures, subject to
laws enacted by Congress to “make or alter such
Regulations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. “‘Times, Places,
and Manner,’ . . . are ‘comprehensive words,’ which
‘embrace authority to provide a complete code for . . .
elections.’” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,
570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.
355, 366 (1932)); see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484, 2495 (2019).
“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a

substantial regulation of elections if they are
to be fair and honest and if some sort of order,
rather than chaos, is to accompany the
democratic processes.” To achieve these
necessary objectives, States have enacted
comprehensive and sometimes complex
election codes. Each provision of these
schemes, whether it governs the registration
and qualifications of voters, the selection and
eligibility of candidates, or the voting process
itself, inevitably affects—at least in some
degree—the individual’s right to vote and his
right to associate with others for political
ends. Nevertheless, the State’s important
1
I join in full Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent. I write separately to place
the majority’s decision today in context of the American democratic
tradition.
(143 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 143
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to

justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (citation

omitted) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974)).
Time, place, and manner restrictions are fundamentally

differently from provisions that affect the “Qualifications
requisite for Electors,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and state
apportionments “according to their respective Numbers,” id.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Constitution restricts with exactness the
qualifications states may require of their voters. See id.
amend. XV, § 1 (“race, color, or previous condition of
servitude”); amend. XIX (sex); amend. XXIV (“failure to pay
any poll tax or other tax”); amend. XXVI (those “eighteen
years of age or older, . . . on account of age”); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (property
ownership). Similarly, the constitutional imperative for one
person, one vote demands that apportionment be subject to
precision approaching “absolute population equality,”
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983), “as nearly as
practicable,” Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531
(1969).
Time, place, and manner restrictions stand on different

footing from status-based restraints on vote qualifications and
legislative malapportionment. State requirements respecting
when and where we vote and how ballots will be counted are
“generally-applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect
the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.”
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9. By contrast, for example,
“redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking
(144 of 432)
144 DNC V. HOBBS
in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws

district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status,
religions and political persuasion, and a variety of other
demographic factors.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646
(1993). Time, place, and manner restrictions are the rules of
the game, announced in advance, so that all voters will know
what they must do. Parties of all stripes should have an equal
interest in rules that are both fair on their face and fairly
administered.
Two such rules are challenged here: the rule about how
Arizona will count out-of-precinct votes (OOP) and the rule
about who may file another person’s absentee ballot (H.B.
2023). As rules of general applicability, they apply to all
voters, without “account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(a).2 Rather than simply recognizing that Arizona has
enacted neutral, color-blind rules, the majority has embraced
the premise that § 2 of the VRA is violated when any
minority voter appears to be adversely affected by Arizona’s
election laws. Although the majority abjures this premise for
now, claiming that it does “not need to go so far” as equating
“the case of an individually targeted single minority voter
who is denied the right to vote and the case where a facially
neutral policy affects a single voter,” Maj. Op. at 45, its
analysis necessarily rests on that premise. The majority has
2
In relevant part, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that “[n]o
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State . . . in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). A
violation of § 2(a) may be shown “based on the totality of the
circumstances . . . [if] the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State . . . are not equally open to participation by members
of a class of citizens [on account of race or color].” Id. § 10301(b).
(145 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 145
no limiting principle for identifying a de minimis effect in a

facially neutral time, place, or manner rule. The premise
finds its clearest expression in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d
224, 244 (4th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added): “[W]hat matters
for purposes of Section 2 is not how many minority voters are
being denied equal electoral opportunities but simply that
‘any’ minority voter is being denied equal electoral
opportunities.” See Maj. Op. at 41–42, 45–46, 107 (relying
on League of Women Voters). Such a premise insists on a
precision that we have never demanded before.
By contrast, the Supreme Court explained that following

City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), “Congress
substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could
be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to
establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test,’
applied . . . in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).”
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). Yet in White,
the Court made clear that it “did not hold . . . that any
deviations from absolute equality, however small, must be
justified to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid
invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause.” 412 U.S. at
763–64. Rather, the Court recognized that any rule in an
election scheme might suffer “relatively minor population
deviations . . . . ‘based on legitimate considerations incident
to the effectuation of a rational state policy.’” Id. at 764
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
A “rational state policy” surely includes the need for a

consistent, neutral set of time, place, and manner rules. The
majority’s reading of the Voting Rights Act turns § 2 into a
“one-minority-vote-veto rule” that may undo any number of
time, place, and manner rules. It is entirely results-bound, so
(146 of 432)
146 DNC V. HOBBS
much so that under the majority’s reading of the Voting

Rights Act, the same rules the majority strikes down in
Arizona may be perfectly valid in every other state, even
states within our circuit. It all depends on the numbers.
Indeed, so diaphonous is the majority’s holding, that it may
be a temporary rule for Arizona. If Arizona were to reenact
these provisions again in, say, 2024, the numbers might come
out differently and the OOP and ballot collection rules would
be lawful once again.
The two Arizona rules at issue here—OOP and H.B.

2023—are rules of general applicability, just like the rules
governing voting on the day of the election, registering with
the Secretary of State, and bringing identification with you.
Such “‘evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process itself’ are not invidious.”
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90
(2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788
n.9). Both rules the majority strikes down today have widely-
held, well-recognized—even distinguished—pedigrees. As
I show in Part I, the OOP is a long-standing rule that remains
in place in a majority of American jurisdictions. The rule the
majority prefers is a minority rule in the United States and,
more importantly, disregards Arizona’s interest in
encouraging voting in local elections and, in application, may
actually disadvantage minority voters. In Part II, I
demonstrate that, although H.B. 2023 is of more recent
vintage, similar rules are in place in other American
jurisdictions, and H.R. 2023 follows carefully the
recommendation of a bi-partisan commission on the integrity
of American elections.
(147 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 147
It has long been a feature of American democracy that, on

election day, voters must vote in person at an assigned polling
venue—an election precinct.
[I]t is the well established practice in nearly

every state to divide the county or city into a
number of geographical districts for the
purpose of holding elections. Each elector is
required to vote at the polling place of his
own precinct, which by custom is ordinarily
located within the precinct, and, in cities,
within a few blocks of his residence.
Joseph P. Harris, Election Administration in the United States

206–07 (1934). Like most American jurisdictions, Arizona’s
election rules require a non-absentee voter’s personal
presence at the polling place. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-411(A)
(“The broad of supervisors of each county . . . shall establish
a convenient number of election precincts in the county and
define the boundaries of the precincts.”). The reasons for
such a venue rule are
significant and numerous: it caps the number

of voters attempting to vote in the same place
on election day; it allows each precinct ballot
to list all of the votes a citizen may cast for all
pertinent federal, state, and local elections,
referenda, initiatives, and levies; it allows
each precinct ballot to list only those votes a
citizen may cast, making ballots less
confusing; it makes it easier for election
officials to monitor votes and prevent election
(148 of 432)
148 DNC V. HOBBS
fraud; and generally puts polling places in

closer proximity to voter residences.
Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565,

569 (6th Cir. 2004).3 Precincts help to secure the orderly
administration of elections, which then assures all voters of
the integrity of the election.
Arizona’s out of precinct rule (OOP) is a standard feature

of American democracy. Under Arizona’s election code,
3
“One of the major voting innovations in certain states was the
increase in the number of polling places.” Robert J. Dinkin, Voting in
Revolutionary America: A Study of Elections in the Original Thirteen
States, 1776–1789, at 96 (1982). Among the states, New York led the
way, “enacting a law in 1778 which stated that all future elections should
be held ‘not by counties but by boroughs, towns, manors, districts, and
precincts.’” Id. at 97 (quoting Laws of New York, sess. 1, chap. 16
(1778)). In early America, polling places were located where the people
were:
voting . . . in barns, private homes, country stores, and

churches—almost anything that could separate voters
from the election officials and the ballot boxes they
tended. On the frontier, where buildings were even
harder to find, votes were sometimes cast in sodhouse
saloons, sutler stores near army forts, the front porches
of adobe houses, and temporary lean-tos thrown
together at desolate desert crossroads. In the larger
cities, fire stations, warehouses, and livery stables were
commonly used. One of the most common venues was
liquor establishments. . . . Such an arrangement made
an election noisy and, sometimes, violent.
Richard Franklin Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth

Century 9 (2004).
(149 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 149
“[n]o person shall be permitted to vote unless such person’s

name appears as a qualified elector in both the general county
register and in the precinct register.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-
122. The election code provides extensive instructions for
electors who have changed their residence or whose name
does not appear on the precinct register; if there is any
question of the elector’s eligibility to vote in that precinct,
Arizona authorizes the filing of a provisional ballot. See, e.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-135, 16-583, 16-584, 16-592.
There is nothing unusual about Arizona’s OOP rule.4

Although there are variations in the way the rule is
formulated, by my count, twenty-six states, the District of
Columbia, and three U.S. territories disqualify ballots cast in
the wrong precinct.5 These states represent every region of
the country: The Northeast (Connecticut, Vermont), the mid-
Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, West Virginia), the
4
For many years, a voter was not even permitted to cast a provisional
ballot in a precinct other than her own. See Harris, Election
Administration in the United States, at 287–88. The Help America Vote
Act (HAVA) now requires states to permit voters to cast a provisional
ballot. 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a). HAVA, however, does not affect a state’s
rules about how to process a provisional ballot. It does provide that states
must create a toll-free number that “any individual who casts a provisional
ballot may access to discover whether the vote of that individual was
counted, and, if the vote was not counted, the reasons that the vote was not
counted.” 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(5)(B); see Blackwell, 387 F.3d at 576
(“HAVA is quintessentially about being able to cast a provisional
ballot. . . . [B]ut the ultimate legality of the vote cast provisionally is
generally a matter of state law.”).
5
I have listed all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and U.S.
territories, with relevant citations to their treatment of out of precinct
votes, in Appendix A. In Appendix B, I have categorized the jurisdictions
by rule.
(150 of 432)
150 DNC V. HOBBS
South (Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, South

Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Virgin Islands), the mid-West
(Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Wisconsin), the Southwest (Arizona, Oklahoma,
Texas), the Mountain States (Montana, Wyoming), and the
West (American Samoa, Hawaii, Nevada, Northern Mariana
Islands). Twenty states and two territories will count out of
precinct ballots, although the states are not uniform in what
they will count.6 They also represent a broad spectrum of the
country: The Northeast (Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
Rhode Island), the mid-Atlantic (Maryland, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania), the South (Arkansas, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Georgia, Puerto Rico), the mid-West (Ohio,
Kansas), the Southwest (New Mexico), the Mountain States
(Colorado, Utah), and the West (Alaska, California, Guam,
Oregon, Washington).7
Nowhere in its discussion of the “totality of the

circumstances” has the majority considered that Arizona’s
OOP provision is a widely held time, place, or manner rule.
It is not a redistricting plan, see Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455 (2017); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); a
multimember district, see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380
(1991); Gingles, 478 U.S. 30; or an at-large system, see
6
For example, five states will count an out-of-precinct vote, but only
if the ballot is filed in the voter’s county (Kansas, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Utah) or town (Massachusetts). Louisiana and Rhode
Island will only count votes for federal office. Puerto Rico will count only
votes for Governor and Resident Commissioner.
7
Four states (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota) are
not accounted for in either list because they allow same-day registration
and do not use provisional ballots.
(151 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 151
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Those

“circumstances” are as unique as a fingerprint, subject to
manipulation, and require “an intensely local appraisal” of the
state’s plan. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Arizona’s OOP applies
statewide; it is not a unique rule, but a traditional rule,
common to the majority of American states. The OOP rule,
as a rule of general applicability, is part of a “political
process[] . . . equally open to participation” by all Arizona
voters. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
The majority asserts that “counting or partially counting

OOP ballots would [not] threaten the integrity of Arizona’s
precinct-based system.” Maj. Op. at 78. Effectively, the
majority holds that Arizona must abandon its traditional
polling venue rules and accept the ballots of voters who cast
their ballot in the wrong precinct, at least for national and
state-wide offices. Id. at 76–78 (citing the rules of California,
Utah, and New Mexico as an example of states partially
counting OOP ballots). Under the majority’s preferred
scheme, Arizona must count all votes for offices that are not
precinct dependent. As to the remainder of the ballot,
Arizona may—in accordance with its traditional rule—
disqualify the ballot for all offices for which the political
geography of the precinct matters. The majority has failed to
take into account that the rule it prefers has its own
consequences, including adverse consequences for minority
voters.
Let’s review an example to consider the unintended

consequences of the majority’s haste. Under Arizona’s
traditional rules, the state would disqualify the ballot of a
(152 of 432)
152 DNC V. HOBBS
voter from Tucson who votes in any precinct other than his
assigned precinct. Under the majority’s new rule, a voter
from Tucson may cross precinct lines and vote in any precinct
in Arizona—for instance, in Phoenix. His cross-precinct
ballot will be counted for those offices which are common to
ballots in his precinct-in-law in Tucson and his new precinct-
in-fact in Phoenix—such offices would include the
presidency, the U.S. Senate, and any statewide offices. His
ballot will be disqualified, however, for all state and local
offices defined by geographic boundaries that are not
common to the two precincts—for example, the U.S. House
of Representatives, the state legislature, and municipal offices
such as mayor, city council, and school board.
The majority’s rule will skew future elections in Arizona

in two predictable ways. First, it overvalues national
elections. Ballots for the presidency, the U.S. Senate, and
any state offices that would otherwise be disqualified must be
counted. Voters—whether intentionally or carelessly—may
vote with impunity in the wrong precinct, knowing that their
vote will count for the national and statewide offices.
Second, it undervalues local elections. Those same

ballots will not be counted toward those federal, state, and
local offices that are defined by geographic boundaries and
for which the voters from the outside precinct are not eligible.
Non-conscientious voters—voters who care more about a
national or a statewide race than the local races—are
permitted to vote wherever they please, while conscientious
voters—those concerned with all the offices on the
ballot—are burdened by the requirement that they find their
way to their proper precinct. And if the conscientious voter
can’t get to the polling place on time, he will have cast no
ballot for any office, national, state, or local.
(153 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 153
The net result is that the majority has lowered the cost to
voters of determining where they are supposed to vote, but
only as to presidential, U.S. Senate, and statewide races. As
the majority no doubt intends, persons who didn’t know or
were confused about their polling place will have their vote
counted, but only in select races. But as the majority may not
have thought through, anyone in Arizona, including people
who know where they are supposed to vote in an election (but
for one reason or another would not have otherwise voted
because it was inconvenient or impossible to vote at their
home precinct), will also be able to vote—but again, only in
select races. Arizona can thus expect more votes in the
presidential, senatorial, and state races than would be cast
under its traditional rules. I suppose that in theory that’s a
good thing. What the majority has not counted on is the
effect its order will have on the races that depend on
geographic boundaries within Arizona: congressional, state-
legislative, and local offices. When voters do not go to their
local precincts to vote, they cannot vote in those races.
Voters who do not take the time to determine their
appropriate precinct—for whatever reason—and vote out of
precinct have disenfranchised themselves with respect to the
local races. That’s a bad thing.
Arizona’s longstanding, neutral rule gives voters an

incentive to figure out where their polling place is, which, in
turn, encourages voters to cast ballots in national, state, and
local elections. In effect, Arizona has stapled national and
statewide elections to other state and local elections. The
opportunity to vote in any one race is the opportunity to vote
in all races. It’s strong medicine, but Arizona’s rule is a self-
protective rule; it helps encourage voting and, presumably,
interest in local elections. The majority’s preferred rule gives
voters an incentive to vote wherever it is convenient for them
(154 of 432)
154 DNC V. HOBBS
which increases the likelihood they will vote in certain

national and statewide races, but decreases the likelihood they
will vote in other state and local races. It places a burden on
voters who wish to exercise their right to vote on all matters
to which they are entitled, a burden that simply would not
exist for the less-engaged voter. The majority’s rule
contradicts our most basic principles of federalism by
deeming elections for national and statewide offices more
important than those for lesser offices.
The majority’s concern is based on the fact that voters

who vote in the wrong precinct are more likely to be
minorities. Maj. Op. at 42–44. If that fact holds true in the
future—and it may not because, as I have explained, any
voter in Arizona (including those who know where to vote)
may take advantage of the majority’s new rule—then
minority ballots will be underrepresented in the local races.
Under the majority’s preferred scheme, it is thus likely that
more minorities will fail to vote in local elections—elections
that most directly affect the daily lives of ordinary citizens,
and often provide the first platform by which citizen-
candidates, not endowed with personal wealth or name
recognition, seek on the path to obtaining higher office. In
any event, the court has just put a big thumb on the scale of
the Arizona elections—national, state, and local—with
unclear results.
These concerns are magnified when we consider the

relatively small number of OOP ballots. See Democratic
Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 873 (D. Ariz.
2018). It is more likely that these ballots would make a
difference in a local election than in a national or statewide
election. Arizona’s rule encourages its OOP voters—white,
African-American, Hispanic, or other—to vote in the correct
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DNC V. HOBBS 155
precinct. Under Arizona’s current OOP rule, a voter, having

gone to the trouble of going to a precinct to vote in person
and suffering the indignity of having to fill out a provisional
ballot, is less likely to make the same mistake the next year.8
A voter who has had a ballot disqualified is more likely to
figure out the correct precinct next time—or, better yet, sign
up for the convenience of early voting, a measure that avoids
the conundrum of OOP altogether.9 The voter who only votes
8
The Majority dismisses this point by highlighting how Arizona has
frequently changed polling places in some localities. Maj. Op. at 111
(referring to Arizona’s high rate of OOP voting). But there is no evidence
in the record that the same voters’s ballots are excluded as OOP year after
year. My point is that a voter who has had her ballot excluded as OOP is
more likely to exercise greater care in finding the right polling location
next time.
9
The Majority worries that OOP voters may never come to know that
their votes were in fact rejected and, hence, will never learn from the
situation. Maj. Op. at 110. Whatever the cause for the Majority’s
concern, Arizona’s statutory law is not to blame. Arizona law specifically
requires county recorders to establish “a method of notifying the
provisional ballot voter at no cost to the voter whether the voter’s ballot
was verified and counted and, if not counted, the reason for not counting
the ballot.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-584(F) (2019). Thus, voters should
have the opportunity to find out whether their vote was counted.
Further, to the extent that voters inadvertently vote in the wrong

precinct, that is not a failing of Arizona law. Instead, the law requires that
voters’ names be checked on the precinct register. If a voter’s name does
not appear on the register, then the address is checked to confirm that the
voter resides within that jurisdiction. Id. § 16-584(B). Once the address
is confirmed to be in the precinct or the voter affirms in writing that the
voter is eligible to vote in that jurisdiction, the voter “shall be allowed to
vote a provisional ballot.” Id. Accordingly, under Arizona law, no voter
should inadvertently vote at the wrong precinct without some indication
that something is amiss.
(156 of 432)
156 DNC V. HOBBS
where it is convenient has disenfranchised himself from local

elections.
States such as California, Utah, and New Mexico have

made the same choice the majority forces on Arizona. Those
states may or may not have made the calculus I have set out
here and they may or may not have measured the costs and
benefits of their new rule; it’s theirs to experiment with.
They may conclude that the new rule is the right one; they
may not. And if any of those states decides that the count-
the-ballots-partially rule is not the best rule, those states will
be free to adopt a different rule, including the OOP rule the
majority strikes down today. After today’s decision, Arizona
has no such recourse.
II
H.B. 2023 presents a different set of considerations.

There is no constitutional or federal statutory right to vote by
absentee ballot. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs
of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 807–08 (1969) (“It is thus not the right
to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive
absentee ballots. . . . [T]he absentee statutes, which are
designed to make voting more available to some groups who
cannot easily get to the polls, do not themselves deny . . . the
exercise of the franchise . . . .”); see also Crawford, 553 U.S.
at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“That the
State accommodates some voters by permitting (not
requiring) the casting of absentee or provisional ballots, is an
indulgence—not a constitutional imperative that falls short of
what is required.”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130
(7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the claim that there is “a blanket
right of registered voters to vote by absentee ballot” because
“it is obvious that a federal court is not going to decree
(157 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 157
weekend voting, multi-day voting, all-mail voting, or Internet

voting”).10 Nevertheless, if a state is going to offer absentee
ballots, it must do so on an equal basis. Arizona’s absentee
ballot rule, like its OOP rule, is a neutral time, place, or
manner provision to help ensure the integrity of the absentee
voting process. In fact, what is at issue here is not the right
of Arizona voters to obtain and return an absentee ballot, but
the question of who can physically return the ballot.
H.B. 2023 provides that “[a] person who knowingly

collects voted or unvoted early ballots from another person is
guilty of a class 6 felony.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-
1005(H) (codifying H.B. 2023). The law does not apply to
three classes of persons: (1) “[a]n election official,” (2) “a
United States postal service worker or any other person who
is allowed by law to transmit United States mail,” and (3) “[a]
10
“The exercise of a public franchise by proxy was illegal at common
law.” Cortlandt F. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies
129 (1893). The Colonies experimented with proxy votes, with varying
degrees of success. Proxy voting was not a success in at least one colony.
A 1683 letter to the Governor of South Carolina warned:
Wee are informed that there are many undue practices

in the choyce of members of Parlmt, and that men are
admitted to bring papers for others and put in their
votes for them, wh is utterly illegal & contrary to the
custome of Parliaments & will in time, if suffered, be
very mischeevious: you are therefore to take care that
such practices be not suffered for the future, but every
man must deliver his own vote & noe man suffered to
bring the votes of another . . . .
Id. at 139 (spelling in original) (citation omitted).

(158 of 432)
158 DNC V. HOBBS
family member, household member or caregiver of the voter.”

Id. § 16-1005(H)–(I)(2).
The Arizona provision is substantially similar to the laws

in effect in many other states. In Indiana, for example, it is a
felony for anyone to collect a voter’s absentee ballot, with
exceptions for members of the voter’s household, the voter’s
designated attorney in fact, certain election officials, and mail
carriers. Ind. Code § 3-14-2-16(4). Connecticut also restricts
ballot collection, permitting only the voter, a designee of an
ill or disabled voter, or the voter’s immediate family
members to mail or return an absentee ballot. Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 9-140b(a). New Mexico likewise permits only the
voter, a member of the voter’s immediate family, or the
voter’s caregiver to mail or return an absentee ballot. N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 1-6-10.1. At least seven other states (Georgia,
Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, and
Texas) similarly restrict who can personally deliver an
absentee ballot to a voting location. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-
385(a) (limiting who may personally deliver an absentee
ballot to designees of ill or disabled voters or family
members); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.291(2) (restricting who can
personally deliver an absentee ballot); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 293.330(4) (making it a felony for anyone other than the
voter or the voter’s family member to return an absentee
ballot); Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 14-108(C) (voter delivering a
ballot must provide proof of identity); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3509.05(A) (limiting who may personally deliver an absent
voter’s ballot); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 86.006(a) (permitting
only the voter to personally deliver the ballot).11
11
Until recently, two other states had similar provisions on the books.
California formerly limited who could return mail ballots to the voter’s
family or those living in the same household. Compare Cal. Elec. Code
(159 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 159
Other states are somewhat less restrictive than Arizona

because they permit a broader range of people to collect early
ballots from voters but restrict how many ballots any one
person can collect and return. Colorado forbids anyone from
collecting more than ten ballots. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-7.5-
107(4)(b). North Dakota prohibits anyone from collecting
more than four ballots, N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-08(1);
New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63-4(a), and Minnesota,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 203B.08 sbd. 1, three; Arkansas, Ark.
Code Ann. § 7-5-403(a)(1), Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-
943(2), and West Virginia, W. Va. Code § 3-3-5(k), two.
South Dakota prohibits anyone from collecting more than one
ballot without notifying “the person in charge of the election
of all voters for whom he is a messenger.” S.D. Codified
Laws § 12-19-2.2.
Still other states have adopted slightly different

restrictions on who may collect early ballots. California,
Maine, and North Dakota, for example, make it illegal to
collect an absentee ballot for compensation. Cal. Elec. Code
§ 3017(e)(1); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 791(2)(A)
(making it a crime to receive compensation for collecting
absentee ballots); N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-08(1)
(prohibiting a person from receiving compensation for acting
as an agent for an elector). Florida and Texas make it a crime
to receive compensation for collecting certain numbers of
§ 3017(a)(2) (West 2019), with Cal. Elec. Code § 3017(a) (West 2015).
It only amended its law in 2016. 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 820 (West).
Illinois also used to make it a felony for anyone but the voter, his or her
family, or certain licensed delivery companies to mail or deliver an
absentee ballot. 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/19-6 (1996); 10 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/29-20(4). Illinois amended that provision in 2015 to let voters
authorize others to mail or deliver their ballots. 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/19-6 (2015).
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160 DNC V. HOBBS
ballots. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.0616(2) (making it a

misdemeanor to receive compensation for collecting more
than two vote-by-mail ballots); Tex. Elec. Code Ann.
§ 86.0052(a)(1) (criminalizing compensation schemes based
on the number of ballots collected for mailing).
Some of these laws are stated as a restriction on how the

early voter may return a ballot. In those states, the voter risks
having his vote disqualified. See, e.g., Wrinn v. Dunleavy,
440 A.2d 261, 272 (Conn. 1982) (disqualifying ballots and
ordering a new primary election when an unauthorized
individual mailed absentee ballots). In other states, as in
Arizona, the statute penalizes the person collecting the ballot.
See Ind. Code Ann. § 3-14-2-16 (making it a felony
knowingly to receive a ballot from a voter); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 293.330(4) (making it a felony for unauthorized
persons to return an absentee ballot); Tex. Elec. Code Ann.
§ 86.006(f)–(g) (making it a crime for an unauthorized person
to possess an official ballot); see also Murphy v. State,
837 N.E.2d 591, 594–96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming a
denial of a motion to dismiss a charge for unauthorized
receipt of a ballot from an absentee voter); People v.
Deganutti, 810 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(affirming conviction for absentee ballot violation). In those
states, the ballot, even if collected improperly, may be valid.
See In re Election of Member of Rock Hill Bd. of Educ.,
669 N.E.2d 1116, 1122–23 (Ohio 1996) (holding that a ballot
will not be disqualified for a technical error).
(161 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 161
In sum, although states have adopted a variety of rules,

Arizona’s ballot collection rule is fully consonant with the
broad range of rules throughout the United States.12
Even more striking than the number of other states with

similar provision is that H.B. 2023 follows precisely the
recommendation of the bi-partisan Carter-Baker Commission
on Federal Election Reform.13 The Carter-Baker Commission
found:
Absentee ballots remain the largest source of

potential voter fraud. . . . Absentee balloting is
vulnerable to abuse in several ways: . . .
Citizens who vote at home, at nursing homes,
at the workplace, or in church are more
susceptible to pressure, overt and subtle, or to
intimidation. Vote buying schemes are far
more difficult to detect when citizens vote by
mail. States therefore should reduce the risks
of fraud and abuse in absentee voting by
prohibiting “third-party” organizations,
12
For context, Appendix C provides the relevant provisions of the
laws from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories
regarding the collection and mailing of absentee ballots.
13
The Commission on Federal Election Reform was organized by
American University’s Center for Democracy and Election Management
and supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Ford
Foundation, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, and the
Omidyar Network. It was co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter
and former Secretary of State James Baker.
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162 DNC V. HOBBS
candidates, and political party activists from

handling absentee ballots.
Comm’n on Fed. Elections Reform, Building Confidence in

U.S. Elections 46 (2005) (“Building Confidence”) (footnote
omitted). The Carter-Baker Commission recommended that
“States . . . should reduce the risks of fraud and abuse in
absentee voting by prohibiting ‘third-party’ organizations,
candidates, and political party activists from handling
absentee ballots.” Id. It made a formal recommendation:
State and local jurisdictions should

prohibit a person from handling absentee
ballots other than the voter, an acknowledged
family member, the U.S. Postal Service or
other legitimate shipper, or election officials.
The practice in some states of allowing
candidates or party workers to pick up and
deliver absentee ballots should be eliminated.
Id. at 47 (Recommendation 5.2.1).
The Carter-Baker Commission recommended that states

limit the persons, other than the voter, who handle or collect
absentee ballots to three classes of persons: (1) family
members, (2) employees of the U.S. Postal Service or another
recognized shipper, and (3) election officials. H.B. 2013
allows two classes of persons to collect absentee ballots:
(1) election officials and (2) employees of the U.S. Postal
Service “or any other person who is allowed by law to
transmit United States mail.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H).
H.B. 2023 also provides that the prior restriction on collection
of ballots does not apply to “[a] family member, household
member or caregiver of the voter.” Id. § 16-1005(I)(2). With
(163 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 163
respect to election officials and mail delivery workers,

Arizona tracks exactly the recommendation from the
Commission. With respect to family, however, Arizona’s
provision is more generous than the Carter-Baker
Commission’s recommendation. Whereas the Commission
recommended that only family members be permitted to
handled a voter’s absentee ballot, Arizona expanded the class
of absentee ballot handlers to “household member[s]” and
“caregiver[s].”
I don’t see how Arizona can be said to have violated the

VRA when it followed bipartisan recommendations for
election reform in an area the Carter-Baker Commission
found to be fraught with the risk of voter fraud. Nothing
could be more damaging to confidence in our elections than
fraud at the ballot box. And there is evidence that there is
voter fraud in the collecting of absentee ballots. As the
Seventh Circuit described it: “Voting fraud is a serious
problem in U.S. elections generally . . . and it is facilitated by
absentee voting. . . . [A]bsentee voting is to voting in person
as a take-home exam is to a proctored one.” Griffin, 385 F.3d
at 1130–31; see also Wrinn, 440 A.2d at 270 (“[T]here is
considerable room for fraud in absentee voting and . . . a
failure to comply with the regulatory provision governing
absentee voting increases the opportunity for fraud.” (citation
omitted)); Qualkinbush v. Skubisz, 826 N.E.2d 1181, 1197
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“[T]he integrity of a vote is even more
susceptible to influence and manipulation when done by
absentee ballot.”); Adam Liptak, Error and Fraud at Issue as
Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2012),
(164 of 432)
164 DNC V. HOBBS
http://nyti.ms/QUbcrg (discussing a variety of problems in

states).14
Organized absentee ballot fraud of sufficient scope to

corrupt an election is no doomsday hypothetical: it happened
as recently as 2018 in North Carolina. In the state’s Ninth
Congressional District, over 282,000 voters cast ballots,
either in person or absentee. See Brief of Dan McCready at 7,
In re Investigation of Election Irregularities Affecting Ctys.
Within the 9th Cong. Dist. (N.C. State Bd. of Elections Feb.
12, 2019) [hereinafter McCready Br.]. North Carolina
permits “[a]ny qualified voter” in the state to vote by
absentee ballot. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163A-1295. However, like
Arizona, the state adheres to the Commission’s
recommendations and restricts the categories of persons who
may collect a voter’s absentee ballot. It is a Class I felony in
North Carolina for “any person except the voter’s near
relative or the voter’s verifiable legal guardian to assist the
voter to vote an absentee ballot.” Id. § 163A-1298.
In last year’s election in the Ninth Congressional District,

evidence suggested that a political activist hired by the
Republican nominee paid employees to collect absentee
ballots—possibly more than 1,000—from voters in violation
of § 163A-1298. See Indictment, State v. Dowless,
No. 19CRS001934 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 2019);
McCready Br. at app. 2–3. An employee of the suspected
14
Pressure on absentee voters has long been noted. See Harris,
Election Administration in the United States, at 302 (“The amount of
intimidation now exercised by the precinct captain in many sections of
large cities is very great; with mail voting it would be enormously
increased. The overbearing and dominant precinct captain would insist
upon seeing how each voter under obligation to him had marked his ballot,
and the voter would have no protection against such tactics.”).
(165 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 165
activist testified that she personally collected about three

dozen ballots. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 150,
In re Investigation of Election Irregularities Affecting Ctys.
Within the 9th Cong. Dist. (N.C. State Bd. of Elections Feb.
18, 2019). She also helped fill in about five or ten
incomplete, unsealed ballots in favor of Republican
candidates. Id. at 67, 99, 152–53. The ballots were kept at
the activist’s home and office for days or longer before they
were turned in. Id. at 69. A voter testified that she turned
over her blank ballot to the activist’s employees in an
unsealed envelope, trusting that the activist would make a
good decision for her. Id. at 207–08, 214–15.
This coordinated ballot fraud led the state Board of

Elections to invalidate the results of the election, which had
been decided by only 905 votes—fewer than the amount of
suspected fraudulent ballots. Order at 10, 44–45, In re
Investigation of Election Irregularities Affecting Ctys. Within
the 9th Cong. Dist. (N.C. State Bd. of Elections Mar. 13,
2019). The residents of the district—some 778,447
Americans—were thus unrepresented in the House of
Representatives for the better part of a year. Perhaps the
more devastating injury will be the damage this episode does
to North Carolinians’ confidence in their election system.
The majority acknowledges that the Democratic Party

disproportionately benefits from get-out-the-vote efforts by
collecting mail-in ballots. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 83 (quoting
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870). Further, the majority
acknowledges that Democratic activists have often led such
collection efforts. Id. Yet the experience of North Carolina
with Republican activists shows starkly the inherent danger
to allowing political operatives to conduct collections of
mail-in ballots. Arizona is well within its right to look at the
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166 DNC V. HOBBS
perils endured by its sister states and enact prophylactic

measures to curtail any similar schemes. By prohibiting
overtly political operatives and activists from playing a role
in the ballot-collection process, Arizona mitigates this risk.
And the State’s well-acknowledged past sins should not
prevent it from using every available avenue to keep safe the
public’s trust in the integrity of electoral outcomes.
Indeed, Arizona does not have to wait until it has proof

positive that its elections have been tainted by absentee ballot
fraud before it may enact neutral rules. “Legislatures . . .
should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the
electoral process with foresight rather than reactively.”
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986).
In Crawford, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the
Carter-Baker Commission:
There is no evidence of extensive fraud in

U.S. elections or of multiple voting, but both
occur, and it could affect the outcome of a
close election. The electoral system cannot
inspire public confidence if no safeguards
exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the
identity of voters.
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194 (quoting Building Confidence

at 18) (footnote omitted).
The majority today holds that, as a matter of federal law,

Arizona may not enforce a neutrally drawn statute
recommended by a bi-partisan commission criminalizing the
very conduct that produced a fraudulent outcome in a race for
Congress less than a year ago. When the Voting Rights Act
requires courts to consider the “totality of the circumstances,”
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DNC V. HOBBS 167
it is a poor understanding of the Act that would strike

common time, place, and manner restrictions designed to
build confidence in the very voting system that it now leaves
vulnerable.
III
As citizens of a democratic republic, we understand

intuitively that we have a legal right and a moral duty to cast
a ballot in free elections. The states have long had the power
to fashion the rules by which its citizens vote for their
national, state, and local officials. Once we consider that
“totality of the circumstances” must take account of long-
held, widely adopted measures, we must conclude that
Arizona’s time, place, and manner rules are well within our
American democratic-republican tradition. Nothing in the
Voting Rights Act makes “‘evenhanded restrictions that
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process’
. . . invidious.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189–90 (quoting
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9).
I would affirm the judgment of the district court, and I

respectfully dissent.
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168 DNC V. HOBBS
Appendix A
State and Territory Laws Regarding Treatment of

Out-of-Precinct Provisional Ballots
Jurisdiction Citation
Alabama Ala. Code § 17-9-10 (2019) (providing
that voters must vote in their “county
and voting place” of domicile); see also
Davis v. Bennett, 154 So. 3d 114, 131
(Ala. 2014) (affirming that Alabama
law requires voters to cast ballots at the
correct voting place).
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.20.207(b) (West
2019) (failing to list out-of-precinct
voting as grounds for rejecting a
ballot); Alaska Stat. Ann.
§ 15.20.211(a) (West 2019) (providing
that a voter may cast a vote in another
house district for statewide and federal
offices); see also Hammond v. Hickel,
588 P.2d 256, 264 (Alaska 1978)
(“There is no constitutional requirement
of precinct residency, and there is clear
statutory authorization for persons
claiming to be registered voters to vote
a questioned ballot if there is no
evidence of registration in the precinct
in which the voter seeks to vote.”).
American Am. Samoa Code Ann. § 6.0223(b)–(c)
Samoa (providing that a voter’s right to vote
may be challenged if the voter “is not
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DNC V. HOBBS 169
entitled to vote in that district” and, if

true, the ballot will be rejected).
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-584(D)–(E)
(2018) (requiring confirmation that the
voter resided in the precinct).
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-308(f) (West
2017) (requiring only that voters be
registered to vote in the state).
California Cal. Elec. Code § 14310(c)(3) (West
2019) (“The provisional ballot of a
voter who is otherwise entitled to vote
shall not be rejected because the voter
did not cast his or her ballot in the
precinct to which he or she was
assigned by the elections official.”).
Colorado 8 Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-1:17.2.9
(2019) (providing that if an elector used
the wrong ballot, then “only races and
issues for which the elector [was]
qualified to vote may be counted”).
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-232, 9-232n
(West 2019) (requiring that only
provisional ballots by applicants
eligible to vote in a given town may be
counted).
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 15,
§ 4948(h)(7)–(8) (West 2015)
(explaining that provisional ballots may
not be counted if cast by voters outside
of their election districts).
(170 of 432)
170 DNC V. HOBBS
District of D.C. Code Ann. § 1-1001.09(b)(3)

Columbia (West 2017) (providing that, aside from
those requiring accessible entrances,
“[n]o registered qualified elector of the
District may cast a vote in a precinct
that does not serve his or her current
residence”); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3,
§ 807 (2019) (stating that a provisional
ballot may be tabulated if, inter alia,
“the voter cast the Special Ballot at the
precinct in which the voter maintains
residence or at an early voting center
designated by the Board”).
Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 101.048(2)(a) (West
2019) (“The county canvassing board
shall examine each Provisional Ballot
Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation to
determine if the person voting that
ballot was entitled to vote at the
precinct where the person cast a vote in
the election . . . .”).
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-419(c)(2) (West
2019) (stating that if a voter voted in
the wrong precinct, then races for
which the voter was entitled to vote
shall be counted).
Guam 3 Guam Code Ann. § 14105(a) (2016)
(“When a provisional voter casts a
provisional ballot in the incorrect
precinct, election officials shall count
the votes on that ballot in every race for
which the voter would be entitled to
(171 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 171
vote if he or she had been in the correct

precinct.”).
Hawai‘i Haw. Code R. § 3-172-140(c)(3) (2017)
(“If [the] county clerk determines the
individual is not eligible to vote in the
precinct where the provisional ballot
was cast, the provisional ballot shall not
be counted.”).
Idaho Does not use provisional ballots
because the state allows for election-
day registration. See Idaho Code Ann.
§ 34-408A (West 2019).
Illinois 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18A-15(b)(1)
(West 2015) (explaining that a
provisional ballot is valid if, inter alia,
“the provisional voter cast the
provisional ballot in the correct
precinct”).
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 3-11.7-5-3(a) (West
2019) (providing that a ballot is invalid
and may not be counted if “the
provisional voter is not a qualified voter
of the precinct”).
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 49.9 (West 2019)
(explaining that “a person shall not vote
in any precinct but that of the person’s
residence”).
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3002(b)(3) (West
2019) (explaining that if a voter cast a
ballot for the wrong precinct, but was
(172 of 432)
172 DNC V. HOBBS
still within the same county, then votes

for which the voter was eligible will be
counted).
Kentucky 31 Ky. Admin. Regs. 6:020(14) (2019)
(“If the county board of elections
determines the individual is ineligible
to vote in the precinct in the election,
the vote shall not be counted . . . .”).
Louisiana La. Stat. Ann. § 18:556.2(F)(3)(a)–(b)
(2017) (stating that a provisional ballot
may be counted if the voter was a
registered voter in the parish and was
eligible to vote for the federal offices
cast).
Maine Me. Stat. tit. 11, § 50 (2019) (providing
that all ballots cast in Maine will be
counted so long as “challenged ballots
are insufficient in number to affect the
result of the election”).
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 11-
303(e)(2) (West 2019) (stating that if
the voter voted out of precinct, “only
the votes cast by the voter for each
candidate or question applicable to the
precinct in which the voter resides” will
get counted).
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 54, § 76C(d)
(West 2004) (“A provisional ballot cast
by a person whose name is not on the
voting list for the city or town in which
(173 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 173
they are claiming the right to vote, but

whom the city or town clerk determines
to be eligible to vote in another precinct
of the same city or town, shall be
counted in the precinct in which the
person cast the provisional ballot for all
offices for which the person is eligible
to vote.”).
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.813(1)
(West 2018) (stating that provisional
ballots may only be counted “if the
identity and residence of the elector is
established”).
Minnesota Does not use provisional ballots
because the state allows for election-
day registration. See Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 201.061 subd. 3(a) (West 2017).
Mississippi 1 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 10, Exh. A
(2019) (“Poll managers shall advise an
affidavit voter his/her ballot will not
count if he/she is voting at the wrong
polling place.”).
Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. § 115.430(2)(1) (West
2019) (explaining that ballots voted in
a polling place where the voter was not
eligible to vote will not be counted).
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 13-15-107 (West
2019) (stating that a ballot must be
rejected if the voter’s identity and
eligibility cannot be verified).
(174 of 432)
174 DNC V. HOBBS
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1002(5)(e)

(West 2019) (providing that a
provisional ballot shall not be counted
if “[t]he residence address provided on
the registration application completed
. . . is in a different county or in a
different precinct than the county or
precinct in which the voter voted”).
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293.3085 (West
2019) (“A provisional ballot must not
be counted if the county or city clerk
determines that the person who cast the
provisional ballot cast the wrong ballot
for the address at which the person
resides.”).
New Does not use provisional ballots
Hampshire because the state allows for election-
day registration. See N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 654:7-a (2017).
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:53C-17 (West
2019) (“If, for any reason, a provisional
ballot voter votes a ballot other than the
ballot for the district in which the voter
is qualified to vote, the votes for those
offices and questions for which the
voter would be otherwise qualified to
vote shall be counted. All other votes
shall be void.”).
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-25.4(F) (West
2019) (“If the voter is a registered voter
in the county but has voted on a
(175 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 175
provisional paper ballot other than the

ballot of the voter’s correct precinct,
the county canvassing board shall
ensure that only those votes for the
positions or measures for which the
voter was eligible to vote are
counted.”).
New York N.Y. Elec. Law § 9-209(2)(a)(iii)
(McKinney 2019) (“If the board of
elections determines that a person was
entitled to vote at such election, the
board shall cast and canvass such ballot
if such board finds that the voter
appeared at the correct polling place,
regardless of the fact that the voter may
have appeared in the incorrect election
district.”).
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A-
1169(a)(4) (West 2019) (“If the county
board of elections finds that an
individual voting a provisional official
ballot (i) was registered in the county as
provided in G.S. 163A-1166, (ii) voted
in the proper precinct under G.S. 163A-
841 and G.S. 163A-842, and (iii) was
otherwise eligible to vote, the
provisional official ballots shall be
counted by the county board of
elections before the canvass. Except as
provided in G.S. 163A-1184(e), if the
county board finds that an individual
voting a provisional official ballot
(176 of 432)
176 DNC V. HOBBS
(i) did not vote in the proper precinct

under G.S. 163A-841 and G.S. 163A-
842, (ii) is not registered in the county
as provided in G.S. 163A-860, or (iii) is
otherwise not eligible to vote, the ballot
shall not be counted. If a voter was
properly registered to vote in the
election by the county board, no
mistake of an election official in giving
the voter a ballot or in failing to comply
with G.S. 163A-1184 or G.S. 163A-
1142 shall serve to prevent the counting
of the vote on any ballot item the voter
was eligible by registration and
qualified by residency to vote.”).
North Dakota North Dakota does not require voters to
be registered and does not utilize
provisional ballots. See N.D. Cent.
Code Ann. § 16.1-01-04 (West 2019).
Northern 1 N. Mar. I. Code § 6215(b)–(c) (2014)
Mariana Islands (providing that a voter’s right to vote
may be challenged if the voter “is not
entitled to vote in that election district”
and, if true, the ballot will be rejected).
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.183(D)
(West 2019) (stating that under certain
circumstances, if a voter cast a ballot in
the wrong precinct due to poll-worker
error, then the votes for which the voter
would have been eligible to cast are
counted).
(177 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 177
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 7-116.1(C)

(West 2019) (“A provisional ballot
shall be counted only if it is cast in the
precinct of the voter’s residence . . . .”).
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 254.408(6) (West
2018) (explaining that provisional votes
will be counted according to whether
“the elector is qualified to vote for the
particular office or on the measure”).
Pennsylvania 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 3050(a.4)(7) (West 2012) (providing
that so long as a ballot is cast within the
voter’s county, if it is cast in the wrong
election district, then only votes which
the voter was entitled to make will be
counted).
Puerto Rico P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 16, § 4062 (2011)
(“If a voter votes in a precinct other
than the one where he/she is registered,
only the vote cast for the offices of
Governor and Resident Commissioner
shall be adjudicated during the general
canvass.”).
Rhode Island 410 R.I. Code R. § 20-00-13.7(C)(1)(b)
(2012) (stating that when a voter who
cast a provisional ballot lives outside of
the precinct, the ballot shall be marked
“Federal Offices Only” and only votes
for federal officials for whom the voter
was eligible to vote shall be counted).
(178 of 432)
178 DNC V. HOBBS
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-830 (2019) (“If

the board certifies the person
challenged is not a qualified elector of
the precinct, this certification is
considered an administrative challenge
and is clear and convincing evidence
for the meeting authority to disallow
the ballot.”).
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 12-20-5.1 (2019)
(“Prior to the official canvass, the
person in charge of the election shall
determine if the person voting by
provisional ballot was legally qualified
to vote in the precinct in which the
provisional ballot was cast.”).
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-112(a)(3)(B)(v)
(West 2018) (explaining that a ballot
shall be rejected if it is determined that
the voter should not have cast the ballot
in the precinct).
Texas Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 65.054(b)(1)
(West 2012) (stating that a provisional
ballot shall be accepted only if the voter
was qualified to cast it); see also
Morales v. Segura, No. 04-15-365,
2015 WL 8985802, at *4 (Tex. App.
Dec. 16, 2015) (upholding the rejection
of a ballot voted in the wrong precinct).
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-107(a)–(c)
(West 2019) (explaining that a ballot
voted in the wrong precinct but the
(179 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 179
right county is able to have any votes

counted for which the voter was
eligible to vote).
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2121(a) (West
2019) (explaining that a voter is
qualified to “register to vote in the town
of his or her residence”); see also id.
§ 2557(a) (stating that a provisional
ballot may be accepted once the town
clerk “determine[s] whether the
applicant meets all of the registration
eligibility requirements”).
Virgin Islands V.I. Code Ann. tit. 18, §§ 581(a), 587
(2019) (providing that voters must
reside in their election districts and that
poll workers must challenge an
individual that they believe does not
reside within the district).
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-653(B) (West
2015) (“The electoral board shall . . .
determine whether each person having
submitted such a provisional vote was
entitled to do so as a qualified voter in
the precinct in which he offered the
provisional vote.”).
Washington Wash. Admin. Code § 434-262-032
(2019) (listing situations where a ballot
must be struck and failing to provide
out-of-precinct voting as reason for
disqualifying a ballot).
(180 of 432)
180 DNC V. HOBBS
West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-1-41(d) (West

2016) (stating that poll clerks must
warn “that if the voter is casting a ballot
in the incorrect precinct, the ballot cast
may not be counted for that election”).
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 6.97(4) (West 2018)
(providing that there must be a
determination of whether the
“individual who has voted under this
section is qualified to vote in the ward
or election district where the
individual’s ballot is cast”).
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-15-105(b) (West
2019) (requiring voters to swear that
they are entitled to vote in the given
precinct).
(181 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 181
Appendix B
State and Territory Treatment of Out-of-Precinct

Provisional Ballots15
Do Not Tabulate Out-of- Tabulate Out-of-Precinct

Precinct Ballots Ballots
Alabama Alaska
American Samoa Arkansas
Arizona California
Connecticut Colorado
Delaware Georgia
District of Columbia Guam
Florida Kansas*
Hawai‘i Louisiana†
Illinois Maine
Indiana Maryland
Iowa Massachusetts*
Kentucky New Jersey
Michigan New Mexico*
15
Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Dakota are not
included because they do not use provisional ballots. See supra
Appendix A.
(182 of 432)
182 DNC V. HOBBS
Mississippi New York

Missouri North Carolina‡
Montana Ohio††
Nebraska Oregon
Nevada Pennsylvania*
Northern Mariana Islands Puerto Rico**
Oklahoma Rhode Island†
South Carolina Utah*
South Dakota Washington
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
* Requires the voter to be in the correct county, city, or

town.
† Tabulates votes for federal offices only.

(183 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 183
‡ There is some divergence among secondary sources

regarding whether North Carolina counts OOP ballots.
Compare Provisional Ballots, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures
(Oct. 15, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx, with What Is
Provisional Voting? Explained, democracy N.C.,
https://democracync.org/resources/what-is-provisional-
voting-explained (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). North Carolina
law generally disfavors counting only provisional ballots cast
within the correct precinct. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A-
1169(a)(4) (West 2019) (“[I]f the county board finds that an
individual voting a provisional official ballot (i) did not vote
in the proper precinct . . . the ballot shall not be counted.”);
see also James v. Bartlett, 607 S.E.2d 638, 642 (N.C. 2005)
(“[V]oters must cast ballots on election day in their precincts
of residence.”). Nevertheless, North Carolina law appears to
allow an OOP vote to be tabulated in very narrow
exceptions—such as election-official error. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 163A-1169(a)(4) (“If a voter was properly
registered to vote in the election by the county board, no
mistake of an election official in giving the voter a ballot or
in failing to comply with G.S. 163A-1184 or G.S. 163A-1142
shall serve to prevent the counting of the vote on any ballot
item the voter was eligible by registration and qualified by
residency to vote.”). This dissent resolves doubt in favor of
listing North Carolina as a state that counts OOP
ballots—even though its current law and practice are not
entirely clear.
†† The ballot may be counted if, among other things, the

casting of the wrong ballot was a result of poll-worker error.
Only offices for which the voter would have been eligible to
vote will be counted.
(184 of 432)
184 DNC V. HOBBS
** Only the votes for Governor and Resident

Commissioner will be canvassed.
(185 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 185
Appendix C
State and Territory Laws Regarding the

Collection of Absentee Ballots
Jurisdiction Citation
Alabama Ala. Code § 17-11-4 (2019):
An application for a voter who requires

emergency treatment by a licensed
physician within five days before an
election pursuant to Section 17-11-3
may be forwarded to the absentee
election manager by the applicant or his
or her designee.
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.20.072 (West
2019) (providing a method a personal
representative to handle and deliver
ballots for a special needs voter).
American Am. Samoa Code Ann. 6.1104(a):
Samoa
The reply envelope shall bear upon the
face thereof the name, official title, and
post office address of the Chief
Election Officer and the words
“Absentee Ballot Enclosed”. The back
of the reply envelope shall contain a
statement to be subscribed to by the
qualified elector which affirms the fact
that he is the person voting.
(186 of 432)
186 DNC V. HOBBS
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-1005(H)–(I)

(2016):
H. A person who knowingly collects

voted or unvoted early ballots from
another person is guilty of a class 6
felony. An election official, a United
States postal service worker or any
other person who is allowed by law to
transmit United States mail is deemed
not to have collected an early ballot if
the official, worker or other person is
engaged in official duties.
I. Subsection H of this section does not

apply to:
1. An election held by a special taxing

district formed pursuant to title 481 for
the purpose of protecting or providing
services to agricultural lands or crops
and that is authorized to conduct
elections pursuant to title 48.
2. A family member, household

member or caregiver of the voter. For
the purposes of this paragraph:
(a) “Caregiver” means a person who

provides medical or health care
assistance to the voter in a residence,
nursing care institution, hospice
facility, assisted living center, assisted
(187 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 187
living facility, assisted living home,

residential care institution, adult day
health care facility or adult foster care
home.
(b) “Collects” means to gain possession

or control of an early ballot.
(c) “Family member” means a person

who is related to the voter by blood,
marri age, adopt ion or legal
guardianship.
(d) “Household member” means a

person who resides at the same
residence as the voter.
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-403(a) (West
2019):
(1) A designated bearer may obtain

absentee ballots for no more than two
(2) voters per election.
(2)(A) A designated bearer shall not

have more than two (2) absentee ballots
in his or her possession at any time.
(B) If the county clerk knows or

reasonably suspects that a designated
bearer has more than two (2) absentee
ballots in his or her possession, the
county clerk shall notify the
prosecuting attorney.
(188 of 432)
188 DNC V. HOBBS
(3)(A) A designated bearer receiving an

absentee ballot from the county clerk
for a voter shall obtain the absentee
ballot directly from the county clerk
and deliver the absentee ballot directly
to the voter.
(B) A designated bearer receiving an

absentee ballot from a voter shall obtain
the absentee ballot directly from the
voter and deliver the absentee ballot
directly to the county clerk.
(4)(A) A designated bearer may deliver

to the county clerk the absentee ballots
for not more than two (2) voters.
(B) The designated bearer shall be

named on the voter statement
accompanying the absentee ballot.
California Cal. Elec. Code § 3017(a)(2) (West
2019):
A vote by mail voter who is unable to

return the ballot may designate another
person to return the ballot to the
elections official who issued the ballot,
to the precinct board at a polling place
or vote center within the state, or to a
vote by mail ballot dropoff location
within the state that is provided
pursuant to Section 3025 or 4005. The
person designated shall return the ballot
(189 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 189
in person, or put the ballot in the mail,

no later than three days after receiving
it from the voter or before the close of
the polls on election day, whichever
time period is shorter. Notwithstanding
subdivision (d), a ballot shall not be
disqualified from being counted solely
because it was returned or mailed more
than three days after the designated
person received it from the voter,
provided that the ballot is returned by
the designated person before the close
of polls on election day.
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-7.5-
107(4)(b)(I) (West 2019)
The eligible elector may:
(A) Return the marked ballot to the

county clerk and recorder or designated
election official by United States mail
or by depositing the ballot at the office
of the county clerk and recorder or
designated election official or at any
voter service and polling center, drop
box, or drop-off location designated by
the county clerk and recorder or
designated election official as specified
in the election plan filed with the
secretary of state. The ballot must be
returned in the return envelope.
(190 of 432)
190 DNC V. HOBBS
(B) Deliver the ballot to any person of

the elector’s own choice or to any duly
authorized agent of the county clerk
and recorder or designated election
official for mailing or personal
delivery; except that no person other
than a duly authorized agent of the
county clerk and recorder or designated
election official may receive more than
ten mail ballots in any election for
mailing or delivery; or
(C) Cast his or her vote in person at the

voter service and polling center.
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-140b(a)
(West 2019):
An absentee ballot shall be cast at a

primary, election or referendum only if:
(1) It is mailed by (A) the ballot
applicant, (B) a designee of a person
who applies for an absentee ballot
because of illness or physical disability,
or (C) a member of the immediate
family of an applicant who is a student,
so that it is received by the clerk of the
municipality in which the applicant is
qualified to vote not later than the close
of the polls; (2) it is returned by the
applicant in person to the clerk by the
day before a regular election, special
election or primary or prior to the
opening of the polls on the day of a
(191 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 191
referendum; (3) it is returned by a

designee of an ill or physically disabled
ballot applicant, in person, to said clerk
not later than the close of the polls on
the day of the election, primary or
referendum; (4) it is returned by a
member of the immediate family of the
absentee voter, in person, to said clerk
not later than the close of the polls on
the day of the election, primary or
referendum; (5) in the case of a
presidential or overseas ballot, it is
mailed or otherwise returned pursuant
to the provisions of section 9-158g; or
(6) it is returned with the proper
identification as required by the Help
America Vote Act, P.L. 107-252,1 as
amended from time to time, if
applicable, inserted in the outer
envelope so such identification can be
viewed without opening the inner
envelope. A person returning an
absentee ballot to the municipal clerk
pursuant to subdivision (3) or (4) of this
subsection shall present identification
and, on the outer envelope of the
absentee ballot, sign his name in the
presence of the municipal clerk, and
indicate his address, his relationship to
the voter or his position, and the date
and time of such return. As used in this
section, “immediate family” means a
dependent relative who resides in the
(192 of 432)
192 DNC V. HOBBS
individual’s household or any spouse,

child or parent of the individual.
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 5507(4) (West
2018):
The elector shall return the sealed ballot

envelope to the Department by:
a. Depositing it in a United States

postal mailbox, thereby mailing it to the
Department; or
b. Delivering it, or causing it to be

delivered, to the Department before the
polls close on the day of the election.
District of D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 722.2 (2019):
Columbia
A duly registered voter shall apply to
vote by emergency absentee ballot
according to the following procedure:
(a) The registered voter shall, by signed

affidavit on a form provided by the
Board, set forth:
(1) The reason why he or she is unable

to be present at the polls on the day of
the election; and
(2) Designate a duly registered voter to

serve as agent for the purpose of
delivering the absentee ballot to the
(193 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 193
voter, except than an officer of the

court in charge of a jury sequestered on
election day may act as agent for any
registered voter sequestered regardless
of whether the officer is a registered
voter in the District.
(b) Upon receipt of the application, the

Executive Director, or his or her
designee, if satisfied that the person
cannot, in fact, be present at the polling
place on the day of the election shall
issue to the voter, through the voter’s
duly authorized agent, an absentee
ballot which shall be marked by the
voter, placed in a sealed envelope and
returned to the Board before the close
of the polls on election day.
(c) The person designated as agent

shall, by signed affidavit on a form
prescribed by the Board, state the
following:
(1) That the ballot will be delivered by

the voter who submitted the application
for the ballot; and
(2) That the ballot shall be marked by

the voter and placed in a sealed
envelope in the agent’s presence, and
returned, under seal to the Board by the
agent.
(194 of 432)
194 DNC V. HOBBS
Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.0616 (West 2016):
(1) For purposes of this section, the

term “immediate family” means a
person’s spouse or the parent, child,
grandparent, or sibling of the person or
the person’s spouse.
(2) Any person who provides or offers

to provide, and any person who accepts,
a pecuniary or other benefit in
exchange for distributing, ordering,
requesting, collecting, delivering, or
otherwise physically possessing more
than two vote-by-mail ballots per
election in addition to his or her own
ballot or a ballot belonging to an
immediate family member, except as
provided in ss. 101.6105–101.694,
commits a misdemeanor of the first
degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-385 (West
2019):
(a) . . . Such envelope shall then be

securely sealed and the elector shall
then personally mail or personally
deliver same to the board of registrars
or absentee ballot clerk, provided that
mailing or delivery may be made by the
elector’s mother, father, grandparent,
aunt, uncle, brother, sister, spouse, son,
(195 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 195
daughter, niece, nephew, grandchild,

son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-
law, father-in-law, brother-in-law,
sister-in-law, or an individual residing
in the household of such elector. The
absentee ballot of a disabled elector
may be mailed or delivered by the
caregiver of such disabled elector,
regardless of whether such caregiver
resides in such disabled elector’s
household. The absentee ballot of an
elector who is in custody in a jail or
other detention facility may be mailed
or delivered by any employee of such
jail or facility having custody of such
elector. An elector who is confined to a
hospital on a primary or election day to
whom an absentee ballot is delivered by
the registrar or absentee ballot clerk
shall then and there vote the ballot, seal
it properly, and return it to the registrar
or absentee ballot clerk. . . .
(b) A physically disabled or illiterate

elector may receive assistance in
preparing his or her ballot from any
person of the elector’s choice other than
such elector’s employer or the agent of
such employer or an officer or agent of
such elector’s union; provided,
however, that no person whose name
appears on the ballot as a candidate at a
particular primary, election, or runoff
(196 of 432)
196 DNC V. HOBBS
nor [specified relatives of a candidate]

to any elector who is not related to such
candidate. . . . The person rendering
assistance to the elector in preparing the
ballot shall sign the oath printed on the
same envelope as the oath to be signed
by the elector. Any person who
willfully violates this subsection shall
be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be sentenced
to imprisonment for not less than one
nor more than ten years or to pay a fine
not to exceed $100,000.00, or both, for
each such violation.
Guam 3 Guam Code Ann. § 10107 (2016):
The Commission shall deliver a ballot

to any qualified elector applying in
person at the office of said
Commission; provided, however, that
such applicant shall complete and
subscribe the application heretofore
prescribed by this Chapter; provided
further, that said application shall be
made not more than thirty (30) days nor
less than one (1) day before the date of
the election for which the vote is being
cast. It is provided further, that said
ballot shall be immediately marked,
enclosed in the ballot envelope, placed
in the return envelope with the proper
affidavit enclosed, and immediately
returned to the Commission.
(197 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 197
Hawai‘i Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-9 (West

2019):
(a) The return envelope shall be:
(1) Mailed and must be received by the

clerk issuing the absentee ballot no later
than the closing hour on election day in
accordance with section 11-131; or
(2) Delivered other than by mail to the

clerk issuing the absentee ballot, or to a
voter service center no later than the
closing hour on election day in
accordance with section 11-131.
(b) Upon receipt of the return envelope

from any person voting under this
chapter, the clerk may prepare the
ballots for counting pursuant to this
section and section 15-10.
(c) Before opening the return and ballot

envelopes and counting the ballots, the
return envelopes shall be checked for
the following:
(1) Signature on the affirmation

statement;
(198 of 432)
198 DNC V. HOBBS
(2) Whether the signature corresponds

with the absentee request or register as
prescribed in the rules adopted by the
chief election officer; and
(3) Whether the person is a registered

voter and has complied with the
requirements of sections 11-15 and 11-
16.
(d) If any requirement listed in

subsection (c) is not met or if the return
or ballot envelope appears to be
tampered with, the clerk or the absentee
ballot team official shall mark across
the face of the envelope “invalid” and it
shall be kept in the custody of the clerk
and disposed of as prescribed for
ballots in section 11-154.
Idaho Idaho Code Ann. § 34-1005 (West
2019):
The return envelope shall be mailed or

delivered to the officer who issued the
same; provided, that an absentee ballot
must be received by the issuing officer
by 8:00 p.m. on the day of election
before such ballot may be counted.
(199 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 199
Illinois 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/19-6 (West

2015):
It shall be unlawful for any person not

the voter or a person authorized by the
voter to take the ballot and ballot
envelope of a voter for deposit into the
mail unless the ballot has been issued
pursuant to application by a physically
incapacitated elector under Section 3-3
or a hospitalized voter under Section
19-13, in which case any employee or
person under the direction of the
facility in which the elector or voter is
located may deposit the ballot and
ballot envelope into the mail. If the
voter authorized a person to deliver the
ballot to the election authority, the
voter and the person authorized to
deliver the ballot shall complete the
authorization printed on the exterior
envelope supplied by an election
authority for the return of the vote by
mail ballot.
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 3-14-2-16(4) (West
2019):
A person who knowingly does any of

the following commits a Level 6
felony: . . .
(200 of 432)
200 DNC V. HOBBS
(4) Receives from a voter a ballot

prepared by the voter for voting,
except:
(A) the inspector;
(B) a member of the precinct election

board temporarily acting for the
inspector;
(C) a member or an employee of a

county election board (acting under the
authority of the board and state law) or
an absentee voter board member acting
under IC 3-11-10; or
(D) a member of the voter’s household,

an individual designated as attorney in
fact for the voter, or an employee of:
(i) the United States Postal Service; or
(ii) a bonded courier company;
(acting in the individual’s capacity as

an employee of the United States Postal
Service or a bonded courier company)
when delivering an envelope containing
an absentee ballot under IC 3-11-10-1.
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 53.17(1) (West
2019):
(201 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 201
a. The sealed return envelope may be

delivered by the registered voter, by the
voter’s designee, or by the special
precinct election officials designated
pursuant to section 53.22, subsection 2,
to the commissioner’s office no later
than the time the polls are closed on
election day. However, if delivered by
the voter’s designee, the envelope shall
be delivered within seventy-two hours
of retrieving it from the voter or before
the closing of the polls on election day,
whichever is earlier.
b. The sealed return envelope may be

mailed to the commissioner by the
registered voter or by the voter’s
designee. If mailed by the voter’s
designee, the envelope must be mailed
within seventy-two hours of retrieving
it from the voter or within time to be
postmarked or, if applicable, to have
the postal service barcode traced to a
date of entry into the federal mail
system not later than the day before the
election, as provided in section 53.17A,
whichever is earlier.
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1221 (West 2019):
After such voter has marked the official

federal services absentee ballot, he or
she shall place it in the official ballot
envelope and secretly seal the same.
(202 of 432)
202 DNC V. HOBBS
Such voter shall then fill out in full the

form printed upon the official ballot
envelope and sign the same. Such ballot
envelope shall then be placed in the
envelope provided for such purpose and
mailed by the voter to the county
election officer of the county of the
voter’s residence.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1124(d) (West

2019):
Any voted ballot may be transmitted to

the county election officer by the voter
or by another person designated in
writing by the voter, except if the voter
has a disability preventing the voter
from writing and signing a statement,
the written and signed statement
required by subsection (e) shall be
sufficient.
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.086(1) (West
2019):
The voter returning his absentee ballot

by mail shall mark his ballot, seal it in
the inner envelope and then in the outer
envelope, and mail it to the county
clerk as shall be provided by this
chapter. The voter shall sign the
detachable flap and the outer envelope
in order to validate the ballot. A person
having power of attorney for the voter
(203 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 203
and who signs the detachable flap and

outer envelope for the voter shall
complete the voter assistance form as
required by KRS 117.255. The
signatures of two (2) witnesses are
required if the voter signs the form with
the use of a mark instead of the voter’s
signature. A resident of Kentucky who
is a covered voter as defined in KRS
117A.010 who has received an absentee
ballot transmitted by facsimile machine
or by means of the electronic
transmission system established under
KRS 117A.030(4) shall transmit the
voted ballot to the county clerk by mail
only, conforming with ballot security
requirements that may be promulgated
by the state board by administrative
regulation. In order to be counted, the
ballots shall be received by the clerk by
at least the time established by the
election laws generally for the closing
of the polls, which time shall not
include the extra hour during which
those voters may vote who were
waiting in line to vote at the scheduled
poll closing time.
Louisiana La. Stat. Ann. § 18:1308(B) (2017):
The ballot shall be marked as provided

in R.S. 18:1310 and returned to the
registrar by the United States Postal
Service, a commercial courier, or hand
(204 of 432)
204 DNC V. HOBBS
delivery. If delivered by other than the

voter, a commercial courier, or the
United States Postal Service, the
registrar shall require that the person
making such delivery sign a statement,
prepared by the secretary of state,
certifying that he has the authorization
and consent of the voter to hand deliver
the marked ballot. For purposes of this
Subsection, “commercial courier” shall
have the same meaning as provided in
R.S. 13:3204(D). No person except the
immediate family of the voter, as
defined in this Code, shall hand deliver
more than one marked ballot to the
registrar.
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A,
§ 791(2)(A) (2009):
A person commits a Class D crime if

that person [d]elivers, receives, accepts,
notarizes or witnesses an absentee
ballot for any compensation. This
paragraph does not apply to a
governmental employee handling
ballots in the course of that employee’s
official duties or a person who handles
absentee ballots before the unvoted
ballots are delivered to the municipality
or after the voted ballots are returned to
the clerk.
(205 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 205
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9-307

(West 2019):
(a) A qualified applicant may designate

a duly authorized agent to pick up and
deliver an absentee ballot under this
subtitle.
(b) An agent of the voter under this

section:
(1) must be at least 18 years old;
(2) may not be a candidate on that

ballot;
(3) shall be designated in a writing

signed by the voter under penalty of
perjury; and
(4) shall execute an affidavit under

penalty of perjury that the ballot was:
(i) delivered to the voter who submitted

the application;
(ii) marked and placed in an envelope

by the voter, or with assistance as
allowed by regulation, in the agent’s
presence; and
(iii) returned to the local board by the

agent.
(206 of 432)
206 DNC V. HOBBS
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 54, § 92(a)

(West 2019):
A voter who receives the ballot by mail,

as provided in subsection (a) of section
ninety-one B, may return it by mail to
the city or town clerk in the envelope
provided pursuant to subsection (d) of
section eighty-seven, or such voter or a
family member may deliver it in
person to the office of the city or town
clerk. A voter to whom a ballot was
delivered in person at the office of the
clerk as provided in said subsection (a)
of said section ninety-one B shall return
it without removing the ballot from
such office.
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.764a
(West 2019):
Step 5. Deliver the return envelope by

1 of the following methods:
(a) Place the necessary postage upon

the return envelope and deposit it in the
United States mail or with another
public postal service, express mail
service, parcel post service, or common
carrier.
(b) Deliver the envelope personally to

the office of the clerk, to the clerk, or to
an authorized assistant of the clerk.
(207 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 207
(c) In either (a) or (b), a member of the

immediate family of the voter including
a father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-
in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, grandparent, or
grandchild or a person residing in the
voter’s household may mail or deliver
a ballot to the clerk for the voter.
(d) You may request by telephone that

the clerk who issued the ballot provide
assistance in returning the ballot. The
clerk is required to provide assistance if
you are unable to return your absent
voter ballot as specified in (a), (b), or
(c) above, if it is before 5 p.m. on the
Friday immediately preceding the
election, and if you are asking the clerk
to pickup the absent voter ballot within
the jurisdictional limits of the city,
township, or village in which you are
registered. Your absent voter ballot will
then be picked up by the clerk or an
election assistant sent by the clerk. All
persons authorized to pick up absent
voter ballots are required to carry
credentials issued by the clerk. If using
this absent voter ballot return method,
do not give your ballot to anyone until
you have checked their credentials. . . .
(208 of 432)
208 DNC V. HOBBS
All of the following actions are

violations of the Michigan election law
and are illegal in this state: . . . .
(4) For a person other than those listed

in these instructions to return, offer to
return, agree to return, or solicit to
return an absent voter ballot to the
clerk.
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 203B.08 subd. 1
(West 2015):
The voter may designate an agent to

deliver in person the sealed absentee
ballot return envelope to the county
auditor or municipal clerk or to deposit
the return envelope in the mail. An
agent may deliver or mail the return
envelopes of not more than three voters
in any election. Any person designated
as an agent who tampers with either the
return envelope or the voted ballots or
does not immediately mail or deliver
the return envelope to the county
auditor or municipal clerk is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-631(f) (West
2019):
Any voter casting an absentee ballot

who declares that he or she requires
assistance to vote by reason of
(209 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 209
blindness, temporary or permanent

physical disability or inability to read or
write, shall be entitled to receive
assistance in the marking of his or her
absentee ballot and in completing the
affidavit on the absentee ballot
envelope. The voter may be given
assistance by anyone of the voter’s
choice other than a candidate whose
name appears on the absentee ballot
being marked, the spouse, parent or
child of a candidate whose name
appears on the absentee ballot being
marked or the voter’s employer, an
agent of that employer or a union
representative; however, a candidate
whose name is on the ballot or the
spouse, parent or child of such
candidate may provide assistance upon
request to any voter who is related
within the first degree. In order to
ensure the integrity of the ballot, any
person who provides assistance to an
absentee voter shall be required to sign
and complete the “Certificate of Person
Providing Voter Assistance” on the
absentee ballot envelope.
Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. § 115.291(2) (West
2018):
Except as provided in subsection 4 of

this section, each absentee ballot that is
not cast by the voter in person in the
(210 of 432)
210 DNC V. HOBBS
office of the election authority shall be

returned to the election authority in the
ballot envelope and shall only be
returned by the voter in person, or in
person by a relative of the voter who is
within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity, by mail or
registered carrier or by a team of
deputy election authorities; except that
covered voters, when sent from a
location determined by the secretary of
state to be inaccessible on election day,
shall be allowed to return their absentee
ballots cast by use of facsimile
transmission or under a program
approved by the Department of Defense
for electronic transmission of election
materials.
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-201 (West
2019):
(1) A legally registered elector or

provisionally registered elector is
entitled to vote by absentee ballot as
provided for in this part.
(2) The elector may vote absentee by:
(a) marking the ballot in the manner

specified;
(211 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 211
(b) placing the marked ballot in the

secrecy envelope, free of any
identifying marks;
(c) placing the secrecy envelope

containing one ballot for each election
being held in the signature envelope;
(d) executing the affirmation printed on

the signature envelope; and
(e) returning the signature envelope

with all appropriate enclosures by
regular mail, postage paid, or by
delivering it to:
(i) the election office;
(ii) a polling place within the elector’s

county;
(iii) pursuant to 13-13-229, the absentee

election board or an authorized election
official; or
(iv) in a mail ballot election held

pursuant to Title 13, chapter 19, a
designated place of deposit within the
elector’s county.
(3) Except as provided in 13-21-206

and 13-21-226, in order for the ballot to
be counted, each elector shall return it
(212 of 432)
212 DNC V. HOBBS
in a manner that ensures the ballot is

received prior to 8 p.m. on election day.
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-943(2) (West
2019):
A candidate for office at such election

and any person serving on a campaign
committee for such a candidate shall
not act as an agent for any registered
voter requesting a ballot pursuant to
this section unless such person is a
member of the registered voter’s
family. No person shall act as agent for
more than two registered voters in any
election.
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293.330(4)
(West 2017):
[I]t is unlawful for any person to return

an absent ballot other than the voter
who requested the absent ballot or, at
the request of the voter, a member of
the voter’s family. A person who
returns an absent ballot and who is a
member of the family of the voter who
requested the absent ballot shall, under
penalty of perjury, indicate on a form
prescribed by the county clerk that the
person is a member of the family of the
voter who requested the absent ballot
and that the voter requested that the
person return the absent ballot. A
(213 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 213
person who violates the provisions of

this subsection is guilty of a category E
felony . . . .
New New Hampshire recently enacted
Hampshire legislation adding greater specificity to
is provision governing the delivery of
absentee ballots—N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 657:17. The new statute will read:
I. . . . . The voter or the person assisting

a blind voter or voter with a disability
shall then endorse on the outer
envelope the voter’s name, address, and
voting place. The absentee ballot shall
be delivered to the city or town clerk
from whom it was received in one of
the following ways:
(a) The voter or the voter’s delivery

agent may personally deliver the
envelope; or
(b) The voter or the person assisting the

blind voter or voter with a disability
may mail the envelope to the city or
town clerk, with postage affixed.
II. As used in this section, “delivery

agent” means:
(214 of 432)
214 DNC V. HOBBS
(a) The voter’s spouse, parent, sibling,

child, grandchild, father-in-law,
mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-
law, stepparent, stepchild; or
(b) If the voter is a resident of a nursing

home as defined in RSA 151–A:1, IV,
the nursing home administrator,
licensed pursuant to RSA 151–A:2, or
a nursing home staff member
designated in writing by the
administrator to deliver ballots; or
(c) If the voter is a resident of a

residential care facility licensed
pursuant to RSA 151:2, I(e) and
described in RSA 151:9, VII(a)(1) and
(2), the residential care facility
administrator, or a residential care
facility staff member designated in
writing by the administrator to deliver
ballots; or
(d) A person assisting a blind voter or a

voter with a disability who has signed a
statement on the affidavit envelope
acknowledging the assistance.
III. The city or town clerk, or ward

clerk on election day at the polls, shall
not accept an absentee ballot from a
delivery agent unless the delivery agent
completes a form provided by the
(215 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 215
secretary of state, which shall be

maintained by the city or town clerk,
and the delivery agent presents a
government-issued photo identification
or has his or her identity verified by the
city or town clerk. Absentee ballots
delivered through the mail or by the
voter’s delivery agent shall be received
by the town, city, or ward clerk no later
than 5:00 p.m. on the day of the
election. A delivery agent who is
assisting a voter who is blind or who
has a disability pursuant to this section
may not personally deliver more than 4
absentee ballots in any election, unless
the delivery agent is a nursing home or
residential care facility administrator,
an administrator designee, or a family
member, each as authorized by this
section.
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63-4(a) (West
2015):
A qualified voter is entitled to apply for

and obtain a mail-in ballot by
authorized messenger, who shall be so
designated over the signature of the
voter and whose printed name and
address shall appear on the application
in the space provided. The authorized
messenger shall be a family member or
a registered voter of the county in
which the application is made and shall
(216 of 432)
216 DNC V. HOBBS
place his or her signature on the

application in the space so provided in
the presence of the county clerk or the
designee thereof. No person shall serve
as an authorized messenger or as a
bearer for more than three qualified
voters in an election. No person who is
a candidate in the election for which the
voter requests a mail-in ballot shall be
permitted to serve as an authorized
messenger or bearer. The authorized
messenger shall show a photo
identification card to the county clerk,
or the designee thereof, at the time the
messenger submits the application
form. The county clerk or the designee
thereof shall authenticate the signature
of the authorized messenger in the
event such a person is other than a
family member, by comparing it with
the signature of the person appearing on
a State of New Jersey driver’s license,
or other identification issued or
recognized as official by the federal
government, the State, or any of its
political subdivisions, providing the
identification carries the full address
and signature of the person. After the
authentication of the signature on the
application, the county clerk or the
designee thereof is authorized to deliver
to the authorized messenger a ballot to
be delivered to the qualified voter.
(217 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 217
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-10.1 (West

2019):
A. A voter, caregiver to that voter or

member of that voter’s immediate
family may deliver that voter’s
absentee ballot to the county clerk in
person or by mail; provided that the
voter has subscribed the official
mailing envelope of the absentee ballot.
B. As used in this section, “immediate

family” means the spouse, children,
parents or siblings of a voter.
New York N.Y. Elec. Law § 8-410 (McKinney
2019):
The absentee voter shall mark an

absentee ballot as provided for paper
ballots or ballots prepared for counting
by ballot counting machines. He shall
make no mark or writing whatsoever
upon the ballot, except as above
prescribed, and shall see that it bears no
such mark or writing. He shall make no
mark or writing whatsoever on the
outside of the ballot. After marking the
ballot or ballots he shall fold each such
ballot and enclose them in the envelope
and seal the envelope. He shall then
take and subscribe the oath on the
envelope, with blanks properly filled in.
The envelope, containing the ballot or
(218 of 432)
218 DNC V. HOBBS
ballots, shall then be mailed or

delivered to the board of elections of
the county or city of his residence.
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A-
1310(b)(1) (West 2018):
All ballots issued under the provisions

of this Part and Part 2 of Article 21 of
this Chapter shall be transmitted by
mail or by commercial courier service,
at the voter’s expense, or delivered in
person, or by the voter’s near relative or
verifiable legal guardian and received
by the county board not later than 5:00
p.m. on the day of the statewide
primary or general election or county
bond election. Ballots issued under the
provisions of Part 2 of Article 21 of this
Chapter may also be electronically
transmitted.
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 16.1-07-08(1)
(West 2019):
Upon receipt of an application for an

official ballot properly filled out and
duly signed, or as soon thereafter as the
official ballot for the precinct in which
the applicant resides has been prepared,
the county auditor, city auditor, or
business manager of the school district,
as the case may be, shall send to the
absent voter by mail, at the expense of
(219 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 219
the political subdivision conducting the

election, one official ballot, or
personally deliver the ballot to the
applicant or the applicant’s agent,
which agent may not, at that time, be a
candidate for any office to be voted
upon by the absent voter. The agent
shall sign the agent’s name before
receiving the ballot and deposit with the
auditor or business manager of the
school district, as the case may be,
authorization in writing from the
applicant to receive the ballot or
according to requirements set forth for
signature by mark. The auditor or
business manager of the school district,
as the case may be, may not provide an
absent voter’s ballot to a person acting
as an agent who cannot provide a
signed, written authorization from an
applicant. No person may receive
compensation, including money, goods,
or services, for acting as an agent for an
elector, nor may a person act as an
agent for more than four electors in any
one election. A voter voting by
absentee ballot may not require the
political subdivision providing the
ballot to bear the expense of the return
postage for an absentee ballot.
(220 of 432)
220 DNC V. HOBBS
Northern 1 N. Mar. I. Code § 6212(a) (2010):

Mariana Islands
The Commission shall provide to any
registered voter entitled to vote by
absentee ballot and who applied for
one, an official ballot, a ballot
envelope, an affidavit prescribed by the
Commission, and a reply envelope. The
absentee voter shall mark the ballot in
the usual manner provided by law and
in a manner such that no other person
can know how the ballot is marked. The
absentee voter shall then deposit the
ballot in the ballot envelope and
securely seal it. The absentee voter
shall then complete and execute the
affidavit. The ballot envelope and the
affidavit shall then be enclosed and
sealed in the covering reply envelope
and mailed via standard U.S. First Class
Mail only or sent by commercial
courier service to the commission at the
expense of the voter. Such ballots and
affidavits will not be counted by the
Commission unless mailed. For the
purpose of this part, the word “mailed”
includes ballots and affidavits sent
through the postal or courier services.
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3509.05(A)
(West 2016):
The elector shall mail the identification

envelope to the director from whom it
(221 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 221
was received in the return envelope,

postage prepaid, or the elector may
personally deliver it to the director, or
the spouse of the elector, the father,
mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law,
grandfather, grandmother, brother, or
sister of the whole or half blood, or the
son, daughter, adopting parent, adopted
child, stepparent, stepchild, uncle, aunt,
nephew, or niece of the elector may
deliver it to the director.
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 14-108(C)
(West 2019):
Any voter who hand delivers his or her

ballot as provided in subsection A of
this section shall provide proof of
identity to the county election board
and shall hand deliver the ballot no
later than the end of regular business
hours on the day prior to the date of the
election. For purposes of this section,
“proof of identity” shall have the same
meaning as used in subsection A of
Section 7-114 of this title.
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 254.470(6) (West
2018):
(6)(a) Upon receipt of any ballot

described in this section, the elector
shall mark the ballot, sign the return
identification envelope supplied with
(222 of 432)
222 DNC V. HOBBS
the ballot and comply with the

instructions provided with the ballot.
(b) The elector may return the marked

ballot to the county clerk by United
States mail or by depositing the ballot
at the office of the county clerk, at any
place of deposit designated by the
county clerk or at any location
described in ORS 254.472 or 254.474.
(c) The ballot must be returned in the

return identification envelope. If the
elector returns the ballot by mail, the
elector must provide the postage.
(d) Subject to paragraph (e) of this

subsection, if a person returns a ballot
for an elector, the person shall deposit
the ballot in a manner described in
paragraph (b) of this subsection not
later than two days after receiving the
ballot.
Pennsylvania 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 3146.6(a)(1) (West 2019) (footnote
omitted):
Any elector who submits an Emergency

Application and receives an absentee
ballot in accordance with section
1302.1(a.2) or (c) shall mark the ballot
on or before eight o’clock P.M. on the
day of the primary or election. This
(223 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 223
envelope shall then be placed in the

second one, on which is printed the
form of declaration of the elector, and
the address of the elector’s county
board of election and the local election
district of the elector. The elector shall
then fill out, date and sign the
declaration printed on such envelope.
Such envelope shall then be securely
sealed and the elector shall send same
by mail, postage prepaid, except where
franked, or deliver it in person to said
county board of election.
Puerto Rico P. R. Laws Ann. tit. 16, § 4177 (2010):
Any voter entitled to vote as an

absentee voter in a specific election, as
established in § 4176 of this title, shall
cast his/her vote in accordance with the
procedure provided by the Commission
through regulations. Only those
absentee ballots sent on or before an
election, and received on or before the
last day of general canvass for that
election, shall be considered validly
cast pursuant to this Section. The
Commission shall establish through
regulations the manner in which the
mailing date of absentee ballots shall be
validated.
Rhode Island 17 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 17-20-2.1(d)
(West 2019):
(224 of 432)
224 DNC V. HOBBS
In addition to those requirements set

forth elsewhere in this chapter, a mail
ballot, in order to be valid, must have
been cast in conformance with the
following procedures:
(1) All mail ballots issued pursuant to

subdivision 17-20-2(1) shall be mailed
to the elector at the Rhode Island
address provided by the elector on the
application. In order to be valid, the
signature on all certifying envelopes
containing a voted ballot must be made
before a notary public or before two (2)
witnesses who shall set forth their
addresses on the form.
(2) All applications for mail ballots

pursuant to § 17-20-2(2) must state
under oath the name and location of the
hospital, convalescent home, nursing
home, or similar institution where the
elector is confined. All mail ballots
issued pursuant to subdivision 17-20-
2(2) shall be delivered to the elector at
the hospital, convalescent home,
nursing home, or similar institution
where the elector is confined; and the
ballots shall be voted and witnessed in
conformance with the provisions of
§ 17-20-14.
(225 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 225

subdivision 17-20-2(3) shall be mailed
to the address provided by the elector
on the application or sent to the board
of canvassers in the city or town where
the elector maintains his or her voting
residence. In order to be valid, the
signature of the elector on the certifying
envelope containing voted ballots does
not need to be notarized or witnessed.
Any voter qualified to receive a mail
ballot pursuant to subdivision 17-20-
2(3) shall also be entitled to cast a
ballot pursuant to the provisions of
United States Public Law 99-410
(“UOCAVA Act”).

subdivision 17-20-2(4) may be mailed
to the elector at the address within the
United States provided by the elector
on the application or sent to the board
of canvassers in the city or town where
the elector maintains his or her voting
residence. In order to be valid, the
signature on all certifying envelopes
containing a voted ballot must be made
before a notary public, or other person
authorized by law to administer oaths
where signed, or where the elector
voted, or before two (2) witnesses who
shall set forth their addresses on the
form. In order to be valid, all ballots
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226 DNC V. HOBBS
sent to the elector at the board of

canvassers must be voted in
conformance with the provisions of
§ 17-20-14.2.
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 7-15-385 (2019):
Upon receipt of the ballot or ballots, the

absentee ballot applicant must mark
each ballot on which he wishes to vote
and place each ballot in the single
envelope marked “Ballot Herein”
which in turn must be placed in the
return-addressed envelope. The
applicant must then return the return-
addressed envelope to the board of
voter registration and elections by mail,
by personal delivery, or by authorizing
another person to return the envelope
for him. The authorization must be
given in writing on a form prescribed
by the State Election Commission and
must be turned in to the board of voter
registration and elections at the time the
envelope is returned. The voter must
sign the form, or in the event the voter
cannot write because of a physical
handicap or illiteracy, the voter must
make his mark and have the mark
witnessed by someone designated by
the voter. The authorization must be
preserved as part of the record of the
election, and the board of voter
registration and elections must note the
(227 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 227
authorization and the name of the

authorized returnee in the record book
required by Section 7-15-330. A
candidate or a member of a candidate’s
paid campaign staff including
volunteers reimbursed for time
expended on campaign activity is not
permitted to serve as an authorized
returnee for any person unless the
person is a member of the voter’s
immediate family as defined in Section
7-15-310. The oath set forth in Section
7-15-380 must be signed and witnessed
on each returned envelope. The board
of voter registration and elections must
record in the record book required by
Section 7-15-330 the date the return-
addressed envelope with witnessed oath
and enclosed ballot or ballots is
received by the board. The board must
securely store the envelopes in a locked
box within the office of the board of
voter registration and elections.
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 12-19-2.2 (2019):
If a person is an authorized messenger

for more than one voter, he must notify
the person in charge of the election of
all voters for whom he is a messenger.
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-202(e) (West
2017):
(228 of 432)
228 DNC V. HOBBS
After receiving the absentee voting

supplies and completing the ballot, the
voter shall sign the appropriate affidavit
under penalty of perjury. The effect of
the signature is to verify the
information as true and correct and that
the voter is eligible to vote in the
election. The voter shall then mail the
ballot.
Texas Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 86.006(f) (West
2017) (footnote omitted):
A person commits an offense if the

person knowingly possesses an official
ballot or official carrier envelope
provided under this code to another.
Unless the person possessed the ballot
or carrier envelope with intent to
defraud the voter or the election
authority, this subsection does not
apply to a person who, on the date of
the offense, was:
(1) related to the voter within the

second degree by affinity or the third
degree by consanguinity, as determined
under Subchapter B, Chapter 573,
Government Code;
(2) physically living in the same

dwelling as the voter;
(229 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 229
(3) an early voting clerk or a deputy

early voting clerk;
(4) a person who possesses a ballot or

carrier envelope solely for the purpose
of lawfully assisting a voter who was
eligible for assistance under Section
86.010 and complied fully with:
(A) Section 86.010; and
(B) Section 86.0051, if assistance was

provided in order to deposit the
envelope in the mail or with a common
or contract carrier;
(5) an employee of the United States

Postal Service working in the normal
course of the employee’s authorized
duties; or
(6) a common or contract carrier

working in the normal course of the
carrier’s authorized duties if the official
ballot is sealed in an official carrier
envelope that is accompanied by an
individual delivery receipt for that
particular carrier envelope.
Texas Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 86.0052(a)(1)
(West 2013) (making it a crime if a
person “compensates another person for
depositing the carrier envelope in the
mail or with a common or contract
(230 of 432)
230 DNC V. HOBBS
carrier as provided by Section

86.0051(b), as part of any performance-
based compensation scheme based on
the number of ballots deposited or in
which another person is presented with
a quota of ballots to deposit”).
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3-306 (West
2019):
(1)(a) Except as provided by Section

20A-1-308, to vote a mail-in absentee
ballot, the absentee voter shall:
(i) complete and sign the affidavit on

the envelope;
(ii) mark the votes on the absentee

ballot;
(iii) place the voted absentee ballot in

the envelope;
(iv) securely seal the envelope; and
(v) attach postage, unless voting in

accordance with Section 20A-3-302,
and deposit the envelope in the mail or
deliver it in person to the election
officer from whom the ballot was
obtained.
(b) Except as provided by Section 20A-

1-308, to vote an absentee ballot in
(231 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 231
person at the office of the election

officer, the absent voter shall:
(i) complete and sign the affidavit on

the envelope;
(ii) mark the votes on the absent-voter

ballot;
(iii) place the voted absent-voter ballot

in the envelope;
(iv) securely seal the envelope; and
(v) give the ballot and envelope to the

election officer.
(2) Except as provided by Section 20A-

1-308, an absentee ballot is not valid
unless:
(a) in the case of an absentee ballot that

is voted in person, the ballot is:
(i) applied for and cast in person at the

office of the appropriate election officer
before 5 p.m. no later than the Tuesday
before election day; or
(ii) submitted on election day at a

polling location in the political
subdivision where the absentee voter
resides;
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232 DNC V. HOBBS
(b) in the case of an absentee ballot that

is submitted by mail, the ballot is:
(i) clearly postmarked before election

day, or otherwise clearly marked by the
post office as received by the post
office before election day; and
(ii) received in the office of the election

officer before noon on the day of the
official canvass following the election;
or
(c) in the case of a military-overseas

ballot, the ballot is submitted in
accordance with Section 20A-16-404.
(3) An absentee voter may submit a

completed absentee ballot at a polling
location in a political subdivision
holding the election, if the absentee
voter resides in the political
subdivision.
(4) An absentee voter may submit an

incomplete absentee ballot at a polling
location for the voting precinct where
the voter resides, request that the ballot
be declared spoiled, and vote in person.
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2543 (West
2019):
(233 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 233
(a) After marking the ballots and

signing the certificate on the envelope,
the early or absentee voter to whom the
same are addressed shall return the
ballots to the clerk of the town in which
he or she is a voter, in the manner
prescribed, except that in the case of a
voter to whom ballots are delivered by
justices, the ballots shall be returned to
the justices calling upon him or her, and
they shall deliver them to the town
clerk.
(b) Once an early voter absentee ballot

has been returned to the clerk in the
envelope with the signed certificate, it
shall be stored in a secure place and
shall not be returned to the voter for
any reason.
(c) If a ballot includes more than one

page, the early or absentee voter need
only return the page upon which the
voter has marked his or her vote.
(d)(1) All early voter absentee ballots

returned as follows shall be counted:
(A) by any means, to the town clerk’s

office before the close of business on
the day preceding the election;
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234 DNC V. HOBBS
(B) by mail, to the town clerk’s office

before the close of the polls on the day
of the election; and
(C) by hand delivery to the presiding

officer at the voter’s polling place.
(2) An early voter absentee ballot

returned in a manner other than those
set forth in subdivision (1) of this
subsection shall not be counted.
Virgin Islands V.I. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 665 (2018):
(a) An absentee who has received an

absentee ballot may vote by mailing or
causing to be delivered to the board of
elections for the proper election district
such ballot marked and sworn to, as
follows:
After marking the ballot, the voter shall

enclose and seal it in the envelope
provided for that purpose. He shall then
swear and subscribe to a self-
administered oath which shall be
provided to the absentee on a printed
form along with the absentee ballot and
he shall further execute the affidavit on
such envelope and shall enclose and
seal the envelope containing the ballot
in the return mailing envelope printed,
as provided in paragraph 3 of
subsection (a) of section 663 of this
(235 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 235
title, with the name and address of the

board of elections for the election
district in which he desires to vote,
endorse thereon his name and return
address, and shall then mail the
envelope, or cause it to be delivered, to
the board of elections; provided that
such envelope must be received by the
board no later than ten days after the
day of election for the absentee vote to
be counted. Absentee ballots received
from overseas in franked envelopes, or
from persons who are members of the
Uniformed Services of the United
States or a spouse of any member of the
Uniformed Services of the United
States, shall be counted if they are
received by the board no later than ten
(10) days after the day of the election.
In the case of a recount authorized by
the board, any ballot received by the
board no later than 5 p.m. the day
before the recount shall be counted.
(b) Any envelope containing an

absentee ballot mistakenly mailed by
the absentee voter to the Supervisor of
Elections contrary to the provisions of
this section shall be mailed or delivered
by the Supervisor of Elections to the
proper board of elections if it can be so
mailed or delivered by him before the
time for the closing of the polls on the
(236 of 432)
236 DNC V. HOBBS
day of election, and if the proper board

can be determined without breaking
open the inner envelope containing the
ballot.
(c) All mailing envelopes containing

absentee ballots received by a board of
elections under this section, whether
received in sufficient time for the
ballots to be counted as provided in this
chapter, or not, shall be stamped or
endorsed by a member of the board or
the clerk with the date of their receipt in
the board’s office, and, if received on
the day of election, with the actual time
of day received, and such record shall
be signed or initialed by the board
member or clerk making it.
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-707(A) (West
2019):
After the voter has marked his absentee

ballot, he shall (a) enclose the ballot in
the envelope provided for that purpose,
(b) seal the envelope, (c) fill in and sign
the statement printed on the back of the
envelope in the presence of a witness,
who shall sign the same envelope,
(d) enclose the ballot envelope and any
required assistance form within the
envelope directed to the general
registrar, and (e) seal that envelope and
mail it to the office of the general
(237 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 237
registrar or deliver it personally to the

general registrar. A voter’s failure to
provide in the statement on the back of
the envelope his full middle name or
his middle initial shall not be a material
omission, rendering his ballot void,
unless the voter failed to provide in the
statement on the back of the envelope
his full first and last name. A voter’s
failure to provide the date, or any part
of the date, including the year, on
which he signed the statement printed
on the back of the envelope shall not be
considered a material omission and
shall not render his ballot void. For
purposes of this chapter, “mail” shall
include delivery by a commercial
delivery service, but shall not include
delivery by a personal courier service
or another individual except as
provided by §§ 24.2-703.2 and 24.2-
705.
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 29A.40.091(4) (West 2019):
The voter must be instructed to either

return the ballot to the county auditor
no later than 8:00 p.m. the day of the
election or primary, or mail the ballot to
the county auditor with a postmark no
later than the day of the election or
primary. Return envelopes for all
election ballots must include prepaid
(238 of 432)
238 DNC V. HOBBS
postage. Service and overseas voters

must be provided with instructions and
a privacy sheet for returning the ballot
and signed declaration by fax or email.
A voted ballot and signed declaration
returned by fax or email must be
received by 8:00 p.m. on the day of the
election or primary.
West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-3-5(k) (West
2010):
Absentee ballots which are hand

delivered are to be accepted if they are
received by the official designated to
supervise and conduct absentee voting
no later than the day preceding the
election: Provided, That no person may
hand deliver more than two absentee
ballots in any election and any person
hand delivering an absentee ballot is
required to certify that he or she has not
examined or altered the ballot. Any
person who makes a false certification
violates the provisions of article nine of
this chapter and is subject to those
provisions.
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 6.87(4)(b) (West
2019):
The envelope shall be mailed by the

elector, or delivered in person, to the
(239 of 432)
DNC V. HOBBS 239
municipal clerk issuing the ballot or

ballots.
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-9-113 (West
2019):
Upon receipt, a qualified elector shall

mark the ballot and sign the affidavit.
The ballot shall then be sealed in the
inner ballot envelope and mailed or
delivered to the clerk.
SB1412 - 501R - I Ver
(240 of 432)
REFERENCE TITLE: early voting; revisions
State of Arizona
Senate
Fiftieth Legislature
First Regular Session
2011
SB 1412
Introduced by
Senator Shooter
AN ACT
AMENDING SECTIONS 16-542, 16-545, 16-547 AND 16-1005, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES; RELATING TO EARLY VOTING.
20
(TEXT OF BILL BEGINS ON NEXT PAGE)
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
-
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona: , No. 18
obbs
Section 1. Section 16-542, Arizona Revised HStatutes, is amended to read:
C v.
16-542. Request for ballot d in DN
cite
A. Within ninety-three days before any election called pursuant to the laws of this state, an elector may make a verbal or signed
request to the county recorder, or other officer in charge of elections for the applicable political subdivision of this state in whose
jurisdiction the elector is registered to vote, for an official early ballot. In addition to name and address, the requesting elector shall provide
the date of birth and state or country of birth or other information that if compared to the voter registration information on file would
confirm the identity of the elector. If the request indicates that the elector needs a primary election ballot and a general election ballot, the
county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall honor the request. For any partisan primary election, if the elector is not
registered as a member of a political party that is entitled to continued representation on the ballot pursuant to section 16-804, the elector
shall designate the ballot of only one of the political parties that is entitled to continued representation on the ballot and the elector may
receive and vote the ballot of only that one political party. The county recorder may establish on-site early voting locations at the
recorder's office, which shall be open and available for use beginning the same day that a county begins to send out the early ballots. The
county recorder may also establish any other early voting locations in the county the recorder deems necessary.
B. Notwithstanding subsection A of this section, a request for an official early ballot from an absent uniformed services voter or
overseas voter as defined in the uniformed and overseas citizens absentee voting act of 1986 (P.L. 99-410; 42 United States Code section
1973ff-6) or a voter whose information is protected pursuant to section 16-153 that is received by the county recorder or other officer in
charge of elections more than ninety-three days before the election is valid. If requested by the absent uniformed services or overseas
voter, or a voter whose information is protected pursuant to section 16-153, the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall
provide to the requesting voter early ballot materials through the next two regularly scheduled general elections for federal office
immediately following receipt of the request.
C. The county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall mail the early ballot and the envelope for its return postage
prepaid to the address provided by the requesting elector within five days after receipt of the official early ballots from the officer charged
by law with the duty of preparing ballots pursuant to section 16-545, except that early ballot distribution shall not begin more than twenty-
six days before the election. If an early ballot request is received on or before the thirtieth day before the election, the early ballot shall be
distributed on the twenty-sixth day before the election.
D. EXCEPT FOR THE SPOUSE, PARENT OR CHILD OF THE ELECTOR, only the elector may be in possession of that
elector's VOTED OR unvoted early ballot. If a complete and correct request is made by the elector within twenty-six days before the
election, the mailing must be made within forty-eight hours after receipt of the request. Saturdays, Sundays and other legal holidays are
https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/sb1412p.htm[1/22/2020 5:26:10 PM]

SB1412 - 501R - I Ver
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excluded from the computation of the forty-eight hour period prescribed by this subsection. If a complete and correct request is made by
an absent uniformed services voter or an overseas voter before the election, the regular early ballot shall be transmitted by mail, by fax or
by other electronic format approved by the secretary of state within twenty-four hours after the early ballots are delivered pursuant to
section 16-545, subsection B, excluding Sundays.
E. In order to be complete and correct and to receive an early ballot by mail, an elector's request that an early ballot be mailed to
the elector's residence or temporary address must include all of the information prescribed by subsection A of this section and must be
received by the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections no later than 5:00 p.m. on the eleventh day preceding the election.
An elector who appears personally no later than 5:00 p.m. on the Friday preceding the election at an on-site early voting location that is
established by the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall be given a ballot and permitted to vote at the on-site
location. If an elector's request to receive an early ballot is not complete and correct but complies with all other requirements of this
section, the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall attempt to notify the elector of the deficiency of the request.
F. Unless an elector specifies that the address to which an early ballot is to be sent is a temporary address, the recorder may use
the information from an early ballot request form to update voter registration records.
G. The county recorder or other officer in charge of early balloting shall provide an alphabetized list of all voters in the precinct
who have requested and have been sent an early ballot to the election board of the precinct in which the voter is registered not later than
the day prior to the election.
H. As a result of an emergency occurring between 5:00 p.m. on the second Friday preceding the election and 5:00 p.m. on the
Monday preceding the election, qualified electors may request to vote early in the manner prescribed by the county recorder of their
respective county. For the purposes of this subsection, "emergency" means any unforeseen circumstances that would prevent the elector
from voting at the polls.
I. A candidate or political committee may distribute early ballot request forms to voters. If the early ballot request forms include
a printed address for return to an addressee other than a political subdivision, the addressee shall be the candidate or political committee
that paid for the printing and distribution of the request forms. All early ballot request forms that are received by a candidate or political
committee shall be transmitted as soon as practicable to the political subdivision that will conduct the election.
Sec. 2. Section 16-545, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
16-545. Early ballot
A. The early ballot shall be one prepared for use in the precinct in which the applicant resides and, if a partisan primary election,
of the political party with which the applicant is affiliated as shown by the affidavit of registration., 2The20 ballot shall be identical with the
ry 22 0
regular official ballots, except that it shall have printed or stamped on it "early".
anua
ed on Jshall:
B. The officer charged by law with the duty of preparing ballots at anyvelection
rchi
15 845 a to the recorder or other officer in charge of elections not later
1. Prepare the official early ballot and deliver a sufficient number
than the thirty-third day before the election. Except as provided . 18- in section 16-542, subsection D, regular early ballots shall not be
distributed to the general public before the beginning bb
of s, No voting.
early
Ho
2. ENSURE THAT THE BALLOT C v.
DNRETURN ENVELOPES ARE OF A TYPE THAT ARE TAMPER EVIDENT AND TAMPER
ed in
RESISTANT WHEN PROPERLY citSEALED.
16-547. Ballot affidavit; form
A. The early ballot shall be accompanied by an envelope bearing upon ON the front the name, official title and post office address
of the recorder or other officer in charge of elections and upon ON the other side a printed affidavit in substantially the following form:
State of Arizona
County of _________
I, _________________, do solemnly swear that I am the identical person whose name is signed to this affidavit and that
this name and signature are my true name and signature, or if I did not personally sign, it was because of physical
disability and that I requested __________________ (name of person signing affidavit) to sign for me, that I have not
voted and will not vote in this election in any other state during the calendar year of this affidavit and that I personally
voted the enclosed ballot or that it was marked according to my instructions because I was unable to do so. I understand
that knowingly voting more than once in any election is a class 5 felony. I declare that I am more than eighteen years of
age, that I am a qualified elector of the state of Arizona and the county of ____________ and that I reside at
_____________. If a challenge is filed against my early ballot, I understand that a copy of the challenge will be sent to me
by first class mail and that I may have as little as forty-eight hours' notice of an opportunity to appear. For purposes of
notifying me of a ballot challenge between the time I return my ballot and seven days after election day, please use the
following address: ________________. (If no address is provided, notice will be mailed to the mailing address listed on the
registration rolls.)
________________________
Elector
B. The face of each envelope in which a ballot is sent to a federal postcard applicant or in which a ballot is returned by such
applicant to the recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall be in the form prescribed in accordance with the uniformed and

SB1412 - 501R - I Ver
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overseas citizens absentee voting act of 1986 (P.L. 99-410; 42 United States Code section 1973ff). Otherwise, the envelopes shall be the same
as those used to send ballots to, or receive ballots from, other early voters.
C. The county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall supply printed instructions to early voters that direct them to
sign the affidavit, mark the ballot and return both in the enclosed self-addressed envelope THAT COMPLIES WITH SECTION 16-545.
The instructions shall include the following statement:
In order to be valid and counted, the ballot and affidavit must be delivered to the office of the county recorder or other
officer in charge of elections or may be deposited at any polling place in the county no later than 7:00 p.m. on election day.
16-1005. Ballot abuse; exception; classification
A. Any person who knowingly marks or punches an early TAMPERS WITH A VOTED OR UNVOTED ballot OR BALLOT
ENVELOPE with the intent to fix an election for his own benefit or for that of another person is guilty of a class 5 felony.
B. ANY PERSON WHO POSSESSES ANOTHER PERSON'S VOTED OR UNVOTED BALLOT IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 6
FELONY. THIS SUBSECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO A PERSON WHO POSSESSES THE VOTED OR UNVOTED BALLOT OF
THE SPOUSE, PARENT OR CHILD OF THAT PERSON.
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Bill Text: AZ SB1412 | 2011 | Fiftieth Legislature 1st Regular | Engrossed | LegiScan
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Bill Title: Early voting; revisions
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Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Republican 1-0)

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Status: (Passed) 2011-04-13 - Governor Signed [SB1412 Detail]

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2011
CO HB1084 Requirements For
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VA HB1039 Felony homicide;
repeals the crime.
MO HB2159 Changes the law

regarding tobacco products
AN ACT
by raising the required
age...
AMENDING SECTIONS 16-545, 16-547 AND 16-1005, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES; RELATING TO BALLOTS.
NY S00298 Provides for the
immunization of all
children born after January (TEXT OF BILL BEGINS ON NEXT PAGE)
1, 2009...
OK HB3296 Airports; setback

requirements for wind
turbines; providing for a Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona:
status... Section 1. Section 16-545, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
16-545. Early ballot
https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/SB1412/id/233492[1/22/2020 5:26:45 PM]

(244 of 432)
VA SB652 Fairfax County;
A. The early ballot shall be one prepared for use in the precinct in which the applicant resides and, if a partisan
policemen's retirement
primary election, of the political party with which the applicant is affiliated as shown by the affidavit of registration. The ballot
system.
shall be identical with the regular official ballots, except that it shall have printed or stamped on it "early".
TN SB1636 As introduced, B. The officer charged by law with the duty of preparing ballots at any election shall:
prohibits a public 1. Prepare the official early ballot and deliver a sufficient number to the recorder or other officer in charge of elections
institution of higher not later than the thirty-third day before the election.೦ Except as provided in section 16ဩ542, subsection D, regular early ballots
education from... shall not be distributed to the general public before the beginning of early voting.
MD HB36 Juvenile 2. ENSURE THAT THE BALLOT RETURN ENVELOPES ARE OF A TYPE THAT ARE TAMPER EVIDENT
Proceedings - Fines, Fees, WHEN PROPERLY SEALED.
and Costs Sec. 2. Section 16-547, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
OK HB3975 Renewable 16-547. Ballot affidavit; form
energy; Oklahoma A. The early ballot shall be accompanied by an envelope bearing upon ON the front the name, official title and post
Renewable Energy Policy office address of the recorder or other officer in charge of elections and upon ON the other side a printed affidavit in
Act of 2020; effective... substantially the following form:
State of Arizona
OK HB3373 Motor vehicles;
creating the Shelby
County of _________
Johnson and Logan
Deardorf Act of 2020;...
I, _________________, do solemnly swear that I am the identical person whose name is signed to this affidavit
and that this name and signature are my true name and signature, or if I did not personally sign, it was
because of physical disability and that I requested __________________ (name of person signing affidavit) to
sign for me, that I have not voted and will not vote in this election in any other state during the calendar year
of this affidavit and that I personally voted the enclosed ballot or that it was marked according to my
instructions because I was unable to do so.೦ I understand that knowingly voting more than once in any
election is a class 5 felony.೦ I declare that I am more than eighteen years of age, that I am a qualified elector
of the state of Arizona and the county of ____________ and that I reside at _____________.೦ If a challenge is
filed against my early ballot, I understand that a copy of the challenge will be sent to me by first class mail and
that I may have as little as fortyဩeight hours' notice of an opportunity to appear.೦ For purposes of notifying
me of a ballot challenge between the time I return my ballot and seven days after election day, please use the
20
following address: ________________.೦ (If no address is provided, notice
ry 22, 20will be mailed to the mailing
address listed on the registration rolls.)
anua
________________________ e d on J
hiv
Elector
584 5 arc
o. 18-1
B. The face of eachbb s, N in which a ballot is sent to a federal postcard applicant or in which a ballot is returned by
envelope
toCthe
such applicant N
Ho
v.recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall be in the form prescribed in accordance with the
i D
nand
cited
uniformed overseas citizens absentee voting act of 1986 (P.L. 99ဩ410; 42 United States Code section 1973ff). Otherwise, the
envelopes shall be the same as those used to send ballots to, or receive ballots from, other early voters.
C. The county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall supply printed instructions to early voters that
direct them to sign the affidavit, mark the ballot and return both in the enclosed selfဩaddressed envelope THAT COMPLIES
WITH SECTION 16-545.೦ The instructions shall include the following statement:
In order to be valid and counted, the ballot and affidavit must be delivered to the office of the county recorder
or other officer in charge of elections or may be deposited at any polling place in the county no later than 7:00
p.m. on election day.
WARNING-IT IS A FELONY TO OFFER OR RECEIVE ANY COMPENSATION FOR A BALLOT.
16-1005. Ballot abuse; classification
A. Any person who knowingly marks or punches an early A VOTED OR UNVOTED ballot OR BALLOT
ENVELOPE with the intent to fix an election for his own benefit or for that of another person is guilty of a class 5 felony.
B. IT IS UNLAWFUL TO OFFER OR PROVIDE ANY CONSIDERATION TO ACQUIRE A VOTED OR
UNVOTED EARLY BALLOT. A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS SUBSECTION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 5 FELONY.
C. IT IS UNLAWFUL TO RECEIVE OR AGREE TO RECEIVE ANY CONSIDERATION IN EXCHANGE FOR A
VOTED OR UNVOTED BALLOT.೦ A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS SUBSECTION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 5
FELONY.
D. ANY PERSON WHO DELIVERS MORE THAN TEN EARLY BALLOTS TO AN ELECTION OFFICIAL FOR
TALLYING SHALL ALSO PROVIDE TO THE ELECTION OFFICIAL A COPY OF THE PERSON'S PHOTO
IDENTIFICATION.೦ IF THE PERSON DELIVERING THE BALLOTS DOES NOT PROVIDE A COPY OF THE
PERSON'S PHOTO IDENTIFICATION, THE ELECTION OFFICIAL SHALL RECORD THE INFORMATION FROM
THE PERSON'S PHOTO IDENTIFICATION AND RETAIN THE INFORMATION AS A PART OF THE RECORDS OF
THE VOTING LOCATION AS PRESCRIBED IN PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN
THE INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES MANUAL ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 16-452.೦ WITHIN SIXTY
DAYS AFTER THE ELECTION, THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THAT ELECTION SHALL SUBMIT TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE THE PHOTOCOPIES OR OTHER ELECTRONIC FACSIMILES OR OTHER INFORMATION
SUBMITTED BY THE PERSONS DELIVERING THE EARLY BALLOTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL
COMPILE A STATEWIDE REPORT ON THE SUBMITTALS AND SHALL MAKE THAT INFORMATION AVAILABLE

(245 of 432)
TO THE PUBLIC ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S WEBSITE.೦ THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY MAKE ANY
REFERRALS TO THE APPROPRIATE PROSECUTING AGENCY FOR PURPOSES OF ENFORCING THIS CHAPTER.
E. IT IS UNLAWFUL TO POSSESS A VOTED OR UNVOTED BALLOT WITH THE INTENT TO SELL THE
VOTED OR UNVOTED BALLOT OF ANOTHER PERSON.೦ A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS SUBSECTION IS
GUILTY OF A CLASS 5 FELONY.
F. A PERSON OR ENTITY WHO KNOWINGLY SOLICITS THE COLLECTION OF VOTED OR UNVOTED
BALLOTS BY MISREPRESENTING ITSELF AS AN ELECTION OFFICIAL OR AS AN OFFICIAL BALLOT
REPOSITORY OR IS FOUND TO BE SERVING AS A BALLOT DROP OFF SITE, OTHER THAN THOSE ESTABLISHED
AND STAFFED BY ELECTION OFFICIALS, IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 5 FELONY.
G. A PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY COLLECTS VOTED OR UNVOTED BALLOTS AND DOES NOT TURN
THOSE BALLOTS IN TO AN ELECTION OFFICIAL, THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE OR OTHER ENTITY
PERMITTED BY LAW TO TRANSMIT POST IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 5 FELONY.
H. A PERSON WHO ENGAGES OR PARTICIPATES IN A PATTERN OF BALLOT FRAUD IS GUILTY OF A
CLASS 4 FELONY.೦ FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SUBSECTION, "PATTERN OF BALLOT FRAUD" MEANS THE
PERSON HAS OFFERED OR PROVIDED ANY CONSIDERATION TO THREE OR MORE PERSONS TO ACQUIRE THE
VOTED OR UNVOTED BALLOT OF A PERSON.
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Effect of Shelby County on Withdrawn Preclearance Submissions | Arizona Attorney General
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Arizona Attorney General

Mark Brnovich Español
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OFFICE COMPLAINTS OUTREACH SENIORS CONSUMER
CRIMINAL CIVIL RIGHTS MEDIA FINTECH
Attorney General Opinions / Effect of Shelby County on Withdrawn Preclearance Submissions
Effect of Shelby County on Withdrawn Preclearance

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Submissions n Ja
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do
archive
5845
o. 18-1
Attorney General: Thomas C. Horne bbs, N
. Ho
Date Posted: Thursday, August 29,v 2013
DNC AG OPINIONS
in
cited (R13-013)
Opinion Number: I13-008 ARCHIVE
Regarding: Effect of Shelby County on Withdrawn Preclearance
Submissions
» 2019 (5)
» 2018 (12)
733.04
I13-008.pdf » 2017 (7)
KB
» 2016 (12)
» 2015 (14)
To: » 2014 (8)
Ken Bennett » 2013 (12)
Arizona Secretary of State » 2012 (3)
» 2011 (8)
» 2010 (8)
Questions Presented
» 2009 (11)
You have asked for an opinion on the following questions: » 2008 (13)
» 2007 (13)
1. Since the United States Supreme Court declared the coverage formula
» 2006 (8)
triggering preclearance obligations to be unconstitutional, are previously
» 2005 (9)
enacted, but not precleared statutes, valid and enforceable?
» 2004 (11)
2. If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the effective dates of any
» 2003 (11)
such statutes that were enacted, but not precleared, and remain in the
» 2002 (10)
statute books?
https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i13-008-r13-013[1/22/2020 5:27:34 PM]

(247 of 432)
» 2001 (24)
3. What statutes are affected by this scenario?
» 2000 (31)
» 1999 (30)
Summary Answers
1. Yes. The statutes that were duly enacted by the Legislature are valid and
enforceable.
2. The effective date for these statutes is June 25, 2013, at the earliest.
3. Six policies and statutes are affected by the preclearance withdrawals and
subsequent Shelby County decision: (1) 2002 Citizens Clean Election
Substantive Policy Statement; (2) Laws 2009 Ch. 134 (H.B. 2101); (3) Laws
2010 Ch. 48 (H.B. 2261); (4) Laws 2010 Ch. 314 (H.B. 2113); (5) Laws
2011 Ch. 105 (S.B. 1412); and (6) Laws 2011 Ch. 166 (S.B. 1471).
Background
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) and its subsequent reauthorizations
created a system by which certain jurisdictions were required to submit any
statutory or procedural change that affected voting for preclearance prior to
implementing it. The preclearance obligation, set forth in Section 5 of the VRA,
shifted the burden of proof to the covered jurisdictions to demonstrate before
implementing any statutory or procedural change that affected voting that such
change would not have a discriminatory effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The covered
20
jurisdictions could seek preclearance by either submitting a letter containing thery 22, 20
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requisite information to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or by filing
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15 45 a of
declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the 8District
Columbia. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b; 28 C.F.R. . 18- Arizona and its sub-
§o51.10.
bbs ,N
v. Ho by the coverage formula contained
jurisdictions(1) were covered jurisdictions
in DNC
d
citeVRA.
within section 4(b) of the
The procedure for seeking preclearance from the DOJ is set forth in 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.20, et seq. For each voting change affecting a statewide election policy,
procedure or statute, the State submitted a letter with the following information:
(a) A copy of the ordinance, enactment, order, or regulation

embodying the change affecting voting for which preclearance is
sought;
(b) A copy of the current voting standard, practice, or procedure that
is being amended;
(c) A statement identifying each change between the submitted
regulation and the previous practice;
(d) A statement identifying the authority under which the jurisdiction
undertook the change;
(e) The date the change was adopted;
(f) The date on which the change takes effect;
(g) A statement regarding whether the change has already been
implemented;
(h) A statement regarding whether the change affects less than the
entire jurisdiction and an explanation, if so;
(i) A statement of the reasons for the change;

(248 of 432)
(j) A statement of the anticipated effect of the change on members of
racial or language minority groups;
(k) A statement identifying any past or pending litigation concerning
the change or related voting practices; and
(l) History of preclearance for the prior practice.
28 C.F.R. § 51.27. The DOJ then had sixty calendar days from the date it
received the submission to interpose an objection. 28 C.F.R. § 51.9. The DOJ
was also authorized to ask for additional information within that sixty-day
period. 28 C.F.R. § 51.37. When the DOJ asked for additional information, a
new sixty-day period would begin from the DOJ’s receipt of that additional
information. Id. A jurisdiction could withdraw a submission at any time prior to a
final decision by the DOJ. 28 C.F.R. § 51.25.
Since 1967, the State has submitted approximately 773 statutes, policies,
forms, and procedures affecting voting to the DOJ for preclearance. According
to the Attorney General’s records, the State did not seek preclearance through
court action in the D.C. district court for any proposed changes. Of those 773
submissions, only six were partially or fully withdrawn:
1.
2002 Citizens Clean Election Substantive Policy Statement
2.
Laws 2009 Ch. 134 (H.B. 2101)
3.
Laws 2010 Ch. 48 (H.B. 2261)
4.
Laws 2010 Ch. 314 (H.B. 2113) 20
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5.
Laws 2011 Ch. 105 (S.B. 1412) anua
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6.
Laws 2011 Ch. 166 (S.B. 1471) rchiv
15 845 a
18-
Those withdrawals, and the current status of
bs No. underlying laws, are
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In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, the United States Supreme Court held
that Section 4(b)’s coverage formula was unconstitutional. 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2631 (2013). The Court stated that the formula “can no longer be used as a
basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.” Id.
Analysis
1. Because Shelby County Eliminated the Coverage Formula and
Therefore Arizona’s Preclearance Obligation, Duly Enacted Statutes that
Were Submitted for Preclearance but Later Withdrawn Are Enforceable.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the enforcement in any covered
jurisdiction of any “change affecting voting” absent preclearance by a
declaratory judgment or from the DOJ. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1, 51.10, 51.12. As set
forth above, this requirement shifted the burden of proof to the State to
demonstrate as a prerequisite for implementing a new statute, procedure, rule,
or form, that the change did not have the purpose or effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1; 51.10.
The preclearance obligation applied only to jurisdictions covered by the

coverage formula set forth in Section 4(b) of the VRA. The United States

(249 of 432)
Supreme Court held that the coverage formula is unconstitutional because
current circumstances do not justify it. 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (stating that in the
2006 reauthorization of the VRA, Congress kept the focus on decades-old data
relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current
needs). The Court declared Section 4(b) unconstitutional, but issued no holding
on Section 5. Id. at 2631. The “formula in [Section 4(b)] can no longer be used
as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance,” but “Congress may draft
another formula based on current conditions.” Id. Consequently, Arizona is
presently not a covered jurisdiction subject to the preclearance obligation.
Until the Shelby County decision, Arizona statutes that had not been
precleared were unenforceable. Other than preclearance, there was no barrier
to implementing those few duly enacted statutes that had been withdrawn from
preclearance consideration. Now, under Shelby County, the preclearance
barrier is removed and such statutes are enforceable.
2. The Effective Date for the Statutes Previously Withdrawn from

Preclearance Consideration Is June 25, 2013.
The general effective date for new statutes is the ninety-first day after the
Legislature adjourns sine die. Bland v. Jordan, 79 Ariz. 384, 386, 291 P.2d
205, 206 (1955). Generally, the effective date for Arizona statutes subject to
preclearance has been the date of preclearance or the general effective date,
whichever comes later. 20
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a
Under federal jurisprudence, when a court announces a rule of federal Janubut
on law
ve d
rchi
15845 a
does not expressly state whether the decision applies prospectively only, the
opinion “is properly understood to have followed o. 18-normal rule of retroactive
the
N
bbs,
HoTaxation,
application.” Harper v. Virginia Dept.
C v.of 409 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
e d in DN
Retroactivity means thatcit when a court decides a case and applies a new legal
rule to the parties before it, then the new rule must be applied “to all pending
cases.” Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995).
In Shelby County, the Court announced a new rule of law that Section 4(b)’s
coverage formula is unconstitutional, but did not expressly limit that ruling to
apply prospectively. 133 S.Ct. at 2631. Therefore, under Harper, Shelby
County must have retroactive application.
This interpretation draws additional support from the DOJ’s own statement that
it would not make preclearance determinations on any matters awaiting ruling
at the time the Shelby County decision was issued:
With respect to administrative submissions under Section 5 of the

Voting Rights Act, that were pending as of June 25, 2013, or
received after that date, the Attorney General is providing a written
response to jurisdictions that advises:
On June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court held that the
coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
1973b(b), as reauthorized by the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, is unconstitutional and can no longer

(250 of 432)
be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c. Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 2013 WL 3184629 (U.S. June 25, 2013) (No.
12-96). Accordingly, no determination will be made under Section 5
by the Attorney General on the specified change. Procedures for the
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 28 C.F.R. 51.35.
We further note that this is not a determination on the merits and,
therefore, should not be construed as a finding regarding whether
the specified change complies with any federal voting rights law.
U.S. DOJ: Civil Rights Division: Voting Section,

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/ . Therefore, anything that was pending
evaluation by the DOJ on June 25, 2013 must be deemed effective as of that
date.
But the Reynoldsville Casket case instructs that the retroactivity only applies to
pending cases. None of the withdrawn submissions were under review at the
time Shelby County was issued, and therefore cannot be considered to have
been pending. As such, their effective date cannot be earlier than June 25,
2013.
3. Current Status of Previously Withdrawn Preclearance Submissions

20
2, 20
Based on a comprehensive review of the Attorney General’s records, the nuary 2
Ja
Attorney General had withdrawn six preclearance submissionshof iv d on
estatewide
5 arc
1 -1584their status as of June
policies and statutes. The following discussion sets8forth
No.
25, 2013.
Hobbs,
C v.
a) 2002 ed in DN Clean Election Substantive Policy Statement
Citizens
cit
The Arizona Citizens Clean Election Commission (“CCEC”) adopted the policy
“Candidates Denied Approval for Funding” during its December 11, 2001 public
meeting. The Attorney General’s Office submitted the policy change to the DOJ
for preclearance on January 11, 2002. Under this policy, a candidate who failed
to submit a sufficient number of valid contribution slips was not permitted to
provide a supplemental submission of additional slips. On February 28, 2002,
the Attorney General submitted a letter to the DOJ withdrawing the submission
because CCEC had effectively superseded the policy by promulgating a new
proposed rule addressing the same subject matter. Because this policy
statement has been superseded by subsequent rules embodied in the Arizona
Administrative Code, the Shelby County decision is irrelevant to the policy’s
effective date.
b) Laws 2009 Ch. 134 (H.B. 2101)
H.B. 2101 made several amendments to the laws governing county supervisor
board members. Section 1 of the bill lowered the population threshold (from
200,000 to 175,000) at which counties must have five board members and
clarified the number of signatures needed for calling a special election. Section
2 provided that a county with a population exceeding 175,000 based on 2000
census data must begin the process of electing two additional supervisors at

(251 of 432)
the next election and required the current applicable board(s) of supervisors to
form five supervisorial districts by adopting the boundaries of five precinct
boundaries. According to comments made in the minutes of the House of
Representatives Committee on Government, H.B. 2101 was needed to
increase county leadership in Pinal County, which had undergone significant
population growth. This Attorney General submitted the law to the DOJ for
preclearance on August 11, 2009.
On September 24, 2009, a group of registered voters in Pinal County sued the
Pinal County Board of Supervisors, the Pinal County Recorder, the Pinal
County Election Director, and Pinal County itself in a special action seeking to
declare Section 2 of H.B. 2101 unconstitutional. Robison v. Pinal County Bd. of
Supervisors, Pinal County Superior Court Cause No. S-1100-CV-200903971.
On October 13, 2009, the Attorney General received a request for more
information from the DOJ with respect to Section 2 of the bill, but the DOJ
precleared Section 1. On October 29, 2009, the Pinal County Superior Court
indicated by minute entry that it would enter the form of judgment lodged by
Plaintiffs, which stated that Section 2 of H.B. 2101 was unconstitutional and
may not be implemented. Specifically, the court held the following:
Section 2 of the Legislation is void and of no effect because it is 0

, 202
based on electoral districts that have never been precleared under nuary 22
n Ja
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c;
chived o
ar
8-1 5845
Section 2 of the Legislation is void and of ono
. effect because it is an
1
bs, N
Hob
unconstitutional special law inv.violation of Article 4, Part 2, § 19 of
C
in DN
the Arizona Constitution;
cited
Section 2 of the Legislation is void and of no effect because it
requires Defendants to establish supervisorial districts grossly
disproportionate in population in violation of Article 2, §§ 13 and 21
of the Arizona Constitution.
In light of the disposition of that litigation, the Attorney General withdrew the
submission for preclearance with regard to Section 2 of H.B. 2101. Under the
superior court’s decision, Section 2 of H.B. 2101 is void and Shelby County
does not revive it.
c) Laws 2010 Ch. 48 (H.B. 2261) 2010 Ch. 314 (H.B. 2113)
Both Laws 2010 Ch. 48 (H.B. 2261) and Laws 2010 Ch. 314 (H.B. 2113)
amended statutes related to governance of community college districts. The
Attorney General submitted the two laws separately, but simultaneously, to the
DOJ for preclearance, but the subsequent letter from DOJ requesting additional
information and the partial withdrawal letter addressed the two bills together.
H.B. 2261 amended A.R.S. § 15-1441 regarding the term of office for board
members for community college districts. Preexisting law provided for a
staggering of board members from the first general election for board members

(252 of 432)
was held and provided that each member’s term is six years. Section 1 of H.B.
2261 changed the term of board members to four years for a county with a
population of at least three million, which presently applies only to Maricopa
County. This amendment was to take effect in the next election after the
statute’s effective date, but the effective date was amended subsequently in
H.B. 2113 (see below). Section 1 also provided for two additional board
members, to be elected at-large, in counties with a population of at least three
million. At the first general election held to elect the new at-large members, the
two candidates having the most votes would be declared elected. The elected
member receiving the highest number of votes would serve a four-year term
and the elected member receiving the next highest number of votes would
serve a two-year term. Thereafter, each member’s term would be four years.
Sections 2 and 3 of the bill were not subject to preclearance. Section 4
provided that current board members shall continue to serve until the expiration
of their normal terms.
The Attorney General submitted Sections 1 and 4 of H.B. 2261 to the DOJ for
preclearance on May 28, 2010.
As noted, the DOJ responded with a request for more information that was
intertwined with a request for more information on H.B. 2113, and parts of H.B.
2113 superseded parts of H.B. 2261. H.B. 2113 also made changes to the
terms of office and number of members for community college district boards.
20
Sections 1 and 6 of H.B. 2113 did not include changes affecting voting and ry 22, 20
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were not submitted for preclearance. Section 2 amended A.R.S. § d15-1441(C)
e
iv
to provide that the change from six year terms to four-year arch would not
45 terms
158
. 18-
become effective until June 30, 2012. Section
bbs, N2oalso provided that the addition
v. H o
of two at-large board members would not be effective until July 1, 2012.
in DNC
citedA.R.S. § 16-322, which provided for the number of
Sections 3 and 4 repealed
signatures needed for nomination petitions and replaced that statute with
identical language except for A.R.S. § 16-322(a)(5), which changed the number
of signatures a candidate for community college district must gather. Section 5
amended Section 4 of H.B. 2261 to clarify the effective date.
The Attorney General submitted Sections 2 through 5 of H.B. 2113 to the DOJ
on May 28, 2010 for preclearance. On July 27, 2010, the DOJ responded. The
DOJ did not make a determination as to H.B. 2261, Sections 1 and 4, because
they were superseded by H.B. 2113, Sections 2 and 5. The DOJ also did not
make a determination as to the implementation schedule set forth in H.B. 2261,
Section 1 and H.B. 2113, Section 2, because they were directly related to the
adoption of the two additional proposed at-large board members for which they
sought additional information. The information sought included a detailed
explanation of the governmental interest to be served by the addition of two
members to the college district board and the basis for the state’s decision that
this interest is better served by electing them on an at-large basis, as opposed
to from single-member districts; a description of alternative proposals; and
election returns by voting precinct within Maricopa County for each federal,
state, county, and county school board election since 1999 in which minorities
have participated as candidates.

(253 of 432)
On October 27, 2010, the Attorney General wrote to the DOJ summarizing its
understanding of what had been precleared as follows:
H.B. 2261, § 1, to the extent that section changed the terms of office for
community college district board members from six years to four years, in a
county with a population of at least three million persons;
H.B. 2113, § 2, to the extent that section amends A.R.S. § 15-1441(C) to
provide that the change in the terms of office provided for in H.B. 2261 will
become effective on June 30, 2012; and
H.B. 2113, §§ 3-5.
The Attorney General then withdrew from consideration the following:
H.B. 2261, § 1, regarding the effective date of that amendment and

regarding that section’s amendment to A.R.S. § 15-1441(I).
H.B. 2261, § 4
H.B. 2113, § 2, except to the extent that section amended A.R.S. § 15-
1441(C) to provide that the change in the terms of office provided for in H.B.
2261 would become effective on June 30, 2012.
The Legislature made no further changes to A.R.S. § 15-1441 or 16-322

relevant to this discussion.
The current version of A.R.S. § 15-1441(I) provides:

20
ry 22, 20
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Beginning in July 1, 2012, in addition to the governing chiv
rboard
15845 a
members who are elected from each of the 18- precincts in a
.five
bb s, No
. Ho with a population of at least
community college district, a county
in DNC v
three million persons
citedshall elect two additional governing members
from the district at large. At the first general election held to elect
at-large governing board members, the two candidates having the
most votes shall be declared elected, if each candidate is a qualified
elector who resides in that county. The elected member who receives
the highest number of votes of the at-large candidates shall serve a
four year term and the elected member who receives the next
highest number of votes shall serve a two year term. Thereafter
each member’s term is four years.
Because Shelby County removed the preclearance obligation and this law has
not been changed since its original passage, the effective date must be June
25, 2013 at the earliest. Therefore, the next applicable election at which time
two at-large board members shall be elected is 2014. Candidates seeking to
run for that office must therefore comply with A.R.S. § 16-322(A)(5)(b) and all
other applicable election statutes. The current members of the applicable
community college district boards will continue to serve the remainders of their
respective terms.
d) Laws 2011 Ch. 105 (S.B. 1412)
Senate Bill 1412 created new security requirements for early ballots and

(254 of 432)
required photo identification from persons who deliver more than ten early
ballots to an election official. Section 1 amended A.R.S. § 16-545 by requiring
election officers to ensure that return envelopes for early ballots are tamper
evident when properly sealed. Section 2 amended A.R.S. § 16-547 by requiring
election officials to provide instructions to voters that early ballots should be
returned in the tamper evident envelope enclosed with the ballot and to include
a warning that it is a felony to receive or offer compensation for a ballot.
Section 3 amended A.R.S. § 16-1005 by including new language to make it a
felony to mark a voted or unvoted ballot or ballot envelope with intent to fix an
election. Section 3 also added new subsections B through H to A.R.S. § 16-
1005 regarding additional forms of ballot abuse and classification for those
violations as felonies. Subsection D required a person who delivers more than
ten early ballots to provide a copy of his or her photo identification to the
election official.
The Attorney General submitted the bill for preclearance on May 18, 2011. On
June 27, 2011, the DOJ precleared all of the sections except Subsection D,
which created A.R.S. § 16-1005(D) regarding the requirement to provide a
photo identification when delivering more than ten early ballots. As to that
section, the DOJ asked for more information, including how that proposed
provision was expected to serve the state interest and whether any alternative
measures had been considered; a list of the acceptable photographic
identification; and a detailed description of the statewide report that would be 20
ry 22, 20
posted on the secretary of state’s website regarding such individuals who ua
andid
e d on J
deliver more than ten early ballots. The Attorney General withdrew v
rchi the
1 5845 a
submission regarding Subsection D on August 4, 12011. - In 2012, the
s, No. 8
bb
Legislature amended A.R.S. § 1005 byHorepealing that subsection. 2012 Ariz.
NC v.
Session Laws Ch. 361, § 22. D
inTherefore, Shelby County has no effect on the
cited
validity of this provision.
e) Laws 2011 Ch. 166 (S.B. 1471)
In 2011, S.B. 1471 made changes to a number of election-related statutes.

Section 1 amended A.R.S. § 16-248 to increase the minimum number of active
registered voters needed to allow precincts to conduct the presidential
preference primary by mail from two hundred to three hundred. Section 2
amended A.R.S. § 16-531 regarding the number of clerks of election a board of
supervisors may appoint. Section 3 repealed the language set forth in A.R.S. §
16-547(A) for the affidavit contained on an early ballot envelope and added
new language. The new language provided that the declaration is provided
under penalty of perjury, that the voter is a registered voter in the county, and
that the voter has not voted in any other county or state. The new language
also indicates whether the voter was assisted and provides blanks for the
signature and address of the assistant. Section 4 amended A.R.S. § 16-
580(G), prohibiting candidates and persons who have been employed by or
volunteered for a candidate, campaign, political organization or political party
from assisting voters in voting. Section 5 of the bill added a requirement that a
new political party seeking recognition must obtain signatures from voters in at
least five different counties, and at least ten percent of the required total shall
be registered in counties with populations under 5,000. Section 6 amended the

(255 of 432)
signature requirements of A.R.S. § 16-803 regarding recognition of a new
political party.
The Attorney General submitted the bill to the DOJ for preclearance on June
15, 2011. The DOJ sent a letter on August 15, 2011 that precleared all but
Section 4 (A.R.S. § 16-580(G)) of the bill. As to that section, the DOJ requested
additional information, including the following:
A detailed description of the manner in which the prohibition will be

implemented including,
a. the minimum amount of time, if any, that an individual may be

employed by or volunteer for one of the prohibited entities that will
preclude them from providing any assistance to a voter;
b. whether for those individuals whose ineligibility is based on

volunteering for an entity that exists for more than a single election
cycle, such as a political party, that the resulting ineligibility for the
individual similarly extends beyond the date of the election;
c. whether the proposed prohibition on providing assistance will be

applicable to those individuals who also serve as employees in
county offices or as poll workers on election day; and
d. any guidance that the state has issued concerning the manner
20
in which it will implement this prohibition, including enforcement at
ry 22, 20
anua
the polling places or in county offices.
ed on J
rchiv
On October 4, 2011, the Attorney General withdrew 1 5
the8 45 a
preclearance
18-
bs No.
, regarding
submission regarding Section 4 of S.B. 1471
b amendments to A.R.S.
NC v. Ho
§ 16-580(G). The Legislature D
in amended A.R.S. § 16-580 in 2012 to remove the
cited
language at issue. 2012 Ariz. Session Laws Ch. 361, § 13. That version was
precleared on July 19, 2012.
Conclusion
The Shelby County decision removed the preclearance obligation by holding
the coverage formula unconstitutional. Therefore, any duly enacted state
statutes that had not been precleared or repealed are deemed valid and
enforceable. The effective date of such statutes is the date of the Shelby
County decision, June 25, 2013. This Opinion does not address the effect of
Shelby County on the enforceability of any laws, policies, or procedures
enacted by the counties, cities, towns, or other jurisdictions subject to the
preclearance obligation.
Of the preclearance submissions withdrawn by the Attorney General, only the

amendments to A.R.S. §§ 15-1441 and 16-322 are affected by the Shelby
County decision. Those sections provide for two new at-large members of
community college districts in counties with a population of at least three million
people. Those two new at-large board members must be elected during the
2014 election.
Thomas C. Horne

(256 of 432)
Attorney General
1. This Opinion does not address Shelby County’s effect on preclearance

submissions made by Arizona’s counties, cities, towns, or other sub-
jurisdictions subject to preclearance. Those jurisdictions independently
sought preclearance for changes in their codes, ordinances, policies,
procedures, etc. that affected voting. The Arizona Attorney General did not
track or monitor those preclearance submissions.
2005 N Central Avenue, Phoenix, AZ 85004 | Email: Contact Us | Phone: (602) 542-5025
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20
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ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

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(258 of 432)
VA SB652 Fairfax County;
policemen's retirement
system.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona:
TN SB1636 As introduced,
Section 1. Section 16-322, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
prohibits a public
16-322. Number of signatures required on nomination petitions
institution of higher
A. Nomination petitions shall be signed:
education from...
1. If for a candidate for the office of United States senator or for a state office, excepting members of the legislature
MD HB36 Juvenile and superior court judges, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to vote for the candidate whose nomination
Proceedings - Fines, Fees, petition they are signing equal to at least oneဩhalf ONEဩSIXTH of one per cent of the voter registration of the party of the
and Costs candidate in at least three counties in the state, but not less than oneဩhalf AND AT LEAST ONEဩSIXTH of one per cent nor
OK HB3975 Renewable BUT NOT more than ten per cent of the total voter registration of the candidate's party in the state.
energy; Oklahoma 2. If for a candidate for the office of representative in Congress, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to
Renewable Energy Policy vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least ONEဩTHIRD OF one per cent but not more
Act of 2020; effective... than ten per cent of the total voter registration of the party designated in the district from which such THE representative shall
OK HB3373 Motor vehicles; be elected except that if for a candidate for a special election to fill a vacancy in the office of representative in congress, by a
creating the Shelby number of qualified electors who are qualified to vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at
Johnson and Logan least one-half ONEဩSIXTH of one per cent but not more than ten per cent of the total voter registration of the party designated
Deardorf Act of 2020;... in the district from which such THE representative shall be elected.
3. If for a candidate for the office of member of the legislature, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to
vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least ONEဩTHIRD OF one per cent but not more
than three per cent of the total voter registration of the party designated in the district from which the member of the legislature
may be elected.
4. If for a candidate for a county office or superior court judge, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to
vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least two per cent but not more than ten per cent
of the total voter registration of the party designated in the county or district, provided that in counties with a population of two
hundred thousand persons or more, a candidate for a county office shall have nomination petitions signed by a number of
qualified electors who are qualified to vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least
oneဩhalf of one per cent but not more than ten per cent of the total voter registration of the party designated in the county or
district.೦ 20
2 2, 20electors who are qualified to vote for the
5. If for a candidate for a community college district, by a number ofryqualified
anua
e d on J
candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least:
(a) Through June 30, 2012, oneဩhalf of one per v
hi but not more than ten per cent of the total voter registration in the
arccent
5 845
precinct as established pursuant to section -15ဩ1441.
1
. 18
bb s , Noone-quarter of one per cent but not more than ten per cent of the total voter registration in
(b) Beginning July 1, 2012,
v. Ho pursuant to section 15-1441. Notwithstanding the total voter registration in the community college
the precinct as established
district, the
in DNC number of signatures required by this subdivision is one thousand.
maximum
cited6. If for a candidate for county precinct committeeman, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to vote for
the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least two per cent but not more than ten per cent of the
party voter registration in the precinct or ten signatures, whichever is less.
7. If for a candidate for justice of the peace or constable, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to vote for
the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least two per cent but not more than ten per cent of the
party voter registration in the precinct.
8. If for a candidate for mayor or other office nominated by a city at large, by a number of qualified electors who are
qualified to vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least five per cent and not more than
ten per cent of the designated party vote in the city, except that a city that chooses to hold nonpartisan elections may by
ordinance provide that the minimum number of signatures required for the candidate be one thousand signatures or five per
cent of the vote in the city, whichever is less, but not more than ten per cent of the vote in the city.
9. If for an office nominated by ward, precinct or other district of a city, by a number of qualified electors who are
qualified to vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least five per cent and not more than
ten per cent of the designated party vote in the ward, precinct or other district, except that a city that chooses to hold
nonpartisan elections may provide by ordinance that the minimum number of signatures required for the candidate be two
hundred fifty signatures or five per cent of the vote in the district, whichever is less, but not more than ten per cent of the vote in
the district.
10. If for a candidate for an office nominated by a town at large, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to
vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least five per cent and not more than ten per cent
of the vote in the town, except that a town that chooses to hold nonpartisan elections may provide by ordinance that the
minimum number of signatures required for the candidate be one thousand signatures or five per cent of the vote in the town,
whichever is less, but not more than ten per cent of the vote in the town.
11. If for a candidate for a governing board of a school district, by a number of qualified electors who are qualified to
vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least oneဩhalf of one per cent of the total voter
registration in the school district if the governing board members are elected at large or one per cent of the total voter
registration in the single member district if governing board members or joint technical education district board members are
elected from single member districts. Notwithstanding the total voter registration in the school district or single member
district, the maximum number of signatures required by this paragraph is four hundred.

(259 of 432)
12. If for a candidate for a governing body of a special district as described in title 48, by a number of qualified electors
who are qualified to vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing equal to at least oneဩhalf of one per cent
of the vote in the special district but not more than two hundred fifty and not fewer than five signatures.
B. The basis of percentage in each instance referred to in subsection A of this section, except in cities, towns and school
districts, shall be the number of voters registered in the designated party of the candidate OR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, AS PRESCRIBED IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN SUBSECTION A OF THIS SECTION AND as
reported pursuant to section 16ဩ168, subsection G on March 1 of the year in which the general election is held. In cities, the
basis of percentage shall be the vote of the party for mayor at the last preceding election at which a mayor was elected. In
towns, the basis of percentage shall be the highest vote cast for an elected official of the town at the last preceding election at
which an official of the town was elected. In school districts, the basis of percentage shall be the total number of voters
registered in the school district or single member district, whichever applies. The total number of voters registered for school
districts shall be calculated using the periodic reports prepared by the county recorder pursuant to section 16ဩ168, subsection
G. The count that is reported on March 1 of the year in which the general election is held shall be the basis for the calculation of
total voter registration for school districts.
C. In primary elections the signature requirement for party nominees, other than nominees of the parties entitled to
continued representation pursuant to section 16ဩ804, is at least oneဩtenth of one per cent of the total vote for the winning
candidate or candidates for governor or presidential electors at the last general election within the district.೦ Signatures must
be obtained from qualified electors who are qualified to vote for the candidate whose nomination petition they are signing.
D. If new boundaries for congressional districts, legislative districts, supervisorial districts, justice precincts or election
precincts are established and effective subsequent to March 1 of the year of a general election and prior to the date for filing of
nomination petitions, the basis for determining the required number of nomination petition signatures is the number of
registered voters in the designated party of the candidate in the elective office, district or precinct on the day the new districts or
precincts are effective.
16-544. Permanent early voting list; civil penalty; violation; classification
A. Any voter may request to be included on a permanent list of voters to receive an early ballot for any election for
which the county voter registration roll is used to prepare the election register. The county recorder of each county shall
maintain the permanent early voting list as part of the voter registration roll.
B. In order to be included on the permanent early voting list, the voter shall make a written request specifically
requesting that the voter's name be added to the permanent early voting list for all elections 0 in which the applicant is eligible to
vote. A permanent early voter request form shall conform to requirements 22, 202 in the instructions and procedures
prescribed
anuforary
manual issued pursuant to section 16ဩ452.೦ The application shall n Jallow the voter to provide the voter's name, residence
o
ed of birth and signature and shall state that the voter is attesting
address, mailing address in the voter's county of residence,
c hivdate
5 ar
1 8 -1584 to vote in the county of residence. The voter shall not list a mailing address
that the voter is a registered voter who is eligible
that is outside of this state for the o.
Npurpose of the permanent early voting list unless the voter is an absent uniformed services
voter or overseas voter H o
as bbs, in the uniformed and overseas citizens absentee voting act of 1986 (P.L. 99ဩ410; 42 United
defined
v.
States Codei DNC 1973ffဩ6). In lieu of the application, the applicant may submit a written request that contains the required
n section
cit e d
information.
C. On receipt of a request to be included on the permanent early voting list, the county recorder or other officer in
charge of elections shall compare the signature on the request form with the voter's signature on the voter's registration form
and, if the request is from the voter, shall mark the voter's registration file as a permanent early ballot request.
D. Not less than ninety days before any polling place election scheduled in March or August, the county recorder or
other officer in charge of elections shall mail to all voters who are eligible for the election and who are included on the
permanent early voting list an election notice by nonforwardable mail that is marked with the statement required by the
postmaster to receive an address correction notification. If an election is not formally called by a jurisdiction by the one
hundred twentieth day before the election, the recorder or other officer in charge of elections is not required to send the election
notice.೦ The notice shall include the dates of the elections that are the subject of the notice, the dates that the voter's ballot is
expected to be mailed and the address where the ballot will be mailed.೦ If the upcoming election is a partisan open primary
election and the voter is not registered as a member of one of the political parties that is recognized for purposes of that
primary, the notice shall include information on the procedure for the voter to designate a political party ballot. The notice
shall be delivered with return postage prepaid and shall also include a means for the voter to do any of the following:
1. Change the mailing address for the voter's ballot to another location in the voter's county of residence.
2. Update the voter's residence address in the voter's county of residence.
3. Request that the voter not be sent a ballot for the upcoming election or elections indicated on the notice.
E. If the notice that is mailed to the voter is returned undeliverable by the postal service, the county recorder or other
officer in charge of elections shall take the necessary steps to contact the voter at the voter's new residence address in order to
update that voter's address or to move the voter to inactive status as prescribed in section 16ဩ166, subsection A.೦ If a voter is
moved to inactive status, the voter shall be removed from the permanent early voting list. If the voter is removed from the
permanent early voting list, the voter shall only be added to the permanent early voting list again if the voter submits a new
request pursuant to this section.
F. Not later than the first day of early voting, the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall mail an
early ballot to all eligible voters included on the permanent early voting list in the same manner prescribed in section 16ဩ542,
subsection C. If the voter has not returned the notice or otherwise notified the election officer within fortyဩfive days before the
election that the voter does not wish to receive an early ballot by mail for the election or elections indicated, the ballot shall
automatically be scheduled for mailing.

(260 of 432)
G. If a voter who is on the permanent early voting list is not registered as a member of a recognized political party and
fails to notify the county recorder of the voter's choice for political party ballot within forty-five days before a partisan open
primary election, the following apply:
1. The voter shall not automatically be sent a ballot for that partisan open primary election only and the voter's name
shall remain on the permanent early voting list for future elections.
2. To receive an early ballot for the primary election, the voter shall submit the voter's choice for political party ballot
to the county recorder.
H. After a voter has requested to be included on the permanent early voting list, the voter shall be sent an early ballot
by mail automatically for any election at which a voter at that residence address is eligible to vote until any of the following
occurs:
1. The voter requests in writing to be removed from the permanent early voting list.
2. The voter's registration or eligibility for registration is moved to inactive status or canceled as otherwise provided by
law.
3. The notice sent by the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections is returned undeliverable and the
county recorder or officer in charge of elections is unable to contact the voter to determine the voter's continued desire to
remain on the list.
I. A voter may make a written request at any time to be removed from the permanent early voting list. The request
shall include the voter's name, residence address, date of birth and signature.೦ On receipt of a completed request to remove a
voter from the permanent early voting list, the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall remove the voter's
name from the list as soon as practicable.
J. An absent uniformed services voter or overseas voter as defined in the uniformed and overseas citizens absentee
voting act of 1986 (P.L. 99ဩ410; 42 United States Code section 1973ffဩ6) is eligible to be placed on the permanent early voting list
pursuant to this section.
K. A voter's failure to vote an early ballot once received does not constitute grounds to remove the voter from the
permanent early voting list.
L. NOTWITHSTANDING SUBSECTION K OF THIS SECTION, BY DECEMBER 1 OF EACH EVEN-
NUMBERED YEAR, THE COUNTY RECORDER OR OTHER OFFICER IN CHARGE OF ELECTIONS MAY SEND A
NOTICE TO EACH VOTER WHO IS ON THE PERMANENT EARLY VOTING LIST AND WHO DID NOT VOTE AN
EARLY BALLOT IN BOTH THE PRIMARY ELECTION AND THE GENERAL ELECTION FOR THE TWO MOST
RECENT GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICE, UNLESS THE VOTER HAD CONTACTED THE COUNTY
2 020
, 2TO
RECORDER IN THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS
ry 2 REAFFIRM THE VOTER'S INTENT
TO REMAIN ON THE PERMANENT EARLY VOTING LIST.೦ Ja nuaNOTICE
THE PRESCRIBED BY THIS SUBSECTION
n
DOES NOT APPLY TO PERSONS WHOSE VOTER c h ived o
REGISTRATION RECORDS ARE SEALED AS PRESCRIBED IN
r
SECTION 16-153.೦ THE NOTICE SHALL 1 5 8 45 a THE VOTER THAT IF THE VOTER WISHES TO REMAIN ON THE
INFORM
-
PERMANENT EARLY VOTING
s o. 18 THE VOTER SHALL DO BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING WITH THE NOTICE
, NLIST,
b b
RECEIVED: v. Ho
DNC
1.in CONFIRM IN WRITING THE VOTER'S DESIRE TO REMAIN ON THE PERMANENT EARLY VOTING
cited
LIST.
2. RETURN THE COMPLETED NOTICE TO THE COUNTY OFFICER IN CHARGE OF ELECTIONS WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS AFTER RECEIPT BY THE VOTER.೦ THE NOTICE SHALL BE SIGNED BY THE VOTER AND SHALL
CONTAIN THE VOTER'S ADDRESS AND DATE OF BIRTH.
M. IF A VOTER RECEIVES A NOTICE AS PRESCRIBED BY SUBSECTION L OF THIS SECTION AND THE
VOTER FAILS TO RESPOND WITHIN THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD, THE COUNTY OFFICER IN CHARGE OF
ELECTIONS SHALL REMOVE THE VOTER'S NAME FROM THE PERMANENT EARLY VOTING LIST.೦ THIS
SUBSECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO VOTERS WHO FAILED TO VOTE AN EARLY BALLOT AND WHO MODIFIED
THEIR VOTER REGISTRATION INFORMATION DURING THE PERIOD FOR EARLY VOTING FOR EITHER THE
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING PRIMARY OR GENERAL ELECTION.
L. N. A candidate, A political committee or other ANOTHER organization may distribute permanent early voting list
request forms to voters. BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 2015, PERMANENT EARLY VOTING LIST REQUEST FORMS THAT
ARE DISTRIBUTED BY A CANDIDATE, A POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR ANOTHER ORGANIZATION SHALL
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS FORM YOU ARE AGREEING TO RECEIVE AN EARLY BALLOT FOR
EVERY ELECTION IN WHICH YOU ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE.೦ YOU ARE INFORMING THE
RECORDER THAT YOU DO NOT WISH TO VOTE AT YOUR ASSIGNED POLLING LOCATION FOR
ALL ELECTIONS.೦ IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO VOTE AT YOUR ASSIGNED POLLING LOCATION,
DO NOT SIGN THIS FORM.
PERMANENT EARLY VOTING LIST REQUEST FORMS THAT ARE SUBMITTED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2015
WITHOUT THE STATEMENT PRESCRIBED BY THIS SUBSECTION ARE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF REQUIRING
THAT THE VOTER BE SENT AN EARLY BALLOT FOR THE IMMEDIATELY SUCCEEDING ELECTION, BUT THAT
VOTER'S NAME SHALL NOT BE PLACED ON THE PERMANENT EARLY VOTING LIST.೦ If the permanent early
voting list request forms include a printed address for return, that address shall be the political subdivision that will conduct the
election.೦ Failure to use the political subdivision as the return addressee is punishable by a civil penalty of up to three times the
cost of the production and distribution of the permanent early voting list request.
M. O. All original and completed permanent early voting list request forms that are received by a candidate, political
committee or other organization shall be submitted within six business days after receipt by a candidate or political committee

(261 of 432)
or eleven days before the election day, whichever is earlier, to the political subdivision that will conduct the election. Any
person, political committee or other organization that fails to submit a completed permanent early voting list request form
within the prescribed time is subject to a civil penalty of up to twenty-five dollars per day for each completed form withheld
from submittal.೦ Any person who knowingly fails to submit a completed permanent early voting list request form before the
submission deadline for the election immediately following the completion of the form is guilty of a class 6 felony.
16-547. Ballot affidavit; form
A. The early ballot shall be accompanied by an envelope bearing on the front the name, official title and post office
address of the recorder or other officer in charge of elections and on the other side a printed affidavit in substantially the
following form:
I declare the following under penalty of perjury: I am a registered voter in ___________ county
Arizona, I have not voted and will not vote in this election in any other county or state, I understand that
knowingly voting more than once in any election is a class 5 felony and I voted the enclosed ballot and signed
this affidavit personally unless noted below.
If the voter was assisted by another person in marking OR RETURNING the ballot, complete the
following:
I declare the following under penalty of perjury: At the registered voter's request I assisted the voter
identified in this affidavit with marking OR RETURNING the voter's ballot, I marked OR RETURNED the
ballot as directly instructed by the voter, I provided the assistance because the voter was physically unable to
mark the ballot solely due to illness, injury or physical limitation OR WAS OTHERWISE UNABLE TO
RETURN THE BALLOT and I understand that there is no power of attorney for voting and that the voter
must be able to make their THE VOTER'S selection even if they THE VOTER cannot physically mark the
ballot.
Name of voter assistant: _____________________________
Address of voter assistant: __________________________
B. The face of each envelope in which a ballot is sent to a federal postcard applicant or in which a ballot is returned by
such THE applicant to the recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall be in the form prescribed in accordance with the
uniformed and overseas citizens absentee voting act of 1986 (P.L. 99ဩ410; 42 United States Code section 1973ff).೦ Otherwise,
the envelopes shall be the same as those used to send ballots to, or receive ballots from, other early voters.
C. The county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall supply printed instructions to early voters that
direct them to sign the affidavit, mark the ballot and return both in the enclosed 22 2020
, selfဩaddressed envelope that complies with
y
section 16-545. The instructions shall include the following statement: Januar
on
In order to be valid and counted, the ballot and
rc ived must be delivered to the office of the county recorder
haffidavit
a
5 be deposited at any polling place in the county no later than 7:00
84may
8-15
or other officer in charge of elections or
p.m. on election day. , No. 1
WARNINGv೦
bs
Itoisba felony to offer or receive any compensation for a ballot.
. H
4. N
C
in D
Sec. Section 16-924, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
cited16-924. Civil penalties; attorney general; county, city or town attorney
A. Unless another penalty is specifically prescribed in this title, if the filing officer for campaign finance reports
designated pursuant to section 16ဩ916, subsection A has reasonable cause to believe that a person is violating any provision of
this title, except for violations of chapter 6, article 2, the secretary of state shall notify the attorney general for a violation
regarding a statewide office or the legislature, the county officer in charge of elections shall notify the county attorney for that
county for a violation regarding a county office or the city or town clerk shall notify the city or town attorney for a violation
regarding a city or town office.೦ The attorney general, county attorney or city or town attorney, as appropriate, may serve on
the person an order requiring compliance with that provision. The order shall state with reasonable particularity the nature of
the violation and shall require compliance within twenty days from the date of issuance of the order. The alleged violator has
twenty days from the date of issuance of the order to request a hearing pursuant to title 41, chapter 6.
B. If a person fails to take corrective action within the time specified in the compliance order issued pursuant to
subsection A OF THIS SECTION, the attorney general, county attorney or city or town attorney, as appropriate, shall issue an
order assessing a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars.೦ The person alleged to have violated the compliance
order has thirty days from the date of issuance of the order assessing the civil penalty to request a hearing pursuant to title 41,
chapter 6.
C. Any party aggrieved by an order or decision of the attorney general, county attorney or city or town attorney, as
appropriate, may appeal to the superior court as provided in title 12, chapter 7, article 6.
D. For the purposes of this section, failure to comply with a compliance order issued by the attorney general, county
attorney or city or town attorney, as appropriate, as prescribed in subsection A OF THIS SECTION is deemed an intentional
act.
E. NOTWITHSTANDING SUBSECTION A OF THIS SECTION:
1. IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS MADE A REASONABLE CAUSE FINDING PURSUANT TO THIS
SECTION REGARDING A VIOLATION BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL
NOTIFY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE VIOLATION OCCURRED, AND THE
COUNTY ATTORNEY MAY SERVE ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AN ORDER REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH
THAT PROVISION AS PRESCRIBED BY THIS SECTION.
2. IF A COUNTY ELECTIONS OFFICER HAS MADE A REASONABLE CAUSE FINDING PURSUANT TO THIS
SECTION REGARDING A VIOLATION BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY OF THAT COUNTY, THE COUNTY

(262 of 432)
ELECTIONS OFFICER SHALL NOTIFY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY SERVE
ON THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AN ORDER REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH THAT PROVISION AS PRESCRIBED
BY THIS SECTION.
3. IF A CITY OR TOWN CLERK HAS MADE A REASONABLE CAUSE FINDING PURSUANT TO THIS
SECTION REGARDING A VIOLATION BY THE CITY OR TOWN ATTORNEY, THE CITY OR TOWN CLERK SHALL
NOTIFY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE VIOLATION OCCURRED, AND THE
COUNTY ATTORNEY MAY SERVE ON THE CITY OR TOWN ATTORNEY AN ORDER REQUIRING COMPLIANCE
WITH THAT PROVISION AS PRESCRIBED BY THIS SECTION.
16-1005. Ballot abuse; ballot return; violation; classification
A. Any person who knowingly marks a voted or unvoted ballot or ballot envelope with the intent to fix an election for
his own benefit or for that of another person is guilty of a class 5 felony.
B. It is unlawful to offer or provide any consideration to acquire a voted or unvoted early ballot. A person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class 5 felony.
C. It is unlawful to receive or agree to receive any consideration in exchange for a voted or unvoted ballot. A person
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class 5 felony.
D. It is unlawful to possess a voted or unvoted ballot with the intent to sell the voted or unvoted ballot of another
person.೦ A person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class 5 felony.
E. A person or entity that knowingly solicits the collection of voted or unvoted ballots by misrepresenting itself as an
election official or as an official ballot repository or is found to be serving as a ballot drop off site, other than those established
and staffed by election officials, is guilty of a class 5 felony.
F. A person who knowingly collects voted or unvoted ballots and WHO does not turn those ballots in to an election
official, the United States postal service or any other entity permitted by law to transmit post is guilty of a class 5 felony.
G. A VOTER MAY DESIGNATE ANY PERSON TO RETURN THE BALLOT TO THE ELECTIONS OFFICIAL
FROM WHOM IT CAME OR TO THE PRECINCT BOARD AT A POLLING PLACE WITHIN THE COUNTY EXCEPT
THAT NO EARLY BALLOT SHALL BE COLLECTED OR RETURNED BY EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING:
1. ANY PAID OR VOLUNTEER WORKER OF ANY POLITICAL COMMITTEE AS DEFINED IN SECTION 16-
901.೦ A PRECINCT COMMITTEEMAN IS NOT PRESUMED TO BE ACTING ON BEHALF OF A POLITICAL
COMMITTEE UNLESS AN AGENT OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR PARTY HAS DIRECTED PRECINCT
COMMITTEEMEN TO COLLECT OR RETURN EARLY BALLOTS. 20
2. ANY OTHER GROUP OR ORGANIZATION ON WHOSE BEHALF
ry 22, 20AN INDIVIDUAL IS DIRECTED TO
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COLLECT OR RETURN THE BALLOT.
ed on J
i v
arch
H. ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY VIOLATES SUBSECTION G OF THIS SECTION IS GUILTY OF A
CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR. SUBSECTION 1 58G45OF THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS
. 18-
COLLECTING OR RETURNING
bb s, NoA BALLOT AND WHO IS ACTING WITHOUT DIRECTION FROM A POLITICAL
COMMITTEE, GROUP HORo ORGANIZATION.
C v. who engages or participates in a pattern of ballot fraud is guilty of a class 4 felony.೦ For the purposes
Nperson
G.inI.DA
cited
of this subsection, "pattern of ballot fraud" means the person has offered or provided any consideration to three or more
persons to acquire the voted or unvoted ballot of a person.
Sec. 6. Title 19, chapter 1, article 1, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding section 19-103, to read:
19-103. Legislative findings and intent; strict compliance
THE LEGISLATURE FINDS AND DETERMINES THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH THE
INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM PROCESS PROVIDE THE SUREST METHOD FOR SAFEGUARDING THE
INTEGRITY AND ACCURACY OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS. THEREFORE, THE
LEGISLATURE DECLARES THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND THAT PERSONS USING EITHER THE
INITIATIVE OR REFERENDUM PROCESS STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THOSE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
19-111. Number for petition
A. A person or organization intending to propose a law or constitutional amendment by initiative petition or to file a
referendum petition against a measure, item, section or part of a measure, before causing the petition to be printed and
circulated, shall file with the secretary of state an application, on a form to be provided by the secretary of state, setting forth his
THE PERSON'S name or, if an organization, its name and the names and titles of its officers, THE PERSON'S OR
ORGANIZATION'S address, his THE PERSON'S OR ORGANIZATION'S intention to circulate and file a petition, a
description of no more than one hundred words of the principal provisions of the proposed law, constitutional amendment or
measure and the text of the proposed law, constitutional amendment or measure to be initiated or referred in no less than eight
point type, and applying for issuance of an official serial number. At the same time as the person or organization files its
application, the person or organization shall file with the secretary of state its statement of organization or its signed exemption
statement as prescribed by section 16ဩ902.01.೦ The secretary of state shall not accept an application for initiative or
referendum without an accompanying statement of organization or signed exemption statement as prescribed by this
subsection.
B. On receipt of the application, the secretary of state shall assign an official serial number to the petition, which
number shall appear in the lower rightဩhand corner of each side of each copy thereof, and issue that number to the

(263 of 432)
applicant. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL ASSIGN numbers shall be assigned to petitions by the secretary of state in
numerical sequence, and a record shall be maintained in his THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S office of each application
received and of the numbers assigned and issued to the applicant. WHEN THE APPLICATION IS RECEIVED BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND MARKED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WITH AN OFFICIAL TIME AND DATE OF
RECEIPT, THE TIMEဩANDဩDATE-MARKED TEXT THAT ACCOMPANIED THE APPLICATION CONSTITUTES THE
OFFICIAL COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND SHALL BE USED IN
ALL INSTANCES AS THE TEXT OF THE MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT
CHANGE IN THE TEXT OF THE MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BY THE APPLICANT, THE
APPLICANT SHALL FILE A NEW APPLICATION AND TEXT, SHALL BE ASSIGNED A NEW OFFICIAL SERIAL
NUMBER AND SHALL USE AS THE TEXT OF THE MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THE
TIMEဩAND-DATE-MARKED TEXT THAT ACCOMPANIED THE NEW APPLICATION.
C. The secretary of state shall make available to each applicant by electronic means a copy of the text of this article
governing the initiative and referendum and all rules adopted by the secretary of state pursuant to this title. In addition, the
secretary of state shall provide the applicant by electronic means the ability to file a statement of organization or five hundred
dollar threshold exemption statement and a notice stating: "This statement must be filed before valid signatures can be
collected." The secretary of state shall make available by electronic means a copy of the text of this article governing the
initiative and referendum and all rules adopted by the secretary of state pursuant to this title to the county, city and town clerks
who shall similarly furnish a copy to each applicant by electronic means.೦ If a member of the public so requests, the secretary
of state and the county, city and town clerks shall provide a copy in pamphlet form.
D. The eight point type required by subsection A of this section shall not apply to maps, charts or other graphics.
19-112. Signatures and verification; attachment; registration of circulators
A. Every qualified elector signing a petition shall do so in the presence of the person who is circulating the petition and
who is to execute the affidavit of verification. At the time of signing, the qualified elector shall sign his first and last names in
the spaces provided and the elector so signing shall print his first and last names and write, in the appropriate spaces following
the signature, the signer's residence address, giving street and number, and if he has no street address, a description of his
residence location. The elector so signing shall write, in the appropriate spaces following the elector's address, the date on
which the elector signed the petition.
B. The signature sheets shall be attached at all times during circulation to a full and correct copy of the title and text of
the measure or constitutional amendment proposed or referred by the petition. The title2and 0 text shall be in at least eight point
22
type and shall include both the original and the amended text. The text shally indicate , 20material deleted, if any, by printing the
ar
o n Januand shall indicate material added or new material by
material with a line drawn through the center of the letters of the material
d
iveSECRETARY
arch
printing the letters of the material in capital letters.೦ THE OF STATE'S TIMEဩANDဩDATE-MARKED COPY
OF THE MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL 5 8 4 5
AMENDMENT WITH ITS PROPOSED TEXT SET OUT IN FULL WITH
1
. 18-TEXT CONSTITUTES THE FULL AND CORRECT COPY AND IS THE ONLY
THE ORIGINAL AND THE AMENDED
bb s, No
VALID COPY OF THE o
v. HTITLE AND TEXT OF THE MEASURE FOR CIRCULATION FOR SIGNATURES. SIGNATURES
THAT ARE in DNC
COLLECTED WITH ANY COPY OF THE MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THAT IS NOT
cited
A FACSIMILE OF THE TIMEဩANDဩDATE-MARKED COPY WITH TITLE AND TEXT THAT IS IDENTICAL TO THE
TIMEဩANDဩDATE-MARKED COPY ARE INVALID.
C. The person before whom the signatures, names and addresses were written on the signature sheet shall, on the
affidavit form pursuant to this section, SHALL subscribe and swear before a notary public that each of the names on the sheet
was signed and the name and address were printed by the elector and the circulator on the date indicated, and that in his belief
each signer was a qualified elector of a certain county of the state, or, in the case of a city, town or county measure, of the city,
town or county affected by the measure on the date indicated, and that at all times during circulation of the signature sheet a
copy of the title and text was attached to the signature sheet. Circulators who are not residents of this state must be registered
as circulators with the secretary of state before circulating petitions. The secretary of state shall provide for a method of
receiving service of process for those petition circulators who register pursuant to this subsection. The secretary of state shall
establish in the instructions and procedures manual issued pursuant to section 16ဩ452 a procedure for registering circulators
and receiving service of process. All signatures of petitioners on a signature sheet shall be those of qualified electors who are
registered to vote in the same county.೦ However, if signatures from more than one county appear on the same signature sheet,
only the valid signatures from the same county that are most numerous on the signature sheet shall be counted. Signature and
handwriting comparisons may be made.
D. The affidavit shall be in the following form printed on the reverse side of each signature sheet:
Affidavit of Circulator
State of Arizona )
) ss.:
County of ___________)
(Where notarized)
I, (print name) , a person who is not required to be a resident of this state but who is otherwise
qualified to register to vote in the county of _______, in the state of Arizona at all times during my circulation
of this petition sheet, and under the penalty of a class 1 misdemeanor, depose and say that subject to section
19ဩ115, Arizona Revised Statutes, each individual printed the individual's own name and address and signed
this sheet of the foregoing petition in my presence on the date indicated and I believe that each signer's name
and residence address or post office address are correctly stated and that each signer is a qualified elector of
the state of Arizona (or in the case of a city, town or county measure, of the city, town or county affected by the

(264 of 432)
measure proposed to be initiated or referred to the people) and that at all times during circulation of this
signature sheet a copy of the title and text was attached to the signature sheet.
(Signature of affiant) ____________________
(Residence address, street
and number of affiant,
or if no street address, a
description of residence
location)
_________________________________
Subscribed and sworn to before me on __________________೦೦೦೦ __
(date)
__________________________________
Notary Public
___________________________, Arizona.
My commission expires on _________________.
(date)
(FORM SHALL INCLUDE A DESIGNATED LOCATION FOR NOTARY STAMP)
E. The eight point type required by subsection B OF THIS SECTION shall not apply to maps, charts or other
graphics.
19-121. Signature sheets; petitions; form; procedure for filing; evidence in challenge; definitions
A. Signature sheets filed shall:
1. Be in the form prescribed by law.
2. Have printed in its THEIR lower rightဩhand corner, on each side of such sheet SHEETS, the official serial number
assigned to the petition by the secretary of state.
3. Be attached to a full and correct copy of the title and text of the measure, or amendment to the constitution,
proposed or referred by the petition.೦ THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TIMEဩANDဩDATEဩMARKED COPY OF THE
MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONSTITUTES THE FULL AND CORRECT COPY AND IS THE
ONLY VALID COPY OF THE TITLE AND TEXT OF THE MEASURE FOR CIRCULATION FOR SIGNATURES.
4. Be printed in at least eight point type. 20
5. Be printed in black ink on white or recycled white pages fourteen
ry 2 2, 20in width by eight and oneဩhalf inches in
inches
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e d on J inch at the bottom of each page.
length, with a margin of at least oneဩhalf inch at the top and oneဩfourth
B. For THE purposes of this chapter, a petition v
hisi filed when the petition sheets are tendered to the secretary of state,
at which time WHO SHALL ISSUE a receipt 5 8
is 5 arc
4immediately issued by the secretary of state based on an estimate made to the
1
18-of sheets and signatures filed. After the issuance of the receipt, no additional petition
secretary of state of the purported No .
number
sheets may be accepted H bbs,
forofiling.
v .
DNC may be filed with the secretary of state in numbered sections for convenience in handling. Not more than
C. Petitions
cite d in
fifteen signatures on one sheet shall be counted. ೦THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE THAT FILES THE PETITIONS SHALL
ORGANIZE THE SIGNATURE SHEETS AND GROUP THEM BY THE COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF THE MAJORITY
OF THE PERSONS SIGNING THAT SIGNATURE SHEET, BY CIRCULATOR ON THAT SIGNATURE SHEET AND BY
THE NOTARY PUBLIC WHO NOTARIZED THE CIRCULATOR'S SIGNATURE ON THAT SHEET.೦ THE
SECRETARY OF STATE MAY RETURN AS UNFILED ANY SIGNATURE SHEETS THAT ARE NOT SO ORGANIZED
AND GROUPED.೦ BEFORE MAKING THE DETERMINATION THAT THE PETITIONS WERE IMPROPERLY
ORGANIZED AND THEREFORE NOT FILED, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL MAKE A REASONABLE CAUSE
FINDING PURSUANT TO SECTION 16ဩ924 THAT THE COMMITTEE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THIS SECTION
AND SHALL REFER THE MATTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECTION 16ဩ924.೦ THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY THEN ISSUE A COMPLIANCE ORDER DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE TO
REORGANIZE THE PETITIONS IN THE PROPER ORGANIZATION OR GROUPING. ANY REORGANIZATION
REQUIRED UNDER THIS SECTION DOES NOT EXTEND THE TIME FOR FILING.೦ THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
THAT IS THE PROPONENT OF THE PETITION IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THIS
SUBSECTION.
D. Initiative petitions which THAT have not been filed with the secretary of state as of 5:00 p.m. on the day required
by the constitution prior to BEFORE the ensuing general election after their issuance shall be null and void, but in no event
shall the secretary of state accept an initiative petition which THAT was issued for circulation more than twentyဩfour months
prior to BEFORE the general election at which the measure is to be included on the ballot.
E. For THE purposes of this article and article 4 OF THIS CHAPTER, the measure to be attached to the petition as
enacted by the legislative body of an incorporated city, OR town or A county means the adopted ordinance or resolution or, in
the absence of a written ordinance or resolution, that portion of the minutes of the legislative body that reflects the action taken
by that body when adopting the measure. In the case of zoning measures the measure shall also include a legal description of
the property and any amendments made to the ordinance by the legislative body.
F. ANY POLITICAL COMMITTEE MAY SUBMIT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FORTYဩFIVE DAYS
BEFORE THE DEADLINE FOR FILING ITS PETITION A LIST OF ALL PETITION CIRCULATORS WHO
CIRCULATED THAT PETITION AND A COPY OF A CRIMINAL RECORDS CHECK VERIFIED THROUGH SOURCE
DOCUMENTS PERFORMED ON EACH PETITION CIRCULATOR BY AN ENTITY LICENSED TO DO SO UNDER
TITLE 32, CHAPTER 24 OR SIMILARLY LICENSED IN ANOTHER STATE.೦ IF THE BACKGROUND CHECK WAS

(265 of 432)
PERFORMED AND PROVIDED BY A PERSON OR ENTITY WHO WAS ENGAGED IN AN ARM'S LENGTH
TRANSACTION WITH THE COMMITTEE, INCLUDING ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES, VENDORS, CONTRACTORS OR
SUBCONTRACTORS, A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION ARISES AND IN ANY CHALLENGE TO THOSE PETITION
CIRCULATORS, THE PRESUMPTION MUST BE OVERCOME BY A SHOWING OF A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THAT THE CIRCULATOR WAS NOT ELIGIBLE TO REGISTER TO VOTE IN THIS STATE.೦ THE
SECRETARY OF STATE MAY ADOPT BY RULE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A
TRANSACTION BETWEEN A POLITICAL COMMITTEE, ITS EMPLOYEES, VENDORS, CONTRACTORS AND
SUBCONTRACTORS AND THE PERSON OR ENTITY PROVIDING THE CIRCULATORS' BACKGROUND CHECKS
CONSTITUTES AN ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTION.೦ FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SUBSECTION:
1. "AFFILIATE" MEANS PARTIES THAT ARE RELATED BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, EMPLOYMENT OR
AGENCY, OR, IN THE CASE OF ENTITIES, THAT ARE UNDER DIRECT OR INDIRECT COMMON CONTROL OR
ONE OF WHICH CONTROLS THE OTHER.
2. "ARMS LENGTH TRANSACTION" MEANS AN AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE A CRIMINAL RECORDS
CHECK NEGOTIATED BETWEEN A WILLING COMMITTEE, INCLUDING ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES, VENDORS,
CONTRACTORS OR SUBCONTRACTORS AND A WILLING ENTITY LICENSED UNDER TITLE 32, CHAPTER 24 OR
SIMILARLY LICENSED IN ANOTHER STATE WHERE THE PARTIES ARE NOT AFFILIATES.
Sec. 10. Section 19-121.01, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
19-121.01. Secretary of state; removal of petition and ineligible signatures; facsimile sheets; random sample
A. Within twenty days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and other legal holidays, of the date of filing of an initiative or
referendum petition and issuance of the receipt, the secretary of state shall:
1. Remove the following:
(a) Those sheets not attached to a copy of the COMPLETE title and text of the measure THAT IS MARKED BY THE
OFFICIAL DATE AND TIME OF RECEIPT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
(b) The copy of the title and text from the remaining petition sheets.
(c) Those sheets not bearing the CORRECT petition serial number in the lower rightဩhand corner of each side.
(d) Those sheets containing a circulator's affidavit that is not completed or signed.
(e) Those sheets on which the affidavit of the circulator is not notarized, the notary's signature is missing, the notary's
commission has expired or the notary's seal is not affixed.
(f) Those sheets on which the signatures of the circulator or the notary are dated earlier than the dates on which the
electors signed the face of the petition sheet. 20
(g) Beginning after November 2, 2010, Those sheets that are circulated
ry 2 2, 20
by a circulator who is prohibited from
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participating in any election, initiative, referendum or recall campaign
e d on J pursuant to section 19-119.01.
2. After completing the steps in paragraph c v
r 1 hofi this subsection, review each sheet to determine the county of the
majority of the signers and shall: 15 8 45 a
-
(a) Place a three or four
s o. 18
, Nletter abbreviation designating that county in the upper rightဩhand corner of the face of the
b b
petition. v. Ho
(b)
in DNC all signatures of those not in the county of the majority on each sheet by marking an "SS" in red ink in the
Remove
citedto the right of the signature line.
margin
(c) Cause all signature sheets to be grouped together by county of registration of the majority of those signing and
attach them to one or more copies of the title and text of the measure. If the sheets are too bulky for convenient grouping by the
secretary of state in one volume by county, they may be bound in two or more volumes with those in each volume attached to a
single printed copy of the measure. The remaining detached copies of the title and text of the measure shall be delivered to the
applicant.
3. After completing the steps in paragraph 2 of this subsection, remove the following signatures that are not eligible for
verification by marking an "SS" in red ink in the margin to the right of the signature line:
(a) If the signature of the qualified elector is missing.
(b) If the residence address or the description of residence location is missing.
(c) If the date on which the petitioner signed is missing.
(d) Signatures in excess of the fifteen signatures permitted per petition.
(e) Signatures withdrawn pursuant to section 19ဩ113.
(f) Beginning after November 2, 2010, Signatures for which the secretary of state determines that the petition
circulator has printed the elector's first and last names or other information in violation of section 19ဩ112.
4. After the removal of petition sheets and signatures, count the number of signatures for verification on the remaining
petition sheets and note that number in the upper rightဩhand corner of the face of each petition sheet immediately above the
county designation.
5. Number the remaining petition sheets that were not previously removed and that contain signatures eligible for
verification in consecutive order on the front side of each petition sheet in the upper leftဩhand corner.
6. Count all remaining petition sheets and signatures not previously removed and issue a receipt to the applicant of this
total number eligible for verification.
B. If the total number of signatures for verification as determined pursuant to subsection A, paragraph 6 of this section
equals or exceeds the constitutional minimum, the secretary of state, during the same twenty day period provided in subsection
A of this section, shall select, at random, five per cent of the total signatures eligible for verification by the county recorders of
the counties in which the persons signing the petition claim to be qualified electors. The random sample of signatures to be
verified shall be drawn in such a manner that every signature eligible for verification has an equal chance of being included in
the sample. The random sample produced shall identify each signature selected by petition page and line number. The

(266 of 432)
signatures selected shall be marked according to the following procedure:
1. Using red ink, mark the selected signature by circling the line number and drawing a line from the base of the circle
extending into the left margin.
2. If a signature line selected for the random sample is found to be blank or was removed from the verification process
pursuant to subsection A of this section and is marked with an "SS", then the next line down, even if that requires going to the
next petition sheet in sequence, on which an eligible signature appears shall be selected as a substitute if that line has not already
been selected for the random sample. If the next eligible line is already being used in the random sample, the secretary of state
shall proceed back up the page from the signature line originally selected for the random sample to the next previous signature
line eligible for verification. If that line is already being used in the random sample, the secretary of state shall continue moving
down the page or to the next page from the line originally selected for the random sample and shall select the next eligible
signature as its substitute for the random sample. The secretary of state shall use this process of alternately moving forward
and backward until a signature eligible for verification and not already included in the random sample can be selected and
substituted.
C. After the selection of the random sample and the marking of the signatures selected on the original petition sheets
pursuant to subsection B of this section, the secretary of state shall reproduce a facsimile of the front of each signature sheet on
which a signature included in the random sample appears. The secretary of state shall clearly identify those signatures marked
for verification by color highlighting or other similar method and shall transmit by personal delivery or certified mail to each
county recorder a facsimile sheet of each signature sheet on which a signature appears of any individual who claims to be a
qualified elector of that county and whose signature was selected for verification as part of the random sample.
D. The secretary of state shall retain in custody all signature sheets removed pursuant to this section except as
otherwise prescribed in this title.
19-121.02. Certification by county recorder
A. Within fifteen days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and other legal holidays, after receiving the facsimile signature
sheets from the secretary of state pursuant to section 19ဩ121.01, the county recorder shall determine which signatures of
individuals whose names were transmitted shall be disqualified for any of the following reasons:
1. No residence address or description of residence location is provided.
2. No date of signing is provided.
3. The signature is illegible and the signer is otherwise unidentifiable.
4. The address provided is illegible or nonexistent. 20
22, 20
5. The individual was not a qualified elector on the date of signing they petition.
r
anua
6. The individual was a registered voter but was not at least
e d on Jeighteen years of age on the date of signing the petition or
affidavit.
rchi v
7. The signature was disqualified after 15 845 a
comparison with the signature on the affidavit of registration.
o . 18- once, all but one otherwise valid signature shall be disqualified.
N
8. If a petitioner signed,more than
9. For the vsame bbs any signatures or entire petition sheets could have been removed by the secretary of state
Horeasons
.
pursuant to DNC 19ဩ121.01, subsection A, paragraph 1 OR 3.
insection
citedB. Within the same time period provided in subsection A of this section, the county recorder shall certify to the
secretary of state the following:
1. The name of any individual whose signature was included in the random sample and disqualified by the county
recorder together with the petition page and line number of the disqualified signature.
2. The total number of signatures selected for the random sample and transmitted to the county recorder for
verification and the total number of random sample signatures disqualified.
C. The secretary of state shall prescribe the form of the county recorder's certification.
D. At the time of the certification, the county recorder shall:
1. Return the facsimile signature sheets to the secretary of state.
2. Send notice of the results of the certification by mail to the person or organization that submitted the initiative or
referendum petitions and to the secretary of state.
19-121.04. Disposition of petitions by secretary of state
A. Within seventyဩtwo hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and other legal holidays, after receipt of the facsimile
signature sheets and the certification of each county recorder, the secretary of state shall determine the total number of valid
signatures by subtracting from the total number of eligible signatures determined pursuant to section 19ဩ121.01, subsection A,
paragraph 6 in the following order:
1. All signatures on petitions containing a defective circulator's affidavit.
2. All signatures that were found ineligible by the county recorders and that were not subtracted pursuant to
paragraph 1 of this subsection.
3. After determining the percentage of all signatures found to be invalid in the random sample, a like percentage from
those signatures remaining after the subtractions performed pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this subsection.
B. If the actual number of signatures on the remaining sheets after any such subtraction equals or exceeds the
minimum number required by the constitution or if the number of valid signatures as projected from the random sample
pursuant to subsection A of this section is at least one hundred per cent of the minimum number required by the constitution,
the secretary of state shall issue the following receipt to the person or organization that submitted them:
___________________ signature pages bearing _____________ signatures for initiative (referendum)
petition serial number ____ have been refused for filing in this office because the person circulating them was

(267 of 432)
a county recorder or justice of the peace at the time of circulating the petition or due to defects in the
circulator's affidavit AS PROVIDED BY LAW. A total of ________________ signatures included on the
remaining petition sheets were found to be ineligible. Of the total random sample of _______________
signatures, a total of __________ signatures were invalidated by the county recorders resulting in a failure rate
of _________ per cent. The actual number of remaining signatures for such initiative (referendum) petition
number ________ are equal to or in excess of the minimum required by the constitution to place a measure on
the general election ballot. The number of valid signatures filed with this petition, based on the random
sample, appears to be at least one hundred five per cent of the minimum required or through examination of
each signature has been certified to be greater than the minimum required by the constitution.
Date:_______________________ _____________________________ Secretary of State
೦ (Seal)
The secretary of state shall then forthwith notify the governor that a sufficient number of signatures has been filed and that the
initiative or referendum shall be placed on the ballot in the manner provided by law.
C. If the number of valid signatures as projected from the random sample is less than one hundred per cent of the
minimum number required by the constitution or if the actual number of signatures on the remaining sheets after any such
subtraction from the random sample or after certification fails to equal or exceed the minimum required by the constitution, the
secretary of state shall immediately return RETAIN the original signature sheets, in the form filed by him under section 19ဩ121,
to UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF ANY LITIGATION REGARDING THE MEASURE OR UNTIL THE TIME HAS
EXPIRED FOR ANY LITIGATION.೦ THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL PROVIDE TO the person or organization that
submitted them, together with a certified statement that, for the following reasons, the petition lacks the minimum number of
signatures to place it on the general election ballot:
1. Signature sheets bearing secretary of state page numbers _________ and bearing signatures of
____________ persons appeared on petitions containing a defective circulator's affidavit SIGNATURE PAGES
THAT WERE REQUIRED TO BE REMOVED.
2. A total of signatures on the remaining petition sheets were found to be ineligible.
3. A total of signatures included in the random sample have been certified by the county
recorders as ineligible at the time such petition was signed and a projection from such random sample has
indicated that _____________ more signatures are ineligible to appear on the petition.
A facsimile of the certifications of the county recorders under section 19ဩ121.02 shall accompany the signature sheets returned
to the person or organization that submitted them. 20
2
Sec. 13. Title 19, chapter 2, article 1, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended 20adding
2, by section 19-201.01, to read:
ry
19-201.01. Legislative findings and intent; strict compliance J a nua
d on
THE LEGISLATURE FINDS AND DETERMINES
a rc hive THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 5845 AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR RECALL PROVIDE
o . 18-1
THE SUREST METHOD FOR, SAFEGUARDING N THE INTEGRITY AND ACCURACY OF THE RECALL PROCESS.೦
THEREFORE, THEvLEGISLATURE H obbs DECLARES THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
FOR RECALL DNBEC .STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND THAT PERSONS USING THE RECALL PROCESS STRICTLY
in
cited WITH THOSE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
COMPLY
19-202.01. Application for recall petition
A. A person or organization intending to file a recall petition shall, before causing the petition to be printed and
circulated, submit an application setting forth his THE FOLLOWING:
1. THE PERSON'S name AND ADDRESS or, if an organization, its name AND ADDRESS and the names and titles of
its officers. , address, his
2. THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION'S intention to circulate and submit such A RECALL petition. ,
3. The text of the general statement required by section 19ဩ203 and a request for issuance of an official number to be
printed on the signature sheets of the petition.
B. Such THE application AND PETITION shall be submitted AS A SINGLE DOCUMENT to the office of secretary of
state if for recall of a state officer, including a member of the state legislature, or a member of Congress, and with the county
officer in charge of elections if for a county or district officer or superior court judge, with the city or town clerk if for a city or
town officer and with the county school superintendent if for a governing board member of a school district.
B. C. On receipt of the application AND PETITION, the receiving officer shall forthwith assign a number to the
petition, which number shall appear in the lower rightဩhand corner on each side of each signature sheet, and issue that number
to the applicant. A record shall be maintained by the receiving officer of each application received, of the date of its receipt and
of the number assigned and issued to the applicant.
D. WHEN THE APPLICATION IS RECEIVED BY THE FILING OFFICER AND MARKED BY THE FILING
OFFICER WITH AN OFFICIAL DATE AND TIME OF RECEIPT, THE TIMEဩANDဩDATEဩMARKED APPLICATION,
INCLUDING THE GENERAL STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 19-203, CONSTITUTES THE OFFICIAL COPY
OF THE TEXT OF THE RECALL AND SHALL BE USED IN ALL INSTANCES AS THE TEXT OF THE RECALL.೦ FOR
ANY SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN THE TEXT OF THE RECALL BY THE APPLICANT, INCLUDING ANY CHANGE IN
THE GENERAL STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 19-203, THE APPLICANT SHALL FILE A NEW
APPLICATION, SHALL RECEIVE A NEW OFFICIAL SERIAL NUMBER AND SHALL USE AS THE TEXT OF THE
RECALL THE TIME-AND-DATE-MARKED TEXT THAT ACCOMPANIED THE NEW APPLICATION.
19-203. Recall petition; contents; submission for verification; nonacceptance

(268 of 432)
A. A recall petition shall contain a general statement of not more than two hundred words stating the grounds of the
demand for the recall. The petition shall be submitted for verification of signatures to ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:
1. The office of the secretary of state if for a state officer, including a member of the legislature or a member of
Congress. , with
2. The county officer in charge of elections if for a county or district officer or superior court judge. , with
3. The city or town clerk if for a city or town officer and with the county school superintendent if for a governing
board member of a school district.
B. No recall petition is considered filed for purposes of this chapter until the verification process is complete and the
petition is filed pursuant to section 19ဩ208.03, subsection A, paragraph 1.
B. C. A recall petition shall not be accepted for such verification if more than one hundred twenty days have passed
since the date of submission of the application for recall petition, as prescribed by section 19ဩ202.01.
D. THE FILING OFFICER'S TIMEဩANDဩDATE-MARKED COPY OF THE APPLICATION, INCLUDING THE
GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS FOR RECALL, CONSTITUTES THE FULL AND CORRECT COPY OF
THE RECALL TEXT AND IS THE ONLY VALID COPY FOR CIRCULATION FOR SIGNATURES.೦ SIGNATURES
THAT ARE COLLECTED WITH ANY COPY OF THE RECALL TEXT THAT IS NOT A FACSIMILE OF THE
TIMEဩANDဩDATEဩMARKED COPY WITH THE COMPLETE TEXT THAT IS IDENTICAL TO THE TIMEဩANDဩDATE-
MARKED COPY ARE INVALID.
Sec. 16. Applicability; permanent early voting list; early ballots; 2012 and 2014 primary and general elections;
secretary of state voter outreach campaign
A. Notwithstanding section 16-544, Arizona Revised Statutes, as amended by this act, for voters on the permanent
early voting list who did not vote an early ballot in the 2012 primary and general elections and the 2014 primary and general
elections, county officers in charge of elections may send the notices prescribed by section 16-544, subsection L, Arizona Revised
Statutes, as amended by this act, and modify their permanent early voting lists.
B. In 2013 and 2014, the secretary of state, in conjunction with county and local elections officials, shall implement a
statewide public information and voter outreach program to educate and inform voters regarding the possible removal of voters
from the permanent early voting list, including the basis for that removal and methods for a voter to avoid removal or to be
added to the permanent early voting list, if desired. The statewide public information and voter outreach program shall include
print and radio advertisements, including advertisements directed at persons who reside in locations with limited services and
persons who receive official elections materials in languages other than English.
Sec. 17. Candidate petition signature collection; date of collection; validity; number
Candidate nomination petition signatures that are properly collectedyand 2 202as0 otherwise provided by law are valid
2,filed
r
anua
without regard to whether those signatures are collected beforenthe
ed o J effective date of this act but the number of signatures
v
racthishall be as prescribed by section 16-322, Arizona Revised Statutes, as
required for a candidate after the effective date of this c
amended by this act. 1 58 45 a
. 18-
b b s , No
Sec. 18. Retroactive applicability
Section 16ဩ924, o
v. HArizona Revised Statutes, as amended by this act, is applicable to reasonable cause findings made from
and after July
in NC2012.
D31,
citedSec. 19. Severability
If a provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect
other provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end
the provisions of this act are severable.
LegiScan is an impartial and nonpartisan legislative tracking and reporting service utilizing GAITS and LegiScan API
Contact Us · Terms · Privacy · 800-618-2750

2000 Presidential General Election Results
(269 of 432)
2000 OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
General Election Date: 11/7/00
Updated: December 2001 Source: State Elections Offices
CHART 1 OF 3
STATE BROWN BROWNE BUCHANAN BUSH DODGE GORE HAGELIN HARRIS

AL 5,893 6,351 941,173 692,611 447
AK 2,636 5,192 167,398 79,004 919
AZ 12,373 781,652 685,341 1,120
AR 2,781 7,358 472,940 422,768 1,098
CA 45,520 44,987 4,567,429 5,861,203 10,934
CO 12,799 10,465 883,748 208 738,227 2,240 216
CT 3,484 4,731 561,094 816,015 *40 *4
DE 774 777 137,288 180,068 107
DC 669 18,073 171,923 114
FL 16,415 17,484 2,912,790 2,912,253 2,281 562
GA 36,332 10,926 1,419,720 1,116,230 *11
HI 1,477 1,071 137,845 205,286 306
ID 3,488 7,615 336,937 138,637 1,177
IL 11,623 16,106 2,019,421 2,589,026 2,127
IN 15,530 16,959 1,245,836 901,980 *167
IA 3,209 5,731 634,373 638,517 2,281 190
KS 4,525 7,370 622,332 399,276 1,375
KY 2,896 4,173 872,492 638,898 1,533
20
LA 2,951 14,356 927,871
ry 22, 20 792,344 1,075 1,103
ME 3,074 4,443 286,616 anua 319,951
ed on J
MD 5,310 4,248 hi
813,797 v 1,145,782 *176
MA 16,366
5 arc
11,149 8-1584878,502 1,616,487 2,884
.1
MI 16,711 bbs, No
*1,851 1,953,139 2,170,418 2,426
v. Ho
MN 5,282 C 22,166 1,109,659 1,168,266 2,294 1,022
in DN
MS cited 2,009 2,265 572,844 404,614 450 613
MO 7,436 9,818 1,189,924 1,111,138 1,104
MT 1,718 5,697 240,178 137,126 675
NE 2,245 3,646 433,862 231,780 478
NV 3,311 4,747 301,575 279,978 415
NH 2,757 2,615 273,559 266,348 *55
NJ 6,312 6,989 1,284,173 1,788,850 2,215 844
NM 2,058 1,392 286,417 286,783 361
NY 7,649 31,599 2,403,374 4,107,697 24,361 1,789
NC 12,307 8,874 1,631,163 1,257,692
ND 660 7,288 174,852 95,284 313
OH 13,475 26,724 2,351,209 2,186,190 6,169 *10
OK 6,602 9,014 744,337 474,276
OR 7,447 7,063 713,577 720,342 2,574
PA 11,248 16,023 2,281,127 2,485,967
RI 742 2,273 130,555 249,508 271 34
SC 4,876 3,519 785,937 565,561 942
SD 1,662 3,322 190,700 118,804
TN 1,606 4,284 4,250 1,061,949 981,720 613
TX 23,160 12,394 3,799,639 2,433,746
UT 3,616 9,319 515,096 203,053 763 186
VT 784 2,192 119,775 149,022 219 70
VA 15,198 5,455 1,437,490 1,217,290 *171
WA 13,135 7,171 1,108,864 1,247,652 2,927 304
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm[1/22/2020 5:28:49 PM]

(270 of 432)
WV 1,912 3,169 336,475 295,497 367
WI 6,640 11,471 1,237,279 1,242,987 853 306
WY 1,443 2,724 147,947 60,481 411
1,606 384,431 448,895 50,456,002 208 50,999,897 83,714 7,378
Total:
.00% .36% .42% 47.87% .00% 48.38% .08% .01%
Back to Top of Page

CHART 2 OF 3
LANE MCREYNOLDS MOOREHEAD NADER PHILLIPS SMITH VENSON YOUNGKEIT

STATE
AL 18,323 775
AK 28,747 596
AZ 45,645 *110 5,775
AR 13,421 1,415
CA *28 418,707 17,042
CO 712 91,434 1,319
CT 64,452 9,695
DE 8,307 208
DC 10,576
FL 622 1,804 97,488 1,371
GA *13,432 *140
HI 21,623 343
ID *12,292 1,469
IL *4 103,759 *57
IN *43 *18,531 *200 20
ry 2 2, 20
IA 107 29,374
Janua613
KS d on
36,086 1,254
archive
KY 5845 23,192 923
o. 18-1
LA N 20,473 5,483
Hobbs,
ME C v. 37,127 579
MD ed in DN 53,768 919
cit
MA *42 173,564
MI 84,165 3,791
MN 126,696 3,272
MS 8,122 3,267
MO 38,515 1,957
MT 24,437 1,155
NE 24,540 468
NV 15,008 621
NH 22,198 328
NJ 1,880 94,554 1,409
NM 21,251 343
NY *2 244,030 1,498
NC *1,226
ND 9,486 373
OH 117,857 3,823
OK
OR 77,357 2,189
PA 103,392 14,428
RI 52 199 25,052 97
SC 20,200 1,682
SD 1,781
TN 19,781 1,015 535
TX *63 137,994 *567

(271 of 432)
UT 35,850 2,709 161
VT 1,044 161 20,374 153
VA 59,398 1,809
WA 660 1,729 103,002 1,989
WV 10,680 *23
WI 1,063 94,070 2,042
WY *4,625 720
1,044 5,602 4,795 2,882,955 98,020 5,775 535 161
Total:
.00% .00% .00% 2.74% .09% .00% .00% .00%
Back to Top of Page

CHART 3 OF 3
WRITE-IN NONE OF THESE TOTAL VOTES ELECTORAL VOTE ELECTORAL VOTE

(MISCELLANEOUS) CANDIDATES CAST BUSH GORE
STATE
AL 699 1,666,272 9
AK 1,068 285,560 3
AZ 1,532,016 8
AR 921,781 6
CA 6 10,965,856 54
CO 1,741,368 8
CT 10 1,459,525 8
DE 93 327,622 3
DC 539 201,894 2##
FL 40 5,963,110 25
GA 13 2,596,804 13 20
ry 22, 20
HI # 367,951 anua 4
ID 6 501,621ed on J 4
iv
IL 45 arch
4,742,123 22
-158
IN 56 s, No. 18 2,199,302 12
b
IA 1,168 v. Hob 1,315,563 7
C
in DN
KS cited 1,072,218 6
KY 80 1,544,187 8
LA # 1,765,656 9
ME 27 651,817 4
MD 1,480 2,025,480 10
MA 3,990 2,702,984 12
MI 4,232,501 18
MN 28 2,438,685 10
MS 994,184 7
MO 2,359,892 11
MT 11 410,997 3
NE # 697,019 5
NV # 3,315 608,970 4
NH 1,221 569,081 4
NJ 3,187,226 15
NM # 598,605 5
NY ** 6,821,999 33
NC 2,911,262 14
ND 288,256 3
OH 4,705,457 21
OK # 1,234,229 8
OR 3,419 1,533,968 7
PA 934 4,913,119 23
RI 329 409,112 4

(272 of 432)
SC # 1,382,717 8
SD # 316,269 3
TN 428 2,076,181 11
TX 74 6,407,637 32
UT 1 770,754 5
VT 514 294,308 3
VA 2,636 2,739,447 13
WA 2,487,433 11
WV 1 648,124 5
WI 1,896 2,598,607 11
WY 218,351 3
20,767 3,315
Total: 105,405,100 271 266
.02% .00%
NOTES
* Write-in Votes.
** 138,216 Miscellaneous write-in, blank and void votes were compiled as one total. This figure is not included in Total Votes
Cast.
# Write-in votes for Presidential candidates not permitted.
## The District of Columbia has 3 electoral votes. There was 1 abstention.
Total Electoral Vote = 538

Total Electoral Vote Needed to Elect = 270
Back to Top of Page
20
ry 2 2, 20
ADDRESSES AND PARTY DESIGNATIONS OF 2000 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES anua ON THE GENERAL ELECTION
BALLOTS e d on J
rchi v
15 845 a
-
s o. 18 reports filed by a candidate's principal campaign committee. The
(Note: Links are provided to an index of campaign finance
, Nwhose
bb
candidate may have additional authorized committees, reports can be found by searching the Commission's Imaging system.)
N C v. Ho
in D
cited
Cathy Gordon Brown (I)
2206 Dabbs Avenue
Old Hickory, TN 37138
Harry Browne (LBT, LBT-IA, LBF, I)

Harry Browne for President, Inc.
PMB 212, 4740 East Sunrise Drive
Tucson, AZ 85718
http://www.harrybrowne.org/
800/777-2000, 202/521-1200
Patrick J. Buchanan (REF, RFM, FRE, BP, BR, CF, IDP, RTL, I)
Committee to Elect Patrick J. Buchanan
8233 Old Courthouse Road, Suite 200
Vienna, VA 22182
http://www.buchananreform.com
703/734-2700
George W. Bush (R, C)

Bush-Cheney 2000, Inc
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 200
Austin, TX 78701
http://www.georgewbush.com
512/637-2000
Earl F. Dodge (P)

P.O. Box 2635
Denver, CO 80201
303/237-4947
Al Gore (D, DFL, DNL, L, WF)

(273 of 432)
Gore/Lieberman, Inc.
601 Mainstream Drive
Nashville, TN 37228
http://www.algore.com/
615/340-2000
John S. Hagelin (NL, NLF, N, IDP, REF, I, U)

Hagelin/Goldhaber
402 North B Street, P.O. Box 1900
Fairfield, IA 52556
http://www.hagelin.org/
877/424-3546, 515/472-2040
James E. Harris, Jr. (SWC, SWP, FSW, I)

520 Park Avenue, S.E., #2
Atlanta, GA 30312
Denny Lane (GRT-VT)

P.O. Box 537
Waitsfield, VT 05673
http://members.aol.com/rootsparty/lane.html
David McReynolds (SOC, SFL, LU, I)

McReynolds 2000 Committee
339 Lafayette Street, #303
New York, NY 10012
http://www.votesocialist.org/
212/780-9405
Monica Moorehead (WW, I)

Workers World Party Presidential Campaign Committee (Moorehead)
55 West 17th Street, 5th Floor
20
New York, NY 10011
ry 22, 20
nua
http://www.vote4workers.org/
n Ja
212/ 255-0352 hived o
rc
1 5845 a
-
s o 18 GRM, GI, HGR, IG, PG, UC, PRO, WG, I)
Ralph Nader (GRN, GRA, DCG,.GPF,
, N2000
b
Nader
b General Committee, Inc.
N C v. Ho P.O. Box 18002
in D
cited Washington, D.C. 20036
http://www.votenader.com/
202/265-4000
Howard Phillips (CON, CST, AIP, AMC, BP, CNC, CPF, IAP, UST, I)
Phillips 2000, Inc.
450 Maple Avenue East
Vienna, VA 22180
http://www.phillips2000.com/
703/242-0613
L. Neil Smith (LBT)

3415 South McClintock, #111-913
Tempe, AZ 85282
Randall Venson (I)

Randall Venson for President Committee
P.O. Box 330668
Nashville, TN 37203
Louie G. Youngkeit (UN)

1979 West Center
Provo, UT 84601
Back to Top of Page
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS OF PARTY NAMES AND IDENTIFYING LABELS
AIP = AMERICAN INDEPENDENT

AMC = AMERICAN CONSTITUTION PARTY
BP = BY PETITION
BR = BUCHANAN REFORM

(274 of 432)
C = CONSERVATIVE
CF = CITIZENS FIRST
CNC = CONCERNED CITIZENS
CON = CONSTITUTION
CPF = CONSTITUTION PARTY OF FLORIDA
CST = CONSTITUTIONAL
D = DEMOCRATIC
DCG = D.C. STATEHOOD GREEN
DFL = DEMOCRATIC-FARMER LABOR
DNL = DEMOCRATIC-NONPARTISAN LEAGUE
FRE = FREEDOM
FSW = FLORIDA SOCIALIST WORKERS
GI = GREEN INDEPENDENT
GPF = GREEN PARTY OF FLORIDA
GRA = GREEN PARTY OF ARKANSAS
GRM = MASSACHUSETTS GREEN PARTY
GRN = GREEN
GRT-VT = VERMONT GRASSROOTS
HGR = HAWAII GREEN
I = INDEPENDENT
IAP = INDEPENDENT AMERICAN
IDP = INDEPENDENCE
IG = IOWA GREEN PARTY
L = LIBERAL
LBF = LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF FLORIDA
LBT-IA = LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF IOWA
LBT = LIBERTARIAN
LU = LIBERTY UNION
N = NONPARTISAN
NL = NATURAL LAW
NLF = NATURAL LAW PARTY OF FLORIDA
P = PROHIBITION PARTY
PG = PACIFIC GREEN
PRO = PROGRESSIVE
R = REPUBLICAN
REF = REFORM
RFM = REFORM PARTY MINNESOTA
RTL = RIGHT TO LIFE
20
SFL = SOCIALIST PARTY OF FLORIDA
ry 22, 20
anua
SOC = SOCIALIST PARTY USA
SWC = SOCIALIST WORKERS CAMPAIGN
on J
ived
arch
SWP = SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
U = UNENROLLED
845
-15
o. 18
UC = UNITED CITIZENS
UN = s, N
UNAFFILIATED
Ho bbTAXPAYERS
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United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548
September 14, 2004
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman

Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives 20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
Subject: Department of Justice’s Activitiesrcto hi Address Past Election-Related Voting
v
Irregularities 15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
o
v. Hin
Election-day problems
DNC Florida and elsewhere in November 2000 raised concerns
in
citedsystems that included, among other things, alleged voting irregularities
about voting
that may have affected voter access to the polls. The term voting irregularities
generally refers to a broad array of complaints relating to voting and/or elections that
may involve violations of federal voting rights and/or federal criminal law for which
the Department of Justice (DOJ) has enforcement responsibilities.
You requested that we review activities at DOJ to help ensure voter access to the
polls and actions to address allegations of voting irregularities. This report
(1) identifies and describes changes DOJ has made since November 2000 to help
ensure voter access to the polls; (2) identifies and describes actions that the Voting
Section in DOJ’s Civil Rights Division has taken to track, address, and assess
allegations of election-related1 voting irregularities received between November 2000
2
and December 2003; and (3) assesses the Voting Section’s internal control activities
1
Election-related refers to a preliminary investigation, matter, or case that the Voting Section initiated based on allegations about
a specific election. A matter is an activity that has been assigned an identification number but has not resulted in a court filing of
a complaint, indictment, or information. A case is an activity that has been assigned the same identification number that it had as
a matter and has resulted in the court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information.
2
Internal controls are integral components of an organization’s management that provide reasonable assurances of objectives
that include, among other things, efficient operations. They comprise the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions,
goals, and objectives and, in doing so, support performance-based management. For additional information on internal controls,
see GAO Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington,
D.C.:November 1, 1999).
GAO-04-1041R DOJ Activities to Address Past Voting Irregularities

(276 of 432)
to help ensure relevant, accurate, and reliable recording and documentation of

allegations of voting irregularities to accurately track actions taken in response to
allegations and provide accurate and complete information to the public and
congressional committees.
We primarily performed our work at DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, Voting Section. We
obtained relevant documentation and interviewed responsible officials regarding
DOJ’s activities to help ensure voter access to the polls. To identify and describe
changes made since November 2000, we reviewed documentation on DOJ’s efforts to
monitor and observe elections, increase emphasis on enforcement of minority
language and overseas voters’ rights, disseminate election-related guidance, and
increase its resources to address voting issues. To identify and describe actions that
the Voting Section took to track, address, and assess allegations of voting
irregularities, we reviewed telephone logs and 34 files with information on a
preliminary investigation, matters, and cases that the Voting Section considered to be
election-related voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003.
To assess the Voting Section’s internal controls, we obtained available documentation
of policies, procedures, and techniques the Voting Section has to manage allegations
of voting irregularities and considered them in relation to GAO’s internal control
standards. We also interviewed officials and obtained documentation from DOJ’s
Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section (PIN), in relation to the0coordination
22, 202
between the Voting Section and PIN to address voter access
nuar
y to the polls.
n Ja
chived o
On August 31, 2004, we provided your 5 ar a briefing document on the results of our
staffs
18-1584
work. Enclosure I contains sthe .
omaterials we presented at that time. Our audit work
obb ,N
H
was performed in Washington, D.C., from May 2003 through August 2004 in
C v.
accordance ed in DN
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
cit
Background
The Voting Section in the Civil Rights Division is charged with the responsibility of
enforcing federal voting rights statutes that are designed to safeguard the right to
vote of racial and language minorities; disabled, elderly, and illiterate persons; and
military and overseas voters, among others. The Voting Section is also charged with
the responsibility of enforcing federal statutes that, among other things, address
issues such as voter registration, provisional voting, and voter information.
Provisional voting permits eligible persons to vote on election day if their names are
not on voter registration lists, with the understanding that each person’s eligibility
will be verified after the election and their votes counted, if eligible. (See enc. I, and
attach. I, for more information on statutes that the Voting Section enforces.)
The Voting Section, among other things, monitors election-day activities to ensure
voting rights are protected and initiates investigations and opens matters—an activity
that has not resulted in a court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information—to
examine allegations of voting irregularities that fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil
Rights Division. If warranted, a matter may culminate in a case—an activity that has
resulted in the filing of a complaint, indictment, or information with a federal court.
Page 2 GAO-04-1041R DOJ Activities to Address Past Voting Irregularities

(277 of 432)
The Voting Section also may initiate matters to monitor private lawsuits. Voting
Section attorneys are generally responsible for conducting investigations and
prosecuting cases.
The Voting Section also coordinates with PIN to refer allegations the Voting Section
receives that involve violations of criminal statutes related to voting fraud. For
example, in relation to the 2002 federal election, the Voting Section referred three
matters deemed to be potential violations of criminal laws to PIN, which assumed
responsibility for the investigations. In addition, the Voting Section and PIN have
provided joint training to Assistant U.S. Attorneys, with the Voting Section presenting
information about civil rights statutes that are to protect the right to vote and PIN
presenting information about criminal statutes that are to prevent election fraud.
Results
Since November 2000, DOJ has implemented changes to help ensure voter access to
the polls. The Voting Section emphasized the importance of its monitoring of
election-day activities and increased its monitoring of these activities. In 2000, DOJ
attorneys and professional staff monitored elections in 5 counties in 5 states. By 2002,
the number of election jurisdictions monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional
staff increased to 19 counties in 10 states, with monitoring of elections20 in counties in
Florida accounting for the bulk of the increase. The Voting ry 22, 20 also (1) placed a
Section
nua
n Ja
greater priority on protecting the voting rightsiveofd olanguage minority voters by helping
arch
to ensure that certain covered jurisdictions45 provided bilingual voting materials for
. 18-158
elections; (2) placed a priority Noon enforcing and preparing for compliance with the
Hobbs,
federal statute to help
C v. ensure voting rights of overseas voters; (3) provided additional
training to in DN U.S. Attorneys on civil rights statutes to educate them about
Assistant
ed
cit
voters’ rights; and (4) provided guidance to states regarding the implementation of
sections of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) that DOJ enforces.3 For
example, the Voting Section provided guidance to states by issuing a press release
that outlined provisions of HAVA that took effect on January 1, 2004, such as
provisional voting and identification requirements for new voters who register by
mail.
The Attorney General directed the Civil Rights Division to work with civil rights
leaders, state and local election officials, and U.S. Attorney Offices prior to election
day in an effort to help ensure that citizens’ voting rights are protected. The Attorney
General also directed the Criminal Division to work with these same groups in
helping to preserve ballot integrity and prevent election offenses. Almost all of the
U.S. Attorney Offices reported that they had contacted various state or local officials
prior to the November 2002 election. Voting Section officials reported that the
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division and staff from that division
met with various civil rights organizations.
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 15301 to 15545.

(278 of 432)
According to Voting Section officials, DOJ plans to help ensure voter access for the
upcoming November 2004 election include increasing its monitoring of elections,
coordinating with civil rights organizations, and establishing procedures for bringing
the concerns of civil rights organizations about specific issues or jurisdictions to DOJ
on or before election day in November 2004. Voting Section officials also said that
final decisions as to where monitoring will be conducted are not made public until
shortly before an election. (See enc. I for more information.)
The Voting Section has used several means of tracking allegations of voting
irregularities and the Section’s actions with regard to those allegations. First, the
Voting Section used telephone logs to track telephone calls regarding allegations of
voting irregularities it received related to the November 2000 and 2002 elections.
According to the Voting Section, contractors were hired to help handle the
unprecedented number of calls that were received concerning the November 2000
election situation to help ensure that the public would be able to voice opinions and
concerns. Second, DOJ tracks matters and cases through its Interactive Case
Management (ICM) system—its formal process for tracking and managing work
activities. Prior to opening a matter, the Voting Section may make a determination
that an allegation does not fall within DOJ’s jurisdiction or may initiate a preliminary
investigation about an allegation. Third, the Voting Section tracked monitoring of
elections using logs and for some election-monitoring activities 0they
0 opened matters;
22,2 2
thus, it has not routinely tracked election-monitoring activities
ry through the ICM
anua
system. (See enc. I for more information.) ived on J
rch
15845 a
. 18- took to address allegations of voting
Actions that Voting Sectionsattorneys
bb , No
irregularities initiated Ho November 2000 to December 2003 included contacting
. from
in DNC v
cognizantcielection
ted officials at the state and local levels; obtaining data as appropriate;
interviewing voters affected by alleged voting irregularities; meeting with minority
groups; and assessing the merits of the allegations to determine what, if any, further
action was needed. Attorneys in the Voting Section addressed allegations of voting
irregularities by first determining whether the allegations were related to violations of
federal civil rights statutes and then, if warranted, initiating a preliminary
investigation or matter to determine whether an allegation had merit. If warranted, a
matter may culminate in a case that is filed with a federal court. We reviewed files for
1 closed preliminary investigation, 25 closed matters, and 8 open and closed cases
that the Voting Section considered election-related. The preliminary investigation and
13 matters were closed because they lacked merit. The remaining 12 matters were
closed because the state or voting jurisdiction took action to remedy an issue, a state
court issued an order addressing the issue, the voting jurisdiction implemented
changes for future elections, or Voting Section attorneys provided election officials
feedback following the on-site monitoring of elections. Six cases remain open
pending fulfillment of consent decrees entered into on behalf of DOJ and the
jurisdiction in alleged violation of federal statute, and two cases were closed because
states had taken action in response to consent decrees. Enclosure I and
attachment IV provide detailed information on actions taken regarding selected
matters and cases that the Voting Section considered as involving election-related
voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003.

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Regarding internal controls, we found that the Voting Section did not have a reliable
method to consistently record and document telephone calls received alleging voting
irregularities. According to Voting Section officials, the number of calls received
following the November 2000 election far exceeded the number received in past
elections. As a result, the Voting Section used a contractor to assist in handling the
telephone calls. To track some of the telephone calls related to the November 2000
election, Voting Section and contractor staff used telephone logs that had several
broad categories to capture the subject of the allegation, rows for states from which
the calls originated and, for the most part, tabulated the numbers of calls using tick
marks. Voting Section staff also kept two other types of logs to record some
telephone calls, which included columns to record a caller’s name, state, telephone
number, and description of the call. Our analysis of the contractor telephone logs
found, among other things, that these logs did not include a way to record calls from
4 states—Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota. According to Voting Section
officials, these 4 states were left off the contractor logs inadvertently, although these
officials noted that they were unaware of any calls received from these states. Our
analysis of logs that Voting Section staff completed found that Voting Section staff
recorded having received calls from some of these states. The Voting Section
improved upon the telephone log for the November 2002 election by having one log
that consistently provided for documenting the caller’s name, telephone number, and
action taken. Compared with the telephone log that contractor staff 0 maintained and
22, 202
one of the three types of logs that Voting Section staff nmaintained
ry after the November
n a ua
Jcategorize
2000 election, which had several columns to broadly d o the subject of the
archive
telephone calls, the November 2002 log 584included
5 one column to capture the subject of
the telephone calls. The Voting o. 18-1 plans to take several actions to address voting
Section
bs, N
irregularities for the v . Hob
November 2004 election, including, among other things, using a
C
telephonecitlog n DN
ed isimilar to the one used for the November 2002 election. The Voting
Section did not provide written instructions to contractors for completing the
telephone logs related to the 2000 election. However, for the November 2002 federal
election, the Voting Section provided instructions to DOJ staff for how to handle calls
from citizens, the press, members of Congress, and others. In addition to its method
for recording and documenting telephone calls received regarding voting
irregularities, we found that the Voting Section did not routinely track its election-
monitoring activities through its ICM system. The Voting Section said that it has plans
to assign one identification number to track these activities in the future. (See enc. I
for more information.)
In conclusion, lack of specifics about allegations and actions limits DOJ’s ability to
have accurate and clear information to share with the public or Congress about the
types of allegations received and actions taken. Predictions of another close
presidential election in November 2004 combined with possible voter confusion over
new requirements in the Help America Vote Act—such as the implementation of
provisional voting in states that had not previously used provisional voting—and
possible questions regarding voting equipment could result in the Voting Section
again receiving a very large number of telephone calls. This could result in the need
to use contractors to record voter allegations because much of the Voting Section
staff will be monitoring election sites on election day. It is important that the

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information collected be as complete, accurate, and specific as possible regarding

specific allegations. If the Voting Section collects more precise information about
voter allegations, it is in a better position to assure the public that it has addressed
allegations of voting irregularities. Moreover, if it documents actions taken more
precisely, it is better able to reassure the public and Congress of its commitment to
enforce federal voting rights statutes.
The Voting Section emphasized the importance of its monitoring of election-day

activities, but the monitoring program has not been routinely tracked in the Voting
Section’s ICM system. We believe the significance of this program warrants a more
formal tracking of monitoring efforts and resources dedicated to the program to
allow for reliable, relevant, and timely information for management decision making
and for external reporting purposes.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Confidence in our election processes is of utmost importance. To help ensure

confidence in the integrity of voting processes, the Voting Section plays an important
role in addressing voting irregularities. By accurately recording and documenting its
activities in as clear a manner as possible, the Voting Section contributes to assuring
the public and Congress of the integrity of our voting processes 0and20 that allegations
of voting irregularities have been addressed. ry 22, 2
nua
n Ja
chived o
To reassure citizens of the integrity of 5 arelection processes and to reassure the
our
18-1584
public and Congress of DOJ’s o.
Ncommitment to its responsibility to enforce federal
Hobbs,
voting rights statutes,
C v. we recommend that the Attorney General direct the Chief of
the Voting in DN to take the following two actions
Section
ed
cit
x develop and implement procedures for the November 2004 election to help
ensure that the Voting Section has a reliable method of tracking and
documenting allegations of voting irregularities and actions taken to address
them. Procedures could include more precise categories to record types of
allegations and actions taken; development of instructions on completing the
telephone logs; and development and implementation of training for
contractors, should they be needed; and
x implement a method to track and report on election-monitoring activities in

the ICM system.
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for review and comment. The draft report
sent to DOJ for comment reflected changes made as a result of DOJ’s prior detailed
review of attachment IV in enclosure I and changes DOJ requested in writing
following our exit conference with them. In commenting on the draft, DOJ generally
agreed with the report and recommendations. The Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Rights Division accepted both recommendations and said that the

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Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division has directed their
implementation.
In commenting on our recommendation for the Civil Rights Division to track and
report on election-monitoring activities in the ICM system, DOJ noted that it currently
has procedures that effectively track election-monitoring activities. Our report
acknowledges that the Division had information on election monitoring. However,
the Voting Section told us that they did not routinely track election-monitoring
activities in the ICM system—its formal process for tracking and managing work
activities. Because we had asked for clarification of the confusing and unclear
information previously provided on election monitoring and tracking, the Civil Rights
Division, in a May 25, 2004, written response provided clarifying information that
explained the different databases and data from logs that were used to capture
information on election monitoring. In this written response, the Civil Rights Division
included four charts on election monitoring that had been recently created, one for
each calendar year from 2000 through 2003 (but not for 2004, as the Division states it
did). In addition, the Civil Rights Division said that it had asked for a program that
would provide the types of reports and data that the Division is routinely asked to
provide regarding the election-monitoring program. Our recommendation is directed
toward improving the Voting Section’s tracking of election-monitoring activities,
which the Voting Section has emphasized as being a very important 0 part of its efforts
22, 202
to help ensure voter access to the polls. Tracking election-monitoring
ary activities in the
ICM system would ensure that this importantivcomponenton Janu of the Voting Section’s
ed
work is incorporated into the Division’s 45 arch process for tracking and managing
formal
158
work activities. . 18-
bbs, No
NC v. Ho
in D DOJ with a copy of the draft report that included this
After we cprovided
ited
correspondence and its enclosure for review and comment, Civil Rights Division
officials realized they had not provided us with information on all of the telephone
logs used following the November 2000 election. The Civil Rights Division
subsequently provided that additional information, which showed that Voting Section
staff used two additional types of logs for the November 2000 election. These logs
included columns to record callers’ names, telephone numbers, states, and
descriptions of the calls. This new information was incorporated into our report to
accurately reflect the Voting Section’s activities to track telephone calls following the
November 2000 election. (See p. 5 in this letter and p. 42 in enc. I.) According to the
Civil Rights Division, the November 2002 log, which it proposes as the basis for
documenting telephone calls related to the upcoming November 2004 elections, was
the only one used by Voting Section staff for the November 2002 election.
DOJ noted that the draft report discussion of the Civil Rights Division’s use of
telephone logs focused almost exclusively on the logs maintained by contractors, that
the draft report failed to note that these logs were only a small portion of all the
records of telephone calls received by the Division, and that any shortcomings in
these logs were extremely unlikely to have changed the course of subsequent
investigations. As we note in our report, it was difficult to obtain precise information
on the number of calls or the specific nature of alleged irregularities from the

(282 of 432)
telephone logs on the November 2000 election. The information that the Voting
Section collected on its telephone logs was not precise enough to support the
Division’s statements that upwards of 95 percent of the calls received regarding the
November 2000 election reflected citizen frustration or anger over the election, that
the vast majority of the calls that contractors received came from New York and
California, or that the vast majority of the calls from those two states expressed
frustration over the situation in Florida. Moreover, it is important to note that our
recommendation with regard to recording complaints about voting irregularities for
the November 2004 election is based on the limitations of the log used in
November 2002 and the lack of a clear plan for accurately recording a potentially
large volume of complaints that may arise from the November 2004 election. For
example, November 2004 will be the first national election in which all states will be
implementing HAVA’s new voter identification and provisional voting requirements
with which many voters may be unfamiliar.
In its comments, DOJ said that the Civil Rights Division invited us to meet with
Voting Section staff who worked during the time of the November 2000 election and
that we declined this invitation. We did not receive an invitation from officials in the
Civil Rights Division, who arranged our meetings with Voting Section staff, to meet to
discuss the November 2000 election logs. Throughout this review, we requested
meetings with Voting Section and Civil Rights Division officials. 0It20is always our
,2
preference, as part of our work, to meet with agency officialsnuary 22 to discuss issues and
a
questions we may have about agency processes, on J
edprocedures, and documentation.
rchiv
However, Civil Rights Division officials a
4preferred
5 that we provide questions in writing
. -158
18in
and to respond to those questions o writing. The Civil Rights Division sometimes
obbs, N
took weeks to respond H
C v. in writing, which contributed significantly to the length of
DNcomplete
time it took ed i
usnto our review. Had Civil Rights Division officials been more
cit
willing to meet with us to explain the Voting Section’s processes and discuss the
documentation provided to us, rather than rely on written questions and responses,
the time required for this review could have been significantly reduced.
DOJ’s written comments are in attachment V. DOJ also provided technical comments
from the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section and from the Civil Rights
Division, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Civil Rights Division provided
additional information on cases initiated for calendar years 2002, 2003, and 2004. The
2002 and 2003 cases involved enforcement under Sections 2 and 208 of the Voting
Rights Act and were not clearly identifiable in the ICM system as also involving
language minority issues under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. The Civil Rights
Division subsequently identified these cases as including enforcement of language
minority violations, and we have included them in our report. Information on cases
initiated in calendar year 2004 had not been included because our review covered
complete calendar years, but we have added information on cases initiated in 2004 as
of August 2004 as a courtesy to the Division.
___ ___ ___ ___ ____
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents earlier, we plan
no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we

(283 of 432)
will send copies of this report to the Attorney General, Department of Justice;
Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; Chairman, House Committee
on Government Reform; Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary; Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on House Administration; and
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration. Copies of this report will be made available to other interested
parties upon request. This report will also be available on GAO’s Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
by e-mail at jenkinswo@gao.gov or Linda Watson, Assistant Director, at (202)
512-8685 or by e-mail at watsonl@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report were
Katherine Davis, Gina Flacco, Evan Gilman, Geoffrey Hamilton, Mary Martin,
Maria Santos, and Daniele Schiffman.
William O. Jenkins, Jr.

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
20
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Enclosures anua
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Enclosure I
Enclosure I
DOJ Activities to Address Past

Election-Related Voting Irregularities
Results of work completed for the
Ranking Minority Member of the
House Committee on Government Reform,
Ranking Minority Member of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, and
20
2, 20
Ranking Member of the anua
ry 2
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Senate Committee on58Governmental
45 a Affairs
-1
s, No. 18
bb
NC v. Ho
in D August 31, 2004
cited

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Enclosure I
Contents
• Objectives
• Results in Brief
• Scope and Methodology
• Background
• Changes to Ensure Voter Access
• Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations
• Assessment of Internal Controls
• Conclusions
• Recommendations
• Attachment I—Federal Voting Rights Statutes
020
2, 2Integrity
• Attachment II—Role of the Criminal Division’sanPublic ary 2 Section
on J u
• Attachment III—Election Jurisdictions d
45 arcMonitored
hive during 2000-2003
158
• Attachment IV—Election-Related . 18- Preliminary Investigation, Matters,
bbs, No
and Cases Initiated vfrom
. Ho November 2000 to December 2003
in DNC
• ted
AttachmentciV—Agency Comments

(286 of 432)
Enclosure I
Objectives
This briefing addresses the following objectives:
1. Identify and describe any changes the Department of Justice

(DOJ) has made since November 2000 to help ensure voter
access to the polls.
2. Identify and describe any actions that the Voting Section in DOJ’s
Civil Rights Division has taken to track (monitoring work initiated
and actions taken), address, and assess allegations of election-
related voting irregularities received between November 2000 and
December 2003. 020 ,2
nuary 22
n Ja
hived o
• Election-related refers to a58preliminary
5 arc investigation, matter, or
8-1 4
case that the Voting NSection
o. 1 initiated pursuant to an allegation
obbs,
about a specific
C v. election.
H
ed in DN
cit

(287 of 432)
Enclosure I
Objectives
• A preliminary investigation is an investigation into an allegation that has not

been assigned an identification number. A matter is an activity that has been
assigned an identification number but has not resulted in a court filing of a
complaint, indictment, or information. A case is an activity that has been
assigned the same identification number that it had as a matter and has
resulted in the court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information.
• Voting irregularities, for purposes of this review, generally refer to a broad

array of complaints relating to voting and/or elections that may involve
violations of federal voting rights and/or federal criminal law for which DOJ has
enforcement responsibilities.
3. Assess the Voting Section’s internal control activities to help ensure relevant,
accurate, and reliable recording and documentation of allegations of voting
irregularities for management decision-making and external reporting
0 purposes.
2
ry 22, 20
nua
• Internal controls are integral components of
d n Jaorganization’s management
oan
hive
that provide reasonable assurance arcobjectives
45 of that include, among other
-158
things, efficient operations.o. 18They comprise the plans, methods, and
procedures used to
o bs, N missions, goals, and objectives and, in doing so,
bmeet
H
C v.
e in DN
supportd performance-based management.
cit

(288 of 432)
Enclosure I
Results in Brief
1. Since November 2000, DOJ has increased its monitoring of election activities
on election day, provided additional training to Assistant U.S. Attorneys on civil
rights laws, placed a greater priority on protecting the voting rights of language
minorities and overseas voters, and provided guidance to states regarding
implementation of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).
2. The Civil Rights Division tracks matters and cases through a case
management system. Telephone calls related to the 2000 and 2002 federal
elections were tracked using telephone logs. The Voting Section addressed
allegations of voting irregularities by contacting cognizant officials, obtaining
data if deemed appropriate, and assessing the merits of the allegation to
determine what, if any, further action was needed.
3. The Voting Section tracked the unprecedented volume of telephone calls
related to the November 2000 election by using logs. Some logs had several
broad categories to capture the subject of the calls and rows for0 states from
2
which the calls originated, while other logs contained callers’ ry 22, 20names, contact
information, and description of the calls. The Voting anua
ed on J Section improved upon the
telephone log for the November 2002 election v
rchi by including categories to
5845 a
capture the action taken on each. 1call -1 and to record the caller’s name,
, No 8
telephone number, and subject bbs of the call. The Voting Section tracked some
monitoring of elections
C . Hoassigning matter identification numbers.
vby
in DN
cited

(289 of 432)
Enclosure I
Scope and Methodology
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(290 of 432)
Enclosure I
Scope
To address our objectives, we performed work at DOJ’s:
• Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section,
• Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section (PIN),
• Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Public Corruption Unit, and
• Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA). 2, 20

20
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v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(291 of 432)
Enclosure I
Methodology
Objective 1
To identify changes in DOJ’s efforts to help ensure voter access to the

polls, we
• gathered documentation on DOJ’s efforts to

• monitor and observe elections,
• increase emphasis on enforcement of minority language and
overseas voters’ rights,
• disseminate election-related guidance, and
• increase its resources to address voting issues, and
020 ,2
nuary 22
n Ja
ived o
• interviewed responsible officials84primarily
5 arch in DOJ’s Voting Section
and PIN. 18-15
No.
Hobbs,
C v.
in DN
cited

(292 of 432)
Enclosure I
Methodology
Objective 2
To identify DOJ’s actions to track, address, and assess allegations of voting

irregularities, we
• interviewed officials in the Voting Section about procedures for tracking,

addressing, and assessing allegations of voting irregularities;
• analyzed information on the approximately 11,000 reported telephone calls

made to the Voting Section about the November 2000 election; and
• reviewed all files that the Voting Section identified as those it considered to
be election-related voting irregularities that were initiated from November
2000 to December 2003. This included 1 closed preliminary investigation,
25 closed matters, and 8 closed and open cases. The 2Voting , 202 Section tracks
0
ry 2
its matters and cases based on statutes it enforces anuaand not on whether an
d on J
allegation relates to a specific election. rcConsequently,
e the Voting Section
iv
45 a h
had to identify for us the preliminary
-15 investigation, matters, and cases that it
8
No. 18 voting irregularities.
considered to be election-related
s,
obb H
C v.
ed in DN
cit

(293 of 432)
Enclosure I
Background
Voting Section
20
ry 22, 20
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bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited
10

(294 of 432)
Enclosure I
Background
Voting Section
Voting Section responsibilities include:
• enforcing the Voting Rights Act, which is designed to safeguard the right
to vote of racial and language minorities and illiterate persons, among
other provisions;
• enforcing federal statutes designed to safeguard the right to vote of

disabled, elderly, military, and overseas voters; and
• enforcing provisions of the National Voter Registration Act,0 and the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) which address issues such 2 , 202
2as voter
ry
Janua
registration, provisional voting, and voterhinformation.
ived
on
rc
15845 a
. 18-
b bs, No
Attachment I providesNmore v. Ho information on statutes that the Voting Section
in D C
enforces. cited
11

(295 of 432)
Enclosure I
Background
Voting Section
The Voting Section, among other things, monitors election-day activities to

ensure voting rights are protected and initiates investigations and opens
matters to examine allegations of voting irregularities that fall within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Division. If warranted, a matter may
culminate in a case that is filed with a federal court.
Voting Section attorneys are generally responsible for conducting

investigations and prosecuting civil cases. The Voting Section also may
initiate matters to monitor private lawsuits.
2 0
The Voting Section coordinates with the Criminal Division’s ry 22, 20 Public Integrity
a
Section (PIN) to help ensure voters’ rightsivare Janu
ed onprotected, such as
rch
referring three allegations to PIN about 15 845 a possible election crimes related
. 18-
to the 2002 election. (See bbs, No
attach. II for more information about PIN’s
v. Ho
election-related responsibilities.)
in DN
C
cited
12

(296 of 432)
Enclosure I
Background
Voting Section
The following table provides information on all matters and cases initiated by the Voting
Section in calendar years 2000 through 2003.
Year initiated Matters Cases Total

2000 70 18 88
2001 53 6 59
2002 127 18 145
2003 99 4 103
Total 349 46 395
Source: GAO analysis of data from DOJ’s Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section.
According to Voting Section officials, the number of matters was higher 20

202002
ry 22,in because the
Voting Section initiated new matters for each of the over 80Janewly nua covered jurisdictions
required by the Voting Rights Act to provide bilingual d on
archiveelection materials and assistance to
language minority citizens. Following the 2000 5845Census, DOJ, in conjunction with the U.S.
o. 18-1
Census Bureau, identified these 80, jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act requires
jurisdictions to provide language o s N
bbminority assistance when certain criteria are met, such as
v. H
when more than 5 percentin DNC of the citizens of voting age, or more than 10,000 of the citizens
d
citemembers
of voting age, are of a single language minority group, and are unable to speak
or understand English adequately enough to participate in the electoral process.
13

(297 of 432)
Enclosure I
Background
Voting Section
As shown in the following table, the Voting Section’s positions for attorneys (authorized and
on-board) increased since the beginning of fiscal year 2000.
Time period Authorized attorney Attorneys on-board

positions
Start FY 2000 34 31
End FY 2000 36 35
End FY 2001 47 40
End FY 2002 47 42
End FY 2003 41 38
As of April 16, 2004 41 39
Source: DOJ’s Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section. 20

ry 22, 20
anua
n Jthe
The number of authorized and on-board attorneys declined ed oat end of fiscal year 2003
hiv
because the number of submissions to the Voting 45 arcSection for redistricting changes
-158
s, o. 18 that year, according to Voting Section officials.
following the 2000 Census began toNdecline
Every 10 years, after the federal b
Hob census, states redraw their legislative election districts to
v. population.
make these districts iequal
N C in The process of drawing new election district
nD
cited redistricting.
boundaries is called
14

(298 of 432)
Enclosure I
Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access
20
ry 22, 20
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bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited
15

(299 of 432)
Enclosure I

Results in Brief
Since November 2000, DOJ focused on ensuring voter access to the polls
by
• placing more emphasis on its election-monitoring program,

• providing additional training for certain Assistant U.S. Attorneys who
handle election-related issues that included placing more emphasis
on handling civil rights issues,
• directing U.S. Attorney Offices to contact election and other officials
at the state and local level to offer assistance prior to election day,
• placing greater priority on enforcing the voting rights of language
minorities and overseas voters, and 20
ry 22, 20
• providing guidance to states regarding HAVA a
anuimplementation.
on J
ived
45 arch
-158
s, No. 18
bb
NC v. Ho
in D
cited
16

(300 of 432)
Enclosure I

Emphasis Placed on Election Monitoring
In March 2001, the Attorney General announced that DOJ was placing more
emphasis on its election-monitoring program. The Attorney General is
authorized by law to notify the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) of the
need to assign federal observers to monitor polling place activities on election
day in counties that the Attorney General has certified under the Voting Rights
Act and in counties authorized by federal court orders. The Attorney General
delegates the authority with respect to federal observers to the Voting Section.
The Voting Section’s decision to request federal observers is based on past
experience or investigations that indicated observers may be needed to protect
voting rights. (See attach. I for information on the law authorizing federal
observers.)
In addition to OPM federal observers, the Voting Section assigns DOJ attorneys
and professional staff to monitor election day activities in local jurisdictions
throughout the United States, whether or not the locations have been certified
2020
2,
under the Voting Rights Act. This additional monitoringnuisarypart of the Voting
2
Ja
Section’s investigations of possible voting rightsveviolations. Unlike OPM
i d on
observers, DOJ attorneys and professional arch
staff do not have specific statutory
5
right of access to polling places ,and 1 -1584get authority from the appropriate
must
8
o.
state and/or local officialsv.for bs N
Hobthem to enter polling places.
in DNC
cited
17

(301 of 432)
Enclosure I

DOJ attorneys and professional staff are assigned to these jurisdictions

when there may be insufficient time to arrange for federal observers in
covered jurisdictions, or when the results of Voting Section staff’s pre-
election investigations indicate the need for some limited federal
presence.
The Attorney General directed the Voting Section to increase resources

devoted to the election-monitoring program through the use of OPM
federal observers and DOJ attorneys and professional staff.
20
ry 22, 20
The level of resources used and number of elections anuamonitored were
ed on J
rchiv
greater in federal election years (even-numbered
5845 a years) than other
18-1
years, as shown in the next figure.
bbs,
No.
Ho
C v.
ed in DN
cit
18

(302 of 432)
Enclosure I

The number of OPM federal observers and DOJ attorneys and

professional staff were greater in the 2002 elections than in the
2000 elections. Similarly, more elections were monitored in
2002 than in 2000.
20
ry 22, 20
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. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited
Note: DOJ monitors are attorneys and professional staff.
19

(303 of 432)
Enclosure I

OPM federal observers are always accompanied by DOJ attorneys and

professional staff when monitoring elections and were present for elections held
during calendar years 2000 through 2003 in Attorney General-certified and
court-ordered counties and jurisdictions in several states. In a few instances,
DOJ attorneys and professional staff independently monitored elections in these
Attorney General-certified and court-ordered counties and jurisdictions.
DOJ attorneys and professional staff also independently monitored elections in

counties and jurisdictions that were not Attorney General-certified or under court
order during this 4-year period. In 2000, DOJ attorneys and professional staff
monitored elections in 5 counties in 5 states. By 2002, the number of election
jurisdictions monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff increased to 19
counties in 10 states, with monitoring of elections in counties in Florida
accounting for the bulk of the increase.
20
y 22, 20
According to the Voting Section, election monitoring is aJahigh-priority
nuar program of
DOJ and a very important part of the Section’s on to address voting
efforts
ed
rchiv
irregularities. 15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
See attachment III for in DNC information on election monitoring in Attorney General-
more
cited
certified and court-ordered election jurisdictions and election jurisdictions that
DOJ monitored independently.
20

(304 of 432)
Enclosure I

Training
Officials in the Voting Section and PIN said that Assistant U.S. Attorneys can attend
annual public corruption conferences, where they receive (1) training on handling
election crime investigations and prosecutions and (2) periodic updates to DOJ’s
manual on prosecuting election crimes. Starting in October 2002, additional
annual training, referred to as the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference,
was provided to Assistant U.S. Attorneys who, in coordination with DOJ
headquarters, handle election-related matters for the 93 U.S. Attorneys.
The Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference training, according to Civil Rights
Division officials, included civil rights issues that had not been covered in the
training offered to Assistant U.S. Attorneys prior to October 2002 and was
designed to provide them a better understanding of what the Voting Section does
to enforce federal voting rights statutes. Also, according to the Civil Rights
Division, the presentations that the Voting Section made at this annual training
conference placed special emphasis on the election-monitoring program and
2020
solicited the Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ involvement in helping 22, to enforce federal
ary
voting rights laws, ballot access, and the election-monitoring
on Janu program. According
c ved
hithe
to PIN, this training, which was mandatory for
ar Assistant U.S. Attorneys
5845
designated as district election officers,
o. 18-1 also covers voting integrity issues
,N
important to election crime obbs
v. Hmatters.
in DNC
cited
21

(305 of 432)
Enclosure I

Training
The Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference training was provided to
Assistant U.S. Attorneys in October 2002, September 2003, and July
2004.
The training materials for 2002 included topics related to federal voter
registration and election-day statutes that the Voting Section enforces,
which include the Voting Rights Act, National Voter Registration Act, and
the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, and topics
related to handling election crime investigations, trials, and the statutes
and theories used to address election crimes.
20
ry 22, 20
The 2003 training materials included, in additionnto anthe
ua same topics
ed o J
covered in 2002, information on HAVA 45 a
and
rchi election monitoring by
v
158
federal observers. According, Nto o. 1PIN
8- and the Voting Section, the content
bbs
of the 2004 trainingNwas v. Hosimilar to that provided in previous years.
in D C
cited
22

(306 of 432)
Enclosure I

Contacts with State and Local Election Officials
In October 2002, the Attorney General directed each U.S. Attorney to

coordinate with state and local election and law enforcement officials
prior to the November 2002 elections to, in part, explore ways that they
could work more closely together to deter and detect discrimination and
to deter and prosecute election crimes.
According to PIN officials, the Attorney General’s October 2002 directive

(1) formalized an ad-hoc practice that had existed in DOJ for many
years of coordinating elections and election-related matters with state
officials and (2) led to a systematic effort to coordinate ,election
20 issues
y 22 20
and matters with these officials. n Ja
nuar
do
archive
5845
o. 18-1
bs, N
v. Hob
C
in DN
cited
23

(307 of 432)
Enclosure I

Contacts with State and Local Election Officials
Prior to the November 2002 federal elections, almost all of the U.S.
Attorney Offices reported to PIN that they had contacted various state or
local officials either by telephone, in writing, or in person.
The state and local officials contacted varied by each U.S. Attorney Office.
For example, according to PIN,
• the three U.S. Attorneys in the state of Florida reported having

met with the Florida Secretary of State and
20
ry 22, 20
anua
• the U.S. Attorney for the Southern on J of California reported
District
ed
iv
arch
having met with the San Diego 15845 County Registrar of Voters,
o. 18-
Election Administrator, bs, N and Deputy District Attorney, and the
v. Hob
Imperial County
in DN
C Registrar of Voters and District Attorney.
cited
24

(308 of 432)
Enclosure I

Contacts with Civil Rights and Other Organizations
The Attorney General directed the Civil Rights Division was to work with civil rights
leaders, state and local election officials, and U.S. Attorney Offices prior to
election day in an effort to help ensure that citizens’ voting rights are protected.
The Attorney General also directed the Criminal Division to work with these
same groups in helping to preserve ballot integrity and prevent election offenses.
According to the Voting Section, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division has met with representatives of civil rights organizations to discuss the
Voting Section’s election-monitoring program and its plans for monitoring the
November 2004 election and has made other presentations concerning voting
rights issues at many of these organizations’ meetings and conferences. The
Voting Section also said that as this election approaches, it plans to ask civil
rights organizations what election jurisdictions they believe the Voting Section
should consider monitoring.
20
y 22, 20
The Voting Section also said that since October 2002, Jstaff anua from the Civil Rights
r
Division have made presentations to, met with, eor
d onreceived presentations from
rchiv
various civil rights and other organizations, 15845 a such as the NAACP, Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under . 18-
bbs, No Law, League of United Latin American
Citizens, LeadershipNConference Ho on Civil Rights, AARP, National Association of
D C v.
Secretaries ofciState,
ted in and National Association of State Election Directors.
25

(309 of 432)
Enclosure I

Language Minority Voting Rights
In 2002, the Civil Rights Division made enforcement of voting rights laws that
address access to voting for language minority groups one of the Voting
Section’s highest priorities. DOJ reported in a civil rights accomplishments fact
sheet that the Civil Rights Division conducted an outreach campaign with state
and local election officials and local language minority groups to help ensure
access to bilingual voting materials for language minority groups. This was
begun in July 2002 following the certification of covered jurisdictions based on
the results of the 2000 census.
• The fact sheet states that the outreach included a July 2002 letter from the
then- Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division to each of the
296 political jurisdictions covered by Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act
notifying them of their bilingual access obligations in the upcoming and
0
, 202
future elections. According to the Civil Rights Division,22attorneys from the
uary
Division visited many of the 296 counties covered
on J
a by Section 203.
n
ived
45 arch
58
18-1 that Civil Rights Division attorneys
• No.
In addition, the fact sheetbsreported
,
conducted in-person Hob
v. meetings with state and local election officials and
DNC
local language
ed in minority groups in almost all of the more than 80 newly
cit
covered jurisdictions.
26

(310 of 432)
Enclosure I

Language Minority Voting Rights
We analyzed data as of March 15, 2004, on matters and cases related to Section
203 language minority issues recorded in DOJ’s Interactive Case Management
(ICM) system, which is used to track and manage these data. We found that the
Voting Section initiated 7 matters and no cases in 2000, 13 matters and 2 cases
in 2001, 94 matters and 1 case in 2002, and 28 matters and no cases in 2003.
According to the Civil Rights Division, the Division also initiated the following
cases: (1) two language assistance cases in 2002 under Section 2 and Section
208 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) two cases in 2003 under Section 2, Section
203, and Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act; and (3) five cases in 2004 under
Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. Sections 2, 203, and 208 of the Voting
Rights Act are described in attachment I.
20
ry 22, 20
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v. Ho
in DNC
cited
27

(311 of 432)
Enclosure I

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Given the large number of troops deployed overseas and an increase in concerns about late
mailing of absentee ballots, Voting Section officials said that the Voting Section placed
increased priority in 2004 on enforcing and preparing to ensure compliance with the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which only applies to
federal elections. These officials cited the following enforcement and preparation activities
during 2004.
• Obtained a court order in April for emergency relief to remedy an UOCAVA violation
committed during the Pennsylvania primary election.
• Negotiated with the state of Alabama in May to obtain a similar emergency relief
order from a state court for a county’s failure to provide enough time for the mailing to
and return of ballots from overseas voters for its primary election.
• Obtained a court order in an UOCAVA lawsuit in July against the state of Georgia for
similar emergency relief for its primary election.
• Established a working group of Voting Section attorneys to facilitate communications
with the Department of Defense’s Federal Voting Assistance Program, 20 which is
charged with administering UOCAVA, and to plan for the y 22, 20 of more UOCAVA
possibility
r
nua
litigation during 2004. n Ja
ed o
iv
45 arch
58
18-1
Our analysis of matters and cases inbsDOJ’s
, No. ICM system as of March 15, 2004, showed that
the Voting Section initiated v3. Hob
matters and 2 cases during calendar years 2000 through
NC
D of absentee voting by uniformed and overseas citizens. All 5 of
2003 involving theteissue
in
ci d
the matters and cases were initiated in 2002.
28

(312 of 432)
Enclosure I

Guidance to States on HAVA
In October 2002, HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission to, in part, serve as
a national clearinghouse and resource to compile information and review procedures
related to federal election administration and provide guidance on implementing certain
HAVA requirements. Because the Election Assistance Commission was not established
until December 2003, the Voting Section provided informal, nonbinding guidance to states
on implementing the requirements of HAVA.
The Voting Section’s guidance to states on HAVA’s requirements included

• interpreting requirements of the law and advising states on how to comply with them
based on DOJ’s enforcement role under HAVA;
• responding to inquiries from state and local officials;
• making presentations at various meetings and conferences;
• writing letters to the chief state election official, governor, and attorney general in
each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories offering to
assist the jurisdictions in their efforts to ensure compliance with HAVA and
summarizing HAVA provisions;
20
• creating a HAVA information page on its Web site; and ry 22, 20
nua
• issuing a press release that outlined provisions of d n Ja that took effect on
oHAVA
January 1, 2004, such as provisional voting ve
hi identification requirements for new
rcand
voters who register by mail. 15 845 a
18-
No.
Hobbs,
According to the Civil Rights C v.
ed in DN Division, the Voting Section also filed its first enforcement action
cit
in California in 2004 against a county for violating the voter information provisions of
HAVA.
29

(313 of 432)
Enclosure I

Plans for November 2004 Election
According to Voting Section officials, DOJ’s plans for helping to ensure voter
access for the November 2004 election include
• increasing its on-site monitoring of elections considerably over prior years

through greater use of staff from other sections in the Civil Rights Division.
Voting Section officials also said that final decisions as to where monitoring
will be conducted are not made public until shortly before an election, but
they told us that the Voting Section has prepared a list of jurisdictions for
consideration based on consent decrees and will update the list with other
jurisdictions being considered for coverage as the election approaches.
According to these officials, the Voting Section has not established a
specific goal for achieving an increase in staff or elections to be covered,
and
20
ry 22, 20
a
• Janube monitoring the
coordinating with civil rights organizations thatonwill
ived
election and establishing procedures45for bringing
arch their concerns about
158
specific issues or jurisdictionso. to
18-DOJ on or before election day in
N
November 2004. v. Hobbs,
C
in DN
cited
30

(314 of 432)
Enclosure I
Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited
31

(315 of 432)
Enclosure I

Results in Brief
In our review, we found that the Civil Rights Division had formal procedures to track matters
and cases to address voting irregularities. Specifically, the Voting Section tracks
investigative matters and cases through the Division’s ICM system using unique
identification numbers. In addition, the Voting Section tracked telephone calls alleging
voting irregularities for the November 2000 and November 2002 elections using telephone
logs.
Voting Section attorneys addressed and assessed allegations of election-related voting

irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003 in various ways, depending
on the allegation. Our review of files related to 1 preliminary close investigation, 25 closed
matters, and 8 open and closed cases generally found that attorneys contacted cognizant
officials and assessed the legal merits of evidence of alleged violations of civil rights laws.
In our review of files, we found that Voting Section attorneys generally addressed allegations
of voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003 through a
preliminary investigation or investigative matters and took actions such as interviewing
20
, 20by
election officials at state and local levels, interviewing voters affected
y 22 alleged voting
irregularities, and meeting with civil rights groups. Januar
do n
archive
5845
Our review of Voting Section files also found
o. 18-1that Voting Section attorneys, in conjunction with
supervisory attorneys, assessed bs, N
v. Hob information collected and determined whether (1) federal
voting rights laws were violated;
C (2) an investigation should be closed; or (3) further action
in DN
was needed byctheited Voting Section, such as filing a complaint with a federal court or
continued monitoring.
32

(316 of 432)
Enclosure I

Tracking Allegations of Voting Irregularities
The ICM is a database system that the Voting Section uses to track and
manage matter and case data for the Section and can be used to
generate reports.
Each matter and case is assigned a DJ number, which is an unique

identification number. Information on matters and cases can be
searched by the identification numbers, statutes, and other information
maintained in the system.
The system is set up to automatically enter certain data and 20

ry 22, 20 has required
a
fields for which data must be entered. Voting Janu
onSection staff can enter
ived
c
other data into the system, as appropriate.
ar h
5845 -1
s, No. 18
bb
NC v. Ho
in D
cited
33

(317 of 432)
Enclosure I

Officials told us that the Voting Section
• receives numerous citizen calls, comments, and questions daily;

• receives telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, letters, and packages. Most of the calls and
written allegations from citizens do not concern issues within the jurisdiction of the
Civil Rights Division and, in such instances, the caller is often notified of this
determination over the telephone and referred to other state or federal agencies with
possible jurisdiction;
• documented telephone calls received at the Section’s toll free telephone number
using telephone logs for the 2000 and 2002 elections;
• found that only a small percentage of allegations that it received following the
November 2000 election fell within its jurisdiction or presented substantive issues that
merited further review. Notations on logs documenting telephone calls related to the
November 2000 election indicated that some of the calls– we were unable to quantify
the number of calls because of the way calls were recorded– were related to
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the election or other issues such as general
complaints about the election process that contained no specific allegations 0 of
violations of federal laws; 22, 202
ary
• in addition to following up with people who called dthe o Janu Section after the
n Voting
November 2000 election, Voting Section staff ive
45 archpursued other avenues of complaints,
such as complaint logs generated by 8
-1the
5 NAACP Voter Fund, hearings conducted by
the U.S. Commission on Civil s, No. 18 and the NAACP, and incidents receiving a large
Rights
bb
amount of publicity, toC . Ho
vdetermine if federal laws had been violated; and
in D N
• expects attorneys to find new matters for investigation in addition to assignments
cited management.
made by Section
34

(318 of 432)
Enclosure I

Voting Section officials told us that on election day

• in addition to calls received by the Section at its toll-free number, an OPM
federal examiner maintains a toll-free telephone number to receive calls. An
examiner is a federal employee assigned by OPM to receive complaints of racial
or minority language discriminatory voting practices. (See attach. I for the statute
related to federal examiners.) Any allegations taken by the examiner that are
deemed to require immediate attention are routed to the Civil Rights Division
when received, while other allegations are transmitted after the election and
reviewed to determine if further action is needed. According to the Chief of the
Voting Section, they received few, if any, allegations from examiners in relation
to the November 2000 election, and
• a small number of Civil Rights Division staff remain available at the Voting
Section on major election days to take citizen calls, with the vast majority of
Section staff at various locations around the country for monitoring 0
purposes.
Major problems that arise from these calls are routed to attorney 22, 202 supervisors to
ry
determine what actions are needed. anua
on J
ived
45 arch
-158
Our review of files included five matters
s, No. 18 that were initiated to monitor elections.
bb
According to Voting Section
NC v. Ho officials, this activity is not routinely tracked through
the ICM, but they in D to designate a single identification number to track this
plan
cited
activity.
35

(319 of 432)
Enclosure I

Actions to Address Allegations
The following presents information on the Voting Section’s process for

addressing allegations related to voting irregularities.
• If the Voting Section deems that a voting allegation falls within its
jurisdiction and appears to have merit, an attorney is assigned to
make inquiries about the allegation. The attorney performs some
investigative work to determine whether the allegation should be
pursued.
• If an attorney believes a matter should be investigated, the attorney
discusses this with the Deputy Chief responsible for the state in
which the matter rises. The Section Chief and Deputies decide
whether or not to formally open a matter. The Voting Section
assigns a number to the matter for tracking purposes. 20
22, 20
• When Voting Section staff monitor electionsJanand ua receive allegations
ry
of or information about voting irregularities ed on while on site, they make
rchiv
efforts to resolve allegations 8by 1 5845 a
contacting local election officials
. 1 -
immediately. Further binvestigation
bs, N
o of such irregularities is
conducted after anv . Ho
election if the allegation was not resolved on
C
election day ed in DN
or if it is deemed otherwise necessary to prevent such
cit
problems from arising in the future.
36

(320 of 432)
Enclosure I

Actions to Address Allegations
Our file review found that the Voting Section generally took the following
actions during its investigations initiated from November 2000 to
December 2003:
• Interviewed state and county election officials, other state and

county officials who may provide insight into the investigation, state
Attorneys General, voters raising the allegations, and
representatives from the NAACP and other minority groups.
• Requested documentation detailing certain election procedures.
• Facilitated the resolution of allegations and issues that arose during
elections, when monitoring elections. If Voting Section staff
monitoring elections received allegations about voting irregularities,
they immediately took steps to resolve the allegations 0by contacting
2
local election officials. ry 22, 20
anua
• Where deemed appropriate, filed enforcement ed on J actions in federal
rchiv
court against jurisdictions that1allegedly
5845
a violated federal voting rights
8-
laws by either obtainings,judgments
o. 1 against them or entering into
b N
bjurisdictions
consent decreesCwith . Ho that agree to remedy their alleged
DN v
violationscitof
ed federal voting statutes.
in
37

(321 of 432)
Enclosure I

Actions to Assess Allegations
Following the investigation of a preliminary investigation or matter, a Voting

Section attorney, in conjunction with a supervisor, determines whether
the allegation has merit, whether the preliminary investigation or matter
should be pursued further, or whether the preliminary investigation or
matter should be closed. The determination to close a matter or pursue
it as a case is a legal judgment and is often based on whether there is
deemed to be a sufficient evidence of violations of voting rights laws and
whether the state or local election officials have taken action to correct
problems.
The Voting Section identified a total of 34 closed investigations and open

and closed cases initiated between November 2000 and December
2003 that it considered to involve election-related voting irregularities:
2, 20
20 1
y 2
closed preliminary investigation, 25 closed matters, anua and 8 open and
r
on J
closed cases. arch
ived
5845
o. 18-1
bs, N
The preliminary investigation
v. Hob was closed because the Voting Section
C
concluded that in DN
citedthe allegation lacked merit.
38

(322 of 432)
Enclosure I

Actions to Assess Allegations
For the 25 closed matters:

• 13 were closed because the Voting Section concluded that the allegations lacked merit;
• 5 were closed because the state or voting jurisdictions took actions to resolve the issues
(e.g., one state passed an election law, and the Voting Section approved changes to
election procedures that one city had proposed);
• 4 were closed following the completion of elections, and the Voting Section provided
feedback or observations related to election procedures while monitoring elections;
• 2 were closed because voting jurisdictions implemented changes for future elections; and
• 1 was closed because a state court issued an order addressing the issue.
For the 8 cases:

• 6 are open pending fulfillment of consent decrees entered into on behalf of DOJ and the
jurisdiction in alleged violation of statute, and
• 2 are closed because consent decrees entered into on behalf of DOJ and 0
the jurisdictions
in alleged violation of statutes required states to take corrective actions
, 202and states did so
by passing legislation, among other actions. n uary 22
Ja
d on
archive
45
158the
Attachment IV provides detailed information o. 18-on results of our file review of the 34 closed
preliminary investigation and matters
bbs, N and open and closed cases initiated from November
o
v. Hthe
2000 to December 2003 that
DNC
Voting Section considered as involving election-related
voting irregularities.
ed in
cit
39

(323 of 432)
Enclosure I
Assessment of Internal Controls
20
ry 22, 20
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v. Ho
in DNC
cited
40

(324 of 432)
Enclosure I

Results in Brief
In our review, we found that
• the Voting Section tracked telephone calls related to the November 2000
election by using telephone logs. Some logs had several broad
categories to capture the subject of the calls, rows for states from which
the calls originated and, for the most part, tabulated the numbers of calls
using tick marks. Other logs that the Voting Section used contained
information such as callers’ names, telephone numbers, and
descriptions of the calls. The Voting Section improved upon the
telephone log for the November 2002 election by including columns to
record the action taken on each call in addition to recording the caller’s
name and telephone number, but has one column to capture the subject
of the call, and
20
• as mentioned previously, the Voting Section tracked ry 22, 20 monitoring of
some
anua
elections by opening matters and assigning ed on J matter an identification
each
iv
number. According to Voting Section arch
45officials, it has not routinely
158
. 18-
tracked election-monitoring bsactivities
,No through the case management
system but is considering v. Hobassigning one identification number to track
C
in DN
cited
election-monitoring activities.
41

(325 of 432)
Enclosure I

November 2000 Election Telephone Logs
The Voting Section received an unprecedented volume of telephone calls in

November and December 2000 related to the unusual events surrounding the
November 2000 presidential election.
• The Voting Section reported to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that
it received approximately 11,000 calls related to the November 2000
election. In comparison, the Voting Section told us it received several
hundred calls related to the November 2002 election. The Voting Section
told us it does not have records of telephone calls related to other elections
except to the extent that such telephone calls generated investigations that
became matters or cases.
• According to the Voting Section, contractors were hired in November 2000
to help handle the unprecedented number of incoming telephone calls
received concerning the November 2000 election to help ensure that the
public would be able to voice opinions and concerns. Hiring 0contractors
2
was not intended as a mechanism to gather specific allegations. ry 22, 20
a
anulogs
• Voting Section staff and contractors kept telephone ed on J that consisted of
iv
tables with columns identifying broad45categories arch of allegations or comments
and rows with the state from which 58
o. 18-1 a call originated. Voting Section staff
also kept two other types s, N
bof logs, which included the caller’s name, state,
v. Hob
telephone number, DNCand description of the call. Calls were recorded on most
ed in
logs as tickcitmarks, while some logs included limited narrative on the nature
of the call.
42

(326 of 432)
Enclosure I

Our analysis of the telephone call logs completed by contractors found the
following:
• It was difficult to count how many calls were received because, for example,
one caller could have made multiple complaints and some logs appeared to
be duplicates.
• The call logs did not include a way to record calls from 4 states—Arkansas,
Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota. According to Voting Section officials,
these 4 states were left off the contractor logs inadvertently, although these
officials noted that they were unaware of any calls received from these
states. Our analysis found that Voting Section staff recorded having
received calls from some of these states.
• Columns that were used to record callers were labeled voter fraud,
irregularities, request investigation, re-vote, and general comments. 0
In
some of the logs, the columns were re-labeled manually 02
, to tally additional
2
y 22
types of comments. The broad nature of these Ja nuar
column labels to record
on
ed the
information about the nature of the calls rcand
hiv limited narrative sometimes
included on logs did not always 8provide158 45 a sufficient information to determine
-
whether the Voting Section s,No. 1
should initiate an investigation.
bb
v . Ho
• The telephonenlogs DNC did not include information on callers’ contact
information di
citesuch as telephone numbers.
43

(327 of 432)
Enclosure I

Some of the telephone logs that Voting Section and contractor staff completed
included comments indicating allegations that people may have been prevented
from voting. According to the Voting Section, Voting Section personnel reviewed
logs on an ongoing basis and efforts were made to contact callers who provided
telephone numbers and whose messages indicated possible violations of federal
civil rights statutes. The Voting Section does not have records indicating how
many such return calls were made and noted that return telephone contact
information was not always provided or asked for.
According to Voting Section officials, an assessment of the calls led them to

determine that most of the calls focused on concerns about the election situation
in Florida, often from citizens in states other than Florida, and that few
allegations included substantive information about possible22violations 0 of federal
, 202
ary
law. However, the information on the November 2000 anutelephone logs is not
ed on J
precise enough to document this assessment. arch
iv
5845
o. 18-1
bs, N
v. Hob
C
in DN
cited
44

(328 of 432)
Enclosure I

For the November 2002 federal election, the Voting Section assigned staff
to receive calls; provided instructions for how to handle calls from
citizens, the press, members of Congress, and others; and provided
state contact information to refer callers to state officials, when
appropriate.
According to Voting Section officials, a telephone log was used to record

calls received. The telephone log included columns to record time of
call; caller information for name, city, state, and telephone number;
subject; and action. No instructions were provided with the telephone
log about how to complete it regarding the type of information to be
20
included in the subject or action columns. ry 22, 20
a
Janu
d on
archive
5845
o. 18-1
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v. Hob
C
in DN
cited
45

(329 of 432)
Enclosure I

Plans for the November 2004 Election
According to the Civil Rights Division, the Voting Section plans to ensure
that it has full capability to receive and respond, as appropriate, to all
calls related to the November 2004 general election in the most
expeditious way possible. Division officials further stated that the Voting
Section has procedures in place to track and respond to telephone calls
that it might receive in relation to the November 2004 general election.
• Specifically, the Civil Rights Division told us that the Voting Section
plans to use a telephone log such as the one used for the November
2002 election to record information on the caller’s name, time of call,
city and state, telephone number, subject of the call, and action
taken on the call. The Division noted that the November 20 2002 log or
ry 22, 20
any log that the Voting Section might useonfor ua November 2004
Janthe
ved
election is a tool to ensure that the 45 a
Voting
rchi Section does not miss
158
calls raising important concerns
, No
. 18- over which it has jurisdiction and is
bbs
not intended to definitively
. Ho track all election-related allegations
DNC v
received.cited in
46

(330 of 432)
Enclosure I

Plans for the November 2004 Election
The Civil Rights Division also cited other procedures that the Voting
Section plans to use to track and respond to possible telephone calls
related to the November 2004 general election. These procedures will
include the Voting Section
• continuing its practice of assigning its staff to specific states for the
purpose of reviewing citizen calls and letters;
• keeping a sufficient number of staff and supervisory attorneys in

headquarters on election day to handle calls and to respond to
allegations referred from Voting Section staff monitoring elections
2, 20
20 in the
ry 2
field on that day; and n Ja
nua
do
archive
5845
o. 18-1
• using contractors, if needed, bs, Nto take telephone calls. The Division plans
v. Hob
to determine the DNC to use contractors on a case-by-case basis.
inneed
cited
47

(331 of 432)
Enclosure I
Conclusions and Recommendations
20
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v. Ho
in DNC
cited
48

(332 of 432)
Enclosure I
Internal Controls
Conclusions
• The Voting Section received an unprecedented number of calls related

to the November 2000 election and took steps to document telephone
calls. According to the Voting Section, it also documented calls for the
November 2002 election for which far fewer calls were received. The
2000 and 2002 election telephone logs differed somewhat in format, and
improvements were made regarding how information was collected on
the 2002 election telephone log. The Voting Section did not provide
written instructions to contractors in November 2000 about how to
complete the logs, but did provide written instructions to DOJ staff on
completing some of the information for the 2002 logs. However, both
logs lack precision for documenting the nature of the call and actions
taken because broad categories were used to capture ,information
20 on the
y 22 20
call. Janu
ar
d on
archive
5845
o. 18-1
bs, N
v. Hob
C
in DN
cited
49

(333 of 432)
Enclosure I
Internal Controls
Conclusions
• Predictions of another close presidential election in November 2004,

possible voter confusion over new requirements in the Help America
Vote Act, and possible questions regarding voting equipment could
result in the Voting Section again receiving a large number of telephone
calls and possibly result in the use of contractors to handle calls since
most of the Voting Section staff are monitoring election sites on election
day. If the Voting Section collects more precise information about such
calls, it is in a better position to assure the public that it addressed
allegations of voting irregularities; if it documents actions taken more
precisely, it is better able to reassure the public and Congress of its
commitment to enforce federal voting rights statutes.
• The Voting Section has emphasized the importance of2, its 2020monitoring of
y 2
election day activities, yet the monitoring program anuahas not been routinely
r
on J
tracked in the ICM system, its formal process rchived for tracking and managing
work activities. Voting Section . officials158 45 a told us they were considering
18-
tracking this program inHthe bs No
,future, and we believe the significance of
b
v. o
this program warrants DNC a more formal tracking of monitoring efforts and
ited in
resources dedicated to the program.
c
50

(334 of 432)
Enclosure I
Recommendations
Confidence in election processes is of utmost importance. To help ensure confidence in the

integrity of our voting processes, the Voting Section plays an important role in addressing
voting irregularities. By accurately recording and documenting its activities in as clear a
manner as possible, the Voting Section contributes to assuring the public and Congress of
the integrity of our voting processes.
To reassure citizens of the integrity of our election processes and to reassure the public and
Congress of DOJ’s commitment to its responsibility to enforce federal voting rights
statutes, we recommend that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division
direct the Chief of the Voting Section to
• develop and implement procedures for the November 2004 election to ensure that
the Voting Section has a reliable method of tracking and documenting allegations of
voting irregularities and actions taken to address them. Procedures could include
more precise categories for recording types of allegations, more precise categories to
020 telephone logs,
record actions taken, development of instructions on completing, 2the
2 should
and development and implementation of training for contractors,
ary 2 they be
needed, and on Janu
d
ive
45 arch
58
• implement a method to track sand 18-1 on election monitoring program activities in
o.report
, N
bb
the Interactive Case Management system.
NC v. Ho
in D
cited
51

(335 of 432)
Attachment I
Voting Laws Enforced by the Voting Section Relevant to Contents of Briefing

and Its Attachments
According to the Voting Section, to carry out its mission, the Voting Section brings
lawsuits against states, counties, cities, and other jurisdictions to remedy denials and
abridgements of the right to vote; defends lawsuits that the Voting Rights Act
authorizes to be brought against the Attorney General; reviews changes in voting laws
and procedures administratively under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and
monitors election day activities through the assignment of federal observers under
Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act. Provided below are short descriptions of some of
the primary voting laws enforced by the Voting Section.
Voting Rights Act Provisions
x Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973)
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act establishes a nationwide ban against any
state or local election practices or procedures that deny or abridge a citizen’s
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in20a2language
0 minority
22,
group.4 The Voting Rights Act provides that plaintiffs ary may establish a violation
on Janu
of Section 2 by demonstrating that “the ivpolitical
ed processes leading to
nomination or election” deny-1members 45 arch of the protected classes an equal
8
8 5
o. 1in
opportunity to participate
s, N the political process and to elect representatives
. Hobb
of their choice.
NC v A court, under the Voting Rights Act, may also consider the
extented in Dwhich
to members of the protected class have been elected to office in
cit
the jurisdiction, though Congress made clear that Section 2 does not confer
upon protected classes a right to proportional representation.
x Sections 203 and 4(f)(4) of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1a,
1973b(f)(4))
Sections 203 and 4(f)(4) are the language minority provisions of the Voting
Rights Act and require certain covered jurisdictions to provide bilingual
election materials and assistance based on census data pertaining to the
population of citizens of voting age with limited English proficiency and their
rate of illiteracy. With respect to Section 203, the Voting Rights Act requires
jurisdictions to provide language minority assistance when certain criteria are
met, such as when more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age or more
than 10,000 of the citizens of voting age are members of a single language
minority group, and are unable to speak or understand English adequately
enough to participate in the electoral process.
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b(f)(2).

(336 of 432)
Attachment I
x Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6)
Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act authorizes voting assistance for blind,
disabled, or illiterate persons. A voter who requires assistance to vote by
reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given
assistance by a person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or
agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.
x Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973c)
Under Section 5 of the Act, “covered” 5 jurisdictions may not change their
election practices or procedures until they obtain federal “preclearance” for
the change. The act provides for either judicial or administrative preclearance.
Under the judicial mechanism, covered jurisdictions may seek declaratory
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
that the change has neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against
protected minorities in exercising their voting rights. Under the administrative
mechanism, covered jurisdictions may seek the same determination from the
Attorney General. The Attorney General may deny preclearance 20 by interposing
ry 22, 20
and objection to the proposed change within 60 days
anua
of its submission.
nJ
chived o
ar
x Section 6 of the Voting Rights8- 845 (42 U.S.C. § 1973d)
15Act
1
No.
Hobbs,
Section 6Dof v. Voting Rights Act provides for the appointment of federal
Cthe
ed in N
examiners
cit by order of a federal court or, with respect to certain covered
jurisdictions, upon certification by the Attorney General. Federal examiners
help to register voters by determining whether a citizen meets state eligibility
requirements and must therefore be included in the registration rolls. A federal
court, under the Voting Rights Act, may order the appointment of federal
examiners to any jurisdiction sued under any statute to enforce certain
constitutional voting guarantees.6 In covered jurisdictions, the Attorney
General may appoint examiners upon certification that the Attorney General
has received at least 20 meritorious written complaints of voting
discrimination or that the Attorney General otherwise believes that the
appointment of examiners is necessary to protect voting rights.
5
The jurisdictions targeted for “coverage” are those evidencing discriminatory voting practices, based
upon a triggering formula, as defined in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1973b). The
Attorney General and the Director of the Census have responsibility for determining which
jurisdictions are covered by the triggering formula, and their determinations are not reviewable in any
court and are effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
6
See also, section 3 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973a).

(337 of 432)
Attachment I
x Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973f)
Under Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act, federal observers may be appointed,
upon request of the Attorney General, in any jurisdiction where an examiner is
serving. Federal observers are to monitor elections and report whether
persons entitled to vote were allowed to vote and whether their votes were
properly counted.
x Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b)
Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act prohibits persons, whether acting under
color of law or not, from intimidating, threatening, or coercing, or attempting
to intimidate, threaten or coerce, any person for voting or attempting to vote.
Section 11(b) further prohibits intimidation, threats, or coercion of those
persons aiding other persons in voting or exercising certain powers or duties
under the Act.
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§
1973ff to 1973ff-6) , 202
0
y 22
Januar
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee d on
archive Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), in
general, requires states and territories 45 allow absent uniformed service voters, their
58to
o. 18-1
spouses and dependents, and bs, Ncertain other overseas voters to register and vote
absentee in elections v. Hobfederal office. UOCAVA requires, for example, that a
for
C
in DN
citeddesignee prescribe a federal write-in absentee ballot for all overseas
presidential
voters in federal elections. The ballot is to be used if the overseas voter applies for,
but does not receive, a state absentee ballot.7 While state law, in general, governs the
processing of these federal write-in ballots, UOCAVA requires that states permit their
use in federal elections.8
National Voter Registration Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10)
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) established procedures designed
to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections Federal
office,” while protecting “the integrity of the electoral process” and ensuring the
maintenance of “accurate and current voter registration rolls.”9 NVRA requires all
states to adopt certain federal voter registration procedures, except for those states
that have no registration requirements or that permit election-day registration with
respect to federal elections.10 NVRA, for example, requires states to allow applicants
for driver’s licenses to register to vote on the same form.11 NVRA also requires states
7
42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(a).
8
Id. § 1973ff-1(3).
9
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg.
10
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2.
11
Id. § 1973gg-3(a).

(338 of 432)
Attachment I
to provide voter registration forms and accept completed applications at various state
agencies, including any office in the state providing public assistance, any office in
the state that provides state-funded disability programs, and other agencies chosen
by the state, such as state licensing bureaus, county clerks’ offices, public schools
and public libraries.12 NVRA also contains detailed requirements regarding state
removal of names from federal registration rolls.13
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. §§
1973ee to 1973ee-6)
Congress has passed legislation intended to improve access for elderly and
handicapped individuals to registration facilities and polling places for federal
elections. The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984
requires, with some exceptions, that political subdivisions within each state that are
responsible for conducting elections assure that polling places and registration sits
are accessible to handicapped and elderly voters.14 If the political subdivision is
unable to provide an accessible polling place, it must provide an alternative means
for casting a ballot on election day upon advance request by the voter.15 The act’s
requirements also include, for example, that each state or political 0subdivision
provide a reasonable number of accessible permanent registration22, 202 facilities, and that
y
nuar
Jaregistration
each state make available certain types of voting d and
on aids such as large-
rchive
type instructions and information by telecommunication
a devices for the deaf.16
845
-15
s, No. 18
bb with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 to 12134)
NC v. Ho
Title II of the Americans
(enforced iby in DDisability Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division)
the
c ted
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities in all programs, activities, and services of public
entities. It applies to all state and local governments, their departments and agencies,
and any other instrumentalities or special purpose districts of State and local
governments. According to the Voting Section, as construed by the courts, Title II
requires that polling places be accessible to persons with disabilities with certain
exceptions.
Help America Vote Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 15301 to 15545)
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), among other things, established a
program to provide funds to states to replace punch care voting systems, established
the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of federal
elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain
12
Id. §§ 1973gg-5(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(6)(A)(i).
13
Id. § 1973gg-6(b).
14
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee to 1973ee-6.
15
Id. § 1973ee-1(b)(2)(ii).
16
Id. § 1973ee-2, 1973ee-3.

(339 of 432)
Attachment I
federal election laws and programs, and established minimum election administration
standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for the
administration of federal elections. Certain HAVA provisions including those relating
to voting system standards, provisional voting and voting information requirements,
and computerized statewide voter registration lists are to be enforced by the Attorney
General.17
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17
42 U.S.C. § 15511.

(340 of 432)
Attachment II
Role of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section in Federal Elections
The Public Integrity Section (PIN), in conjunction with the 93 U. S. Attorneys and the
FBI, is responsible for enforcing federal criminal laws applicable to federal election
fraud offenses, among other things. Election fraud is conduct that corrupts the
electoral processes for: (1) obtaining, marking, or tabulating ballots; (2) canvassing
and certifying election results; or (3) registering voters. Election fraud can be
committed with or without the participation of voters. Examples of election fraud
that does not involve voter participation are ballot box stuffing, ghost voting, and
“nursing home” frauds. Examples of election fraud that involves, at least to some
extent, voter participation are vote buying schemes, absentee ballot fraud, voter
intimidation schemes, migratory-voting or floating-voter schemes, and voter
“assistance” fraud in which the voters’ wishes are ignored or not sought. According to
a PIN official, its attorneys spend about 10 percent of their time on election fraud
investigations and trials.
PIN is also responsible for overseeing the U.S. Attorneys’ and the FBI’s investigation
and prosecution of federal election fraud, one of the most common types of alleged
federal election crimes. PIN’s oversight entails (1) advising investigators20 and
prosecutors on the application of federal criminal lawsnuto ry 2 2, 20 crimes, (2)
election
a a
reviewing all major election crime investigations ed on J all proposed election crime
and
rchiv
15845 a DOJ’s District Election Officer (DEO)
charges, and (3) assisting with implementing
program. Under the DEO program, . 18-PIN asks each of the 93 U.S. Attorneys to appoint
bbs, No
v. Ho to serve a 2-year term as a DEO and provides training and
an Assistant U.S. Attorney
in DNC
guidancectoitedDEOs on carrying out their responsibilities. DEOs, whose responsibilities
are performed in conjunction with their other responsibilities, are to
x screen and conduct preliminary investigations of complaints, in conjunction with

the FBI and PIN, to determine whether they constitute potential election crimes
and should become matters for investigation;
x oversee the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and other election
crimes in their districts;
x coordinate their district’s (investigative and prosecutorial) efforts with DOJ
headquarters prosecutors;
x coordinate election matters with state and local election and law enforcement
officials and make them aware of their availability to assist with election-related
matters;
x issue press releases to the public announcing the names and telephone numbers
of DOJ and FBI officials to contact on election day with complaints about voting
or election irregularities and answer telephones on election day to receive these
complaints; and
x supervise a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and FBI special agents who are
appointed to handle election-related allegations while the polls are open on
election day.

(341 of 432)
Attachment II
Our analysis of information from PIN on election fraud matters showed that U.S.
Attorneys and PIN attorneys initiated a total of 61 election fraud matters, or
investigations, related to election years 2000 through 2003. Most of the 61 matters
related to elections held in 2002. Matters were initiated in 28 states and 1 U.S.
territory (the U.S. Virgin Islands) and ranged from 1 to 7 matters per state/territory
over the 4-year period. The most frequent allegations of election fraud were for
absentee ballot fraud and vote buying. According to PIN, many of these matters
resulted in indictments and subsequent convictions.
According to the Criminal Division, the information provided by PIN does not include
all election fraud investigations that the U.S. Attorneys have initiated because
(1) U. S. Attorneys are not required to consult with PIN for preliminary investigations
as opposed to grand jury investigations, which require consultation; (2) PIN did not
track election fraud investigations prior to October 2002; and (3) election fraud
investigations are sometimes initiated under non-election statutes.
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(342 of 432)
Attachment III
Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003
Table 1: Attorney General-Certified Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003
Election jurisdictions monitored during

State 2000 2001 2002 2003
Hale County Hale County
a
Selma (Dallas County) Chambers County
Lowndes County
Arizona Apache County Apache County
Navajo County Navajo County
a
Georgia Randolph County Randolph County
Brooks County
Sumter County
Twiggs County
Louisiana Tensas Parish
Mississippi Aberdeen (Monroe Clarksdale Adams County Greenville
a
County) (Coahoma (Washington
b
County) County)
Bolivar County Isola Amite County Humphreys
(Humphreys County
County)
Grenada County Macon Centreville (Wilkinson
20 Noxubee
(Noxubee
ry 2 2, 20
County) County
a
County) anua
Neshoba County Sunflower ed on J Drew (Sunflower Neshoba
iv
arch
45(Sunflower County) County
1 58
o. 18- County)
bs, N
Hob County
Newton Newton County
C v. Kemper County
ed in DN
cit Vicksburg Leake County
(Warren
a
County)
Webb Jones County
(Tallahatchie
County)
Winston County
New York Kings County Kings County Kings County
New York County New York New York County
County
Bronx County
a
South Carolina Marion County Ridgeville Ridgeville (Dorchester
a
(Dorchester County)
County)
Texas Irving (Dallas County) Irving (Dallas Titus County
County)
Total jurisdictions 19 11 13 9
Source: GAO’s analysis of election monitoring data provided by DOJ’s Voting Section.
a
Elections were monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff only, not OPM federal observers.
b
Three elections were held in Clarksdale (Coahoma County), Mississippi, in calendar year 2001. Only DOJ
attorneys and professional staff monitored one of the three elections, held on June 5, 2001. For the remaining
two elections held that year, DOJ attorneys and professional staff accompanied OPM observers in monitoring the
elections.

(343 of 432)
Attachment III
Table 2: Court-Ordered Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003

State 2000 2001 2002 2003
a
California Alameda County
b
Illinois Cicero (Cook Cicero (Cook County)
County)
c c c c
Louisiana
Michigan City of Hamtramck City of Hamtramck City of Hamtramck City of Hamtramck
d
New Jersey Passaic County Passaic County Passaic County Passaic County
New Mexico Bernalillo County Bernalillo County
Cibola County Cibola County
Sandoval County Sandoval County
Socorro County Socorro County
Pennsylvania Reading (Berks Reading (Berks Reading (Berks
b b
County) County) County)
e e
Utah San Juan County San Juan County
a
The court order for Alameda County, California, was in effect until January 22, 2001.
b
Elections were monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff only, not OPM federal observers.
c
A court order for St. Landry Parish was entered into on December 5, 1979. Data from the Voting Section shows
that as of August 26, 2003, the court order was still in effect and that no elections were 0monitored at this parish
during calendar years 2000 through 2003. 22, 202
d ry
nua2003.
Four elections were held in Passaic County, New Jersey, in calendar
o n Jayear Only DOJ attorneys and
professional staff monitored one of the four elections, heldhoniv d 13, 2003. For the remaining three elections
eMay
5 ar c
held that year, DOJ attorneys and professional staff
- 84accompanied
15in
OPM observers in monitoring the elections.
e
o.
The court order for San Juan County, Utah, 18was effect until December 31, 2002.
bs, N
v. Hob
C
in DN
cited

(344 of 432)
Attachment III
Table 3: Other Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003

State 2000 2001 2002 2003
California San Francisco County San Francisco
County
Connecticut Waterbury (New Haven
County)
Florida Osceola County Osceola County
Duval County Duval County
Miami-Dade County Miami-Dade County
Century (Escambia
County)
Orange County
Broward County
Georgia Putnam Atlanta (Fulton County)
County
Hawaii Honolulu County
Kentucky Jefferson County
Louisiana St. Martinville (St. Baker (East Baton
Martin Parish) Rouge Parish)
Winnsboro (Franklin Tangipahoa Parish
Parish)
Massachusetts Lawrence (Essex 20 Lawrence (Essex
County) ry 2 2, 20 County)
Michigan Flint anua
ed on J
(Genesee
rchiv
County)
1 58 45 a
Missouri . 18- St. Louis St. Louis St. Louis
b bs, No
New Jersey
v. H o Hudson County
NC Middlesex County
in D
New Mexicocited McKinley San Juan County
a
County
a
New York Queens County Queens County New York City
(Queens County)
Suffolk County Suffolk County Brentwood Union
Free School District
(Suffolk County)
Ohio Maple Heights
(Cuyahoga County)
South Carolina Marion
County
Texas Forth Worth Bexar County Kenedy ISD (Karnes Harris County
(Tarrant County)
County)
Comal County Seagraves (Gaines Moore County
County)
Guadalupe County
Note: DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored the election jurisdictions shown in this table unless
otherwise noted.
a
OPM federal observers also monitored elections in these counties even though the counties are not under
Attorney General-certification or court order.

(345 of 432)
Attachment IV
Summaries of Election-Related Preliminary Investigation, Matters, and

Cases Initiated from November 2000 to December 2003
Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Case Initiated during November

or December 2000
No. Matter/Case Jurisdiction Date matter initiated DJ No.
a
1 Matter Florida December 2000 No
a
2 Matter Hillsborough County, November 2000 No
Florida
3 Matter Palm Beach County, Florida November 2000 Yes
4 Matter Several counties in Florida November 2000 Yes
5 Matter DeKalb County, Georgia December 2000 Yes
6 Matter Gwinnett County, Georgia November 2000 Yes
7 Case St. Louis, Missouri November 2000 (case filed Yes
in August 2002)
Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division.
a
For the matters that the Voting Section initiated in Florida after the 2000 election, the Voting Section initially
used a general DJ number for all work on investigations and inquiries related to the Florida election. This number
was opened in November 2000. Subsequently, the Voting Section assigned separate DJ numbers for individual
matters. The 2000 matters in Florida and Hillsborough County, Florida, were inadvertently not given an individual
DJ number.
Summary of Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Case Initiated during November 0 or December
2000 22 , 202
ary
Description based on Voting Voting Section’s actions
o n Janu Section’s
Voting Disposition by
Section information taken to address hived assessment of Voting Section
arc
8 -1 5845
allegation allegations
1. The Voting Section Voting o . 1
Section staff Interviews by Voting Florida enacted
bs, N individuals
received a large number of Hobcontacted Section staff with election reform
complaints alleging that NC v. mentioned in complaints individuals mentioned in legislation in 2001
D
Florida voters ed in at the
citarrived that the NAACP had the complaints did not requiring, among
polls expecting to be properly forwarded to determine reveal a distinct pattern of other things, that the
registered to vote, but were the nature of their alleged registration problems in state implement a
told that their names were not registration problems. any one Florida county statewide voter
on the voter rolls. Some Voting Section staff sufficient to warrant registration
people who tried to vote but monitored election-related litigation, but taken as a database, permit
whose names were not on the hearings and lawsuits in whole the registration provisional voting,
voter rolls were often told to Florida to see what steps complaints seemed to and provide funds to
stand in another line so the state was going to indicate general problems counties for voter
election officials could be take. The Voting Section with the state of education and poll
called to verify their reviewed election reform compliance with NVRA worker training. The
registrations, but many voters legislation that Florida provisions for clarity and Voting Section
alleged that office phones enacted in 2001. processing of voter reviewed this law
were busy all day and registration forms, under Section 5 of
registrations could not be transmission of the forms the Voting Rights
verified. Some voters to election officials, Act and precleared it
apparently left and some education of registration on March 28, 2002.
remained at the polls until they personnel, adherence to With respect to this
closed, at which time they NVRA registration investigation, the
were apparently told they deadlines, maintenance Voting Section noted
could not vote because the of registration lists, ability that these reforms
polls were closed. to verify registration at the should help address
polls, and education of the problems alleged
voters, state registration to have occurred in
personnel, election 2000. While the
officials, and poll workers. Voting Section
further noted that the

(346 of 432)
Attachment IV
new state legislation

did not appear
specifically to
address all the
NVRA-related
issues, such as the
voter registration
process and
education of motor
vehicle agency and
other state agency
employees
regarding state
registration
procedures and
requirements in
federal law, such
issues could be
addressed through
design and
implementation of
the forthcoming
election procedures
to carry out the
requirements of the
new law. Therefore,
the Voting Section
20
ry 22, 20 determined that it
anua would monitor
ed on J Florida’s NVRA
rchiv actions in the future
15845 a
. 18-
in light of the new
bbs, No state legislation and
v. Ho ongoing federal
in DNC legislative efforts in
cited election reform
which might also
impact Florida’s
election procedures.
The Voting Section

closed the matter
because, based on
its monitoring of the
situation and the
provisions in the
state law pertinent to
registration that had
been precleared, it
concluded that the
problems which
occurred in the 2000
election were being
adequately
addressed.
2. The NAACP National Voter Voting Section staff met The sheriff’s office The Voting Section
Fund alleged (1) that on with, among others, reported that the closed the matter
Election Day 2000, sheriff’s officials from the county presence of sheriff’s because the
deputies in marked cars in sheriff’s office and several deputies near the polling complaint lacked
Hillsborough County, Florida, local residents, and spoke place was related to a merit since there
blocked access to a polling with a poll watcher to burglary nearby. One of was no evidence on
place, (2) that their presence gather additional the sheriff’s deputies any of the

(347 of 432)
Attachment IV
had an intimidating effect on observations. learned two days after the allegations raised.
voters, and (3) that at least on election that the same
one occasion they harassed a man who had approached
voter. An African-American the deputies on Election
man approached sheriff’s Day returned to the
deputies after they left the polling place and
scene of a burglary successfully voted. A poll
complaining that he was not worker observed the
allowed to vote. presence of the sheriff’s
cars around the same
time they were
responding to the
burglary, and observed
that no voter had been
deterred from voting due
to the police activity.
3. It was alleged that the The Voting Section The Voting Section The Voting Section
design of the butterfly ballot in opened a matter related to determined that there was concluded that
Palm Beach County, Florida, this issue and reviewed no basis for asserting because it had no
violated federal voting rights federal law for which the federal jurisdiction. jurisdiction
laws. Section had enforcement concerning this
authority to determine if matter, no further
any action was action was
appropriate. warranted. In
addition, according
to the Voting
20
ry 2 2, 20 Section, the new
anua Florida election
ed on J reform law should
rchiv
158 45 a help to alleviate
. 18- faulty ballot design
bbs, No by providing for
v. Ho greater oversight of
in DNC ballot design.
ited
4. Four statec troopers with the The Voting Section The Voting Section’s The Voting Section
Florida Department of opened a matter to investigation revealed closed the matter
Highway Safety and Motor investigate this issue and that the Florida Highway because there was
Vehicles ran a driver’s license asked the Florida State Patrol had set up a traffic no evidence of
checkpoint on Election Day Office of the Attorney check stop close to a intimidation or racial
2000 in Leon County, Florida. General about the polling place (about a intent to affect or
This checkpoint was located checkpoint in Leon mile away) located in a intimidate voters.
near (about a mile from) a County. A Voting Section predominantly African-
voting precinct. Another attorney also spoke with American neighborhood.
checkpoint was held in Bay an African-American voter The Voting Section
and Escambia Counties. who was stopped at one of investigation also
According to a highway patrol the driver’s license indicated that the
official, this checkpoint was checkpoints. troopers’ traffic stop plan
not located near a voting had not been pre-
precinct. approved by their
commander, as is the
standard procedure.
Further investigation
revealed that the traffic
checkpoint was in effect
for about 3 hours, and a
higher number of white
drivers were stopped than
African-American drivers.
According the Voting
Section, an African-
American voter who was

(348 of 432)
Attachment IV
stopped was treated

courteously and
proceeded to vote without
incident.
5. A U.S. Representative A Voting Section attorney The Voting Section The county
raised concerns regarding met with the following in attorney’s analysis of the implemented the
long voting delays in Georgia to address these documents that DeKalb following changes
predominantly African- concerns: (1) the DeKalb County provided revealed for the March 2001
American precincts in DeKalb County Elections that most of the county’s election: (1)
County, Georgia during the Supervisor, (2) the polling places that stayed increased the
November 2000 election. It Chairman of the DeKalb open past closing time number of voting
was alleged that there were County Elections Board, were located in majority machines, (2)
no corresponding delays in (3) the Gwinnett County African-American assigned additional
majority white precincts. In Elections Supervisor, (4) precincts. The polls’ poll workers and
one predominantly African- the president of the extended hours almost managers, (3)
American precinct, several DeKalb County NAACP, uniformly resulted from assigned at least 10
hundred voters apparently left (5) the Assistant DeKalb there being large additional staff
the precinct without voting County Attorney, and (6) numbers of people in line members to answer
after waiting in line for several one of the representative’s as well as insufficient telephones at the
hours. In districts with a staff members. The Voting numbers of poll workers Elections
majority of white residents, Section attorney received and voting machines. The Department and
voting lines apparently moved and reviewed documents attorney also determined installed 10 more
quickly with some people from both counties’ that there had been no telephone lines, and
being able to vote in less than elections departments unequal division of (4) gave the
15 minutes. In addition, two regarding the November electoral resources Elections
people complained about 2000 election. between majority white Department and
possible voting irregularities and majority African- area managers cell
20
during a March 2001 election. The Voting Section 2, 20
American precincts.
y2
phones in case
attorney requested
Ja nuar regular telephone
on
additional documents from edAccording to lines were busy. The
the Assistant DeKalb archiv investigations of the Voting Section
5845
o . 18-1 and
County Attorney November 2000 election determined that a
b s,
DeKalbN County Elections by the county’s elections dramatic
v. HobSupervisor to determine if department, the area improvement
C
in DN there was an unequal manager and his resulted from these
cited division of resources assistants at the main remedial actions
among African-American precinct of concern failed and, as a result,
and white districts. These to contact the precinct closed the matter.
documents outlined the office about the long lines
budget for expenses and insufficient voting
related to the elections machines. The former
from 1998 through 2000. area manager also
The Voting Section denied the poll workers’
attorney also spoke with requests for additional
the president of the voting machines, stating
DeKalb County NAACP none were available.
and the U.S. Attorney for The president of the
the Northern District of DeKalb County NAACP,
Georgia. staff in the office of the
U.S. Attorney for the
The Voting Section Northern District of
attorney spoke with the Georgia, and the DeKalb
two persons alleging fraud County Elections
during the March 2001 Supervisor did not receive
election. complaints related to
Election Day in DeKalb
County.
With respect to the March

2001 allegations, the
Voting Section attorney
noted that the two

(349 of 432)
Attachment IV
persons could not identify

the precincts where
alleged irregularities
occurred, and that they
did not have allegations
of racial intimidation or
vote suppression. The
determined that their
complaints seemed to
concern Georgia state
law, suggested that they
explore their state law
remedies, suggested that
they contact the county
elections department and
the office of Georgia’s
Secretary of State, and
asked them to keep the
informed of
developments.
6. The Voting Section The Voting Section spoke The Voting Section’s The Voting Section
received information that with staff in the Georgia investigation revealed closed the matter in
people in Gwinnett County, Attorney General’s office that the problem likely April 2002 mostly
Georgia who had registered to and the Georgia DPS and arose from the DPS because the state
vote via the Georgia DMV, a voter who raised paperless system to had created a new
Department of Public Safety the allegations, and the obtain and renew2,a202
0 agency, the
ry 2
(DPS) were not on the voter Deputy Director of nua
driver’salicense. The Department of Motor
registration rolls and were not on J seemed to result
Elections in the Secretary edprocess Vehicle Safety, to
v
rchi in people believing they
15845 a
allowed to vote. DPS operated of State’s Office. The which responsibility
vehicle registration sites in Voting Section - monitored had been registered to for voter registration
Georgia. Subsequently, DPS thes, No. 18 of NVRA
transition vote when they had not. A was in the process
bb
began the process of C v. Ho responsibilities from DPS person who indicated the of being transitioned.
i
transitioning National N
n DVoter to the new DMV from April intention to register to The Voting Section
ed
it (NVRA)
RegistrationcAct 2001 to April 2002. vote did not receive any determined this
responsibilities to the state’s confirmation at the time of system would
newly created Department of the transaction. remedy the problem.
Motor Vehicles (DMV). It was
alleged that voters were The Voting Section’s
turned away from the polls investigation revealed
and were not offered that since DPS
provisional ballots. Some implemented a paperless
voters were told to go to the system in 1996, the
county registration office, but percentage of those who
officials there told them they registered to vote at DPS
were not allowed to vote. sites when they applied or
renewed their licenses
had dropped almost every
year. There was also
evidence that DPS
officials knew of concerns
regarding the agency’s
paperless registration
system from its
implementation.
7. DOJ, on behalf of the Following an investigation, The Voting Section The consent order
United States, alleged that the DOJ filed a complaint with alleged that the state was gives court
St. Louis Board of Election the U.S. District Court in in violation of NVRA and jurisdiction over the
Commissioners’ (referred to the Eastern District of filed a complaint. proceeding until
hereafter as the Board) Missouri on August 14, January 31, 2005.
placement of eligible voters on 2002. On the same date, The consent order

(350 of 432)
Attachment IV
inactive status, when DOJ entered into a requires the Board

combined with election-day consent order with the city to initiate
procedures that inactive voters of St. Louis. procedures to
were required to follow to remedy the
restore their active voter problems that
status and vote during the occurred during the
November 2000 and March November 2000
2001 elections, constituted a election, such as
removal of those voters from improved methods
the voter registration rolls in of notifying voters
violation of Section 8 of who are moved to
NVRA. As of the November an inactive status,
2000 general election, more improved methods
than 54,000 registered voters of canvassing, and
in St. Louis had been improved resources
designated as inactive and to process eligible
excluded from the lists of voters not included
eligible voters following a on the rolls on
series of mail canvasses that Election Day. This
the Board conducted of its relief included
voter registration rolls. These requiring that every
mail canvasses did not include polling place have a
the notices required by complete list of
Section 8(d)(2) of NVRA. The registered voters,
Board did not make an effort including inactive
to notify inactive voters that voters, and a polling
their registration status had place locator to
20
changed, that their names
ry 22, 20 assist voters in
would not appear on the voter
anua finding their correct
registration lists, or that they ed on J precincts.
would face more rchi v
1 58 45 a
. 18-
administrative efforts on The consent decree
election day before being
b bs, No is valid until January
permitted to vote. v. Ho 31, 2005. The case
DNC
cited in remains open to
As a result, certain eligible, but monitor
inactive voters, were not able implementation of
to vote in the November 2000 the consent order.
general election and March
2001 municipal primary
election due to the lack of an
adequate infrastructure (i.e.,
insufficient phone lines,
working telephones, and staff)
in place to enable voters to
complete the verification
procedures required by the
Board on election day. For the
November 2000 election, over
300 eligible inactive voters
were able to obtain
authorization to vote after
going to the Board’s
headquarters as instructed by
the election judges.

(351 of 432)
Attachment IV
Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2001
No. Matter/Case Jurisdiction Date matter initiated DJ No.
b
1 Matter Florida March 2001 Yes
b
2 Matter Florida June 2001 Yes
b
3 Matter Florida June 2001 Yes
b c
4 Matter Florida August 2001 No
b
5 Matter Broward County, Florida October 2001 Yes
b
6 Matter Miami-Dade County, Florida June 2001 Yes
b
7 Matter Miami-Dade County, Florida June 2001 Yes
8 Matter (election New York, New York July 2001 Yes
monitoring)
9 Matter Georgetown County, South April 2001 Yes
Carolina
10 Matter Seagraves, Texas July 2001 Yes
11 Case Miami-Dade County, Florida March 2001 (case filed in June Yes
b
2002)
12 Case Orange County, Florida June 2001 (case filed in June Yes
b
2002)
13 Case Osceola County, Florida June 2001 (case filed in June Yes
b
2002)
14 Case Berks County, Pennsylvania March 2001 (case filed in Yes
February 2003)
15 Case Tennessee April 2001 (case filed in Yes
September 2002)
20
ry 2 2, 20
b
Each of these Florida matters was initiated in the period shortly after the a
anuNovember 2000 election—i.e., in
November or December 2000—and was reported under the general ed on JDJ number for Florida discussed previously
rchiv
(see note a under the summary table for November and
15 845 a December 2000 and note c below). The above dates are
. 18-
the dates they received individual DJ numbers.
bbs, No
v. HoSection initiated in Florida after the 2000 election, the Voting Section initially
c
For the matters that theCVoting
used a general DJ in DN for all work on investigations and inquiries related to the Florida election. This number
number
cited
was opened in November 2000. Subsequently, the Voting Section assigned separate DJ numbers for individual
matters. The 2000 matters in Florida and Hillsborough County, Florida, were inadvertently not given an individual
DJ number.

(352 of 432)
Attachment IV
Summary of Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2001
Description based on Voting Section’s Voting Section’s Disposition by Voting
Voting Section actions taken to assessment of Section
information address allegation allegations
1. There were allegations The Voting Section’s The Voting Section The Voting Section closed
made by students at investigation consisted determined that the the matter because it
Florida A&M University of phone interviews with problems were likely lacked merit based on the
(FAMU) in Tallahassee Bethune-Cookman attributable to voter evidence gathered during
(Leon County), Florida, students, on-campus confusion, not racial the investigation.
and Bethune-Cookman interviews of FAMU animosity. The Voting
College in Daytona Beach, students and student Section noted that the
Florida, regarding government leaders, incidents of the three
discriminatory treatment of and a review of FAMU students who
African-American students statements taken by a successfully voted were
in the registration process representative of the isolated incidents, and
or at the polls. First-time Service Employees since each student
voters, apparently International Union legal ultimately voted, the
unfamiliar with the department working in problems they suggested
registration process, had association with the did not suggest a pattern
greater difficulty NAACP. of intimidation or
registering to vote. Older attempted vote denial.
students did not seem to A Voting Section
have such difficulty. attorney interviewed The Voting Section
three students on concluded that most of
FAMU’s campus who the allegations were likely
claimed to experience to have been the result of
difficulty voting, but students not being
20
were able to vote. The familiar with the voting
ry 2 2, 20
Voting Section attorney process. Many ua
anstudents
left his contact had e d on J at their
registered
rchi v
information with
15 845 a permanent home
FAMU’s student. 18- addresses and did not
s, No association understand they had to
government
b b
v. H o
for any individuals who re-register in Leon
in DNC wanted to give County. The Voting
cited
statements regarding Section found that voter
voting problems but inexperience and
could not meet with the confusion were to blame
attorney. at Bethune-Cookman, not
any pattern of
The Voting Section discriminatory treatment.
attorney attempted to
contact all ten students
from Bethune-
Cookman, but was only
able to speak with
three. The attorney sent
letters to the remaining
students but never
received responses to
the letters.
The Voting Section

attorney followed up
with his contacts at
FAMU, but the Voting
Section did not receive
any response from
students to its efforts to
conduct further
inquiries. The student
government association

(353 of 432)
Attachment IV

also posted and
distributed flyers and
sent out internet notices
with the attorney’s
contact information.
Neither the attorney nor
the student association
at FAMU received
additional allegations of
voting irregularities.
2. Beginning in 1999, The Voting Section The evidence gathered The Voting Section closed
under Florida state law, reviewed testimony by the Voting Section the matter in April 2002.
the state contracted with a from Florida election showed that the matching The closing memo noted
firm to compare names of officials and at the state level was set that the new statute
registered voters with representatives of the up in a way that it appears to require no
names of convicted felons company that compiled captured names that additional procedures for
who under Florida law the database and were less than definite accurate name matching
were disqualified from obtained information on matches. The Voting compared to the old law. It
voting. The state elections how the lists of felons’ Section also learned that also noted that the new
division sent lists of felon names were matched to after receiving the state- statute appeared to codify
names for each of voter registration lists. generated list, counties’ a procedure used by many
Florida’s 67 counties to The Voting Section also actions varied. For counties under prior law
election officials in those did extensive additional example, some counties where voters whose
counties for investigation investigation to refused to use the list names
0 are matched by the
and purging. The Voting determine whether the because they perceived 2 2,it202state must affirmatively
ary
Section was concerned method in which Florida to contain many
on Januerrors. prove their eligibility to
that county and state compiled a list of felons Other
ve d
counties sent avoid removal.
hi
actions with regards to the and how they purged 45 arcletters to all the people on
5 8
purging process may have these felons. violated
o 18-1 the state’s list telling them However, the Voting
been flawed and anybofbs ,
theN statutes that their names were Section closing memo also
v. H o
impermissible under enforced by the Voting matched to those of noted that the new voter
NVRA. The Voting i DNC Section.
nSection disqualified felons, and purge procedures (which
cite d
questioned whether they would be required to included the assurances
eligible voters had been In addition, the Voting show their eligibility to made by the Attorney
inadvertently removed Section reviewed vote or be removed from General of Florida to
from the voter rolls. Florida’s 2001 election the rolls. The Voting protect voters from
reform law pursuant to Section determined that erroneous purging) had
Section 5 of the Voting evidence gathered for this been precleared on March
Rights Act. This review matter was inconclusive, 28, 2002. It further stated
included provisions of but showed there was a that the Florida felon
the new law related to possibility that voters purge statute in effect at
the voter purge could have been removed the time of the 2000
procedures that were in violation of federal law. election no longer existed
the subject of the and that any litigation
investigation. With respect to the against it based on how
Section 5 review of the that law was implemented
2001 election reform law, would be moot. Based on
this law was precleared these two factors, the
on March 28, 2002 after matter was closed.
careful review. The memo also stated that
Preclearance was the Voting Section may
granted only after open a new investigation
receiving explicit depending on any
assurances from the information received
Attorney General of regarding the operation of
Florida describing how the new statute and
the law would be related regulations.
implemented with respect
to voter purge lists Finally, the closing memo

(354 of 432)
Attachment IV

generated by the state also made note of pending
pursuant to the new state litigation in the case of
law. These assurances NAACP v. Harris, which
included (1) a statement included allegations that
that there would not be a the voter purge list used in
presumption in favor of 2000 violated the NVRA.
the accuracy of the Subsequent to the April
statewide database, and 2002 closing of this
any presumption would matter, a settlement was
be in favor of the voter reached in this case which
and (2) the appearance of required new procedures
a voter’s name on any for how the state was to
voter purge list of complete its voter purge
potentially ineligible lists in the future. This
voters generated by the change in voter purging
state would not by itself procedures was
confirm a voter’s precleared under Section
ineligibility, and that the 5 of the Voting Rights Act
burden of determining in 2003.
ineligibility was on county
supervisors of elections,
a burden which must
meet the highest degree
of proof. These
20
assurances were
ry 22, 20
anuawhen
specifically noted
d on J was issued
preclearance
e
rchi v
15 845 a by the Voting Section.
-
3. A newspaper article s
A Voting,N o. 18
Section The investigation found The Voting Section closed
o bb
provided to DOJ by a C v. H attorney analyzed rates that Florida counties with this matter because it
member of theteU.S.
d in DN of ballot spoilage in optical scan machines found no evidence
ci
Senate provided counties that had that activated the indicating a violation of
information that officials in disabled the spoilage spoilage detection federal law. Moreover,
several Florida counties detection function in technology had lower election reform legislation
disabled a feature in their optical scan rates of ballot spoilage enacted in Florida in May
optical scan voting machines and than counties that did not of 2001 requires all
machines used during the compared those rates to have or did not use the counties to acquire voting
November 2000 election those of ballot spoilage technology. Some machines with precinct-
to detect ballots spoiled by in counties that had not counties that had this based spoilage detection
over-voting and allow disabled this function. detection feature disabled technology by September
voters to correct the error. it on their voting 2002. The election reform
machines. There were law also requires counties
also isolated instances to activate this technology
where the technology during voting. The
was either disabled or Attorney General, under
failed to function properly. Section 5 of the VRA,
The Voting Section precleared election
determined that there procedures provided for in
was no evidence that the this legislation.
disabling of this feature
was done with a
discriminatory effect or
purpose.
4. The U.S. Commission The Voting Section Several analyses The Voting Section
on Civil Rights issued a reviewed the findings of suggested patterns of concluded that there was
report that posed the Commission’s report racial disparity in the no basis for bringing a
questions regarding regarding ballot ballot rejection practices Section 2 lawsuit against

(355 of 432)
Attachment IV

spoiled ballots in Florida rejection disparity and of a few Florida counties Florida on the basis of the
during the November 2000 several newspaper during one election. evidence of racial
election. The Commission studies of the spoilage However, the Voting disparities found in
questioned whether the issue. It then prepared a Section determined that spoilage rates.
racial disparity in spoiled factual and legal the disparity alone did not Furthermore, it was
ballots that occurred in analysis of issues meet the standards for a determined that because
Florida in 2000 was a raised in the Section 2 lawsuit. The Florida’s 2001 election
violation of Section 2 of Commission’s report to Voting Section noted that reform law required new
the Voting Rights Act. The determine if a Section 2 more investigation, election machines,
Commission stated that violation had occurred. analysis, and careful significant steps had been
the U.S. Department of thought would have to be taken by Florida towards
Justice (DOJ) should given to the causes of remedying the election
specifically investigate ballot rejection problems problems with respect to
whether the racial in Florida, the actual level voting machines. The
disparity in spoiled ballots of racial disparities, and Voting Section also
violated Section 2. the role played by state concluded that it would
and county officials make sense to monitor the
before a decision could actions of Florida and its
be made concerning a counties over the
Section 2 violation. subsequent few years to
see whether they would
follow through in acquiring
new voting machines with
error detection
0
22, 202technologies and
ry
anua educating voters to see
ed on J what impact such actions
rc hiv
5 a would have on ballot
18 -1584 rejection rates.
.
5. DOJ received s, NoSection
ThebVoting
b Based on information that As a result of the problems
. Ho
in D NC v opened a matter and
allegations of inaccessible the county provided, the experienced in the 2000
polling places tand
ed voting looked into the county’s Voting Section found that election, the Florida
ci
booths in Broward County, compliance with the the county conducted legislature enacted
Florida. Voting Accessibility for polling place surveys in changes to its accessibility
the Elderly and 1999 and conducted requirements for polling
Handicapped Act another survey devised to places and voting
(VAEHA). The Voting address the problem of machines. In light of this
Section sent a letter to disabled voters’ access to and the Voting Section’s
the Broward County the polls. The determination that the new
Supervisor of Elections investigation revealed that Florida law went further
requesting specific the people conducting the than the requirements in
information regarding surveys had no training in VAEHA, the investigation
procedures in place to accessibility standards. was closed.
ensure the physical The county provided the
accessibility of polling Voting Section attorney
places for federal with a memo and a plan
elections pursuant to stating that Florida
VAEHA. intended to purchase new
touch-screen voting
Attorneys from the machines with an audio
Voting Section and the component for the blind or
Civil Rights Division’s visually impaired, with one
Disability Rights Section such voting machine
met with the county available per precinct.
supervisor of elections
and the supervisor’s
attorney to discuss
physical accessibility of
polling places and

(356 of 432)
Attachment IV

purchase of new voting
machines. The Voting
Section and Disability
Rights Section’s
attorneys requested
documentation such as
copies of county
surveys covering
accessibility
procedures, a list of
polling place changes
spurred by accessibility
concerns; a list of
disability community
contacts with whom
officials from the office
of the county supervisor
of elections met, and
procedures for
reassignment or
curbside voting. The
county provided both
attorneys with a
demonstration of the
20
new touch-screen voting
ry 2 2, 20
machines with an audio anua
component for the blind e d on J
rchiv
1 5845 a
or visually impaired. The
Voting Section -
. 18attorney
alsobb s , No the
contacted
Ho
v. county supervisor of
in DNC election’s attorney
cited
requesting information
on VAEHA compliance.
6. It was alleged that a The Voting Section Based on the information The Voting Section
crowd of persons attorney reviewed the gathered, the Voting concluded that no further
attempted to intimidate allegations along with Section determined that investigation was
election officials on the numerous accounts of no cause of action existed warranted and closed the
canvassing board of events that transpired under the civil matter.
Miami-Dade County, that day. enforcement provisions of
Florida, during the the federal voting laws
presidential vote recount that the Voting Section is
after the November 2000 charged with enforcing.
election. It was alleged
that this group’s activities
at the county courthouse
during the recount
intimidated the canvassing
board into abandoning the
recount.
7. There were allegations The Voting Section The discussions that the The Voting Section closed
made after the November attorney examined voter Voting Section conducted the matter because it
2000 election that ballot turnout data for the two with counsel for Miami- lacked merit. According to
boxes in two precincts in question. Dade County indicated the Voting Section, the
predominantly minority The Voting Section that all of the county’s evidence that the Voting
precincts in Miami-Dade attorney also held ballot boxes had been Section collected made it
County, Florida, had not discussions with the accounted for on that day. seem doubtful that there
been picked up on First Assistant County According to the county were any missing ballot

(357 of 432)
Attachment IV

Election Day, and that Attorney in Miami-Dade supervisor of elections, boxes.
they were allegedly later County, who in turn the boxes that were later
found in the polling places. contacted the county located in the two
supervisor of elections. precincts contained
election supplies, not
ballots. Analysis of data
from the two precincts
indicated that both
precincts reported voter
turnout rates in the
expected range given the
county’s overall turnout
rate.
8. The Voting Section In pre-election activities, Thirty federal observers The Voting Section closed
opened this matter in two Civil Rights Division monitored activities at 31 the matter because the
August 2001 to initiate the attorneys met with polling places in Bronx monitoring of the election
monitoring of an election officials from the New County and 12 polling was completed. Voting
in New York City in York City Board of places in Brooklyn County Section staff could not
November 2001 on the Elections to discuss during the municipal comprehensively identify
basis of observations concerns about general elections. Three failure by individual poll
made during the preparations for the staff members from DOJ’s workers to post or provide
November 2000 election. election, including the Civil Rights Division and all materials to Spanish-
Thirty federal observers need for poll worker one AUSA for the speaking voters because
and seven DOJ staff training for the election, Southern District of New of
0 the large number of
members monitored the need for voting York traveled with the22, 202election districts—nearly
y
polling place procedures machines to observers to nuar
Japrovide 2,000—and the small
during municipal general accommodate the d
additionalon monitoring. number of observers.
hive
elections in 2001 in Kings number of registered 45 arcTwo Voting Section staff However, the Voting
-15 8
County (also known as voters, the need
. 1 8 for members visited six Section found that the
Brooklyn) and in Bronx b bs , No
Spanish-language voter polling places in both Board of Elections was
o
County. The Attorney C v. H registration materials for counties. During the very responsive to all of
ed in DN
General had previously poll workers to distribute election, observers found the Voting Section’s
it
certified bothc counties for minority language that materials to be concerns and sent Board
federal observers assistance, and displayed to inform officials to places where
pursuant to Section 6 of consolidation of polling Spanish-speaking voters problems arose, usually
the Voting Rights Act. places. A Voting of assistance to interpret within 30 minutes.
Also, 17 federal observers Section attorney also the ballot were not always
and 5 Voting Section attended four poll- clear or in public view at
attorneys monitored worker training classes. nearly half of the polling
polling place procedures After the election, the places in both counties.
during the general election Voting Section The Board of Election
in 2002 in Brooklyn. attorneys met with officials were informed of
several Board of this and took action.
Elections officials to These officials noted that
debrief them. it was up to each polling
place inspector to display
the materials they are
given. Poll workers were
observed asking voters
for identification, which
was in violation of New
York State law; Board of
Election officials were
notified of this and went to
the polling place to
address the issue. DOJ
monitors did not witness
any Spanish-speaking
poll workers at the 12

(358 of 432)
Attachment IV

polling locations visited in
Brooklyn; this was
discussed with Board of
Election officials;
however, DOJ officials
found that appropriate
language assistance was
available in both counties.
Seventeen federal
observers and five
attorneys from the Civil
Rights Division monitored
polling place procedures
during the general
election in Kings County.
The Voting Section

attorney who attended
four poll-worker training
classes found that the
classes appropriately
addressed minority
language issues and
20
assistance.
ry 22, 20
9. The Voting Section The Voting Section Voting Section ua wrote The Voting Section closed
anstaff
received an allegation attorney interviewed to ithe
e on JRegistration
dVoter the matter on March 9,
v
h Election Commission 2004. As of that date, the
from an African-American officials with the 45 arcand
-15 8
o 18
voter that a supervisor at a Georgetown. County for Georgetown County Voting Section had not
voting precinct in Board bs ,
of N
Registration outlining the allegations received additional
H o b
Georgetown County, C v. and Elections, concerning the rude complaints concerning the
South Carolina, e d in DN representatives of the treatment by the poll treatment of African-
discriminatedcitagainst Republican and worker and the Voting American voters in
African-American voters Democratic parties, Section’s findings and Georgetown County or
during the 2000 voters, and an attorney asked the commission about voting registration
presidential election. The representing the county. how it planned to issues previously
voter alleged that the The Voting Section respond. investigated. According to
supervisor treated African- attorney also The county’s Voter the complainant, the
American voters in a rude interviewed an official Registration and Election election held on June
and discriminating who managed the Commission responded in 11,2002, went smoothly.
manner. In talking to the Georgetown County writing that the election
complainant and others, it DMV office regarding supervisor was informed
was learned that there the second-hand by letter that she would
were also alleged voter allegations from a be reassigned to another
registration problems Democratic party precinct and not permitted
during the 2000 election representative to serve in a supervisory
related to precinct regarding possible capacity for the June 11,
changes and the local registration problems at 2002, election. She
DMV. the local DMV. decided not to work the
June 2002 election.
After interviewing the
DMV official and Other issues examined in
examining the forms this investigation were not
that the DMV provides raised with the county in
to drivers applying for this letter. With respect to
new licenses to the precinct change
simultaneously allow allegations, the Voting
them to register to vote, Section learned that
the Voting Section confusion as to proper

(359 of 432)
Attachment IV

attorney noted that the voting precincts was likely
form on the DMV the result of a change in
driver’s license the method of identifying
application did not addresses of voters. With
contain a box for people respect to allegations
to check if they wanted about the DMV
to register to vote and procedures, the Voting
that this might not Section received no
adhere to the NVRA complaints from voters
provision for a who indicated that the
simultaneous process to alleged problems at the
apply for a driver’s DMV existed or resulted
license and register to in denying them the right
vote. In addition, in the to vote. In addition, after
interview with the the examination of the
employee in the local DMV forms and interview
DMV office, the Voting with the local DMV
Section attorney employee, it was
learned that they may concluded that there did
have been only asking not appear to be a
people applying for new violation of the NVRA.
drivers’ licenses, not
people renewing their
licenses, if they wanted
20
to register to vote.
ry 2 2, 20
However, this employee anua
further informed the e d on J
rchiv
158 45 a
-
. 182000
that in October
s , No
shebreceived
b
v. H o
instructions from the
in DNC head of the state DMV
cited to ask every person
who was applying for a
driver’s license whether
he or she wished to
register to vote, and she
followed that instruction
through the election.
10. The Voting Section A Voting Section Information in a The Voting Section
received a complaint attorney visited newspaper article attorney suggested that
alleging that the Seagraves and the indicated that the the town should make an
Seagraves Independent Seagraves Independent allegations were untrue, effort to educate voters of
School District and the School Board. The and that all election district boundaries by
City of Seagraves, both in Voting Section also material was produced in methods other than
Texas, held elections contacted a newspaper English and Spanish. The newspaper advertising.
without bilingual judges or to review published Voting Section attorney Subsequent to the
bilingual training. articles regarding the was told that confusion election, the city of
school board election. existed for all voters Seagraves sent a map of
because of the present district boundaries and
districting system. candidates running in
each district to each city
The Seagraves City household. The Voting
Secretary wrote a letter to Section closed the matter.
the Voting Section
attorney stating that each
year the city names a
Hispanic judge who is
also bilingual. The City

(360 of 432)
Attachment IV

Secretary also provided
the Voting Section
attorney with minutes of
prior city council meetings
highlighting the
nomination and approval
of the election judges,
and a sample ballot
printed in both English
and Spanish.
11. During the November After a full investigation, Evidence gathered during A consent order was
2000 election, Miami- the Voting Section the investigation entered into on June 17,
Dade County, Florida, initiated litigation demonstrated that Creole- 2002, that, in part,
allegedly engaged in against Miami-Dade speaking Haitian- prohibited the county from
practices that prevented County because of its American voters at denying Haitian-American
the county’s Creole- alleged violation of several precincts were voters assistance from
speaking Haitian- Section 208 of the denied assistance from persons of their choice
American voters with Voting Rights Act. Prior persons of their choice in and mandated that the
limited ability to speak to initiating litigation, the violation of Section 208 of county take certain steps
English from securing Voting Section the Voting Rights Act. to prevent violations of
assistance at the polls. In conducted an Oftentimes, only poll Section 208 and to
circumstances where the investigation of the workers, who did not redress the harm caused
county permitted voter county’s voter speak Creole, were these voters, such as
assistance from persons assistance practices permitted to assist the modifying
0 poll worker
of the voters’ choice, the during the 2000 voters, and they limited
2 2 , 202training to include
ary
scope of the assistance election. DOJ filed a Januto voter
their assistance
on
instruction on how to
was limited (e.g., standing complaint with the U.S. ve d
demonstrations outside handle requests for
next to voters during poll
hi
District Court in the 45 arcthe voting booths. The language assistance. The
- 5
1for8
worker demonstrations) Southern District
. 18 Voting Section did not find consent order is in effect
and of little value to voters Florida
b s NoJune
,on 7, 2002. evidence that through December. 31,
o b
once they entered the C v. H noncompliance with 2005. The case is open to
N
voting booths.ted in D Section 208 was the monitor implementation of
ci result of intentional the consent order.
discrimination. In this
regard, it was noted that
the Miami-Dade Board of
County Commissioners
passed ordinances in
1999 and 2000 mandating
that Haitian-Creole ballot
translations be available
in voting booths located at
precincts where
“significant” numbers of
Haitian-American people
vote.
12. As described in DOJ’s After investigating these In the complaint, the The case is open to
complaint, DOJ alleged allegations, DOJ filed a Voting Section alleged monitor implementation of
that various election complaint in the U.S. that Orange County the consent decree. The
practices and procedures District Court for the violated VRA Sections consent decree permits
in Orange County, Florida, Middle District of Florida 203 and 208. DOJ to monitor elections
unlawfully denied or on June 28, 2002, and in Orange County from
abridged the voting rights entered into a consent October 9, 2002 until
of Spanish-speaking decree with Orange January 31, 2005. The
citizens. The challenged County on October 9, consent decree also
practices concerned the 2002. mandates policies and
alleged failure of the procedures that Orange
county to: (1) provide an County must adopt with

(361 of 432)
Attachment IV

adequate number of regards to treatment of
bilingual poll workers Spanish-speaking voters.
trained to assist Hispanic The consent decree is
voters on Election Day; (2) valid until January 31,
ensure that poll officials 2005. DOJ did not
allow Spanish-speaking contend that Orange
voters to have persons of County’s failure to adhere
their choice assist them in to VRA Sections 203 and
casting their ballots; and 208 was the result of
(3) translate certain written intentional discrimination.
election materials into
Spanish.
13. As described in DOJ’s After investigating the In the complaint, the
The case is open to
complaint, DOJ alleged matter, DOJ filed a Voting Section alleged
monitor implementation of
that Osceola County, complaint in the U.S. that Osceola County
the consent decree. The
Florida, engaged in District Court for the violated VRA Sections 2
consent decree allows
various election practices Middle District of Florida and 208. DOJ to monitor elections
and procedures that on June 28, 2002, and held in Osceola County
unlawfully denied Spanish- entered into a consent from the date of the
speaking citizens an decree with Osceola consent decree through
opportunity equal to that of County on July 22, January 31, 2005. It
other citizens to vote. The 2002. specifies procedures that
challenged practices the Osceola County Board
concerned: (1) the failure of
0 Elections must
of poll officials to 22, 202implement with regards to
ary
communicate effectively to
on Janu the treatment of Spanish-
Spanish-speaking voters ived speaking voters and efforts
necessary information 45 arch the county must engage in
-158
concerning their eligibility . 18 to facilitate voting by
to vote, voter registration bbs, No Spanish-speaking voters.
status, identification v. Ho The consent decree is
requirements,tand DNC
inpolling valid through January 31,
ed
ci and
place changes 2005. DOJ did not contend
assignments; (2) the that Osceola County
refusal of poll officials to intended to deny Spanish-
allow certain Spanish- speaking voters an equal
speaking voters opportunity to participate in
assistance in voting by the political process.
persons of their choice;
and (3) hostile remarks by
poll officials directed
towards Hispanic voters
with limited English
proficiency.
14. It was alleged that, in After extensive In the complaint, the On July 17, 2003, DOJ
conducting elections in investigation, which Voting Section alleged filed a motion for (1)
Reading City, included the monitoring that actions contributing to permanent injunction and
Pennsylvania, Berks of several elections held the denial by Berks entry of final judgment
County denied Hispanic in the county, the Voting County to provide that sought to
citizens with limited Section initiated Hispanic citizens with permanently enjoin the
English proficiency an litigation against Berks limited English proficiency county’s conduct of
equal opportunity to County because of its an equal opportunity to elections using policies,
participate in the political alleged violation of participate in the political practices, procedures,
process and elect the several provisions of the process and elect the and methods that violate
representatives of their Voting Rights Act. DOJ representatives of their certain VRA requirements
choice. filed a complaint with choice included the and (2) the court to issue
the U.S. District Court following: poll officials an order authorizing OPM
for the Eastern District directed hostile remarks to appoint federal

(362 of 432)
Attachment IV

of Pennsylvania on at, and acted in a hostile examiners pursuant to
February 25, 2003. manner toward, Hispanic VRA to serve in Berks
voters to deter them from County through June 30,
voting and make them feel 2007. The court granted
unwelcome at the polls; the United States’ motion
poll officials engaged in on August 20, 2003. The
election practices case remains open for
including the failure to monitoring and several
communicate effectively elections have been
with Spanish-speaking monitored since entry of
voters regarding the consent decree.
necessary information
about their eligibility to
vote, voter registration
status, identification
requirements, and polling
place changes and
assignments, and turning
away Hispanic voters at
the 2001 and 2002
elections; and Berks
County failed to recruit,
train, and maintain an
adequate pool of Hispanic
20
ry 2 2, 20
and bilingual poll officials
despite their a nua
knowledge of
d
thevneeds
e onofJ Hispanic
rchi
1 5 845 a voters with limited English
. 18- proficiency.
15. As described in DOJ’s After
b b s, No
investigating this In the complaint, the The case is open to
Ho
complaint, DOJ alleged C v. matter, DOJ filed a Voting Section alleged monitor implementation of
that the state ofed in DN complaint against the that Tennessee violated the consent decree. The
cit
Tennessee engaged in state of Tennessee in provisions in NVRA. consent decree requires
practices that unlawfully the U.S. District Court of the state and state
denied certain citizens full Tennessee on agencies to develop
and complete September 27, 2002. uniform procedures with
opportunities to register to On that same day, the regards to the voter
vote in elections for state of Tennessee application process and
federal office as mandated entered into a consent the implementation of
by NVRA. The challenged decree with DOJ. NVRA and report progress
practices included the to DOJ annually while the
failure of the state and consent decree is in effect.
agency officials to: (1) The consent decree
provide applications to expires on August 1, 2005.
register to vote
simultaneously with
applications for motor
vehicle driver’s licenses
(including renewal
applications); (2) request
only the minimum amount
of information necessary
to prevent duplicate voter
registration and enable
state election officials to
assess the eligibility of the
applicant and to
administer voter
registration and other part

(363 of 432)
Attachment IV

of the election process; (3)
distribute voter registration
applications with every
application for public
assistance or services to
persons with disabilities;
and (4) transmit completed
voter registration
applications in a timely
manner.
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(364 of 432)
Attachment IV
Election-Related Closed Preliminary Investigation and Matters and Closed Cases Initiated during
Calendar Year 2002
No. Preliminary Jurisdiction Date investigation or matter DJ No.
Investigation/Matter/Case initiated
1 Preliminary investigation Hinds County, Mississippi November 2002 No
2 Matter (election monitoring) Apache and Navajo September 2002 Yes
Counties, Arizona
3 Matter (election monitoring) Broward County, Florida November 2002 Yes
4 Matter (election monitoring) Duval County, Florida November 2002 Yes
d
5 Matter Georgia October 2002 No
6 Matter Minnesota October 2002 Yes
7 Matter New Jersey October 2002 Yes
8 Matter (election monitoring) Bexar County, Texas October 2002 Yes
9 Matter Hidalgo County, Texas December 2002 Yes
10 Case Oklahoma August 2002 (case filed in Yes
September 2002)
11 Case Texas March 2002 (case filed in Yes
March 2002)
d
According to the Voting Section, this matter did not receive a DJ number inadvertently.
Summary of Election-Related Closed Preliminary Investigation and Matters and Closed Cases Initiated
during Calendar Year 2002
Description based on Voting Voting Section’s Voting Section’s Disposition by
Section information actions taken to assessment 20
, 20of Voting Section
2 2
ary
address allegation
on Januallegations
1. The wife of a soldier from Hinds A Voting Section official ived The AUSA told the The Voting Section
County, Mississippi, assigned to discussed the 45 arch
allegation soldier’s wife that an closed the preliminary
8
15 in the
-official
Guantanamo, Cuba, alleged that with. 1
o 8
an investigation revealed investigation after the
her husband and approximatelyo50 b bs, N
Federal Voting the ballots had been lost AUSA concluded, and
other soldiers from thatNcounty
C v. Hdid Assistance Program in the mail. The FBI the Voting Section
not receive theired inD
absentee ballots in (FVAP) under the agent concluded that the agreed, that there
cit
the mail. Hinds County Department of Defense county officials had was no basis for
acknowledged receiving their (DOD), who said that mailed the ballots to the bringing charges
requests in mid-September of someone in Hinds soldiers, but they had against anyone
2002, and the circuit clerk County told FVAP on been lost or involved in the
confirmed they were mailed in the November 20, 2002, disappeared. The private handling of the ballots
first week of October 2002. that about 20 ballots company that processed because the ballots
had been sent to mail for the county told had been lost in the
The Mississippi Secretary of State’s soldiers in Guantanamo. the FBI agent that they mail and no further
office suggested that the soldiers Voting Section staff also were unable to check the action was needed.
fax in federal ballots but was not phoned the AUSA in zip codes of mail
sure the ballots would be counted. Jackson, Mississippi, processed on a
That office also suggested to the and noted in a memo particular day.
soldier’s wife that she contact the that the AUSA had
Voting Section. She reported to the directed a local Federal
Voting Section that soldiers from Bureau of Investigation
Madison and Rankin counties, also (FBI) agent to interview
in Mississippi, did not receive their the chancery clerk, the
ballots until after the election. She registrar, and all others
also contacted the Assistant U.S. in the chain of custody
Attorney (AUSA) for Hinds County. of the ballots. The
Voting Section also
discussed asking FVAP
to monitor transit of
absentee ballots to
soldiers from Hinds and
Brandon Counties

(365 of 432)
Attachment IV

Section information actions taken to assessment of Voting Section
address allegation allegations
during the next election
in response to the
soldier’s wife January
2003 request that the
Voting Section keep
these counties on its
“radar screen.”
2. On November 5, 2002, federal In September 2002, the The counties’ A November 22,
election observers and Voting Voting Section met with implementation of their 2002, memo
Section staff monitored polling the Apache County Navajo Language discussing the
place activities at 21 locations in Election Director, the election information monitoring of the
Apache and Navajo Counties, Apache County Deputy program was November 5, 2002,
Arizona. The Attorney General, County Attorney, the inadequate. While the election indicated that
pursuant to VRA Section 6, had Navajo County Election counties provided the Voting Section
certified these counties for federal Director, the Navajo language assistance to would meet in the
observers. Since then, federal County recorder, and many voters, the future with election
observers have documented two Navajo County assistance was officials from both
problems related to the counties’ outreach workers to frequently insufficient counties to discuss
inability to provide consistently discuss several issues and failed to provide the November 5,
effective Navajo language related to elections in consistent and accurate 2002, election and
assistance to voters and other the two counties. The language translation of develop methods to
related circumstances affecting the Voting Section provided the offices and improve the counties’
Navajo voting population. suggestions on how to propositions on the provision of language
prevent prior problems ballot’s 14 propositions. assistance and
20
The Voting Section was concerned from recurring. The
ry 2 2, 20
The Voting Section overall Election Day
about the following issues related Voting Section observed nua that the
concluded performance. The
to the primary held in September the November 2002 ived n Ja
ocounties must improve matter was closed
rch
10, 2002, and the general election election.
58 45 a and expand their training after the election.
held in November 5, 2002: (1) the
o. 18-1 program for interpreters. According to the
counties’ provision for Navajo bbs, N
The original poll worker Voting Section, this is
. Ho
in D N v
language assistance, (2)Cvoters training schedules that The federal observers standard Voting
being turned away at the polls, (3) the two counties had reported that the Section procedure
cited and (4) polls not
crossover voting, provided to the Voting interpreters and poll when irregularities
opening on time. During the 2000 Section allotted workers believed more are observed during
election cycle and 2002 primary, approximately 2 hours training in Navajo election coverage.
federal observers documented for training. The Voting language translation was
several problems with the counties’ Section suggested necessary. Some poll In the case of Navajo
provision of Navajo language having all-day training workers told the language assistance
assistance to voters. The Voting sessions, and the observers that the in these counties, the
Section suggested that both schedules were revised audiotapes containing Voting Section stated
counties distribute cassette tapes to allot 6-½ hours for Navajo translations were that such outreach
containing Navajo language ballot training. too long and confusing. has been continuous
translations to poll workers. The for many years.
counties committed to preparing The Voting Section One polling place was Another memo
and distributing the tapes to poll suggested that both not well organized, discussing
workers. Officials from both counties provide each resulting in very long compliance and
counties also informed the Voting polling place on the lines. The Voting Section outreach efforts since
Section that they would use Navajo Reservation with reported this to the the 2002 election
updated flip charts for the voter registration lists Navajo County Elections indicates many
November election. These charts, from both counties, and Director, who sent an improvements in
which were used for the September train poll workers to outreach worker to Navajo language
primary at the Voting Section’s check both lists and remedy the problem. The assistance efforts as
suggestion, displayed pictorial check with the line was moving more a result of this
representations and written Navajo appropriate county quickly by mid-afternoon. outreach, including:
translations of each of the offices election department (1) improved poll
on the primary election ballot. before turning voters The number of voters worker training which
away. Both counties turned away from the included the use of
There had been confusion in agreed to adopt this polls was less than pictorial flip charts to
previous elections among many suggestion. The Voting during the September assist voters in

(366 of 432)
Attachment IV

elderly Navajo voters who live near Section also expressed primary. However, while understanding the
the Navajo/Apache county line concern about polling all the polling places had ballot; (2) outreach
about polling place and voter places that opened late both counties’ and voter registration
registration. These voters often for the September registration books, poll efforts on the
vote in different locations for tribal primary. The counties workers at most reservation at various
and state/federal elections. Tribal agreed to address this locations did not use events; (3) the
elections do not recognize county prior to the November them. Some did not opening of new early
boundaries. Poll workers at polling 2002 election. know the books were voting locations on
places near the county line available. At one Apache the Navajo
apparently turned away dozens of County location, Reservation; (4) the
elderly voters because of voting observers reported that opening of a new
location confusion during the 2000 the Navajo county list satellite election office
primary and general elections and was not present. The on the reservation to
the 2002 primary. In 2000, poll Voting Section informed disseminate voter
workers gave affidavit ballots to the county elections information and
other crossover voters in the director, who showed the register voters; and
mistaken belief that the ballots Navajo County book to (5) greater
would be accepted later. However, the polling place cooperation among
since these voters were not inspector. The poll the counties providing
registered in the counties where workers had not Navajo language
they voted, their votes were removed the book from assistance.
considered invalid. the elections supply box.
The Voting Section felt
that more training and
practice would2 2020the
2,make
ry
nua more
pollaworkers
d nJ
ofamiliar with this new
chive
5 a r system. There were no
18 -1584 complaints about polls
.
bbs, No not opening on time.
. Ho
in D NC v and 2
3. Voting Section personnel Actions taken by DOJ Voting Section staff The Voting Section
AUSAs monitored e d 84 precincts in staff included provided assistance to closed the matter
cit Florida, during the interviewing the clerk of help correct issues that
Broward County, because the election
November 2002 election. the precinct where a arose during the being monitored was
white male precinct monitoring. Examples of completed.
worker who allegedly issues/problems
harassed African- observed were: (1)
American voters was African-American voters
employed about any felt somewhat harassed
complaints or problems by a white male precinct
with the assistant worker; (2) a poll official
precinct clerk in did not want to allow a
question. DOJ staff person to vote who said
spoke with four voters at he had requested an
this precinct regarding absentee ballot but did
their experience voting not receive it; and (3)
and asked election persons were turned
officials to make chairs away because of
available for the precinct changes due to
disabled and elderly redistricting, because
waiting in line to vote. they moved, and for
They contacted county other reasons.
election officials about a
voter who was told he
could not vote because
he had already sent an
absentee ballot; the
precinct clerk eventually
verified that the voter

(367 of 432)
Attachment IV

had not been sent an
absentee ballot, and the
voter was allowed to
cast his vote on election
day.
With regard to the

absentee ballot issue,
DOJ staff advised the
poll official to contact
the Broward County
Election Board. In
addition, DOJ staff: (1)
gave a voter the toll-free
telephone number for
the Voting Section
because the voter
wanted to complain
about the lack of voting
machines; (2) asked a
poll clerk and poll
workers if they had
received complaints
about not having
20
enough voting
ry 22, 20
machines; and (3) anua
spoke with two votersved on J
rchi
who complained
1 5 845 aabout a
- being hard to
o. 18
precinct
bbs,N
find.
. Ho
in D NC v
4. At the request of Florida’s Voting Section attorneys While monitoring the The Voting Section
Secretary of State,
ed the Voting monitored the election election, the Voting closed the matter
cit
Section monitored the election in and facilitated the Section found various because the election
November 2002 in Duval County, resolution of problems areas of clarification and being monitored was
Florida. that arose by improvement. One issue completed.
communicating proper involved absentee
election procedures to ballots and Florida law
the Supervisor of allowing a person who
Elections. Prior to requested an absentee
monitoring the election, ballot but did not submit
Voting Section attorneys it to vote at the polls.
met with the Supervisor There was confusion
of Elections, minority when absentee ballots
leaders in the were submitted but
community, leaders of rejected as being
the NAACP, and incomplete because they
representatives from the lacked voters’ signatures
local Democratic and and voters then being
Republican parties. able to vote at the polls.
They exchanged Voters who submit
telephone information absentee ballots are
and invited each person considered to have voted
or group to contact them and cannot vote at the
with details of any polls on election day if
problems that they the absentee ballot is
might help address. rejected.
They also provided
guidance on issues that Also, poll workers had
might arise to provide a given incorrect ballots to

(368 of 432)
Attachment IV

common understanding some voters. Voters
of action that should be were turned away who
taken if a particular lacked signed photo
problem arose. identification and were
not allowed to vote by
The Voting Section provisional ballot. There
attorneys worked with were also a few
the Supervisor of instances of insensitivity
Elections to improve to minority voters and
election processes and voters with disabilities.
were invited by the
Supervisor of Elections
to monitor elections in
April and May 2003 to
further improve upon
their election processes.
5. Georgia state law requires FVAP advised the FVAP favored going The Voting Section
counties to have absentee ballots Voting Section that a forward with the suit that closed the matter.
on hand 45 days before a general senior official in Georgia’s Secretary of
election. Georgia missed the Georgia’s Elections State had suggested, but
September 20, 2002, deadline for Division said that the Voting Section did
the November 5, 2002, general election officials in each not because (1) the
election because of the of Georgia’s counties number of voters
compressed election schedule in would photocopy all affected was very small,
0
2002. The 45-day deadline was set necessary ballots and less than 1322 , 202
2overseas;
ry
to comply with federal mandates to send them to every nua
(2)JUOCAVA was
make it easier for U.S. military military and overseasived n a
oamended in 1986 to add
rch
personnel stationed outside the
1 58 45 avoter
citizen absentee the federal write-in
- an
o. 18
United States to vote. Georgia had from whom absentee ballot as a
compressed its 2002 primary andbbs, N application had been back-up ballot when
. Ho
in D N v that received in time. All 154
runoff election schedulesCsuch timely requested ballots
the runoff wasteheld only 49 days Georgia counties had do not reach voters in a
ci d
before the November 5 general done this by October 7. timely matter (the Voting
election. This precluded the printing Section relies on the use
of the general election ballot in time A Voting Section of the back-up ballot as a
for the mailing deadline required attorney asked the remedy in UOCAVA
under state law. Georgia election source of the allegation lawsuits brought in
officials had contacted FVAP during in Catoosa County to primary elections, and
the first week of October regarding keep in touch and gave had no reason to believe
the state’s compliance with the the person who made it was an inadequate
Uniformed and Overseas Citizen the allegation the phone remedy); and (3) the
Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). number and Web site Voting Section believed
for FVAP for additional the Secretary of State’s
Catoosa County ballots omitted the information about true interest in the
names of the Republican candidate FVAP’s role in this lawsuit stemmed from
for the U.S. Senate and the process. The Voting the large number of
Republican gubernatorial candidate Section attorney regular absentee ballots
from the ballot. An allegation was contacted FVAP, and a that were mailed late,
made that this, among other FVAP official agreed to and such ballots could
absentee ballot irregularities, contact officials in not be part of any
violated UOCAVA because the Catoosa and Ben Hill UOCAVA remedy.
correct ballots, even if sent at the counties to get copies of
time this concern was raised on their ballots and get
October 16, 2002, would not be back to the Voting
received in time. Section attorney. The
Georgia’s Secretary of State asked also contacted a state
DOJ to bring suit against the state election official.
to extend the deadline for receipt of

(369 of 432)
Attachment IV

military and other absentee ballots.
6. The Voting Section conducted an In an e-mail, the Voting The Voting Section The Voting Section
investigation under UOCAVA and Section attorney monitored state actions closed the matter
monitored a lawsuit in Minnesota expressed concern to address this issue. after the state
over absentee ballots used in the about ballots being Supreme Court
November 2002 general election. mailed, filled out, and issued an order
At issue was the removal of returned between addressing the
Senator Paul Wellstone’s name on October 31 and absentee ballot issue.
the ballots and issuance of new November 5 (6 days). The order specified
ballots. Senator Wellstone died 11 the procedures for
days prior to the election, and absentee ballots that
former Vice President Mondale was included various
designated the replacement options based on
candidate for the Democratic- whether a voter had
Farmer-Labor party. This party or had not already
argued for mass mailing of new voted for Senator
absentee ballots, and the Wellstone.
Republican party argued to do the
mailing based on requests.
7. A suit arose from the resignation The Voting Section The Voting Section The Voting Section
of Senator Robert Torricelli from prepared a discussion noted that late concluded that New
the general election and ballot for memo evaluating the transmittal of ballots to Jersey state law
Democratic nomination to the U.S. impact that the New voters by airmail provides for several
Senate. The New Jersey Jersey Supreme Court generally raises 0 methods for UOCAVA
Democratic party brought suit to ruling would have on concerns that 2 , 202
2overseas voters to participate in
a r y
secure a declaration that the New overseas absentee votersnuwould not have federal elections over
Jersey Democratic State voters. The Voting ived n Ja
osufficient time to receive, and above the use of
rch
Committee was permitted to select
158 45 a the
Section monitored mark, and return their regular absentee
a qualified candidate to replace New 8-
o. 1Jersey Democratic ballots to local election ballots sent by
Sen. Torricelli. The New Jersey bbs, N
party lawsuit and state officials. The Voting airmail. The Voting
Ho
D C v. of the
Supreme Court ruled inNfavor remedies to address this Section staff determined Section closed the
state Democratic in
party and issue. that New Jersey state matter due to lack of
cited
required that a new ballot be law contains several merit.
prepared under the direction of the unique features that
state Attorney General and a state obviate the need for 20-
court judge. Military and overseas 40 days of roundtrip
ballots were to be given airmailing. In addition,
precedence and an explanatory DOD provides a backup
letter was to be sent to all voters ballot available at military
who received the new ballots. The installations and U.S.
Voting Section was concerned embassies/consulates.
about the late transmittal of ballots This is referred to as a
to military and overseas voters. federal write-in absentee
ballot.
The Voting Section

noted that the question
might arise regarding
how the state would
address ballots that had
already been transmitted
to overseas voters and
may have already been
returned. The Voting
Section determined that
this was a question for
state officials to resolve,
and that the Voting

(370 of 432)
Attachment IV

Section planned to raise
this issue when speaking
with state officials in
October 2002.
8. An attorney for Bexar County, The Chief of the Voting In a letter dated The Voting Section
Texas, requested, in a letter to the Section wrote a letter November 1, 2002, The closed the matter
Voting Section dated October 18, back to the attorney for Voting Section stated because it granted
2002, expedited review of changes Bexar County. The that the Attorney General preclearance for the
in the county’s early voting process Voting Section had did not interpose any changes.
in the joint general and special telephone discussions objection to the specified
election on November 5, 2002. with various people changes, but noted that
Changes included: (1) the one-time regarding the ballot Section 5 of the Voting
use of two-page ballots for partisan format issues. Rights Act provides that
contested races, (2) procedures for failure of the Attorney
counting ballots with straight-party General to object does
votes, and (3) one-time use of a not bar subsequent
single two-sided ballot for partisan litigation to enjoin
contested races supplemented by a enforcement of the
separate sheet with duplicate changes.
voting instructions for the
November 5, 2002, general After the League of
election. Prior to that request, the United Latin American
League of United Latin American Citizens filed the lawsuit,
Citizens filed suit in U.S. District Bexar County advised 0
Court for the Western District of the court that2 , 202
2they
ry
Texas alleging that Bexar County nuaSection 5
initiated
implemented changes to the d n Ja
opreclearance submission
ive
conduct of the November general 45 arch procedures on October
58
election without obtaining 18-1 18, 2002, and October
No.
preclearance from DOJ.
Ho bbs, 21, 2002. The county
C v. had not obtained
ed in DN preclearance from DOJ
cit at the time the lawsuit
was filed. The court
agreed with both parties
that the changes were
required and allowed the
changes to proceed
pending the
preclearance. On
October 31, 2002, the
court decided to retain
jurisdiction over the case
through the conclusion of
the 2002 election
process and ordered the
parties to advise the
court as to their positions
on the case on or before
December 1, 2002.

(371 of 432)
Attachment IV

9. A U.S. Representative sent a A Voting Section memo The Voting Section The Voting Section
letter to the Attorney General referred to an allegation determined that Hidalgo closed the matter on
regarding possible voter received from the U.S. County’s election June 25, 2003,
suppression in Alabama, Arkansas, Representative administrator handled because it lacked
Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, regarding possible the situation well by merit. The Voting
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, intimidation at the expelling the poll Section attorney
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and November 2002 election watchers when the observed that there
Texas. In Arkansas, Louisiana, and held in Hidalgo County, voting supervisors was a tense
Maryland, it was alleged that Texas. The Voting alerted the election atmosphere in
African-Americans were victims of Section attorney administrator that two Hidalgo County
voter suppression. In New Jersey requested several poll watchers for the between some of the
and Texas, allegations of voter pieces of documentation Republican candidate white Republicans
suppression involved Hispanics. from the county were making random and the Hispanic
The victims of voter suppression in elections administrator, challenges to Hispanic citizenry. The Voting
the other states were not specified. including newspaper voters. Section
articles, letters between recommended that
According to the Voting Section, the elections The Voting Section this is an area that
many of the matters referred to in administrator and the further determined that should be monitored
the letter were matters under the Republican elections efforts on the part of the in future elections.
jurisdiction of the Criminal Division administrator, and Republican party did not
and were being investigated by that information regarding a dampen minority turnout
Division when the letter was study regarding the and did not discover
received. The Voting Section possibility of 13,000 instances of voter
investigated two of the allegations dead or ineligible voters intimidation at the polls
referred to in the letter, including on the county voter rolls. on election day. 020
2, 2The
ary 2
one in Hidalgo County, Texas, The Voting Section VotingnuSection noted that
where it was alleged that the attorney spoke with ved n Ja contacts in the
ominority
rchi
Republican party intimidated Hispanic voters
1 5 8 45 aand county: (1) did not think
-
o. 18
Hispanic voters countywide to other minority contacts. that the allegations of
dampen their turnout at the general b bs,N
The Voting Section dead voters on the rolls
election. The second allegationv. Hothat attorney also analyzed dampened turnout; (2)
the Voting Section in DNC
investigated that voter turnout data for did not believe that the
ited
was referredcto in the letter was in Hidalgo County and challenges made by the
New Jersey; the Voting Section compared it to the state two poll watchers caused
opened a matter in 2003 to of Texas for 2002 and fewer Hispanic voters to
investigate this allegation (see previous elections. vote; and (3) did not
information provided in this report problems of voter
attachment for 2003). intimidation at the polls.
The Voting Section did
The most direct form of alleged not find apparent
intimidation in Hidalgo County was differences between the
reported to have occurred when voter turnout data in the
two poll watchers for a Republican 2002 election compared
candidate challenged Hispanic to other elections.
voters at early voting on the basis
that a study indicated that 13,000
dead or ineligible voters were in the
county’s voter registration rolls. The
Republican party held a press
conference two weeks before the
election where party
representatives alleged that voter
fraud could be a significant problem
with the number of people listed
incorrectly on the voter rolls.
10. As described in DOJ’s After an expedited In the complaint, the The consent decree
complaint, DOJ alleged that the investigation, DOJ filed Voting Section alleged required the state to
state of Oklahoma was not in a complaint in the U.S. that the state of take corrective
compliance with UOCAVA. Election District Court for the Oklahoma violated actions so that all

(372 of 432)
Attachment IV

officials in Oklahoma could not mail Western District of UOCAVA. uniformed military
absentee ballots to military and Oklahoma on personnel and
civilian overseas voters on a date September 12, 2002, citizens living
sufficiently in advance of the and entered into a overseas who filed a
September 17, 2002, primary runoff consent decree with the timely request to
election to allow voters to receive state of Oklahoma on receive an absentee
the ballot, cast a vote, and return September 17, 2002. ballot are given the
the ballot to election officials by the opportunity to vote.
deadline established by state law. The state did so
through, among other
things, the passage of
UOCAVA compliance
legislation in May
2003.
11. As described in DOJ’s After an expedited In the complaint, the The court entered a
complaint, DOJ alleged that as a investigation, DOJ filed Voting Section alleged temporary restraining
result of the compressed period of a complaint and motion that the state of Texas order and preliminary
time between the Texas primary for a temporary violated UOCAVA. injunction on March
and runoff elections, election restraining order and 25, 2002, permitting
officials in the state of Texas failed preliminary injunction in qualified Texas voters
to mail absentee ballots to military the U.S. District Court to use federal write-in
and civilian overseas voters on a for the Western District absentee ballots for
date sufficiently in advance of the of Texas on March 22, the April 9, 2002,
April 9, 2002, federal primary runoff 2002. election. According to
20
election to allow such voters to
ry 22, 20 the terms of the court
receive the ballot, cast a vote, and anua order, the state was
return the ballot to election officials ed on J required to take
rchiv
by the deadline established by
15845 a actions to remedy
state law. . 18- absentee ballot
bbs, No issues in the future.
v. Ho This included
in DNC permitting voters to
cited submit write-in ballots
if their ballots are not
sent to them in time
and counting the
write-in ballots as
valid as long as the
voters living outside
the United States are
qualified to vote in
Texas.
A stipulation of
dismissal was
entered in February
2004 following
passage by the state
legislature of
legislation remedying
the United States’
complaint.

(373 of 432)
Attachment IV
Election-Related Closed Matter Initiated during Calendar Year 2003

No. Matter Jurisdiction Date matter initiated DJ No.
1 Matter New Jersey January 2003 Yes
Summary of Election-Related Closed Matter Initiated during Calendar Year 2003

Description based on Voting Section’s actions Voting Section’s Disposition by Voting
Voting Section taken to address assessment of Section
information allegation allegations
1. This matter was the The Voting Section The people that the Voting The Voting Section closed
second matter opened attorney contacted a Section attorney the matter because it
by the Voting Section in Latino political activist in contacted were not aware lacked merit.
response to the the New York of the e-mail or any other
November 2002 letter metropolitan area, the threats or intimidation
from a U.S. Treasurer of the New tactics against Latino
Representative referred Jersey Hispanic Bar voters. The Voting Section
to in the previously Foundation, and a noted that its investigation
described 2002 matter community activist and yielded results similar to
for Hidalgo County, attorney based in Newark, the judge’s findings—that
Texas. There were New Jersey. the ballot fairness plan
allegations of voter mentioned in the e-mail
intimidation in New did not raise concerns
Jersey. According to a about Latino voter
newspaper article, e- intimidation during the
mails were sent to Latino November 2002 general
lawyers urging them to election. 20
engage in an aggressive
ry 22, 20
campaign to ensure anua
ballot fairness. Attorneys e d on J
rchi v
for both the Democratic
1 5 8 45 a
and Republican National . 18-
Committees presented bbs , No
their case before the NC v.
Ho
in D
ited The
U.S. district ccourt.
judge ruled a few days
before the November
2002 election that there
was “nothing sinister” in
the Republican ballot
fairness plan and
characterized the plan
as legitimate campaign
activity.

(374 of 432)
Attachment V
Comments from the Department of Justice
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(375 of 432)
Attachment V
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(376 of 432)
Attachment V
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(377 of 432)
Attachment V
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(378 of 432)
Attachment V
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(379 of 432)
Attachment V
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited

(380 of 432)
Attachment V
20
ry 22, 20
anua
ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
bbs, No
v. Ho
in DNC
cited
(440350)

Voting Determination Letters for Arizona
(381 of 432)
Search this site Search
ABOUT OUR AGENCY PRIORITIES NEWS RESOURCES CAREERS CONTACT
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VOTING DETERMINATION LETTERS FOR ARIZONA
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About the To the extent that any documents do not currently comply with Section 508 Eric S. Dreiband
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documents used to prepare this site, the Division is applying its available General
Meet the
resources in an effort to create alternative records that are readable.
Assistant CONTACT
Attorney General Determination Letters for Arizona, by date.
Civil Rights Division
How to File a Jurisdiction Description and submission
Complaint Notes (202) 514-4609
and date numbers
Telephone Device for
Press Room 0 20
State of Chapter 159--method of 22, 2
Withdrawn 3-15-74
ary
the Deaf (TTY) (202)
Cases and Arizona circulating recall petitions on Janu 514-0716
Matters 10/09/1973 (V5782) ived
45 arch
(pdf) -158
Publications s, No. 18
bb
Employment
Cochise Cty.
NC v. Ho
Redistricting
College Board in D(7071A)
Opportunities cited
02/03/1975
Civil Rights FOIA (pdf)
Contact the Apache Cty. Bond election; multilingual Declaratory
Division High School procedures judgment denied in
District No. (X7759) Apache County Report a Violation
90 High School District Get a Job
10/04/1976 No. 90 v. United Contact Us
(pdf) States, No. 77-1815
Apache Cty. Special dissolution election and Withdrawn 5-7-80
High School changes relating to election,
District No. including polling places and LEARN ABOUT
90 multilingual procedures (D.D.C. PROSECUTING AND
03/20/1980 June 12, 1980) PREVENTING HATE
(pdf) (7X-0067) CRIMES
State of H.B. No. 2001--House and Senate

Arizona reapportionment
03/08/1982 (82-1539)
(pdf)
Douglas At-large method of election; Withdrawn 6-23-98
(Cochise Cty.) residency districts; staggered
12/05/1983 terms; majority vote
(pdf) requirements; limitation on the
https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-determination-letters-arizona[1/22/2020 5:30:20 PM]

(382 of 432)
number of terms councilmembers
may serve; special election
LEARN ABOUT
(83-1403; 83-1404)
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Navajo County Redistricting for the five IN HOUSING
08/31/1984 supervisor districts INITIATIVE
(pdf) (84-1778)
Navapache Elimination of two polling places,
Hospital the implementation of a five-
District polling place rotation system, and LEARN ABOUT
(Navajo and the reduction in the polling hours PLACE TO

Apache Ctys.) (85-1768) WORSHIP INITIATIVE
08/16/1985
(pdf)
Cochise Cty. 1983 redistricting plan
Community (83-1398)
College
District
11/03/1986
(pdf)
Apache Navajo-language bilingual election
County procedures
07/17/1987 (80-1278)
(pdf)
, 2020
Apache Navajo-language bilingual election y 22
Januar
County procedures d on
02/10/1988 (87-1799) a rchive
-15 845
(pdf)
s , No. 18
bb
Coconino Voter
C . Ho
vregistration challenge and
in DN
County cited purge procedures
11/04/1991 (91-3167)
(pdf)
State of Act No. 1 (1992)--Senate and
Arizona House redistricting plan
06/10/1992 (92-1347)
(pdf)
La Paz County 1992 redistricting plan for the
07/17/1992 board of supervisors
(pdf) (92-2285)
State of Act No. 240 (1992)--House and
Arizona Senate redistricting plan
08/12/1992 (92-3395)
(pdf)
Arizona 1992 and existing redistricting
Western plans for Yuma County portion of
College the district
District (Yuma (88-2479)
and La Paz
Ctys.)
09/28/1992
(pdf)

(383 of 432)
Yuma County 1992 redistricting plan for the
09/28/1992 board of supervisors
(pdf) (92-2355)
Graham 1992 redistricting plan for the
County board of supervisors
02/22/1993 (92-2466)
(pdf)
Coconino Two additional superior court
County judgeships
04/08/1994 (93-0681)
(pdf)
Navajo County Two additional superior court
05/16/1994 judgeships
(pdf) (93-0684)
State of 2001 legislative redistricting plan
Arizona (2002-0276)
05/20/2002
(html | pdf)
Coconino Method of election
Association (2002-3844)
for Vocations,
Industry, and
Technology 20
(Coconino ry 2 2, 20
anua
Cty.) ed on J
rchiv
02/04/2003
15845 a
(html | pdf) . 18-
bbs, No
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As More Vote by Mail, Faulty Ballots Could Impact Elections - The New York Times
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Error and Fraud at Issuen Jaas 2 0

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An absentee ballot in Florida. Almost 2 percent of mailed ballots are rejected, double the rate
for in-person voting. Sarah Beth Glicksteen for The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/us/politics/as-more-vote-by-mail-faulty-ballots-could-impact-elections.html?smid=tw-share[1/22/2020 5:35:06 PM]

(385 of 432)
By Adam Liptak
Oct. 6, 2012
TALLAHASSEE, Fla. — On the morning of the primary here in August, the

local elections board met to decide which absentee ballots to count. It was
not an easy job.
The board tossed out some ballots because they arrived without the
signature required on the outside of the return envelope. It rejected one
that said “see inside” where the signature should have been. And it debated
what to do with ballots in which the signature on the envelope did not quite
match the one in the county’s files.
“This ‘r’ is not like that ‘r,’ ” Judge Augustus D. Aikens Jr. said, suggesting
that a ballot should be rejected.
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Ion Sancho, the elections supervisor here, disagreed. anua
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Scenes like thisdwill play
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C out in many elections next month, because Florida
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and other states are swiftly moving from voting at a polling place toward
voting by mail. In the last general election in Florida, in 2010, 23 percent of
voters cast absentee ballots, up from 15 percent in the midterm election
four years before. Nationwide, the use of absentee ballots and other forms
of voting by mail has more than tripled since 1980 and now accounts for
almost 20 percent of all votes.
Yet votes cast by mail are less likely to be counted, more likely to be
compromised and more likely to be contested than those cast in a voting
booth, statistics show. Election officials reject almost 2 percent of ballots
cast by mail, double the rate for in-person voting.
“The more people you force to vote by mail,” Mr. Sancho said, “the more
invalid ballots you will generate.”
Election experts say the challenges created by mailed ballots could well

(386 of 432)
affect outcomes this fall and beyond. If the contests next month are close
enough to be within what election lawyers call the margin of litigation, the
grounds on which they will be fought will not be hanging chads but ballots
cast away from the voting booth.
In 2008, 18 percent of the votes in the nine states likely to decide this year’s
presidential election were cast by mail. That number will almost certainly
rise this year, and voters in two-thirds of the states have already begun
casting absentee ballots. In four Western states, voting by mail is the
exclusive or dominant way to cast a ballot.
The trend will probably result in more uncounted votes, and it increases the
potential for fraud. While fraud in voting by mail is far less common than
innocent errors, it is vastly more prevalent than the in-person voting fraud
that has attracted far more attention, election administrators say.
In Florida, absentee-ballot scandals seem to arrive like clockwork

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election time. Before this year’s primary, for example, n Ja a woman in Hialeah
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local law. cited
The flaws of absentee voting raise questions about the most elementary
promises of democracy. “The right to have one’s vote counted is as
important as the act of voting itself,” Justice Paul H. Anderson of the
Minnesota Supreme Court wrote while considering disputed absentee
ballots in the close 2008 Senate election between Al Franken and Norm
Coleman.
Voting by mail is now common enough and problematic enough that

election experts say there have been multiple elections in which no one can
say with confidence which candidate was the deserved winner. The list
includes the 2000 presidential election, in which problems with absentee
ballots in Florida were a little-noticed footnote to other issues.
In the last presidential election, 35.5 million voters requested absentee

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ballots, but only 27.9 million absentee votes were counted, according to a
study by Charles Stewart III, a political scientist at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. He calculated that 3.9 million ballots requested by
voters never reached them; that another 2.9 million ballots received by
voters did not make it back to election officials; and that election officials
rejected 800,000 ballots. That suggests an overall failure rate of as much as
21 percent.
Some voters presumably decided not to vote after receiving ballots, but Mr.
Stewart said many others most likely tried to vote and were thwarted. “If
20 percent, or even 10 percent, of voters who stood in line on Election Day
were turned away,” he wrote in the study, published in The Journal of
Legislation and Public Policy, “there would be national outrage.”
The list of very close elections includes the 2008 Senate race in Minnesota,
in which Mr. Franken’s victory over Mr. Coleman, the Republican
2 0
incumbent, helped give Democrats the 60 votes in the Senate
ry 22
, 20needed to
a
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pass President Obama’s health care bill. Mr. Franken
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while state officials rejected 12,000
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elections in New iYork
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v Republican state senators who had voted
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to allow same-sex marriage also hinged on absentee ballots.
There are, of course, significant advantages to voting by mail. It makes life

easier for the harried, the disabled and the elderly. It is cheaper to
administer, makes for shorter lines on election days and allows voters more
time to think about ballots that list many races. By mailing ballots, those
away from home can vote. Its availability may also increase turnout in local
elections, though it does not seem to have had much impact on turnout in
federal ones.
Still, voting in person is more reliable, particularly since election

administrators made improvements to voting equipment after the 2000
presidential election.
There have been other and more controversial changes since then, also in
the name of reliability and efficiency. Lawmakers have cut back on early

(388 of 432)
voting in person, cracked down on voter registration drives, imposed
identification requirements, made it harder for students to cast ballots and
proposed purging voter rolls in a way that critics have said would eliminate
people who are eligible to vote.
But almost nothing has been done about the distinctive challenges posed by
absentee ballots. To the contrary, Ohio’s Republican secretary of state
recently sent absentee ballot applications to every registered voter in the
state. And Republican lawmakers in Florida recently revised state law to
allow ballots to be mailed wherever voters want, rather than typically to
only their registered addresses.
“This is the only area in Florida where we’ve made it easier to cast a ballot,”
Daniel A. Smith, a political scientist at the University of Florida, said of
absentee voting.
He posited a reason that Republican officials in particular have

20
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expand absentee voting. “The conventional wisdom nuar
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absentee ballots and Democrats vote 5early,”
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In Florida, a Look at the Challenges of Mailed Ballots
10 Photos View Slide Show ›

(389 of 432)
Sarah Beth Glicksteen for The New York Times
Republicans are in fact more likely than Democrats to vote absentee. In the
2008 general election in Florida, 47 percent of absentee voters were
Republicans and 36 percent were Democrats.
There is a bipartisan consensus that voting by mail, whatever its impact, is

more easily abused than other forms. In a 2005 report signed by President
Jimmy Carter and James A. Baker III, who served as secretary of state
under the first President George Bush, the Commission on Federal Election
Reform concluded, “Absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential
voter fraud.”
On the most basic level, absentee voting replaces the oversight that exists at
polling places with something akin to an honor system.
“Absentee voting is to voting in person,” Judge Richard A.2Posner

, 202
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United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh dCircuit
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Election administrators have a shorthand name for a central weakness of

voting by mail. They call it granny farming.
“The problem,” said Murray A. Greenberg, a former county attorney in

Miami, “is really with the collection of absentee ballots at the senior citizen
centers.” In Florida, people affiliated with political campaigns “help people
vote absentee,” he said. “And help is in quotation marks.”
Voters in nursing homes can be subjected to subtle pressure, outright

intimidation or fraud. The secrecy of their voting is easily compromised.
And their ballots can be intercepted both coming and going.
The problem is not limited to the elderly, of course. Absentee ballots also
make it much easier to buy and sell votes. In recent years, courts have
invalidated mayoral elections in Illinois and Indiana because of fraudulent

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absentee ballots.
Voting by mail also played a crucial role in the 2000 presidential election in
Florida, when the margin between George W. Bush and Al Gore was razor
thin and hundreds of absentee ballots were counted in apparent violation
of state law. The flawed ballots, from Americans living abroad, included
some without postmarks, some postmarked after the election, some
without witness signatures, some mailed from within the United States and
some sent by people who voted twice. All would have been disqualified had
the state’s election laws been strictly enforced.
In the recent primary here, almost 40 percent of ballots were not cast in the
voting booth on the day of the election. They were split between early votes
cast at polling places, which Mr. Sancho, the Leon County elections
supervisor, favors, and absentee ballots, which make him nervous.
“There has been not one case of fraud in early voting,” Mr. Sancho
20 said.
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nuarballots.”
“The only cases of election fraud have been in absentee
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Efforts to prevent fraud at polling o. 8-15
1places have an ironic consequence,
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C v. at Loyola Law School, told the Senate Judiciary
Justin Levitt, a professor
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cit
Committee September last year. They will, he said, “drive more voters into
the absentee system, where fraud and coercion have been documented to
be real and legitimate concerns.”
“That is,” he said, “a law ostensibly designed to reduce the incidence of

fraud is likely to increase the rate at which voters utilize a system known to
succumb to fraud more frequently.”
Clarity Brings Better Results
In 2008, Minnesota officials rejected 12,000 absentee ballots, about 4

percent of all such votes, for the myriad reasons that make voting by mail
far less reliable than voting in person.
The absentee ballot itself could be blamed for some of the problems. It had
to be enclosed in envelopes containing various information and signatures,

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including one from a witness who had to attest to handling the logistics of
seeing that “the voter marked the ballots in that individual’s presence
without showing how they were marked.” Such witnesses must themselves
be registered voters, with a few exceptions.
Absentee ballots have been rejected in Minnesota and elsewhere for

countless reasons. Signatures from older people, sloppy writers or stroke
victims may not match those on file. The envelopes and forms may not
have been configured in the right sequence. People may have moved, and
addresses may not match. Witnesses may not be registered to vote. The
mail may be late.
But it is certainly possible to improve the process and reduce the error rate.
Here in Leon County, the rejection rate for absentee ballots is less than 1
percent. The instructions it provides to voters are clear, and the outer
envelope is a model of graphic design, with a large signature box
20
at its
, 20
center. nuary 22
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The envelope requires only standard
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arrangements within Dthe
NC vpost office to pay for ballots that arrive without
cited
stamps.
Still, he would prefer that voters visit a polling place on Election Day or
beforehand so that errors and misunderstandings can be corrected and the
potential for fraud minimized.
“If you vote by mail, where is that coming from?” he asked. “Is there
intimidation going on?”
Last November, Gov. Rick Scott, a Republican, suspended a school board

member in Madison County, not far from here, after she was arrested on
charges including absentee ballot fraud.
The board member, Abra Hill Johnson, won the school board race “by what
appeared to be a disproportionate amount of absentee votes,” the arrest
affidavit said. The vote was 675 to 647, but Ms. Johnson had 217 absentee

(392 of 432)
votes to her opponent’s 86. Officials said that 80 absentee ballots had been
requested at just nine addresses. Law enforcement agents interviewed 64 of
the voters whose ballots were sent; only two recognized the address.
Ms. Johnson has pleaded not guilty.
Election law experts say that pulling off in-person voter fraud on a scale
large enough to swing an election, with scores if not hundreds of people
committing a felony in public by pretending to be someone else, is hard to
imagine, to say nothing of exceptionally risky.
There are much simpler and more effective alternatives to commit fraud on
such a scale, said Heather Gerken, a law professor at Yale.
“You could steal some absentee ballots or stuff a ballot box or bribe an
election administrator or fiddle with an electronic voting machine,” she
said. That explains, she said, “why all the evidence of stolen elections
20
involves absentee ballots and the like.” ry 22, 20
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Provisional Ballots
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v. Ho
in DNC
cited
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Provisional Ballots
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TABLE
OF Provisional Ballots
CONTENTS 10/15/2018
Introduction Introduction
Federal Provisional ballots ensure that voters are not excluded from
Law the voting process due to an administrative error. They
provide a fail-safe mechanism for voters who arrive at the
Why Are polls on Election Day and whose eligibility to vote is
Provisional uncertain.
Ballots 0
Used? Also referred to asy 22, 202
ar
“challenge on Janu or
ballots”
ived
Legislative 45 arch
“affidavit ballots” in
58
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Role bs, N some states, they are
v. Hob
DNC required by the federal
cited in
How Help America Vote Act
Investigated? of 2002 (HAVA).
When there is
Partial
uncertainty about a
Count
voter’s eligibility—the
potential voter’s name
Reasons
is not on the voter
for
rolls, a required
Acceptance/Rejection
identification
Inform document isn’t
the Voter available or other
issues—the election
Time to official is required to offer the voter a provisional ballot
Determine instead of a regular ballot.
Status
In nearly all of the states, after being cast, the provisional
Which States ballot is kept separate from other ballots until after the
Don't election. A determination is then made as to whether the
Use voter was eligible to vote, and therefore whether the ballot is

Provisional Ballots
(395 of 432)
Provisional to be counted. Generally, a board of elections or local
Ballots? election officials will investigate the provisional ballots within
days of the election. Since this is an additional administrative
Methodology step, a large number of provisional ballots can increase costs
for jurisdictions.
Additional
Resources States vary greatly in how provisional ballots are handled
and in the number that are issued and rejected, and both the
About processes and the data are tracked by the U.S. Election
This Assistance Commission (EAC). States can have as few as
Project 100 provisional ballots cast statewide, or as many as
100,000.
CONTACT
Often standards for handling provisional ballots are
NCSL's
determined by state law.
Elections
Team, This Web page provides a general overview of state
303-364- provisional ballot laws and practices. The information was
7700 gathered from several sources, including the EAC’s 2014
Statutory Summary, state election manuals, state statutes
and regulations, and through consultation with state election
Elections 20
administrators. ry 22, 20
and a
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Campaigns ed on J
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NOTE: Idaho, Minnesota and New Hampshire
845 a
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All bbs, No we do not provide information
provisional ballots, therefore,
regarding those v. Ho
Documents in DNCstates in any of the material below. For
cited of why they do not issue provisional ballots see
explanation
What states do not use provisional ballots, and why?
Initiative
and Because state laws vary so greatly we recommend
Referendum consulting your state’s laws and regulations if you have
specific questions.
Election
Administration This page answers the following questions:
StateVote What does federal law require regarding provisional

Election ballots?
Results
and Why are provisional ballots used?
Analysis What is the legislative role regarding provisional ballots?
Campaign How is a provisional ballot investigated?

Finance Is any part of a provisional ballot counted if it is cast in the
wrong precinct?
What are the reasons for rejecting a provisional ballot?
How does a voter find out if his or her provisional ballot

Provisional Ballots
(396 of 432)
was counted?
What time is allotted to determine the status of provisional
ballots?
Which states do not use provisional ballots, and why?
Methodology
What Does Federal Law Require

Regarding Provisional Ballots?
Provisional ballots are mandated by section 15482 of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), but even
before HAVA, some states offered “provisional,” “challenge”
or “affidavit” ballots to ensure that no eligible voters were
turned away. HAVA exempts only a few states: Idaho,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming (see below).
The law states: “If an individual declares that such individual

is a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the individual , 2020
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desires to vote and that the individual is eligible to vote Ja nuainr an
on
election for Federal office, but the name of
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does not appear on the official o. 1list eligible voters for the
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polling place or Canv.election official asserts that the individual
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is notceligible vote, such individual shall be permitted to
cast a provisional ballot…”
HAVA sets out what actions are required of voters and of

election officials:
Voters: To use a provisional ballot, each voter whose

eligibility to vote is uncertain must provide a written
affirmation, signed in front of an election official at the polling
place, stating that he or she is a registered voter and is
eligible to vote in the election.
Election officials: Election officials and poll workers must

notify potential voters that they have a right to use a
provisional ballot, provide the ballot, witness the affirmation,
and receive the ballot for later processing. Additionally,
election officials must provide information to the voter on how
the process works and how to find out if his or her ballot was
cast—and if not, why not.

Provisional Ballots
(397 of 432)
Why Are Provisional Ballots
Issued?
For a voter to cast a provisional ballot, there must be some
question as to his or her eligibility to vote. These questions
vary across states. The most common reasons, as identified
by the EAC, are:
The voter’s name is not on the poll or registration list.

The voter’s eligibility cannot be otherwise established.
The voter’s identity and/or eligibility to vote has been
challenged by a poll-worker or election official.
The voter does not have identification as required by that
state.
The voter requested an absentee ballot but claims he or
she either didn’t receive it or didn’t cast it.
The voter’s address or name has changed but their voter
registration information does not reflect the change.
0
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party listing. d on
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No.
Hobbs, reasons specific to those states.
Most states have additional
v.
In addition,
i DNC requires all states to issue provisional
nHAVA
cited
ballots if the polling place hours are extended by court order.
Below is a chart of the most common reasons voters may

need to cast a provisional ballot and the states that will allow
a voter to cast a provisional ballot in those instances.
Common Reasons Voters May Need to Cast a Provisional

Ballot
Reason States
Voter eligibility 46 states, plus D.C.: Alabama, Alaska,

cannot be Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
immediately Connecticut, Delaware, District of
established— Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
i.e., name is Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
not on Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
registration list Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,

Provisional Ballots
(398 of 432)
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming
The voter’s 27 states, plus D.C.: Alabama, Alaska,

eligibility is Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
challenged by Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
a poll watcher Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana,
Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia,
Wyoming
Voter did not 36 states, plus D.C.: Alabama, Alaska,

present ID as Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
required by Connecticut, District of
the state Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 20
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Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, n Janua
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Massachusetts, Michigan,
archive
845
Mississippi,
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1Montana, Nebraska,
N
H obbs, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
Nevada,
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cit
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin
Voter 16 states, plus D.C.: Alabama, Arizona,

requested an Arkansas, California, District of
absentee Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
ballot and has Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
not cast it Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas,
Virginia, Washington/td>
Registration Nine states, plus D.C.: District of

reflects an Columbia, Maine, Maryland,
error in party Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
listing (primary North Carolina, Oklahoma,
election only) Pennsylvania, West Virginia
Address Nine states, plus D.C.: Alaska, Arizona,

and/or name California, District of Columbia, Florida,
has changed Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey,

Provisional Ballots
(399 of 432)
Ohio, Texas
What Is the Legislative Role

Regarding Provisional Ballots?
Because it takes longer to process provisional ballots than
regular ballots, legislators and administrators may be
motivated to reduce the use of provisional ballots. While the
availability of provisional ballots is mandated by federal law—
the Help America Vote Act of 2002—state laws determine
how and why provisional ballots are used. They may also
want to make procedures for the use of provisional ballots
uniform throughout their state. Here are issues relating to
provisional ballots that legislators may address:
Same Day Registration. In some states that offer same

day registration, they may implement it by requiring the
use of provisional ballots for Election Day registrants. In 20
ry 22, 20
these cases, voters can indeed register and voteJaatnuthea
ed on
same time, but if they cannot immediately v
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1 5845 a
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required identification ando.proof
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are not countedv. until
in DNC
citedmay provide same day registration through other
states
mechanisms). Montana uses provisional ballots for this
purpose and OK S 314, from 2015, would have created
same day registration through the use of provisional
ballots.
Voter ID. Many states who have strict voter ID
requirements ask voters who do not provide the
appropriate ID at the time of voting to cast a provisional
ballot. Voters have the opportunity to show ID within a few
days of the election, and if not, the provisional ballot is not
counted.
Voted the Wrong Ballot. In states where several
precincts may be housed in one polling place, it is not
uncommon for a voter to get in the wrong line. In this
case, the voter is offered the opportunity to either get in
the right line for the correct ballot, or be issued a
provisional ballot that would be partially counted. This is
called the “right church, wrong pew” situation. In Ohio, in
2014 SB 216 was enacted to set procedures for these

Provisional Ballots
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cases that allow a portion of the ballot to be counted.
Issued an Absentee Ballot. In many states, voters who
have been issued an absentee ballot are not able to vote
on Election Day even if they haven’t cast the absentee
ballot. States can permit voters who say this is the case to
vote on Election Day on a provisional ballot; that way, if
the original absentee ballot does get submitted, the
provisional ballot will not be counted. For instance, RI S
639, from 2015, would permit voters to vote on a
provisional ballot even if they had requested an absentee
ballot.
Name Not on the Voter List. One of the most common
reasons provisional ballots are issued is that the voter’s
name does not appear on the voter list, even if the voter
says he or she has registered. In 2015, TX H 2987, which
failed, proposed giving each new registrant a receipt
saying they had applied to register. If the name is not on
the voter list, the receipt could be attached to a provisional
ballot, thus proving the voter had done their part by
registering. 020
ary 22, 2
on Janu
Voting Outside One’s Precinct. In someivestates,
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45 arch
provisional ballots can be used 8
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outside their ownHjurisdiction.
bb State law governs whether
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these dballots
cite
ballot the voters were eligible to vote will be counted. In
2013, Illinois and Utah passed legislation to count partial
ballots. Also in 2013, North Carolina enacted HB 589,
which clarified that provisional ballots cast in the wrong
precinct will not be counted.
Uniform Time Frames. States can create uniform time
periods for handling provisional ballots. Illinois’ HB 2418,
enacted in 2013, requires election officials to transmit
information about provisional ballots cast to the state
board within two calendar days of the election, and
increases from two to seven days the time period during
which a provisional voter may submit additional
information to election authorities. Also in 2013, Texas
established a time frame for counting provisional ballots.
Uniform Procedures: States can also establish statewide
procedures for counting provisional ballots. In 2013,
Virginia addressed two procedural issues. With HB 63, it
established who can be present when provisional ballots

Provisional Ballots
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are counted, and with HB 2143, the state now requires
that provisional ballots be “promptly” put in the ballot box.
How Is a Provisional Ballot

Investigated?
Once a provisional ballot is cast, it is stored separately from
other ballots and investigated by local election officials.
Generally, this process entails verifying the voter’s identity
and eligibility to vote, and may require the voter to provide
further information. If the identity of the voter and the voter’s
eligibility can be established through reviewing the voter rolls
or verifying a signature, all or a portion of the ballot will be
counted (see below). If their eligibility cannot be established,
the ballot will not be counted.
In some states, the voter may be asked to take action after

Election Day to have his or her provisional ballot. In these
cases, the voter may be required to return to an election
office following the election to verify his or her identity and/or 2020
,
y 22
nuar a
eligibility to vote. In most cases, these voters were Jissued
a
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provisional ballot because they did not present
archive voter
45
identification as required by othat
. -158 In Alabama, Arizona,
18state.
bs, N
Georgia, Indiana, v. Hob
Kansas, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,
in DNC
Texas,cite d
Virginia and Wisconsin voters have a few days after
Election Day to show required identification (see NCSL’s
Voter ID Requirements page.)
Occasionally a voter may be asked to return to provide proof

of residence, such as a utility bill, or other eligibility
verifications depending on the reason for the issuance of the
provisional ballot. These states are likely to be those that
offer Election Day registration.
Is Any Part of a Provisional Ballot

Counted If it Is Cast in the Wrong
Precinct?
States vary in how they handle provisional ballots cast in the
wrong precinct. This most commonly happens when a voter
goes to the wrong precinct because he or she can’t get to the
home precinct, and therefore votes on a provisional ballot.
(As part of get-out-the-vote efforts toward the end of Election

Provisional Ballots
(402 of 432)
Day, candidates, campaigns and advocacy groups may
encourage this choice.)
Some states count a portion of the provisional ballot if it is

cast in the wrong precinct or jurisdiction. Generally, they will
count the votes for races that the voter would have been
eligible to vote in, if they did so in the correct precinct or
jurisdiction. This may include just votes for federal offices, as
in Rhode Island, or for state or local races that would be
shared among precincts.
In other states, the entire ballot will be rejected.
Exceptions may exist. For example, in Maine, the full ballot is

counted first. If the number of provisional ballots cast would
change the outcome of the election, and only then is the
validity of the provisional ballots investigated.
In Ohio, there may be certain polling places holding elections

for more than one precinct. In that situation, if the voter is in
the right polling place but the wrong precinct, they will first be
20
directed to the correct precinct. If they chose not to get back
ry 22, 20
in line they can choose to vote a provisional ballot Jan ua
ed on in the
iv
wrong precinct (Ohio Code § 3505.183) arch
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State Handling
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Provisional Ballots Cast in the Wrong
in D
cited Precinct.
Full Maine**
Count
Partial Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado

Count District of Columbia, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiania*, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio***,
Oregon, Rhode Island*, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia
Does Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,

Not Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Count Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming

Provisional Ballots
(403 of 432)
*Only Federal races
** Validity is only reviewed if the number of provisional ballots

cast is a large enough number to affect the results of the
election
*** See Ohio Code § 3505.183
What Are the Reasons for

Rejecting/Accepting a Provisional
Ballot?
Once the provisional ballot has been investigated, the
election officials will either accept the ballot and count all or
part of it, or reject the ballot and not count it.
According to the EAC the most common reasons for rejection

of a provisional ballot are: (1) the voter was not registered;
(2) the voter cast a provisional ballot in the wrong jurisdiction;
(3) the vote was cast in the wrong precinct; (4) the voter
20
lacked required ID or did not provide the proper ID within ythe
r 22, 20
anua
allotted time after Election Day as described above;
ed on J (5) the
v
chi or envelope
provisional ballot was incomplete, or 58 5 arballot
4the
18-1
was illegible; (6) the voter
bs No. already voted in that election;
, had
b
v. Ho
DNCno signature on the provisional ballot or the
or (7) therenwas
i
ited
ballotcenvelope.
Some states provide lists of the reasons for rejecting

provisional ballots. The chart below includes 50-state
information regarding how states have defined the reasons
for rejecting or accepting provisional ballots. When possible
the language listed is directly from state sources.
Reasons for rejecting provisional ballots
A provisional ballot is rejected

when:
The provisional ballot voter is not
registered to vote
The provisional ballot voter cast
the provisional ballot in a precinct
where he/she does not reside
The provisional ballot voter is
determined to be ineligible to vote

Provisional Ballots
(404 of 432)
based on a challenge
The provisional ballot voter fails
to provide proper photo ID
It is determined that the
provisional ballot voter requested
Alabama and voted an absentee ballot
Information despite the claim that the
provided by a provisional ballot voter did not
state election vote his/her absentee ballot
official
Alaska A person whose registration is inactive

Alaska Stat. under AS 15.07.130(b) and who votes
§15.15.198 a questioned or absentee ballot shall
have the ballot counted if:
The person was registered to vote in
the last four calendar years
The person signs a statement to that
effect; and
The earlier registration is verified by22, 2020
ry
the director anua
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4 5 arch
-158
s, No. 18
Arizona b
A bprovisional ballot is rejected when:
NC v. Ho
Ariz. Rev.in D
Stat. Not registered
cited
§16-584(E)
No ballot in envelope
Registered after 29-day cut-off
No signature
Insufficient/illegible information
Signature does not match
Wrong party
Outside jurisdiction ballot

Voter challenge upheld
Voted in wrong precinct
Voted and returned an early ballot
Proper identification not provided by
deadline
Administrative error
Not eligible

Provisional Ballots
(405 of 432)
Arkansas A provisional ballot is counted when:

Rules on Poll It is cast by a registered voter and is
Watchers, Vote the correct ballot for the precinct of
Challenges, and the voter’s residence
Provisional
Voting It is cast by a registered voter who
presents proof of identity or an
affidavit of indigence or religious
objection to having his or her
photograph made to the county clerk
or the county board no later than the
first Monday following the election;
or
It is an absentee ballot and the
county board determines that the
voter is eligible to vote in the
precinct.
California A provisional ballot is rejected when: 20

ry 22, 20
Election Signature doesn’t match voter anua
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2014 1 5845 a
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v. Ho correct precinct
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Rights
Responsibilities,
2014
Colorado A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Provisional Choosing to vote a provisional ballot
Ballot FAQ, than vote in correct county
SOS Website
If the elector’s registration cannot be
verified, the ballot shall not be
counted
Connecticut A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Conn. Gen. Not registered in proper precinct at
Stat. §9-232n time of casting ballot
Delaware A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Del. Code tit. Incomplete provisional ballot
15, §4948

Provisional Ballots
(406 of 432)
affidavit that does not include all of
the following information: full name,
complete address, political party
affiliation (primary elections only),
and date of birth
No suitable identification
Not registered to vote in the state or

are not registered to vote in the
election district in which they were
cast
District of A provisional ballot (aka special ballot)

Columbia is counted when:
D.C. Mun. The voter registered to vote at the
Regs. Tit. 3, polls or an early voting center, the
§807.3 voter cast the Special Ballot at the
precinct in which the voter maintains
residence or at an early voting
center designated by the Board;
20
ry 22, 20
The voter is a qualified elector ua the
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District of Columbia;
158 45 a
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The
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Florida A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Fla. Stat. Not registered
§101.048
Not entitled to vote at the precinct
where the person cast a vote
Georgia A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Ga. Code §21- No registered
2-419 (c)(3)
Not otherwise eligible
Registrars unable to determine
within three days following the
election whether the voter was
registered or eligible to vote
Hawaii A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Haw. Admin. Any part of the provisional ballot
Rules § 3-172- application form or affirmation

Provisional Ballots
(407 of 432)
140 statement is incomplete, not
executed, or altered, the provisional
ballot shall be not be counted
The county clerk determines the
individual is eligible under state law
to vote in the precinct the individual
wishes to vote in, the individual's
provisional ballot shall be counted in
accordance with state law
individual is not eligible to vote in the
precinct where the provisional ballot
was cast, the provisional ballot shall
not be counted
Idaho N/A
Illinois A provisional ballot is rejected when:

10 ILCS 5/18A- Information available to the election
2020
15 authority from five specifically- uary 22,
an
identified sources opposes
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registration15 845 a If a conflict exists
status.
. 18-
b bs, No the information available, the
among
v. Ho
in DNC election authority shall make a
cited
determination by a totality of the
circumstances
The affidavit executed by the voter
fails to contain the voter’s first and
last name, house number and street
name and signature or mark
The voter is determined to have
voted by mail in the election
concerned; or
The voter does not provide the
election authority with the necessary
registration documentation (ID)
within 7 days of the election
Indiana A provisional ballot is rejected when:

2015 Election The provisional voter affidavit has
Administrator’s not been properly executed
Manual

Provisional Ballots
(408 of 432)
Ind. Code § 3- The provisional voter is not a
11.7-5-5 qualified voter of the precinct
The provisional voter failed to
provide photo ID, if required
The provisional voter did not register
to vote at a registration agency on a
date within the registration period; or
Ballot does not contain the initials of
the poll clerks
Iowa A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Election Voter did not provide ID and was
Administrator’s required to do so
Handbook
Voter was not registered in the
precinct on election day
Voter already returned an absentee
ballot that was counted
Voter is not qualified to vote; or 20
ry 22, 20
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Voter is inactive/pending d n Jahas
oand
ive
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45 as
not provided
158ID required by the
o. 18-
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time
v. Hob
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cited
ballots
Kansas A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Kan. Admin. The voter did not provide additional
Regs. § 7-36-7 information, an updated signature,
or an additional photocopy upon
request by the county election officer
or if the information, signature, or
photocopy is inconsistent with the
information on the voter registration
list
Kentucky A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Ky. Admin. The county board of elections
Regs. tit. 31, § determines the individual is ineligible
6:020 to vote in the precinct in the election

Provisional Ballots
(409 of 432)
Louisiana A provisional ballot is rejected when:
Information The voter is not a registered voter or
provided by a
Fails to vote in the precinct where he
state election
official is eligible to vote in the federal
election
Maine All challenged ballots are initially

Me. Rev. Stat. counted in the same manner as regular
tit. 21-A §673 ballots. No further determination is
made on the challenge unless a
recount occurs and it is determined that
the challenged ballot could affect the
outcome of the election. If there are
enough challenged ballots to affect the
outcome of an election, then the
challenged ballots in that district will be
segregated, and the basis for each
challenge may be determined by the
appropriate authority designated by
statute or by state or federal 20
ry 22, 20
a
constitution. Janu
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A provisional 5845
Maryland
o. 18-1ballot is rejected when:
Md. Election bs, N
v. HobVoter is determined not to be
C
in DN
Law §11-303 qualified
cited
The voter failed to sign the oath on
the provisional ballot application
The individual cast more than one
ballot for the same election
The local board determines that a
provisional ballot is intentionally
marked with an identifying mark that
is clearly evident and placed on the
ballot for the purpose of identifying
the ballot; or
If the intent of the voter with respect
to a particular contest is not clearly
demonstrated, the local board shall
reject only the vote for that contest
Massachusetts A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Mass. Gen. The city or town clerk determines

Provisional Ballots
(410 of 432)
Laws. ch. 54, that the individual is ineligible to vote
§76C in the precinct in the election under
the law of the commonwealth
Michigan A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Mich. Comp. The voter is not registered
Laws Ann. §
The voter did not show a proper ID
168.813
or verification of residence
Minnesota N/A
Mississippi A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Information The voter is not a registered voter
provided by a
The voter is registered, but in wrong
state election
official precinct
The voter failed to return to the
circuit clerk’s office to present an
acceptable form of photo ID within 5
0
business days of the election , 202
ar y 22
o n Janu
ivedan affidavit
The voter failed torcsign
45 a h
8
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of religious
s , No. 18
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bphotographed in the circuit clerks’
NC v. Ho
in D office within 5 business days of the
cited
election
Missouri A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Mo. Rev. Stat. Not registered
§115.430
Not eligible
Rules of
Elected Officials Voted in wrong polling place
Montana A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Mont. Code § Officials cannot verify the voter’s
13-15-107 identity or eligibility
Nebraska A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Neb. Rev. Stat. The voter is not registered
§32-1002(5)
Already voted in county or
elsewhere
The voter failed to complete and

Provisional Ballots
(411 of 432)
sign a registration application
Residence on registration is in a
different county or in a different
precinct
Party affiliation on the registration
application completed prior to voting
the provisional ballot is different than
the party affiliation that appears on
the voter’s voter registration record
Failed to complete and sign the
certification on the envelope or
attached form
Nevada A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Nev. Rev. Stat. Person who cast the provisional
§293.3085 ballot cast the wrong ballot for the
address at which the person resides
20
New N/A ry 22, 20
anua
Hampshire ed on J
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15845 a
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New Jersey
b bs , No
A provisional
N.J. Stat. Ann. v. Ho If the voter already cast a provisional
in DNC
cited
§19:53C-17 ballot
N.J. Stat. Ann.
§19:53C-13 If the name, signature, or address
does not match the voter registration
record and cannot be verified.
If a provisional ballot voter votes a

ballot in a district other than the one in
which the voter is qualified to vote, the
votes for those offices and questions
for which the voter would be otherwise
qualified to vote are counted. All other
votes are not counted.
New Mexico A provisional ballot is rejected when:

2013 Election No signature
Handbook
Not registered
NM ADC
1.10.22 Voter is registered to vote in another
county in the state
If they already cast an absentee

Provisional Ballots
(412 of 432)
ballot
New York A provisional ballot is rejected

N.Y. Election or accepted when:
Law § 5-403 research at the county board
N.Y. Election supports the claim the voter makes
Law § 9-209 in their oath on the ballot envelope,
the ballot will be counted. If research
proves otherwise, the ballot is not
counted. Provisional ballots cast by
voters who were in the correct poll
site but at the wrong voter sign-in
table, will be counted, however only
those contests and questions which
the two different districts had in
common will be counted.
North Carolina A provisional ballot is rejected when

N.C. Gen. Stat. the voter:
Ann. § 163- Did not vote in the proper precinct 22, 2020
ry
182.2 anua
under G.S. 163-55 anddG.S. on J 163-57
ive
45 arch
-158
Is not registered in the county as
s, No. 18
b
bprovided in G.S. 163-82.1, or
NC v. Ho
in D
cited Is otherwise not eligible to vote
North Dakota North Dakota does not require voters to

NDCC § 16.1- register and only uses provisional
13-34 ballots if a court order has extended
the polling hours. If this happens, the
secretary of state would proscribe
procedures.
Ohio A provisional ballot is rejected when::

Ohio Rev. Stat. The voter is not registered
§3505.183
The voter Is not eligible to cast a
ballot in that precinct or for that
election
The voter did not provide the
required information
The voter already voted
The voter did not provide any

Provisional Ballots
(413 of 432)
additional information required within
7 days of the election
The voeter did not provide a current
and valid identification
The voter’s information does not
match the information in the voter
registration database
The voter's date of birth is different
Oklahoma A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Information Voter is not registered to vote in the
provided by a county or the voter’s residence
state election address is located in another
official precinct
Voter’s change of party affiliation
was not timely received or voter’s
residence address is not located
within the boundaries of the school
20
district or municipality for which the
ry 22, 20
a
Janu
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provisional ballot was ecast
iv
45 arch
8
-15 cannot be verified as
Voter’s. 1identity
s, No 8
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NC v. Ho required by state law based upon
in D the information provided on the
cited
Provisional Ballot Affidavit
The US/OV voter does not provide
an address of residence within the
county or the address provided is
located in another precinct
Oregon A provisional ballot is counted when:

Or. Rev. Stat. The elector is validly registered to
§254.408 vote and the vote was properly cast
registration of the elector is
considered active or inactive
The elector is qualified to vote for
the particular office or on the
measure
Pennsylvania A provisional ballot

Provisional Ballots
(414 of 432)
Provisional is rejected or accepted when:
Balloting If the board of elections determines
Procedures that the elector has knowingly voted
in an improper election district, the
board of elections may declare the
ballot to be invalid. However, absent
a determination of willfulness by the
elector, the board should dispose of
the provisional ballot as a ballot cast
in the proper county but at an
improper election district and count
the ballot as to those offices for
which, and questions on which, the
elector was qualified to vote.
Rhode Island A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Rules and Voter not registered or in the wrong
Regulations for congressional district
Provisional
Voting Signature on latest voter reg. form
20
on record does not match signature
ry 22, 20
a
Janu
on provisional ballot application
ive d on
4 5 arch
Signature -1on8
5 latest voter reg. form
s, No. 18
b record does not match signature
bon
NC v. Ho
in D on provisional ballot application and
cited
voter has not submitted valid ID by 4
p.m. day following election
The individual has cast a mail ballot,
emergency ballot or military ballot in
the same election
South Carolina A provisional ballot is rejected when:

S.C. Code § 7- Case in wrong precinct
7-910
South Dakota A provisional ballot is rejected when:

S.D. Codified Not registered
Laws § 12-20-
5.1
Tennessee A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Tenn. Code The voter is not properly registered
Ann. §2-7-112 in that precinct

Provisional Ballots
(415 of 432)
The voter already voted in a different

precinct
Texas A provisional ballot is counted when:

Tex. Elec. Code The person is eligible to vote in the
§65.054 election and has not previously
voted in that election; or
The person:
meets the identification
requirements
the voter executes an affidavit
under penalty of perjury that
states the voter has a religious
objection to being photographed
and the voter has consistently
refused to be photographed for
any governmental purpose from
the time the voter has held this
020
belief; or
ary 22, 2
on Janu
executes an affidavitivedunder
45 arch
penalty -1of8
5 perjury that states the
s, No. 18
bb voter does not have any
NC v. Ho
in D identification as a result of a
cited
natural disaster that was declared
by the president of the United
States or the governor, occurred
not earlier than 45 days before
the date the ballot was cast; and
The voter has not been challenged

for any reason other than lack of
identification.
Utah A provisional ballot is counted when:

Utah Code § The person provides valid voter
20A-4-107 identification to the county clerk or
an election officer who is
administering the election by the
close of normal office hours on
Monday after the date of the election

Provisional Ballots
(416 of 432)
Vermont If a voter chooses to vote by
Vt. Stat. Ann. provisional ballot, the clerk reviews the
Title 17 § 2555 application and determine eligibility
Vt. Stat. Ann. after the close of the polls. The
Title 17 § 2557 following eligibility conditions must be
Vt. Stat. Ann. met:
Title 17 § 2121 a citizen of the United States;
a resident of the state of Vermont;
has taken the voter's oath; and

18 years of age or more.
Any person meeting the
requirements of subdivisions (a)(1)-
(3) of this section who will be 18
years of age on or before the date of
a general election may register and
vote in the primary election
immediately preceding that general
election.
20
ry 22, 20
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A provisional ballot is rejected Jwhen:
ed on
Va. Code § Not eligible to votercinv
hi precinct
15845 a
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b bs, No to determine right to vote
Unable
v. Ho
in DNC No proper ID
cited
Washington A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Wash. Admin. Not registered
Code § 434-
Already voted a regular ballot
262-032
Signature on provisional ballot
envelope does not match the voter
registration record and/or they do
not present a proper ID
West Virginia A provisional ballot is rejected or

W. Va. Code § counted when:
3-1-41
Provisional ballots may not be counted
by the election officials. The county
commission shall, on its own motion, at
the time of canvassing of the election
returns, sit in session to determine the
validity of any challenges according to

Provisional Ballots
(417 of 432)
the provisions of this chapter. If the
county commission determines that the
challenges are unfounded,
each provisional ballot of each
challenged voter, if otherwise valid,
shall be counted and tallied together
with the regular ballots cast in the
election. The county commission, as
the board of canvassers, shall protect
the privacy of each provisional ballot
cast. The county commission shall
disregard technical errors, omissions or
oversights if it can reasonably be
ascertained that the challenged voter
was entitled to vote.
Note: Guidance on deciding whether or

not to count provisional ballots is
provided in the Secretary of State’s
manual 2014 Best Practices Guide for
Canvass and Recount.
0
Wisconsin A provisional ballot is rejected when: 22, 202
y
Wis. Stat. § If voter does not provide the nuar
Japroper
d on
7.52 documentation 5to chive eligibility to
arprove
84
-15
vote
s, No. 18or proof of residency) by 4
(ID
bb
NC v. Ho p.m. the Friday after the election.
in D
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Wyoming A provisional ballot is rejected when:

Wyo. Stat. § 22- The voter is not on the registration
15-105 rolls and is registering for the first
time on Election Day but did not
present documentation at the polls
or by close of business on the
following day.
How Does a Voter Find Out If

a Provisional Vote Was Counted?
HAVA requires the state or local election official to give the
person casting a provisional ballot information on how he or
she can find out whether the voted was counted, and, if not,

Provisional Ballots
(418 of 432)
the reason why not. The law says this may be “a toll-free
telephone number or an Internet website” established for that
purpose.
This requirement often is reflected in state statute, rule, or in

the election manual. In 2012, 20 states offered an online
tool for voters to find out if their provisional ballot was
counted, according to the Election Performance Index from
The Pew Charitable Trusts.
What Time Is Allotted to Determine

the Status of Provisional Ballots?
Each state establishes when provisional ballots are
processed. For example, some states base this timeframe on
how long the voter has to prove eligibility as detailed above,
or they use the same timeframe as the official election
canvass.
Time Allotted to Determine the Status of Provisional Ballots

20
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When Provisional Ballots
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Alabama
NC v. Ho By noon, seven days after the
in DVoting in
Provisional election.
cited
Alabama
Alaska Fifteen days.

Alaska Stat.
§15.20.205
Arizona Ten business days following the

Elections Procedures general federal election and five
Manual, 2014 days for all other elections.
Arkansas Forty-eight hours—15 days after

Rules on Poll the election.
Watchers, Vote
Challenges, and
Provisional Voting
California The canvass shall commence

Cal. Elec. Code § no later than the Thursday
14310 following the election, shall be
open to the public, and, for state
or statewide elections, shall

Provisional Ballots
(419 of 432)
result in a report of results to the
Secretary of State. The canvass
shall be continued daily,
Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays excepted, for not less
than six hours each day until
completed.
Colorado Ten days after a primary or 14

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1- days after a general election.
8.5-105 (5)
Connecticut Not later than six days after the

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9- election or primary.
232n
Delaware The day following an election in

Del. Code tit. 15, § 4948 which provisional ballots were
used, the Department shall
meet to examine the provisional
ballots, determine which of the
ballots should be tallied in
accordance with the rules stated , 2020
y 22
below, and then tally those
Ja nuar
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ballots. ived
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5845
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District of Columbia bs, NTen days after the election.
v. Hob
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Ballot FAQ
Florida The provisional ballot count

Information provided by must be completed by noon on
a state election official the third day after a primary
election, and noon on the fourth
day after a general election.
Georgia Three days to prove identity or

Ga. Code. § 21-2-419 for county registrar to verify
(c) (1) registration.
Hawaii Twenty days.

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 11-
174.5
Idaho N/A
Illinois Fourteen days following the

10 ILCS 5/18A-15 election.
Indiana Ten days after the election.

Provisional Ballots
(420 of 432)
Ind. Code § 3-11.7-5-1
Iowa Thursday after Election Day.

Election Administrator’s
Handbook
Kansas Provisional ballots are counted

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25- as part of the intermediate
3104, The Kansas canvass conducted by the
Election Standards county board of canvassers on
either the Monday or second
Thursday following the election.
Kentucky Not later than 12 p.m.,

Ky. Admin. Regs. tit. 13, prevailing time, on the Friday
§ 6:020 following the election.
Louisiana Provisional ballots shall be

La. Rev. Stat. § counted on the third day
18:566.2 following the election.
Maine Reasonable time after the

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A election. 20
§673 ry 22, 20
anua
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Maryland 1 5845 a ballot because of
If provisional
-
o. 18of proper ID, the voter has
Maryland State Boardbs, Nlack
b
of Elections, v. Ho until 10 a.m. on the second
in DNC
cited
Challengers, Watchers Wednesday after the election to
& Other Election provide proper ID to local board
Observers Manual of elections.
Massachusetts Twelve days.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54,
§ 76C
Michigan Six calendar days after the

Election Inspector’s election.
Manual
Minnesota N/A
Mississippi Five business days.

Mississippi Poll
Manager Guide
Missouri Same time as official canvass,

Miss. Code Ann. two weeks following the
§115.511 election.

Provisional Ballots
(421 of 432)
Montana Six days.
Mont. Code § 13-15-
107
Nebraska The verification and

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32- investigation shall be completed
1002 within seven days after the
election.
Nevada Six working days following the

Nev. Rev. Stat. § election.
293.387
New Hampshire N/A
New Jersey Before the Monday following the

N.J. Stat. § 19:19-1 election when the Board of
County Canvassers meets.
New Mexico Voter has until 5 p.m. on the

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-12- second day following the
7.1 election to provide proper
identification. 20
ry 22, 20
a
New York No more than 14vdays Janu a
on after
i ed
N.Y. Election Law, § 9- general arch election and
or45special
1 58
8-
o. 1more
209 bs, Nno than eight days after a
Hob
C v. primary election at which such
ed in DN
cit ballots are voted.
North Carolina Vote counting at the precinct

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163- shall occur immediately after the
182.2 polls close and shall be
continuous until completed.
North Dakota N/A
Ohio Until any hearing required to be

Ohio Code § 3505.183 conducted under section
3503.24 of the Revised Code
with regard to the provisional
voter is held, or until the
eleventh day after the day of the
election, whichever is earlier.
Oklahoma After 5 p.m. on Friday after

Okla. Admin. Code Election Day.
230:35-5-177
Oregon Fourteen days.

Provisional Ballots
(422 of 432)
Or. Rev. Stat. §
254.426
Pennsylvania Seven days.

About Provisional
Voting
Rhode Island Forty-eight hours after the

Provisional Ballot election.
Overview
South Carolina Before the board of canvassers

S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13- meet, on the Thursday following
830, § 7-17-10, § 7- a primary/runoff or the Friday
17-510 following a general or special
election.
South Dakota Seven-17 days following the

S.D. Codified Laws § election, just prior to the official
12-20-13.2, 12-20-13.3 canvass.
Tennessee The counting of all provisional

Tenn. Code Ann. §2-7- ballots must be completed 20
112 within four business days nof the
ry 22, 20
a ua
close of polls on on J Day.
Election
e d
rc hiv
15845 a
-
Texas s o. 18
, NSeven-13 days.
bb
Tex. Election v.
Code Ho
§
C
in DN
cited
65.051
Utah Counted during the official

Utah Code 20A-4- canvass no later than 14 days
301(1)(b) after the election.
Vermont Two days after the election.

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §
2557
Virginia Seven calendar days from the

Va. Code § 24.2-653 date of the election.
Washington Fourteen-21 days after the

Wash. Rev. Code § election.
29A.60.190
West Virginia Provisional ballots are

W. Va. Code, § 3-6-9 investigated during canvass, on
the fifth day after the election.
Wisconsin At 4 p.m. the Friday after the

Provisional Ballots
(423 of 432)
Wis. Stat. § 7.52 election.
Wyoming The first Friday following the

Wyo. Stat. § 22-16-103 election.
Which States Do Not Use

Provisional Ballots?
States that offered same-day voter registration at the time
the National Voter Registration Act was enacted (1993) are
also exempt from HAVA’s provisional ballot requirements.
Those states are: Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North
Dakota (which does not require voter registration although it
does keep a list of voters), Wisconsin and Wyoming.
While those state are not required to provide provisional

ballots under HAVA, they are also not prohibited from using
provisional ballots.
20
ry 22, 20
North Dakota, for instance, uses them in cases where a
anuthe
ed on J
hours at a polling place have been extended. v
rchi Wisconsin uses
15845 a
-
. 18registration
provisional ballots for same-day
, No when a voter is
ob bs
H
C v. required identification. In this case, a
not able to provide
ed in DN
cit
provisional ballot is not counted until identification is shown,
allowing the voter to register.
Similarly, Wyoming uses provisional ballots if the voter is not

on the registration list and does not have proper identification
in order to register on Election Day, if they are challenged by
a poll watcher or if there are extended polling hours. The
voter is then required to provide additional information, such
as proof of residence or identification, in order for the ballot
to be counted. The provisional ballot will not be counted if the
voter does not provide the requisite information needed for
registration.
Idaho, Minnesota and New Hampshire do not issue

provisional ballots at all.
Methodology
This information was compiled from various sources,
including state statutes and regulations, state election

Provisional Ballots
(424 of 432)
manuals, the Election Assistance Commission Statutory
Survey, and conversations with state election directors.
To offer comments or corrections, please contact elections-

info@ncsl.org.
Additional Resources
NCSL LegisBrief on Provisional Ballots
About This NCSL Project

The development of this Web page was generously support
by The Pew Charitable Trusts.
NCSL tracks election and campaign issues in four major

categories: election laws and procedures, campaign finance,
initiative and referendum, and election results and analysis.
We provide comprehensive 50-state research and analysis
20
on a wide variety of topics related to these issues. ry 2 2, 20
ua
an
ed on J
rchiv
15845 adata that covers
For redistricting, NCSL provides similar
. 18-
bbs, No and litigation.
redistricting laws, commissions
v. Ho
in DNC
cited NCSL's Redistricting and Elections Standing
Additionally,
Committee works on issues that affect all states, including
voting technology and redistricting systems and technology.
If you don't find the information you need, please contact our
elections team at 303-364-7700 or election-info@ncsl.org.
NCSL staff can do specialized searches for legislators and
legislative staff.
We are the nation's most respected bipartisan organization providing states support, ideas, connections and a strong
voice on Capitol Hill.
Members Resources

Provisional Ballots
(425 of 432)
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Legislative Careers
NCSL Staff Directories
Staff Directories
StateConnect Directory
Terms and Conditions
Policy & Research Resources

Bill Information Service
Legislative Websites
NCSL Bookstore
State Legislatures Magazine
Accessibility Support
Tel: 1-800-659-2656 or 711
Accessibility Support
Accessibility Policy
Meeting Resources 20
ry 22, 20
Calendar anua
ed on J
Online Registration rchiv
15845 a
. 18-
Press Room
bbs, No
v. Ho
Media Contact
in DNC
NCSL in the News cited
Press Releases
Go 29490 Go
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Legislatures

Provisional Voting Explained. - Democracy NC
(426 of 432)
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PROVISIONAL VOTING
Tagged: Handout
EXPLAINED.
What is Provisional Voting? 20

ry 22, 20
anua
What is a provisional ballot? ed on J
rchiv
15845 a
18-
A provisional ballot is a safety net for voters
bs No. there is some confusion or question about their ability to
, when
b
v. Ho
vote. in DNC
cited
Federal law requires that anyone who presents to vote be given the opportunity to vote, and provisional
ballots guarantee that every voter is given that chance.
Do provisional ballots count?

Yes. Many provisional ballots do count, and no official election results are final until every provisional ballot
is reviewed.
In 2016, just under half of all provisional ballots counted entirely or partially (44%). But for voters who cast
provisional ballots because they were at the wrong precinct (called “out of precinct” voting), or because
they moved within county and did not update their registration, more than 90% of ballots counted in whole
or in part.
Note: An out-of-precinct voter’s ballot will count in all state- and countywide races, and in many other races
at the top of the ticket. But, because an out-of-precinct voter is voting a ballot different from the one at their
own precinct, there may be some local races where their vote doesn’t count.
https://democracync.org/resources/what-is-provisional-voting-explained/[1/22/2020 5:38:44 PM]

(427 of 432)
How do voters cast provisional ballots? What happens to them?
1. If a voter gets to the front of the line to vote and the poll worker cannot find their registration, tells them
they are at the wrong precinct, or finds some other problem with their voting record, the voter can still vote
using a provisional ballot.
2. In the case of out-of-precinct voting, a voter should be offered the choice between voting a provisional
ballot at their current polling place, or going to their own precinct where they will be able to vote a regular
ballot. In other cases, a provisional ballot is the voter’s only option for casting a ballot that day.
3. The poll worker will direct the voter to the help desk, where a help desk worker will give them a form,
called a “provisional ballot application.” After filling out the form, the voter will be given the ballot and vote
it.
4. Then, the form and the ballot will be placed in a sealed envelope and sent to the Board of Elections for
review after the election. The voter will be given a phone number and PIN they can use to find out if their
ballot was counted.
5. Following the election, nonpartisan Board of Elections staff will conduct research to determine whether
the voter was properly registered and if the ballot can be counted, in whole 2or 0
202part.
2, in
ary
on Janu
6. Even for voters whose votes do not ultimately count, casting ived
45 arch a provisional ballot will get them registered
-158
for the next election.
s, No. 18
bb
NC v. Ho
Still have questions? Call in D
Democracy North Carolina at 888-OUR-VOTE or visit www.ncvoter.org to
cited
learn more about voting in North Carolina.
What is Provisional Voting?

Explained.
Download our one-page explainer on Provisional
Ballots here.
DOWNLOAD

(428 of 432)
Contact Us Media Center Email Alerts Annual Reports Donate
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ry 22, 20
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(429 of 432)
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Office of the Clerk

95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, CA 94103
Information Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings
Judgment
• This Court has filed and entered the attached judgment in your case.
Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please note the filed date on the attached
decision because all of the dates described below run from that date,
not from the date you receive this notice.
Mandate (Fed. R. App. P. 41; 9th Cir. R. 41-1 & -2)

• The mandate will issue 7 days after the expiration of the time for
filing a petition for rehearing or 7 days from the denial of a petition
for rehearing, unless the Court directs otherwise. To file a motion to
stay the mandate, file it electronically via the appellate ECF system
or, if you are a pro se litigant or an attorney with an exemption from
using appellate ECF, file one original motion on paper.
Petition for Panel Rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40; 9th Cir. R. 40-1)
Petition for Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-1 to -3)
(1) A. Purpose (Panel Rehearing):

• A party should seek panel rehearing only if one or more of the following
grounds exist:
► A material point of fact or law was overlooked in the decision;
► A change in the law occurred after the case was submitted which
appears to have been overlooked by the panel; or
► An apparent conflict with another decision of the Court was not
addressed in the opinion.
• Do not file a petition for panel rehearing merely to reargue the case.
B. Purpose (Rehearing En Banc)

• A party should seek en banc rehearing only if one or more of the following
grounds exist:
Post Judgment Form - Rev. 12/2018 1

(430 of 432)
► Consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure or maintain

uniformity of the Court’s decisions; or
► The proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance; or
► The opinion directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another
court of appeals or the Supreme Court and substantially affects a
rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for
national uniformity.
(2) Deadlines for Filing:

• A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
• If the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party in a civil case,
the time for filing a petition for rehearing is 45 days after entry of judgment.
Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
• If the mandate has issued, the petition for rehearing should be
accompanied by a motion to recall the mandate.
• See Advisory Note to 9th Cir. R. 40-1 (petitions must be received on the
due date).
• An order to publish a previously unpublished memorandum disposition
extends the time to file a petition for rehearing to 14 days after the date of
the order of publication or, in all civil cases in which the United States or an
agency or officer thereof is a party, 45 days after the date of the order of
publication. 9th Cir. R. 40-2.
(3) Statement of Counsel

• A petition should contain an introduction stating that, in counsel’s
judgment, one or more of the situations described in the “purpose” section
above exist. The points to be raised must be stated clearly.
(4) Form & Number of Copies (9th Cir. R. 40-1; Fed. R. App. P. 32(c)(2))
• The petition shall not exceed 15 pages unless it complies with the
alternative length limitations of 4,200 words or 390 lines of text.
• The petition must be accompanied by a copy of the panel’s decision being
challenged.
• An answer, when ordered by the Court, shall comply with the same length
limitations as the petition.
• If a pro se litigant elects to file a form brief pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-1, a
petition for panel rehearing or for rehearing en banc need not comply with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.

(431 of 432)
• The petition or answer must be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance
found at Form 11, available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under
Forms.
• You may file a petition electronically via the appellate ECF system. No paper copies are
required unless the Court orders otherwise. If you are a pro se litigant or an attorney
exempted from using the appellate ECF system, file one original petition on paper. No
additional paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise.
Bill of Costs (Fed. R. App. P. 39, 9th Cir. R. 39-1)

• The Bill of Costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
• See Form 10 for additional information, available on our website at
www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms.
Attorneys Fees
• Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1 describes the content and due dates for attorneys fees
applications.
• All relevant forms are available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms
or by telephoning (415) 355-7806.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

• Please refer to the Rules of the United States Supreme Court at
www.supremecourt.gov
Counsel Listing in Published Opinions

• Please check counsel listing on the attached decision.
• If there are any errors in a published opinion, please send a letter in writing
within 10 days to:
► Thomson Reuters; 610 Opperman Drive; PO Box 64526; Eagan, MN 55123
(Attn: Jean Green, Senior Publications Coordinator);
► and electronically file a copy of the letter via the appellate ECF system by using
“File Correspondence to Court,” or if you are an attorney exempted from using
the appellate ECF system, mail the Court one copy of the letter.

(432 of 432)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Form 10. Bill of Costs
Instructions for this form: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/forms/form10instructions.pdf
9th Cir. Case Number(s)
Case Name
The Clerk is requested to award costs to (party name(s)):
I swear under penalty of perjury that the copies for which costs are requested were
actually and necessarily produced, and that the requested costs were actually
expended.
Signature Date
(use “s/[typed name]” to sign electronically-filed documents)
REQUESTED
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(each column must be completed)
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Excerpts of Record* $ $
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Brief; 1st, 2nd , and/or 3rd Brief on Cross-Appeal; $ $
Intervenor Brief)
Reply Brief / Cross-Appeal Reply Brief $ $
Supplemental Brief(s) $ $
Petition for Review Docket Fee / Petition for Writ of Mandamus Docket Fee $
TOTAL: $
*Example: Calculate 4 copies of 3 volumes of excerpts of record that total 500 pages [Vol. 1 (10 pgs.) +
Vol. 2 (250 pgs.) + Vol. 3 (240 pgs.)] as:
No. of Copies: 4; Pages per Copy: 500; Cost per Page: $.10 (or actual cost IF less than $.10);
TOTAL: 4 x 500 x $.10 = $200.
Feedback or questions about this form? Email us at forms@ca9.uscourts.gov
Form 10 Rev. 12/01/2018

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Case: 18-15845, 01/27/2020, ID: 11574519, DktEntry: 123-1, Page 1 of 239

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL No. 18-15845

KATIE HOBBS, in her official

THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY;

Appeal from the United States District Court

Argued and Submitted En Banc March 27, 2019

Filed January 27, 2020

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;

The en banc court reversed the district court’s judgment

Plaintiffs asserted that the out-of-precinct policy (OOP)

The en banc court held that Arizona’s policy of wholly

American Indian, Hispanic, and African American voters in

The en banc court held that H.B. 2023’s criminalization

Concurring, Judge Watford joined the court’s opinion to

Dissenting, Judge O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Clifton,

Dissenting, Judge Bybee, joined by Judges O’Scannlain,

Bruce V. Spiva (argued), Marc E. Elias, Elisabeth C. Frost,

Andrew G. Pappas (argued), Joseph E. La Rue, Karen J.

Brett W. Johnson (argued) and Colin P. Ahler, Snell &

John M. Gore (argued), Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

Kathleen E. Brody, ACLU Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix,

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

The right to vote is the foundation of our democracy.

For over a century, Arizona has repeatedly targeted its

DNC challenged, first, Arizona’s policy of wholly

policy); and, second, House Bill 2023 (“H.B. 2023”), a 2016

Following a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in

We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo

court’s overall finding of vote dilution or vote denial in

Reviewing the full record, we conclude that the district

I. Out-of-Precinct Policy and H.B. 2023

DNC challenges (1) Arizona’s policy of wholly

Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person

location. Arizona’s OOP policy affects in-person voting.

We describe in turn Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023.

1. Policy of Entirely Discarding OOP Ballots

Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote-center

In precinct-based counties, if a voter arrives at a polling

In both instances, the county discards the OOP ballot in

2. Comparison with Other States

The district court found that Arizona “consistently is at or

Dr. Jonathan Rodden, Professor of Political Science and

Dr. Rodden reported that, from 2006 to 2010, between

provisional ballots. Id. at 24. In the 2012 general election,

Arizona also rejects a higher percentage of provisional

In 2012 alone “[m]ore than one in every five

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 856 (alterations in original)

One of the most frequent reasons for rejecting provisional

As the figure below shows, Arizona is an extreme outlier

Rodden at 26. The percentage of rejected OOP votes in

The percentage of OOP ballots in Arizona, compared to

of in-person ballots between 2008 and 2014, the percentage

3. Reasons for OOP Ballots

Three key factors leading to OOP ballots are frequent

Voters must invest significant effort in order

Rodden at 2; see also Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 857–58