VOL.

458, MAY 6, 2005 83

Santos vs. Ayon

*
G.R. No. 137013. May 6, 2005.

RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES TONY AYON

and MERCY AYON, respondents.

Remedial Law; Jurisdictions; Ejectment; Jurisdiction of a

court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant; rule is no
different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.—It is
an elementary

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Ayon

rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is

determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
pleadings filed by the defendant. This rule is no different in an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. All actions for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not
only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for
damages and costs arising therefrom. The said courts are not
divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants
therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated
property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.
Same; Same; Same; There are two entirely distinct and
different causes of action under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.—Under the above provision, there are
two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a
case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of
a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal
from the beginning as he acquired possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for
unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession
from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively
lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession
despite the termination of his right thereunder.
Same; Same; Same; A complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the
refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.—Petitioner’s allegations in his complaint
clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error in
the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. A
complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here,
there is an allegation in petitioner’s complaint that respondents
occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his
tolerance. Petitioner’s cause of action for unlawful detainer
springs from respondents’ failure to vacate the questioned
premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one

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(1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the

instant complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Possession by tolerance is lawful, but
such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance
refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner.—It bears
stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such
possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance
refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in
Roxas vs. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case: “A person
who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     J. Edgar Ilagan for petitioner.
     Angelita A. Alfonso­Tumanda for respondents.

SANDOVAL­GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the1

petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated2
October 5, 1998 in CA­G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution
dated December 11, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben
Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal
detainer

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1 Rollo, pp. 55­59. Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero,

retired, and concurred in by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena, now
retired Justice of this Court, and Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola
(deceased).
2 Rollo at p. 60.

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Santos vs. Ayon

against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents,

docketed as Civil Case No. 3506­B­96.
In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the
registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona
Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and
108176. Respondent spouses are the registered owners of
an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T­247792.
The previous occupant of this property built a building
which straddled both the lots of the herein parties.
Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.
 Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985,
when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents
that the building occupies a portion of his land. However,
he allowed them to continue using the building. But in
1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he
demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part
of the building encroaching his property and turn over to
him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they
continued occupying the contested portion and even made
improvements on the building. The dispute was then
referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to
reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27,
1996, a certification to file action was issued.
In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this
case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it
since there is no lessor­lessee relationship between the
parties. Respondents denied they were occupying
petitioner’s property by mere tolerance, claiming they own
the contested portion and have been occupying the same
long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in
favor of petitioner, thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendants ordering the latter, their successors­in­
interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the por­

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tion of the subject properties and peacefully surrender possession

thereof to plaintiff as well as dismantle/remove the structures
found thereon.
Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the
use and occupation of the encroached area in the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996
and the subsequent months thereafter until premises are vacated;
to pay attorney’s fees of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to
pay the costs of suit.
3
SO ORDERED.”

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11,

Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12, 1998 in Civil4
Case No. 25, 654­97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.
The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents’
occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance.
Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right
to eject them through court action.
Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a petition for review. In its Decision dated
October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the
Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s proper remedy
should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not
an action for unlawful detainer, thus:

“In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the

premises in question at the time private respondent bought three
(3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is
occupied by a building being used by the former as a bodega.
Apart from private respondent’s bare claim, no evidence was
alluded to show that petitioners’ possession was tolerated by (his)
predecessor­in­interest. The fact that respondent might have
tolerated petitioners’ possession is not decisive. What matters for
purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of
petitioners’ possession from its inception. And in this regard, the
Court notes that the com­

_______________

3 Id., at p. 50.
4 Id., at p. 53.

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Santos vs. Ayon

plaint itself merely alleges that defendants­petitioners have been

‘occupying a portion of the above properties of the plaintiff for the
past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.’
Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated
petitioners’ possession of the premises. x x x.
Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim
before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana and not
before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of
unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, 5
the complaint for
unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED.”

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was

denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated
December 11, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari
ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
 “I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE

LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND
THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.

II

THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS
AND JURISPRUDENCE.”

The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals

committed a reversible error of law in holding that
petitioner’s complaint is within the competence of the RTC,
not the MTCC.

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5 Rollo at p. 59.

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Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has

prior physical possession of the questioned property before
he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses
that he tolerated respondents’ occupancy of the portion in
controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they
vacate, their continued possession became illegal. Hence,
his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is proper.
Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have
been in possession of the disputed property even before
petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he
cannot claim that they were occupying the property by
mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical
possession.
We sustain the petition.
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set
6
up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant. This rule is no different
7
in an action for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer. All actions for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and
the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall
include not only the plea for restoration of possession but8
also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom.
The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such
cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of
ownership over the litigated property in his

_______________

6 Rozas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138955, October 29, 2002, 391
SCRA 351, citing Vda. de Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 197 (1999).
7 Lavido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123462, April 10, 1997, 271
SCRA 143.
8 Progressive Development Corp., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
123555, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 637.

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pleadings and the question of possession9 cannot be resolved

without deciding the issue of ownership.
Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful
detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
reads:

“Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to

the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.”

Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct

and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible
entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property
from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from
the beginning as he acquired possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for
unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from defendant whose possession of the property
was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or
implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he
continued his possession
10
despite the termination of his
right thereunder.

_______________

9 Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 420 (1996); Caniza vs. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640 (1997); Heirs of Placido Miranda vs. Court of
Appeals, 255 SCRA 368 (1996).
10 Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44, 48 (1951); Medel vs. Militante, 41
Phil. 526, 530 (1921).

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Petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case

No. 3506­B­96 is properly within the competence of the
MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:

“4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of

their residential house as well as other structures and have been
occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for
the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the
plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the property;
5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of
1996 and made demands to the defendants to vacate and
turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their
structures found inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that
without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to
vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them
to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.
6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the
Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74­A, Davao City for a
possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996.
The barangay case reached the Pangkat but no settlement was
had. Thereafter, a ‘Certification To File Action’ dated March 27,
1996 was11issued x x x;
x x x.” (italics ours)

Verily, petitioner’s allegations in his complaint clearly

make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error in
the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner’s
complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if
it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the
refusal to vacate is unlawful
12
without necessarily employing
the terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in
petitioner’s complaint that respondents occupancy on the
portion of his property is

_______________

11 Rollo at p. 80.
12 Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 134651, September 18, 2000, 340
SCRA 525; Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, May 10,
1994, 232 SCRA 372; Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136 (1972).

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Santos vs. Ayon

by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioner’s cause of action for

unlawful detainer springs from respondents’ failure to
vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime
in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6,
1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful,
but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor
by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by13the
owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals is
applicable in this case: “A person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R.
SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654­97,
affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case
No. 3506­B­96, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio­Morales

and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution

reversed and set aside.
 _______________

13 Supra; Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., Id.; Banco de Oro Savings and
Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 464, 469 (1990); Dacudao
vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877, 883 (1983); Vda. de Catchuela vs.
Francisco, 98 SCRA 172, 177 (1980); Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA
146, 148 (1967); Munoz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September
23, 1992, 214 SCRA 216.

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Note.—The pendency of an action questioning the

ownership of property will not divest the city or municipal
trial court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case and
neither will it bar the execution of a judgment thereon.
(Diu vs. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452 [2000])

——o0o——

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