G.R. No. 170463. February 2, 2011.

​*

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and

WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General Manager,
petitioners, ​vs.​ ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA, respondents​.

FACTS:

On May 2002, Petitioners charged the respondents with administrative case for grave misconduct for their
alleged participation and in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees to denounce the alleged
corruption within the agency and to oust its president Winston Garcia. The Board placed the respondents
under preventive suspension for 90 days.

On April 2003, respondent Molina requested for a step increment but it was denied because he did not
pass the qualifications mentioned in the Board Resolution. The respondents filed a petition for prohibition
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction claiming that they were denied of their benefits as employees
of GSIS due to their pending administrative case. Respondents also argued that the subject resolutions
were ineffective because they were not registered with the UP Law Center pursuant to the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.

The trial court granted the petition and declared the subject Board Resolution null and void.

ISSUE:

1. WON GSIS Board Resolution needs to be filed with UP Law Center

2. WON a Special Civil action for Prohibition against GSIS Board – who is exercising quasi
legislative and administrative function – is within the jurisdiction of RTC

HELD:

1. NO

Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center.
Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s
guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, “interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the
public,” need not be filed with the UP Law Center

Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority
to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and
promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the
personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP
Law Center.

2. YES

The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case may be. It is also a
personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. It
may comment and be tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent
Velasco is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila.

Romy's Freight vs. Castro

G.R. No. 141637, 08 June 2006
By: Unknown Contributor

FACTS:

Castro was hired by petitioner as a mechanic in April 1975. He was promoted to supervisor in 1986. On
December 31, 1994, he suffered a stroke. On his doctor's advice, he took a leave of absence from work.
He extended his leave several times, and while on leave, Cruz sent him several letters urging him to
return to work. Cruz also filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft. Because of these, Castro was
constrained to file a case for illegal dismissal on the ground that Cruz's act constituted constructive
dismissal.

Veloria, on the other hand, was hired in 1977 as a carpenter and, in 1993, as senior mechanic. He figured
in an accident when overheated water coming from the radiator he was repairing spurted onto his face,
burning it. He was forced to absent himself to recuperate and during such absence, he also received
several letters from Cruz. He was also charged for qualified theft. Veloria also sued Cruz for illegal
dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Castro and Veloria but the decision was reversed by the NLRC.
Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The
appellate court granted the petition. Petitioner now faults the CA for reversing the decision asserting that
the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration
with the NLRC before filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed outright.

HELD:

No, the petition for certiorari should not have been dismissed outright.

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can
be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. The case at bar falls under the
exceptions to the general rule. The employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and private
respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus it was proper for the appellate court to take
cognizance of the case even if no motion for reconsideration had been filed by the private respondents
with the NLRC.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari
where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. The phrase 'grave abuse of discretion' has a precise meaning in law, denoting
abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not encompass an error of law.
Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties' respective evidence of the
evaluation of their relative weight.

LTS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION and JULIE L. EVANGELISTA v. JOCELYN D. MALIWAT, et al.

Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. From 12 to 23 of February in 2001, respondents received
separate notice of termination of employment. The notices alleged that the sales and profitability of the
petitioner corporation had been completely affected by the recent economic crisis and that it had decided
to reduce its personnel. Respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and accrued
monetary benefits against their employer and Julie Evangelista with the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter's resolution was in favor of respondents. Said resolution was affirmed with
modifications by the NLRC on appeal by the petitioner. An MR was filed which was later denied.

Aggrieved, the petitioner went up to the CA on a petition for certiorari. There are two allegations:

I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF SEPARATION PAY TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, IN CLEAR DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF NORTH DAVAO MINING CORPORATION VS. NLRC (254
SCRA 721).

II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING
THE FINDING MADE BY THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER THAT PETITIONER CORPORATION
HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS BUSINESS LOSSES.

The petitioners alleged that their petition was filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the November 22,
2002 Resolution of the NLRC.

The CA issued a Resolution on March 21, 2003 dismissing the petition for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period therefor. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA,
pleading an honest mistake in their computation of the sixty-day period provided for in Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court which was caused by their counsels heavy workload. The CA denied the motion.

The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that -

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, IN A MANNER
WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE UPHOLDING
THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE THAT THE RULES OF PROCEDURE ARE LIBERALLY
CONSTRUED TO EFFECT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.

The petitioners maintain that the petition had been prepared for filing in the CA three days before March
18, 2003, but because of the heavy workload of their counsel brought about by equally important and
pressing matters, said counsel inadvertently computed March 18, 2003 as the last date for filing the
petition, instead of March 17, 2003. The petitioners assert that by dismissing their petition merely because
it was filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period without taking into account the substantial issues
raised therein, the CA thereby perpetuated the reversible error in affirming the decision of the NLRC
awarding separation pay to each of the respondents in its decision and disregarding the findings of facts
of the Labor Arbiter, as well as the losses suffered by the petitioner corporation and the rulings of this
Court. The petitioners plead for a liberal application of the Rules of Court, in light of the substantial issues
raised by them in the CA.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents assert that the fact that the petitioners counsel
neglected to file their petition within the sixty-day period, is inexcusable negligence; hence, the appellate
court did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing their petition for certiorari.
RULING: The Supreme Court stressed, at the outset, that the CA should not be faulted for dismissing the
petition for certiorari of the petitioners for having been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period
therefor. As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed with fealty as they are designed
primarily to speed up the final disposition of the case.

Such reglementary periods are indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly
discharge of judicial business. Deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. More importantly, its
observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of the parties. What is worrisome is that parties who
fail to file their pleading within the periods provided for by the Rules of Court, through their counsels
inexcusable neglect, resort to beseeching the Court to bend the rules in the guise of a plea for a liberal
interpretation thereof, thus, sacrificing efficiency and order.

The Supreme Court cannot simply respond with alacrity to every claim of injustice and bend the rules to
placate vociferous protestors' crying and claiming to be victims of a wrong.

The petitioners misplaced insistence that their counsels failure to file their petition on time due to an
incorrect computation of the last day for filing the said petition has been discredited. The inadvertent
computation of the period for one to file a pleading is inexcusable, and have become an all too familiar
and ready excuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with the mandatory
periods.

In the present case, the petitioner's counsel was inexcusably negligent in failing to file their petition within
the period therefor. It bears stressing that a lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track
of the period of time left to file pleadings, and to see to it that said pleadings are filed before the lapse of
the period. If he fails to do so, his client is bound by his conduct, negligence and mistakes. The petitioners
knew and should have known that they had only until March 17, 2003 to file the petition, as shown on
page 25 thereof. It was incumbent on the petitioner's counsel to arrange his workload and attend to
important and pressing matters such that pleadings are filed within the prescribed period therefor. If the
failure of the petitioners counsel to cope with his heavy workload should be considered a valid justification
to sidestep the reglementary period, there would be no end to litigations so long as counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced.

We are not swayed by the petitioners plea for a deviation from the application of the reglementary period
for filing their petition for certiorari, on their argument that the NLRC erred in ordering them to pay
separation pay to the respondents contrary to and prescinding from the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter. We have reviewed the records and find that the errors ascribed by the petitioners to the NLRC are
mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction. DENIED.