QTR A319-320-321 Study Notes
QTR A319-320-321 Study Notes
QTR A319-320-321 Study Notes
− MEA: (In amber/maroon) lowest alt. with radio signal coverage. 5NM from centerline. QTR minimum altitude
− MORA: (In amber + “a”) clearance (1000/2000ft) btw fixes within 10NM fm. centerline Jeppesen derivate
− MOCA: (In amber + “T”) lowest published alt btw radio fixes
− MSA: On SID+STAR. 1000ft obstacle clearance within 25NM
OPERATIONAL GOLDEN RULES. FCTM OP-010
1. The aircraft can be flown like any other aircraft
2. Fly, navigate, communicate - in that order
3. One head up at all times
4. Cross check the accuracy of the FMS
5. Know your FMA at all times
6. When things don’t go as expected - take over
7. Use the proper level of automation for the task
8. Practice task sharing and back-up each other
AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (DOC 4444) ATC p414
CIRCUMSTANCES PHRASEOLOGIES
TCAS
TCAS resolution advisory TCAS RA;
RA is completed and a return to the ATC clearance or instruction is CLEAR OF CONFLICT, RETURNING TO (Assigned clearance);
initiated
After the response to an TCAS RA CLEAR OF CONFLICT (assigned clearance), RESUMED;
ATC clearance or instruction contradictory to the TCAS RA UNABLE, TCAS RA;
RVSM
To report RVSM approved status AFFIRM RVSM;
To report RVSM non-approved status followed by supplementary NEGATIVE RVSM [(supplementary information, e.g. State Aircraft)];
information
To report when severe turbulence, equipment, that affects the UNABLE RVSM DUE TURBULENCE; UNABLE RVSM DUE EQUIPMENT;
capability of an aircraft to maintain height-keeping requirements for
RVSM
To report ability to resume RVSM operations READY TO RESUME RVSM.
GNSS / RNP / RNAV
GNSS/RNP/RNAV UNABLE RNP (specify type) (or RNAV) [DUE TO (reason e.g. LOSS OF
Degradation of Aircraft Navigation Perf. RAIM or RAIM ALERT)].
Additional Reports
If pilot is unable to comply with a clearance UNABLE;
To report at a specified place or distance MILES (GNSS or DME) FROM (name of DME station) (or significant
point);
Emergency Descent EMERGENCY DESCENT (intentions);
DOH Ground Communication
Purpose Department Call Sign Frequency
Flight Documentation
NOTAMS
Performance related MEL clarification in Tech Log Flight Dispatch “Dispatch” 125.150
Queries on Flight Plans
Weather Data
ZFW Changes
Clarification of MEL entries in
Technical Log Engineer Maintenance “Maintenance Control” 125.150
Required Technical Documentation Technical Problems.
Aircraft Cleaning Air Conditioning Catering
ETA Updates (Prior to Arrival)
Fuel
Gate Information
QAS Hub Control “QAS Hub Control” 121.050
Ground Power Unit Medical/Police/Security Assistance
QAS or QR Ground Staff
Assistance
Passenger Steps.
Minimum Ground Times OM-A 8.2.2.15
Doha Outstations
A319 45’ 45’
A320 / A321 60’ 45’
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Technical Log.
Time starts at midnight + RIO = repair interval overrun = RIE = rectification interval extension
A = according procedure One time extension = 2 time extension allow
B = 3 days = Only B, C or D. MEL 00-02
C = 10 days MEL 00-02
D = 120 days
= system must be placarded in cockpit
Aircraft dispatched in accordance with MEL reference number MEL 00-02
...Acceptable to Carry Forward (ACF)”.
Cabin defects to be transferred to ACFT technical Log OM-A 8.1.11.2.4
Daily inspection: OM-A 8.1.11.1.4 + 36 hrs. If outstation extend 48 hrs.
Time Management. OM-A 8.3.16.8
ON TIME PERFORMANCE is a MUST and explain GREEN LIGHT BOARDING and SLOT TIMES when is applicable.
− 75 minutes to join briefing (early is advised during training)
− 60 minutes the cabin crew at the aircraft
− 45 minutes the pilots at aircraft
− Briefing with cabin crew not longer than 5 minutes
− Complete check list down to the “line” 20 minutes prior ETD
− The Welcome announcement 10 minutes prior ETD.
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ON TIME PERFORMANCE “OTP”. ACN NO.: GEN (OPS) 32/11
− ACARS Loadsheet should be requested no later than STD - 35 minutes.
− If final Loadsheet not received by STD - 10 minutes, annotate the arrival time on the Journey Log and inform the OCC.
− The Captain welcome P.A. at ETD -15 minutes.
− Ground Staff must complete all activities by ETD -10 minutes.
− NO DELAYS will be accepted waiting for “VIPs” unless advised by the Company through OCC.
− Call for start should be initiated at earliest possible after doors closed, to allow the flight to depart on time (STD + 0).
Cabin Crew Briefing.
Commander shall conduct a Cabin Crew briefing, latest upon reaching the aircraft relating to information and particulars pertinent
to individual flight, which will include the at lest following: Taxi time, Trip time, Cruising Altitude, Enroute Weather with possible
Turbulence encounters, Weather at destination with expected Temperature and any defective items that affect cabin and
passengers. The Commander will follow the following guidelines to summarize the briefing:
− The Commander will introduce himself and the F/O to the crew.
− Confirm that the crew is legal to do the flight to the best of their knowledge.
− Check if any crew was called from SBY.
− Defects affecting the cabin, any significant weather, turbulence or delay to release the cabin crew.
− Confirm if all crewmembers are conversant with the location of all safety equipment and emergency exits.
− Ask if there are any questions on the briefing of the CSD/CS.
− Add any points at this time to include weather at destination, or if training is being conducted on this flight.
− Emphasize the importance of open line communication between flight deck and cabin crew.
− Emergency Access Code for the Flight Deck or Assign the password for access to the Flight Deck (in event of a system failure).
− Any special handling passenger.
FUEL PLANNING. OM-A 8.1.8.1
An Operational Flight Plan (OFP) is used to calculate the minimum fuel required for the flight using this Company fuel policy at the
planning stage. These calculations are based on available forecasted weather conditions, expected aircraft weights, routings,
optimum flight levels, ATC procedures and restrictions; aircraft fuel consumption data (e.g.: Performance degradation factor).
When flight planned fuel is carried, the Company accepts responsibility for any diversion as a result of unusual circumstances, which
result in less than the minimum fuel required being available to complete the flight. Nevertheless the Commander retains final
responsibility for adjusting the total fuel required, if in his opinion extra fuel uplift is operationally justified. (I.e.: high probability of
diversion due to destination marginal forecasted weather).
Missing Passenger. OM-A 10.1.14
When a passenger fails to board the aircraft after checking in or has been offloaded, then the aircraft MUST NOT DEPART with the
baggage of the missing passenger; THE CHECKED IN BAGGAGE MUST BE OFFLOADED.
If a passenger is missing in transit, then his cabin baggage that may have been left on-board must be identified and offloaded. To
readily identify the cabin baggage, the remaining passengers on-board should be asked to identify their personal belongings.
The station staff shall notify the Commander by manually writing and signing the applicable loadsheet with the following information:
− Names of missing passengers; and
− Number of offloaded bags.
Note: There is no need for the crew to visually identify the offloaded baggage.
The offloaded baggage must be removed to a designated area and dealt with in accordance with the local security regulations.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Refueling and Defueling when Passengers on-board or Embarking / Disembarking OM-A 8.2.1.5
The start of refueling / defueling must be coordinated with the Commander to allow him to brief the entire crew concerning safety
regulations and procedures. After refueling / defueling is completed, the Commander must be informed. The minimum cabin crew
complement must be available (one of the cabin crew must be CS/CSD). The following special safety precautions have to be strictly
adhered to:
− A certified person (Engineer) must remain at a specified location (Ramp area) during refueling / defueling process with
passengers on-board. He must handle emergency procedures concerning fire protection and fire fighting. All necessary
measures have to be coordinated with the Commander;
− A two-way communication shall be established and shall remain available by the aircraft inter-communication system or other
suitable means between the ground Crew supervising the refueling / defueling and the Commander on-board the aircraft;
− Crew, responsible staff and passenger must be warned that refueling / defueling will take place;
− “Fasten Seat Belt” signs must be OFF;
− “No Smoking” signs must be ON together with interior lighting to enable emergency exits to be identified;
− A Passenger Announcement is to be made briefing passengers:
a. Not to smoke at any time on the ground;
b. To remain seated, but with seat belts/harnesses unfastened, until the refueling / defueling has been completed;
c. Not to operate any electronic devices.
− If the presence of fuel vapors is detected inside the aircraft, or any other hazard arises during refueling / defueling, the cabin
crew shall inform the Commander immediately.
Refueling / defueling process and other activities within the aircraft must be stopped immediately;
− In the cabin, a qualified cabin crew must be positioned near boarding doors and be prepared for an immediate emergency
evacuation;
− In principle, for all aircraft types, at least a minimum of two exit doors shall be opened and passenger stairs /jetways must be
positioned at these doors.
If only one passenger stair/jetway is available, the requirement for the second exit may be met by positioning a qualified cabin crew,
who will remain at a second exit throughout the refueling / defueling process. The exit door should not be armed, unless required in
an emergency. In addition, access and egress from all areas where aircraft escape slides may be deployed are to be kept clear,
except for those exits not available due to their use for catering or other ground servicing activities;
− Ground servicing and other activities within the aircraft are to be conducted so that available exits are not obstructed;
− If passengers are embarking during refueling, they should be under supervision of a responsible person and their route must
avoid the fuelling zone (OM A 8.2.1.3 – Fuelling Zone). Congestion in front of the aircraft doors must be avoided.
Note: The refueling / defueling process must be interrupted immediately if any of the safety regulations are not adhered to.
Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF) capability. OM-A 8.1.2.1
Takeoff Destination ALL Alternate
A319 / A320 6 6 5
A321 7 7 6
RFF category required for ETOPS and Adequate alternates is 4.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
WCH R Can walk the stairs, but requires help btw acft. and terminal
WCH S Cannot walk the stairs, but can move in the acft.
WCH C Completely immobile
INAD 1 No visa or expired Passport has expired PAX keep documents
INAD 2 Dubious documents Forged documents CS/CSD keep documents
BLIND PAX Max 30 ≤4 no escort 5: 1 escort 6-10: 2 esc. 10-30: 3 esc.
DOG Only 1 seeing Eye
DEP A Deportee accompanied Max 2 Documents with escort
DEP U Dep. unaccompanied No limit CS/CSD keep documents
BEH Stretcher in hold Only 1
TRIPPED C/B REENGAGEMENT. PRO-SUP-24 P 1/ QRH 80.20. Do not pull the following circuit breakers:
− SFCC (could lead to SLATS/FLAPS locked).
− ECU or EEC, EIU.
Is not allowed to reset the following computers in specific circumstances:
− ECU (Engine Control Unit on CFM engines), or EEC (Electronic Engine Control on IAE engines), and EIU (Engine Interface Unit)
while the engine is running.
− BSCU (Brake Steering Control Unit), if the aircraft is not stopped.
On ground, do not reengage the C/B of the fuel pump(s) of any tank.
Cabin Defects to be transferred to Aircraft Technical Log. 8.1.11.2.4
1. Cabin interphone system including handsets.
2. Passenger address system.
3. Megaphones.
4. Cabin and lavatory loudspeakers.
5. Emergency locator transmitters.
6. Cabin - cockpit call system.
7. Attendant seats shoulder harnesses and lap belts.
8. Passenger seats recline mechanisms.
9. Cabin attendant seat mechanical defects.
10. Evacuation slides and slide rafts.
11. Emergency flashlights and holders.
12. Evacuation signals systems.
13. Passenger and emergency doors.
14. Under-seat baggage restraining bars.
15. Overhead stowage bin latches.
16. Smoke barrier curtains.
17. Lavatory smoke warning system.
18. Lavatory fire extinguishing system.
19. “FASTEN SEAT BELT” signs and placards.
20. “NO SMOKING” signs and placards.
21. Life jackets.
22. Cabin emergency lights and test functions.
23. Floor proximity emergency escape path lighting systems.
24. Passenger oxygen service units.
25. Lavatory oxygen modules.
26. Portable oxygen units (Bottle and masks).
27. Protective Breathing Equipment (PBE).
28. First-aid kits.
29. Potable water defects.
30. Inoperative lavatories.
31. Any other defect considered affecting aircraft airworthiness or passenger/crew safety and security.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
MINIMUM FLIGHT CREW OXYGEN PRESSURE. LIM-35, around 652 psi for 2 crewmembers + 1 observer
Weights. LIM-11 P 5
DOW MZFW MTOW MLW
A319 44.2 t. 58.5 t. 75.5 t. 62.5 t.
A320 45.0 t. 62.5 t. 77.0 t. 66.0 t.
A321 51.5 t. 73.8 t. 93.0 t. 77.8 t.
POWER PLANT. DSC-70-PLP. The V2500-A5 engine is a high bypass ratio turbofan.
Minimum oil for t/o: SOP 3.03.04 p7. 11 qtrs. + 0.3 qtrs./flight hrs. (Warning only at 3 qtrs. Vibration. PRO-ABN-70 P 67
decreasing or 5 qtrs. increasing) N2 > 6.5 Pulses > 5.0 (N1+N2)
Starter. LIM-70 P 2 30min cooling after 3x starts or NO starter engagement if: N2 >10% on
3 consecutive start max 635º. 2x 2min each + 1x 4min cont. cranking GND N2 >18% in FLT
1min 15sec pause btw each
35Kts max x wind for start. 10 Kts Tail wind consider Man Start
Type Thrust lbs. Bypass Ratio Comp. Ratio Fan diameter (m) Total length (m) Weight (kg) Aircraft type
V2527M-A5 27,000 4.9: 1 32.8: 1 1.613 3.2 2,359 A319
V2527-A5 27,000 4.8: 1 32.8: 1 1.613 3.2 2,359 A320
V2533-A5 33,000 4.5: 1 35.2: 1 1.613 3.2 2,359 A321
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Planning Minima. OM-A 8.1.2. Planning Minima required for Destination Alternate Aerodrome, isolated Aerodrome, 3% ERA and En-
route Alternate
NOTE: All Pilots must ensure that a meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV conversion is not used for:
− Takeoff
− For calculating any other required RVR minimum less than 800m,
− Or when reported RVR is available
AWOPS PREPARATION & CONSIDERATIONS FLGHT PREPARATION OM-A 8.4.3
In addition to normal flight preparation, the following planning and preparation must be performed when CAT 2 / 3 approaches are
envisaged.
1. Review NOTAMS: Make sure that the destination airport still meets visual or non-visual CAT 2 / 3 requirements:
− Runway and approach lighting.
− Radio navaid availability.
− RVR equipment availability. Etc.
2. Aircraft Status: Check that required equipment’s for CAT 2 or CAT 3 approach are operative. QRH OPS.04. Also check the
Aircraft Technical Logbook to confirm that no write-up during previous flights affects equipment required for CAT 2 / 3.
3. Crew Qualification: Crew qualification and currency must be reviewed (both Captain and F/O must be qualified and current).
Refer to OM A Chapter 5 - Qualification Requirements and to Operations Manual Part ‘D’ for training requirements.
4. Weather Information: Check that the weather forecast at destination is within Company’s and crew operating minima. If the
forecast is below CAT 1 minima, verify that alternate weather forecasts are appropriate to the available approach means and
at least equal to or better than the planning minima.
5. Fuel Planning: As a guidance, a minimum of 30 minutes fuel should be carried or the expected delays (taxiing / approach)
whichever is higher.
6. Cabin Crew Briefing: Brief the Cabin Crew not to enter the Flight Deck, or call on the intercom during taxi or approach unless
safety dictates.
7. Take-off Speed: Use the flap setting that gives the lowest take-off speeds utilizing the tailwind (if it gives lower speeds).
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Low Visibility Taxi. OM-A 8.4.4. Note: THE FOLLOWING CONDITION’S MUST BE MET
1. LVPs are in force
2. Crewmembers are qualified and familiar with taxiways and CAT 2/3 holding points.
3. Taxi speed approx. 10 kt.
4. The status of the visual and non-visual facilities is sufficient;
5. Minimum required RVR for take-off is obtained;
6. Any checklist, clearance or action while the aircraft is stationary and parking brake ON;
7. Make full use of all aircraft lights,
8. Use of aircraft anti-icing procedures if applicable.
9. Sterile flight deck applies.
LOW Visibility Take-off (LVTO): OM-A 8.4.5
1. LVTO is RVR < 400m
2. The take-off minima are mainly determined by the airport installation
3. QCAA approval required to conduct Low Visibility Take-off with RVR below 150 m for Cat. C and 200 m for Cat. D aircraft.
4. Conditions for start the take off run:
− A 90 m visual segment at the start of the take-off run (6 center-line lights)
− RVR 125m (A319/A320) or RVR 150m (A321). The required RVR value must be achieved for all of the relevant RVR reporting
points.
− LVP in force
− High intensity runway centerline lights spaced 15m or less. High intensity edge lights spaced 60m or less.
− Flight crew members completed training
5. When departure aerodrome with weather conditions below applicable landing minima, a take-off alternate aerodrome must
be selected.
6. The take-off alternate within 60 min (or 120 min ETOPS), at one engine inoperative cruising speed in ISA conditions based on the
actual take-off weight
Rejected Take off. OM-A 8.4.6
− With very limited visibility, directional control with reference to centerline is difficult, particularly with the inherent swing of an
engine failure, and loss of “streaming effect” as speed reduces demands an early correction to maintain the centerline.
Utilization of the “YAW BAR” is recommended.
− Standard runway centerline lights change from white to alternate red and white when there is approx. 3000 ft. (900 m) of
runway remaining and to continuous red when there is only 1000 ft. (300m) remaining.
− If the take-off was rejected then the CM1 should switch all landing lights ON so that the emergency services can easily identify
the aircraft in bad visibility conditions
Take-off Operating Minima (QCAR-OPS 1.360 / 1.430). OM-A 8.1.3.3
Take-off minima are generally expressed as VIS or RVR Limits. If needed, a ceiling or climb gradient will be specified.
− Take-off shall not be commenced unless weather conditions at the airport of departure are equal to or better than applicable
minima for landing at that airport, unless a suitable take-off alternate aerodrome is available.
− When the reported visibility VIS is below that required for take-off and RVR is not reported, a take-off may only be commenced if
the commander can determine that the RVR/VIS along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum.
− When no report of VIS or RVR is available, a take-off may only be commenced if the commander can determine that the
RVR/VIS along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minima
− The lowest RVR authorized for take-off is 400m, unless Low Visibility Procedures are in force.
Operating minima for take-off from a specific airport are specified and can be determined by the flight crew using the following:
− Qatar Airways customized Jeppesen charts with the reverse bold print STANDARD in the top left hand corner of the minima box,
− A discrete Jeppesen 10-9S (or 20-9S, 30-9S etc.) plate.
− The applicable take-off minima specified under AIR CARRIER on the 10-9A.
The table below defines the lowest take-off minima authorized, and is not to be used by flight crew for establishing applicable take-
off minima. Applicable take-off minima for specific airports are specified on the relevant Jeppesen chart.
Take-off RVR / Visibility
Facilities RVR / Visibility (m) (Note 2)
CAT C CAT D
Nil (Day only) 500
Runway edge Lighting and/or Centerline Marking (Note 1) 250 300
Runway edge and Centerline Lighting 200 250
LVP in force
Runway edge and Centerline Lighting and Multiple RVR information (Note 3) 150 (Note 4) 200
(Note 4)
Note 1: For night operations at least runway edge and runway end lights are required.
Note 2: If the required RVR / Visibility value representative of the initial part of the take off run is not reported it can be substituted by
pilot assessment.
Note 3: The required RVR value must be achieved for all the relevant RVR reporting points except as stated in Note 2 above.
Note 4: Refer to 8.4.2.3.2 for Low Visibility Take-off (LVTO) below 150 m for Category C and 200 m for Category D aircraft.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Period of suitability
To declare an adequate ETOPS En-route alternate Aerodrome as suitable to support a given flight, the ceiling and visibility forecast
must be checked to comply with the ETOPS dispatch weather minima during the required period of suitability.
The following conservative method is used to define it manually.
Beginning of Period of Suitability = Departure Time + Taxi Time + Flight time to Equitime point before alternate (or entry point if only 1
ETOPS ERA) +Diversion Time at normal cruise speed and altitude.
End of period of Suitability = Departure Time + Taxi Time + Flight time to Equitime point after alternate (or exit point if only 1 ETOPS ERA)
+ Diversion Time at FL 100 or MORA at LRC Speed + 1 Hour
ETOPS Fuel Planning
Critical fuel scenarios in the LIDO system are calculated for all required Equitime
Points and the Entry/Exit points for all the cases:
− One engine inoperative (1E)
− Decompression with one engine inoperative based on long-range cruise speed. (1D)
− Decompression with no engine failure based on Long Range Cruise speed. (2D)
Note: The one engine out case is never considered for ETOPS Critical Fuel scenario, even though it is calculated anyway. It is shown in
the ETOPS output window.
If destination and surroundings are below minima, critical fuel scenarios often occur towards the end of the ETOPS area, e.g. at the
exit point. This is due to the fact that little trip fuel is left on the last route sections. For dispatching an aircraft for an ETOPS flight, the
ETOPS dispatcher must determine, for the considered route, both a standard and an ETOPS fuel planning. The highest of the two fuel
requirements shall be considered as being the minimum block fuel for the flight. For ETOPS operations, a specific fuel planning
(Critical fuel reserve) shall be established.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
JEPPESEN TEXT MANUAL. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL. FLIGHT PROCEDURES. Part IV Holding Procedures
Holding Speed (PANS OPS) Categories A through E
Levels Normal conditions Turbulence (ATC Clearance) Outbound Timing
≤ 14000ft 230 kts.
280 kts. 1 min
> FL 140 ≤ FL 200 240 kts.
> FL200 265 kts. .80 Mach 1 ½ min
Commencement and Continuation of an Approach OM-A 8.3.1.9.5
An instrument approach may be commenced regardless of the reported RVR/VIS but the approach shall not be continued beyond
the outer marker, or equivalent position, if the reported RVR/Visibility is less than the applicable landing minima. Where no outer
marker or equivalent position exists, the Commander shall make the decision to continue or abandon the approach before
descending below 1000 ft. above the aerodrome on the final approach segment.
If, after passing the outer marker or equivalent position depicted on the Instrument Approach Chart, the reported RVR/Visibility falls
below the applicable minimum, the approach may be continued to DA (H) or MDA (H). A pilot may continue the approach below
DA (H) or MDA (H) and the landing may be completed provided that the required visual reference is established at the DA (H) or
MDA (H) and is maintained.
Warnings for ILS Approach PRO-NOR-SRP-01 FMS
Autoland Warning RED (In CAT 2 (200 – DH) CAT 3 (200 & blw)):
− Both A/P lost
− A/C too far off beam, or
− Loss Loc signal above 15 ft. or loss G/S above 100 ft.
− Difference between both radio altimeters more than 15 ft.
PRECISION APPROACH CAT 2/3 OM-A 8.4.8
Approach Category DH RVR Alert Height Required Equipment
CAT 2 100ft<DH<200ft >300m note1 N/A N/A
CAT 3A 50ft<DH<100ft >200m N/A Fail Passive
CAT 3B <50ft 75m<RVR<200m Applicable Fail Operational
CAT 3B NO DH 75m Applicable Fail Operational
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
*Note: 350m must be used for category D aircraft conducting manual landing. Manual CAT II autoland will only be
approved for specific airports listed in Part C.
Note 1: For CAT III B operations, in the case of a CAT III runway it may be assumed that operations with no DH can be
supported, unless specifically restricted, as published in the AIP or NOTAM. In contrast to weather minima:
Therefore, an automatic landing system is mandatory to perform CAT III operations. Its reliability must be sufficient to control
the aircraft to touchdown in CAT III A operations and through rollout to a safe taxi speed in CAT III B.
− Cat 2: RVR TDZ required
− Cat 3A: RVR TDZ + MID mandatory (MID replaced by RO if inop.)
− Cat 3>B: only one RVR
CAT 2 / 3 Approach Briefing. OM-A 8.4.13
Additional to normal briefing, During CAT 2 / 3 approach briefing, the Commander shall satisfy himself that:
− Flight crew members are qualified;
− Aircraft systems status and capacity;
− The status of the visual and non-visual facilities is sufficient;
− LVPs are in force;
− Airfield and runway operational status e.g. CAT 2 / 3 …… etc.;
− Destination and alternate weather;
− Brief review of task sharing;
− Review approach procedure (stabilized approach);
− Review and set applicable landing minima (RA) value in DH field;
− Review Approach Ban
− Review go-around procedure, ATC calls;
− Review downgrading possibilities above 1000 ft. AGL;
− Brief review of procedure in case of malfunction below 1000 ft. AGL;
− Optimum seat position and reminder to set cockpit lights when appropriate; and
− Review of the FMA calls.
FUEL:
− Add 30’ taxi fuel if vis. < 400 m. = 400 kg.
− Add 30´holding if WX below CAT 1 = 1200 kg.
Required Visual Reference for CAT 2 / 3. OM-A 8.4.9
A pilot may not continue an approach below DH unless the following visual references are attained and can be maintained
App. Type Required Visual Reference
A pilot may not continue an approach below DH unless the following visual references are attained and can be maintained:
a) A segment of at least 3 consecutive lights being:
− The center line of the approach lights, or
− Touchdown zone lights, or
− Runways center line lights, or
CAT 2 − Runway edge lights, or
− A combination of these is attained and maintained.
b) And a lateral element of the ground pattern:
− An approach lighting crossbar, or
− The landing threshold, or a barrette of the touchdown zone lighting
A segment of at least 3 consecutive lights being:
− The center line of the approach lights, or
− Touchdown zone lights, or
CAT 3A
− Runways center line lights, or
− Runway edge lights, or
− A combination of these is attained and maintained.
− For CAT 3B operations with fail-operational flight control systems using a DH, a pilot may not continue an approach
below DH unless a visual reference containing at least one centerline light is attained and can be maintained.
CAT 3B
− For CAT 3B operations with no DH there is no requirement for visual contact with the runway prior to touchdown. The
permitted RVR is dependent on the level of airplane equipment.
FAILURES AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS BELOW 1 000 FT. PRO-NOR-SRP-01-70
Go Around if insufficient visual references below 1000 ft.: to DH in CAT 2, or100 ft. in CAT 3
− Alpha Floor activation.
− AP OFF (Cavalry charge)
− Loss of Approach capability. (Triple click)
− Amber Caution (Single chime)
− Engine Failure.
− No Land Mode a 350 ft.
− AUTOLAND Warning Light, below 200ft,
− No FLARE at 30 ft. (CAT 3)
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
AUTOLAND WARNING
With “LAND” or “FLARE” green on the FMA and at least one AP engaged, the AUTOLAND red light appears on the
Glareshield when the aircraft is below 200 ft. RA and one of the following events occurs:
− The autopilots are lost, or
− The aircraft gets too far off the beam (LOC or G/S flash on PFD), or
− Loss of LOC signal above 15 ft., or loss of glide signal above 100 ft. (transmitter or receivers).
− The difference between both radio altimeter indications is greater than 15 ft.
When the Autoland light comes on, Autoland must be discontinued
Visual Maneuvering (Circling / Visual Approach): OM-A 8.1.3.9 Circling Minima: Visibility 5000m MDH 1000ft rounded up to
the nearest 100ft or published minima.
Visual Approach. OM-A 8.1.3.10
The PF may commence a visual approach provided the following conditions can be maintained throughout the approach:
− Visual contact with the landing runway environment (runway threshold, approach lighting, or other markings identifiable with
the runway)
− If circling minima is published, then the cloud ceiling must be at least the MDH specified under “CIRCLE-TO-LAND” or 1500 ft.
whichever is greater and reported visibility of at least 5 km.
− If no circling minimum is specified, then the cloud ceiling must be at least the Minimum Safe/Sector Altitude (MSA) and reported
visibility of at least 5 km.
In all cases the approach shall be discontinued if the specified visual reference is lost. In the event of a missed approach,
advise ATC as soon as practicable to ensure the appropriate procedure is followed.
Stabilized Approach OM-A 8.3.1.9.4
A missed approach is mandatory if any of the following have not been achieved by 1000 ft. AAL:
− Landing Configuration (Gear Down, Flaps in the Landing position and Speedbrake armed.)
− Stabilized on glideslope/ final approach path
− Stabilized at Command Speed/VAPP taking into consideration the prevailing conditions
− Vapp -5kts to Vapp or GS Mini (whichever is higher) +10kts
− Landing checklist completed.
Manual Roll Out: PRO-NOR-SRP-01-70
− Antiskid Inop.
− Nose wheel Steering inop.
Contaminated RWY. LIM-22-20
NON-PRECISION APPROACH. FPA: 1º = 100 ft./NM.
Ground Clearance. SOP 3.03.22
A319 A320 A321
PITCH ROLL PITCH ROLL PITCH ROLL
No compress 15.5º 18.1º 13.5º 20º 11.2º 18.1º
Full compress 13.9º 16.2º 11.7º 16º 9.7º 16.2º
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
(1) Equivalent runway condition (only valid for maximum crosswind determination):
1. Dry, damp or wet runway (less than 3 mm water depth)
2. Runway covered with slush
3. Runway covered with dry snow
4. Runway covered with standing water with risk of hydroplaning
5. Icy runway or high risk of hydroplaning
Fluid Contaminated Runway. PRO-SUP-91-50
Taxiing
− Avoid high thrust.
− Keep distance from other A/C
− Taxi speed max. 10 kts, antiskid de-activates
− On slippery taxiways during turns with large nose wheel steering angles, noise and vibration may result from the wheels slipping
sideways.
− Differential power may be needed.
− Keep flaps retracted till last minute.
Takeoff
− Max T/O power (TOGA)
− If abort T/O try to use rudder & small inputs to nose wheel to maintain directional control.
− Don’t lift the nose before VR
− Rotate lift off and retract gear and high lift devices in the normal manner.
Landing
− Avoid landing with inoperative antiskid.
− Approach at the normal speed.
− Make a positive touchdown after a brief flare.
− Don’t hold the nose wheel off the ground.
− Use Max reverse thrust.
− Maintain directional control with rudder as long as possible
− If the runway length is limiting, apply the brakes before lowering the nose gear onto the runway, but be prepared to apply back
stick to counter the nose down pitch produced by the brakes application.
19
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
The five lever positions correspond to the following surface positions: DSC-27-30-20
Position SLATS FLAPS 319/320 FLAPS 321 Ind. on ECAM
0 0 0 0 CRUISE
HOLD
18 0 0 1
1
10 10 1+F
2 22 15 14 2 TAKEOFF
APPR
3 22 20 21 3
LDG
FULL 27PROC. QRH
TASKSHARING FOR ABN/EMER 40GEN.01 25 FULL
20
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
21
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
22
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
T/O BRIEFING:
Briefing Example:
− Aircraft type and model for tail strike awareness. Aircraft technical status: MEL, CDL, and OEBs.
− This will be a left seat takeoff, standard calls and procedures.
− Below 100kts >I will call “STOP” for any relevant reason. Between 100kts and approaching V1, I will call “STOP” in the event of any
Warning, Caution, windshear, loss of engine thrust or any indication that the aircraft will not fly safely.
− If the call is “Stop I will call “STOP” while simultaneously closing the thrust levers, apply MAX reverse, and verify operation of
Autobrake or apply MAX braking. When the aircraft is stopped, I will set and confirm the PARK brake is on and make a P.A.
“ATTENTION CREW AT STATIONS”. I will then call for the appropriate checklist.” I will not attempt to vacate the runway until I am
certain that an evacuation is NOT required and it is safe to do so. You will monitor reverse thrust operation, aircraft deceleration
and cancel any aural warning. When the aircraft is stopped you will call ATC. You will carry out the ECAM or QRH procedure on
my command.
− If the call is “Go” I will continue the takeoff and there will be no actions apart from silencing the aural warning, raising the gear
and selecting TOGA if required. The autopilot will be used when the aircraft is under safe control. At 400 feet AAL and aircraft is
under control I will call for the ECAM actions on my command and you will perform them.
− In the event of an engine failure, I will advise ATC of our intentions and fly the Special Engine Out SID
− In VMC and if conditions allow, I may continue on the cleared SID or accept radar vectors.
Normal Takeoff Briefing:
Briefings will consist of five modules covered by the acronym “C-TWO-Plus”:
− Chart. Pushback considerations, taxi route. Runway, Name of SID / Dep. / Trans Chart ID’s, Date’s initial level. Transition altitude.
− Terrain. Airfield elevation if 100 ft. or greater, Terrain if applicable, Sector MSA, Terrain on ND.
− Weather
− Operational. NOTAMS, Flex or TOGA, Use of Anti-Ice, Radar, Packs during takeoff, Noise Abatement procedure, Low Visibility
Procedures, Use of AP
− Plus Threats
INIT B page.
− Block Fuel. FOB on EW/D
− Estimated TOW.
− Extra time at destination.
Takeoff PERF page.
− TO RWY.
− TO CONFIG.
− FLEX/TOGA. FLEX/TOGA on MCDU
− V1, VR, V2. V1, VR, V2 on PFD
− Transition altitude.
− Thrust Red/Acc altitude.
Flight Plan page.
− Minimum Safe Altitude.
− First Assigned FL. ALT target in Blue on PFD
− Flight Plan Description. SID, route on F-PLN page
− RAD NAV. RAD NAV on ND
Abnormal Operations.
− EOSID and return plan. SEC F-PLN and PERF
23
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
24
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
25
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
26
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
27
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
During ground operations, limit the aircraft electric power supply with avionics ventilation system in normal configuration as follows:
− OAT = 49°C no limitation
− OAT = 55°C time limit 2 hours
− OAT = 60°C time limit 1 hour
− OAT = 64°C time limit ½ hour.
Pack Use on Ground:
When the outside air temperature is 25°C or below switch one pack OFF, as this will result in good airline savings.
Pack Flow Selection:
− NORM, for normal operating conditions
− ECON FLOW ON, if pax count < 140 (A321)
− LO if passengers count is below 115
− HI, for abnormally hot and humid conditions.
− A319: At and above FL380, Pack Flow LO.
Ditching Guarded Pushbutton:
CAUTION: If the ditching pushbutton is set to ON, on ground, with the low pressure ground cart connected and all doors closed, a
differential pressure will build up.
ATA 22 – Auto Flight
Auto Pilot Function
Minimum Use Heights:
− On Takeoff with SRS Mode: 100 ft. AGL (5 Sec)
− Straight-In Non-Precision Approach: MDA/MDH
− Straight-In LNAV/VNAV Approach: DA
− Circling Approach: Circle Min. minus 100 ft.
− ILS Approach w/o Cat2/3 on FMA:160 ft. AGL
− Cat II with no Autoland: 80 ft. AGL
− All Other Phases of Flight: 500 ft. AGL or 900 ft. AGL
Use of the AP or FD in OPEN DES or DES mode is not permitted on approach unless the FCU altitude is set to, or above, MDA (H) or
500/900 ft., whichever is higher.
Autothrust Function
Use of autothrust is approved with or without AP/FD in selected or managed mode.
Flight Management Function
– FMGS lateral and vertical navigation has been certified for after takeoff, en route, and terminal area operations, for
instrument approach procedures and for missed approach procedures.
– FMGS is not certified for ILS, LOC, LOC-BC, LDA, SDF or MLS approaches.
With GPS PRIMARY or radio updating, RNP (NM) demonstrated to be:
AP ON FD NAV AP OFF FD NAV AP OFF FD OFF
En route: 1 1 1.1
Terminal: 0.5 0.51 0.51
Approach: 0.3 0.3 Not Authorized
Without GPS PRIMARY, navigation accuracy is a function of ground radio navaid infrastructure, or elapsed time since the last radio
update. The RNP accuracy has been demonstrated, provided the appropriate RNP value is checked or entered on the MCDU, and
HIGH accuracy is displayed.
The FMGS is also certified for navigation within BRNAV, PRNAV, RNP-4 and RNP-10 airspace. RNP-10 oceanic/remote area operations
are approved with GPS PRIMARY, or without GPS PRIMARY provided time limitations in IRS only navigation are established.
FMGS NAV database must be validated for intended use.
Obstacle clearance and adherence to airspace constraints remains the flight crew’s responsibility.
Fuel, time, performance info is provided for advisory purposes only.
NAV mode may be used after takeoff, provided FMGS runway updating has been checked.
Takeoff in GPS PRIMARY:
For certain airports where the difference between the local coordinate system and WGS 84 is not negligible, an incorrect NAV
guidance may occur after takeoff. GPS must be deselected for takeoff from these airports, until a safe altitude is reached.
NAV or NAV and FINAL APP mode may be used for:
− VOR, VOR/DME, NDB, NDB/DME or RNAV (including GPS) approaches.
NAV or NAV and FINAL APP mode may NOT be used for:
− ILS, LOC, LOC-BC, LDA, SDF, or MLS approaches.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
For instrument procedures not coded in the WGS 84 coord. system, the GPS must be deselected, unless the shift between the local
coord. system and the WGS 84 is found acceptable (except RNAV (GPS) and RNP RNAV). The assessment of this shift can be done:
− In flight, monitoring the navaid raw data in non-RNAV procedures.
− On ground, performing a GPS survey of the procedure waypoints.
FINAL APP mode guidance capability with GPS PRIMARY has been demonstrated down to MDH/DH (barometric) 250 feet.
VOR, VOR/DME, NDB, NDB/DME approach procedures may be performed in NAV or NAV and FINAL APP, provided AP or FD is used,
and:
− GPS PRIMARY is available. Navaid or airborne radio may be inop.
− Without GPS PRIMARY:
− The reference navaid must be tuned and monitored during the approach, or
− The radio navaid coverage supports the RNP value specified for the approach procedure.
For GPS approaches, GPS PRIMARY must be available.
RNAV approaches without GPS PRIMARY may be performed only if the radio navaid coverage supports the RNP value and HIGH
accuracy is displayed on the MCDU with the specified RNP.
NAV mode may be used in the terminal area, provided:
− GPS PRIMARY is available, or
− HIGH accuracy is displayed, and the appropriate RNP is checked or entered on the MCDU, or
− Navaid raw data is monitored.
Non-Precision approaches with engine-out:
Autopilot use in FINAL APP, NAV V/S or NAV/FPA is prohibited. Only FD use is permitted. This does not apply to A320
Automatic Approach, Landing and Roll Out CAT II:
− Minimum Decision Height: 100 ft. AGL
− At least one AP on in APPR mode, CAT 2, CAT 3 SINGLE or CAT 3 DUAL
− If no Autoland, AP must be off no lower than 80 ft. AGL
Automatic Approach, Landing and Roll Out CAT III Fail Passive (SINGLE)
− Minimum Decision Height: 50 ft. AGL
− At least one AP on in APPR mode, CAT 3 SINGLE or CAT 3 DUAL
− Autothrust must be used in selected or managed speed.
Automatic Approach, Landing and Roll Out CAT III Fail Operational (DUAL)
− Alert Height: 100 ft.
− Two APs on in APPR mode, CAT 3 DUAL
− Autothrust must be used in selected or managed speed
− CAT III with DH, Minimum Decision Height: 25 ft. (or 22 ft.)
CAT III without DH, Minimum RVR: 75 m Automatic Approach, Landing and Roll Out Engine Out:
− CAT II and CAT III fail passive autoland are only approved in Config FULL and if engine-out procedures are completed before
1000 ft. AGL.
− A319 and A321 are approved for Config 3.
Automatic Approach, Landing and Roll Out CAT II/III Maximum Wind:
ALL A321 CAT II w/o autoland
– Headwind: 30 kts 40 kts
– Crosswind: 20 kts 25 kts
– Tailwind: 10 kts 10 kts
Tower surface wind is controlling. If tower reports surface wind beyond limitations, only CAT I automatic approach without autoland
allowed. A321 may degrade to CAT II without autoland provided wind is within limitations in second column.
CAT II and CAT III Autoland:
− Approved in CONFIG 3 and CONFIG FULL
− Autoland has been demonstrated:
− With CAT II and CAT III ILS beam
− With glideslope between 2.5° and 3.15°
− At or below maximum landing weight. (A319 up to 69,000 kg in an emergency)
− At approach speed (Vapp) = Vls + wind correction (5 to 15 kts)
− At airport altitudes below:
− A319: 9200 ft.
− A320: 6500 ft.
− A321: 5750 ft. (A/c 1487: 2500 ft.)
29
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
31
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Maximum EGT:
− For start, below 25,000 ft.: 900°C
− For start, above 25,000 ft.: 982°C
With APU running:
− With 5 seconds confirmation time for shutdown: 682°C
Immediate shutdown, depending on ambient temp: 700-742°C APU Start Envelope:
− 1,000 to 41,000 ft.
− -40°C to ISA+40°C or ISA+35°C above 9,200 ft.
APU Gen Load Ground/Flight:
− 100% (90 kVA) to as low as 39% (35 kVA)
APU Air bleed extraction for wing anti-ice not permitted. Air Bleed Extraction for packs
− Two Packs up to 15,000 ft.
− One Pack up to 20,000 ft.
ATA 70 – Power Plant
Engine Starter Duty Cycles:
− 2 minutes on, 15 seconds off
− 2 minutes on, 15 seconds off
− 1 minute on, 30 minutes off
− 30 minute cooling period following three starts attempts or 4 minutes of continuous cranking.
− No running engagement of the starter when N2 is 10% on the ground or above 18% in flight.
Reverse Thrust:
− DO NOT select reverse thrust in flight.
− Power-backs with reverse thrust on the ground are not permitted.
− Maximum thrust should not be used below 70 kts or when the airspeed indication fluctuates. Idle reverse is permitted down to
aircraft stop.
Reduced Thrust Takeoff permitted if:
− The airplane meets performance requirements at the planned takeoff weight with the operating engines at the thrust available
for the assumed temperature.
− The flex temp is not higher than ISA+42°C (+54°C, +72°C)
− The assumed temperature is not lower than the flat rating temperature or the actual OAT.
− The runway is not contaminated.
− The aircraft has an inoperative item affecting the performance, but only if the associated performance shortfall has been
applied to meet all performance requirements at the takeoff weight with the operating engines at the thrust available for the
flex temperature.
− The braking action is Good or better (mu ≥ 0.40)
The engine is capable of starting in crosswinds up to 35 knots.
− EGT/Thrust Setting Limits A321
− TOGA setting, Two Engines 5 min: 635°C (650°C)
− TOGA setting, One Engine Inop. 10 min: 635°C
− MCT setting unlimited time 610ºC
Starting: 635ºC Oil Temperature:
− Minimum Starting: -40°C
− Minimum prior to exceeding idle: -10°C
− Minimum prior to takeoff: 50°C
− Maximum continuous: 155°C
− Maximum Transient (15 minutes): 165°C Oil Quantity:
Check that the oil quantity is at or above 11 qt. plus maximum average consumption (0.3 qtr./hr.)
Oil Pressure:
Minimum Oil Pressure: 60 psi.
− N1 Maximum: 100 % (may be limited by ambient temperature and bleed configuration)
− N2 Maximum: 100 %
32
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
PITCH/THRUST:
– Below THRUST RED ALT……………………………………………….15°/TOGA
– Above THRUST RED ALT and Below FL 100……………………….10°/CLB
– Above THRUST RED ALT and Above FL 100……………………….5°/CLB
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
WINDSHEAR
CALL-OUT: “WINDSHEAR TOGA”
− A red flag “WINDSHEAR” is displayed on each PFD associated with an aural synthetic voice “WINDSHEAR” repeated
three times.
− If windshear is detected either by the system or by pilot observation, apply the following recovery technique:
AT TAKEOFF:
− If before V1:
The takeoff should be rejected only if significant airspeed variations occur below indicated V1 and the pilot decides that
there is sufficient runway remaining to stop the airplane.
− If after V1:
THR LEVERS………………………………………………………………………TOGA
REACHING VR…………………………………………………………………..ROTATE
SRS ORDERS……………………………………………………………………..FOLLOW
AIRBORNE, INITIAL CLIMB or LANDING:
THR LEVERS AT TOGA………………………………………………………….SET OR CONFIRM
AP (if engaged)………………………………………………………………..KEEP
SRS ORDERS……………………………………………………………………..FOLLOW
This includes the use of full backstick, if necessary. The AP disengages when α is greater than αprot.
If FD bars are not available, use an initial pitch attitude of 17.5°. If needed to minimize height loss, increases this pitch
attitude.
− DO NOT CHANGE CONFIG (SLATS/FLAPS, GEAR) UNTIL OUT OF SHEAR
− CLOSELY MONITOR FLIGHT PATH AND SPEED
− RECOVER SMOOTHLY TO NORMAL CLIMB OUT OF SHEAR
WINDSHEAR AHEAD
The “W/S AHEAD” message is displayed on each PFD. The color of the message depends on the severity and location of the
windshear.
Note: When a predictive windshear alert (“WINDSHEAR AHEAD” or “GO AROUND WINDSHEAR AHEAD”) is triggered, if the
flight crew makes a positive verification that no hazard exists, then the alert may be disregarded, as long as:
− There are no other signs of possible windshear conditions, and
− The reactive windshear system is operational.
Known cases of spurious predictive windshear alerts have been reported at some airports, during either takeoff or landing,
due to the specific obstacle environment.
However, always rely on any reactive windshear (“WINDSHEAR”)
W/S AHEAD RED
TAKEOFF
Associated with an aural synthetic voice “WINDSHEAR AHEAD” X 2.
Before Takeoff
− Delay Takeoff, or select the most favorable runway.
During the takeoff run
− Reject takeoff
Note: Pred. W/S alerts are inhibited above 100 knots until 50 ft.
When Airborne
THR LEVERS………………………………………………………TOGA As usual, the slat/flat config. can be changed,
provided the windshear is not entered.
− SRS ORDERS………………………………………………………FOLLOW
Same notes as above in “Windshear”
LANDING
Assoc. with an aural synthetic voice “GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD”
− GO-AROUND……………………………………………………PERFORM
− Same notes as above in “Windshear”
W/S AHEAD AMBER
Apply precautionary measures outlined in Supplementary Techniques PRO-SUP-91-10 General
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
35
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
CREW INCAPACITATION
If a cockpit crewmember becomes incapacitated, the remaining crewmember must call a cabin attendant as soon as
practicable. The best way to request assistance from the cabin crew is by means of the PA:
“CS TO THE FLIGHT DECK, CS TO THE FLIGHT DECK”
The CS or any other cabin attendant must proceed to the cockpit immediately. The cabin attendant must then:
– Tighten and manually lock the shoulder harness of the incapacitated crewmember.
– Push the seat completely aft.
– Recline the seat back.
It takes two people to remove an unconscious body from a seat without endangering any controls or switches. If it is not
possible to remove the crewmember, one cabin attendant must remain in the cockpit to take care of and observe the
incapacitated crewmember. In coordination with the CS:
− Request assistance from any medically qualified passenger.
− Check if a type qualified company pilot is on board to replace the incapacitated crewmember.
STALL RECOVERY
As soon as any indication (could be aural warning, buffet…) is recognized, apply the immediate actions:
– NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL…………………………………………..APPLY
This will reduce angle of attack
Note: In case of lack of pitch down authority, reducing thrust may be necessary.
BANK…………………………………………………………………………WINGS LEVEL When out of stall (no longer stall
indications):
– THRUST………………………………………………………………………INCREASE SMOOTHLY AS NEEDED
Note: In case of one engine inoperative, progressively compensate the thrust asymmetry with rudder.
– SPEEDBRAKES……………………………………………………….………CHECK RETRACTED
FLIGHT PATH…………………………………………………………………RECOVER SMOOTHLY If in clean configuration and
below 20,000 feet:
– FLAP 1…………………………………………………………………………SELECT
Note: If a risk of ground contact exists, once clearly out of stall, establish smoothly a positive climb gradient.
STALL WARNING AT LIFTOFF
Spurious stall warning may sound in NORMAL law, if an angle of attack probe is damaged. In this case, apply immediately
the following actions:
– THRUST…………………………………………………………………………TOGA At the same time:
– PITCH ATTITUDE……………………………………………………………....15°
– BANK……………………………………………………………………………WINGS LEVEL
Note: When a safe flight path and speed are achieved and maintained, if stall warning continues, consider it as spurious.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
38
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
39
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
40
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
6. Check that V2 is above the minimum V2 value due to VMU (Refer to PER-TOF-TOD-25-10 SPEEDS LIMITED BY VMC).
7. Check that the corrected flexible temperature is higher than OAT and Tref.
Note:
− Do not extrapolate below the shortest runway length provided in the table.
− If no minimum speed value is available, use the conservative values provided on Refer to PER-TOF-TOD-25-10 SPEEDS LIMITED BY
VMC
Nicosia FIR – IATA Comm. / Control Procedures
Authority for Air Traffic Control within Nicosia FIR/UIR rests solely with Nicosia ACC. boundary between Ankara- Nicosia FIRs/UIRs, runs
from N3605 E03000 to N3558 E03230 to N3555 E03333 to N3555 E03540.
ATC co-ordination can be poor in this area with several frequencies to monitor at one time.
ERCAN control, pronounced “ERJAN”, a station located in Northern Cyprus, requires position reports at “VESAR” an “NIKAS” even
though these waypoints are in NICOSIA FIR/UIR.
However, NICOSIA ACC is the controlling authority either NIXOSIA FIR/UIR, and any ATC clearances must ONLY be accepted from
Nicosia ACC, including allocation of SSR codes.
Aircraft, which remain tuned on the ERCAN frequency and fail to establish contact with Nicosia at all for part o for the whole journey
with in Nicosia FIR are treated as unknown and constitute potential conflicts with other aircraft.
Pilots should be aware that they are under the sole control of Nicosia Radar and must comply with instructions and clearances issued
by Nicosia Controllers.
Attempts by ERCAN to provide ATC services with the Nicosia FIR endanger safety, and instructions fro ERCAN are NOT to be
accepted under any circumstances whilst in the Nicosia FIR.
ERCAN has been recognized by ICAO, or by any other international organization, and therefore it operates contrary to ICAO
SARPs.
Note: This procedure can be found in Jeppesen Text Manual “Bulletin” Section
When Operating Southbound
− Contact Nicosia ACC 10 minutes prior to the FIR boundary and pass essential flight details (CALLSIGN, FL, ETA AT ENTRY POINT) on
frequency 125.50 for TOMBI and 126.3 MHz for VESAR or DOREN.
− Change to Nicosia ACC at waypoint VESR TOMBI or DOREN.
− Although no formal transfer of control procedures is affected between Ankara and Nicosia ACC, and no changeover
instructions are issued on crossing the FIR boundary, flights should ONLY accept control instructions issued by Nicosia ACC until
handover to the next ATC unit or FIR/UIR.
− Only after insistence to change to another station (i.e. ERCAN control), should a check be made with Nicosia ACC.
− Contact Damascus 10 minutes prior to NIKAS.
When Operating Northbound at “NIKAS”
− Transfer control to Nicosia AAC.
− Contact ERCAN on 126.70, providing essential flight details, ERCAN will relay to Ankara AAC.
Note 1: Control authority remains with Nicosia AAC until “VERSAR”.
Note 2: FL change under instructions from Nicosia AAC must be communicated to ERCAN immediately.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
DISCUSSIONS
TURBULENCE PLANNING AND PROCEDURES (AIRCRAFT, CREW, PAX, ETC)
INTRODUCTION
During a flight it is common for an aircraft to encounter turbulence. Turbulence is the leading cause of injury to passengers and cabin
crew in non-fatal accidents.
Initiatives can be taken to reduce turbulence-related injuries, with little or no financial cost to Qatar Airways.
The aim is to:
− Increase cabin crew awareness of the hazards of turbulence
− Provide strategies to enable the cabin crew to effectively manage the cabin during turbulence
− Help cabin crewmembers to ensure safety in the cabin and prevent turbulence- related injuries.
TURBULENCE MANAGEMENT
Crew Communication and Coordination Two-way communication between the cabin crew and the flight crew is necessary in order
to manage turbulence and prevent turbulence-related injuries. There are Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) that can be
implemented to enable the flight crew and the cabin crew to improve communication and effectively manage the aircraft and the
cabin during turbulence.
For example, use common terminology when communicating the severity of turbulence:
− Light turbulence
− Moderate turbulence
− Severe turbulence.
Using common terminology ensures that the flight crew and the cabin crew share a common understanding of the level of
turbulence expected. This enables the cabin crew to perform the appropriate actions and duties, to effectively manage the cabin
during turbulence.
NOTE: On large aircraft, it is possible that the forward section of the aircraft will experience less turbulence than the aft section of the
aircraft. Therefore, the flight crew may not be aware of the level of turbulence experienced in the aft section of the cabin.
It is important that the cabin crew inform the flight crew of turbulent conditions in the cabin during the flight.
ANTICIPATED TURBULENCE
The flight crew should be briefed on the en-route weather as part of the preparation for the flight. Therefore, the flight crew can be
aware of possible areas of turbulence that are forecast for the flight.
The preflight briefing between the flight crew and the cabin crew should include information about the areas of turbulence
expected during the flight, and the procedures to be applied in the case of turbulence, for example:
− If areas of turbulence are forecast during the flight
− Estimated time until reaching the area of turbulence
− The severity of the expected turbulence (i.e. light, moderate or severe turbulence)
− The actions that the Captain wants the cabin crew to perform when turbulence is expected
− The signal that flight crew will give to the cabin crew to indicate that the aircraft is no longer going through turbulence
(for example, by calling the cabin crew via the cabin interphone, or Passenger Address (PA)).
UNANTICIPATED TURBULENCE
During the flight, the aircraft may encounter areas of turbulence that were not forecast.
For example, Clear Air Turbulence (CAT), which usually occurs at high altitudes, during cruise the aircraft, may suddenly enter an
area of turbulence. Clear Air Turbulence can be forecast but cannot be detected by the aircraft radar, so there is often no warning.
When an aircraft encounters, or is about to encounter, moderate or severe turbulence there may be little or no time for preparation.
If the flight crew turns on the FASTEN SEAT BELT signs and makes an announcement for “all passengers and crew to fasten seat belts
immediately”, the cabin crew should:
− Immediately sit down and secure themselves (if a crew seat is not near or is not available, the cabin crewmember
should use a passenger seat)
NOTE: - If the turbulence occurs during the cabin service, active the brake on the trolleys.
− Instruct passengers via the PA to fasten their seat belts
− Stay seated until advised by the flight crew or until the FASTEN SEAT BELT sign is switched off.
If time permits before the turbulence encounter, the flight crew should advise the cabin crew:
− How much time is available to secure the cabin
− The level and expected duration of the turbulence encounter
− How the flight crew will inform the cabin crew that the aircraft is no longer going through turbulence (for example, by
calling the cabin crew via the cabin interphone, or Passenger Address).
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Start Malfunctions
FADEC
Each power plant has a FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) system. FADEC, also called the Electronic Engine Control (EEC),
is a digital control system that performs complete engine management. FADEC has two-channel redundancy, with one channel
active and one in standby. If one channel fails, the other automatically takes control.
The system has a magnetic alternator for an internal power source. The FADEC system is self-powered above 10 % N2. In case of a
FADEC self-power loss, the aircraft electrical network automatically supplies the FADEC.
FADEC is mounted on the fan case. The Engine Interface Unit (EIU) transmits to FADEC the data it uses for engine management.
FUNCTIONS
The FADEC system performs the following functions:
Control of gas generator
− Control of fuel flow
− Acceleration and deceleration schedules
− Variable bleed valve and variable stator vane schedules
− Control of turbine clearance
− Idle setting
Protection against engine exceeding limits
− Protection against N1 and N2 overspeed
− Monitoring of EGT during engine start
Power management
− Automatic control of engine thrust rating
− Computation of thrust parameter limits
− Manual management of power as a function of thrust lever position
− Automatic management of power (A/THR demand).
Automatic engine starting sequence
− Control of:
– The start valve (ON/OFF)
– The HP fuel valve
– The fuel flow
– The ignition (ON/OFF)
− Monitoring of N1, N2, FF and EGT
− Initiation of abort and recycle (on the ground only)
Manual engine starting sequence
− Passive monitoring of engine
− Control of:
– The start valve
– The HP fuel valve
– The ignition
Thrust reverser control
− Actuation of the blocker doors
− Engine setting during reverser operation
Fuel recirculation control
− Recirculation of fuel to the fuel tanks, depending on the engine oil temperature, the fuel system configuration, and the
flight phase.
Transmission of engine parameters and engine monitoring information to cockpit indicators:
− Primary engine parameters
− Starting system status
− Thrust reverser system status
− FADEC system status
Detection, isolation, and recording of failures
FADEC cooling
Protection against fan flutter
− When on ground at low speed (less than or equal to M 0.1), the Electronic Engine Computer (EEC) protects against fan
flutter. In so doing, the EEC prevents the engine from being stabilized between an approximate range of 60 % to 74 %
N1 (depending on the outside air temperature). Therefore, during engine acceleration on ground, the pilot may notice
a non-linear thrust response to thrust lever movement.
44
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
45
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
46
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
PROCEDURE
Establish initial climb of 15 °
− When reaching the thrust reduction altitude (THR RED ALT):
– SELECT a climb speed.
– SET the thrust levers to CL detent.
– ACTIVATE the autothrust.
– TURN ON the FDs (basic modes engage).
– SELECT the appropriate mode.
Failure of both FDs after the start of takeoff:
− The FD bars disappear.
− The FCU window displays the target speed, which synchronizes on V2, or the current speed (if it is higher).
− The autothrust remains armed.
− At thrust reduction altitude, LVR CLB flashes. If the pilot set the thrust levers to the CLB detent, the autothrust becomes
active in selected SPD mode (no FDs selected). If the current speed is greater than the target speed, the thrust
decreases.
− At acceleration altitude the target speed does not change, since it is selected.
FLEXIBLE TAKEOFF
In many cases the aircraft takes off with a weight lower than the maximum permissible takeoff weight. When this happens, it can
meet the required performance (runway, second segment, obstacle...) with a decreased thrust that is adapted to the weight: this is
called FLEXIBLE TAKEOFF and the thrust is called FLEXIBLE TAKEOFF THRUST. The use of flexible takeoff thrust saves engine life.
The pilot can use flexible takeoff when the actual takeoff weight is lower than the maximum permissible takeoff weight for the actual
temperature. The maximum permissible takeoff weight decreases when temperature increases, so it is possible to assume a
temperature at which the actual takeoff weight would be the limiting one. This temperature is called FLEXIBLE TEMPERATURE or
assumed temperature and is entered in the FADEC via the MCDU PERF TO page in order to get the adapted thrust.
REQUIREMENTS
− Thrust must not be reduced by more than 40% of the full rated takeoff thrust.
− The flexible takeoff EPR cannot be lower than the Max climb EPR at the same flight conditions.
The FADEC takes the above two constraints into account to determine flexible EPR.
The above two constraints also limit the maximum flexible temperature at ISA + 72 / 54 (87°C/69ºC at sea level).
− The flexible temperature cannot be lower than the flat rating temperature, TREF (See Note), or the actual temperature
(OAT).
Note: TREF being a function of the speed and the pressure-altitude, read it on the takeoff chart.
− Flexible takeoff is not permitted on contaminated runways.
− The operator should check the maximum thrust (TOGA) at regular intervals in order to detect any engine deterioration,
or maintain an adequate engine performance monitoring program to follow up the engine parameters.
In order to extend engine life and save maintenance costs, it is recommended to use flexible thrust reduction.
However, to improve the takeoff performance, selecting a lower flexible temperature can increase the thrust.
Using the same takeoff chart, for a given weight it is possible to:
− Select a temperature lower than the maximum determined one and keep the speeds defined at maximum
temperature or,
− Move towards the left side (tailwind) of the takeoff chart while remaining within the same configuration and looking for
the same actual takeoff weight at lower temperature.
This produces a lower flexible temperature and, in general, lowers takeoff speeds (V1/VR/V2).
Using one of the two above possibilities, check that the selected temperature is greater than the actual temperature (OAT)
and greater than the flat rating temperature (TREF).
Depending on environmental takeoff conditions, the following procedure is recommended.
CONDITIONS PROCEDURE REASON
Dry or wet well paved - Use the flap setting giving the highest flexible temperature. Extend engine life and save maintenance
runway costs.
- When flexible temperature difference between two flap
settings is low, use the highest flap setting.
High altitude takeoff Use CONF2/CONF3 Improve comfort
Badly paved runway or Use CONF2/CONF3 or Improve comfort
Accelerate stop distance Move towards left side of the takeoff chart Improve stopping distance
limited Runway
Windshear expected along Use maximum thrust Maintain acceleration capability
takeoff path
Contaminated runway Use maximum thrust (Flex forbidden) Improve stopping distance Decrease time on
runway. Required by regulations.
47
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR
The Auto Pilot and Flight Director assist the flight crew to fly the aircraft within the normal flight envelope, in order to:
− Optimize performance in the takeoff, go-around, climb, or descent phases
− Follow ATC clearances (lateral or vertical)
− Repeatedly fly and land the aircraft with very high accuracy in CAT II and CAT III conditions.
To achieve these objectives:
− The AP takes over routine tasks. This gives the PF the necessary time and resources to assess the overall operational situation.
− The FD provides adequate attitude or flight path orders, and enables the PF to accurately fly the aircraft manually.
Managed And Selected Modes
The choice of mode is a strategic decision that is taken by the PF.
Managed. - To fly along the pre-planed F-PLN entered in the MCDU
Selected. - For specific ATC request, or when there is not sufficient time to modify the MCDU F-PLN Managed modes require:
− Good FMS navigation accuracy (or GPS PRIMARY)
− An appropriate ACTIVE F-PLN (i.e. the intended lateral and vertical trajectory is entered, and the sequencing of the F-PLN is
monitored).
If these two conditions are not fulfilled, revert to selected modes.
Main Interfaces With The AP/FD
MCDU Long-term* interface, to prepare lateral or vertical revisions, or to preset the speed for the next phase
− FCU Sort-term interface, to select the ATC HDG, expedite, speed, etc. (Quickly performed “head-up”)
*The DIR TO function is an exception to this rule
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATION:
With the FMS, anticipate flight plan updates by preparing in the SEC F-PLN:
− EN ROUTE DIVERSIONS
− DIVERSION TO ALTN
− CIRCLING
LATE CHANGE OF RWY This enables the MCDU to be used for short-term actions. Task sharing And Communications The FCU
and MCDU must be used, in accordance with the rules outlined below, in order to ensure:
− Safe operation (correct entries made)
− Effective inter-pilot communication (knowing each other’s intentions)
− Comfortable operations (use “available hands”, as appropriate)
MCDU entries are performed by the PF, during a temporary transfer of command to the PNF. A crosscheck must be performed. Time-
consuming entries should be avoided below 10000 feet, and should be restricted tom those that have an operational benefit. (PERF
APPR, DIR TO, INTERCEPT, RAD NAV, LATE CHANGE OF RWY, ACTIVATE SEC F-PLN, ENABLE ALT)
FCU entries are performed by:
− The PF with the AP on.
− The PNF, upon PF request, with AP off
FCU entries must be announced. The PF must check and announce the corresponding PFD/FMA target and mode. The PNF must
crosscheck and announce: “CHECKED”
AP/FD Monitoring
The FMA indicates the status of the AP, FD, and A/THR, and their corresponding operating modes. The PF must monitor the FMA, and
announce any FMA changes. The flight crew uses the FCU or MCDU to give orders to the AP/FD. The aircraft is expected to fly in
accordance with these orders. The main concern for the flight crew should be:
– WHAT IS THE AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO FLY NOW?
– WHAT IS THE AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO FLY NEXT?
If the aircraft does not fly as expected, and if in managed mode, select the desired target, or, disengage the AP, and fly the aircraft
manually.
Autopilot (AP) Operation
The AP can be engaged within the normal flight envelope, 5 s after liftoff and at least 100 ft. It automatically disengages, when the
aircraft flies significantly outside the normal flight envelope limits. The AP cannot be engaged, when the aircraft is outside the flight
envelope. Flight control laws are designed to assist the flight crew to return within the flight envelope, in accordance with the
selected strategy.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
If the I/D pushbutton is pressed when the thrust levers are in CLB detent, thrust will increase to MAX CLB. This may cause a not desired
thrust change. For example, during approach, A/THR in SPEED mode, commands approximately N1 55 %. If the PF presses the I/D
pushbutton, the A/ THR is set to off, and thrust goes to MAX CLB. This will perturbate the approach.
Therefore, the recommended technique for setting A/THR to off is:
− Return the thrust levers to approximately the current thrust setting, by observing the TLA symbol on the thrust gauge
− Press the I/D pushbutton. This technique minimizes thrust discontinuity, when setting A/THR to off. Thrust levers set to idle
If thrust levers are set to IDLE, A/THR is set to off. This technique is usually used in descent, when the A/THR is in THR IDLE, or at landing.
During flare, with the A/THR active, the thrust levers are set to the CLB detent. Then, when thrust reduction is required for landing, the
thrust levers should be moved rapidly and set to the IDLE stop.
This will retard thrust, and set A/THR to off. As a reminder, the “RETARD” aural alert will sound. In flare, this aural alert will occur at 20 ft.,
except in the case of autoland, where it occurs at 10 ft. It should be noted that, when the thrust levers are set back to IDLE and A/THR
set to off: The A/ THR can be reactivated by pressing the pushbutton on the FCU, and returning the thrust levers to the applicable
detent. The thrust levers should be immediately returned to the applicable detent, in order to avoid an ECAM “AUTO FLT A/THR
LIMITED” message.
Use of the FCU pushbutton is considered to be an involuntary A/THR off command (e.g. in the case of a failure). When pressed, thrust
is frozen and remains locked at the value it had when the flight crew pressed the A/THR pushbutton, as long as the thrust levers
remain in the CLB or MCT detent. If thrust levers are out of detent, thrust is manually controlled and, therefore, unlocked. An ECAM
caution and an FMA message trigger during thrust lock:
− THR LK appears in amber on the FMA
− The ECAM caution is:
– AUTOFLT: A/THR OFF THR LEVERS MOVE
– ENG: THRUST LOCKED THR LEVERS MOVE
In this case, when the flight crew moves the thrust levers out of detent, full manual control is recovered, and the THRUST LOCKED
message disappears from the FMA. This feature should not be used, unless the instinctive disconnect pushbuttons are inoperative.
Alpha Floor
When the aircraft’s angle-of-attack goes beyond the ALPHA FLOOR threshold, this means that the aircraft has decelerated
significantly (below ALPHA PROT speed): A/THR activates automatically and orders TOGA thrust, regardless of the thrust lever position.
The example below illustrates that:
− The aircraft is in descent with the thrust levers manually set to IDLE.
− The aircraft decelerates, during manual flight with the FD off, as indicated on the FMA. Speed scale and FMA indications in a
typical αfloor case
When the speed decreases, so that the angle-of-attack reaches the ALPHA FLOOR threshold, A/ THR activates and orders TOGA
thrust, despite the fact that the thrust levers are at IDLE. When the aircraft accelerates again, the angle-of-attack drops below the
ALPHA FLOOR threshold. TOGA thrust is maintained or locked. This enables the flight crew to reduce thrust, as necessary.
TOGA LK appears on the FMA to indicate that TOGA thrust is locked. The desired thrust can only be recovered by setting A/THR to off,
with the instinctive disconnect pushbutton. ALPHA floor is available, when the flight controls are in NORMAL LAW, from liftoff to 100 ft.
RA at landing. It is inhibited in some cases of engine failure.
A/THR Use - Summary
Use of A/THR is recommended during the entire flight. It may be used in most failures cases, including:
− Engine failure, even during autoland
− Abnormal configurations
A/THR should be monitored via the:
− FMA – SPEED / SPEED TREND on the PFD
− N1/N1 command (EPR) on the ECAM E/WD.
AP, FD, A/THR Mode Changes And Reversions
The flight crew manually engages the modes. However, they may change automatically, depending on the:
− AP, FD, and A/THR system integration
− Logical sequence of modes
− So-called “mode reversions”.
AP, FD, ATHR System Integration
There is a direct relationship between aircraft pitch control, and engine thrust control. This relationship is designed to manage the
aircraft’s energy.
− If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a vertical trajectory (e.g. ALT, V/S, FPA, G/S): A/THR controls speed
− If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a speed (e.g. OP CLB, OP DES): A/THR controls thrust (THR CLB, THR IDLE)
If no AP/FD pitch mode is engaged (i.e. AP is off and FD is off): A/THR controls speed Therefore, any change in the AP/FD pitch
mode is associated with a change in the A/THR mode.
Note: For this reason, the FMA displays the A/THR mode and the AP/FD vertical mode columns next to each other.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
52
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
CREW INCAPACITATION
Crew incapacitation is a real safety hazard that occurs more frequently than many of the other emergencies. Incapacitation can
occur in many forms varying from obvious sudden death to subtle, partial loss of function. Any warning may not precede it.
RECOGNITION
The keys to early recognition of the incapacitation are
− Routine monitoring and cross checking of flight instruments
− Crew members should have a very high index of suspicion of a subtle incapacitation
− If one crew member does not feel well, the other crew must be advised
− Others symptoms e.g. incoherent speech, pale fixed facial expression or irregular breathing could indicate the beginning of an
incapacitation.
ACTION
The recovery from a detected incapacitation of the fit pilot shall follow the sequence below:
First phase
− Assume control, return the aircraft to a safe flight path, announce, “I have control”, use the take-over Pb. and engage the on
side AP as required.
− Declare an emergency to ATC
− Take whatever steps are possible to ensure the incapacitated pilot cannot interfere with the handling of the aircraft. This may
include involving cabin crew to restrain the incapacitated pilot
− Request assistance from any medically qualified passenger
− Check if a type qualified company pilot is on board to replace the incapacitated crew member
− Land as soon as practicable after considering all pertinent factors
− Arrange medical assistance after landing giving many details about the condition of the affected crewmember
Second phase
− Prepare the approach and read the checklist earlier than usual
− Request radar vectoring and prefer a long approach
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
HYDRAULIC
Hydraulic generation particularities
The aircraft has three continuously operating hydraulic systems: green, blue and yellow. A bidirectional Power Transfer Unit (PTU)
enables the yellow system to pressurize the green system and vice versa. Hydraulic fluid cannot be transferred from one system to
another.
PTU principle
In flight, the PTU operates automatically if differential pressure between green and yellow systems exceeds 500 PSI. This allows
covering the loss of one engine or one engine driven pump cases. Use of PTU in case of failure
In case of reservoir low level, reservoir overheat, reservoir low air pressure, the PTU must be switched OFF as required by ECAM to
avoid a PTU overheat which may occur two minutes later. Indeed, a PTU overheat may lead to the loss of the second hydraulic
circuit.
Recommendations
When required by the ECAM, the PTU should switched off without significant delay in case of:
− HYD G (Y) RSVR LO LVL
− HYD G (Y) RSVR LO PR
− HYD G (Y) RSVR OVHT
However, if PTU has been switched off because of HYD G (Y) RSVR OVHT and the alert disappears, affected pump may be restored
and PTU switched back to AUTO.
Dual Hydraulic Failures
Preface
Single hydraulic failures have very little effect on the handling of the aircraft but will cause a degradation of the landing capability to
CAT 3 Single. Dual hydraulic failures however, although unlikely, are significant due to the following consequences:
− Loss of AP
− Flight control law degradation (ALTN)
− Landing in abnormal configuration
− Extensive ECAM procedures with associated workload and task-sharing considerations
− Significant considerations for approach and landing.
General guidelines
It is important to note that the AP will not be available to the crew but both FD and A/THR still remain. Additionally, depending on the
affected hydraulic circuits, aircraft handling characteristics may be different due to the loss of some control surfaces. The PF will
maneuver with care to avoid high hydraulic demand on the remaining systems. The PF will be very busy flying the aircraft and
handling the communications with the flight controls in Alternate Law.
A double hydraulic failure is an emergency situation, with red LAND ASAP displayed, and a MAYDAY should be declared to ATC. A
landing must be carried out as soon as possible bearing in mind, however, that the ECAM actions should be completed prior the
approach. PF will then require the ECAM actions. A clear reading of STATUS is essential to assess the aircraft status and properly
sequence actions during the approach.
This failure is called a “complex procedure” and the QRH summary should be referred to upon completion of the ECAM procedure.
Refer to OP-040 USE OF SUMMARIES. While there is no need to remember the following details, an understanding of the structure of
the hydraulic and flight control systems would be an advantage.
The F/CTL SD page and the OPS DATA section of the QRH provide an overview of the flight controls affected by the loss of hydraulic
systems. The briefing will concentrate on safety issues since this will be a hand-flown approach with certain handling restrictions:
− Use of the selected speeds on the FCU.
− Landing gear gravity extension
− Approach configuration and flap lever position
− Approach speed VAPP
− Tail strike awareness
− Braking and steering considerations
− Go around call out, aircraft configuration and speed
The STATUS page requires, in each case, a landing gear gravity extension. The LANDING GEAR GRAVITY EXTENSION procedure will be
completed with reference to the QRH.
A stabilized approach will be preferred.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Remaining systems
Remaining systems
Flight phase Systems HYD G+B SYS LO PR HYD G+Y SYS LO PR HYD B+Y SYS LO PR
Cruise Auto pilot Inop. Inop. Inop.
Yaw damper YD2 only Inop. YD1 only
Control law ALTN LAW and DI- RECT LAW when L/G ALTN LAW and DI- RECT LAW when NORM LAW
DN L/G DN
Stabilizer Avail Inop. See (1) Avail
Spoilers 2 SPLRS/wing 1 SPLR/wing 2 SPLRS/wing
Elevator R ELEV only Avail L ELEV only
Aileron Inop. Avail Avail
Slats/Flaps FLAPS slow only SLATS slow Only See (2) SLATS/FLAPS slow only
L/G extension Gravity Gravity Gravity
Braking ALTN BRK only Y ACCU PRESS only NORM BRK only
Landing Anti skid Avail Inop. Avail
Nose wheel Inop. Inop. Inop.
steering
Reverse REV 2 only Inop. REV 1 only
Go/around L/G retraction Inop. Inop. Inop.
Systems particularities
The stabilizer is lost. In alternate law, the auto trim function is provided through the elevators. At landing gear extension, switching to
direct law, the auto trim function is lost. However, the mean elevator position at that time is memorized, and becomes the reference
for centered sidestick position. This is why, in order to ensure proper centered sidestick position for approach and landing, the
procedure requires waiting for stabilization at VAPP, before landing gear extension.
If this procedure is missed, the flare and pitch control in case of go-around may be difficult. The PFD message USE MAN PITCH TRIM
after landing gear extension should thus be disregarded.
High pitch during approach should be expected. Approach briefing should outline it for tail strike awareness and pitch attitude will
be monitored during flare.
Major effects on a/c handling and procedures:
Roll control is always affected by loss of spoilers. With one hydraulic system remaining, there is always one part of the high lift devices
lost (whether slats or flaps).
Landing gear has to be extended by gravity (paper c/l) and NWS is systematically lost. In the event of loss of G + B, the speed has to
be increased to 200 kt. during gravity extension to provide a good pitch control until stabilized. The flight controls revert to direct law.
To leave the runway after landing under these circumstances might become a demanding exercise. Thus high-speed turn off may
preferably satisfy the demand rather than 90° turns.
The landing will need most likely a high-speed touch down as the abnormal configuration may require a greater speed increment
(i.e. VREF + 30 kt. - depending on a/c version -refer to QRH chapter 2). Both normal and alternate braking may be lost and the
braking relies on yellow brake accumulator without antiskid.
The approach after landing gear extension may require (ECAM procedure) a voluntary disconnection of the ATHR (G + B) in order to
obtain an easier a/c pitch control during approach and go around.
In the event of loss of G + Y hydraulics, the pitch trim is lost. The procedure thus requires the landing gear extension at VAPP at the
earliest, since the integrator provides a trim with the elevator as long as the landing gear is not extended. If this procedure is missed,
the flare and the pitch control in case of go around may be difficult. The PFD message MANUAL PITCH TRIM USE after landing gear
extension should thus be disregarded.
In the event of loss of G + Y there is high pitch during approach and go around expected (slats may be extended only), causing a
duck under during approach because of PFs eye position in relation to the runway and causing a risk of tail strike upon touch down
(A321). To properly brief the PNF to watch the pitch during approach and touch down becomes thus essential.
Hard pitch inputs on side stick during approach may trigger spurious stall warnings. The PF should thus manage a well-stabilized
approach with the landing gear down early in order to avoid those distractions that may cause an unnecessary go around.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
Procedure sequence
A dual hydraulic malfunction is considered as an Emergency situation (LAND ASAP in red on ECAM memo status) and shall be
declared as such to the ATC units. The general procedure recommended sequence is as follows:
1. PF should be well declared. CM1 may take the opportunity to shift from PNF to PF tasks.
2. ECAM actions including a/c status reading should be done as prescribed in SOPs.
3. QRH tables in chapter 2 (ABNORMAL PROCEDURES) and in chapter 4 (IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE) become the reference next in
order to whether confirm or to calculate, VAPP, FLAPs lever position, actual landing distance etc.
4. FMGS may be prepared next (suitable position prior to land). VAPP should be set as a reminder.
5. The a/c configuration should be established early prior to approach (on down wind or on a suitable place on long final) by
asking for and performing SLATS FLAPS JAMMED C/L till landing configuration has been achieved. The PNF should brief the PF on
go around procedure (minimum) from the same c/l. The procedure should be performed entirely with selected speed.
6. For landing gear gravity extension, the L/G GRAVITY EXTENSION paper c/l should be asked for and should be performed while
doing the actions. It is strongly recommended to have the gear down and be stabilized prior to starting the final descent.
7. The approach briefing should concentrate on safety issues and should be given early, probably after FMGS preparation or in
any other suitable moment of the sequence. It should mention all the special items above concerning the situation amongst the
normal approach briefing.
NOTE: For PF’s awareness, the S/F jammed c/l and the L/G gravity extension c/l additional information (NOTES written in small font)
may be read after ECAM has been completed and thus may be skipped whilst configuring the a/c or whereas extending the landing
gear by gravity.
EMERGENCY DESCENT
The emergency descent should only be initiated upon positive confirmation that cabin altitude and rate of climb is excessive and
uncontrollable. The fly crew should carry out the immediate actions of this procedure by memory. The use of AP and auto thrust is
strongly recommended for an emergency descent. The FCU selections for an emergency descent progress from right to left, i.e. ALT,
HDG, SPD.
At high flight levels, the speed brake should be extended slowly while monitoring VLS to avoid the activation of angle of attack
protection This would cause the speed brakes to retract and may also result in AP disconnection. If structural damage is suspected,
caution must be used when using speed brakes to avoid further airframe stress. When the aircraft is established in the descent, the PF
should request the ECAM actions if any or QRH.
The passenger oxygen MASK MAN ON pb should be pressed only when it is clear that cabin altitude will exceed 14 000 ft. When in
idle thrust, high speed and speed brake extended, the rate of descent is approximately 7000 ft./min. To descend from FL 390 to FL
100, it takes approximately 4 min and 40 nm. The crew will be aware that MORA displayed on ND (if available) is the highest MORA
within an 80 nm circle round the aircraft. After taking off the emergency mask following an emergency descent, the crew should
close the mask box and reset the control slide in order to deactivate the mask microphone.
56
AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
DECOMPRESSION
Introduction
The drifts down procedures are applicable to aircraft equipped with minimum oxygen supply of:
− 13 minutes: Applicable to ALL fleet, and
− 22 minutes: Applicable for A330, A340 and B777 aircraft.
Gaseous System: Applicable to A300F and B777F only.
Note: For Bombardier fleet, decompression routes designed for A330 with 22 min of oxygen are applicable, provided the below
conditions are met:
− CL605; min oxygen cylinder pressure: 1,335 psi;
− BD700; min oxygen 90% on EICAS.
If these conditions are not met, decompression routes defined with 13 min oxygen shall apply. Assumptions. The following assumptions
apply:
− All obstacles located 10NM of either side of the route centerline have been considered, based on Lido, Jeppesen and SRTM
(Shuttle Radar Topography Mission) surveys.
− All obstacles are cleared by at least 2000ft at ISA condition.
− Flight after depressurization is performed at MMO/VMO.
− By default No Wind effect (Except otherwise specified).
− In case of in-flight turn back, 2.5 minutes are lost for the turn. The altitude lost due to bank angle is considered.
− Maximum descend time from Ceiling Flight Level to FL180 at MMO/VMO is 5 minutes.
− Maximum descend time from FL180 to FL140 at VMO is 0.5 minutes.
− Maximum descend time from FL140 to FL100 at VMO is 0.5 minutes.
CAUTION: Accuracy High is imperative to stay within the specified route corridor in case of decompression.
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
10. As the PNRs are based on the most critical scenario in terms of obstacle clearance, the time is a maximum for Passenger O2
requirements and a minimum for terrain clearance requirements. Therefore, if the depressurization occurs far after/before the
PNR then these times may not be strictly applicable for terrain clearance.
QR OM-A USEFULL REF
1.4 Commander – Authority, Duties And Responsibilities
7.3.8 Standard Reporting Time and Maximum FDP
7.4.4 Aircraft Commander’s Discretion to Extend a Flying Duty Period
8.1.1.1.1 Minimum Altitudes Definitions
8.1.2.1 Adequate Aerodrome
8.1.2.2.4 Destination Alternate
8.3.1.4 Climb and Descent Speed Limit
8.1.3.3 Take-off Operating Minima
8.1.3.5.1.2 RNP AR Operation
8.1.3.9 Visual Maneuvering (Circling / Visual Approach)
8.1.3.13 Effect of Failed or Downgraded Ground Equipment
8.1.7.1 Fuel Planning
8.1.7.4.2 Fuel Transportation - Tankering
8.1.11 Qatar Airways Aircraft Technical Log
8.1.8.2 Weight and Balance Sheet
8.1.8.3 Last Minute Changes Procedure
8.1.3.12 CMV
8.1.10 Operational Flight Plan
8.1.10.4 Signing of OFP
8.1.11.2 Cabin Discrepancy Log
8.1.11.2.4 Cabin Defects to be Transferred to Aircraft Technical Log
8.1.12 Documents, Forms and Additional Information to be Carried
8.2.1 Fuelling Procedures
8.2.2.1 Passenger Embarkation / Disembarkation
8.2.2.4 Sick Passengers
8.2.2.4 Transportation of Expectant Mother
8.2.2.4 Wheel Chair Passengers
8.2.1.5 Refueling and Defueling when Passengers on-board or Embarking / Disembarking
8.2.2.6.1 MEDAIR
8.2.2.6.1 Illness
8.2.2.6.2 Birth or Death On-board
8.2.2.7.2 Deportees
8.2.2.13.1 Operation of Cabin Doors
8.2.2.13.2 Operation of Compartment Doors
8.2.2.15 Minimum Ground Times
8.2.2.18 Oxygen filled or exchanged
8.3.1.3.1 Transfer of Controls
8.3.1.3.2 Runway Incursions
8.3.1.4 Climb and Descent Speed Limit
8.3.1.5 Noise Abatement Procedures
8.3.1.7.2 Minimum Height for Turns
8.3.1.8.3 Rate of Descent Limit
8.3.1.9.4 Stabilized Approach
8.3.1.9.5 Commencement and Continuation of an Approach
8.3.1.9.6 Landing Criteria
8.3.1.10.2 Engine Failure
8.3.1.10.5 Overweight Landing
8.3.1.10.6 Hard Landings
8.3.1.10.8 Fly-By Confirmation
8.3.2.9 Required Navigation Performance - RNP
8.3.3.5 Metric Altimetry. Procedures when clearance is in meters. Metric Altitude Conversions
8.3.3.11 Temperature Correction
8.3.4 Altitude Alerting System Procedures
8.3.5 Ground Proximity Warning System Procedures
8.3.5 Ground Proximity Warning System Procedures
8.3.6 Use of TCAS / ACAS
8.3.7.1 Fuel Quantity Check
8.3.7.1.2 In-flight Fuel Checks. On a Flight to an Isolated Aerodrome
8.3.7.1.4 Required Minimum Remaining Fuel Cancellation of Destination Alternate in cruise
8.3.7.1.5 Low Fuel State
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AIRBUS A320 STUDY NOTES
8.3.8.12 Operational Runway Conditions. Wet Runway. Contaminated Runway. Braking Action
8.3.9 Wake Turbulence
8.3.10.1.1 Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck during Flight
8.3.12 Admission to the Flight Deck
8.3.14 Incapacitation of Crew Members
8.3.15.5.1 First-aid Kits
8.3.15.2 Smoking On-board
8.3.16.8 Public Address (PA) Announcements
8.4 ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS
8.5 ETOPS
8.7 NON COMMERCIAL-FLIGHTS
8.7.2 Test Flights
8.7.3 Delivery Flights
8.8 OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
11.6 AIR SAFETY REPORTING
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