Mil STD 464a

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NOT MEASUREMENT
SENSITIVE
MIL-STD-464A
19 December 2002
________________
SUPERSEDING
MIL-STD-464
18 March 1997
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INTERFACE STANDARD
ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEMS
AMSC F7489 AREA EMCS
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MIL-STD-464A
FOREWORD
1. This Military Standard is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the
Department of Defense.
2. This standard contains two sections, the main body and an appendix. The main body of the
standard specifies a baseline set of requirements. The appendix portion provides rationale,
guidance, and lessons learned for each requirement to enable the procuring activity to tailor the
baseline requirements for a particular application. The appendix also permits Government and
Industry personnel to understand the purpose of the requirements and potential verification
methodology for a design. The appendix is not a mandatory part of this document.
3. A joint committee consisting of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, other DoD
Agencies, and Industry participated in the preparation of the basic version of this standard.
4. Comments, suggestions, or questions on this document should be addressed to

USAF/Aeronautical Systems Center, ASC/ENOI, 2530 Loop Road West, Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH 45433-7101 or email to Engineering.Standards@wpafb.af.mil. Since contact information
can change, you may want to verify the currency of this address information using the ASSIST
Online database at http://www.dodssp.daps.mil/.
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MIL-STD-464A
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
FOREWORD ............................................................................................. ii
1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Purpose ......................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Application ................................................................................................... 1
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ................................................................ 1
2.1 General ........................................................................................................ 1
2.2 Government documents .............................................................................. 1
2.2.1 Specifications, standards, and handbooks ................................................... 1
2.2.2 Other Government documents, drawings, and publications ....................... 1
2.3 Non-Government publications .................................................................... 2
2.4 Order of precedence .................................................................................... 2
3. DEFINITIONS .......................................................................................... 3
3.1 Above deck ................................................................................................. 3
3.2 Below deck .................................................................................................. 3
3.3 Compromising emanations .......................................................................... 3
3.4 Electrically initiated device (EID) ............................................................... 3
3.5 Electromagnetic environmental effects ....................................................... 3
3.6 Launch vehicle ............................................................................................. 3
3.7 Lightning direct effects ................................................................................ 3
3.8 Lightning indirect effects ............................................................................. 3
3.9 Margins ........................................................................................................ 3
3.10 Maximum no-fire stimulus .......................................................................... 3
3.11 Mission critical ........................................................................................... 4
3.12 Multipaction ................................................................................................. 4
3.13 Non-developmental item .............................................................................. 4
3.14 Ordnance ...................................................................................................... 4
3.15 Safety critical ............................................................................................... 4
3.16 Space vehicle ............................................................................................... 4
3.17 System operational performance requirements ............................................ 4
3.18 TEMPEST .................................................................................................... 4
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................... 5
4.1 General ........................................................................................................ 5
5. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS .............................................................. 5
5.1 Margins ....................................................................................................... 5
5.2 Intra-system electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) ................................... 5
5.2.1 Hull generated intermodulation interference (IMI) .................................... 5
5.2.2 Shipboard internal electromagnetic environment (EME) ........................... 5
5.2.3 Multipaction ................................................................................................ 6
5.3 External RF EME ........................................................................................ 6
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MIL-STD-464A
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
5.4 Lightning ..................................................................................................... 9

5.5 Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ..................................................................... 9
5.6 Subsystems and equipment electromagnetic interference (EMI) ............... 9
5.6.1 Non-developmental items (NDI) and commercial items ............................ 11
5.6.2 Shipboard DC magnetic field environment ................................................ 11
5.7 Electrostatic charge control ........................................................................ 11
5.7.1 Vertical lift and in-flight refueling .............................................................. 11
5.7.2 Precipitation static (p-static) ....................................................................... 11
5.7.3 Ordnance subsystems .................................................................................. 11
5.8 Electromagnetic radiation hazards (EMRADHAZ) ................................... 11
5.8.1 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel (HERP) ....................... 11
5.8.2 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel (HERF) ................................ 12
5.8.3 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) ....................... 12
5.9 Life cycle, E3 hardness ............................................................................... 13
5.10 Electrical bonding ....................................................................................... 13
5.10.1 Power current return path ........................................................................... 13
5.10.2 Antennas installations ................................................................................. 13
5.10.3 Mechanical interfaces ................................................................................. 13
5.10.4 Shock, fault, and ignitable vapor protection ............................................... 14
5.11 External grounds ......................................................................................... 14
5.11.1 Aircraft grounding jacks ............................................................................. 14
5.11.2 Servicing and maintenance equipment grounds ......................................... 14
5.12 TEMPEST ................................................................................................... 14
5.13 Emission control (EMCON) ....................................................................... 15
5.14 EM spectrum compatibility ........................................................................... 15
6. NOTES ....................................................................................................... 15
6.1 Intended use ................................................................................................ 15
6.2 Associated Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) ................................................ 15
6.3 Tailoring guidance for contractual application.............................................. 16
6.4 Subject term (key word) listing .................................................................. 16
6.5 International interest ...................................................................................... 16
6.6 Acronyms used in this standard ..................................................................... 16
6.7 Technical points of contact ......................................................................... 17
TABLES
1A External EME for deck operations on ships ............................................... 6
1B External EME for shipboard operations in the mean beam of transmitters... 7
1C External EME for space and launch vehicle systems ................................. 7
1D External EME for ground systems .............................................................. 7
1E External EME for Army rotary wing aircraft ............................................... 8
1F External EME for fixed wing aircraft, excluding shipboard operations ...... 8
2A Lightning indirect effects waveform parameters ........................................ 9
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MIL-STD-464A
CONTENTS
Page
TABLES
2B Electromagnetic fields from near strike lightning (cloud-to-ground) ......... 9
3A External EME for HERO ............................................................................. 12
3B Ordnance phases and associated environments ........................................... 13
4 EMCON Bandwidths ................................................................................... 15
FIGURES
1 Lightning direct effects environment .......................................................... 10
2 Lightning indirect effects environment ....................................................... 10
APPENDIX
A MIL-STD-464A Application Guide ........................................................... 19
CONCLUDING MATERIAL .............................................................................. 114
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MIL-STD-464A
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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MIL-STD-464A
1. SCOPE
1.1 Purpose. This standard establishes electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) interface
requirements and verification criteria for airborne, sea, space, and ground systems, including
associated ordnance.
1.2 Application. This standard is applicable for complete systems, both new and modified.
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
2.1 General. The documents listed in this section are referenced in sections 3, 4, and 5 of the
main body of this standard. This section does not include documents referenced in other sections
of this standard or recommended for additional information or examples. While every effort has
been made to ensure completeness of this list, document users are cautioned that they must meet
all specified requirements of documents cited in sections 3, 4, and 5 of this standard, whether or
not they are listed.
2.2 Government documents
2.2.1 Specifications, standards, and handbooks. The following specifications, standards, and
handbooks form a part of this document to the extent specified herein. Unless otherwise
specified, the issues of these documents are those cited in the solicitation or contract.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARDS
MIL-STD-331 Fuze and Fuze Components, Environmental and

Performance Tests for
MIL-STD-461 Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic
Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and
Equipment
MIL-STD-1399-070 Interface Standard for Shipboard Systems, D.C.
Magnetic Field Environment
MIL-STD-2169 (Classified) High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Environment
(Copies of these documents are available from the Standardization Documents Order Desk,
700 Robbins Avenue, Building 4D, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094 or
http://assist2.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/ or http://www.dodssp.daps.mil/. Application for copies
of MIL-STD-2169 should be addressed with a need-to-know to: HQ DTRA, ATTN:
TD/TDANE, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 22310-3398.
2.2.2 Other Government documents, drawings, and publications. The following other
Government documents, drawings, and publications form a part of this document to the extent
specified herein. Unless otherwise specified, the issues are those cited in the solicitation or
contract.
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MIL-STD-464A
PUBLICATIONS
CNSS Advisory Memorandum, NONSTOP Evaluation Standard

TEMPEST 01-02
DoDD 4650.1 Management and Use of the Radio Frequency Spectrum
DoDI 6055.11 Protection of DoD Personnel from Exposure to Radio
Frequency Radiation and Military Exempt Lasers
NSTISSAM Compromising Emanations Laboratory Test

TEMPEST/1-92 Requirements, Electromagnetics
NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio
Frequency Management
(Copies of the NTIA Manual are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office,
Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. Copies of the
DoD documents are available from the Standardization Documents Order Desk, 700 Robbins
Avenue, Building 4D, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094 http://assist2.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/ or
http://www.dodssp.daps.mil/. Copies of NACSEM and NSTISSAM documents are available
only through the procuring activity.)
2.3 Non-Government publications. The following documents form a part of this document to
the extent specified herein. Unless otherwise specified, the issues of documents are those
specified in the solicitation or contract.
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE
ANSI/IEEE C63.14 Standard Dictionary for Technologies of Electromagnetic

Compatibility (EMC), Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), and
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
(Copies are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Service
Center, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331 or http://www.ieee.org/.)
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO)
ISO 46 Aircraft - Fuel Nozzle Grounding Plugs and Sockets
(Copies of this document are available from the International Organization for
Standardization, 3 rue de Varembe, 1211 Geneve 20, Geneve, Switzerland or
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/ISOOnline.openerpage.)
2.4 Order of precedence. In the event of a conflict between the text of this document and the
references cited herein, the text of this document takes precedence. Nothing in this document,
however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been
obtained.
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MIL-STD-464A
3. DEFINITIONS
The terms used in this standard are defined in ANSI Standard C63.14. In addition, the following
definitions are applicable for the purpose of this standard.
3.1 Above deck. An area on ships, which is directly exposed to the external electromagnetic
environment, and is not considered to be below deck as defined herein.
3.2 Below deck. An area on ships which is surrounded by a metallic structure or an area which
provides an equivalent attenuation to electromagnetic radiation, such as the metal hull or
superstructure of a surface ship, the hull of a submarine and the screened rooms in non-metallic
ships.
3.3 Compromising emanations. Unintentional intelligence-bearing signals which, if

intercepted and analyzed, disclose the national security information transmitted, received,
handled, or otherwise processed by any classified information processing system.
3.4 Electrically initiated device (EID). An EID is a single unit, device, or subassembly that
uses electrical energy to produce an explosive, pyrotechnic, thermal, or mechanical output.
Examples include: electroexplosive devices (such as hot bridgewire, semiconductor bridge,
carbon bridge, and conductive composition), exploding foil initiators, laser initiators, burn wires,
and fusible links.
3.5 Electromagnetic environmental effects. The impact of the electromagnetic environment

upon the operational capability of military forces, equipment, systems, and platforms. It
encompasses all electromagnetic disciplines, including electromagnetic compatibility;
electromagnetic interference; electromagnetic vulnerability; electromagnetic pulse; hazards of
electromagnetic radiation to personnel, ordnance, and volatile materials; and natural phenomena
effects of lightning and p-static.
3.6 Launch vehicle. A composite of the initial stages, injection stages, space vehicle adapter,
and fairing having the capability of launching and injecting a space vehicle or vehicles into orbit.
3.7 Lightning direct effects. Any physical damage to the system structure and electrical or
electronic equipment due to the direct attachment of the lightning channel and current flow.
These effects include puncture, tearing, bending, burning, vaporization, or blasting of hardware.
3.8 Lightning indirect effects. Electrical transients induced by lightning due to coupling of
electromagnetic fields.
3.9 Margins. The difference between the subsystem and equipment electromagnetic strength
level, and the subsystem and equipment stress level caused by electromagnetic coupling at the
system level. Margins are normally expressed as a ratio in decibels (dB).
3.10 Maximum no-fire stimulus. The greatest firing stimulus which does not cause initiation
within five minutes of more than 0.1% of all electric initiators of a given design at a confidence
level of 95%. When determining maximum no-fire stimulus for electric initiators with a delay
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MIL-STD-464A
element or with a response time of more than five minutes, the firing stimulus is applied for the
time normally required for actuation.
3.11 Mission critical. Unless otherwise defined in the procurement specification, a term
applied to a condition, event, operation, process, or item which if performed improperly, may:
1) prohibit execution of a mission, 2) significantly reduce the operational capability, or 3)
significantly increase system vulnerability.
3.12 Multipaction. Multipaction is a radio frequency (RF) resonance effect that occurs only in
a high vacuum where RF field accelerates free electrons resulting in collisions with surfaces
creating secondary electrons that are accelerated resulting in more electrons and ultimately a
major discharge and possible equipment damage.
3.13 Non-developmental item. Non-developmental item is a broad, generic term that covers
material, both hardware and software, available from a wide variety of sources with little or no
development effort required by the Government.
3.14 Ordnance. Explosives, chemicals, pyrotechnics, and similar stores (such as bombs, guns,
and ammunitions, flares, smoke and napalm) carried on an airborne, sea, space, or ground
system.
3.15 Safety critical. Unless otherwise defined in the procurement specification, a term applied
to a condition, event, operation, process, or item whose proper recognition, control, performance
or tolerance is essential to safe system operation or use; for example, safety critical function,
safety critical path, or safety critical component.
3.16 Space vehicle. A complete, integrated set of subsystems and components capable of
supporting an operational role in space. A space vehicle may be an orbiting vehicle, a major
portion of an orbiting vehicle, or a payload of an orbiting vehicle which performs its mission
while attached to a recoverable launch vehicle. The airborne support equipment, which is
peculiar to programs utilizing a recoverable launch vehicle, is considered a part of the space
vehicle being carried by the launch vehicle.
3.17 System operational performance. A set of minimal acceptable parameters tailored to the
platform and reflecting top level capabilities such as range, probability of kill, probability of
survival, operational availability, and so forth. A primary aspect of acquisition related to this
definition are key performance parameters (KPPs), which are used in acquisition to specify
system characteristics that are considered most essential for successful mission accomplishment
and that are tracked during development to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. For the
purposes of this document, the set of parameters under consideration would normally extend
beyond this limited set of parameters to address other details of system performance that may be
less critical but still have a substantial impact on system effectiveness.
3.18 TEMPEST. An unclassified, short name referring to the investigation and study of
compromising emanations.
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MIL-STD-464A
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1 General. The system shall be electromagnetically compatible among all subsystems and
equipment within the system and with environments caused by electromagnetic effects external
to the system. Verification shall be accomplished as specified herein on production
representative systems. Safety critical functions shall be verified to be electromagnetically
compatible within the system and with external environments prior to use in those environments.
Verification shall address all life cycle aspects of the system, including (as applicable) normal
in-service operation, checkout, storage, transportation, handling, packaging, loading, unloading,
launch, and the normal operating procedures associated with each aspect.
5. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS
5.1 Margins. Margins shall be provided based on system operational performance

requirements, tolerances in system hardware, and uncertainties involved in verification of
system-level design requirements. Safety critical and mission critical system functions shall
have a margin of at least 6 dB. EIDs shall have a margin of at least 16.5 dB of maximum no-fire
stimulus (MNFS) for safety assurances and 6 dB of MNFS for other applications. Compliance
shall be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof. Instrumentation installed in system
components during testing for margins shall capture the maximum system response and shall not
adversely affect the normal response characteristics of the component. When environment
simulations below specified levels are used, instrumentation responses may be extrapolated to
the full environment for components with linear responses (such as hot bridgewire EIDs). When
the response is below instrumentation sensitivity, the instrumentation sensitivity shall be used as
the basis for extrapolation. For components with non-linear responses (such as semiconductor
bridge EIDs), no extrapolation is permitted.
5.2 Intra-system electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). The system shall be

electromagnetically compatible within itself such that system operational performance
requirements are met. Compliance shall be verified by system-level test, analysis, or a
combination thereof.
5.2.1 Hull generated intermodulation interference (IMI). For surface ship applications, the
intra-system EMC requirement is considered to be met for hull generated IMI when the 19th
product order and higher of IMI generated by High Frequency (HF) transmitters installed
onboard ship are not detectable by antenna-connected receivers onboard ship. Compliance shall
be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof, through measurement of received levels at
system antennas and evaluation of the potential of these levels to degrade receivers.
5.2.2 Shipboard internal electromagnetic environment (EME). For ship applications,

electric fields (peak V/m-rms) below deck from intentional onboard transmitters shall not exceed
the following levels:
a. Surface ships.
(1). Metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to 18 GHz.
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MIL-STD-464A
(2). Non-metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to 2 MHz, 50 V/m

from 2 MHz to 1 GHz, and 10 V/m from 1 GHz to 18 GHz.
b. Submarines. 5 V/m from 10 kHz to 1 GHz.
Compliance shall be verified by test of electric fields generated below deck with all antennas
(above and below decks) radiating.
5.2.3 Multipaction. For space applications, equipment and subsystems shall be free of
multipaction effects. Compliance shall be verified by test and analysis.
5.3 External RF EME. The system shall be electromagnetically compatible with its defined
external RF EME such that its system operational performance requirements are met. For
systems (including fixed and rotary wing aircraft) employed in shipboard applications, Table 1A
shall be used for operations on the deck, and Table 1B shall be used for operations that can occur
in the mainbeam of the transmitters. For space and launch vehicle systems applications, Table
1C shall be used. For ground systems, Table 1D shall be used.
TABLE 1A. External EME for deck operations on ships
Frequency Range Flight Deck Weather Deck

(MHz) Electric Field (V/m – rms) Electric Field (V/m – rms)
Peak Average Peak Average
0.01 - 2 45 45 - -
2 - 30 100 100 200 200
30 - 150 61 61 61 61
150 - 225 61 61 61 61
225 - 400 61 61 61 61
400 - 700 151 71 151 71
700 - 790 162 95 162 95
790 - 1000 1125 99 1125 99
1000 - 2000 550 112 550 180
2000 - 2700 184 158 184 158
2700 - 3600 2030 184 2030 184
3600 - 4000 290 200 290 200
4000 - 5400 290 200 290 200
5400 - 5900 345 200 345 200
5900 - 6000 345 200 345 200
6000 - 7900 345 200 345 200
7900 - 8000 345 200 345 200
8000 - 8400 345 200 345 200
8400 - 8500 483 200 483 200
8500 - 11000 510 200 510 200
11000 - 14000 310 200 310 200
14000 - 18000 310 200 310 200
18000 - 40000 200 200 200 200
40000 - 45000 200 200 200 200
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MIL-STD-464A
TABLE 1B. External EME for shipboard operations in the main beam of transmitters
Frequency Range Electric Field

(MHz) (V/m - rms)
Peak Average
0.01 - 2 - -
2 - 30 200 200
30 - 150 20 20
150 - 225 10 10
225 - 400 25 25
400 - 700 1940 260
700 - 790 15 15
790 - 1000 2160 410
1000 - 2000 2600 460
2000 - 2700 6 6
2700 - 3600 27460 2620
3600 - 4000 9710 310
4000 - 5400 160 160
5400 - 5900 3500 160
5900 - 6000 310 310
6000 - 7900 390 390
7900 - 8000 860 860
8000 - 8400 860 860
8400 - 8500 390 390
8500 - 11000 13380 1760
11000 - 14000 2800 390
14000 - 18000 2800 310
18000 - 40000 7060 140
40000 - 45000 570 570
TABLE 1C. External EME for space and launch vehicle systems
(MHz) (V/m - rms)
Peak Average
0.01 - 100 20 20
100 - 1000 100 100
1000 - 10000 200 200
10000 - 40000 20 20
40000 - 45000 - -
TABLE 1D. External EME for ground systems

(MHz) (V/m - rms)
Peak Average
0.01 - 2 25 25
2 - 250 50 50
250 - 1000 1500 50
1000 - 10000 2500 50
10000 - 40000 1500 50
40000 - 45000 - -
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MIL-STD-464A
For Army rotary wing aircraft, Table 1E shall be used. For fixed wing aircraft applications,
where shipboard operations are excluded, Table 1F shall be used.
TABLE 1E. External EME for Army rotary wing aircraft

(MHz) (V/m - rms)
Peak Average
0.01 - 150 264 264
150 - 249 3120 3120
249 - 500 2830 260
500 - 700 1940 260
700 - 790 1550 240
790 - 1000 3480 460
1000 - 2000 8420 588
2000 - 2700 21270 490
2700 - 3600 27460 2620
3600 - 4000 21270 490
4000 - 6000 21270 400
6000 - 7900 3750 390
7900 - 8000 2500 860
8000 - 8400 8000 860
8400 - 8500 8000 390
8500 - 11000 13380 1760
11000 - 14000 2800 390
14000 - 18000 2800 350
18000 - 40000 7060 420
40000 - 45000 570 570
TABLE 1F. External EME for fixed wing aircraft, excluding shipboard operations

(MHz) (V/m - rms)
Peak Average
0.01 - 0.1 50 50
0.1 - 0.5 60 60
0.05 - 2 70 70
2 - 30 200 200
30 - 100 30 30
100 - 200 90 30
200 - 400 70 70
400 - 700 730 80
700 - 1000 1400 240
1000 - 2000 3300 160
2000 - 4000 4500 490
4000 - 6000 7200 300
6000 - 8000 1100 170
8000 - 12000 2600 1050
12000 - 18000 2000 330
18000 - 40000 1000 420
40000 - 45000 - -
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MIL-STD-464A
Systems exposed to more than one of the defined EMEs shall use the worst case composite of the
applicable EMEs. External RF EME covers compatibility with, but is not limited to, EME’s
from like platforms (such as aircraft in formation flying, ship with escort ships, and shelter-to-
shelter in ground systems), friendly emitters and hostile emitters. Compliance shall be verified
by system, subsystem, and equipment level tests; analysis; or a combination thereof.
5.4 Lightning. The system shall meet its operational performance requirements for both direct
and indirect effects of lightning. Ordnance shall meet its operational performance requirements
after experiencing a near strike in an exposed condition and a direct strike in a stored condition.
Ordnance shall remain safe during and after experiencing a direct strike in an exposed condition.
Figure 1 provides aspects of the lightning environment that are relevant for protection against
direct effects. Figure 2 and Table 2A provide aspects of the lightning environment associated
with a direct strike that are relevant for protecting the platform from indirect effects. Table 2B
shall be used for the near lightning strike environment. Compliance shall be verified by system,
subsystem, equipment, and component (such as structural coupons and radomes) level tests,
analysis, or a combination thereof.
TABLE 2A. Lightning indirect effects waveform parameters
Current Description -αt -βt

i(t) = Io (ε - ε ) t is time in seconds (s)
Component
Io (Amperes) -1 -1
α (s ) β (s )
A Severe stroke 218,810 11,354 647,265
B Intermediate current 11,300 700 2,000
C Continuing current 400 for 0.5 s Not applicable Not applicable
D Restrike 109,405 22,708 1,294,530
D/2 Multiple stroke 54,703 22,708 1,294,530
H Multiple burst 10,572 187,191 19,105,100
TABLE 2B. Electromagnetic fields from near strike lightning (cloud-to-ground)
Magnetic field rate of change @ 10 meters 2.2x109 A/m/s

Electric field rate of change @ 10 meters 6.8x1011 V/m/s
5.5 Electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The system shall meet its operational performance
requirements after being subjected to the EMP environment. This environment is classified and
is currently defined in MIL-STD-2169. This requirement is not applicable unless otherwise
specified by the procuring activity. Compliance shall be verified by system, subsystem, and
equipment level tests, analysis, or a combination thereof.
5.6 Subsystems and equipment electromagnetic interference (EMI). Individual subsystems

and equipment shall meet interference control requirements (such as the conducted emissions,
radiated emissions, conducted susceptibility, and radiated susceptibility requirements of MIL-
STD-461) so that the overall system complies with all applicable requirements of this standard.
Compliance shall be verified by tests that are consistent with the individual requirement (such as
testing in accordance with MIL-STD-461).
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MIL-STD-464A
COMPONENT A (Initial Stroke)
Peak Amplitude = 200 kA + 10% COMPONENT D (Restrike)
Action Integral = 2 x10 6 A 2 s + 20% Peak Amplitude = 100 kA + 10%
Action Integral = 0.25 x 10 6 A 2 s + 20%
COMPONENT B (Intermediate Current)
Maximum Charge Transfer = 10 Coulombs
CURRENT (NOT TO SCALE)

Average Amplitude = 2 kA + 10 %
COMPONENT C (Continuing Current)

Charge Transfer = 200 Coulombs + 20%
Amplitude = 200 - 800 A
A B C D
< 500 µ s < 5 x 10 -3 s
_ _ T <_ 1 s
0.25 s < < 500 µ s
TIME (NOT TO SCALE)
ELECTRICAL CURRENT WAVEFORMS
Average dV/dt =
VOLTAGE (NOT TO SCALE)

VOLTAGE (NOT TO SCALE)
1,000 kV/µ s + 50 %
Voltage not limited
Flashover
by flashover or puncture
occurs to
limit voltage
50 % of Crest
Amplitude
1.2 µ s + 20 % 50 µ s + 20 %
TIME (NOT TO SCALE)
TIME (NOT TO SCALE)
ELECTRICAL VOLTAGE WAVEFORMS
FIGURE 1. Lightning direct effects environment
i
One component D followed by 13 component D/2s
100 kA distributed up to a period of 1.5 seconds
10 ms < t < 200 ms
50 kA D/2 D/2 D/2 D/2

D
t
1 2 3 13 14
Multiple Stroke Flash
i 50 uS < t < 1000 uS i 30 ms < t < 300 ms
10 kA 10 kA
H H H H
1 2 3 20 t 20 Pulses t
One burst is composed of 20 pulses
Multiple Burst Waveform
FIGURE 2. Lightning indirect effects environment
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MIL-STD-464A
5.6.1 Non-developmental items (NDI) and commercial items. NDI and commercial items
shall meet EMI interface control requirements suitable for ensuring that system operational
performance requirements are met. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, or a
5.6.2. Shipboard DC magnetic field environment. Subsystems and equipment used aboard
ships shall not be degraded when exposed to its operational DC magnetic environment (such as
MIL-STD-1399, Section 070). Compliance shall be verified by test.
5.7 Electrostatic charge control. The system shall control and dissipate the build-up of
electrostatic charges caused by precipitation static (p-static) effects, fluid flow, air flow, exhaust
gas flow, personnel charging, charging of launch vehicles (including pre-launch conditions) and
space vehicles (post deployment), and other charge generating mechanisms to avoid fuel ignition
and ordnance hazards, to protect personnel from shock hazards, and to prevent performance
degradation or damage to electronics. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, inspections,
or a combination thereof.
5.7.1 Vertical lift and in-flight refueling. The system shall meet its operational performance
requirements when subjected to a 300 kilovolt discharge. This requirement is applicable to
vertical lift aircraft, in-flight refueling of any aircraft, and systems operated or transported
externally by vertical lift aircraft. Compliance shall be verified by test (such as MIL-STD-331
for ordnance), analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof. The test configuration shall
include electrostatic discharge in the vertical lift mode and in-flight refueling mode from a
simulated aircraft capacitance of 1000 picofarads, through a maximum of one ohm resistance.
5.7.2 Precipitation static (p-static). The system shall control p-static interference to antenna-
connected receivers onboard the system or on the host platform such that system operational
performance requirements are met. The system shall protect against puncture of structural
materials and finishes and shock hazards from charge accumulation. Compliance shall be
verified by test, analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof.
5.7.3 Ordnance subsystems. Ordnance subsystems shall not be inadvertently initiated or

dudded by a 25 kilovolt electrostatic discharge caused by personnel handling. Compliance shall
be verified by test (such as MIL-STD-331), discharging a 500 picofarad capacitor through a 500
ohm resistor to the ordnance subsystem (such as electrical interfaces, enclosures, and handling
points.
5.8 Electromagnetic radiation hazards (EMRADHAZ). The system design shall protect
personnel, fuels, and ordnance from hazardous effects of electromagnetic radiation. Compliance
shall be verified by test, analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof.
5.8.1 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel (HERP). The system shall comply
with current DoD criteria for the protection of personnel against the effect of electromagnetic
radiation. DoD policy is currently found in DoDI 6055.11. Compliance shall be verified by test,
analysis, or combination thereof.
11
MIL-STD-464A
5.8.2 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel (HERF). Fuels shall not be inadvertently
ignited by radiated EMEs. The EME includes onboard emitters and the external EME (see 5.3).
Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, inspection, or a combination thereof.
5.8.3 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO). Electrically initiated

devices (EIDs) in ordnance shall not be inadvertently actuated during or experience degraded
performance characteristics after exposure to the external EME levels of Table 3A (Table 1E
shall be used for the “Unrestricted” EME for Army rotorcraft operations), for both direct RF
induced actuation of the EID and inadvertent activation of an electrically powered firing circuit.
Relevant ordnance phases involving unrestricted and restricted levels in Table 3A are listed in
Table 3B. Compliance shall be verified by test and analysis.
TABLE 3A. External EME for HERO
Frequency Range Field Intensity

(MHz) (V/m - rms)
Unrestricted Restricted
Peak Average Peak Average
0.01 - 2 70 70 70 70
2 - 30 200 200 100 100
30 -150 90 61 50 50
150 - 225 90 61 90 61
225 - 400 70 70 70 70
400 - 700 1940 260 1500 100
700 - 790 290 95 290 95
790 - 1000 2160 410 1500 100
1000 - 2000 3300 460 2500 200
2000 - 2700 4500 490 2500 200
2700 - 3600 27460 2620 2500 200
3600 - 4000 9710 310 2500 200
4000 - 5400 7200 300 2500 200
5400 - 5900 15970 300 2500 200
5900 - 6000 320 320 320 200
6000 - 7900 1100 390 1100 200
7900 - 8000 860 860 860 200
8000 - 8400 860 860 860 200
8400 - 8500 390 390 390 200
8500 - 11000 13380 1760 2500 200
11000 - 14000 2800 390 2500 200
14000 - 18000 2800 350 1500 200
18000 - 40000 7060 420 1500 200
40000 - 45000 570 570 200 200
NOTE: In some of the frequency ranges for the “Restricted Average” column, limiting the exposure of
personnel through time averaging will be required to meet the requirements of 5.8.1 for personnel safety.
12
MIL-STD-464A
TABLE 3B. Ordnance phases and associated environments
Stockpile-to-Safe Separation
Environment
Phase
Transportation/storage Unrestricted
Assembly/disassembly Restricted
Loading/unloading Restricted
Staged Unrestricted
Platform-loaded Unrestricted
Immediate post-launch Unrestricted
5.9 Life cycle, E3 hardness. The system operational performance and E3 requirements of this
standard shall be met throughout the rated life cycle of the system and shall include, but not be
limited to, the following: maintenance, repair, surveillance, and corrosion control. Compliance
shall be verified by test, analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof. Maintainability,
accessibility, and testability, and the ability to detect degradations shall be demonstrated.
5.10 Electrical bonding. The system, subsystems, and equipment shall include the necessary
electrical bonding to meet the E3 requirements of this standard. Compliance shall be verified by
test, analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof, for the particular bonding provision.
5.10.1 Power current return path. For systems using structure for power return currents,
bonding provisions shall be provided for current return paths for the electrical power sources
such that the total voltage drops between the point of regulation for the power system and the
electrical loads are within the tolerances of the applicable power quality standard. Compliance
shall be verified by analysis of electrical current paths, electrical current levels, and bonding
impedance control levels.
5.10.2 Antenna installations. Antennas shall be bonded to obtain required antenna patterns
and meet the performance requirements for the antenna. Compliance shall be verified by test,
analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof.
5.10.3 Mechanical interfaces. The system electrical bonding shall provide electrical continuity
across external mechanical interfaces on electrical and electronic equipment, both within the
equipment and between the equipment and other system elements, for control of E3 such that the
system operational performance requirements are met. For instances where specific controls
have not been established for a system and approved by the procuring activity, the following
direct current (DC) bonding levels shall apply throughout the life of the system.
a. 10 milliohms or less from the equipment enclosure to system structure, including the
cumulative effect of all faying surface interfaces.
b. 15 milliohms or less from cable shields to the equipment enclosure, including the
cumulative effect of all connector and accessory interfaces.
c. 2.5 milliohms or less across individual faying interfaces within the equipment, such as
between subassemblies or sections.
13
MIL-STD-464A
Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof.
5.10.4 Shock, fault, and ignitable vapor protection. Bonding of all electrically conductive
items subject to electrical fault currents shall be provided to control shock hazard voltages and
allow proper operation of circuit protection devices. For interfaces located in fuel or other
flammable vapor areas, bonding shall be adequate to prevent ignition from flow of fault currents.
Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof.
5.11 External grounds. The system and associated subsystems shall provide external
grounding provisions to control electrical current flow and static charging for protection of
personnel from shock, prevention of inadvertent ignition of ordnance, fuel and flammable
vapors, and protection of hardware from damage. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis,
inspections, or a combination thereof.
5.11.1 Aircraft grounding jacks. Grounding jacks shall be attached to the system to permit
connection of grounding cables for fueling, stores management, servicing, maintenance
operations and while parked. ISO 46 contains requirements for interface compatibility.
Grounding jacks shall be attached to the system ground reference so that the resistance between
the mating plug and the system ground reference does not exceed 1.0 ohm DC. The following
grounding jacks are required:
a. Fuel nozzle ground. A ground jack shall be installed at each fuel inlet. To satisfy
international agreements for interfacing with refueling hardware, the jack shall be located within
1.0 meter of the center of the fuel inlet for fuel nozzle grounding.
b. Servicing grounds. Ground jacks shall be installed at locations convenient for servicing
and maintenance.
c. Weapon grounds. Grounding jacks shall be installed at locations convenient for use in
handling of weapons or other explosive devices.
Compliance shall be verified by test and inspections.
5.11.2 Servicing and maintenance equipment grounds. Servicing and maintenance

equipment shall have a permanently attached grounding wire suitable for connection to earth
ground. All servicing equipment that handles or processes flammable fuels, fluids, explosives,
oxygen, or other potentially hazardous materials shall have a permanently attached grounding
wire for connection to the system. Compliance shall be verified by inspection.
5.12 TEMPEST. National security information shall not be compromised by emanations from
classified information processing equipment. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis,
inspections or a combination thereof. ( NSTISSAM TEMPEST/1-92 and CNNS Advisory
Memorandum TEMPEST 01-02 provide testing methodology for verifying compliance with
TEMPEST requirements.)
5.13 Emission control (EMCON). Unintentional electromagnetic radiated emissions shall not
exceed -110 dBm/m2 at one nautical mile (-105 dBm/m2 at one kilometer) in any direction from
14
MIL-STD-464A
the system over the frequency range of 500 kHz to 40 GHz, when using the resolution
bandwidths listed in Table 4. Compliance shall be verified by test and inspection.
TABLE 4. EMCON Bandwidths
Frequency Range (MHz) 6 dB Bandwidth (kHz)

0.5 – 1 1
1 – 30 10
30 – 1000 30
1000 – 40000 100
Notes:
1. Video filtering shall not be used to bandwidth limit the receiver response.
2. Larger bandwidths may be used, but no correction factors are permissible.
5.14 EM spectrum compatibility. Systems, subsystems, and equipment shall comply with the
DoD, national, and international regulations for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum (such as
NTIA “Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Radio Frequency Management” and DoDD
4650.1). Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof, as appropriate
for the equipment development stage.
6. NOTES
(This section contains information of a general or explanatory nature that may be helpful, but is
not mandatory.)
6.1 Intended use. This standard contains electromagnetic environmental effects requirements
for systems.
6.2 Associated Data Item Descriptions (DIDs). This standard has been assigned an
Acquisition Management Systems Control number authorizing it as the source document for the
following DIDs. When it is necessary to obtain the data, the applicable DIDs must be listed on
the Contract Data Requirements List (DD Form 1423).
DID Number DID Title

DI-EMCS-81540A Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Integration
and Analysis Report
DI-EMCS-81541A Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Verification
Procedures
DI-EMCS-81542A Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Verification
Report
The above DIDs were current as of the date of this standard. The ASSIST database should be
researched at http://assist2.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/ or http://www.dodssp.daps.mil/ to ensure
that only current and approved DIDs are cited on the DD Form 1423.
15
MIL-STD-464A
6.3 Tailoring guidance for contractual application. Application specific criteria may be
derived from operational and engineering analyses on the system being procured for use in
specific environments. When analyses reveal that a requirement in this standard is not
appropriate or adequate for that procurement, the requirement should be tailored and
incorporated into the appropriate documentation. The appendix of this standard provides
guidance for tailoring.
6.4 Subject term (key word) listing.
E3
Electrical bonding
EMC
EMCON
EMI
EMP
Electromagnetic compatibility
Electromagnetic environment
Electromagnetic emission
Electromagnetic interference
Electromagnetic radiation hazards
Electromagnetic susceptibility
Grounding
HERF
HERO
HERP
Inter-system electromagnetic compatibility
Intra-system electromagnetic compatibility
Lightning
Multipaction
RADHAZ
System
TEMPEST
6.5 International interest. This standard implements NATO STANAG 3614,

“Electromagnetic Environmental Effects – Requirements for Aircraft Systems and Equipment.”
When changes to or revision or cancellation of this standard are proposed, the preparing activity
must coordinate the action with the U.S National Point of Contact for the international
standardization agreement, as identified in the ASSIST database at http://www.dodssp.daps.mil/.
6.6 Acronyms used in this standard. The acronyms used in this standard are defined as
follows.
CTTA certified TEMPEST technical authority

E3 electromagnetic environmental effects
EID electrically initiated device
EMC electromagnetic compatibility
EMCON emission control
16
MIL-STD-464A
EME electromagnetic environment

EMI electromagnetic interference
EMP electromagnetic pulse
EMRADHAZ electromagnetic radiation hazards
EPS engineering practice study
HERF hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel
HERO hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance
HERP hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel
IMI intermodulation interference
ISO International Standards Organization
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
KPP key performance parameter
MNFS maximum no-fire stimulus
NDI non-developmental item
p-static precipitation static
RF radio frequency
rms root-mean-square
6.7 Technical points of contact. Requests for additional information or assistance on this
standard can be obtained from the following:
Air Force
ASC/ENA, Bldg. 560
2530 Loop Road West
Wright Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7101
DSN 785-5078, Commercial (937) 255-5078
Army
US Army Research Laboratory
Survivability/Lethality Directorate
AMSRL-SL-BN
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD 21010-5423
DSN 584-8702, Commercial (410) 436-8702
Navy
NAVAIRSYSCOM
Code AIR-417, Building 3197, Suite 1040
48142 Shaw Rd
Patuxent River, MD 20670
DSN 342-7967, Commercial (301) 342-7967
Any information relating to Government contracts must be obtained through contracting officers.
17
MIL-STD-464A
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
18
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
MIL-STD-464A
APPLICATION GUIDE
19
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
A1. SCOPE ................................................................................................................. 22

A1.1 Scope....................................................................................................................... 22
A2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ......................................................................... 22

A2.1 Government documents ....................................................................................... 22
A2.1.1 Specifications, standards, and handbooks ............................................................ 22
A2.1.2 Other Government documents, drawings, and publications ................................ 23
A2.2 Non-Government publications ............................................................................. 25
A3. ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................... 28
A4. REQUIREMENTS AND VERIFICATION .................................................... 29

A4.1 General ................................................................................................................. 29
A5. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................... 33

A5.1 Margins ................................................................................................................ 33
A5.2 Intra-system electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) ............................................... 36
A5.2.1 Hull generated intermodulation interference (IMI) ............................................... 41
A5.2.2 Shipboard internal electromagnetic environment (EME)....................................... 42
A5.2.3 Multipaction .......................................................................................................... 43
A5.3 Inter-system EMC .................................................................................................. 44
A5.4 Lightning ............................................................................................................... 54
A5.5 Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ................................................................................. 60
A5.6 Subsystems and equipment electromagnetic interference (EMI) ......................... 65
A5.6.1 Non-developmental items (NDI) and commercial items ..................................... 68
A5.6.2 Shipboard DC magnetic field environment ......................................................... 71
A5.7 Electrostatic charge control .................................................................................. 72
A5.7.1 Vertical lift and in-flight refueling.......................................................................... 74
A5.7.2 Precipitation static (P-static) .................................................................................. 76
A5.7.3 Ordnance subsystems.............................................................................................. 78
A5.8 Electromagnetic radiation hazards (EMRADHAZ) ............................................... 79
A5.8.1 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel (HERP)................................... 79
A5.8.2 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel (HERF) ............................................ 81
A5.8.3 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) .................................. 82
A5.9 Life cycle, E3 hardness ........................................................................................ 86
A5.10 Electrical bonding ................................................................................................ 91
A5.10.1 Power current return path .................................................................................... 95
A5.10.2 Antennas installations ............................................................................................. 96
A5.10.3 Electromagnetic interference (EMI) ....................................................................... 97
20
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
A5.10.4 Shock, fault, and ignitable vapor protection ........................................................ 99

A5.11 External grounds .................................................................................................. 101
A5.11.1 Aircraft grounding jacks ...................................................................................... 103
A5.11.2 Servicing and maintenance equipment grounds .................................................. 105
A5.12 TEMPEST ............................................................................................................ 106
A5.13 Emission control (EMCON) ................................................................................... 107
A5.14 EM spectrum compatibility .................................................................................... 110
TABLES
Table A1 Specialized rotorcraft testing ............................................................................ 53

Table A2 Lightning indirect effects waveform characteristics ....................................... 55
Table A3 HERO EME test levels ...................................................................................... 85
Table A4 Minimum HERO test frequencies .................................................................... 86
FIGURES
Figure A1 Lightning indirect effects waveform parameters ............................................. 56

Figure A2 Unclassified free-field EMP environment (IEC 61000-2-9) ............................ 61
Figure A3 EMP environment (E1, E2, and E3)................................................................... 61
21
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
A1 SCOPE
A1.1 Scope. This appendix provides background information for each requirement in the main
body of the standard. The information includes rationale for each requirement, guidance on
applying the requirement, and lessons learned related to the requirement. This information
should help users understand the intent behind the requirements and adapt them as necessary for
a particular application.
A2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
A2.1 Government documents
A2.1.1 Specifications, standards, and handbooks. The following specifications, standards,

and handbooks are referenced in this appendix and form a part of this document to the extent
specified herein.
DEPART OF DEFENSE SPECIFICATIONS
MIL-I-23659 Initiator, Electric, General Design Specification

MIL-C-83413 Connectors and Assemblies, Electrical, Aircraft Grounding,
General
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARDS
MIL-STD-188-124 Grounding, Bonding and Shielding for Common Long

Haul/Tactical Communications Systems Including Ground
Based Communication-Electronics Facilities and Equipments
MIL-STD-188-125-1 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for
Ground-Based C4I Facilities Performing Critical, Time-Urgent
Missions, Part 1 Fixed Facilities
MIL-STD-188-125-2 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for
Ground-Based C4I Facilities Performing Critical, Time-Urgent
Missions, Part 2 Transportable Systems
MIL-STD-331 Fuze and Fuze Components, Environmental and Performance
Tests for
MIL-STD-449 Radio Frequency Spectrum Characteristics, Measurement of
MIL-STD-461 Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference
Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment
MIL-STD-469 Radar Engineering Design Requirements, Electromagnetic
Compatibility
MIL-STD-704 Aircraft Electric Power Characteristics
MIL-STD-1310 Shipboard Bonding, Grounding, and Other Techniques for
Electromagnetic Compatibility and Safety
MIL-STD-1399-070 Interface Standard for Shipboard Systems, DC Magnetic Field
22
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
Environment
MIL-STD-1399-300 Interface Standard for Shipboard Systems, Section 300, Electric
Power, Alternating Current
MIL-STD-1541 Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements for Space Systems
MIL-STD-1542 Electromagnetic Compatibility and Grounding Requirements
for Space System Facilities
MIL-STD-1576 Electroexplosive Subsystem Safety Requirements and Test
Methods for Space Systems
MIL-STD-1605 Procedures for Conducting a Shipboard Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) Survey (Surface Ships)
MIL-STD-2169 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Environment
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HANDBOOKS
MIL-HDBK-235 Electromagnetic (Radiated) Environment Considerations for

Design and Procurement of Electrical and Electronic
Equipment, Subsystems and Systems
MIL-HDBK-237 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects and Spectrum
Management Guidance for the Acquisition Process
MIL-HDBK-240 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) Test
Guide
MIL-HDBK-419 Grounding, Bonding, and Shielding for Electronic
Equipments and Facilities
MIL-HDBK-423 High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for
Fixed and Transportable Ground-Based Facilities, Volume 1,
Fixed Facilities
MIL-HDBK-454 Electronic Equipment, General Guidelines for
MIL-HDBK-274 Electrical Grounding for Aircraft Safety
MIL-HDBK-1568 Materials and Processes for Corrosion Prevention and Control
(USAF) in Aerospace Weapons Systems
MIL-HDBK-83575 General Handbook for Space Vehicle Wiring Harness Design and
Testing
MIL-HDBK-83578 Criteria for Explosive Systems and Devices Used on Space
(USAF) Vehicles
(Unless otherwise indicated, copies of these documents are available from the
Standardization Documents Order Desk, 700 Robbins Avenue, Building 4D, Philadelphia, PA
19111-5094 or http://assist2.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/ or http://www.dodssp.daps.mil/.
Application for copies of MIL-STD-2169 should be addressed with a need-to-know to: Defense
Special Weapons Agency, Electronics Technology Division, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria,
VA 22310-3398.)
A2.1.2 Other Government documents, drawings, and publications. The following other
Government documents are referenced in this appendix.
23
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
Air Force
AFWL-TR-85-113 Guidelines for Reducing EMP Induced Stresses in Aircraft

R-3046-AF Techniques for the Analysis of Spectral and Orbital Congestion
in Space Systems (DTIC No. ADA140841)
TO 00-25-172 Ground Servicing of Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding
TO 31Z-10-4 Electromagnetic Radiation Hazards
Army
ADS-37A-PRF Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Performance and

Verification Requirements
TR-RD-TE-97-01 Electromagnetic Effects Criteria and Guidelines for EMRH,
EMRO, Lightning Effects, ESD, EMP, and EMI Testing of US
Army Missile Systems
TB MED 523 Control of Hazards to Health from Microwave and Radio
Frequency Radiation and Ultrasound
Department of Defense (DoD)
DoDI 6055.11 Protection of DoD Personnel from Exposure to Radiofrequency

Radiation and Military Exempt Lasers
DoDD 4650.1 Management and Use of the Radio Frequency Spectrum
DoDD 5200.19 Control of Compromising Emanations (Classified)
EPS-0178 Results of Detailed Comparisons of Individual EMC
Requirements And Test Procedures Delineated In Major
National And International Commercial Standards With Military
Standard MIL-STD-461E
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
AC 20-53 Protection of Aircraft Fuel Systems Against Fuel Vapor

Ignition Due to Lightning
AC 20-136 Protection of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems Against
the Indirect Effects of Lightning
DOT/FAA/CT-89/22 Aircraft Lightning Handbook
DOT/FAA/CT-86/40 Aircraft Electromagnetic Compatibility
NASA
CR 4776 The On-Orbit Radio Frequency Environment

TP2361 Design Guidelines for Assessing and Controlling Spacecraft
Charging Effects
TR 32-1500 Final Report on RF Voltage Breakdown in Coaxial Transmission
Lines
24
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
Navy
IA PUB-5239-31 Information Assurance Shipboard Red/Black Installation

Publication
NAWCWPNS Electronic Warfare and Radar Systems Engineering
TS 92-78 Handbook
NAVSEA OP 3565/ Electromagnetic Radiation Hazards
NAVAIR 16-1-529/
NAVELEX 0967-
LP-624-6010
OD 30393 Design Principles and Practices for Controlling Hazards of
Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO DESIGN
GUIDE)
Publications
CNSS Advisory Memorandum, NONSTOP Evaluation Standard

TEMPEST 01-02
NSTISSAM Compromising Emanations Laboratory Test Requirements,
TEMPEST/1-92 Electromagnetics
NSTISSAM Compromising Emanations Field Test Evaluations
TEMPEST/1-93
NSTISSAM Red/Black Installation Guidance
TEMPEST/2-95
NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio
Frequency Management
OMB Circular A-11 Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates
(Copies of FAA publications and military technical reports are available from National
Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161 or the
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Bldg. 5, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
22304-6145. Copies of the EPS-0178 are available on the DISA/JSC website,
http://www.jsc.mil/Documents/Documents.asp. Air Force Technical Orders are available from
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC/MMEDT), Tinker AFB, OK 73145-5990.
Copies of DoD documents are available from the Standardization Documents Order Desk, 700
Robbins Avenue, Building 4D, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094 or
http://assist2.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/ or http://www.dodssp.daps.mil/. Copies of NASA
documents are available from NASA Industrial Application Center/USC, 3716 South Hope St.
#200, Los Angeles, CA 90007. Copies of NAVSEA documents available from Commanding
Officer, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Naval Sea Data Support
Activity (Code 5700), Department of the Navy, Port Hueneme, CA 93043. Copies of NACSEM,
NSTISSAM, and NSA documents are available only through the procuring activity.)
A2.2 Non-Government publications. The following non-Government documents form a part

of this standard to the extent specified herein.
25
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
Electrostatic Discharge Association (ESDA)
ANSI/ESD S20.20 ESD Association Standard for the Development of an Electrostatic

Control Program for - Protection of Electrical and Electronic
Parts, Assemblies, and Equipment (Excluding Electrically
Initiated Explosive Devices)
ESD TR 20.20 Handbook for the Development of an Electrostatic
Control Program for - Protection of Electrical and Electronic
Parts, Assemblies, and Equipment
(Application for copies should be addressed to Electrostatic Discharge Association, 7900

Turin Rd, Building 3, Suite2, Rome, NY 13440-2069).
EUROCAE
ED-107 Guide for the Certification of Aircraft in a High Intensity Radiated

Field (HIRF) Environment
(Copies of EUROCAE documents are available at http://www.eurocae.org/)
International Electrotechnical Commission
IEC 61000-2-9 Description of HEMP Environment - Radiated Disturbance
(Copies of IEC documents are available at http://www.iec.ch/webstore/shop_entry.htm).
International Organization for Standardization
ISO 46 Aircraft - Fuel Nozzle Grounding Plugs and Sockets
(Application for copies should be addressed to ISO, International Organization for

Standardization, 3 rue de Varembe, 1211 Geneve 20, Geneve, Switzerland or
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/ISOOnline.openerpage)
Franklin Applied Physics
F-C2560 RF Evaluation of the Single Bridgewire Apollo Standard Initiator

M-C2210-1 Monograph on Computation of RF Hazards
(Application for copies should be addressed to Franklin Applied Physics, P.O. Box 313,
Oaks, PA 19456)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
70 National Electrical Code
26
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
780 Lightning Protection Code
(Application for copies of the Code should be addressed to the National Fire Protection
Association, Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02269-9101 or http://www.nfpa.org/Catalog/.)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
ANEP 45 Electro-Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) in Glass Reinforced

Plastic
(GRP) Vessels
(Application for copies should be addressed to Central US Registry, The Pentagon, Room
1B889, Washington, DC 20310-3072)
RTCA
DO-160 Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne

Equipment
(Application for copies of this standard should be addressed to RTCA, 1425 K Street NW,
Washington, DC 20005 or http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/.)
Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.
ARP1870 Aerospace Systems Electrical Bonding and Grounding for

Electromagnetic Compatibility and Safety
ARP4242 Electromagnetic Compatibility Control Requirements,
Systems
ARP5412 Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms
ARP5413 Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the
Indirect Effects of Lightning
ARP5414 Aircraft Lightning Zoning
ARP5415 User’s Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic
Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning
ARP5416 (Draft) Aircraft Lightning Test Methods
ARP5577 Aircraft Lightning Direct Effects Certification
(Application for copies should be addressed to the Society of Automotive Engineers Inc.,
400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096 or
http://www.sae.org/servlets/techtrack?PROD_TYP=STD.)
Statistical Research Group
AMP Report Statistical Analysis for a New Procedure in Sensitivity

No. 101-1R Experiments (ATI-34558)
SRG-P, No. 40
27
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
(Application for copies should be addressed to the Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC), Bldg. 5, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22304-6145)
A3. ACRONYMS. The acronyms used in this appendix are defined as follows.
AAPG antenna inter-antenna propagation with graphics

AGC automatic gain control
AM amplitude modulation
AMITS air management information tracking system
ASEMICAP air systems EMI corrective action program
BIT built-in test
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CTTA certified TEMPEST technical authority
CW continuous wave
E3 electromagnetic environmental effects
ECCM electronic counter counter-measures
ECM electronic counter-measures
EID electrically initiated device
ELV expendable launch vehicle
EM electromagnetic
EMC electromagnetic compatibility
EMCON emission control
EME electromagnetic environment
EMI electromagnetic interference
EMP electromagnetic pulse
EMRADHAZ electromagnetic radiation hazards
EMV electromagnetic vulnerability
ESD electrostatic discharge
GPS global positioning system
GTD geometric theory of diffraction
HEMP high altitude electromagnetic pulse
HERF hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel
HERO hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance
HERP hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel
HIRF high intensity radiated fields
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IMI intermodulation interference
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
I/CC induced/contact current
MHD magnetohydrodynamic
MNFS maximum no-fire stimulus
MoM method of moments
NDI non-developmental item
PCS personal communication system
POR point of regulation
28
MIL-STD-464A
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PEL permissible exposure limit

p-static precipitation static
RF radio frequency
SEMCIP shipboard EMC improvement program
TWT traveling wave tube
A4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND VERIFICATION. In this section, the

requirements from the main body are repeated (printed in italics) and are then followed by
rationale, guidance, and lessons learned for each interface requirement and rationale, guidance,
and lessons learned for each verification requirement. Interface and verification requirement
discussions are treated separately because they address different issues. Tables and figures
associated with the requirements from the main body are not repeated in this appendix.
A4.1 General. The system shall be electromagnetically compatible among all subsystems and
equipment within the system and with environments caused by electromagnetic effects external to
the system. Verification shall be accomplished as specified herein on production representative
systems. Safety critical functions shall be verified to be electromagnetically compatible within
the system and with external environments prior to use in those environments. Verification shall
address all life cycle aspects of the system, including (as applicable) normal in-service
operation, checkout, storage, transportation, handling, packaging, loading/unloading, launch,
and the normal operating procedures associated with each aspect.
Requirement Rationale (A4.1): The E3 area addresses a number of interfacing issues with
environments both external to the system and within the system. External to the system are
electromagnetic effects such as lightning, EMP and man-made RF transmissions. Internal to the
system are electromagnetic effects such as electronic noise emissions, self-generated RF
transmissions from antennas, and cross-coupling of electrical currents. Systems today are
complex from a materials usage and electronics standpoint. Many materials being used are non-
metallic and have unique electromagnetic properties which require careful consideration.
Electronics performing critical functions are common. Wide use of RF transmitters, sensitive
receivers, other sensors, and additional electronics creates a potential for problems within the
system and from external influences. Increasing use of commercial equipment in unique military
operational environments poses special interface considerations. Each system must be
compatible with itself, other systems, and external environments to ensure required performance
and to prevent costly redesigns for resolution of problems.
Requirement Guidance (A4.1): The system and all associated subsystems and equipment,
including ordnance, need to achieve system compatibility. Every effort needs to be made to
meet these requirements during initial design rather than on an after-the-fact basis. System E3
Integration and Analysis Reports are used to aid in technical management of programs. These
reports describe requirement flowdown from this standard and specific design measures being
implemented to meet the requirements of this standard. The other requirements of this standard
address specific aspects of the E3 control area. Additional guidance on EMC can be found in
MIL-HDBK-237, DOT/FAA/CT-86/40, SAE ARP4242, Army ADS-37A-PRF, and NATO
ANEP 45.
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An overall integrated EMC design and verification approach for the system must be established.
Based on system-level architecture, appropriate hardening requirements are allocated between
system design features and subsystems and equipment hardness. Transfer functions from
system-level environments to stresses at the subsystem and equipment-level are determined and
appropriate electromagnetic interference controls are imposed.
An E3 integration approach can be organized into five activities:
a. Establish the external threat environment against which the system is required to
demonstrate compliance of immunity. The external environments (EME, lightning and EMP) to
which the system should be designed and verified are addressed in other sections of this
appendix.
b. Identify the system electrical and electronic equipment performing functions required for
operation during application of the external threat. Normally all functions essential for
completing the missions are protected against the external threats.
c. Establish the internal environment caused by external electromagnetic effects for each
installed equipment. All of the environments external to the system specified in this standard
cause related environments internal to the system. The level of this internal environment will be
the result of many factors such as structural details, penetration of apertures and seams, and
system and cable resonances. The internal environment for each threat should be established by
analysis, similarity to previously tested systems, or testing. The internal environment is usually
expressed as the level of electrical current stresses appearing at the interface to the equipment or
electromagnetic field quantities. These internal stresses are typically associated with
standardized requirements for equipment (for example, MIL-STD-461). Trade-offs need to be
made of the degree of hardening to be implemented at the system-level (such as shielded
volumes or overbraiding on interconnecting wiring) versus equipment-level (more stringent
electromagnetic interference requirements) to establish the most effective approach from
performance and cost standpoints.
d. Design the system and equipment protection. System features are then designed as
necessary to control the internal environment (including margin considerations) to levels
determined from the trade-off studies and appropriate requirements are imposed on the electrical
and electronic equipment. The equipment immunity levels must be above the internal
environments by necessary margins to account for criticality of the equipment, manufacturing
tolerances, and uncertainties in verification. Normally there are design and test requirements in
MIL-STD-461 applicable for each of the external environments, but they may need modification
for the particular system application. For example, external environment may result in internal
environments above the susceptibility level specified in MIL-STD-461. If so, the limit must be
tailored for the particular system, alternative requirements must be imposed or the internal
environment must be reduced to an acceptable level. The system E3 design must be viable
throughout the system life cycle. This aspect requires an awareness of proper application of
corrosion control provisions and issues related to maintenance actions that may affect EMC.
Examples are ensuring that electrical bonding provisions are not degraded, maintaining surface
treatments in place for E3 control, and considering exposure of electronics to EMEs when access
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panels are open. Maintaining a viable system E3 design also requires an effective configuration
management program for tracking and evaluating engineering changes to the system to ensure
that the E3 design is not compromised.
e. Verify the protection adequacy. The system and equipment E3 protection design must be
verified as meeting contractual requirements. Verification of the adequacy of the protection
design includes demonstrating that the actual levels of the internal environments appearing at the
equipment interfaces and enclosures do not exceed the qualification test levels of the equipment
for each environment by required margins. All electronic and electrical equipments must have
been qualified to their appropriate specification level. Systems-level testing is normally required
to minimize the required-margin demonstration. Analysis may be acceptable under some
conditions; however, the required margins will typically be larger.
These verification activities need to be documented in detail in verification procedures and

verification reports, as applicable. Section 6.2 of the main body provides data item descriptions
for documents that are suitable for this purpose.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A4.1): The early implementation of E3 requirements have

been instrumental in preventing problems on previous programs. Evolving system designs
regarding changing materials and increasing criticality of electronics demand that effective
electromagnetic effects controls be implemented.
It is important that all external environments be treated in a single unified approach. Duplication
of efforts in different disciplines have occurred in the past. For example, hardening to
electromagnetic pulse and lightning-induced transients have been addressed independently rather
than as a common threat with different protection measures being implemented for each. This
situation is apparently due in part to organizational structures at contractor facilities which place
responsibility in different offices for each of the threats.
Verification Rationale (A4.1): Each separate requirement must be verified in accordance with
the contractual system requirements and Statement of Work. The developing activity should
flow down elements of verification responsibility to associate contractors as appropriate for their
supplied systems and subsystems.
Verification Guidance (A4.1): Most of the requirements in this standard are verified at the
system-level. Compliance for some requirements is verified at the subsystem, equipment, or
component level, such as electromagnetic interference requirements on a subsystem or lightning
certification of an airframe component.
The selection of test, analysis, or inspection or some combination to demonstrate a particular

requirement is generally dependent on the degree of confidence in the results of the particular
method, technical appropriateness, associated costs, and availability of assets. Some of the
requirements included in this standard specify the method to be used. For example, verification
of subsystem and equipment-level electromagnetic interference requirements must be
demonstrated by test, because analysis tools are not available which will produce credible
results.
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Analysis and testing often supplement each other. Prior to the availability of hardware, analysis
will often be the primary tool being used to ensure that the design incorporates adequate
provisions. Testing may then be oriented toward validating the accuracy and appropriateness of
the models used. The level of confidence in a model with respect to a particular application
determines the balance between analysis and testing. Testing is often essential to completing a
convincing verification argument.
E3 requirements need to be verified through an incremental verification process. "Incremental"

implies that verification of compliance with E3 requirements is a continuing process of building
an argument (audit trail) throughout development that the design satisfies the imposed
performance requirements. Initial engineering design must be based on analysis and models. As
hardware becomes available, testing of components of the subsystem can be used to validate and
supplement the analysis and models. The design evolves as better information is generated.
When the system is actually produced, inspection, final testing, and follow-on analysis complete
the incremental verification process. It is important to note that testing is often necessary to
obtain information that may not be amenable to determination by analysis. However, testing
also is often used to determine a few data points with respect to a particular interface
requirement with analysis (and associated simulations) filling in the total picture. It should be
noted that the guidance sections for individual E3 requirements specified in other sections below
generally treat the predominant methods for final verification rather than dealing with the overall
philosophy described in this section.
The following list provides guidance on issues which should be addressed for E3 verification:
a. Systems used for verification should be production configuration, preferably the first
article.
b. The system should be up-to-date with respect to all approved engineering change
proposals (both hardware and software).
c. Electromagnetic interference qualification should be completed on subsystems and

equipment.
d. Subsystems and equipment should be placed in modes of operation that will maximize
potential indication of interference or susceptibility, consistent with system operational
performance requirements.
e. Any external electrical power used for system operation should conform to the power
quality standard of the system.
f. Any anomalies found should be evaluated to determine whether they are truly an E3 issue
or some other type of malfunction or response.
g. Any system modifications resulting from verification efforts should be validated for
effectiveness after they have been engineered.
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h. Margins need to be demonstrated wherever they are applicable.
Verification Lessons Learned (A4.1): Historically, failure to adequately verify system

performance in an operational EME has resulted in costly delays during system development,
mission aborts, and reduced system and equipment operational effectiveness. It is important that
assets required for verification of E3 requirements be identified early in the program to ensure
their availability when needed.
A5. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS
A5.1 Margins. Margins shall be provided based on system operational performance

requirements, tolerances in system hardware, and uncertainties involved in verification of
system-level design requirements. Safety critical and mission critical system functions shall
have a margin of at least 6 dB. EIDs shall have a margin of at least 16.5 dB of maximum no-fire
stimulus (MNFS) for safety assurances and 6 dB of MNFS for other applications. Compliance
shall be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof. Instrumentation installed in system
components during testing for margins shall capture the maximum system response and shall not
adversely affect the normal response characteristics of the component. When environment
simulations below specified levels are used, instrumentation responses may be extrapolated to
the full environment for components with linear responses (such as hot bridgewire EIDs). When
the response is below instrumentation sensitivity, the instrumentation sensitivity shall be used as
the basis for extrapolation. For components with non-linear responses (such as semiconductor
bridge EIDs), no extrapolation is permitted.
Requirement Rationale (A5.1): Variability exists in system hardware from factors such as
differences in cable harness routing and makeup, adequacy of shield terminations, conductivity
of finishes on surfaces for electrical bonding, component differences in electronics boxes, and
degradation with aging and maintenance. Margins must be included in the design to account for
these types of variability. In addition, uncertainties are present in the verification process due to
the verification method employed, limitations in environment simulation, and accuracy of
measured data. The proper application of margins in system and subsystem design provides
confidence that all production systems will perform satisfactorily in the operational E3
environments.
Requirement Guidance (A5.1): Margins are generally applied for particular environments
external to the system, including lightning (only indirect effects), inter-system EMC, EMP,
HERO, and aspects of intra-system EMC associated with any type of coupling to explosive
circuits.
Margins need to be viewed from the proper perspective. The use of margins simply recognizes
that there is variability in manufacturing and that requirement verification has uncertainties. The
margin ensures that every produced system will meet requirements, not just the particular one
undergoing a selected verification technique. Smaller margins are appropriate for situations
where production processes are under tighter controls or more accurate and thorough verification
techniques are used. Smaller margins are also appropriate if many production systems undergo
the same verification process, since the production variability issue is being addressed. Margins
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are not an increase in the basic defined levels for the various electromagnetic environments. The
most common technique is to verify that electromagnetic and electrical stresses induced internal
to the system by external environments are below equipment strength by at least the margin.
While margins can sometimes be demonstrated by performing verification at a level in excess of
the defined requirement, the intent of the margin is not to increase the requirement.
The 16.5 dB margin specified for safety assurance for EIDs in ordnance is derived from the
criterion in MIL-STD-1385 (which has been canceled and superseded by MIL-STD-464) that the
maximum allowable induced level for electrically initiated devices (EIDs) in required
environments is 15% of the maximum no-fire current. The ratio of no-fire to allowable currents
in decibels is 20 log (0.15) or a 16.5 dB margin. The requirement is expressed in decibels in this
standard so that the requirement can be applied to designs which do not use conventional hot
bridgewire EIDs, where the term “no-fire current” may be meaningless. MIL-STD-1385 also
specified a criterion of 45% of no-fire current (7 dB margin) for EIDs when there are consequences
other than safety. The equivalent criterion in this standard is specified as 6 dB.
Hot bridgewire EIDs with a one amp/one watt MNFS are often used in ordnance applications to
help in meeting safety requirements. As an alternative to using large sample sizes to
demonstrate that the statistical criteria contained in the definition of MNFS (no more than 0.1%
firing with a confidence level of 95%) is met, the methods of MIL-I-23659 can be used to
establish a one amp/one watt MNFS.
MNFS values for EIDs are normally specified by manufacturers in terms such as DC currents or
energy. Margins are often demonstrated by observing an effect during the application of an
electromagnetic environment that is the same effect observed when applying a stimulus level in
the form under which the MNFS is defined. For example, the temperature rise of a bridgewire
can be monitored in the presence of an EME relative to the temperature rise produced by a DC
current level that is 16.5 dB below MNFS. The space community has elected to use MNFS
levels determined using RF rather than DC. This approach is based on Franklin Institute studies,
such as report F-C2560. Outside of the space community, the use of DC levels has provided
successful results.
Margins are closely linked to both design and verification since the planned verification
methodology influences the size of the margin and the resulting impact on the required
robustness of the design. The specific margin assigned for a particular design and environment
is an engineering judgment. If the margin is too large, then penalties in weight and cost can be
inflicted on the design. If the margin is too small, then the likelihood of a undesirable system
response becomes unacceptably high.
The size of the margin assigned is inversely proportional to the inherent accuracy of the
verification method employed. One method of verifying lightning protection is to expose an
operational aircraft to a simulated severe lightning encounter (most severe flashes with worst
case attachment points). With this relatively accurate method of verification, a smaller overall
margin should be required. Another method of verifying lightning protection is the use of low-
level pulsed or continuous-wave (CW) testing with extrapolation of measured induced levels on
electrical cabling to a full scale strike. These levels are then either applied to the cables at the
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system level or compared to laboratory data. This type of approach would typically require an
overall margin of 6 dB. Similar margins may be appropriate for purely analytical approaches
which produce results that have been shown by previous testing to be consistently conservative
for the particular type of system being evaluated.
The least accurate verification method is the use of an analysis which has not been previously
verified as yielding “accurate” results for the system type of interest. The term “previously
verified" in this case means that the analysis is based on accepted principles (such as previously
documented in E3 handbooks) but the particular system configuration presented for certification
has not been previously tested to verify the accuracy of the analysis. For this case, margins as
large as 30 dB are not unrealistic.
For most approaches, margins typically fall in the range of 6 to 20 dB. For equipment that is not
classified as safety critical, mission critical, or ordnance, it may be desirable to use a reduced
(possibly zero) margin to conserve program resources.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.1): The use of margins in verifying intra-system EMC
requirements among subsystems by test has been attempted in the past; however, this practice
has largely been abandoned except for electroexplosive circuits. A basic difficulty existed in the
lack of available techniques to evaluate how close a circuit is to being upset or degraded. With
the numerous circuits on most platforms, it can be a formidable task to evaluate all circuits. One
technique that has been used is to identify the circuits through analysis which are potentially the
most susceptible. The intentional signal being transmitted across the electrical interface is
reduced in amplitude by the required number of dB to decrease the relative level of the
intentional signal to whatever interference is present. However, there is some controversy in this
type of testing since the receiving circuit does not see its normal operating level. Margins for
EIDs have been commonly demonstrated using techniques such as electro-optics, infrared,
current probes, thermocouples, RF detectors, and temperature sensitive waxes.
Verification Rationale (A5.1): To obtain confidence that the system will perform effectively in
the various environments, margins must be verified. In addition to variability in system
hardware, test and analysis involve uncertainties which must be taken into account when
establishing whether a system has met its design requirements. These uncertainties include
instrumentation tolerances, measurement errors, and simulator deficiencies (such as inadequate
spectral coverage).
Verification of margins for space and launch vehicles is essential since these items are costly and
must meet performance the first and only time. For expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), there
are no on-orbit repairs.
Verification Guidance (A5.1): Some uncertainties, such as system hardware variations or

instrumentation errors, may be known prior to the verification effort. Other uncertainties must
be evaluated at the time of a test or as information becomes available to substantiate an analysis.
Margins must be considered early in the program so that they may be included in the design. It
is apparent that better verification techniques can result in leaner designs, since uncertainties are
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smaller. Caution must be exercised in establishing margins so that the possible lack of reliable
or accurate verification techniques does not unduly burden the design.
During an E3 test, the contribution to uncertainties from the test are either errors or variations.
The errors fall into categories of measurement, extrapolation (simulation), and repeatability.
Variations are caused by various issues such as system orientation with respect to the incident
field, polarization of the incident field, and different system configurations (such as power
on/off, refuel, ground alert). The contributions of errors and variations are combined for margin
determination. They can be directly added; however, this approach will tend to produce an
overly conservative answer. The more common approach is to combine them using the root-
sum-square.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.1): An example of margin assessment used during

verification of lightning indirect effects and electromagnetic pulse protection is the
demonstration that the electrical current levels induced in system electrical cables by the
particular environment are less than the demonstrated equipment hardness at least by the margin.
This verification is generally accomplished by a combination of tests and analyses. The
equipment hardness level is generally demonstrated in the laboratory during testing in
accordance with MIL-STD-461. Testing can also be performed on individual equipment items at
the system-level. There are some concerns with induced transient waveforms determined at the
system-level being different than those used during equipment-level testing. Analysis techniques
are available for waveform comparison such as the use of norm attributes to asses various
parameters in the waveform. Test techniques are available to inject measured current waveforms
into electrical cables at amplified levels during a system-level test.
A5.2 Intra-system electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). The system shall be

electromagnetically compatible within itself such that system operational performance
requirements are met. Compliance shall be verified by system-level test, analysis, or a
Requirement Rationale (A5.2): It is essential within a system that the subsystems and
equipment be capable of providing full performance in conjunction with other subsystems and
equipment which are required to operate concurrently. EMI generated by a subsystem or other
subsystems and equipment must not degrade the overall system effectiveness.
Electromagnetic compatibility among antenna-connected subsystems (termed RF compatibility

on some programs) is an essential element of system performance. Inability of an antenna-
connected subsystem to properly receive intentional signals can significantly affect mission
effectiveness. Achieving compatibility requires careful, strategic planning for the placement of
receiver and transmitter antennas on the system and on the interoperability of the subsystems
Requirement Guidance (A5.2): Intra-system EMC is the most basic element of E3 concerns.
The various equipment and subsystems need to be designed and integrated to coexist and to
provide the operational performance required by the user. However, varying degrees of
functionality are necessary depending upon the operational requirements of individual items
during particular missions. Certain equipment may not need to be exercised at the time of
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MIL-STD-464A
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operation of other equipment. For this situation, intra-system compatibility requirements do not
necessarily apply. The procuring activity and system user should be consulted to determine the
required functionality. An example of these circumstances is that it is unlikely that an aircraft
instrument landing system needs to be compatible with a radiating electronic warfare jamming
subsystem during precision approaches. However, they need to be compatible during other
operations such as when built-in test (BIT) is exercised.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.2): When appropriate measures are included in system
design, such as E3 hardening at the system level, EMI requirements on subsystems and
equipment, and good grounding and bonding practices, there are relatively few intra-system
EMC problems found. Most problems that are found involve antenna-connected transmitters and
receivers. Receiver performance has been degraded by broadband thermal noise, harmonics, and
spurious outputs coupled antenna-to-antenna from transmitters. Microprocessor clock harmonics
radiating from system cabling and degrading receivers have been another common problem.
Electromagnetic fields radiated from onboard antennas have affected a variety of subsystems on
platforms. Typical non-antenna-related problems have been transients coupled cable-to-cable
from unsuppressed inductive devices and power frequencies coupling into audio interphone and
video signal lines. Problems due to cable-to-cable coupling of steady state noise and direct
conduction of transient or steady state noise are usually identified and resolved early in the
development of a system.
Generation of broadband EMI on ships from electrical arcing has been a common source of
degradation of antenna-connected receivers and must be controlled. Sources of the arcing have
been brush noise from electrical machinery and induced voltages and currents between metallic
items from antenna transmissions. Intermittent contact of the metallic items due to wind or ship
motion is a contributor. MIL-STD-1605 provides guidance on controlling and locating sources
of broadband EMI.
Predictive antenna-to-antenna software modeling is recommended to reduce risk early in a

system development program. Common software modeling techniques include Method of
Moments (MoM), Geometric Theory of Diffraction (GTD), and geometrical optics (ray-tracing).
Software programs can use one of these techniques or a hybrid of multiple techniques to predict
antenna-to-antenna coupling, and ultimately an EMI margin between coupled levels versus
receiver sensitivity. Software modeling is extremely useful when actual hardware is not
available for testing. Limitations of any analysis program must be considered when using the
results to draw conclusions.
A common problem in systems occurs when the system uses both ECM (electronic
countermeasures) and radar equipment operating at overlapping frequencies. The following
measures may be helpful to provide RF compatibility between these types of subsystems:
blanking, pulse tagging, utilization of coherent processing dead time, band splitting, and digital
feature extraction. A blanking matrix is commonly used to depict the relationship between
source and victim pairs.
Intermodulation products (sometimes termed passive intermodulation) are caused by the mixing
of two signals in non-linear junction (such as a corroded bond) and occur at predictable
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frequencies: intermodulation frequency = mf1 + nf2 where m and n are integers and f1 and f2 are
two signal frequencies. These products may degrade antenna-connected receivers that are tuned
to the intermodulation frequency. In some installations where there is flexibility on selecting the
operating frequencies of equipment, potential problems can be handled through frequency
management by avoiding predicable combinations. Where very sensitive receivers are involved,
even higher order products may affect the receivers. Space applications have special concerns
with intermodulation issues.
Verification Rationale (A5.2): Verification of intra-system electromagnetic compatibility

through testing supported by analysis is the most basic element of demonstrating that E3 design
efforts have been successful.
Verification of RF compatibility by test is essential to ensure an adequate design which is free

from the degradation caused by antenna-to-antenna coupled interference. Prior analysis and
equipment-level testing are necessary to assess potential problems and to allow sufficient time
for fixing subsystem problems.
Verification Guidance (A5.2): Although analysis is an essential part of the early stages of
designing or modifying a system, testing is the only truly accurate way of knowing that a design
meets intra-system EMC requirements. An anechoic chamber is often required for system-level
testing, to minimize reflections and ambient interference that can degrade the accuracy of the
testing, and to evaluate modes of operation that are reserved for war or are classified.
The following list provides guidance on issues which should be addressed for intra-system EMC
testing:
a. Potential interference between source/victim pairs should be systematically evaluated by

exercising the subsystems and equipment onboard the system through their various modes and
functions while monitoring the remaining items for degradation. Both one source versus a
victim and multiple sources versus a victim conditions need to be considered.
b. A frequency selection plan should be developed for exercising antenna-connected

transmitters and receivers. This plan should include:
1). Predicable interactions between transmitters and receivers such as transmitter

harmonics, intermodulation products, other spurious responses (such as image frequencies), and
cross modulation. The acceptability of certain types of responses will be system dependent.
2). Evaluation of transmitters and receivers across their entire operating frequency range,
including emergency frequencies.
3). Evaluation of known electromagnetic interference emission and susceptibility issues

with individual subsystems.
c. Margins should be demonstrated for explosive subsystems and other relevant subsystems.
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d. Operational field evaluation of system responses found in the laboratory environment

should be performed (such as flight testing of an aircraft to assess responses found during testing
on the ground).
e. Testing should be conducted in an area where the electromagnetic environment does not
affect the validity of the test results. The most troublesome aspect of the environment is usually
dense utilization of the frequency spectrum, which can hamper efforts to evaluate the
performance of antenna-connected receivers with respect to noise emissions of other equipment
installed in the system.
f. Testing should include all relevant external system hardware such as weapons, stores,
provisioned equipment (items installed in the system by the user), and support equipment.
g. It should be verified that any external electrical power used for system operation
conforms with the power quality standard of the system.
Operational testing of systems often begins before a thorough intra-system electromagnetic

compatibility test is performed. Also, the system used for initial testing is rarely in a production
configuration. The system typically will contain test instrumentation and will be lacking some
production electronics. This testing must include the exercising and evaluation of all functions
that can affect safety. It is essential that aircraft safety-of-flight testing be done to satisfy safety
concerns prior to first flight and any flight thereafter where major electrical and electronic
changes are introduced.
A common issue in intra-system EMC verification is whether to use instrumentation during the
test to evaluate the performance of subsystems and equipment. The most common approach is to
monitor subsystem performance through visual and aural displays and outputs. It is usually
undesirable to modify cabling and electronics boxes to add instrumentation, since these
modifications may change subsystem responses and introduce additional coupling paths.
However, there are some areas where instrumentation is important. Demonstration of margins
for critical areas normally requires some type of monitoring. For example, EIDs require
monitoring for assessment of margins.
Some antenna-connected receivers, such as airborne instrument landing systems and

identification of friend or foe, require a baseline input signal (set at required performance levels)
for degradation to be effectively evaluated. Other equipment which transmits energy and
evaluates the return signal, such as radars or radar altimeters, need an actual or simulated return
signal to be thoroughly assessed for potential effects. The instrumentation required for these
type of operations work thorough antenna coupling and don’t require the onboard equipment to
be modified.
The need to evaluate antenna-connected receivers across their operating ranges is important for
proper assessment. It has been common in the past to check a few channels of a receiver and
conclude that there was no interference. This practice was not unreasonable in the past when
much of the potential interference was broadband in nature, such as brush noise from motors.
However, with the waveforms associated with modern circuitry such as microprocessor clocks
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and power supply choppers, the greatest chance for problems is for narrowband spectral
components of these signals to interfere with the receivers. Therefore, it is common practice to
monitor all antenna-connected outputs with spectrum analysis equipment during an intra-system
electromagnetic compatibility test. Analysis of received levels is necessary to determine the
potential for degradation of a particular receiver.
Attempts are sometimes made to perform intra-system EMC testing of space systems with on-
board transmitters being simulated. It is essential that the actual transmitters be used and
operated in their mission modes to ensure that equipment is exposed to realistic electromagnetic
fields and resulting currents and voltages and to adequately evaluate intermodulation concerns.
Without the actual RF emitters being used, there is no assurance that a 100% functional system
is being provided.
Output characteristics of spread spectrum transmitters present unique technical issues which
need to be addressed to achieve EMC.
RF compatibility between antenna-connected receivers is an element of intra-system

electromagnetic compatibility and demonstration of compliance with that requirement needs to
be integrated with these efforts. Any blanking techniques implemented for EMC performance
should be evaluated during the testing.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.2): Performance degradation of antenna-connected

communication receivers cannot be effectively assessed by simply listening to open channels as
has been done commonly in the past. Squelch break has often been used as the criteria for
failure. There are number of problems with this technique.
The most common receiver degradation being experienced is from microprocessor clock
harmonics radiating from cabling. These signals are narrowband and stable in frequency.
Considering a receiver designed to receive amplitude modulated (AM) signals, there are several
responses that may be observed as discussed below. Similar analysis is applicable to other type
receivers.
If an intentional signal above the squelch is present, the type of degradation is dependent on the
location of the interfering signal with respect to the carrier. If the interfering signal is within a
few hundred hertz of the carrier, the main effect will probably be a change in the automatic gain
control (AGC) level of the receiver. If the interfering signal is far enough from the carrier to
compete with the sideband energy, much more serious degradation can occur. This condition
gives the best example of why squelch break is not an adequate failure criterion. AM receivers
are typically evaluated for required performance using a 30%-AM, 1-kHz tone which is
considered to have the same intelligibility for a listener as typical 80%-AM voice modulation.
The total power in the sidebands is approximately 13 dB below the level of the carrier. Receiver
specifications also typically require 10 dB (signal plus noise)-to-noise ratios during sensitivity
demonstrations. Therefore, for an interfering signal which competes with the sidebands not to
interfere with receiver performance, it must be approximately 23 dB below the carrier. An
impact of this conclusion is that an interfering signal which is well below squelch break can
cause significant range degradation in a receiver. If squelch break represents the true sensitivity
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required for mission performance, an interfering signal just below squelch break can cause over
a 90% loss in potential range.
If no intentional signal is present and the clock harmonic does not have any AM associated with
it, the main result is a quieting of the receiver audio output due to AGC action. To an observer,
this effect might actually appear to be an improvement in receiver performance. If some AM is
present at audio passband frequencies, a signal will be apparent that is dependent on the depth of
the AM; however, the degree of receiver degradation cannot be effectively assessed since it is
masked by the AGC.
Two acceptable methods of assessing degradation are apparent. A 30% AM signal can be
radiated at each channel of interest at an induced level at the receiver which corresponds to the
minimum required performance. Changes in intelligibility can be assessed with and without the
interference present. Also, the level of the signal source can be varied and the resultant effects
evaluated. Due to the large number of channels on many receivers (UHF receivers (225 - 400
MHz) typically have 7000 channels), this technique may often not be practical. An increasingly
popular approach is to monitor antenna-induced signal levels with a spectrum analyzer. A
preamplifier is usually necessary to improve the noise figure of the analyzer and obtain adequate
sensitivity. The received levels can then be easily assessed for potential receiver degradation.
This technique has been found to be very effective. Use of a spectrum analyzer is also helpful
for RF compatibility assessment.
Other than for EIDs, margin assessment is practical in several areas. Margins can be assessed
for antenna-connected receivers using the spectrum analyzer technique described above.
Another area where margin evaluation is practical is potential degradation of subsystems due to
electrical cable coupling from electromagnetic fields generated by on-board antenna-connected
transmitters. Intra-system compatibility problems due to communication transmitters,
particularly HF (2-30 MHz), are fairly common. The induced levels present in critical interface
cables can be measured and compared to demonstrated hardness levels from laboratory testing in
the same manner as described in the appendix under section 5.3 for inter-system EMC.
System-level testing should be a final demonstration that RF compatibility has been obtained. It
should not be a starting point to identify areas requiring fixes. Previous analysis and bench
testing should resolve compatibility questions beforehand.
Active signal cancellation techniques present a risky approach to EMC and should be rigorously
tested before being implemented. This approach is most sensitive to signal phase error and may
actually worsen an interference problem by injecting phase noise resulting from a changing
multi-path situation (due to aircraft stores load, release, and so forth).
A5.2.1 Hull generated intermodulation interference (IMI). For surface ship applications,
the intra-system EMC requirement is considered to be met for hull generated IMI when the 19th
product order and higher of IMI generated by High Frequency (HF) transmitters installed
onboard ship are not detectable by antenna-connected receivers onboard ship. Compliance
shall be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof, through measurement of received
levels at system antennas and evaluation of the potential of these levels to degrade receivers.
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Requirement Rationale (A5.2.1): In general, control of IMI in systems is covered by the

requirements of section 5.2 addressing intra-system electromagnetic compatibility. Because of
difficulty on ships with limiting IMI produced by HF transmitters, only higher order
intermodulation products must be controlled to permit effective use of the spectrum. Issues with
lower order products are addressed through frequency management.
Requirement Guidance (A5.2.1): The large number of HF transmitters, output power of the
transmitters, and construction materials and techniques used on ships make the presence of IMI a
reality. Electromagnetic fields from HF transmissions induce current flow in the ships hull. The
various currents from different transmitters mix in non-linearities within the hull (termed the
“rusty bolt effect”) to produce signals at sum and difference frequencies of the fundamental and
harmonic frequencies of the incident signals (F3 = ± n1F1 ± n2F2 ± ...; n1, n2, ... are integers).
The order of the IMI is the sum of the n terms. The mixing of a fundamental with a fourth
harmonic produces a fifth order IMI.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.2.1): Experience has shown that controlling 19th order and
higher IMI provides frequency management personnel with sufficient flexibility to effectively
manage the spectrum.
Verification Rationale (A5.2.1): Test and associated analysis are the only effective means to
verify IMI requirements.
Verification Guidance (A5.2.1): Guidance on evaluating IMI is available through the

Shipboard EMC Improvement Program (SEMCIP) technical assistance network. Access to the
data base can be obtained by contacting the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code J54, Dahlgren,
VA (Commercial phone 540-653-3473/8594, military phone DSN 249-3473/8594).
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.2.1): Testing, supported by analysis, has proven to be an

effective tool in evaluating IMI.
A5.2.2 Shipboard internal electromagnetic environment (EME). For ship applications,

electric fields (peak V/m-rms) below deck from intentional onboard transmitters shall not exceed
the following levels:
a. Surface ships.
(1). Metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to 18 GHz.
(2). Non-metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to 2 MHz, 50 V/m
from 2 MHz to 1 GHz, and 10 V/m from 1 GHz to 18 GHz.
b. Submarines. 5 V/m from 10 kHz to 1 GHz.
Compliance shall be verified by test of electric fields generated below deck with all antennas
(above and below decks) radiating.
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Requirement Rationale (A5.2.2): Specific controls must be imposed to limit internal

electromagnetic fields for ship applications to ensure that the variety of electronic equipment
used onboard ships will be able to function with limited risk of performance degradation. This
approach is partially due to the methodology by which equipment is installed on ships. For
system applications other than ships, it is generally the responsibility of the system integrator to
ensure that fields internal to the system are controlled to levels consistent with immunity
characteristics of installed equipment.
Requirement Guidance (A5.2.2): Many types of electronic equipment are used on ships which
have not been designed to be used in higher level electric field environment. Most predominant
in this group are NDI and commercial items. Therefore, the EME must be controlled to provide
a level of assurance that the equipment will operate properly.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.2.2): Compatibility problems have been experienced with
electronic equipment due to inadequate control of field coupling below deck.
Verification Rationale (A5.2.2): Testing is the only reliable method to determine the coupled
EME to a reasonable level of certainty.
Verification Guidance (A5.2.2): Testing needs to be performed with frequency selective

receivers (spectrum analyzer or EMI receiver) and appropriate antennas such as those used in the
RE102 test procedures of MIL-STD-461. Broadband omnidirectional E-field sensors, such as
those used in the RS103 test procedures of MIL-STD-461, can be used to search for areas of
higher fields. Since these devices are broadband, they will detect the resultant E-field from all
sources present within the bandpass of the device. The dominant source of the reading may not
be obvious. Also, since these devices do not use the peak detection function present in spectrum
analyzers and EMI receivers, indicated levels may be well below actual peak levels, particularly
for pulsed fields.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.2.2): Measurements of the electric fields below deck is the
only means of verifying compliance with the internal EME requirements.
A5.2.3 Multipaction. For space applications, equipment and subsystems shall be free of
multipaction effects. Compliance shall be verified by test and analysis.
Requirement Rationale (A5.2.3): It is essential that RF transmitting equipment and signals not
be degraded by the action of multipaction. It is essential that multipaction not result in spurious
signals that interfere with receivers.
Requirement Guidance (A5.2.3): Multipaction is a resonant RF effect that happens in a high

vacuum. An RF field accelerates free electrons resulting in collisions with surfaces creating
secondary electrons. If the frequency of the signal is such that the RF field changes polarity in
concert with the production of the secondary electrons, the secondary electrons are then
accelerated resulting in more electrons leading to a major discharge and possible equipment
damage. The guiding document for multipaction analysis is NASA TR 32-1500. This effect can
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be much worse in the presence of low partial pressure Paschen-minimum gasses, such as
Helium. Helium venting during ascent is common on expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.2.3): Connectors, cables, and antennas have all been
involved in multipaction incidents. Sometimes, the application of insulators on antennas or a
vent in connectors is sufficient to limit multipaction or damage. In some cases, transmitted
signal strength has been severely impacted. Multipaction in RF amplifier circuitry has been
implicated in semiconductor and insulator degradation.
Verification Rationale (A5.2.3): Multipaction is a resonant phenomenon in the dimensions of

frequency and power. Secondary electron emission decreases as electron energy rises. So a
rapid increase in power (for example, a radar pulse) may well reduce the probability of
multipaction. Analysis is absolutely necessary to determine how margin is shown. Since
multipaction can show flaws in machining and dielectrics that no other test will indicate, testing
also must be performed.
Verification Guidance (A5.2.3): All components experiencing RF levels in excess of 5 watts

(less in space environments) need to be tested for multipaction. The test equipment must provide
adequate power and transient levels to show margin with respect to the operating state. VSWR
measurements provide a crude method of detecting multipaction; however, it is better to detect
free electrons or changes in harmonic emissions.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.2.3): For multipaction to occur, seed electrons must be
present. In space, these electrons are provided by radiation. Some tests at sea level have shown
no multipaction on components, while severe multipaction occurred in orbit. It is vital that a
source of radiation or electrons be provided to get an accurate test. Some claim that some metals
like aluminum are self-seeding. However, since the effect is strongly dependent on surface
treatment, aluminum should not be depended upon to be self-seeding.
A5.3 External RF EME. The system shall be electromagnetically compatible with its defined
external RF EME such that its system operational performance requirements are met. For
systems (including fixed and rotary wing aircraft) employed in shipboard applications, Table 1A
shall be used for operations on the deck, and Table 1B shall be used for operations that can
occur in the mainbeam of the transmitters. For space and launch vehicle systems applications,
Table 1C shall be used. For ground systems, Table 1D shall be used. For Army rotary wing
aircraft, Table 1E shall be used. For fixed wing aircraft applications, where shipboard
operations are excluded, Table 1F shall be used. Systems exposed to more than one of the
defined EMEs shall use the worst case composite of the applicable EMEs. External RF EME
covers compatibility with, but is not limited to, EME’s from like platforms (such as aircraft in
formation flying, ship with escort ships, and shelter-to-shelter in ground systems), friendly
emitters and hostile emitters. Compliance shall be verified by system, subsystem, and equipment
level tests; analysis; or a combination thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.3): The threat presented by RF emitters around the world is
becoming increasingly more hostile. Increased multi-national military operations, proliferation
of both friendly and hostile weapons systems, and the expanded use of the spectrum worldwide
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have resulted in operational EMEs not previously encountered. It is therefore essential that these
environments be defined and used to establish the inter-system EMC design requirements.
Documents such as MIL-HDBK-235 list various land-based, ship-based, airborne, and battle-
force emitters and associated environments. The electromagnetic fields from these emitters,
which may illuminate systems, are very high and can degrade system performance if they are not
properly addressed. Even relatively low power personal communication system (PCS) items
such as cellular phones, used in close proximity to sensitive electronic items, can create
electromagnetic fields sufficient to degrade performance.
Operational problems resulting from the adverse effects of electromagnetic energy on EIDs in
ordnance systems are well documented. Problems include premature detonation, component failure,
and unreliable BIT indications. These problems underscore the importance of designing ordnance
systems that are compatible with their intended operational EME.
Joint service operations further increase the potential for safety and reliability problems if the system
is exposed to operational EMEs different from those for which they were designed. For example,
Army systems, if designed for compatibility with a ground operations EME, may be adversely
affected by exposure to a Navy shipboard “joint” environment.
The same transmitter does not necessarily drive the peak and average levels in a particular frequency
range in any table. The average electric field levels in the tables are based on the average output
power, which is the product of the maximum peak output power of the transmitter and maximum
duty cycle. Duty cycle is the product of pulse width and pulse repetition frequency. VAvg =
1/2
VPeak x (duty cycle) . This applies to pulsed systems only. The average power for non-pulsed
signals is the same as the peak power (that is, no modulation present).
Table 1A describes a composite of calculated and measured levels present on deck of various ships.
Table 1B describes fields present at a 50 foot distance from the mainbeam of transmitters onboard
various ships.
Note that the deck levels in Table 1A are higher than the main beam values in Table 1B in some
frequency bands. This situation is due to the Navy making a conscious decision to base the deck
EME levels on the Permissible Exposure Levels (PELs) in DoDI 6055.11 in some bands to allow
for situations where external emitters may be brought onboard a ship or emitters may be operated
in a maintenance mode with the antenna in an unusual position.
Table 1C was created by combining environments from several sources. Calculation of fields
from S-Band transmitter located near avionics yields values on the order of 20 volts/meter. This
value is the baseline level used in the table. Radars associated with launch sites attenuate their
outputs to limit fields to 10 volts/meter. NASA CR 4776, “The On-Orbit Radio Frequency
Environment,” used the Joint Spectrum Center data base to evaluate environments at a 200
nautical mile orbit and 90 degree inclination. Also, studies were conducted on Eastern and
Western launch sites using the Joint Spectrum Center data base with the largest emitters being
verified and updated as necessary. The work was based solely on presently existing systems.
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Table 1D describes the minimum baseline EME for ground systems. The EME values for Table
1D were derived from a ground scenario assuming certain separation distances from various
classes of emitters. Dips in the EME were smoothed out so as not to imply a level of fidelity that
does not really exist and to simplify testing.
Table 1E provides the external EME for Army rotary wing aircraft. The environment is derived
from a combination of the FAA/JAA Rotorcraft Severe environment, the US Navy shipboard
mainbeam field levels and the environment anticipated by operating around other aircraft (U.S.
and coalition partners), airfields, and special use and expeditionary airspace. The databases
include both "red" and "gray" countries' emitters, which rotorcraft may be operating in
conjunction with or in their airspace. The minimum distance from ground emitters that is
assumed for low level (Nap-Of-Earth) flights is set at 150 meters and the distance from other
aircraft can be assumed to be as close as 50 meters.
Table 1F is a modified environment primarily based on work by the SAE AE-4R subcommittee
and the European organization EUROCAE Working Group to determine “severe” EME levels
seen by fixed wing commercial aircraft. This environment represents a good baseline that fixed
wing military aircraft should meet. The environment has been verified by examining the
databases for accuracy and by taking measurements of field strength through flight tests at
selected sites. The civil airline community refers to this EME as the high intensity radiated
fields (HIRF) environment.
The SAE AE-4R subcommittee and EUROCAE developed the “Guide for the Certification of
Aircraft in a High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Environment” in a cooperative effort to
provide detailed approaches for certification. EUROCAE issued the guide as ED-107; however,
the SAE document has not been released.
Assumptions for the calculation of the Table 1F EME environment are as follows. These details
are provided as an example to demonstrate the many parameters that can be considered in
developing a particular environment and to help in interpreting the environment.
a. All single (one-of-a-kind) transmitters and those in restricted air space are excluded.
b. Main beam illumination by transmitting antenna is assumed.
c. Maximum main beam gain of a transmitter antenna is used.
d. Modulation of a transmitted signal is not considered except that a duty cycle is used to
calculate the average power for pulsed transmitters.
e. Constructive ground reflections of high frequency (HF) signals - that is, direct and
reflected waves - are assumed to be in phase.
f. Non-cumulative field strength is calculated. Simultaneous illumination by more than one

antenna is not considered.
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g. Near-field corrections for the aperture and phased-array antennas are used.
h. Field strengths are calculated at minimum distances which are dependent on location of
the transmitter and aircraft. The minimum distances are defined as follows.
(1) Airport environment
(a) 250 feet, slant range, for fixed transmitters within a 5-nautical-mile boundary
around the runway with the exception of airport surveillance radar and air route surveillance
radar. For these two radar types a 500-foot slant range is used.
(b) 500 feet, slant range, for fixed transmitters beyond a 5-nautical-mile boundary
around the runway.
(c) 50 feet for mobile emitters, including those on other commercial aircraft, and 150
feet for airborne weather radar.
(2) Air-to-air environment.
(a) 500 feet for non-interceptor aircraft with all transmitters operational.
(b) 100 feet for interceptor aircraft with only non-hostile transmitters operational.
(c) Airborne warning and control aircraft are excluded.
(3) Ship-to-air environment. A 2.4% gradient is used for the aircraft flight path, clearing
the antenna by 300 feet. The ship is assumed to be 2.5 nautical miles from the end of the
runway. Slant range is computed using maximum elevation angle. Where maximum elevation
angle is not available, 45 degrees is used.
(4) Ground environments, including airport transmitters, while aircraft is in flight.

Aircraft are assumed to be at a minimum flight altitude of 500 feet and avoiding all obstructions,
including transmitters, by 500 feet. Slant range is calculated for the maximum elevation angle
for the transmitter antenna. If maximum elevation angle is not available, 90 degrees is assumed.
i. Field strength for each frequency band is the maximum for all transmitters within that
band.
j. Peak field strength is based on the maximum authorized power of the transmitter and
maximum antenna gain less system losses (estimated at 3 dB, if not known).
k. For transmitters in special use airspace, fields are calculated at the perimeter of the special
use airspace.
Rotary wing aircraft for the Army are required to meet Table 1E. Fixed wing aircraft Army
aviation systems are required to meet Table 1F. For Army systems, the actual operational
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APPENDIX
electromagnetic environment is highly dependent upon operational requirements and should be

defined by the procuring activity. The EME of these tables provide a starting point for an
analysis to develop the actual external radiated field environment based on the system's
operational requirements. The actual levels for most Army ground equipment will be
somewhere in between the minimum baseline (Table 1D) and the shipboard operations EME in
Tables 1A and 1B. However, it is possible, due to special operational requirements or
restrictions, for the actual environment to be higher or lower than these EME values. There is no
substitute for well thought out criteria for a system based on its operational requirements.
An relevant aspect of environment definition is the development of both modulation and

polarization requirements, in order to fully describe the peak and average fields over the entire
frequency range. These requirements need to be based on the operational modulations of
friendly, hostile, and civilian systems. For instance, amplitude modulation (AM) may cause
substantial interference at low field levels, whereas continuous wave (CW) at significantly
higher levels may not cause any interference. This type of difference can hold true for frequency
modulation (FM) and pulse modulation (PM), as well as variations in polarization (vertical,
horizontal, and circular).
Requirement Guidance (A5.3): The EME in which military systems and equipment must
operate is created by a multitude of sources. The contribution of each emitter may be described
in terms of its individual characteristics including: power level, modulation, frequency,
bandwidth, antenna gain (mainbeam and sidelobe), antenna scanning, and so forth. These
characteristics are important in determining the potential impact on system design. A high-
powered emitter may illuminate the system for only a very short time due to its search pattern or
may operate at a frequency where effects are minimized.
Antenna-connected receivers are not generally expected to operate without some performance
degradation for the EME levels specified in the tables. In all cases, the receiver needs to be
protected against burn-out. While the tables express the requirements in terms of a single level
over a frequency band, it is quite unlikely that actual threat transmitters that drive the levels in
the tables will be at the tuned frequency of a particular receiver. Some wide band devices, such
as electronic warfare warning receivers, would tend to be the exception. It also needs to be
recognized that the tables represent levels that will be seen infrequently in most instances.
Antenna-connected receivers have often been designed to operate without degradation with an out-
of-band signal of 0 dBm present at the antenna port and levels that are 80 dB above sensitivity for
signals within the tunable range (see early versions of MIL-STD-461). Since the levels represent
reasonable requirements for minimum performance, receivers usually will perform substantially
better. Calculations using the fields in the tables and typical receiver antenna characteristics show
that levels at the receivers may be on the order of 50 dBm for peak fields and 30 dBm for average
fields. Receiver performance cannot be assured without the use of external filtering. If there are
operational performance issues with the absolute need for a particular receiver to be totally
functional in a particular environment, design measures need to be implemented.
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The external EME must be determined for each system. When considering the external EMEs
(flight deck, airborne, battlefield and so forth), the following areas should be included in the
evaluation.
a. Mission requirements. The particular emitters to which the system will be exposed
depend upon its intended use. MIL-HDBK-235 provides information on the characteristics of
many friendly and hostile transmitters.
b. Appropriate standoff distance from each emitter. MIL-HDBK-235 typically specifies

fields 50 feet from the emitter. Fields at the distance that the system will pass by the
transmitting antenna need to be determined.
c. The number of sites and where they are located. The probability of intercept for each
emitter and the dwell time should be calculated.
d. If applicable, high power microwave and ultra-wideband emitters should be included.
e. Operational performance requirements with options such as survivable only, degraded

performance acceptable, or full performance required.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.3): Without specific design and verification requirements,
problems caused by the external EME typically are not discovered until the system becomes
operational. By the time interference is identified, the system can be well into the production
phase of the program, and changes will be expensive. In the past, the EME generated by the
system's onboard RF subsystems (electronic warfare, radars, communications, and navigation)
produced the controlling environment for many systems. From a probability of exposure, these
items still play a critical role. However, with external transmitter power levels increasing, the
external transmitters can drive the overall system environment.
Issues with external RF EMEs have become more visible due to more joint operations among the
military services and unforeseen uses of systems. For example, some aircraft and weapons that
were not originally intended for shipboard use have been deployed onboard ships.
A complication with modern systems is the use of specialized structural materials. The classic
system is made of aluminum, titanium, or steel structures. Modern technology and the need to
develop higher performance systems are providing alternatives using composites such as carbon-
epoxy and kevlar structure. Metals can provide good shielding against the EME and protection
for electronic circuits. Electrically conductive composites typically provide system shielding
comparable to metal at higher frequencies (approximately 100 MHz); however, at lower
frequencies they do not perform as well. Some structure is made of non-conductive composites
such as kevlar which provide no shielding, unless they are treated with appropriate finishes.
High-powered shipboard radars have caused interference to satellite terminals located on other
ships, resulting in loss of lock on the satellite and complete disruption of communication. The
interference disables the satellite terminal for up to 15 minutes, which is the time required to re-
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APPENDIX
establish the satellite link. Standoff distances of up 20 nautical miles between ships are required
to avoid the problem.
A weapon system suffered severe interference due to insufficient channel selectivity in the
receiver’s front end. Energy originating from electronic warfare systems and another nearby
“sister” channelized weapon system (operating on a different channel but within the same
passband) coupled into the victim receiver and was “processed,” severely degrading target
detection and tracking capability. Installation of an electronically tuned filter immediately after
the antenna countered the off-channel interference problem by: 1) eliminating receiver front-end
amplifier saturation and 2) reducing overload of the system processor with extraneous in-band
signals.
An aircraft lost anti-skid braking capability upon landing due to RF fields from a ground radar
changing the weight-on-wheels signal from a proximity switch. The signal indicated to the
aircraft that it was airborne and disabled the anti-skid system.
An aircraft experienced uncommanded flight control movement when flying in the vicinity of a
high power transmitter, resulting in the loss of the aircraft. If the mission profile of the aircraft
and the anticipated operational EME had been more accurately considered, this catastrophe
could have been averted.
Aircraft systems have experienced self-test failures and fluctuations in cockpit instruments, such
as engine speed indicators and fuel flow indicators, caused by sweeping shipboard radars during
flight-deck operations. These false indications and test failures have resulted in numerous
unnecessary pre-flight aborts.
Aircraft on approach to carrier decks have experienced interference from shipboard radars. One
such problem involved the triggering of false "Wheels Warning" lights, indicating that the
landing gear is not down and locked. A wave-off or preflight abort could occur due to this EMI
induced condition.
Aircrews have reported severe interference to communications with and among flight deck crew
members. UHF emissions in the flight deck environment caused interference severe enough that
crews could not hear each other for aircrew coordination. This problem poses a serious hazard to
personnel with the potential for damage to, or loss of, the aircraft and aircrew during carrier
flight deck operations.
Verification Rationale (A5.3): There are many different RF environments that a system will be
exposed to during its lifespan. Many threats will be seen only infrequently. Normal operational
testing of a system may expose it to only a limited number of threats. Dedicated testing and
analysis are required to verify the system capability in all RF environments it may see.
Verification Guidance (A5.3): External RF EME testing should be performed under laboratory
conditions where the system under test and the simulated environment are controlled. Undesired
system responses may require an electromagnetic vulnerability (EMV) analysis to determine the
impact of the laboratory observed susceptibility on system operational performance. Only under
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unusual circumstances is system verification accomplished or system susceptibilities

investigated by operational testing in the actual external EME. There is much less control on
variable conditions, fewer system functions can generally be exercised, and expenses can be
much greater. The results of the EMV analysis and operational testing guide the possible need
for system modification, additional analysis or testing.
System-level testing of large platforms such as aircraft, tanks, and ships, are usually done in an
open area test site. The system’s inter-system environment is evaluated to determine: which
frequencies are of interest from the possible emitters to be encountered by the system when
deployed, optimum coupling frequencies to the system, potential system EMV frequencies,
available simulators, and authorized test frequencies that can be radiated. Based on these
considerations and other unique factors to the system or program, a finite list of test emitters is
derived. For each test emitter the system is illuminated and evaluated for susceptibilities. The
test emitters may be swept with fixed frequency steps or may dwell at selected frequencies. For
air delivered ordnance, system-level testing should include: preflight, captive-carry, and free-flight
configurations.
Ideally, the entire system should be illuminated uniformly at full threat for the most credible
demonstration of hardness. However, at most frequencies, test equipment does not exist to
accomplish this task. Established test techniques are based on the size of the system compared
to the wavelength of test frequency. At frequencies where the system is small compared to the
wavelength of the illumination frequency (normally below 30 MHz), it is necessary to illuminate
the entire system uniformly or to radiate the system such that appropriate electromagnetic
stresses are developed within the system. Where illumination of the entire system is not
practical, various aspects of the system’s major physical dimensions should be illuminated to
couple the radiated field to the system structure. At frequencies (normally above 400 MHz)
where the size of the system is large compared to the wavelength, localized (spot) illumination is
adequate to evaluate potential responses by illuminating specific apertures, cables and
subsystems. 30 to 400 MHz is a transition region from one concept to the other where either
technique may be appropriate, dependent upon the system and the environment simulator.
Typically, for a new system, 4 to 6 positions are used for low frequency illumination and 12 to
36 positions are used for spot illumination at higher frequencies. The emitters are radiated
sequentially in both vertical and horizontal polarization. It usually is not practical to use circular
and cross polarization. For an existing system which is undergoing retesting after installation of
a new subsystem, 2 positions are normally used for low frequencies and 2 to 4 positions for high
frequencies.
For the situation where the external environment exceeds all available simulators or it is
necessary to achieve whole system illumination, the method of bulk current testing may be used.
The system can be illuminated from a distance to obtain near uniform illumination but at low
levels. The induced current on the cable bundles from the uniform external field is measured.
The induced current levels are then scaled to full current level based on the system’s external
environment. These extrapolated levels are compared to electromagnetic interference data on
individual subsystems and equipment. If sufficient data in not available, cables can be driven at
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APPENDIX
required levels on-board the system to evaluate the performance of the system. The cable drive
technique has been applied up to 400 MHz.
The system during an inter-system EMC test is evaluated as a victim of interference from the
environment. Modes of subsystems and equipment should include: BIT, operational procedures
common to the test emitter environment, (for example, carrier deck operations versus airborne
weapons release for an aircraft), and backup modes.
Pre-flight inter-system testing of air delivered ordnance is conducted to ensure that the system can
successfully perform those pre-flight operations required during service use. Operations such as
aircraft initiated BIT and mission or target data up-loading and down-loading are performed while
exposing the weapon to the test EME.
Captive-carry inter-system testing of air delivered ordnance is conducted to verify weapon

survivability following exposure to the main beam operational EMEs. Since this test simulates the
weapon passing through the radar’s main beam during takeoff and landing of the host platform, the
weapon should be operated as specified for those flight conditions - typically standby or off. The
duration of weapon exposure to the EMEs from the main beam should be based on normal
operational considerations. Verification of system survivability may, in many cases, be made
utilizing the weapon BIT function. However, if this is not possible, verification utilizing an
appropriate system test set is required.
Free-flight testing of ordnance is performed utilizing an inert, instrumented weapon which is

suspended in a noise free environment (anechoic chamber) simulating free space or a mode-stirred
chamber. Since the RF entry points and aspect angles associated with specific susceptibilities cannot
be determined in the mode-stirred chamber, use of the anechoic chamber is sometimes required.
The free-flight test program consists of evaluating weapon performance during the launch, cruise,
and terminal phases of flight, while exposed to friendly and hostile EMEs.
The formal verification test of a system for inter-system EMC usually comes late in system
development. A system such as an aircraft often undergoes extensive development and
integration tests first. The external environment that may be encountered during these tests must
be reviewed and the status of the aircraft with regard to the environment must be evaluated for
safety prior to flight. EMI testing of the subsystems can be used as a baseline of hardness.
Limited inter-system testing of the systems for safety concerns due to specific emitters may be
necessary or possible restriction on allowable operation (such as aircraft flight paths) may need
to be imposed.
For the US Army aircraft community, system-level testing is performed on rotorcraft under the
conditions in Table A1. The fourth and fifth columns specify pulse modulation parameters to be
used for the peak and average fields in Table 1E. In addition, testing is performed at the reduced
electric field levels in the second column of Table A1 using the modulation types listed in the
third column. This additional testing is intended to demonstrate performance for the types of
modulations used in communications.
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Verification Lessons Learned (A5.3): Failure to perform adequate inter-system EMC analysis
or testing prior to system deployment has reduced the operation effectiveness and or availability
of military platforms, systems, ordnance, and equipment. For instance, a review of the numerous
reports in the Navy’s Air Management Information Tracking System (AMITS) data base
demonstrates that over half of reported incidents could have been prevented by completing an
adequate verification program during the system’s development. Access to the AMITS data base
for personnel with a demonstrated need can be arranged through the Naval Air Warfare Center,
Aircraft Division, Code AIR-4.1.7, Patuxent River, MD.
Field problems and test results have shown the main concern for system degradation is the
frequency range below 5 GHz with the majority of major problems below 1 GHz. At system
resonance, maximum coupling usually occurs with the environment. Resonance of the system
structural features, apertures, and cables is usually between 1 MHz and 1 GHz. Test data
indicates a linear increase in induced cable current levels with the frequency up to the quarter-
wave resonance of a structure where induced levels flatten out and oscillate up and down at the
quarter-wave level with increasing frequency. To detect these resonances during test, it is
desirable to either sweep or use small increments of frequency.
TABLE A1. Specialized Rotorcraft Testing
Electric Field for Modulation for Pulse Modulation for

Frequency Simulating Simulating Peak/Average Fields in Table 1E
(MHz) Communications Communications Pulse Width Pulse Rep Freq
(V/m – rms) (µS) (Hz)
0.01 - 2 200 CW, AM
2 - 20 200 CW, AM 833.3 300
20 - 25 200 CW, AM, FM 833.3 300
25 - 150 200 CW, AM, FM
150 - 250 200 AM, FM 20.0 - 25.0 200 - 310
250 - 500 200 AM, FM 25.0 - 33.0 300
500 - 1000 200 AM, FM 33.0 100 - 300
1000 - 2000 200 AM, FM 1.0 - 2.0 670 - 1000
2000 - 4000 200 AM, FM 1.0 250 - 600
4000 - 8000 200 AM, FM 1.0 - 2.0 250
8000 - 10000 200 AM, FM 1.0 150 -250
10000 - 40000 200 CW, FM 1.0 1000
The predominance of problems at lower frequencies can be explained by considering coupling of

a field to the area of a tuned aperture (λ2/4π), which is proportional to the wavelength (λ) of the
frequency squared. This aperture is an ideal area which is optimized for coupling maximum
power from an incident field. This expression is multiplied in antenna theory by the gain of the
antenna to determine the capture area of the antenna. The gain is simply assumed to be unity in
this case. This concept can be viewed as either direct coupling through an aperture (opening) in
system structure or coupling directly to subsystem circuitry treated as an antenna. As the
wavelength becomes smaller with increasing frequency, the capture area becomes smaller and
the received power is lower. In addition, as the frequency is increased, electrical cables are
relatively poor transmission lines and coupling into subsystem becomes even less efficient,
which leaves only direct penetration of enclosures as the main coupling path into the subsystem.
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As an example of the wavelength effect, the power coupled into a tuned aperture at 10 MHz for a
given power density will be one million times greater than the power coupled into a tuned
aperture at 10 GHz for the same power density: (λ1/λ2)2 = (30 meters/0.03 meters)2 = 1,000,000.
Typical test equipment used for the CW and high duty cycle tests are broadband distributed
tube/transistor amplifiers and traveling wave tube (TWT) amplifiers together with long wire,
vertical whip, double ridge horns, or dipole antennas. Typical test equipment used for pulsed
tests are cavity tuned amplifiers, low duty cycle TWTs, magnetrons and klystrons with high gain
horns.
A5.4 Lightning. The system shall meet its operational performance requirements for both
direct and indirect effects of lightning. Ordnance shall meet its operational performance
requirements after experiencing a near strike in an exposed condition and a direct strike in a
stored condition. Ordnance shall remain safe during and after experiencing a direct strike in an
exposed condition. Figure 1 provides aspects of the lightning environment that are relevant for
protection against direct effects. Figure 2 and Table 2A provide aspects of the lightning
environment associated with a direct strike that are relevant for protecting the platform from
indirect effects. Table 2B shall be used for the near lightning strike environment. Compliance
shall be verified by system, subsystem, equipment, and component (such as structural coupons
and radomes) level tests, analysis, or a combination thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.4): There is no doubt that lightning is hazardous for systems and
that systems must include provisions for lightning protection. There is no known technology to
prevent lightning strikes from occurring; however, lightning effects can be minimized with
appropriate design techniques.
Lightning effects on systems can be divided into direct (physical) and indirect (electromagnetic)
effects. The physical effects of lightning are the burning and eroding, blasting, and structural
deformation caused by lightning, as well as the high pressure shock waves and magnetic forces
produced by the associated high currents. The indirect effects are those resulting from the
electromagnetic fields associated with lightning and the interaction of these electromagnetic
fields with equipment in the system. Hazardous effects can be produced by lightning that does
not directly contact system structure (nearby strikes). In some cases, both physical and
electromagnetic effects may occur to the same component. An example would be a lightning
strike to an antenna which physically damages the antenna and also sends damaging voltages
into the transmitter or receiver connected to that antenna. DOT/FAA/CT-89/22 is an excellent
source of lightning characteristics and design guidance.
An additional reason for requiring protection is potential effects on personnel. For example,
serious electrical shock may be caused by currents and voltages conducted via mechanical
control cables or wiring leading to the cockpit of an aircraft from control surfaces or other
hardware struck by lightning. This effect can be quite hazardous in high performance aircraft,
particularly under the thunderstorms conditions during which lightning strikes generally occur.
Shock can also be induced on flight crews under dielectric covers such as canopies by the intense
thunderstorm electric fields. One of the most troublesome effects is flash blindness, which
54
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invariably occurs to a flight crew member looking out of the aircraft in the direction of the
lightning and may persist for 30 seconds or more.
Requirement Guidance (A5.4): The direct effects environment is described in Figure 1. The
indirect effects environment is described in Table 2A and Figure 2. In Table 2A, the indirect
effects environment is defined by specifying parameters of a double exponential waveform
(except for component C, which is a rectangular pulse) for the various electrical current
components. Figure 2 represents a model of the properties of lightning events which include a
series of strokes of significant current spaced over time (multiple stroke) and many individual
strokes of lower current more closely spaced and grouped in bursts over time (multiple burst).
This model is intended to be associated only with potential upset of electronics through indirect
effects and is not intended to address physical damage issues. Figure A1 identifies important
characteristics of the double exponential waveform and wavefront which are listed in Table A2
for each of the indirect effects current components. Both the direct and indirect effects
environments are derived from SAE ARP5412. This ARP contains a more detailed description
of the environment than provided above and includes additional waveforms.
TABLE A2. Lightning indirect effects waveform characteristics
Current Peak Action Decay Time to Time to Time to Rate of Peak rate
compo- current Integral to 50% 10% 90% Peak rise of rise
nent t = 0+
2
(kA) (A s) (µs) (µs) (µs) (µs)
(A/s) (A/s)
6 11 11
A 200 2.0x10 69 0.15 3.0 6.4
1.0x10 1.4x10
@ 0.5 µs
B Produces average current of 2 kA over a 5 millisecond period
C Defined as rectangular waveform for analysis purposes of 400 A for 500 milliseconds
6 11 11
D 100 0.25x10 34.5 0.08 1.5 3.18 1.0x10 1.4x10
@ 0.25µs
4 11 11
D/2 50 6.25x10 34.5 0.08 1.5 3.18 0.5x10 0.7x10
@ 0.25µs
11
H 10 N/A 4.0 0.0053 0.11 0.24 N/A 2.0x10
Table 2B is a special case applied to ordnance for a nearby lightning strike. The indirect
lightning requirements specified in Table 2A and Figure 2 are associated with the electrical
properties of a direct attachment of lightning. Ordnance is not generally required to function
after a direct attachment in the exposed condition. However, it must survive the electromagnetic
coupling effects of a near strike as defined in Table 2B. Ordnance is required to survive a direct
attachment to the container where the ordnance is stored.
The near strike parameters in Table 2B are derived by modeling the lightning stroke as a vertical
line charge. Use of Ampere’ Law for a constant magnetic field strength at a distance “r” away
from the channel and taking the time derivative produces :
dH (t ) dI (t )
= / 2πr where H is magnetic field, I is current, and r is the distance from the channel.
dt dt
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Using the maximum rate of change for Current Component A in Table A2 produces the magnetic
field rate of change in the Table 2B for a distance of 10 meters. For safety hazards, a minimum
separation distance of 10 meters is assumed. Smaller separation distances are regarded as a
direct strike event. Alternative separation distances for specific systems can be theoretically
calculated by utilizing the "cone of protection" or "rolling sphere" calculation techniques.
Additionally, for system survivability, separation distances greater than 10 meters may be
acceptable when combined with appropriate analysis and justification. The development of the
electric field rate of change is too involved for presentation in this standard. It is based on
modeling a vertical leader approaching the earth as a line charge a specified distance above the
ground. For the detailed development of the requirement, see US Army report TR-RD-TE-97-
01.
Time to peak
Peak current Peak current
Time to 90%
∫ i dt
2
Action integral: CURRENT
CURRENT
Decay to 50 % Rate of rise @ __ µs
Time to 10%
Peak rate of rise @ t = 0+
TIME (NOT TO SCALE) TIME (NOT TO SCALE)
WAVEFORM WAVEFRONT
FIGURE A1. Lightning indirect effects waveform parameters
As nearby lightning gets closer to an object, the effects approach those associated with the
definitions for direct or indirect lightning. The peak field intensity of extremely close lightning
can reach 3X106 V/m. For any system hardened against the defined indirect effects lightning
requirement, protection against nearby lightning is included. Many ground systems can accept
some risk that the system operate only after a moderate lightning strike at a reasonable distance.
For example, a requirement for equipment in a tactical shelter to survive a 90th percentile
lightning strike at 50 m may represent a reasonable risk criteria for that shelter. This type of
requirement would result in a high level of general lightning protection at a reduced design and
test cost.
The direct and indirect effects environments, while describing the same threat, are defined
differently to account for their use. The direct effects environment is oriented toward supporting
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available test methodology to assess the ability of hardware to protect against the threat. The
indirect effects environment is more slanted toward supporting analysis. While these
environments were developed for aircraft applications, they should represent a reasonable
environment definition for other systems. Some recent measurements of natural lightning have
indicated that spectral content of some strikes at higher frequencies may be greater than
represented by the defined lightning models. For small systems, there could be some
enhancement of coupling due to exciting of resonances
In addition to ARP5412 previously mentioned, the SAE AE-2 committee has issued several
other documents that thoroughly address the lightning discipline. ARP5413 and ARP5415 deal
with certification of aircraft for indirect effects protection, ARP5577 provides guidance on
certification of aircraft for direct effects protection, and ARP5414 addresses lightning zoning for
aircraft. The SAE AE-2 committee is working on ARP5416, which details test methodology for
evaluating both the direct and indirect effects of lightning.
While all airborne systems need to be protected against the effects of a lightning strike, not all
systems require the same level of protection. For example, an air-launched missile may only
need to be protected to the extent necessary to prevent damage to the aircraft carrying the
missile.
Direct effects protection on all-metal aircraft has been generally limited to protection of the fuel
system, antennas, and radomes. Most of the aircraft lost due to lightning strikes have been the
result of fuel tank arcing and explosion. Other losses have been caused by indirect effects arcing
in electrical wiring in fuel tanks. As aircraft are built with nonmetallic structures, protection of
the fuel system becomes much more difficult and stricter attention to details is required. In
general, some metal will have to be put back into nonmetallic structures to provide adequate
lightning protection. FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-53 and its users manual provide
requirements for protection of aircraft fuel systems.
In aircraft, lightning protection against indirect effects has become much more important due to
the increased use of electrically and electronically controlled flight and engine systems. Also,
the nonmetallic skins that are being used on aircraft to save weight provide less shielding to the
electromagnetic fields associated with lightning strikes. FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-136 and
its users manual provide indirect effects protection information. Section 22 of DO-160 provides
detailed indirect effects requirements for aircraft electronic equipment that are not covered by
MIL-STD-461.
If these documents are considered for use, the hazard terminology and various indirect effects
transients requirements used by the civil air community need to be reviewed regarding their
applicability to particular military procurements.
For space systems, the launch facility is expected to provide protection for the space and launch
vehicles from a direct lightning strike. The space and launch vehicles themselves are not
normally required to survive a direct strike. Indirect effects requirements for the space and
launch vehicles apply for electromagnetic fields at a 100 meter or greater distance. The system
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should be capable of detecting any loss in operational performance before launch caused by a
lightning strike.
Specific protection measures for ground facilities are highly dependent on the types of physical
structures and equipment involved. Devices such as lightning rods, arrestors, ground grids in the
pavement, and moisture content of the soil all influence the protection provided. The guidance
provided in MIL-STD-1542, MIL- HDBK-454, and NFPA 780 addresses different design
approaches to reduce lightning effects on equipment.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.4): Aircraft can be exposed to naturally occurring strikes
or may initiate the lightning strike. The naturally occurring strike to an aircraft is described as
follows. As an aircraft flies through an electric field between two charge centers, it diverts and
compresses adjacent equipotential lines. The highest electric fields will occur at the aircraft
extremities where the lines are most greatly compressed. If the aircraft intercepts a naturally-
occurring lightning flash, the on-coming step leader will intensify the electric field and induce
streamers from the aircraft extremities. One of these streamers will meet the nearest branch of
the advancing step leader forming a continuous spark from the cloud charge center to the
aircraft. The aircraft becomes part of the path of the leader on its way to a reservoir of opposite
polarity charge, elsewhere in the same cloud (intra-cloud strike), in another cloud (inter-cloud
strike), or on the ground (cloud-to-ground strike). In the case of aircraft initiated strikes, the
electric field induces leaders to start propagating from entry and exit of the aircraft. It is
believed that aircraft triggered lightning is the more common event.
High peak currents occur after the stepped leader completes the path between charge centers and
forms the return stroke. These peak currents are typically 30 - 40 kA; however, higher peak
currents are encountered with peak currents in excess of 200 kA. The current in the return stroke
rises rapidly with typical values of 10-20 kA/microsecond and rare values exceeding 100
kA/microsecond. Typically, the current decays to half its peak amplitude in 20-40
microseconds.
The lightning return stroke transports a few coulombs (C) of charge. Higher levels are
transported in the following two phases of the flash. The first is an intermediate phase with
currents of a few thousand amperes for a few milliseconds which transfers about 20 C. The
second is a continuing current phase with currents on the order of 200-400 amps flowing for 0.1
to 1 second, which transfers about 200 C.
Typical lightning events include several high current strokes following the first return stroke.
These occur at intervals of several milliseconds as different pockets in the cloud feed their
charge into the lightning channel. The peak amplitude of the restrikes is about one half of the
initial high current peak.
When lightning strikes a platform, the electrical current distributes throughout any electrically
conductive portions of the platform structure. Current levels that are developed internal to the
platform are strongly dependent upon external structural materials and associated “skin” effect
and current diffusion. For aircraft made of metallic structure, the currents on internal
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conductors, such as shielded cables, are often on the order of ten’s of amperes. For aircraft
using large amounts of graphite epoxy based structure, currents can be on the order of 10 kA.
Internal currents on electrical conductors within fuel tanks can cause arcing and sparking that
can potentially ignite fuel vapors if electrical bonding is not properly implemented. An
important aspect in fuel vapor areas is that the current appears on all types of electrically
conductive materials such as fuel tubes, hydraulic tubes, inerting lines, metal brackets, and
conduits. There have been recent cases where it was found after the fact that bonding was not
implemented properly and significant redesign efforts were required. There appears to be more
of a tendency for inadequate bonding when purely mechanical systems are involved and where
corrosion control concerns can dominate decisions.
The effects of lightning can cause physical damage to personnel and equipment. In one of
numerous documented lightning incidences, lightning appeared to enter a Navy aircraft nose,
travel down the right side, and exit on top of the right vertical tail. The pilot suffered from flash
blindness for 10-15 seconds. Upon regaining his vision, the pilot noticed all cockpit electrical
power was gone. After another 15 seconds had elapsed, all cockpit electrical power returned on
its own, with no cockpit indications of any equipment malfunction.
In another case, lightning attached to the nose pitot tube, inducing transients that damaged all 28
volt DC systems. The pilot, disoriented, broke out of a cloud bank at 2000 feet above the
ground, at 600 knots and a 45 degree dive. Nearly all cockpit instruments were dysfunctional -
compass, gyrohorizon, and so forth. A secondary effect occurred but was not uncovered for
several months. The lightning current path that carried the direct effects lightning current did
what it was supposed to do, but the path was not inspected on landing. Over 800 man-hours
were expended to correct electrical (28 volt DC) problems but no effort went into inspecting for
direct effects damage to ensure the lightning protection system was intact. The rigid coax from
the front of the radome to the bulkhead had elongated and nearly torn away from its attachment
point at the bulkhead due to magnetic forces involved. This damage reduced the effectiveness of
the designed lightning protection. Another secondary effect was the magnetization of all ferrous
material which caused severe compass errors. The entire aircraft had to be degaussed.
Verification Rationale (A5.4): Verification of lightning requirements is essential to

demonstrate that the design protects the system from the lightning threat environment.
Verification Guidance (A5.4): There is no single approach to verifying the design. A well-
structured test program supported by analysis is generally necessary. SAE ARP5413 contains
information on the elements that are accepted as leading to proof of design for indirect effects
protection. These same elements can be used for other electromagnetic effects areas such as
electromagnetic pulse and the external EME.
During development of an system design, numerous development tests and analyses are normally
conducted to sort out the optimum design. These tests and analyses can be considered part of the
verification process, but they must be properly documented. Document details should include
hardware definition, waveforms, instrumentation, and pass-fail criteria.
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Flight testing of aircraft often occurs prior to verification of lightning protection design. Under
this circumstance, the flight test program must include restrictions to prohibit flight within a
specified distance from thunderstorms, usually 25 miles. Lightning flashes sometimes occur
large distances from the thunderstorm clouds and can occur up to an hour after the storm appears
to have left the area. Large pockets of charge can remain that can be discharged by an aircraft
flying between oppositely charged pockets.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.4): The naturally occurring lightning event is a complex
phenomenon. The waveforms presented in this standard are the technical community's best
effort at simulating the natural environment for design and verification purposes. Use of these
waveforms does not necessarily guarantee that the design is adequate when natural lightning is
encountered. One example is an aircraft nose radome that had included lightning protection,
which had been verified as being adequate by testing techniques existing at the time. However,
when the aircraft was struck, natural lightning often punctured the radome. Subsequent testing
had been unable to duplicate the failure. However, the lightning community has now developed
new test methodology for radomes that can duplicate the failures.
The use of non-metallic (composite) materials for parts such as fuel tanks and aircraft wings
introduces the need for specific tests for sparking and arcing in these members. A test in the wet
wing of an aircraft identified streamering and arcing from fastener ends. The tests resulted in a
new process by the manufacturer to coat each fastener tip with an insulating cover.
A5.5 Electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The system shall meet its operational performance
requirements after being subjected to the EMP environment. This environment is classified and
is currently defined in MIL-STD-2169. This requirement is not applicable unless otherwise
specified by the procuring activity. Compliance shall be verified by system, subsystem, and
equipment level tests, analysis, or a combination thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.5): High-altitude EMP (HEMP) is generated by a nuclear burst

above the atmosphere which produces coverage over large areas and is relevant to many military
systems. The entire continental US area can be exposed to high-level fields with a few bursts.
MIL-STD-2169, a classified document, provides detailed descriptions of the components of the
threat waveforms (E1, E2, and E3). Figure A2 provides an unclassified version of the free-field
threat developed by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). In a nuclear war, it is
probable that most military systems will be exposed to HEMP.
Requirement Guidance (A5.5): EMP protection should be implemented for selected military
systems. Many systems do not have a specific need expressed in their operational requirements
for the EMP environment. In these instances, EMP requirements should not be imposed, since
protection and verification can merely add unnecessary acquisition costs.
HEMP is propagated as a plane wave. The direction of propagation with respect to a system is
determined by line of sight from the system to the burst point. Therefore, for systems located
directly beneath the burst, the electric field is horizontally polarized (parallel to the earth’s
surface), whereas for systems located near the tangent to the earth from the burst point, the fields
are essentially vertically polarized. Also, the fields vary in a complex manner in amplitude and
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MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
polarization with respect to direction and angle from the burst point. Since it is generally
unknown where a system will be located with respect to the burst point, a prudent design
approach is to harden against the maximum threat-level field.
A composite waveform of the early-time (E1), mid-time (E2), and late-time (E3) HEMP
environment is shown in Figure A3.
60000
E 1 (t) = 0 when t <_ 0
-a1 t -b 1 t
=E 01 x k 1 (e -e ) when t > 0
50000
E 01 = 5x10 4 V/m
a 1 = 4x10 7 s -1
b 1 = 6x10 8 s -1
FIELD STRENGTH (V/m)
40000 k 1 = 1.3
30000
20000
10000
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
TIME (ns)
FIGURE A2. Unclassified free-field EMP environment (IEC 61000-2-9)
FIGURE A3. EMP environment (E1, E2, and E3)
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The prompt gamma HEMP (E1) couples well to local antennas, equipment in buildings (through
apertures), and to short and long conductive lines. E1 contains strong in-band signals for
coupling to MF, HF, VHF and some UHF radios. The most common protection against the
effects of E1 is accomplished using electromagnetic shielding, filters, and surge arresters. E1
can temporarily or permanently disrupt the operation of fixed, mobile, and transportable ground-
based systems, aircraft, missiles, surface ships, and electronic equipment and components. Thus,
E1 effects must be considered in protecting essentially all terrestrial military systems and
equipment that must be capable of operating in a HEMP environment.
Typical HEMP-induced currents on and in military systems are related to the lengths and shapes
of conductive elements (such as a fuselage); to the size, number, and location of apertures in
metal structural elements; to the size, number, and location of penetrating conductors; to the
overall shielding effectiveness; and to a number of other factors. For aircraft, and interconnected
ground vehicles, peak external currents are on the order of 1000’s of Amperes. Peak surface
currents on ships are on the order of 1000’s of Amperes while peak currents on isolated vehicles
of modest size are less than that of aircraft and ships. Currents on HF, LF, and VLF antennas
associated with these systems range from 100’s to 1000’s of Amperes.
The scattered gamma HEMP (E2a) couples well to long conductive lines, vertical antenna
towers, and aircraft with trailing wire antennas. Dominant frequencies are in the LF and VLF
range. Protection against E2a is accomplished using EM filters and surge arresters.
The neutron inelastic gamma HEMP (E2b) couples well to long overhead and buried conductive
lines and to extended VLF and LF antennas on submarines. Dominant frequencies overlap AC
power and audio spectrums making filtering difficult.
Magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) HEMP (E3) couples well to power and long communications
lines including undersea cables. Low frequency content (sub Hertz) makes shielding and
isolation difficult. Experience from magnetic storms and previous above-ground nuclear testing
indicates significant probability of commercial power and landline disruption.
Figure A2 only addresses E1, since it is the most common portion of the EMP waveform which
is imposed on systems. MIL-STD-2169 addresses all aspects of the threat.
The requirement wording addresses meeting operational performance requirements “after”

exposure to the EMP environment. This wording is recognition that at the instant of the EMP
event, the electrical transients present within the system may be causing some disruption of
performance. Immediately after the event or within some specified time frame (driven by system
operational performance requirements), the system must function properly.
MIL-STD-188-125-1 prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection of

ground-based command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) facilities
from mission-impacting damage and upset from the HEMP threat environments as defined in
MIL-STD-2169. MIL-STD-188-125-1 also addresses minimum testing requirements for
demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed
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protection subsystem provides the operationally required hardness for the completed facility.
The standard may also be used for other types of ground-based facilities that require hardening.
MIL-HDBK-423 contains guidance on implementing the requirements of MIL-STD-188-125-1.
MIL-STD-188-125-2 prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection of
transportable ground-based C4I facilities from mission-impacting damage and upset from the
HEMP threat environments as defined in MIL-STD-2169.
AFWL-TR-85-113 provides guidance on design considerations which address electromagnetic

pulse concerns for aircraft.
While ionizing radiation is not within the scope of this document, some space vehicles have
performance requirements during exposure to the ionizing radiation environments of a nuclear
anti-satellite weapon. In those cases, the space vehicle and associated payload electronics need
to be designed to operate through and survive the effects. Specific requirements should be
placed in relevant contracts.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.5): EMP poses a threat only to electrical and electronic
equipment in systems. There are no structural damage mechanisms; however, EMP induced
arcing of insulators on antenna systems can permanently damage the insulator, disabling the
antenna. The EMP waveform results in a broadband transient excitation of the system.
Transient currents are induced to flow at the natural resonance frequencies of the system.
Currents may flow into internal portions of the system through direct conduction on electrical
wiring or mechanical assemblies which penetrate external structure. The magnetic fields
produced by the large external currents may couple voltages and currents into wiring internal to
the system through any available apertures.
Ground-based military systems typically specify the HEMP environment even when other
components of the nuclear environment are not specified. This threat is a plane wave
electromagnetic field at ground level resulting from a high altitude burst. Hardening against
ground-burst nuclear radiation environments is often not cost effective because a burst near
enough to produce a radiation and electromagnetic threat is also close enough for the blast to
disable the facility.
The most commonly observed effect from EMP is system upset. Burnout of electronics has
occurred less frequently. However, as electronic chip sizes continue to decrease (sub-micron),
the amount of energy required for burnout will reduce, and designers must insure that adequate
interface protection is present. Upsets can range from mere nuisance effects, such as flickers on
displays and clicks in headsets, to complete lockups of systems. Upsets, which change the state
of a system, can be either temporary (resettable) or permanent. Some upset cases can be reset
almost instantaneously at the time a switch is activated while others, such as reloading of
software, may take minutes. With the introduction of safety critical functions controlled by
electronics in systems, potential effects from upsets can be life threatening.
Verification Rationale (A5.5): For systems with an EMP requirement, verification is necessary
to demonstrate that implemented measures provide required protection. Both analysis and test
are usually essential in verifying system performance.
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Verification Guidance (A5.5): Analysis is the starting point for initial system design and for
hardening allocations. Development tests are generally conducted to clarify analysis predictions
as well as to determine the optimum designs. These analyses and tests are part of the overall
design verification.
For many systems, the cost of EMP verification is a major driver. Therefore, the procuring
activity should decide what level of verification is consistent with the risk that they are willing to
take.
The following are elements of an iterative process for designing and verifying protection of a
system’s electrical and electronic equipment against the effects of EMP.
a. EMP coupling analysis. A coupling analysis is necessary to determine the EMP free-field
coupling into the system. Existing coupling data on similar system designs should be used
whenever possible. This analysis provides an estimate of the voltages and currents generated by
the EMP at each interface of each mission-critical equipment and can be used to establish stress
levels to be included in electromagnetic interference (EMI) requirements imposed on the
equipment. Requirements CS115, CS116, and RS105 of MIL-STD-461 provide a basis for
appropriate requirements for equipment.
b. Identification of relevant subsystems. Subsystems and equipment that may be affected by

EMP, and whose proper operation is critical or essential to the operation of the system, must be
identified. The equipment locations within the system need to be determined.
c. Equipment strength determination. The inherent hardness of equipment without specific

EMI susceptibility requirements needs to be determined. These results together with existing
EMI requirements on equipment establish a lower bound on the upset and damage thresholds for
each mission critical equipment.
d. Specification compliance demonstration. Verification that the system meets EMP design
requirements is accomplished by demonstrating that the actual transient levels appearing at the
equipment interfaces do not exceed the hardness levels of the individual equipment or subsystem
and that the required design margins have been met. Verification should be accomplished by a
combination of test and analysis.
MIL-STD-188-125-1 and MIL-STD-188-125-2 contain verification test methods for

demonstrating that C4I fixed ground-based and transportable facilities meet HEMP requirements.
The test methods describe coupling of threat-relatable transients using pulse current injection to
penetrating conductors at injection points outside of the facility’s electromagnetic shielding
barrier. Residual internal responses are measured, and the operation of mission critical
subsystems is monitored for upset or damage. The standard also contains shielding effectiveness
and CW illumination test procedures used to measure the performance of the facility shield.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.5): Nuclear testing during the 1960’s confirmed that the
effects of nuclear EMP are significant well beyond the detonation site.
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The choice of verification methods is somewhat dependent upon uncertainties associated with
the available methods. Verification schemes that are oriented more toward analysis will usually
introduce much larger uncertainties than test. Therefore, the required margins that must be
demonstrated will be that much greater. Also, analysis is not capable of anticipating design
flaws. For example, larger-than-anticipated current levels resulted during an aircraft system-
level test due to metallic lines which had not been designed for proper electrical bonding
entering a shielded volume. In another case, terminal protection devices did not operate due to
the low impedance present in the circuit which they were designed to protect, and as a result,
high current levels appeared in a shielded volume. Uncertainties in analysis can be reduced by
selective testing of sections of the system.
Protection measures related to structural components should be evaluated for performance

during assembly to verify that they meet requirements as installed in the system. After assembly,
access to some components may not be practical. Passing a test in the laboratory does not
necessarily mean that requirements will be satisfied in the actual assembly. Many times the final
design contains materials, surfaces, or fasteners which are different from the laboratory model.
Also, the complex geometry of a final system design may be so different from that which was
modeled in the laboratory that the electromagnetic behavior is substantially altered.
There are a number of ways to obtain system-level excitation for purposes such as quality
control or hardening evaluation. Low-level CW illumination of the system or of individual
components is relatively easy and can often reveal an oversight in system assembly or a
deficiency in the design of a hardening element. For aircraft, single point excitation (electrical
connection of a signal source to a physical point on the external structure of the system) can be
done (even in a hanger) and can similarly reveal any obvious problems in the airframe shielding.
Tests of structural design and hardening measures should be done as early in the assembly of the
system as possible and should continue throughout the design process. If problems are
uncovered during the initial assembly, the correction is usually straightforward. However, if the
deficiencies are not found until the system is completed, the result can be a very expensive
retrofit program. Analysis, laboratory testing, and system-level testing with low-level signals are
important elements of compliance. However, a system-level test of a functioning system using a
high-level EMP simulator is a high confidence method of demonstrating compliance.
A5.6 Subsystems and equipment electromagnetic interference (EMI). Individual

subsystems and equipment shall meet interference control requirements (such as the conducted
emissions, radiated emissions, conducted susceptibility, and radiated susceptibility requirements
of MIL-STD-461) so that the overall system complies with all applicable requirements of this
standard. Compliance shall be verified by tests that are consistent with the individual
requirement (such as testing to MIL-STD-461).
Requirement Rationale (A5.6): EMI (emission and susceptibility) characteristics of individual

equipments and subsystems must be controlled to obtain a high degree of assurance that these
items will function in their intended installations without unintentional electromagnetic
interactions with other equipments, subsystems, or external environments. The electromagnetic
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environment within a system is complex and extremely variable depending upon the various
operating modes and frequencies of the on-board equipment. Also, system configurations are
continuously changing as new or upgraded equipment is installed. Equipment developed on one
platform may be used on other platforms. MIL-STD-461 provides a standardized set of
interference control and test requirements which form a common basis for assessing the EMI
characteristics of equipment.
Some of the primary factors driving the need for controls are the presence of sensitive antenna-
connected receivers, which respond to interference generated within their tuning ranges, and the
environments produced by on-board and external transmitters, lightning, and electromagnetic
pulse.
Requirement Guidance (A5.6): The particular EMI requirements on individual items need to
be specified based on system design concepts related to transfer functions between environments
external to the vehicle and installation locations, isolation considerations with respect to other
on-board equipment, and operational characteristics of other equipment. MIL-STD-461 is a tri-
service coordinated document which standardizes EMI design and test requirements.
Historically, MIL-STD-461 specified requirements while MIL-STD-462 provided test
methodology. The “E” revision to MIL-STD-461 combined all of the material into one
document, with MIL-STD-462 being cancelled.
MIL-STD-461 requirements should be used as a baseline. Appropriate requirements for a

particular application may also be obtained from commercial specifications, such as RTCA DO-
160 or other industry standards. DO-160 contains a variety of limits which the equipment
manufacturer can choose as a qualification level for his equipment. For any EMI standard, care
needs to be taken to ensure that appropriate limits are used for a particular application. Unique
requirements may also be specified as necessary. For example, additional requirements may be
necessary for reasons such as lightning protection of systems using composite structure or
spectrum compatibility. Section 22 of DO-160 deals with indirect lightning effects requirements
that are not presently covered in MIL-STD-461, particularly for installations using composite
structural materials. Section 5.6.1 of this standard provides additional guidance for the
development of tailored EMI requirements for NDI and commercial items. Space vehicles
should also comply with the additional EMI requirements of MIL-STD-1541.
EMI requirements are separated into two areas, interference emissions from the subsystem and
susceptibility (sometimes referred to as immunity) to external influences. Each of these areas
have conducted and radiated controls. Most emission requirements are frequency domain related
and data are taken with spectral analysis equipment, current probes for conducted measurements,
and antennas for radiated measurements. Susceptibility requirements are usually defined in
terms of conducted drive voltages and currents for transients and modulated sinusoids to
evaluate power and signal interfaces and electromagnetic field levels for radiated signals.
Susceptibility measurements are performed with a wide variety of signal sources, power
amplifiers, injection devices, and antennas.
An application where emission requirements may need to be imposed that are more stringent
than the default limits in MIL-STD-461 concerns platforms or ground installations that perform
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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. ISR generally involves trying to
detect very weak signals across a wide portion of the frequency spectrum. Standard emission
limits that are placed to protect other antenna-connected receivers in the installations may not
provide sufficient protection to allow these receivers to be used optimally. As with any
application, the actual controls that are necessary are based on transfer functions for coupling
electromagnetic energy between the locations of the equipment and the antenna installations.
There have been continuing issues with ISR equipment being placed in existing installations that
weren’t originally designed for that type of application.
Electromagnetic coupling considerations for wiring and cable for space and launch vehicles can
be found in MIL-HDBK-83575.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.6): The limits specified in MIL-STD-461 are empirically
derived levels to cover most configurations and environments; however, they may not be
sufficient to guarantee system compatibility. Tailoring needs to be considered for the
peculiarities of the intended installation. The limits have a proven record of success
demonstrated by the relatively low incidence of problems at the system-level. There is usually
reluctance to relax requirements since system configurations are constantly changing, and
subsystems/equipments are often used in installations where they were not originally intended to
be used. Measurements of a particular environment are usually not available and actual levels
would be expected to vary substantially with changes of physical location on the system and
with changes in configuration
Past experience has shown that equipment compliance with its EMI requirements assures a high
degree of confidence of achieving system-level compatibility. Non-conformance to the EMI
requirements often leads to system problems. The greater the noncompliance is with respect to
the limits, the higher the probability is that a problem will develop. Since EMI requirements are
a risk reduction initiative, adherence to the EMI requirements will afford the design team a high
degree of confidence that the system and its associated subsystems will operate compatibly upon
integration.
There is often confusion regarding perceived margins between emission and susceptibility
requirements. The relationship between most emission control requirements and susceptibility
levels is not a direct correspondence. For example, MIL-STD-461 requirement RS103 specifies
electric fields which subsystems must tolerate. Requirement RE102 specifies allowable electric
field emissions from subsystems. RE102 levels are orders of magnitude less than RS103 levels.
Margins on the order of 110 dB could be inferred. The inference would be somewhat justified if
the limits were strictly concerned with a one-to-one interaction such as wire-to-wire coupling of
both RE102 and RS103 levels. This type of coupling is a minor concern for RE102. The driving
reason for RE102 levels is coupling into sensitive RF receivers through antennas. The front-
ends of receivers are typically many orders of magnitude more sensitive than wire-connected
interfaces in systems. Similarly RS103 levels directly correspond to electromagnetic fields
radiated from antenna-connected transmitters. These fields are typically orders of magnitude
larger than fields produced by cable emissions. Consequently, the apparent excessive margins
that can be erroneously inferred from MIL-STD-461 do not exist.
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Verification Rationale (A5.6): Testing is required to demonstrate compliance with

electromagnetic interference requirements. For most cases, analysis tools are not available
which can produce credible results to any acceptable degree of accuracy.
Verification Guidance (A5.6): For programs using MIL-STD-461, it also provides

corresponding test methods for each requirement (conducted and radiated requirements for
emissions and susceptibility).
RTCA DO-160 is the commercial aircraft industry's equivalent of MIL-STD-461 for both
requirements and test methodology. Some of the larger commercial aircraft companies have
their own in-house standards which the FAA accepts for certification. Some military aircraft
(primarily cargo type) have a mixture of military and commercial subsystems. Subsystems that
are newly designed or significantly modified should be qualified to MIL-STD-461. Unmodified
off-the-shelf equipment usually does not require requalification providing acceptable
electromagnetic interference data exists (MIL-STD-461, DO-160, or other approved test
methods). Section 5.6.1 contains additional guidance on verification for NDI and commercial
items. Some additional laboratory evaluation may be necessary to ensure their suitability for
each particular application.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.6): The “E” revision of MIL-STD-461 emphasizes testing
techniques which are more directly related to measurable system-level parameters. For instance,
bulk cable testing is being implemented for both damped sine transient waveforms and
modulated continuous wave. The measured data from these tests can be directly compared to
stresses introduced by system-level threats. This philosophy greatly enhances the value of the
results and allows for acceptance limits which have credibility.
An argument has sometimes been presented in the past that successful completion of an intra-
system compatibility test negates the need to complete electromagnetic interference tests or to
comply with requirements. Electromagnetic interference tests must be completed prior to
system-level testing to provide a baseline of performance and to identify any areas which may
require special attention during the system-level testing. Also, system-level testing exercises
only a limited number of conditions based on the particular operating modes and parameters of
the equipment and electrical loading conditions. In addition, electromagnetic interference
qualification of the subsystems provides protection for the system with configuration changes in
the system over time. One particular concern is the addition of new antenna-connected receivers
to the system, which can be easily degraded if adequate controls are not maintained.
A5.6.1 Non-developmental items (NDI) and commercial items. NDI and commercial items
shall meet EMI interface control requirements suitable for ensuring that system operational
performance requirements are met. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, or a
Requirement Rationale (A5.6.1): NDI and commercial items may be installed in systems for
any number of reasons - economic, availability, and so forth. When installed in the system, the
NDI and commercial items need to comply with the system level E3 requirements of this
standard. Therefore, NDI and commercial items must have suitable EMI characteristics such
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that they are not susceptible to electromagnetic stresses present in their installation and that they
do not produce interference which degrades other equipment. Most equipment built these days is
designed and tested to some form of EMI requirement and the data may be available. Other
equipment may require testing.
Requirement Guidance (A5.6.1): The use of NDI or commercial items presents a dilemma
between the need for imposing EMI controls and the desire to take advantage of existing designs,
which may have unknown or undesirable EMI characteristics. Blindly using NDI or commercial
items carries a risk of incompatibilities onboard the system. To mitigate the risk, a suitability
assessment is required to evaluate the installation environment and the equipment’s EMI
characteristics through a review of existing data, review of equipment design, or limited testing.
Existing EMI test data should be reviewed to determine if the equipment is suitable for the
particular application intended. If a piece of NDI or commercial item is being considered for use
as mission equipment on an aircraft, then the equipment should meet the same EMI requirements
as imposed on other equipment on the aircraft. However, if the NDI or commercial item is being
considered for use in an electromagnetically hardened ground shelter, then imposition of EMI
requirements may not be necessary. Each potential use of NDI or commercial items needs to be
reviewed for the actual usage intended, and a determination needs to be made of appropriate
requirements for that application.
The Defense Industry EMC Standards Committee (DIESC) studied the suitability of using
equipment in military applications that had been qualified to various commercial EMI standards.
The DIESC performed detailed comparisons of requirements and test methodology of the
commercial documents with respect to MIL-STD-461E. The results of this work are available in
EPS-0178: “Results Of Detailed Comparisons Of Individual EMC Requirements And Test
Procedures Delineated In Major National And International Commercial Standards With
Military Standard MIL-STD-461E.”
The following guidelines should be considered in selecting and utilizing NDI or commercial
items in the system:
a. The equipment EMI characteristics may be considered adequate if the specific

requirements for installed equipment on a particular system developed from transfer functions
are less stringent than those to which the equipment was designed and applicable EMI test data is
available to verify compliance. Compliance with the equipment-level EMI requirements does
not relieve the developing activity of the responsibility of providing system compatibility.
b. Where compliance with applicable equipment-level EMI requirements cannot be

substantiated, laboratory EMI testing should be performed to provide the data necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements.
c. If after evaluation of the equipment level EMI data, it is determined that the equipment
would probably not meet the system compatibility requirements, then it is the responsibility of
the developing activity to implement design modifications to meet the required EMI levels or to
select other equipment with adequate characteristics.
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Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.6.1): There have been both good and bad EMI results with
the use of NDI and commercial items in the past. The military has taken some commercial
aircraft avionics equipment and installed them on land-based military aircraft with good results.
This is due to the fact that these equipments were tested and qualified to a commercial aircraft
EMI specification such as RTCA DO-160. In some cases, the commercial avionics required
EMI modifications to make them compatible with a more severe electromagnetic environment on
the military aircraft. Forward-looking infrared sensors originally developed for commercial
police use were not compatible in the Army helicopter EME and significant restrictions on their
use needed to be imposed. A night vision system developed by the Army was procured by the
Navy as NDI. Significant EMC problems were experienced aboard ship due to the higher
shipboard EME.
Several instances have been noted in ground-based applications where EMI emissions from
commercial digital processing equipment have interfered with the operation of sensitive radio
receivers. Of particular concern are radiated emissions from processor clock signals causing
interference with communications equipment that operates from 30 to 88 MHz. Most
commercial equipment is qualified by testing at a distance of three meters. The problems have
been largely caused by use of the commercial items at distances of one meter or closer where the
fields will be higher.
An example of NDI and commercial item problems at the system-level, that most travelers have
observed, is restrictions on the use of portable electronic devices on commercial aircraft during
take-off and landings. These restrictions are in place because of several problems noted with
coupling of interference from the portable electronics to antenna-connected receivers used for
navigation and communications .
The military has successfully used NDI and commercial items in many other situations.
Electronics maintenance shops generally use test equipment built to commercial EMI
specifications or industry standards without requiring modifications. Ground system
applications of data-processing equipment, displays, and office equipment used with other
commercial items and NDI has been successful, where care has been taken with integration. The
primary emphasis needs to be whether the equipment is suitable for that particular application.
When a delivered item is composed of a number of individual pieces of equipment, it is

sometimes more cost-effective to qualify an integrated assembly rather than the individual pieces
of equipment. Also, the performance of the integrated assembly, as installed in the system, is the
more important issue since the EMI characteristics of the individual items may be modified by
integration.
Verification Rationale (A5.6.1): When EMI requirements are needed on NDI or commercial
items, then EMI testing data are required to demonstrate compliance with those requirements.
The equipment cannot be susceptible to EMI that would degrade it or render it ineffective.
Likewise, the equipment cannot be a source of EMI that impacts the operation of other
equipment within the system. NDI and commercial items may have been previously qualified to
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a wide variety of types of EMI requirements. Analysis of the applicability of the particular type
of EMI qualification in relation to a particular system installation will be necessary.
Verification Guidance (A5.6.1): Verification is required for the particular requirements

imposed for the system installation. If the NDI or commercial items selected are currently in
military use, then in all probability EMI test data exist which can be evaluated for suitability.
Verification requires an understanding of the installation environment both from the aspect of
electromagnetic stresses present and potential susceptibility of equipment and from knowing the
EMI characteristics of NDI and commercial items well enough to reach conclusions on system
compatibility.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.6.1): Most commercial equipment is qualified by testing at

a distance of three meters. MIL-STD-461 uses one meter. When considering the use of NDI or
commercial items, the location of the equipment with respect to system antennas needs to be
considered in assessing the suitability of the equipment. The data from the three meter distance
may be appropriate. It is difficult to translate the resulting commercial data to one meter. This
situation is due to variable field impedances associated with near-field emissions and variations
in indeterminate near-field emission patterns.
NDI and commercial avionics qualified to a commercial specifications, such as RTCA DO-160,
are generally acceptable for military use on land-based aircraft, since the commercial and
military EMI standards for airborne avionics are very similar in the tests required and the limits
imposed. Over time, more general use electrical and electronic type devices are being required
to meet some form of EMI requirement. In some cases, those would also be acceptable for
military use, and, in other cases, more testing or qualification to a tighter limit may be required.
Some testing to characterize important qualities of the NDI and commercial items will often be
necessary. For example, if coupling to particular receivers is the concern, an RE102 test from
MIL-STD-461 limited to particular frequency bands may be all that is necessary.
A5.6.2. Shipboard DC magnetic field environment. Subsystems and equipment used aboard
ships shall not be degraded when exposed to its operational DC magnetic environment (such as
MIL-STD-1399, Section 070). Compliance shall be verified by test.
Requirement Rationale (A5.6.2): High level DC magnetic fields are intentionally generated
onboard ships for degaussing, and equipment must be able to operate in the presence of these
fields.
Requirement Guidance (A.5.6.2): MIL-STD-1399, Section 070, provides requirements and

guidance for protection of equipment against DC magnetic fields. Shipboard measurements have
shown DC magnetic fields varying between 40 and 640 A/m dependent on location and time
during normal operations and 1600 A/m during deperming. They tend to be the highest below
the flight and weather decks. A typical requirement imposed on equipment is to operate in 400
A/m and to survive 1600 A/m. Another important parameter is the rate of change that the
magnetic field can vary, which is 1600 A/m per second. Ship surveys to determine magnetic
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fields are useful in locating areas where the fields are less than 400 A/m or tailoring the
requirement for a particular installation location. There will be cases where performance in 1600
A/m is required or where localized shielding will need to be used in the installation.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.6.2): Items most commonly influenced by DC magnetic

fields and its variations are cathode ray tube monitors. The earth’s magnetic field varies in
magnitude between 24 and 56 A/m. These fields are as large as the ship generated field in some
cases. Mobile platforms may experience changes of two times the local earth field simply
through motion and the changing orientation of the platform. Unmodified commercial monitors
can experience picture distortion when local fields change as little as 16 A/m.
Verification Rationale (A5.6.2): Testing is the only effective means to verify compliance.
Verification Guidance (A5.6.2): MIL-STD-1399, Section 070, provides guidance on test

methodology. Testing normally needs to be performed in all three axes of orientation, although
this is not always possible because of equipment size.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.6.2): Simulating the rate of change in the field is sometimes
more important than the absolute field magnitude.
A5.7 Electrostatic charge control. The system shall control and dissipate the build-up of
electrostatic charges caused by precipitation static (p-static) effects, fluid flow, air flow, exhaust
gas flow, personnel charging, charging of launch vehicles (including pre-launch conditions) and
space vehicles (post deployment), and other charge generating mechanisms to avoid fuel ignition
and ordnance hazards, to protect personnel from shock hazards, and to prevent performance
degradation or damage to electronics. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis,
Requirement Rationale (A5.7): Voltages associated with static charging and energy released
during discharges are potentially hazardous to personnel, fuel vapors, ordnance, and electronics.
Dust, rain, snow, and ice can cause an electrostatic charge buildup on the system structure due to
charge separation and the phenomenon called precipitation static charging.
Sloshing fuel in tanks and fuel flowing in lines can both create a charge buildup resulting in a
possible fuel hazard due to sparking. Any other fluid or gas flowing in the system (such as
cooling fluid or air) can likewise deposit a charge with potentially hazardous consequences.
During maintenance, contact of personnel with the structure and various materials can create an
electrostatic charge buildup on both the personnel and structure (particularly on non-conductive
surfaces). This buildup can constitute a safety hazard to personnel or fuel or may damage
electronics. Potentially susceptible electronic parts are microcircuits, discrete semiconductors,
thick and thin film resistors, integrated circuits, hybrid devices, and piezoelectric crystals,
dependent upon the magnitude and shape of the electrostatic discharge (ESD) pulse.
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Ordnance is potentially susceptible to inadvertent ignition from electrostatic discharge. The

primary concern is discharge through the bridgewire of the EID used to initiate the explosive.
Space and launch vehicles experience charge separation effects in space from sunlight shining on
the surface of the vehicles.
Requirement Guidance (A5.7): Any component of the system structure can accumulate an
electrostatic charge and adequate means must be provided to dissipate the charge at low levels to
prevent any significant voltage from developing. Electrically conductive and non-conductive
materials behave differently. Charge deposits on conductive materials will migrate in the
material such that all portions are at the same electrical potential. Charges deposited on purely
non-conductive material cannot move and large voltage differences can exist over small
distances.
Control of static charging is accomplished by ensuring that all structural surfaces are at least
mildly conductive, that all components are electrically bonded, and that an electrical path to
earth is provided. In general, conductive coatings need to be applied to all internal and external
sections of the system structure which are electrically non-conductive. For most applications,
resistive paths from 106 to 109 ohms (or 107 to 1010 ohms per square) are sufficient to dissipate
the charge buildup. The factor of ten between the two ranges is due to the geometry of
concentric rings used in electrode assemblies to measure surface resistivity. This conversion
may not be appropriate for materials that are plated with metallic coatings or laminated. Values
in the stated ranges are considered to be “static dissipative,” with lower values being termed
“conductive.” For shielding purposes, lower values will produce superior shielding properties.
However, in electronics maintenance and repair, static dissipative materials are actually more
desirable since they minimize the discharge current from devices that already possess a charge.
The shock hazard to personnel begins at about 3000 volts; therefore, the charge on system
components should not be allowed to exceed 2500 volts.
ANSI/ESD S20.20, issued by the Electrostatic Discharge Association (ESDA), provides

requirements for designing and establishing an ESD control program to minimize hazards to
ESD sensitive devices. It is applicable for essentially all activity stages associated with
electronic equipment from manufacturing, testing, packaging, and servicing to operational use.
This document resulted from a cooperative effort between commercial and military experts. It
forms the basis for ESD protection measures implemented by the US Air Force for both
contractual mechanisms during development and for the military operators and maintainers.
ESD TR 20.20 is a handbook that provides guidance for applying ANSI/ESD S20.20.
Systems must incorporate features to minimize the possibility of sparks within the fuel system.
The system design must consider the electrical conductivity of the fuels to be used and control
the conductivity, if necessary. Fuel vapors can be ignited with about 0.2 millijoules of energy.
As with structural features of the system, any component of the fuel system can accumulate an
electrostatic charge and adequate means must be provided to dissipate the charge. Electrical
bonding, grounding, and conductive coating measures need to be implemented. Fuel lines routed
through fuel tanks require special attention.
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The fuel system must also prevent sparking within the fuel tanks during refueling operations.
Some useful requirements are: 1) bonding and grounding of fuel components, 2) limiting line
velocities to no more than 30 feet per second, 3) limiting tank entry velocity to no more than 10
feet per second, and 4) refueling the tank from the bottom. Guidance for the control of static
electricity during refueling of aircraft is presented in TO 00-25-172.
NASA document TP2361 provides design guidelines for space and launch vehicle charging
issues. Subsystems and equipment installed aboard space systems should be able to meet
operational performance requirements during and after being subjected to a 10 kV pulsed
discharge. This value is derived from charging of insulation blankets and subsequent discharges
in accordance with MIL-STD-1541.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.7): A maintenance person was working inside a fuel tank
and experienced an arc from his wrench when removing bolts. It was found that maintenance
personnel were routinely taking foam mats into the tank to lie on while performing maintenance.
Friction between the mat and clothing allowed a charge buildup which caused the arc. All static
generating materials should be prohibited from the tank during maintenance.
Many equipment failures have been attributed to ESD damage of electronic parts.
Verification Rationale (A5.7): Verification of protection design for electrostatic charging is

necessary to ensure that adequate controls have been implemented.
Verification Guidance (A5.7): The selected verification method must be appropriate for the
type of structural material being used and the particular type of control being verified.
Relatively poor electrical connections are effective as discharge paths for electrostatic charges.
Therefore, inspection would normally be appropriate for verifying that metallic and conductive
composite structural members are adequately bonded provided that electrically conductive
hardware and finishes are being used. For dielectric surfaces which are treated with conductive
finishes, testing of the surface resistivity and electrical contact to a conductive path would
normally be more appropriate.
For space and launch vehicles, ESD requirements are verified by a pulsed discharge at one per
second for 30 seconds at a distance of 30 cm to exposed face of subsystems and equipment. This
test is then repeated using a direct discharge from the test electrode to each top corner of the
equipment under test. The discharge network is 100 pF in series with 1500 ohms.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.7): To evaluate proper design of structural components,

verification that all components are adequately bonded to each other often must be done during
system assembly. After manufacturing is completed, access to some components may be
restricted making verification difficult.
A5.7.1 Vertical lift and in-flight refueling. The system shall meet its operational performance
requirements when subjected to a 300 kilovolt discharge. This requirement is applicable to
vertical lift aircraft, in-flight refueling of any aircraft, and systems operated or transported
externally by vertical lift aircraft. Compliance shall be verified by test (such as MIL-STD-331
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for ordnance), analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof. The test configuration shall
include electrostatic discharge in the vertical lift mode and in-flight refueling mode from a
simulated aircraft capacitance of 1000 picofarad, through a maximum of one ohm resistance.
Requirement Rationale (A5.7.1): Any type of aircraft can develop a static charge on the
fuselage from p-static charging effects addressed in 5.7.2 of this standard. Aircraft that have the
capability for lifting cargo or performing inflight refueling have special operational concerns. In
the case of vertical lift, the accumulated charge can cause an arc between the hook and the cargo
during pick-up or between the suspended cargo and the earth during delivery. In the case of in-
flight refueling, the tanker aircraft can be at one voltage potential and the aircraft to be refueled
will be at a different potential, possibly resulting in an arc during mating of the two aircraft. The
maximum expected discharge level for either of these cases is 300 kV. The resulting electrical
transients can affect both the aircraft and the suspended cargo.
Requirement Guidance (A5.7.1): For vertical lift capability, the requirement should be applied
to both the lifting aircraft and the system being lifted. The concern is for the safe and
satisfactory operation of the vertical lift system hardware and no degradation or permanent
damage of other mission equipment. For in-flight refueling, the requirement should be applied
to the equipment and subsystems that are functioning during refueling. Equipment located near
the refueling hardware is of primary concern. Potential hazards due to the presence of ignitable
fuel vapors also need to be addressed.
For sling loaded ordnance, this requirement is applicable in addition to 5.7.3 of this standard.
Examples of systems operated externally by vertical lift aircraft are dipping SONAR and
apparatus used for helicopter rescue. The discharge occurs for these systems when the item
approaches or contacts the surface of the earth or water.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.7.1): To protect personnel on the ground from receiving
electrical shocks, it is standard practice for rotorcraft to touch the ground with the hook before it
is connected to the cargo. As the cargo is lifted, the whole system (aircraft and cargo) will
become recharged. Again, when the cargo is lowered to the ground, it must touch the ground to
be discharged before handling by personnel. The aircraft system and cargo often see several
electrical discharges as the vertical lift process is executed.
During in-flight refueling, pilots have reported seeing arcing between the refueling probe and the
fueling basket during mating. These discharges were several inches long. Based on these
observations, the 300 kV number was derived. Aircraft that have experienced discharges from
in-flight refueling have had upsets to the navigation system resulting in control problems.
Verification Rationale (A5.7.1): The path of the discharge is somewhat unpredictable.

Inspections and analysis are need to verify that assumptions on current flow path are reasonable
and that protection is appropriately implemented. Testing is necessary to evaluate possible paths
where the discharge event may occur. The 1000 picofarad capacitance used for testing
represents a reasonable value for a large size aircraft.
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APPENDIX
Verification Guidance (A5.7.1): The testing for vertical lift equipment on the aircraft has
involved injecting the cargo hook with discharges from a mini-Marx generator. Testing for the
in-flight refueling has involved injecting the in-flight refueling probe on the aircraft with
discharges from a mini-Marx generator. Both positive and negative discharge voltages have
been used for both types of testing. Aircraft equipment are monitored for upset or failure.
Testing of the vertical-lift cargo has involved applying mini-Marx discharges to the shipping
container or directly to the cargo system depending upon the configuration used in transport.
The container should have discharges applied to several locations around the container. After
the discharge, the system is checked for proper operation.
MIL-STD-331 provides guidance on issues with explosive devices and additional background.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.7.1): Not available.
A5.7.2 Precipitation static (P-static). The system shall control p-static interference to
antenna-connected receivers onboard the system or on the host platform such that system
operational performance requirements are met. The system shall protect against puncture of
structural materials and finishes and shock hazards from charge accumulation. Compliance
shall be verified by test, analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.7.2): As systems in motion encounter dust, rain, snow, and ice, an
electrostatic charge buildup on the structure results due to precipitation static charging. This
buildup of static electricity causes significant voltages to be present which can result in
interference to equipment, puncture of dielectric materials, and constitute a shock hazard to
personnel. For aircraft applications, aircrew personnel may be affected during flight and ground
personnel may be affected after landing.
Requirement Guidance (A5.7.2): Static electricity accumulates on aircraft in flight (p-static

charging) because there is no direct electrical path to allow the charges to flow off the aircraft.
Special control mechanisms become necessary to dissipate the charge. The accumulated charge
develops a voltage on an aircraft with respect to the surrounding air. When the voltage becomes
high enough, the air periodically breaks down in an impulse fashion at sharp contour points
where the electric field is the highest. The sharp impulses produce broadband radiated
interference which can degrade antenna-connected receivers, particularly lower frequency
receivers. The impulses can occur so rapidly that the receivers produce only a hissing sound and
become useless. Precipitation static dischargers are usually used to control this effect. These
devices are designed to bleed the accumulated charge from the aircraft at levels low enough not
to cause receiver interference.
The total charging current (It - µA) is dependent on charging current densities (Ic - µA/m2)
related to weather conditions, the frontal surface area (Sa - m2) of the aircraft, and the speed of
the aircraft (V - knots). The total charging current can be estimated by the following equation:
I t = I c × S a × V / 600
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APPENDIX
The following current densities have been determined for various types of clouds and
precipitation:
Cirrus 50 to 100 µA/m2
Strato-cumulus 100 to 200 µA/m2
Snow 300 µA/m2
On rare occasions, levels as high as 400 µA/m2 have been observed.
Control of static charge accumulation is accomplished by ensuring that all structural surfaces are
at least mildly conductive (megohms). Conductive coatings need to be applied to all external
sections of the system structure which are electrically non-conductive. Any component of the
structure can accumulate an electrostatic charge, and adequate means must be provided to
dissipate the charge at low levels to prevent any significant voltage from developing.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.7.2): A fighter aircraft was experiencing severe

degradation of the UHF receiver when flying in or near clouds. Investigation revealed that the
aircraft was not equipped with precipitation static dischargers. Installation of these devices
solved the problem.
An aircraft had a small section of the external structure made of fiberglass. Post-flight
inspections required personnel to get in close proximity to this non-conductive structural
component. On several occasions, personnel received significant electrical shocks which caused
them to fall from ladders and be injured. Corrective action was easily accomplished be applying
a conductive paint to the surfaces exposed to airflow and personnel contact.
Static discharges from the canopy were shocking pilots on a fighter aircraft during flight.
Charges accumulating on the outside of the canopy apparently induced a similar charge on a
conductive finish that was in the inside of the canopy. When a discharge occurred on the outside
of the canopy, the internal charge discharged to the pilot’s helmet. Proper grounding of the
conductive finish on the inside of the canopy fixed the problem.
When an aircraft was flying in clouds during a thunderstorm, the pilot was unable to transmit or
receive on the communications radio. Further investigations were performed with the most
reasonable conclusion that the radio blanking was caused by electrostatic discharge. Several
incidents were also reported where pilots and ground crews received shocks due to static
discharges from aircraft canopies. These incidents occurred on the carrier deck after the aircraft
had been airborne for several hours.
Canopies and dielectric finishes on structural materials have been punctured with resulting
damage due to large voltages being present from static accumulation.
It was discovered on an aircraft that was experiencing p-static problems that the static
dischargers had been installed using an adhesive that was not electrically conductive.
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APPENDIX
Verification Rationale (A5.7.2): Systems, subsystems and equipment must be verified to not
pose a hazard when subjected to p-static charging. Conductive coating resistance must be
verified to fall within the given range so as to not cause an excessive accumulation of
electrostatic charge.
Verification Guidance (A5.7.2): Relatively poor electrical connections are effective as

discharge paths for electrostatic charging. Therefore, inspection would normally be appropriate
for verifying that metallic and conductive composite structural members are adequately bonded
provided that electrically conductive hardware and finishes are being used. A device capable of
measuring surface resistance within the given range should be used to test the resistance of the
coated area.
Testing hardware which applies electrical charge to system surfaces must be able to isolate and
identify corona sources, locate isolated metal, identify surface streamering problems, and allow
for evaluation of effects to antenna-connected receivers.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.7.2): Coordination between structural and electrical

engineer personnel is necessary to ensure that all required areas are reviewed. For example, a
structural component on an aircraft was changed from aluminum to fiberglass and experienced
electrostatic charge buildup in flight which resulted in electrical shock to ground personnel. The
structural engineer made this change without proper coordination, which resulted in an
expensive modification to correct the shock problem.
A5.7.3 Ordnance subsystems. Ordnance subsystems shall not be inadvertently initiated or

dudded by a 25 kilovolt electrostatic discharge caused by personnel handling. Compliance shall
be verified by test (such as MIL-STD-331), discharging a 500 picofarad capacitor through a 500
ohm resistor to the ordnance subsystem (such as electrical interfaces, enclosures, and handling
points.
Requirement Rationale (A5.7.3): Explosive subsystems are used for many purposes including
store ejection from aircraft, escape systems, rocket motors, and warhead initiation. Voltages and
discharge energies associated with ESD can inadvertently ignite or fire these devices. The
consequences can be hazardous.
Requirement Guidance (A5.7.3): This requirement is based on charge levels that could
possibly be developed on personnel. All explosive subsystems should meet this requirement to
guarantee safe personnel handling.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.7.3): Explosive subsystems have been initiated by ESD
caused from human contact or other sources of ESD.
Verification Rationale (A5.7.3): Due to the safety critical nature of maintaining explosive
safety, the high confidence provided by testing is necessary to ensure that requirements are met.
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APPENDIX
Verification Guidance (A5.7.3): During testing, circuit inductance should be limited to 5

microhenries.
The 500 picofarad capacitor and 500 ohm resistor simulate worst-case characteristics of a human
body discharge. A significant number of components must be tested to provide a statistical basis
for concluding that the requirement is met. For EIDs, the discharges must be applied in both
pin-to-pin and pin-to-case modes for both polarities.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.7.3): A ground launched missile being removed from a
container exploded. It was hypothesized the accident could have been caused by an electrostatic
discharge to the propellant (not to the EID).
A5.8 Electromagnetic radiation hazards (EMRADHAZ). The system design shall protect
personnel, fuels, and ordnance from hazardous effects of electromagnetic radiation.
Requirement Rationale (A5.8): It has been firmly established that sufficiently high
electromagnetic fields can harm personnel, ignite fuel, and fire electrically initiated devices
(EIDs). Precautions must be exercised to ensure that unsafe conditions do not develop.
Requirement Guidance (A5.8): See guidance for 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and 5.8.3.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.8): See lessons learned for 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and 5.8.3.
Verification Rationale (A5.8): See rationale for 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and 5.8.3.
Verification Guidance (A5.8): See guidance for 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and 5.8.3.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.8): See lessons learned for 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and 5.8.3.
A5.8.1 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel (HERP). The system shall

comply with current DoD criteria for the protection of personnel against the effect of
electromagnetic radiation. DoD policy is currently found in DoDI 6055.11. Compliance shall
be verified by test, analysis, or combination thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.8.1): The proven adverse biological effects of non-ionizing

(electromagnetic) radiation are thermal, resulting from overheating of human body tissue.
Overheating results when the body is unable to cope with or adequately dissipate heat generated
by exposure to RF energy. The body’s response is dependent on the energy level, time of
exposure, and ambient temperature. Unlike ionizing radiation, no cumulative effects from
repeated exposure or molecular changes that can lead to significant genetic damage to biological
tissues have been proven. RF exposure guidelines and procedures have been adopted and
promulgated to protect DoD personnel from the deleterious effects of RF exposure.
Requirement Guidance (A5.8.1): DoDI 6055.11 implements the HERP criteria for military
operations.
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APPENDIX
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.8.1): Radar and electronic countermeasures (ECM)

systems usually present the greatest potential personnel hazard due to high transmitter output
powers and antenna characteristics and possible exposure of servicing personnel.
Personnel assigned to repair, maintenance, and test facilities have a higher potential for being
overexposed because of the variety of tasks, the proximity to radiating elements, and the
pressures for rapid maintenance response.
Verification Rationale (A5.8.1): Safety regarding RF hazards to personnel must be verified.
Verification Guidance (A5.8.1): DoDI 6055.11 provides detailed methodology for assessing
hazards.
An RF hazard evaluation is performed by determining safe distances for personnel from RF

emitters. Safe distances can be determined from calculations based on RF emitter characteristics
or through measurement. Once a distance has been determined, an inspection is required of
areas where personnel have access together with the antenna's pointing characteristics. If
personnel have access to hazardous areas, appropriate measures must be taken such as warning
signs and precautions in servicing publications, guidance manuals, operating manuals, and the
like.
Air Force TO 31Z-10-4, NAVSEA OP 3565, and Army TB MED 523 provide technical
guidance and methodology for assessing RF hazards.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.8.1): Safe distance calculations are often based on the
assumption that far-field conditions exist for the antenna. These results will be conservative if
near-field conditions actually exist. TO 31Z-10-4 and OP 3565 provide techniques for
calculating the reduction of gain for certain types of antennas. Measurements may be desirable
for better accuracy.
Before a measurement survey is performed, calculations should be made to determine distances

for starting measurements to avoid hazardous exposures to survey personnel and to prevent
damage to instruments. Since hazard criteria are primarily based on average power density and
field strength levels (peak levels are also specified), caution needs to be exercised with the
probes used for measurements because they have peak power limits above which burnout of
probe sensing elements may occur.
When multiple emitters are present and the emitters are not phase coherent (the usual case), the
resultant power density is additive. This effect needs to be considered for both calculation and
measurement approaches.
In addition to the main beam hazard, localized hot spots may be produced by reflections of the
transmitted energy from any metal structure. These results can occur in areas having general
power densities less than the maximum permissible exposure limits.
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APPENDIX
Experience has shown aboard ships, that unless personnel observe the restrictions (clear zones)
around emitting radiators, personnel can be affected by extensive exposure to electromagnetic
radiation.
A5.8.2 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel (HERF). Fuels shall not be

inadvertently ignited by radiated EMEs. The EME includes onboard emitters and the external
EME (see 5.3). Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, inspection, or a combination
thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.8.2): Fuel vapors can be ignited by an arc induced by a strong RF
field.
Requirement Guidance (A5.8.2): The existence and extent of a fuel hazard are determined by
comparing the actual RF power density to an established safety criteria. TO 31Z-10-4 and OP
3565 provide procedures for establishing safe operating distances.
RF energy can induce currents into any metal object. The amount of current, and thus the
strength of an arc or spark produced between two electrical conductors (or heating of small
filaments) depends on both the field intensity of the RF energy and how well the conducting
elements act as a receiving antenna. Many parts of a system, a refueling vehicle, and static
grounding conductors can act as receiving antennas. The induced current depends mainly on the
conductor length in relation to the wavelength of the RF energy and the orientation in the
radiated field. It is not feasible to predict or control these factors. The hazard criteria must then
be based on the assumption that an ideal receiving antenna could be inadvertently created with
the conductors.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.8.2): There is a special case where a fuel or weapon RF
hazard can exist even though the RF levels may be within the safe limits. This special case is for
both the hand-held (1-5 watts) and mobile (5-50 watts) transceivers. The antennas on this
equipment can generate hazardous situations if they touch the system, ordnance, or support
equipment. To avoid this hazard, transceivers should not be operated any closer than 10 feet
from ordnance, fuel vents, and so forth.
Verification Rationale (A5.8.2): Safety regarding RF hazards to fuels must be verified. A

majority of the verification is done by inspection and analysis with testing limited to special
circumstances.
Verification Guidance (A5.8.2): TO 31Z-10-4 and OP 3565 provide methodology for

calculating hazard distances from RF emitters. An important issue is that fuel hazard criteria are
usually based on peak power, while hazard criteria for personnel are based primarily on average
power. Any area in the system where fuel vapors may be present needs to be evaluated.
Restrictions on use of some RF emitters may be necessary to insure safety under certain
operations such as refueling operations. Any required procedures must be carefully documented
in technical orders or other appropriate publications.
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The volatility and flash point of particular fuels influence whether there is a hazard under
varying environmental conditions.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.8.2): See lesson learned for section 5.8.1.
A5.8.3 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO). Electrically initiated

devices (EIDs) in ordnance shall not be inadvertently actuated during or experience degraded
performance characteristics after exposure to the external EME levels of Table 3A (Table 1E
shall be used for the “Unrestricted” EME for Army rotorcraft operations), for both direct RF
induced actuation of the EID and inadvertent activation of an electrically powered firing circuit.
Relevant ordnance phases involving unrestricted and restricted levels in Table 3A are listed in
Table 3B. EME levels within the system shall not exceed the restricted levels in Table 3A in
physical areas where the restricted operations listed in Table 3B are being performed.
Compliance shall be verified by test and analysis.
Requirement Rationale (A5.8.3): RF energy of sufficient magnitude to fire or dud EIDs can be
coupled from the external EME via explosive subsystem wiring or capacitively coupled from nearby
radiated objects. The possible consequences include both hazards to safety and performance
degradation. Table 3A represents a composite of the maximum levels from the various EME tables.
Requirement Guidance (A5.8.3): Ordnance includes weapons, rockets, explosives, EIDs

themselves, squibs, flares, igniters, explosive bolts, electric primed cartridges, destructive devices,
and jet assisted take-off bottles.
Table 3A specifies both “unrestricted” and “restricted” environments. The unrestricted

environment represents the worst case levels to which the ordnance may be exposed. The
restricted environment involves circumstances where personnel are directly interacting with the
ordnance (assembly/disassembly, loading/unloading). There is a need to limit environmental
exposure to personnel for their safety (see 5.8.1); however, these operations also tend to increase
coupled levels into the ordnance because of actions such as mating and de-mating of electrical
connectors. Therefore, ordnance must be designed to be safe under these types of actions at the
lower fields associated with the restricted levels.
To define a realistic representation of the EME requires knowledge of how and where the
ordnance will be deployed. For example, ordnance developed solely for ground operations for
the Army or ordnance developed solely for airborne operations for the Air Force is typically
exposed to propagating plane waves (far-field region). On the other hand, ordnance developed
for the Navy and the Marines are expected to be utilized on board naval ships and is thus more
likely to be exposed to the near field, particularly in the HF band. Ordnance deployed or
transported on helicopters is exposed to EM fields in both the far field and the near-field regions.
For the special case of handling operations, the environment is intentionally restricted to prevent
personnel from being exposed to hazardous levels of EM energy or contact currents. In order to
meet the requirements for Joint operations, ordnance must be tested to the full range of EME
levels for all the military services and all phases and configurations of the ordnance. Specific
environments for Joint ordnance include both near-field and far-field conditions.
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APPENDIX
The accidental initiation of EIDs by RF energy is not a new concern. Commercial manufacturers of
blasting caps have warned their customers for many years about the potential hazard involved in
using electrically fired blasting caps in the vicinity of radio transmitters. Most EIDs employ a small
resistive element called a bridgewire. When the EID is intentionally initiated, a current pulse is
passed through the bridgewire, causing heating and resultant initiation of the explosive charge or
functioning of the device. RF induced currents will cause bridgewire heating that may inadvertently
actuate the EID. Interface wiring to the EID generally provides the most efficient path for RF fields
to couple energy to the bridgewire. However, RF energy can also fire extremely sensitive devices,
such as electric primers, as a result of capacitive coupling from nearby radiated objects. RF energy
may also upset energized EID firing circuits, causing erroneous firing commands to be sent to the
EID. Non-bridgewire types of EIDs are being increasingly used for many ordnance applications.
The electrothermal behavior of these devices differs considerably from bridgewire devices; many
have much faster response times and exhibit non-linear response characteristics.
In certain cases, ordnance systems may be exposed to levels other than those indicated in
Table 3A. Special consideration must be given to the platform emitters to ensure that the
required EME reflects their levels at the ordnance location. For example, the Close-In Weapon
System installed aboard some Navy ships is in close proximity to high-power HF antennas and
also requires certification to levels exceeding even those in the Unrestricted category. The
appropriate levels amount to an upward tailoring of the MIL-STD-464 levels. For ground-
launched systems, it may be reasonable to reduce EME HERO levels. Thus, field strength levels
may be tailored up or down, depending on the EME expected to be encountered throughout all
phases and configurations of the ordnance. All such tailoring must be addressed on an individual
basis.
EIDs should have the highest MNFS that will allow the EID to meet system requirements.
Each EID must be categorized as to whether its inadvertent ignition would lead to either safety or
performance degradation problems. There are two types of safety issues with ordnance: soft and
hard. The safety consequence (soft) is the inadvertent actuation of an EID that does not create an
immediate catastrophic event but does increase the probability of a future catastrophic event by
removing or otherwise disabling a safety feature of the ordnance item. Premature actuation of
most EIDs used in a safe and arm device associated with a fuse will have either a soft safety
consequence or adversely affect the fuse’s performance. A safety consequence (hard) is the
inadvertent actuation of an EID that creates an immediate catastrophic event that has the
potential to either destroy equipment or to injure personnel, such as the firing of an inline rocket
motor igniter by RF energy. Performance degradation can be any condition which does not have
safety implications. Performance degradation may occur because an EID may have been
desensitized as a result of multiple low-level exposures, which would prevent it from firing when
needed, or because it already had been ignited. All of the above categorizations should be
determined by the procuring activity.
OD 30393 provides design principles and practices for controlling electromagnetic hazards to
ordnance. MIL-STD-1576 and MIL-HDBK-83578 (USAF) provide guidance on the use of
ordnance devices in space and launch vehicles. For space applications using ordnance devices, an
analysis of margins based on the RF threshold determination of the MNFS should be performed.
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APPENDIX
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.8.3): The response of an EID to an RF energy field, and
the possibility of detonation, depend on many factors. Some of these factors are transmitter
power output, modulation characteristics, operating frequency, antenna propagation
characteristics, EID wiring configuration (such as shielding, length, and orientation) and the
thermal time constant of the device.
Several incidences onboard Navy ships involving the inadvertent firing of rockets and missiles
have resulted in catastrophic loss of life and equipment.
There have been numerous explosive mishap reports involving RF induced, uncommanded
actuation of automatic inflators worn by aircrew personnel both on flight decks and in-flight
while launching from and landing on the carrier. These problems pose a tremendous hazard to
aircrews, especially those in-flight at the time of occurrence.
Use of uncertified systems onboard ships due to joint operations has resulted in operational
restrictions on shipboard emitters.
Verification Rationale (A5.8.3): Adequate design protection for electroexplosive subsystems and
EIDs must be verified to ensure safety and system performance. Unless a theoretical assessment
positively indicates that the RF-induced energy on EID firing lines or in electronic circuits
associated with safety-critical functions is low enough to assure an acceptable safety margin in the
specified EME (bearing in mind the possible inaccuracies in the analysis technique), it will be
necessary to conduct a practical test.
Verification Guidance (A5.8.3): Verification methods must show that electroexplosive

subsystems will not inadvertently operate and EIDs will not inadvertently initiate or be dudded
during handling, storage, or while installed in the system. Assessment of the immunity of an EID is
based upon its no-fire threshold. For acceptance, it must be demonstrated that any RF-induced
energy in an EID circuit in the specified EME will not exceed a given level expressed as a margin in
dB below the maximum no-fire threshold sensitivity for the EID concerned. Refer to MIL-HDBK-
240 for test guidance.
HERO testing should include exposure of the ordnance to the test EME in all life cycle
configurations, including transportation/storage, assembly/disassembly, loading/unloading, staging,
platform-loaded, and immediate post-launch. The system should be exposed to the test EME while
being exercised with operating procedures associated with those configurations. For system
configurations exclusively involving the presence of personnel, such as assembly and disassembly or
loading and downloading, the restricted levels in Table 3A must be used with time averaging
considerations related to personnel exposure being applied, where necessary, to meet the applicable
personnel hazards criteria (see 5.8.1).
Table A3 shows the appropriate field intensity levels from Table 3A as they relate to slow versus
fast responding EIDs and energized versus non-energized firing circuits in all phases and
configurations of ordnance. Whether an EID is considered slow or fast responding depends on
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APPENDIX
its thermal time constant relative to the pulse widths and pulse repetition frequency of radars.
See MIL-HDK-240 for discussions on thermal time constants.
TABLE A3. HERO EME test levels
EME Levels1
Stockpile-to-Safe Separation
Non-energized firing circuits or slow- Energized firing circuits or fast-
Phases
responding EIDs responding EIDs
Transportation/storage Unrestricted average levels Unrestricted peak levels2,3
Assembly/disassembly Restricted average levels Restricted peak levels
Loading/unloading Restricted average levels Restricted peak levels4
Staged Unrestricted average levels Unrestricted peak levels2,3
Platform-loaded Unrestricted average levels Unrestricted peak levels2
Immediate post-launch Unrestricted average levels Unrestricted peak levels2
NOTES:
1. Applicable field intensity levels are specified in Table 3A.
2. Unrestricted peak levels should be used unless tailored environments have been developed.
3. Applies to fast-responding EIDs only.
4. Some firing circuits may be energized during the loading/unloading sequence in order to accomplish pre-
and post-loading diagnostic procedures.
For stockpile-to-safe-separation phases where personnel are required to handle the ordnance,
exposure of personnel must be limited to that considered safe in accordance with DoDI 6055.11
(see 5.8.1). The “restricted” levels in Table 3A are based on actual radiated levels to which
personnel are exposed in normal operational situations. There are some instances where the
restricted levels in Table 3A exceed the continuous (6 minutes or more) Permissible Exposure
Limits (PELs) cited in the instruction. In such cases, test personnel must limit the duration of
their exposure to appropriate intervals less than 6 minutes. Refer to MIL-HDBK-240 for
specific guidance on how to determine maximum exposure times as a function of frequency and
field strength. In addition to limits on the radiated field levels, there are also limits on
induced/contact current (I/CC) levels that can result from exposure to radiated environments.
Guidance to ensure compliance with radiated PELs and I/CC limits is provided in MIL-HDBK-
240.
Table A4 identifies a minimum set of frequencies where testing should be performed. Testing
should also be performed at any frequencies known to be system resonances. Swept frequency
testing is preferable but it is usually not practical at the field strength levels that are required.
MIL-HDBK 240 provides additional guidance.
The test EME should simulate the specified EME to the extent necessary to stimulate maximum EID
and firing circuit responses. This requires an appropriate representation of the specified EME with
respect to frequency, field strength (power density), field polarization, and illumination angle. For
radar EMEs, representative pulse widths, pulse repetition frequencies, and beam dwell periods
should be chosen to maximize system response with due consideration for the response times of
EIDs and firing circuits. Refer to MIL-HDBK-240 for detailed guidance.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A4. Minimum HERO test frequencies.
Frequency Range Test Frequencies (MHz)

(MHz)
0.01 - 2 0.010, 0.017, 0.029, 0.049, 0.083, 0.141, 0.240, 0.407, 0.692, 1.175
2 - 30 2.00, 2.30, 2.64, 3.03, 3.48, 4.00, 4.59, 5.28, 6.06, 6.96, 8.00, 9.19, 10.56, 12.13, 13.93,
16.00, 18.38, 21.11, 24.25, 27.86
30 -150 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 43, 45, 48, 50, 53, 57, 60, 63, 67, 71, 75, 80, 84, 89, 94, 100, 115, 132
150 - 225 152, 174, 200
225 - 400 230, 264, 303, 348
400 - 700 400, 438, 480, 527, 577, 632, 693
700 - 790 760
790 - 1000 833, 912
1000 - 2000 1000, 1155, 1335, 1543, 1783
2000 - 2700 2060, 2380
2700 - 3600 2750, 2950, 3178
3600 - 4000 3672
4000 - 5400 4243, 4902
5400 - 5900 5665
5900 - 6000 5950
6000 -7900 6545, 7563
7900 - 8000 7950
8000 - 8400 8200
8400 - 8500 8500
8500 - 11000 9300, 10098
11000 - 14000 11668, 13482
14000 - 18000 15578, 18000
18000 - 40000 26500, 33000, 39000
40000 - 45000 43000
MIL-STD-1576 provides guidance on verifying ordnance requirements for space systems.

Statistical Research Group report No. 101-R, SRG-P, No. 40 provides evaluation methods for
ordnance. Franklin Institute report M-C2210-1 provides analysis techniques.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.8.3): There are a number of concerns with EIDs and
instrumentation techniques. The influence of the instrumentation on the normal thermal and
electrical characteristics of the EID must be minimized. Even the removal of the explosive
powder for both safety and instrumentation reasons will have some effect on heating and
electrical characteristics due to changes in thermal capacity and dielectric properties. Devices
with greater sensitivity used in place of the EID must have characteristics as close as possible to
the EID, including electrical wiring and lead construction. Similarity of RF impedance and
response times of substitution devices should be verified, if possible, by measurement.
A5.9 Life cycle, E3 hardness. The system operational performance and E3 requirements of
this standard shall be met throughout the rated life cycle of the system and shall include, but not
be limited to, the following: maintenance, repair, surveillance, and corrosion control.
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Maintainability, accessibility, and testability, and the ability to detect degradations shall be
demonstrated.
Requirement Rationale (A5.9): Advanced electronics and structural concepts are offering
tremendous advantages in increased performance of high-technology systems. These advantages
can be seriously compromised, however, if E3 protection concepts impact life cycle costs
through excessive parts count, mandatory maintenance, or costly repair requirements. It is
essential, therefore, that life-cycle considerations be included in the tradeoffs used to develop E3
protection.
Corrosion control is an important issue in maintaining EMC throughout the system’s life cycle.
It is important that protection provisions that require maintenance be accessible and not be
degraded due to maintenance actions on these provisions.
Requirement Guidance (A5.9): There are normally a number of approaches available for
providing E3 protection. The particular design solution selected must give adequate
consideration to all aspects of the life cycle including maintenance and need for repair.
E3 hardening features should either be accessible and maintainable or should survive the design
lifetime of the system without mandatory maintenance or inspection. Protection measures which
require maintenance should be repairable or replaceable without degradation of the initial level
of protection. The system design should include provisions to restore the effectiveness of
bonding, shielding, or other protection devices which can be disconnected, unplugged, or
otherwise deactivated during maintenance activities.
E3 protection schemes include specific design measures both internal to electrical and electronic
enclosures and in the basic system structure. Factors such as corrosion, electrical overstress,
loose connections, wear, misalignment, dirt, paint, grease, sealant, and maintenance actions will
degrade the effectiveness of some protection measures with time.
To ensure continued protection (hardness) throughout the system life-cycle, protection schemes
and devices must be identified and maintenance intervals and procedures specified. Emphasis
needs to be placed on critical functions for system operational and mission performance. The
user must assume the responsibility to maintain the hardness for the life of the system and to
modify procedures as necessary to include conditions not originally anticipated. Maintenance
publications should document required actions. Some of the design features affecting hardness
are overbraiding of electrical cables, integrity of shielded volumes, electrical bonding of
surfaces, linear (resistance, capacitance and inductance) and non-linear (such as transzorbs,
zener diodes, and varistors) filtering, circuit interface design (balance, grounding, and so forth),
and circuit signal processing characteristics.
Maintenance actions must also be addressed which are performed on non-critical items which
are in the same area as the critical items to ensure that personnel do not inadvertently
compromise the protection measures of the critical functions. Procedures addressing
modifications to the system which involve either new or existing subsystems which perform
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critical functions must be considered. They could also involve modifications to the system
structure or subsystem components, such as wiring and protective devices.
E3 maintenance should be integrated into normal system maintenance and repair cycles.
Separate independent maintenance is undesirable.
Electromagnetic design features that require scheduled maintenance shall be accessible so they
can be tested or inspected.
In deployment, space-based equipment cannot be routinely inspected or serviced. Therefore, the

space vehicle must have features that are designed for unattended operation and durability for the
life of the mission.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.9): Many times in the past, E3 protection has been
installed without sufficient thought being given to maintenance and repair. It is often very
difficult to access protection measures to determine if they are still effective. By considering the
problem of access and test during design, it can be relatively simple to provide protection
measures which will allow maintenance checks to be made while minimizing any negative
impacts to the design. Also, design techniques oriented toward better maintenance access can
provide capability for quality control checks during assembly, benefiting both the system
manufacturer and user.
“Don't design it if it can't be repaired." Protection must be designed so as to be easily repairable.

The protection system and any repair details must be appropriately documented. For example, if
lightning diverter strips or buttons are used on radomes, the maintenance information must
reflect any precautions, such as not painting. If fuel tank skins should not be painted to prevent
puncture by lightning, this information must be documented with rationale.
Some key areas which require special consideration are addressed in the sections below.
Access doors made of composite materials which are an element of the shielding for a volume
are generally designed to be bonded electrically to the system structure. If door spring fingers
are employed, they must be kept clean, free from damage, and aligned at all times. Good contact
between the door frame around the access door and the spring fingers is critical for maintaining
shielding integrity. The bonding area must be inspected to ensure that the bonding effectiveness
has not been degraded by dirt, corrosion, sealant and paint overruns, damage, or misalignment.
Screens using wire mesh have been used to shield openings in structure. These screens need to
be treated in a fashion similar to the access doors.
Effective electrical bonding of electrical and electronic enclosures to system structure is often
essential for proper operation in the various electromagnetic environments. Surfaces on the
enclosures and structure must be kept clean to maintain proper bonding. Documentation
associated with the system should clearly show areas needed for bonding and the appropriate
finishes which should be on the surfaces. Painting of areas intended for electrical bonding has
been a common cause of EMC problems. An example of bonding design is the contact between
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the back of an enclosure and the finger washers in the rear wall of the electronics rack. Other
electrical bonds which require attention may be in the form of flat bands or braids across shock
mounts or structural members.
It is important that replacement hardware conform to the original design concept. For example,
when damaged cables are repaired, shield termination techniques established for the design must
be observed.
An example of a subtle change in hardware configuration to the original design concept can be
found in a life vest. The life vest was fielded with a bridgewire EID that could be fired by a salt-
water activated battery pack that had been hardened and certified for HERO. After introduction into
the fleet, an engineering change proposal was developed, and approved, to modify the type of
battery used in the battery pack. The change was not submitted for HERO consideration. When the
life vests were equipped with the new battery pack and used on board Navy ships, there were reports
of uncommanded activation of the vests during flight operations and on the flight deck. The
subsequent investigation found that the new battery pack made the EID subsystem resonant to a ship
radar system; thereby, creating susceptibility problems.
Verification Rationale (A5.9): Compliance with life cycle requirements must be verified to
ensure that E3 protection can be maintained and does not degrade with time. Verification can
range from inspection of proper documentation to actual demonstration of techniques.
Verification Guidance (A5.9): Some E3 protection measures, such as electrical contact of

critical components and electromagnetic shielding effectiveness, cannot be maintained by visual
inspections alone. Some testing will probably be necessary; however, the need for any hardness
surveillance testing should be minimized as much as possible.
The techniques and time intervals for evaluating or monitoring the integrity of the system
protection features need to be defined. The user will probably need to adjust the maintenance
intervals after attaining experience with the degradation mechanisms. BIT capability, test ports,
resistance measurements, continuity checks, transfer impedance measurements, and transfer
function measurements are some of the means available for use in the periodic surveillance of
system integrity. For evaluation of possible degradation, a baseline of the system as delivered to
the user is necessary.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.9): The manufacturer of the system has the best
understanding of the system protection measures. His role in defining appropriate requirements
for various protection measures in a manner which can be effectively verified at the system-level
and evaluated during maintenance is key to a successful life cycle program. These
considerations include the need for easy access to protection measures requiring evaluation.
Otherwise the performance of some protection measures may be neglected. In some cases, other
system design considerations may be overriding. In such cases, it is often possible to provide
features in the design (such as test tabs or special connectors) which will permit a test
measurement to be made without time-consuming disassembly.
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Most shielded cable failures occur at the connector and a resistance meter capable of measuring
milliohms is usually sufficient for locating these failures. Testing on several aircraft has shown
that holes or small defects in the shields themselves are not a significant problem. It takes major
damage to the shield for its effectiveness to be degraded. In addition, time domain
reflectometers can be used to locate discontinuities or changes in protection schemes.
Measurements after the system is fielded can be compared to baseline measurements.
Cable shield testers are available for more thorough evaluation of shield or conduit performance.
A current driver is easily installed on the outside of the cable; however, a voltage measurement
on wires internal to the shield requires access to these wires. If an electrical connector is
sufficiently accessible, the voltage measurement is straightforward. In some cases, cables pass
through bulkheads without the use of connectors and access is not readily available. A possible
solution is to include a pick-off wire attached to one of the wires within the bundle which is
routed to a connector block accessible to technicians.
An aperture tester can be used to monitor the integrity of RF gaskets and screens protecting
apertures on the system. An existing tester uses a stripline on the outside of the system structure
to drive a current across the aperture and the voltage developed across the aperture within the
structure is measured. The installation of the stripline has not been difficult; however, paint and
non-conductive materials on the inside of structure have hampered the ability to measure
induced voltages across doors and window frames. Test tabs or jacks would have greatly
simplified the measurement.
Frequent performance of surveillance checks after initial deployment can help in refining
maintenance intervals by determining degradation mechanisms and how fast degradation
develops.
Life cycle considerations must include the fact that systems are often modified soon after they
are fielded and frequently throughout their life. Sometimes the modifications are small and can
be qualified with a limited effort. Often there are major changes to system structure as well as to
the electronics. The addition of major new subsystems can introduce new points of entry for
electromagnetic energy into protected areas, and a major requalification of the system may be
necessary. Also, if enough small modifications are made over a period of time, the hardness of
the system may be in doubt and requalification should be considered.
EMI hardness evaluations under the Navy’s Air Systems’ EMI Corrective Action Program
(ASEMICAP) have shown that the hardness of aircraft is degraded over time. Electrical
inspections have shown numerous instances of foreign object damage, excessive chaffing of
wires, and improper splicing and terminations. Bonding measurements performed over a ten
year period on a Navy fighter aircraft indicates 10-15% out of specification conditions on a new
aircraft, 40-60% out of specification conditions on a five year old aircraft and 70-80% out of
specification conditions on a ten year old aircraft. These out of specification bonding conditions
result in inadequate termination of shields and boxes and degrade shielding effectiveness.
During EMC tests, the effects of corrosion and maintenance practices on the EMC design have
been noted. For example, composite connectors were incorporated in the pylons of a Navy
attack aircraft to correct a severe corrosion problem on the existing aluminum connectors. The
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composite connectors are more resistant to the corrosion than aluminum. They do, however,
oxidize and produce a powdery residue on the connector. The maintenance personnel would
then wire brush this residue, thereby eliminating the outer conductive coating, severely
degrading the connector conductivity, and introducing potentially more severe corrosion
problems.
A5.10 Electrical bonding. The system, subsystems, and equipment shall include the necessary
electrical bonding to meet the E3 requirements of this standard. Compliance shall be verified by
test, analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof, for the particular bonding provision.
Requirement Rationale (A5.10): Good electrical bonding practices have long been recognized
as a key element of successful system design. An indicator of the importance of electrical
bonding is that the first item often assessed when EMC problems occur is whether the bonding is
adequate. Since electrical bonding involves obtaining good electrical contact between metallic
surfaces while corrosion control measures often strive to avoid electrical continuity between
dissimilar materials, it is essential that the (potentially conflicting) requirements of each
discipline be fully considered in the system design.
Systems generally include ground planes to form equipotential surfaces for circuitry. If voltage
potentials appear between electronics enclosures and the ground plane due to internal circuitry
operation, the enclosure will radiate interference. Similarly, electromagnetic fields will induce
voltage potentials between poorly bonded enclosures and the ground plane. These potentials are
imposed as common-mode signals on all circuitry referenced to the enclosure. The same two
effects will occur for poorly bonded shield terminations.
Without proper bonding, lightning interaction with systems can produce voltages which can
shock personnel, ignite fuel through arcing and sparking, ignite or dud ordnance, and upset or
damage electronics. Lightning requirements are described under section 5.4 in terms of a
description of the environment. There are no specific levels defined under section 5.10 because
of the wide variety of possible needs based on the particular platform and physical location
within the platform. While electrical bonding is an important aspect in achieving an acceptable
lightning design, it is only one element of an overall design to deal effectively with lightning. In
the past, lightning requirements for aircraft were actually defined in the electrical bonding
specification, MIL-B-5087. In this standard, lightning requirements are more appropriately
defined at higher level, since design involves much more than just bonding.
It is essential that system electrical and electronic equipment be provided with adequate voltage
levels from prime power sources for proper operation. Electrical fault conditions must not
introduce potential fuel or fire hazards due to arcing or sparking from melted or vaporized
structural material. Bonding provisions help control voltage drops in power current return and
fault paths.
The system design must protect personnel from shock hazards.
Requirement Guidance (A5.10): The role of bonding is essentially to control voltage by

providing low-impedance paths for current flow. Unconventional joints should receive special
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attention to ensure their adequacy, particularly conductive joints in fuel vapor areas. SAE
ARP1870 provides details on electrical bonding concepts for aerospace systems and examples of
bonding techniques. MIL-HDBK-419 provides guidance for grounding, bonding, and shielding
of land-based facilities, including installed electronic equipment. MIL-STD-1310 provides
guidance for electrical bonding onboard ships.
Special attention should be given to the interdependent relationship between electrical bonding
and corrosion control. Design techniques for effective corrosion protection, such as the use of
finishes which are not electrically conductive, can result in lack of bonding. Conversely,
obtaining a good electrical bond can lead to potential corrosion problems, if the bonding is not
properly implemented. Detailed corrosion requirements for systems are imposed by other
documents, such as MIL-HDBK-1568 for airborne systems.
While specific bonding levels needed to obtain required performance are system dependent, 2.5
milliohms has long been recognized as an indication of a good bond across a metallic interface,
particularly aluminum. There is no technical evidence that this number must be strictly met to
avoid problems. However, higher numbers tend to indicate that a quality assurance problem may
be present and bonding may be degrading or not under proper control. Higher values may be
more appropriate for other metals such as stainless steel or titanium. Also, composite materials
will exhibit much higher levels and imposed requirements should be consistent with those
materials. Selected bonding levels need to be justified for design and demonstrated as being
adequate, particularly when they deviate from traditional norms used in the past.
Controls need to be implemented in shield termination paths through connector assemblies. A

realistic value would be on the order of 10 milliohms from the shield to the electronics enclosure
for a cadmium-plated aluminum assembly, with 2.5 milliohms maximum for any particular joint.
Bonding measures for prevention of fuel ignition hazards from electrical fault currents need to
address areas with flammable vapors, installed electrical equipment (such as fuel pumps),
electrical paths of fault currents, available levels of fault current, and the bonding value
necessary for the implemented design architecture to prevent arcing, sparking, and hot spots.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.10): Historically, MIL-B-5087 (superseded by this

document) first established electrical bonding requirements for aircraft in 1949. Several
electrical bonding classes were defined and eventually designated in subsequent revisions as
follows:
a. Class A for antenna installation - no bonding resistance specified.
b. Class C for current return path - fault current versus resistance table provided.
c. Class H for shock hazard - 0.1 ohm.
d. Class L for lightning protection - control internal vehicle voltages to 500 volts.
e. Class R for RF potentials - 2.5 milliohms from electronic units to structure.
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f. Class S for static charge - 1.0 ohm.
MIL-B-5087 also provided several approved bonding techniques including the specific hardware
that was to be used for electrical bonding. This approach was in essence providing the
contractor with a bonding design requirement followed by direction on how to achieve the
requirement. There were also less obvious requirements in the standard such as a 2.5 milliohm
requirement on connector shells, when used to electrically bond shields. Over the years, the 2.5
milliohm class R requirement became synonymous with MIL-B-5087 and was universally
accepted as a design requirement for electronic units to vehicle structure. No scientific basis has
been found for this 2.5 milliohm requirement other than the fact that it is a value that can be
achieved with good metal-to-metal contact. It therefore represents a good design requirement to
ensure that positive electrical bonding is included in the design. The rationale behind this class
R bond was most likely to assure that the return circuit impedances were kept very low due to
the extensive use of single end circuits in that time frame. Modern electronics uses primarily
balanced circuits and the need for this low class R bond is less obvious.
Bonding requirements are still important in today’s systems, only from a different perspective.
The equipment case-to-structure class R requirement probably is not important in most instances;
however, the 2.5 milliohm is still a good number for several other electrical bonds such as
terminating shields to connectors and bonding a connector to the equipment case. It is also a
good value as a design goal where a good bond is needed for other purposes. It mainly requires
the designer to design an intentional bonding path.
The other bonding values of MIL-B-5087 for shock protection, current return paths, and static
charge are still valid numbers for use today.
Numerous instances of the need for good bonding have been demonstrated. Bonding
improvements or corrections have solved many system problems including precipitation static in
UHF radios, susceptibility of electronics to external electromagnetic fields, radiation of
interference into antenna-connected receivers, and lightning vulnerabilities.
The actual need for certain bonding in a particular application is not easily ascertained. It is
dependent on various items such as the shielding topology, type of circuit interfaces, and the use
of the enclosure as a ground reference for circuits and filters. For example, a subsystem which is
wholly contained (all enclosures and cable interfaces in a continuous unbroken shield) typically
does not necessarily require bonding for RF potential control. External currents will remain
outside the shield and internal currents will remain inside. This configuration is rare. The
increasing use of differential interface circuits makes equipment enclosure-to-vehicle structure
bonding less critical since there is better rejection of common-mode noise
In systems using basically metallic structure, the entire vehicle structure forms a ground plane.
The introduction of composite materials in structure, which are much less conductive than
metals, has created a need in some cases to introduce separate ground planes to maintain
adequate control of E3.
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Verification Rationale (A5.10): Verification of protection measures for electrical bonding is

necessary to ensure that adequate controls are implemented.
Verification Guidance (A5.10): The electrical bonding area involves a number of different
concerns. The particular verification methodology needs to be tailored for the bonding control
being assessed. Many elements require more than one form of verification. When bonding
values in the several milliohm range or less is required, accurate testing with a four point probe
is a necessity. When much higher values are adequate, inspection of surface finishes and
mounting techniques supplemented by analysis can be acceptable. Verification that bonding for
lightning protection and antenna patterns is adequate generally requires system-level testing.
Analysis is an element of assessing structural voltage drops for power returns, fuel ignition
hazards, and personnel shock.
Requirements for electrical continuity across external mechanical interfaces on electrical and
electronic equipment are normally verified during the development of the equipment. The
equipment to structure interface is normally verified at the system-level. A measurement is
made from an enclosure surface to the next major assembly. For example, in an installation with
an enclosure mounted in a tray, separate measurements would be applicable from the enclosure
to the tray and from the tray to structure. The measurement is normally performed with a DC
resistance meter. Ideally, the impedance should be maintained as high in frequency as possible.
The impedance will normally remain low for enclosures that are hard-mounted to structure.
However, for enclosures installations which use bonding straps, such as shock mounts, the
impedance of bonding straps will be significant due to the inductance of the strap. A 5:1 length
to width ratio or less is generally considered to be necessary for a bonding strap to be effective.
Use of low current and voltage bonding meters, inspection and analysis of bonding paths, and
determination of the number of mechanical interfaces in a bonding path are some of the aspects
of verification.
Verification of electrical bonding measures for design against electrical shock is primarily
achieved by demonstrating that voltage faults to electrically conductive surfaces will not result in
hazardous voltages on the surface. These types of faults should normally trip circuit protection
equipment.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.10): The adequacy of much electrical bonding can be
evaluated through DC or low frequency AC resistance measurements and inspection. RF
measurements can be performed; however, they require more sophisticated instrumentation, can
provide misleading results, and are not recommended. DC measurements have proven to
provide a good indication of the quality of a bond. An exception where high frequency
measurements can be effective is transfer impedance measurements of shielded cables. Under
this type of evaluation, a known RF current is driven on the cable shield and the voltage
developed along the inside the shield is measured. Electrical bonding levels of shield
terminations and connector assemblies are included in the overall measured value.
Bonding meters are normally four point devices which determine the resistance of a bond by
driving a known current between two probes and then measuring the voltage drop across the
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bond with two other probes. Large applied voltages and currents can influence the measurement
by burning through contamination that might be on bonding surfaces. It is better to use lower
voltage and current devices to determine the value of a bond.
Torque requirements on bolts and screws plays a role in the effectiveness and life-cycle
durability of a bond.
Bonding measurements often require that a protective finish be penetrated with electrical probes
to obtain good electrical contact. Care should be taken so that a corrosion problem is not
introduced.
For lightning protection, metallic structural members (aluminum, steel, titanium, and so forth)
provide the best opportunity to achieve an electrical bond on the order of 2.5 milliohms. A bond
of this level will limit the induced voltage on system cabling to 500 volts from lightning strike
attachments (200 kA) to system structure.
Overpainting of structure for corrosion control prior to ensuring an electrical bond has been
documented as the leading cause of poor or ineffective bonds.
P-static testing has found open bonds such as antenna mounting provisions which are electrically
isolated from system structure.
A5.10.1 Power current return path. For systems using structure for power return currents,
bonding provisions shall be provided for current return paths for the electrical power sources
such that the total voltage drops between the point of regulation for the power system and the
electrical loads are within the tolerances of the applicable power quality standard. Compliance
shall be verified by analysis of electrical current paths, electrical current levels, and bonding
impedance control levels.
Requirement Rationale (A5.10.1): It is essential that system electrical and electronic

equipment be provided with adequate voltage levels from prime power sources for proper
operation. Electrical fault conditions must not introduce potential fuel or fire hazards due to
arcing or sparking from melted or vaporized structural material.
Requirement Guidance (A5.10.1): Power quality standards, such as MIL-STD-704 for aircraft
and MIL-STD-1399, Section 300, for ships, control the supply voltage for utilization equipment
within specified limits. The voltage is maintained at a monitoring location termed the “point of
regulation” with allowances for voltage drops beyond this point to the input of the utilization
equipment. These drops must be controlled through wire conductor type and size selection and
current return path design. Most aircraft use structure as the return path for power currents.
Bonding provisions must be incorporated to control the impedance of this path. Space vehicle
power systems generally prohibit the use of structure as power return and should use the
requirements of MIL-STD-1541 as guidance.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.10.1): Maintaining required voltage levels on metallic

aircraft at utilization equipment has not been a problem since the current return paths have low
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impedance. With increasing use of composites, the need for separate wire returns or
implementation of a ground plane becomes a consideration.
Verification Rationale (A5.10.1): Voltage drops present in power current return paths must be
evaluated to ensure that electrical power utilization equipment receive power in accordance with
power quality standards and to ensure that fuel and fire hazards are avoided.
Verification Guidance (A5.10.1): On most military aircraft, aircraft structure is used as the
current return for electrical power. The controls on bonding between structural members, the
resistance of structure, and electrical current levels need to be considered. For aircraft which use
wired returns, the resistance of the wire is the primary consideration. The location of the point
of regulation for the power system also plays a role.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.10.1): With metallic aircraft, voltage drops through
structure are typically very low. Much higher levels are possible with graphite/epoxy structure.
A5.10.2 Antenna installations. Antennas shall be bonded to obtain required antenna patterns
and meet the performance requirements for the antenna. Compliance shall be verified by test,
analysis, inspections, or a combination thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.10.2): Good electrical bonding is a key element of successful

antenna installation. Poor bonding can result in changes to the desired antenna patterns and
degradation of the effective apertures.
Communications antennas such as blade antennas, often become attachment points for lightning.
Without proper bonding, lightning can produce voltages which can severely damage antenna-
connected equipment.
Antennas are being connected to composite structures via metallic mesh. This “pseudo ground
plane” must be capable of conducting lightning induced currents.
Requirement Guidance (A5.10.2): Bonding provisions required to attain adequate antenna

patterns and required antenna gains are system dependent. Typically, counterpoises or ground
planes associated with antennas are designed to provide negligible impedance at the operating
frequencies of the equipment. Additionally, antenna designs that require a low resistance RF
path for efficient operation should have a low impedance path of minimum length to the
appropriate metallic portion of the antenna.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.10.2): Poor bonding of antennas has resulted in degraded
operations of communications and navigation equipment. P-static generation at the antenna base
has significantly degraded equipment performance for VHF radios. Additionally, severe
lightning damage has occurred on blade antennas with a poor ground plane, specifically, on
composite panels. Damage has been severe enough as to require replacement of the antenna and
the entire panel.
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Verification Rationale (A5.10.2): Verification of bonding for antennas is necessary to ensure

that adequate antenna patterns and gains are achieved while providing sufficient low impedance
paths for currents induced by p-static, RF, and lightning sources.
Verification Guidance (A5.10.2): Verification of bonding measures for antennas is achieved

by demonstrating there is a low impedance path between the conducting portions of the antenna
and the counterpoise or ground plane. Antenna patterns and gains can be verified in anechoic
chambers or in an RF quiet environment.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.10.2): The adequacy of antenna bonds can be evaluated
through antenna pattern measurements, DC resistance measurements, and inspection. AC
measurements are desired; however, they require more sophisticated measurement equipment
and procedures.
A5.10.3 Mechanical interfaces. The system electrical bonding shall provide electrical
continuity across external mechanical interfaces on electrical and electronic equipment, both
within the equipment and between the equipment and other system elements, for control of E3
such that the system operational performance requirements are met. For instances where
specific controls have not been established for a system and approved by the procuring activity,
the following direct current (DC) bonding levels shall apply throughout the life of the system.
a. 10 milliohms or less from the equipment enclosure to system structure, including the
cumulative effect of all faying surface interfaces.
b. 15 milliohms or less from cable shields to the equipment enclosure, including the
cumulative effect of all connector and accessory interfaces.
c. 2.5 milliohms across other individual faying surfaces within the equipment, such as
between subassemblies or sections.
Requirement Rationale (A5.10.3): Mechanical bonding (formerly designated Class R “Radio

Frequency” in MIL-B-5087) is necessary to avoid coupling of interference signals present in the
system to subsystems. These interference signals may be generated by other subsystems, the
external EME, lightning, p-static, power system ground currents, and so forth. The interference
signals from subsystems are usually RF noise on power and control circuits that are seen on
subsystem grounds. With a low resistance between a subsystem and the rest of the system,
potential differences can be controlled to low values.
Requirement Guidance (A5.10.3): There is a general requirement for all systems to address
and implement bonding measures, without specific control levels being stated. An important
issue is that bonding be “under control” and at “known levels.” Bonding must not be haphazard
or erratic. Repeatability of performance from system to system and over time is critical.
Specific control levels are the responsibility of the developing activity to propose and obtain
procuring activity approval.
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There are bonding levels provided in the requirement where specific alternative controls have
not been developed for a platform. The levels are specified to take several items into
consideration. They involve the entire interface between an equipment enclosure and system
hardware as a whole, without addressing each individual mechanical interface. Both system
integrator provisions (such as electrical harnesses, equipment mounting racks, and
surface/material treatments) and equipment manufacturer provisions (such as connector
installation and surface/material treatments) are included. The values take into account that
several faying surface interfaces are often included. For example, the cable shield termination
requirement will often include the following interfaces: shield to backshell, backshell to
connector shell, mating between connector shells, and connector shell to enclosure. Also, the
levels are specified as a requirement “at the end of life,” which addresses the life cycle aspects of
this standard. In general, lower values than those specified will be required during
manufacturing to account for degradation over time. The expected degradation over time must
be understood.
There will be instances where the 10 milliohm value from equipment enclosure to system
structure may not be adequate. Army aviation has experienced an issue on board rotary wing
aircraft when a particular bond exceeded 8 milliohms. This example emphasizes that it is best to
review individual situations to determine actual bonding requirements based on the equipment
involved and the environments being encountered.
The 15 milliohm bonding requirement from cable shields to the enclosure is an important
element of the overall transfer impedance performance of a shielded cable. The transfer
impedance is the relationship of a common mode voltage developed within the shield that is
impressed on interface circuits relative to currents flowing on the shield. Ideally the connector
assembly transfer impedance should be low enough that the transfer impedance of the entire
cable shield is the dominant factor in the overall transfer impedance of the entire shield and
terminating connector assemblies.
Poor mechanical bonding on ships has resulted in the “rusty bolt” effect where intermodulation
products are generated by non-linear effects of the improper bonds. See the appendix discussion
on 5.2.1 for additional information.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.10.3): Most EMC handbooks contain information on

various techniques to obtain a successful mechanical “Class R” bond. Specific techniques are
not required in this standard to allow a more flexible implementation of bonding. The use of 2.5
milliohms in the past has precluded many EMI problems. On one aircraft, the rudder was found
to shake while being subjected to the external environment. The problem was determined to be
that the aileron rudder interconnect subsystem was not mechanically bonded. Once bonded, the
rudder was stable.
Measurements during several years of Navy ASEMICAP tests have revealed equipment bonding
measurements that do not always meet the 2.5 milliohm requirement. Extensive E3 tests
afterwards generally have not connected any EMI problems with the degraded bonding. This
extensive data base has supported the concept that it is possible under some conditions to exceed
2.5 milliohms and still have adequate E3 control.
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Bonding requirements in the past have largely focused on bonding between an equipment
enclosure and system structure. In many cases, it has been recognized that bonding of cable
shields is more critical to performance than enclosure bonding. There are even cases where it is
desirable to isolate an enclosure from structure, such as to prevent large lightning currents from
flowing along a particular cable harness. For these cases, it is essential to ensure that the
electronics and filtering in the enclosure are configured such that the lack of a bond will not be
detrimental.
Verification Rationale (A5.10.3): Testing is required to actually measure a low impedance

bond. Inspection of drawings and processes can ensure that bonding provisions are properly
implemented. Analysis of the role of bonding in providing overall E3 protection is necessary.
Verification Guidance (A5.10.3): The first step in verification is to review the bonding
implementation to determine the amount of resistance required from the equipment enclosure to
the system ground reference. Next an analysis is made of the points where the measurement can
be made. Based on the measurement points, the resistance between the two points is calculated
using the total of the mechanical bonds in the path. When actually performing the measurement,
first visually inspect the bonds to verify their presence and proper construction. Then, remove
all other connections to the equipment to ensure that only the mechanical bonding is being
measured and not the equipment safety ground or other grounding provisions.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.10.3): Bonding meters that use high voltage and current
which may arc or burn through contamination in junctions thus giving optimistic readings should
be avoided.
When bonding was accomplished as outlined above with the calculation of the total resistance
across a number of faying surfaces, a common problem has been avoided of over-designing the
bonding. Measurements can be made using a common point on the system for one probe,
thereby simplifying the test.
A5.10.4 Shock, fault, and ignitable vapor protection. Bonding of all electrically conductive
items subject to electrical fault currents shall be provided to control shock hazard voltages and
allow proper operation of circuit protection devices. For interfaces located in fuel or other
flammable vapor areas, bonding shall be adequate to prevent ignition from flow of fault
currents. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof.
Requirement Rationale (A5.10.4): Personnel must be protected from hazardous voltages. For
circuit protection devices to work properly, bonding must be adequate to allow sufficient fault
current flow to trip the devices in a timely manner. Flow of electrical fault currents across
poorly bonded interfaces can cause arcing, sparking and hot spots due to heating of materials that
may result in ignition of flammable vapors.
Requirement Guidance (A5.10.4): Voltages on conductive surfaces can result from sources
such as broken components in assemblies allowing “hot" wiring to contact the housing or from
electrically referencing a circuit to the housing (such as capacitive filtering). The requirement
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addresses any electrically conductive portion of the system which can become “hot” from
contact with higher voltage wiring. It is not limited to electrical and electronic housings. MIL-
HDBK-454, Guideline 1, suggests protection from voltages in excess of 30 volts rms and DC.
Requirements to prevent ignition of flammable vapors need to consider any paths where
significant fault currents may flow. Most prominent are fault paths associated with electrical
devices that receive prime electrical power for operation, such as fuel pumps or valves.
Considerations should address issues such as available fault currents, structural materials used,
areas always immersed in fuel, surface finishes (both bonding areas and exposed surfaces),
sealants, and types of debris potentially present.
Past studies on electrical bonding for fault currents in flammable vapor areas have determined
that bonding requirements are related to a particular voltage appearing across the interface under
fault conditions. Since the developed voltage is directly proportional to the fault current for a
fixed resistance, required bonding levels vary dependent on the available fault current. An
ignition threshold was found to be 0.37 volts for an aluminum safety wire with a point contact in
parallel with the intended bonding path. A safety factor of five has been used to account for
degradation over time and variability in testing with 0.074 volt bonding criteria resulting. Under
this approach, the available fault current for a circuit is first calculated by dividing the source
voltage by the wiring resistance in the circuit. For example, using a 115 Volt, 400 Hz, source
and 200 milliohms of wiring resistance, the available fault current is 575 amperes. The required
bonding resistance is determined by dividing 0.074 volts by 575 amperes with a result of 0.13
milliohms. Bonding levels specified in SAE ARP1870 for fault currents are based on the study
results. Other work found that less severe bonding levels were appropriate for safety wire made
of stainless steel rather than aluminum.
Flammable vapors can be ignited through electrical arcs, sparks (hot particles and voltage
breakdown), and thermal hot spots. As an example of an ignition threshold, JP-5 fuel vapors can
be ignited by thermal hot spots at 245 degrees Centigrade.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.10.4): Powerline filtering arrangements in electronics

which isolate the powerline neutral from chassis can result in hazardous voltages on the
enclosure if the frame ground is disconnected. Typically, filters will be present on both the high
side and the return which will have capacitance to the chassis. If the chassis is floating with
respect to earth ground, the capacitors act as a voltage divider for AC waveforms with half the
AC voltage present on the case with respect to earth. The value of the capacitors determines the
amount of current that may flow.
For circuit protection to work quickly and effectively, fault currents well in excess of the rating
of the circuit are necessary. For example, a circuit breaker can take tens of seconds to interrupt a
circuit at a current twice its rating.
Verification Rationale (A5.10.4): Some testing will probably be necessary to evaluate bonds.
Analysis will be necessary to determine where potentially hazardous voltages exist and to assess
fault conditions.
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Verification Guidance (A5.10.4): System elements where potentially hazardous voltages may
appear need to be identified. Fault current paths and associated electrical bonding provisions
need to be assessed for adequacy. A traditional control level for shock hazard protection
contained in MIL-B-5087 and MIL-STD-1310 was 0.1 ohms. This level is somewhat arbitrary
but it may be a suitable control for some applications.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.10.4): The level of bonding necessary to meet this
requirement will normally require that four point bonding meters discussed in section 5.10 be
used for measurements.
A5.11 External grounds. The system and associated subsystems shall provide external
grounding provisions to control electrical current flow and static charging for protection of
personnel from shock, prevention of inadvertent ignition of ordnance, fuel and flammable
vapors, and protection of hardware from damage. Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis,
Requirement Rationale (A5.11): External grounds are necessary to provide fault current paths
for protection of personnel from shock hazards and to dissipate static electricity for prevention of
hazards to personnel, flammable vapors, ordnance and electronic hardware.
All telecommunications and electronic facilities are inherently referenced to earth by capacitive
coupling, accidental contact, and intentional connections. Therefore, “ground” must be looked at
from a total system viewpoint, with various subsystems comprising the total facility ground
system. The facility ground system forms a direct path of known low impedance between earth
and the various power, communications, and other equipments that effectively extends in
approximation of ground reference throughout the facility. The facility ground system is
composed of an earth electrode subsystem, lightning protection subsystem, fault protection
subsystem, and signal reference subsystem.
For safety reasons, both the MIL-STD-188-124 and the National Electrical Code in NFPA 70
require that electrical power systems and equipment be intentionally grounded. Therefore, the
facility ground system is directly influenced by the proper installation and maintenance of the
power distribution systems. The intentional grounding of electrical power systems minimizes
the magnitude and duration of overvoltages on an electrical circuit, thereby reducing the
probability of personnel injury, insulation failure, or fire and consequent system, equipment, or
building damage.
Requirement Guidance (A5.11): Many portions of a system require a grounding scheme to

ensure that a suitable current path is available for sufficient currents to flow in the event of an
electrical fault to trip circuit protection devices. All electrically conductive surfaces with which
personnel may come in contact need to be bonded to the ground reference to prevent hazardous
voltages from appearing on the surfaces during faults and to provide a path for the resultant fault
currents to trip the protection devices.
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Grounding provisions are often necessary under certain operations to provide a current path to
prevent static electricity charges from accumulating, such as during ordnance handling, refueling
or other flammable vapor operations, and maintenance actions on sensitive electronics.
Grounding provisions are usually required for munitions that are stored in bunkers while in
containers, or when exposed to the elements to reduce static charge buildup during handling.
These include munitions-to-container, container-to-ground, and munitions (not in containers)-to-
ground.
General Tactical Ground Shelter Grounding Guidance:
The facility ground system connects any metallic element of the associated subsystems to earth
by way of an earth-electrode configuration. It establishes a reference potential common to any
equipment or subsystem and makes the ground potential available throughout the system. In
general, four subsystems comprise the facility ground system and should be addressed during the
design and installation of any electrical and electronic equipment, subsystem, and system.
Although, it is not possible to have a fixed set of rules governing the grounding of all
conceivable electrical or electronic equipment or system configurations, the guidelines presented
here should be adapted to the requirement of a particular tactical installation. More detailed
guidance is provided in MIL-STD-188-124 and MIL-HDBK-419.
It is important that serious consideration be given to grounding implementation. Proper

grounding can have a significant impact on the ability to maintain operations under adverse
conditions. This section contains grounding requirements for tactical deployments of mobile
equipment. Grounding methods set forth are based not only on implementation considerations
but also on complying with specific measured resistance requirements. The tactical deployments
of mobile equipments are considered to be of four types: stand-alone equipment, stand-alone
shelters, collocated equipments and collocated shelters.
A stand-alone shelter is comprised of equipment housed in a mobile metallic shelter and,

typically, is not situated close enough to other equipments to merit construction of a common
extensive earth electrode subsystem between its interfacing systems. Power supplied to the
shelter may come from a power generator or a commercial source. Interfacing with the shelter
may be through the power cable. The need for grounding stand-alone shelters is to provide a
ground for: 1) the fault protection subsystem, 2) “bleeding off” static charges or EMI from
interfacing signal cables, 3) the signal reference subsystem, and 4) the lightning protection
subsystem.
Collocated mobile equipments are equipments operating individually but hosted together within
a single transportable enclosure, such as a tarpaulin. Typically, these equipments are not rack
mounted and may be situated on the earth. Intra-enclosure communication links may exist
among equipments, but normally links are established between an equipment and an external
system. Basic operational characteristics of collocated equipments are similar to stand-alone
equipments. Grounding requirements are primarily for personnel safety from lightning and
power faults.
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Collocated shelters are transportable metallic shelters that share common signal or power cables
and are classified in two general categories; those located within 8 meters (26.5 feet) of one
another, and those located greater than 8 meters from one another. Collocated shelter
configurations are typically of an equipment system that must be housed in multiple shelters.
Grounding requirements for collocated shelters are required to provide personnel and equipment
protection from the effects of lightning and power faults and to provide a reference for signal
grounds. Particular consideration must be given to collocated shelters receiving power from the
same power source or communicating over inter-shelter signal cables. The need to establish an
all encompassing shelter grounding system for collocated shelters situated more than eight
meters apart should be a function of ground resistance measurements taken at each shelter site.
The ground system of each shelter should be interconnected as shown in MIL-HDBK-419. If
noise or other undesirable effects are produced as a result of higher ground resistance
differences, the system having the higher resistance can be reduced by use of chemical treatment
or enhancement per MIL-HDBK-419.
Fixed prefabricated shelters are generally designed having the major components prefabricated
and then assembled on-site into a fixed shelter which can be considered as a fixed facility. As
such, it should have its own earth electrode subsystem (ring ground). It should also have a
lightning protection subsystem meeting the requirements of MIL-HDBK-419, whenever the
shelter is located outside the cone of protection of a higher grounded tower. The shell of
metallic prefabricated shelters should be constructed to be electrically continuous and should be
grounded to the earth electrode subsystem to bleed off static charges and reduce the effects of
interference to C-E equipments and circuits. If metallic and electrically continuous, the skin of a
fixed prefabricated shelter may serve as the equipotential plane. If the skin is not metallic or
electrically continuous, a separate equipotential plane will be required.
At space vehicle launch systems and facilities, the launch vehicle should be earth grounded at the
launch site. It is important that ground loops be controlled for electrical interfaces between
launch vehicles and space vehicles to prevent problems.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.11): Ignition of ordnance and fuel vapors and damage to
electronics have all occurred from static discharges.
Verification Rationale (A5.11): To ensure safety, proper use and installation of external
grounds for the system must be verified.
Verification Guidance (A5.11): Inspection is appropriate for verification that external

grounding provisions have been implemented.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.11): Installation practices should be reviewed to ensure that
corrosion protection is included.
A5.11.1 Aircraft grounding jacks. Grounding jacks shall be attached to the system to permit
connection of grounding cables for fueling, stores management, servicing, maintenance
operations and while parked. ISO 46 contains requirements for interface compatibility.
Grounding jacks shall be attached to the system ground reference so that the resistance between
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the mating plug and the system ground reference does not exceed 1.0 ohm DC. The following
grounding jacks are required:
a. Fuel nozzle ground. A ground jack shall be installed at each fuel inlet. To satisfy
international agreements for interfacing with refueling hardware, the jack shall be located
within 1.0 meter of the center of the fuel inlet for fuel nozzle grounding.
b. Servicing grounds. Ground jacks shall be installed at locations convenient for servicing
and maintenance.
c. Weapon grounds. Grounding jacks shall be installed at locations convenient for use in
handling of weapons or other explosive devices.
Compliance shall be verified by test and inspections.
Requirement Rationale (A5.11.1): Grounding between air vehicles and servicing equipment is
essential to prevent safety hazards from electrostatic charging effects. The grounding provisions
provide paths for equalization of voltage potentials between various points. Grounding jacks
must be located at a sufficient number of locations to provide ease of maintenance and to comply
with international agreements.
It is well established that sparks due to voltage potential differences between aircraft and
servicing equipment can be sufficient to ignite fuel vapors. The motion of fuel during refueling
operations is a large contributor to static charging. There is also a concern to prevent
electrostatic discharge during ordnance handling. EIDs used in ordnance are potentially
susceptible to inadvertent ignition from static discharge.
Electrical resistance between the grounding jack and vehicle structure must be controlled to
ensure that an adequate connection is present to dissipate static charge.
Requirement Guidance (A5.11.1): Relatively poor electrical connections (much greater than
the specified one ohm) are adequate to dissipate static charge. However, controls must be
imposed which indicate that a reasonable metal-to-metal connection is present. Allowing values
greater than 1.0 ohm could result in questionable or erratic connections being considered
adequate.
Technical Order 00-25-172 provides requirements for grounding of Air Force aircraft during
servicing. MIL-HDBK-274 provides information for naval aircraft operations and maintenance
personnel to ensure that aircraft are properly and safely electrically grounded for both static and
power.
Connection between the aircraft and servicing equipment in the presence of potentially
hazardous materials is necessary to prevent potential problems due to electrostatic discharges
between servicing equipment hardware and aircraft structure.
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International agreements require common interfaces for aircraft static grounding. ISO 46
provides the physical description of grounding jack provisions to ensure interface compatibility.
MIL-C-83413 specifies hardware for aircraft static grounding.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.11.1): Aircraft fuel fires have been attributed to
electrostatic discharge. Precisely demonstrating that an electrostatic discharge caused a mishap
is usually not possible due to difficulty in reproducing conditions that were present.
Grounding jacks on aircraft in the field have been found to be electrically open-circuited with
respect to the aircraft structure due to corrosion. It is important that corrosion control measures
be implemented at the time of installation.
Verification Rationale (A5.11.1): To ensure safety, compliance with provisions for grounding
jacks must be verified.
Verification Guidance (A5.11.1): Placement of jacks can be verified by test of required

distances and inspection. Proper bonding resistance can be verified by test with an ohmmeter.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.11.1): The availability of grounding jacks on modern

aircraft has minimized the probability of an explosion during fueling and ordnance handling.
Proper treatment of surfaces should be reviewed to determine if measures have been

implemented to ensure that life cycle issues have been addressed such that corrosion will not
degrade electrical bonding of the jacks over time.
A5.11.2 Servicing and maintenance equipment grounds. Servicing and maintenance

equipment shall have a permanently attached grounding wire suitable for connection to earth
ground. All servicing equipment that handles or processes flammable fuels, fluids, explosives,
oxygen, or other potentially hazardous materials shall have a permanently attached grounding
wire for connection to the system. Compliance shall be verified by inspection.
Requirement Rationale (A5.11.2): Grounding provisions are required to prevent electrical

shocks to personnel and potential arcing in the presence of hazardous materials.
Requirement Guidance (A5.11.2): Electrical fault conditions within the servicing and
maintenance equipment can cause hazardous voltages to appear on the structure of the
equipment. The grounding wire for connection to earth is necessary to allow fault currents to
flow and actuate circuit protection devices, thereby removing the hazardous voltage. If an earth
ground is always present through the power cord to the equipment, then separate ground
provision should not be necessary. The grounding wire for connection to the system prevents
voltage differences from developing due to static charging effects, which can cause arcing and
potential ignition of flammable vapors. If the servicing connection is designed to provide an
electrically conductive path between the system and the servicing equipment, then a separate
grounding wire should not be necessary.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.11.2): Not applicable
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Verification Rationale (A5.11.2): The implementation of grounding needs to be verified.
Verification Guidance (A5.11.2): Inspection of hardware or drawings is adequate to ensure

that appropriate grounding provisions are included.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.11.2): Not applicable.
A5.12 TEMPEST. National security information shall not be compromised by emanations

from classified information processing equipment. Compliance shall be verified by test,
analysis, inspections or a combination thereof. (NSTISSAM TEMPEST/1-92 and CNNS
Advisory Memorandum TEMPEST 01-02 provide testing methodology for verifying compliance
with TEMPEST requirements.)
Requirement Rationale (A5.12): Compromising emanations are unintentional intelligence

bearing signals, which if intercepted and analyzed, would disclose national security information
transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise processed by any classified information processing
system. The requirement for TEMPEST is found in DoDD 5200.19 (classified). For Air Force
aircraft, this requirement is generally applied to the communications subsystem only.
Requirement Guidance (A5.12): Baseline requirements are contained in NSTISSAM

TEMPEST/1-92, NSTISSAM TEMPEST/1-93, NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, CNNS Advisory
Memorandum TEMPEST 01-02, and Navy publication IA PUB-5239-31.
The need to apply TEMPEST requirements is determined by the certified TEMPEST technical
authority (CTTA). The CTTA considers several vulnerability and threat factors to determine the
residual risk to which the information is exposed. The CTTA then determines if
countermeasures are required to reduce risk to an acceptable level and identifies the most cost
effective approach to achieving imposed TEMPEST requirements.
Points of contact for the military services are as follows:
Navy: NISE East, PO Box 190022, North Charleston, SC 29419-9022. Telephone: (800) 304-
4636.
Air Force: HQ AFCA/TCBA-CTTA, 203 West Losey St, Room 2000, Scott AFB, IL 62225-
5222. Telephone: (618) 256-5027.
Army: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, ATTN: DAMI, 1000 Army Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20310-1000. Telephone: (703) 695-8909.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.12): In some cases, the RE102 limits of MIL-STD-461D
are considered an acceptable risk level for TEMPEST control of unintentional radiated
electromagnetic emissions.
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Additional TEMPEST lessons learned fall into three categories: 1) cases where inadequate
requirements were levied on the system; 2) cases where requirements were appropriate, but
implementation or procedural errors resulted in potentially compromising emissions; and 3)
cases where unnecessarily harsh requirements were levied on the system resulting in
questionable expenditure of program funds. The former and latter categories have been judged
to be equally inappropriate. The second must be considered as cost and risk trades for the
program. To address these three issues, National Policy established the CTTAs to ensure a
balance of risk and cost through implementation of a risk management process.
Verification Rationale (A5.12): Good EMC design practices can significantly reduce, but not
necessarily eliminate, the risk of compromising national security information. Depending upon
the environment in which these systems will operate, this risk may be unacceptable. The CTTA
should take into account the risk (such as the location, the level being processed, amount being
processed, and so forth) and weigh it against the cost prior to accepting TEMPEST compliance
by analysis or inspection.
Verification Guidance (A5.12): Test guidelines can be found in the documents referenced in
the verification requirement.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.12): Due to the nature of TEMPEST testing, lessons
learned are often classified. While most programs take TEMPEST into account during the
design phase, a large number of discrepancies are still found. Strictly using analysis to verify
system performance can be inherently risky. When certification tests have been run on systems,
the tests have sometimes revealed that a system did not meet the applicable standards. It is
important to note that the CTTA may consider the option of analysis or test certification as a
trade-off for possible cost savings versus the risk associated with a specific program.
A5.13 Emission control (EMCON). Unintentional electromagnetic radiated emissions shall

not exceed -110 dBm/m2 at one nautical mile (-105 dBm/m2 at one kilometer) in any direction
from the system over the frequency range of 500 kHz to 40 GHz, when using the resolution
bandwidths listed in Table 4.. Compliance shall be verified by test and inspection.
Requirement Rationale (A5.13): EMCON generally provides for protection against detection
by hostile forces who may monitor the electromagnetic spectrum for any emissions that indicate
that presence and operation of military electronics. These “unintentional” emissions may
originate from spurious signals, such as local oscillators, being present at antennas or from
electromagnetic interference emissions from platform cabling caused by items such as
microprocessors.
Operations on Naval ships are frequently conducted in electromagnetic silence which is the most
stringent state of EMCON. Other systems located onboard the ship (such as aircraft, tow
tractors, fire control radars, and ship communication systems) are not permitted to transmit on
any radios, radars, and navigation equipment over the frequency range of 500 kHz to 40 GHz.
This operation has resulted in requiring systems that deploy on ships to be capable of controlling
emissions from their onboard active transmitters by quickly changing operating mode to receive,
standby, or off and to control all other unintentional emissions such that they are undetectable.
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After aircraft have been launched from the ship, EMCON is frequently used to avoid detection of
the aircraft.
Army surface systems impose EMCON requirements to minimize detection and provide inter-
platform compatibility between one system’s radios and another system’s unintentional
emissions.
The Air Force considers EMCON to be an aspect of enhancing “low observable” properties of a
platform.
Requirement Guidance (A5.13): The highest state of EMCON used aboard Naval ships is
complete RF silence; however, other states of EMCON exist. Based on the activity of possible
threats and operational needs for safety and security, normal active emissions are permitted for
selected frequency ranges. For instance, if normal UHF communications is authorized, then it
could be called EMCON Alpha. Further states are set depending upon which transmitters
(frequency ranges) are authorized to be active. Typically, the systems being developed under
this standard will be either all on or all in the EMCON mode with no sub-states. Some
subsystems are normally in a non-emitting mode and are not controlled by the EMCON function.
A system such as the UHF communications is always in receive unless the operator presses the
push-to-talk button. Therefore, it is already in a non-emitting mode, and if EMCON Alpha was
authorized, the radio could transmit without deactivating the EMCON function.
It is important to note the need for complete electromagnetic silence from all aspects of the
system. Positively no emissions in excess of the specified level are permitted from antenna-
connected sources or from unintentional sources such as cables and equipment.
In an effort to reduce the complexity of developing ground systems for the Army, the EMCON
requirement is being used to set levels for unintentional emissions from systems that would
interfere with other platform’s radio operations. At the same time, they are minimizing the
possibility of exploitation of unintentional emissions such as EMI radiated due to ignition noise
and electronic control systems.
Guidance on EMCON can be found in NAWCWPNS TS 92-78.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.13): Radio silence, now called EMCON, was used very
effectively during World War II to hide the location of Naval ships from the Japanese. EMCON
was used by Naval forces in the Viet Nam and Korean War to deploy aircraft over the forward
edge of the battle area. These tactics continue today in modern Naval forces.
Local oscillator emissions must be controlled for a system to meet EMCON requirements.
Verification Rationale (A5.13): Almost all systems have a variety of apertures that are sources
of unintentional radiation. Since many of these apertures are inadvertent, it is only possible to
find some emissions by test. Analysis is not reliable.
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Verification Guidance (A5.13): The measurement of the EMCON level is normally conducted
in a anechoic chamber at a distance close to the system where normal laboratory equipment can
be used to detect the emissions. After several years of EMCON tests by the Naval Air
community, the distance commonly used is 10 meters from the system. At this distance the
values measured are related to the EMCON limit through the inverse square law of EM
propagation. The following equation is used:
Pt G t
Pd =
4πr 2
where:
Pd = Power density (watts/meter2)
Pt = Power transmitted (watts)
Gt = Gain of transmitting antenna
r = Radius from aircraft (meters)
Since the power density is proportional to 1/r2 with other parameters remaining constant, the
limit at 10 meters, assuming far-field conditions are maintained, is calculated by:
Limit = -110 dBm/m2 + 20 log (1852 meters per nautical mile/10 meters) = -64.6 dBm/m2.
EMCON measurements are made at 4 positions around the system, usually at 45, 135, 225 and
315 degrees from the front. Additional positions are added above, below and around the system
based on antennas positions and apertures. The measurement equipment used to detect the
emission is a spectrum analyzer augmented with a preamplifier or an EMI receiver with a noise
figure capable of having 6 dB or more margin between the noise floor and the derived EMCOM
limit. No distinction is made between narrow or broadband signals. Receiver dwell time must be
sufficient to capture the peak value of signals whose level varies with time. At each position, an
ambient measurement is made with all equipment on the system turned off, followed
immediately by a system EMCON measurement. The two measurements are compared to
remove emissions common to both. Emissions that remain in the emission measurement are
evaluated if they exceed the derived EMCON level. Those emissions that exceed the level
undergo further testing and analysis to determine compliance. Issues such as near-field effects
and ground reflections need to be considered. On mature systems which are having additional
capability added, the ambient measurement can be used to measure the system’s active
emissions, and the EMCON measurement then detects the new capability in the EMCON mode.
Pre-existing emissions from the mature system are removed from evaluation.
The developing activity can show by analysis of extrapolated measurements that the system does
not radiate above the EMCON limit. The extrapolated MIL-STD-461E limit (for fixed wing
aircraft “external” and helicopter applications) is less than the EMCON limit at all frequencies.
For example, the maximum RE102 value of 69 dBµV/m occurs at 18 GHz and is 2 dB below the
EMCON limit. Extrapolating 69 dBµV/m to 1 nautical mile (1852 meters), assuming far-field
conditions and using the relationship that Pd = E2/377 (where Pd is power density and E is field
strength), yields:
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69 dBµv/m - 116 (dBm/ m2)/(dBµV/m) - 20 log (1852 meters/1 meter) = -112 dBm/m2
Since this extrapolation uses near-field measurements to determine far-field values, there is some
uncertainty concerning actual far-field levels. The far field levels will tend to be higher than
those predicted. However, the example uses is a worst-case point on the RE102 curve and the
technique is considered to be valid for the purposes of the EMCON requirement.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.13): For equipment which is required to meet the radiated
emission limits of MIL-STD-461, there is assurance that the overall system will comply with the
EMCON requirement for any emission contributions from this equipment at most frequencies of
interest. When other EMI standards are imposed, analysis is necessary to determine whether the
requirements are adequate for EMCON at the system-level.
Naval ship subsystems typically have a standby select switch for powering up the subsystems
without deliberately transmitting.
A5.14 EM spectrum compatibility. Systems, subsystems, and equipment shall comply with the
DoD, national, and international regulations for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum (such
as NTIA “Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Radio Frequency Management” and
DoDD 4650.1). Compliance shall be verified by test, analysis, or a combination thereof, as
appropriate for the equipment development stage.
Requirement Rationale (A5.14): The availability of adequate spectrum to support military

electronic systems and equipment is critical to maximizing mission effectiveness. Spectrum
planning and frequency management must be given appropriate and timely consideration during
the development, procurement, and deployment of military assets that utilize the electromagnetic
spectrum.
To ensure maximum compatibility among the various worldwide users of the electromagnetic
spectrum, it is essential that antenna-connected equipment comply with spectrum usage and
management requirements. The DoD’s use of the spectrum is constantly being challenged by the
commercial sector. It is expected that the military’s control of the spectrum will diminish in
favor of commercial use. As more and more spectrum is taken away, the available spectrum
must be managed as efficiently as possible to ensure the success of all military operations.
Requirement Guidance (A5.14): International spectrum management policy originates from

the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) which establishes world-wide radio
regulations. The U.S. national hierarchy for spectrum management was established by the
Communication Act of 1934. Under the Communications Act, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) oversees the U.S. civilian use of the spectrum, and the Department of
Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), oversees the
federal Government’s use of the spectrum. The Director, NTIA, executes these duties through
the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), which consists of 20 representatives
from Government departments and agencies, including a representative from each military
service. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and
Intelligence (C3I) oversees spectrum management within the DoD.
110
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
Spectrum certification is a legal requirement derived from Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular No. A-11 and DoDD 4650.1. Paragraph 13-2 (o) of OMB Circular No. A-11
states: "Estimates for the development or procurement of major communications-electronics
systems (including all systems employing space satellite techniques) will be submitted only after
certification by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Department
of Commerce, that the radio frequency required for such systems is available."
Spectrum certification denotes the supportability of an electronic system or equipment for

operation in a designated frequency band. The DoD spectrum certification process requires that
a DD Form 1494, “Application for Frequency Allocation,” be submitted through appropriate
service frequency managers for approval. Instructions are delineated by each service for
compliance with spectrum certification regulations. An approved frequency allocation
authorizes the development or procurement of electronic systems in a defined frequency band or
specified frequencies. Without an approved frequency allocation the program manager
does not have the authority to procure electronic equipment, including commercial items.
The program manager is responsible for obtaining an approved frequency allocation for his
system. Contractors may support the program manager in acquiring data for describing the item,
but the program manager has the responsibility for submitting the frequency allocation
application. The various stages applicable for obtaining spectrum certification are defined
below:
a. Stage 1 (Conceptual) approval is required for the Pre-Concept phase. A frequency allocation
for Stage 1 must be requested (DD Form 1494) and approved prior to the releasing of funds for
studies or assembling "proof-of-concept" test beds. The system purpose, planned frequency
range and power, and any other planned or estimated details that are available on the item must
be provided.
b. Stage 2 (Experimental) approval is required prior to contracting for the Concept Exploration
and Definition phase. An approved frequency allocation for Stage 2 is required prior to the
release of funds for building a radiating test model or obtaining an approved frequency
assignment for experimental usage. Estimated and calculated data can be used for nearly all of
the blocks on DD Form 1494 when requesting a frequency allocation for Stage 2.
c. Stage 3 (Developmental) approval is required prior to contracting for the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase. An approved frequency allocation for Stage 3 is required
prior to the release of funds for developmental and operational testing. Frequency assignments
must likewise be obtained prior to operation of radiating equipment. Calculated data is
acceptable during Stage 3.
d. Stage 4 (Operational) approval is required prior to contracting for the Production and
Deployment phase. Prior to contracting for production units, an approved frequency allocation
for Stage 4 is mandatory. Measured data is mandatory for Stage 4. Calculated data is generally
unacceptable. Commercial items normally require Stage 4 approval; however, if extensive
modifications to the commercial item is planned, then Stage 3 may be appropriate.
111
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
Prior to operating electronic systems and equipment that intentionally transmit or receive
electromagnetic radiation, a frequency assignment which authorizes the use of specified
frequencies is required.
Design requirements for radar equipment and subsystems which are related to spectrum
compatibility are provided in MIL-STD-469. The minimum design requirements in MIL-STD-
469 satisfy Section 5.3, Radar Spectrum Engineering Criteria, in the NTIA manual. MIL-STD-
469 also provides design requirements for radars that are more stringent than the NTIA standards
for systems that operate in critical EMEs.
Analysis techniques addressing spectrum compatibility are found in Air Force document R-
3046-AF.
Requirement Lessons Learned (A5.14): Currently there are numerous incidences of co-site,
intra-ship, and inter-ship interference, as well as interference with the civilian community. For
example, the Honolulu Airport air traffic control radars have been degraded by shipboard radars
stationed adjacent to Pearl Harbor.
A program manager developed a system without requesting spectrum certification. After

development, it was discovered that the system had the potential to interfere with other critical
systems. Costly EMC testing and operational restrictions resulted, impacting the ability to meet
mission requirements. Both items could have been avoided if spectrum management directives
had been followed.
A base communications officer funded the purchase of commercially approved equipment. The
user was unable to get a frequency assignment because the equipment functioned in a frequency
range authorized for only non-Government operation. A second system had to be purchased to
satisfy mission requirements.
A tactical user bought commercial items as part of a deployable communications package.

Because spectrum certification was not acquired and resulting host nation coordination for the
use of that equipment was not accomplished, the user found that they were unable to use the
equipment in the host European and Asian countries. This problem would have been identified
prior to purchase had the proper coordination taken place. The user was unable to meet
communication needs and had to buy additional equipment to satisfy requirements.
Verification Rationale (A5.14): Spectrum certification practices must be properly followed

including verification of the characteristics of systems, subsystems, and equipment to ensure
that they are in compliance with spectrum usage requirements.
Verification Guidance (A5.14): Frequency allocation requests must include technical

information on the operating characteristics of the equipment to assist authorities in determining
the disposition of the request. When requesting a frequency assignment, the developing activity
should verify that the DoD Frequency Coordinator has approved the request as required. The
data required is detailed on the DD Form 1494. The stage of the request determines the level of
112
MIL-STD-464A
APPENDIX
testing or analysis required. MIL-STD-461, MIL-STD-449, and MIL-STD-469 provide

guidance for measuring the electromagnetic signal characteristics.
Verification Lessons Learned (A5.14): Numerous developed systems have been delayed in
being allowed to operate because of the lack of an approved allocation.
113
MIL-STD-464A
CONCLUDING MATERIAL
Custodians: Preparing Activity:

Navy - AS Air Force - 11
Army - SY
Air Force - 11 (Project EMCS - 0179)
Review Activities:
Air Force - 13, 19, 22, 84, 99
Army - AC, AM, AR, AT, AV, CE, CR, GL, MD, MI, PT, SC, TE
Navy - CG, EC, MC, OS, SH, YD
JSC
DTRA
NSA
114
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INSTRUCTIONS
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letter should be given.
2. The submitter of this form must complete blocks 4, 5, 6, and 7.
3. The preparing activity must provide a reply within 45 days from receipt of the form.
NOTE: This form may not be used to request copies of documents, not to request waivers, or clarification of requirements on
current contracts. Comments submitted on this form do not constitute or imply authorization to waive any portion of the
referenced document(s) or to amend contractual requirements.
1. DOCUMENT NUMBER 2. DOCUMENT DATE (YYMMDD)

I RECOMMEND A CHANGE: MIL-STD-464A
3. DOCUMENT TITLE
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects, Requirements for Systems
4. NATURE OF CHANGE (Identify paragraph number and include proposed rewrite, if possible. Attach extra sheets as needed.)
5. REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION
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C. ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE A REPLY WITHIN 45 DAYS, CONTACT:
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ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEMS

AMSC F7489 AREA EMCS

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

4. Comments, suggestions, or questions on this document should be addressed to

5.4 Lightning ..................................................................................................... 9

CONCLUDING MATERIAL .............................................................................. 114

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

2.2 Government documents

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARDS

MIL-STD-331 Fuze and Fuze Components, Environmental and

CNSS Advisory Memorandum, NONSTOP Evaluation Standard

NSTISSAM Compromising Emanations Laboratory Test

AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE

ANSI/IEEE C63.14 Standard Dictionary for Technologies of Electromagnetic

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO)

ISO 46 Aircraft - Fuel Nozzle Grounding Plugs and Sockets

3.3 Compromising emanations. Unintentional intelligence-bearing signals which, if

3.5 Electromagnetic environmental effects. The impact of the electromagnetic environment

5.1 Margins. Margins shall be provided based on system operational performance

5.2 Intra-system electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). The system shall be

5.2.2 Shipboard internal electromagnetic environment (EME). For ship applications,

(1). Metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to 18 GHz.

(2). Non-metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to 2 MHz, 50 V/m

b. Submarines. 5 V/m from 10 kHz to 1 GHz.

TABLE 1A. External EME for deck operations on ships

Frequency Range Flight Deck Weather Deck

Frequency Range Electric Field

TABLE 1D. External EME for ground systems

TABLE 1E. External EME for Army rotary wing aircraft

Frequency Range Electric Field

TABLE 2A. Lightning indirect effects waveform parameters

Current Description -αt -βt

TABLE 2B. Electromagnetic fields from near strike lightning (cloud-to-ground)

Magnetic field rate of change @ 10 meters 2.2x109 A/m/s

5.6 Subsystems and equipment electromagnetic interference (EMI). Individual subsystems

CURRENT (NOT TO SCALE)

COMPONENT C (Continuing Current)

TIME (NOT TO SCALE)

ELECTRICAL CURRENT WAVEFORMS

VOLTAGE (NOT TO SCALE)

ELECTRICAL VOLTAGE WAVEFORMS

FIGURE 1. Lightning direct effects environment

10 ms < t < 200 ms

50 kA D/2 D/2 D/2 D/2

Multiple Stroke Flash

i 50 uS < t < 1000 uS i 30 ms < t < 300 ms

One burst is composed of 20 pulses

Multiple Burst Waveform

FIGURE 2. Lightning indirect effects environment

5.7.3 Ordnance subsystems. Ordnance subsystems shall not be inadvertently initiated or

5.8.3 Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO). Electrically initiated

TABLE 3A. External EME for HERO

Frequency Range Field Intensity