Samahan NG Mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City PDF

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 225442. August 8, 2017.]
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK), *

JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA,
RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE
VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father,
JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR. , petitioners, vs. QUEZON CITY, as represented
by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented
by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented
by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO , respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p
This petition for certiorari and prohibition 1 assails the constitutionality of the
curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and
Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering
respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of
their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing
and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare
the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA)
9 3 4 4 , 2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew
ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel,
as well as the right of parents to rear their children. HTcADC
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to
strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which
were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody." 3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were
respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02, 4 dated
August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang
Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13, 5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 8046 6 entitled "An Ordinance
Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay
Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing
Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301, 7 Series of 2014,
entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors
from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation
Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances). 8
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Petitioners, 9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
(SPARK) — an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and
just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and
minors 1 0 — led this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process. 1 1 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance
contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630. 1 2
More speci cally, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed
standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of
the alleged curfew violators. 1 3 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension
depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the
law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator. 1 4
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions
indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e.,
exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend that the
lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or
reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the
legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 1 5
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional
as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive
due process; 1 6 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly
tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose. 1 7
They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community. 1 8
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4 1 9
thereof, contravenes Section 57-A 2 0 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited
curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and
admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's
express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. 2 1
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose
curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling
interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard,
they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit
televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable
means of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the
government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the
curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their
children to be out during curfew hours. 2 2
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the
Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case.
Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court,
contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review. 2 3 aScITE
A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." 2 4 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIIIJUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
a n d to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of
judicial power, which up to then was con ned to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable." 2 5
In Araullo v. Aquino III, 2 6 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition
led before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government may be determined under the Constitution." 2 7 It was explained that
"[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or o cer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to
set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
G o vernment , even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions . This application is expressly authorized by the text of the
second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]." 2 8
I n Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc., 2 9 it was expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no
speci c procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional de nition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave
abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court — based on its power to relax its rules — allowed Rule
65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"
30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the
legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their
delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the
Constitution, speci cally, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and
the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by
imposing penalties against minors, con icts with RA 9344, as amended, which
prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held
that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias." 3 1 In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail
the constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be
resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must rst be made
to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the
Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this
Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition [.] " 3 2 This Court is tasked
to resolve " the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the rst
instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people ," 3 3 as in this case. Hence,
petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case." 3 4 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the rst two
(2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the
expanded setting — is the presence of an actual case or controversy." 3 5 "[A]n actual
case or controversy is one which 'involves a con ict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, ' there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence. '" 3 6 According to recent jurisprudence, in the
Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simpli ed " by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave
abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act ." 3 7 HEITAD
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement

of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action . He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of." 3 8
Applying these precepts, this Court nds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly
on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights,
and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on
their asseverations, petitioners have — as will be gleaned from the substantive
discussions below — conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which
perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise
ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented
until the Court issued the TRO 3 9 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or
incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real
and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of
whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the
matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the
enforcement of the challenged governmental act ." 4 0 "'[I]nterest' in the question
involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the
official act — as distinguished from being merely incidental or general." 4 1
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions . Unless a person is
injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing." 4 2
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2)
constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their
respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related
to the rst is the purported con ict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal
provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the ve (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa)
has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel, 4 3 because: (a)
she was still a minor at the time the petition was led before this Court, 4 4 and, hence, a
proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by
virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim,
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes
(Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond
the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances,
for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that
they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional
parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her
father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly led the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question
the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the
representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly
infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal
personality to bring an action in court. 4 5 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members
who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to le this case on their
behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in
the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged
violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents'
right.
These notwithstanding, this Court nds it proper to relax the standing
requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court has
taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when
paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the o cial act
are able to craft an issue of transcendental signi cance to the people, the
Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit . It
may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act." 4 6
This is a case of rst impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew
ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the
impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the right of
minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to
regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching signi cance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of
procedural rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of
parents to rear their children, this Court must rst tackle petitioners' contention that the
Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not
containing su cient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities
with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of
procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and
Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing
authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical
appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit
that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or
identification of the child to show his age. 4 7 ATICcS
The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid ; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. " 4 8
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is
improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the
Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair
warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly. 4 9 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations , which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined
that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which
may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due
process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases
where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate
warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper
standards for adjudication. Such a de nition encompasses the vagueness
doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due
process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional
provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness." 5 0
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide
the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They
do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances
prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement
guidelines . The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances
are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of
government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the
sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that
this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in
the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is
prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law
contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably
decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 5 1 it was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague
standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
impressions and personal predilections. 5 2
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any
of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how
the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any
vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no su cient
standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew
Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing
ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. — x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certi cate, baptismal certi cate or
any other pertinent documents . In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because
RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with
statutory law. 5 3 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, 5 4
minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and,
therefore, covered by its provisions. 5 5 It is a long-standing principle that
" [c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a
municipal ordinance ." 5 6 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be read
and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who
was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond
the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of
identi cation establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect,
which — needless to state — should be done ethically and judiciously under the
circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the
ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for
vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their
Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to
determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be
allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with
parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically
be compelling. 5 7
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It
shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic e ciency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as
the "youth") for civic e ciency and the development of their moral character are
characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that
parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of
this provision is a re ection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth
would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation.
For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to
society. " [T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read
to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship ." 5 8 "This a rmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring
by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially
responsible citizens." 5 9 TIADCc
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of

authority over one's children." 6 0 In Ginsberg v. New York, 6 1 the Supreme Court of the
United States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society . " 6 2 As in our
Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as
"natural," but also as "primary." The quali er "primary" connotes the parents'
superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children . 6 3 The rationale
for the State's deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US
Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti), 6 4 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justi es
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring
parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an
additional and more important justi cation for state deference to
parental control over children is that "the child is not [a] mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations ." 6 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that
"when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the
well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests." 6 6 Thus, " [i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health
of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated,
these legitimate state interests may override the parents' quali ed right to
control the upbringing of their children ." 6 7
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in
the exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive
of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision . In Nery v. Lorenzo , 6 8 this
Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae . To it is
cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who
because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis
other parties . Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they
have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state
must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State , x x x." 6 9
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A s parens patriae , the State has the inherent right and duty to aid
parents in the moral development of their children , 7 0 and, thus, assumes a
supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
"[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the
State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example,
who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility . " 7 1
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid
parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed
at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the
promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily
entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because
of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to
potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral
well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental
decisions during this time. 7 2
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only
when the minors are not — whether actually or constructively (as will be later
discussed) — accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of
the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of
parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in
all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is
the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without
parental accompaniment during the curfew hours . 7 3 In this respect, the
ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to
apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to
in uence or control their minors' activities . 7 4 As such, the Curfew Ordinances
only amount to a minimal — albeit reasonable — infringement upon a parent's right to
bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively in uence
children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents
with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer) , 7 5 the US court observed that the city
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote
parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who
desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the
nocturnal behavior of those children." 7 6 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents
who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets." 7 7 Reason
dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local
context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal
curfews on parental rights.
In ne, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for
violating the parents' right to rear their children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on
the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right,
which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they
submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of
juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive
means for achieving the government's interest. 7 8 In addition, they posit that the Curfew
Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours. 7 9 AIDSTE
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth
doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights
to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere) , 8 0 this
Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only
to free speech cases," 8 1 viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply
a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad
if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks
an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of
the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for"
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit . The Court assumes that an overbroad
law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties . 8 2 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth
doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the
US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment, 8 3 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks , 8 4 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not speci cally addressed to
speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justi ed by the
'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.'" 8 5
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 8 6 it was opined that
"[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on
vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of
due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of
overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression ." 8 7
That being said, this Court nds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis
in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary,
however, this Court nds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict
scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right 8 8 under
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety , or public health, as may be provided by
law . (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. 8 9 It is a right embraced within
the general concept of liberty. 9 0 Liberty — a birthright of every person — includes the
power of locomotion 9 1 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in
lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
ends of life. 9 2
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise
their other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly,
association, and religion. 9 3 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was brie y rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 9 4 as
follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech,
assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement must
necessarily be protected under the First Amendment. Restricting movement in
those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot
be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of
those rights . One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is
impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall,
freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot
safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities for
freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is
inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment.
(Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify
restrictions even if made against fundamental rights. Speci cally on the freedom to
move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.
9 5 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State 9 6 may impose limitations on the
exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health ; and (2) are provided by law . 9 7
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, speci cally the promotion of
juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public
safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the con nes of
their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to
reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes
and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be
provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to
afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, 9 8 as amended, RA 9775, 9 9 RA 9262,
1 0 0 RA 9851, 1 0 1 RA 9344, 1 0 2 RA 10364, 1 0 3 RA 9211, 1 0 4 RA 8980, 1 0 5 RA 9288, 1 0 6
and Presidential Decree (PD) 603, 1 0 7 as amended. AaCTcI
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly

authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set
curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. — City or municipal councils
may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by
local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon
the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as
what respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local
o cials. In other words, PD 603 provides su cient statutory basis — as required by
the Constitution — to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors
do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, 1 0 8 but the exercise of these rights is
not co-extensive as those of adults . 1 0 9 They are always subject to the authority or
custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. 1 1 0 As
parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise
of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, 1 1 1 the right to
execute contracts, 1 1 2 and the right to engage in gainful employment. 1 1 3 With respect
to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign
country by themselves or with a person other than their parents. 1 1 4 These limitations
demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over
similar actions of adults, 1 1 5 and overall, re ect the State's general interest in the well-
being of minors. 1 1 6 hus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of
rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
I n Bellotti, 1 1 7 the US Supreme Court identi ed three (3) justi cations for the
differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first , the peculiar
vulnerability of children; second , their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed and mature manner; and third , the importance of the parental role
in child rearing : 1 1 8
[On the rst reason,] our cases show that although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, . . .
sympathy, and . . . paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them . x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justi es limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding. 1 1 9 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts , 1 2 0 the US Supreme Court acknowledged
the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may
secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of
selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects
of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms
arising from other activities subject to all the diverse in uences of the
[streets] . It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to
reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's
claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary
action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary
use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not
affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things,
this difference may be magni ed . 1 2 1 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justi ed in setting restrictions on the minors'
exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to
determine the reasonableness of classi cations. 1 2 2 The strict scrutiny test applies
when a classi cation either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes. 1 2 3 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classi cation does not
involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such
as in classi cations based on gender and legitimacy. 1 2 4 Lastly, the rational basis
test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests. 1 2 5
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test 1 2 6 is the applicable test.
1 2 7 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional
rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over
adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny. 1 2 8 In Nunez v. City of
San Diego (Nunez), 1 2 9 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews
implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict
scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are
no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of
those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-de ned age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.
x x x. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because
the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement
of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three speci c factors that, when
applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors
and adults: x x x. T h e Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower
level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context
of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to
determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x. EcTCAD
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in

regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that [a]
lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors'
fundamental rights . x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.
130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the
peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-à-vis the State's duty as
parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State
interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a
legislative classi cation that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. 1 3 1
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classi cation (i) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest , and (ii) is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest. 1 3 2
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally
declared policies. 1 3 3 This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the
State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute
compelling interests to justify regulations by the State . 1 3 4 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way. 1 3 5
As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling
interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on
minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to
protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have su ciently established that the ultimate objective
of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night
time off of public areas, so as to reduce — if not totally eliminate — their exposure to
potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and in uences which
may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City
Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their
proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them
into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
xxx xxx xxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school
youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious
gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or
other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;
xxx xxx xxx
[f] reports of barangay o cials and law enforcement agencies reveal
that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the
frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and
national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours,
protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children,
there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth
spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society
are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]
136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer, 1 3 7 as regards the information

gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of
that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own treatment of the present case.
Signi cantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to
implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during
the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justi ed in believing that its curfew
would materially assist its rst stated interest — that of reducing juvenile
violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from
many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a
survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department
of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On
the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude
that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will
make for a safer community . The same streets may have a more
volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day.
Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and
potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use
narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or
participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who
succumb to these criminal in uences at an early age may persist in
their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these
theories is beside the point. Those elected o cials with their nger on the pulse
of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew
the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal in uences, the
City was directly advancing its rst objective of reducing juvenile
violence and crime . 1 3 8 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon
City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in
their respective localities. 1 3 9 Based on these ndings, their city councils found it
necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general
welfare clause. 1 4 0 In this light, the Court thus nds that the local governments have
not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns
on public welfare, especially with respect to minors . As such, a compelling State
interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances. HSAcaE
With the rst requirement of the strict scrutiny test satis ed, the Court now
proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are
narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling
State interest — the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental
premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the
exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions
must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address
the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations
to be more narrowly drawn to avoid con icts with constitutional rights, then
they must be so narrowly drawn . 1 4 1
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to
regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any
legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic. 1 4 2 Thus, in the present case,
each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not
only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights. 1 4 3
I n In Re Mosier, 1 4 4 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional
impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors'
rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech. 1 4 5 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone
Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or
Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It
would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services
at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts
or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age to the
above mentioned services. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not
even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they
frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.
xxx xxx xxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra
note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven
exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional
muster. It speci cally excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment
rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route
from religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases
supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court
nds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement,
while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the
curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age,
or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night. 1 4 6
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors
with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or
church activity, in coordination with a speci c barangay o ce; (d) those traveling
towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision
of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (f) those
involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew
during these speci c occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New
Year's day, the night before the barangay esta, the day of the esta, All Saints' and All
Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday. 1 4 7
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that
their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the
minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to
education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. 1 4 8
However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent,
the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors'
rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly
trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective
of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides
insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First , although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it
hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the
streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social,
emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under
the Navotas Ordinance.
Second , although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending
traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying
adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier. 1 4 9 This legitimate activity done
pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively
curtailed.
Third , the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to
engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in
line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression. HESIcT
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these
activities outside curfew hours, but the Court nds no reason to prohibit them from
participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does
not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the
streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's
interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila
Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down
since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of
the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence 1 5 0 of any
separability clause. 1 5 1
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the rst two (2)
ordinances as it su ciently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the
following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS. — Minor children under the following
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian ;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular
activities of their school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when
such minors are out and unable to go home early due to
circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper
authorities concerned ; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation
such as con agration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident,
law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity,
or going to or returning home from the same place of employment
activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied
by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an
o cial school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
community or other similar private activity sponsored by
the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the
community) that supervises the activity or when the minor
is going to or returning home from such activity, without
any detour or stop ; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or
that he/she is a working student. 1 5 2 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As compared to the rst two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the
Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to su ciently protect the minors' rights
of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression.
Speci cally, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees
the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
association by enabling minors to attend both o cial and extra-curricular
activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations . The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are
also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the o cial
activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew
hours . Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is
su ciently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at
religious masses even during curfew hours . In relation to their right to travel, the
ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where
these activities are held . Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City
Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly
contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the
locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her
minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations
on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian," as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but
also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable
construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the
basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to
parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to
rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on
these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be
incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the
import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on
the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as
parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. 1 5 3
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full
rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court nds that the curfew
imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justi ed with its narrowly
drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no
way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its
police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of
scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper — as it was
raised — to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as
amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian
under Section 8 thereof, 1 5 4 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the
Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to
render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of — should the parent/s or
guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the ne imposed — or in addition to the ne
imposed therein. 1 5 5 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various
sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations , to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth
violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the
sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18)
years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition ;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition ,
and a warning about the legal impositions in case of a third
and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES,
Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a
Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or
both at the discretion of the Court , PROVIDED, That the
complaint shall be led by the Punong Barangay with the
o ce of the City Prosecutor. 1 5 6 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on
minors these sanctions — i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c)
ne; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses
such as curfew violations , viz.: caITAC
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an

offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a
child .
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted
by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as , but
not limited to, curfew violations , truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking
and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against
public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public
scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance,
vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing,
shall be for the protection of children . No penalty shall be imposed on
children for said violations , and they shall instead be brought to their
residence or to any barangay o cial at the barangay hall to be released to the
custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances . The child shall also be recorded as a "child
at risk" and not as a "child in con ict with the law." The ordinance shall also
provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group
activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that
curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as
an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the
imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently,
the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" 1 5 7 is de ned as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the
form of imprisonment or ne"; 1 5 8 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a
person who commits a deliberate or negligent act." 1 5 9 Punishment, in turn, is de ned
as "[a] sanction — such as ne, penalty, con nement, or loss of property, right, or
privilege — assessed against a person who has violated the law." 1 6 0
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the
actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences.
Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention
programs, such as community-based programs 1 6 1 recognized under Section 54 1 6 2
of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form
of intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case)
could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one,
the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation
as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social
stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light, these programs help inculcate
discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give
them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote
their integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent
with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings
and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally
de ned as a "gentle or friendly reproof" or "counsel or warning against fault or
oversight." 1 6 3 The Black's Law Dictionary de nes admonition as "[a]n authoritatively
issued warning or censure"; 1 6 4 while the Philippine Law Dictionary de nes it as a
"gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault,
error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning." 1 6 5 Notably, the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition
shall not be considered a penalty." 1 6 6
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and
admonition are clearly not penalties — as they are not punitive in nature — and are
generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their
objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and nes
and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is
generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof." 1 6 7 The Black's Law Dictionary defines
it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to
practice law"; 1 6 8 while the Philippine Law Dictionary de nes it as a "public and formal
censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior o cer or
body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition." 1 6 9 In other
words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or
violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly
warn the erring individual including the public against repeating or committing the
same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted
censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence
explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty, 1 7 0 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment , on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties
— as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence — that
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and
unambiguous. It states that " [n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x
violations [of] juvenile status offenses] ." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of
reprimand, ne, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of
Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably con ict with the clear
language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other
hand, the impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors
are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court nds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the
rst prong of the strict scrutiny test — that is, that the State has su ciently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of
the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the
least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance
provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their
fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn
to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian," has also been construed to include parental
permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable
exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the
discretion of the local government unit.
In ne, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and
thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and
thus, valid in accordance with this Decision. ICHDca
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal
provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section
57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always
conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE , the petition is PARTLY GRANTED . The Court hereby declares
Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13
issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,
NULL and VOID ; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local
government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Mendoza, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN , J.:
I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should have been struck
down for failing to ground themselves on demonstrated rational bases, for failing to
adopt the least restrictive means to achieve their aims, and for failing to show narrowly
tailored enforcement measures that foreclose abuse by law enforcers. The doctrine of
parens patriae fails to justify these ordinances. While this doctrine enables state
intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must not transgress the
constitutionally enshrined natural and primary right of parents to rear their children.
However, the adoption by this Court of the interpretation of Section 4, item (a) of
the Quezon City Ordinance to the effect that parental permission in any form for any
minor is also an exception will have the effect of narrowly tailoring the application of
that curfew regulation.
The assailed ordinances are not novel. Navotas City Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
99-02 1 was passed on August 26, 1999. City of Manila Ordinance No. 8046 2 was
passed on October 14, 2002. Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-2301 3 was passed on July
31, 2014.
The present controversy was spurred by the revitalized, strict implementation of
these curfew ordinances as part of police operations under the broad umbrella of
"Oplan Rody." These operations were in ful llment of President Rodrigo Duterte's
campaign promise for a nationwide implementation of a curfew for minors. 4
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an association of youths and
minors for "the protection of the rights and welfare of youths and minors," and its
members Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan
(Baccutan), Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), and Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Villegas)
led the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the ordinances are
unconstitutional and in violation of Republic Act No. 9344. 5
I
Constitutional challenges against local legislation
Petitioners submit a multi-faceted constitutional challenge against the assailed
ordinances.
They assert that the assailed ordinances should be declared unconstitutional as
the lack of expressed standards for the identi cation of minors facilitates arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 6
Petitioners further argue that the assailed ordinances unduly restrict a minor's
liberty, in general, and right to travel, in particular. 7
Likewise, petitioners assert that, without due process, the assailed ordinances
intrude into or deprive parents of their "natural and primary right" 8 to rear their children.
Ordinances are products of "derivative legislative power" 9 in that legislative
power is delegated by the national legislature to local government units. They are
presumed constitutional and, until judicially declared invalid, retain their binding effect.
In Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates: 1 0
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this
presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the con ict with
the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists,
even if well-founded, there can be no nding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is
to sustain. 1 1
The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect that the judiciary
must accord to the legislature. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan: 1 2
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it
is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may rmly
rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of
the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. 1 3
The same respect is proper for acts made by local legislative bodies, whose
members are equally presumed to have acted conscientiously and with full awareness
of the constitutional and statutory bounds within which they may operate. Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila 1 4 explained:
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is
all in favor of validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitates action.
The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice
that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 1 5
TCAScE
The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be challenged. Challenges,

however, shall only be sustained upon a clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for
invalidating a law. In Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar: 1 6
To justify the nulli cation of the law or its implementation, there must be
a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of
doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must
sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on . . . baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it
but also of the executive which approved it." This presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is
reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of
the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. 1 7
Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating ordinances, Hon. Fernando
v. St. Scholastica's College , 1 8 outlined the test for determining the validity of an
ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 1 9
The rst consideration hearkens to the primacy of the Constitution, as well as to
the basic nature of ordinances as products of a power that was merely delegated to
local government units. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio: 2 0
Anent the rst criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not
contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two
requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test
of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The
requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the
precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their
derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. 2 1 (Citations omitted)
II
Appraising due process
and equal protection challenges
At stake here is the basic constitutional guarantee that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws." 2 2 There are two (2) dimensions to this: first, is
an enumeration of objects of protection — life, liberty and property; second, is an
identi cation and delimitation of the legitimate mechanism for their modulation or
abnegation — due process and equal protection. The rst dimension lists speci c
objects whose bounds are amorphous; the second dimension delineates action, and
therefore, requires precision.
Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail ensuring biological
subsistence. It is not just a proscription against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and
its protection does not merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The objects of the
constitutional protection of due process are better understood dynamically and from a
frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise better understood integrally,
operating in a synergistic frame that serves to secure a person's integrity.
"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations' formulation of "life,
liberty, and security of person" 2 3 and the American formulation of "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness." 2 4 As the American Declaration of Independence postulates, they
are "unalienable rights" for which "[g]overnments are instituted among men" in order
that they may be secured. 2 5 Securing them denotes pursuing and obtaining them, as
much as it denotes preserving them. The formulation is, thus, an aspirational
declaration, not merely operating on factual givens but enabling the pursuit of ideals.
"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of human potential:
not merely organic, physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization, enabled
and effected not only by freedom from bodily restraint but by facilitating an
empowering existence. 2 6 "Life and liberty," placed in the context of a constitutional
aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the government to facilitate this empowering
existence. This is not an inventively novel understanding but one that has been at the
bedrock of our social and political conceptions. As Justice George Malcolm, speaking
for this Court in 1919, articulated:
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As
enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose,
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of
the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the
right to labor, and the right of locomotion. 2 7
It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the objects of due process
protection admits amorphous bounds. The constitutional protection of life and liberty
encompasses a penumbra of cognate rights that is not xed but evolves — expanding
liberty — alongside the contemporaneous reality in which the Constitution operates.
People v. Hernandez 2 8 illustrated how the right to liberty is multi-faceted and is not
limited to its initial formulation in the due process clause:
[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political
system that, not satis ed with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very rst
paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution
devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(18), and (21) of said section (1) 2 9 to the protection of several aspects of
freedom. 3 0 cTDaEH
While the extent of the constitutional protection of life and liberty is dynamic,
evolving, and expanding with contemporaneous realities, the mechanism for preserving
life and liberty is immutable: any intrusion into it must be with due process of law and
must not run afoul of the equal protection of the laws.
Appraising the validity of government regulation in relation to the due process
and equal protection clauses invokes three (3) levels of analysis. Proceeding similarly
as we do now with the task of appraising local ordinances, White Light Corporation v.
City of Manila 3 1 discussed:
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due
process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test
laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote 4 of
the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular"
minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." Consequently, two standards
of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom
of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of
review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was
later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classi cations based on
gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Craig, after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. While the test
may have rst been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United
States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis
of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means
for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers
to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from
its earlier applications to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel. 3 2 (Citations omitted)
An appraisal of due process and equal protection challenges against government
regulation must admit that the gravity of interests invoked by the government and the
personal liberties or classi cation affected are not uniform. Hence, the three (3) levels
of analysis that demand careful calibration: the rational basis test, intermediate review,
and strict scrutiny. Each level is typi ed by the dual considerations of: rst, the interest
invoked by the government; and second, the means employed to achieve that interest.
The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government
interest and that there is a reasonable connection between it and the means employed
to achieve it.
Intermediate review requires an important government interest. Here, it would
su ce if government is able to demonstrate substantial connection between its
interest and the means it employs. In accordance with White Light, "the availability of
less restrictive measures [must have been] considered." 3 3 This demands a
conscientious effort at devising the least restrictive means for attaining its avowed
interest. It is enough that the means employed is conceptually the least restrictive
mechanism that the government may apply.
Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental freedoms or what
is involved are suspect classi cations. It requires that there be a compelling state
interest and that the means employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually — not
only conceptually — being the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked interest.
Here, it does not su ce that the government contemplated on the means available to
it. Rather, it must show an active effort at demonstrating the ine cacy of all possible
alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore all possible avenues but to even
debunk the viability of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course of action is
the sole effective means. To the extent practicable, this must be supported by sound
data gathering mechanisms.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 34
further explained:
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in
deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to
Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on
the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by
the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict.
A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's
solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights
it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act
is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the
actor. 3 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation of fundamental
rights and the non-discrimination of protected classes. Thus, in these cases, the burden
falls upon the government to prove that it was impelled by a compelling state interest
and that there is actually no other less restrictive mechanism for realizing the interest
that it invokes:
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to
prove the same. 3 6
III
The present Petition entails fundamental rights and
defines status offenses. Thus, strict scrutiny is proper.
By de nition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the assailed ordinances,
this restriction applies daily at speci ed times and is directed at minors, who remain
under the authority of their parents. cSaATC
Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present Petition is the right to
travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this right is not absolute.
The Constitution itself states that the right may be "impaired" in consideration of:
national security, public safety, or public health. 3 7 The ponencia underscores that the
avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is "the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime." 3 8 The assailed ordinances, therefore, seem to nd
justi cation as a valid exercise of the State's police power, regulating — as opposed to
completely negating — the right to travel.
Given the overlap of the state's prerogatives with those of parents, equally at
stake is the right that parents hold in the rearing of their children.
There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v. Torres 3 9 identi ed the
right of persons to be secure "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," 4 0 the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 4 1 liberty of abode, 4 2 the right to form
associations, 4 3 and the right against self-incrimination 4 4 as among these facets.
While not among the rights enumerated under Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
the rights of parents with respect to the family is no less a fundamental right and an
integral aspect of liberty and privacy. Article II, Section 12 characterizes the right of
parents in the rearing of the youth to be "natural and primary." 4 5 It adds that it is a right,
which shall "receive the support of the Government." 4 6
Imbong v. Ochoa , 4 7 a rms the natural and primary rights of parents in the
rearing of children as a facet of the right to privacy:
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually
decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is,
the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of
one's privacy with respect to his family. 4 8
This Court's 2009 Decision in White Light 4 9 unequivocally characterized the right
to privacy as a fundamental right. Thus, alleged statutory intrusion into it warrants strict
scrutiny. 5 0
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the
injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the
application of the most deferential standard — the rational basis test. Yet as
earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons — those persons who would be deprived of
availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.
xxx xxx xxx
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to
liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on
that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was de ned by
Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person
of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare." . . . In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen
to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty . . .
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the
subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery
and fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the 'ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers.'" Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene
of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among
consenting married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
protected will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our
holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect . . .
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justi ed by a
compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right
to privacy independently of its identi cation with liberty; in itself it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental
powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen. 5 1 (Citations omitted)
In determining that the interest invoked by the State was not su ciently
compelling to justify intrusion of the patrons' privacy rights, this Court weighed the
State's need for the "promotion of public morality" as against the individual patrons'
"liberty to make the choices in [their] lives," thus:
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens
deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do
not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect . . .
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the
acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental
liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration
on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the
individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the
State. 5 2 (Citation omitted) cHDAIS
Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed ordinances de ne

status offenses. They identify and restrict offenders, not purely on the basis of
prohibited acts or omissions, but on the basis of their inherent personal condition.
Altogether and to the restriction of all other persons, minors are exclusively classi ed
as potential offenders. What is potential is then made real on a passive basis, as the
commission of an offense relies merely on presence in public places at given times and
not on the doing of a conclusively noxious act.
The assailed ordinances' adoption and implementation concern a prejudicial
classi cation. The assailed ordinances are demonstrably incongruent with the
Constitution's unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose mandate is
to "promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-
being." 5 3
This attitude is re ected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which takes great pains at a nuanced
approach to children. Republic Act No. 9344 meticulously de nes a "child at risk" and a
"child in con ict with the law" and distinguishes them from the generic identi cation of
a "child" as any "person under the age of eighteen (18) years." 5 4 These concepts were
adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical reduction to a wholesale and
indiscriminate concept, consistent with the protection that is proper to a vulnerable
sector. The assailed ordinances' broad and sweeping determination of presence in the
streets past de ned times as delinquencies warranting the imposition of sanctions
tend to run afoul of the carefully calibrated attitude of Republic Act No. 9344 and the
protection that the Constitution mandates. For these, a strict consideration of the
assailed ordinances is equally proper.
IV
The apparent factual bases for the
assailed ordinances are tenuous at best.
To prove the necessity of implementing curfew ordinances, respondents City of
Manila and Quezon City provide statistical data on the number of Children in Con ict
with the Law (CICL). 5 5 Quezon City's data is summarized as follows: 5 6
Year No. of Barangay with Barangays No. of Total
Barangays submissions without Barangays No. of
submissions with Zero CICL CICL
2013 142 102 40 Not provided 2677
(January to (January to
June) June)
44 98
(July to (July to
December) December)
2014 142
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017
119 23 32 2937 cdasiaonline.com
2014 142 119 23 32 2937
(January to (January to (January to
June) June) June)
82 60 25
(July to (July to (July to
December) December) December)
2015 142 142 0 51 4778
The data submitted, however, is inconclusive to prove that the city is so overrun
by juvenile crime that it may as well be totally rid of the public presence of children at
speci ed times. While there is a perceptively raised number of CICLs in Quezon City, the
data fails to specify the rate of these gures in relation to the total number of minors
and, thus, fails to establish the extent to which CICLs dominate the city. As to
geographical prevalence that may justify a city-wide prohibition, a substantial number
of barangays reported not having CICLs for the entire year. As to prevalence that
stretches across the relative maturity of all who may be considered minors (e.g., grade-
schoolers as against adolescents), there was also no data showing the average age of
these CICLs.
The City of Manila's data, on the other hand, is too con icting to be authoritative.
The data reports of the Manila Police Department, as summarized in the ponencia, 5 7
state:
YEAR NUMBER OF CICL
2014 74
2015 30
January to June 2016 75
The Department of Social Welfare and Development of the City of Manila has
vastly different numbers. As summarized in the ponencia: 5 8
YEAR NUMBER OF CICL
2015 845
The Department of Social Welfare of Manila submits that for January to August
2016, there was a total of 480 CICLs as part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign. 5 9
Of the 480 minors, 210 minors were apprehended for curfew violations, not for petty
crimes. 6 0 Again, the data fails to account for the percentage of CICLs as against the
total number of minors in Manila.
The ponencia cites Shleifer v. City of Charlottesville , 6 1 a United States Court of
Appeals case, as basis for examining the validity of curfew ordinances in Metro Manila.
Far from supporting the validity of the assailed ordinances, Shleifer discounts it.
Shleifer relies on unequivocally demonstrated scienti c and empirical data on the rise
of juvenile crime and the emphasis on juvenile safety during curfew hours in
Charlottesville, Virginia. Here, while local government units adduced data, there does
not appear to have been a well-informed effort as to these data's processing,
interpretation, and correlation with avowed policy objectives.
With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local government units'
justi cations of reducing crime and sweeping averments of "peace and order" hardly
sustain a rational basis for the restriction of minors' movement during curfew hours. If
at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions ipso facto equate to the reduction of CICLs
appears to be a gratuitous conclusion. It is more sentimental than logical. Lacking in
even a rational basis, it follows that there is no support for the more arduous
requirement of demonstrating that the assailed ordinances support a compelling state
interest.
V
It has not been demonstrated that the curfews
effected by the assailed ordinances are the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed purposes.
The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law be narrowly
tailored in order to achieve compelling governmental interests, it also requires that the
mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least drastic means to achieve its
ends: ISHCcT
Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms
such as free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.
Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classi es on the
basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental
constitutional rights, the presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is,
such legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government
demonstrates otherwise. The government must show that the statute is
supported by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen to
accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains as
follows:
. . . The intensive review associated with the new equal
protection imposed two demands a demand not only as to means
but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny
required a far closer t between classi cation and statutory
purpose than the rough and ready exibility traditionally tolerated
by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to
achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related." Moreover,
equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well:
legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be
justi ed by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide
spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least
drastic means available for achieving the governmental objective. 6 2 (Citations
omitted)
The governmental interests to be protected must not only be reasonable. They
must be compelling . Certainly, the promotion of public safety is compelling enough to
restrict certain freedoms. It does not, however, su ce to make a generic, sweeping
averment of public safety.
To reiterate, respondents have not shown adequate data to prove that an
imposition of curfew lessens the number of CICLs. Respondents further fail to provide
data on the frequency of crimes against unattended minors during curfew hours.
Without this data, it cannot be concluded that the safety of minors is better achieved if
they are not allowed out on the streets during curfew hours.
While the ponencia holds that the Navotas and Manila Ordinances tend to restrict
minors' fundamental rights, it found that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly tailored
to achieve its objectives. The Quezon City Ordinance's statement of its objectives
reads:
WHEREAS . . . the children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected
of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which led
them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk
of committing criminal offenses;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-
school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of
notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads,
streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups, without lawful
purpose or justification;
WHEREAS, to keep themselves away from the watch and supervision of
the barangay o cials and other authorities, these misguided minor children
preferred to converge or ock together during the night time until the wee hours
of the morning resorting to drinking on the streets and other public places,
illegal drug use and sometimes drug peddling, engaging in troubles and other
criminal activities which often resulted to bodily injuries and loss of lives;
WHEREAS, reports of barangay o cials and law enforcement agencies
reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening
are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances
and national laws;
WHEREAS, it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to
regulate the movement of minor children during night time by setting
disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
WHEREAS, to strengthen and support parental control on these minor
children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of a growing number
of the youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face
of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements in
society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious
activities[.] 6 3
In order to achieve these objectives, 6 4 the ponencia cites the ordinances'
exemptions, which it found to be "su ciently safeguard[ing] the minors' constitutional
rights": 6 5
SECTION 4. EXEMPTIONS. — Minor children under the following
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance:
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school
or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise
indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home
early due to circumstances beyond their control as veri ed by the
proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation
such as con agration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident,
law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents;
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity,
or going to or returning home from the same place of employment
activity, without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by
an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an o cial
school, religious, recreational, educational, social, community or
other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school
or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when
the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without
any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or
that he/she is a working student. 6 6
The ponencia states:
[T]he Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that
hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within
the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent. 6 7
T h e ponencia unfortunately falls into a hasty generalization. It generalizes
unattended minors out in the streets during curfew hours as potentially, if not actually,
engaging in criminal activities, merely on the basis that they are not within the bounds
of the stated exemptions. It is evident, however, that the exemptions are hardly
exhaustive. CAacTH
Consider the dilemma that petitioner Villegas faces when she goes out at night
to buy food from a convenience store because the rest of her family is already asleep.
6 8 As a Quezon City resident, she violates the curfew merely for wanting to buy food
when she gets home from school.
It may be that a minor is out with friends or a minor was told to make a purchase
at a nearby sari-sari store. None of these is within the context of a "party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school and
organization" or part of an "o cial school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
community or other similar private activity." Still, these activities are not criminal or
nefarious. To the contrary, socializing with friends, unsavorily portrayed as mere loa ng
or loitering as it may be, contributes to a person's social and psychological
development. Doing one's chores is within the scope of respecting one's elders.
Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that it can keep them
safe from crime is not the least restrictive means to achieve this objective. Petitioners
suggest street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs in street corners, and visible
police patrol. 6 9 Public safety is better achieved by effective police work, not by
clearing streets of children en masse at night. Crimes can just as well occur in broad
daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an environment. E cient law
enforcement, more than sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children will be
safe regardless of what time they are out on the streets.
The assailed ordinances' de ciencies only serve to highlight their most
disturbing aspect: the imposition of a curfew only burdens minors who are living in
poverty.
For instance, the Quezon City Ordinance targets minors who are not traditionally
employed as the exemptions require that the minor be engaged in "an authorized
employment activity." Curfew violators could include minors who scour garbage at
night looking for food to eat or scraps to sell. The Department of Social Welfare and
Development of Manila reports that for 2016, 2,194 minors were turned over as part of
their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign. 7 0 The greater likelihood that most, if not all,
curfew violators will be street children — who have no place to even come home to —
than actual CICLs. So too, those caught violating the ordinance will most likely have no
parent or guardian to fetch them from barangay halls.
An examination of Manila Police District's data on CICLs show that for most of
the crimes committed, the motive is poverty, not a drive for nocturnal escapades. 7 1
Thus, to lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the government must rst alleviate
poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty alleviation programs, not curfews, are the least
restrictive means of preventing indigent children from turning to a life of criminality.
VI
The assailed ordinances give
unbridled discretion to law enforcers.
The assailed ordinances are de cient not only for failing to provide the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed ends but also in failing to articulate
safeguards and define limitations that foreclose abuses.
In assailing the lack of expressed standards for identifying minor, petitioners
invoke the void for vagueness doctrine. 7 2
The doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario: 7 3
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 7 4
While facial challenges of a statute on the ground of vagueness is permitted only
in cases involving alleged transgressions against the right to free speech, penal laws
may nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness "as applied." In Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan: 7 5
[T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as
they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made
to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such
statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly
it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the
Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. 7 6
The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge is settled.
As explained in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council :
77
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant

facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire
law, pinpointing its aws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities. 7 8 (Citation omitted)
Thus, to invalidate a law with penal provisions, such as the assailed ordinances,
as-applied parties must assert actual violations of their rights and not prospective
violations of the rights of third persons. In Imbong v. Ochoa: 7 9
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule
that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing. 8 0
T h e ponencia states that petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper. It reasons that petitioners failed to point out any ambiguous
provision in the assailed ordinances. 8 1 It then proceeds to examine the provisions of
the ordinances, vis-à-vis their alleged defects, while discussing how these defects may
affect minors and parents who are not parties to this case. In effect, the ponencia
engaged in a facial examination of the assailed ordinances. This facial examination is an
improper exercise for the assailed ordinances, as they are penal laws that do not
ostensibly involve the right to free speech.
The more appropriate stance would have been to examine the assailed
ordinances, not in isolation, but in the context of the speci c cases pleaded by
petitioners. Contrary to the ponencia's position, the lack of speci c provisions in the
assailed ordinances indeed made them vague, so much so that actual transgressions
into petitioner's rights were made.
The questioned Navotas and City of Manila Ordinances do not state any
guidelines on how law enforcement agencies may determine if a person apprehended
is a minor.
For its part, Section 5 (h) of the Quezon City ordinance provides:
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act; 8 2
However, the Section 7 it refers to provides no guidelines on the identi cation of
age. It merely states that any member of the community may call the attention of
barangay officials if they see minors during curfew hours:
SECTION 7. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT/PARTICIPATION. — Any person
who has personal knowledge of the existence of any minor during the wee
hours as provided under Section 3 hereof, must immediately call the attention of
the barangay. 8 3
The ponencia asserts that Republic Act No. 9344, Section 7 8 4 addresses the
lacunae as it articulates measures for determining age. However, none of the assailed
ordinances actually refers law enforcers to extant statutes. Their actions and
prerogatives are not actually limited whether by the assailed ordinances' express
provisions or by implied invocation. True, Republic Act No. 9344 states its
prescriptions but the assailed ordinances' equivocation by silence reduces these
prescriptions to mere suggestions, at best, or to mere afterthoughts of a justi cation,
at worst. IAETDc
Thus, the lack of su cient guidelines gives law enforcers "unbridled discretion in
carrying out [the assailed ordinances'] provisions." 8 5 The present Petition illustrates
how this has engendered abusive and even absurd situations.
Petitioner Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), an 18-year-old — no longer a
minor — student, recalled that when he was apprehended for violating the curfew, he
showed the barangay tanod his registration card. Despite his presentation of an o cial
document, the barangay tanod refused to believe him. Delos Reyes had to resort to
showing the barangay tanod his hairy legs for the tanod to let him go. 8 6
Petitioner Baccutan likewise alleged that he and his friends were apprehended by
10 barangay tanods for violating curfew even though he was already 19 years old at
that time. He alleged that he and his friends were told to perform 200 squats and if they
refused, they would be framed up for a crime. They were released only when the aunt of
one (1) of his friends arrived. 8 7
These instances illustrate how predicaments engendered by enforcing the
assailed ordinances have not been resolved by "simply presenting any competent proof
of identi cation" 8 8 considering that precisely, the assailed ordinances state no
mandate for law enforcers to check proof of age before apprehension. Clear and
explicit guidelines for implementation are imperative to foreclose further violations of
petitioners' due process rights. In the interim, the assailed statutes must be invalidated
on account of their vagueness.
VII
The doctrine of parens patriae
does not sustain the assailed ordinances.
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions into parental
prerogatives made by the assailed ordinances. The State acts as parens patriae in the
protection of minors only when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or
exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children are to be reared, supplanting
its own wisdom to that of parents.
The doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American, common law origin. It was
understood to have "emanate[d] from the right of the Crown to protect those of its
subjects who were unable to protect themselves." 8 9 It was the King's "royal
prerogative" 9 0 to "take responsibility for those without capacity to look after
themselves." 9 1 At its outset, parens patriae contemplated situations where vulnerable
persons had no means to support or protect themselves. Given this, it was the duty of
the State, as the ultimate guardian of the people, to safeguard its citizens' welfare.
The doctrine became entrenched in the United States, even as it gained
independence and developed its own legal tradition. In Late Corporation of Church of
Jesus Christ v. United States , 9 2 the United States Supreme Court explained parens
patriae as a beneficent state power and not an arbitrary royal prerogative:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of
every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature,
and has no a nity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the people and the destruction
of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most bene cent function, and often
necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention
of injury to those who cannot protect themselves . 9 3 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the same case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the exercise
of parens patriae applies "to the bene ciaries of charities, who are often incapable of
vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority." 9 4 It is
from this reliance and expectation of the people that a state stands as "parent of the
nation." 9 5
American colonial rule and the adoption of American legal traditions that it
entailed facilitated our own jurisdiction's adoption of the doctrine of parens patriae. 9 6
Originally, the doctrine was understood as "the inherent power and authority of the
state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris." 9 7
However, signi cant developments have since calibrated our own understanding
and application of the doctrine.
Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 12. . . . The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic e ciency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is only the 1987 Constitution which introduced the quali er "primary." The
present Article II, Section 12's counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution merely
referred to "[t]he natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4. . . . The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic e ciency and the development of moral character shall receive
the aid and support of the Government. 9 8
As with the 1973 Constitution, the 1935 Constitution also merely spoke of "[t]he
natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4. The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency should receive the aid and support of the government. 9 9
The addition of the quali er "primary" unequivocally attests to the constitutional
intent to afford primacy and preeminence to parental responsibility. More plainly
stated, the Constitution now recognizes the superiority of parental prerogative. It
follows, then, that state interventions, which are tantamount to deviations from the
preeminent and superior rights of parents, are permitted only in instances where the
parents themselves have failed or have become incapable of performing their duties.
Shifts in constitutional temperament contextualize Nery v. Lorenzo , 1 0 0 the
authority cited by ponencia in explaining the State's role in the upbringing of children.
1 0 1 In Nery, this Court alluded to the State's supreme authority to exercise parens
patriae. Nery was decided in 1972, when the 1935 Constitution was in operation. 1 0 2 It
stated:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the
duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual[s] who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they
are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community
to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust. 1 0 3
This outmoded temperament is similarly re ected in the 1978 case of Vasco v.
Court of Appeals, 1 0 4 where, without moderation or quali cation, this Court asserted
that "the State is considered the parens patriae of minors." 1 0 5
In contrast, Imbong v. Ochoa , 1 0 6 a cased decided by this Court in 2014,
unequivocally characterized parents' rights as being "superior" to the state:
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic e ciency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution a rms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it
places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 1 0 7 (Emphasis
supplied) DcHSEa
Thus, the State acts as parens patriae only when parents cannot ful ll their role,
as in cases of neglect, abuse, or exploitation:
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from
abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is
mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the
State safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the end that
their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society
shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. 1 0 8
As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere substitute or supplement to
parents' authority over their children. It operates only when parental authority is
established to be absent or grossly de cient. The wisdom underlying this doctrine
considers the existence of harm and the subsequent inability of the person to protect
himself or herself. This premise entails the incapacity of parents and/or legal guardians
to protect a child.
To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching and almost absolute power to the
State; to allow the Government to arbitrarily exercise its parens patriae power might as
well render the superior Constitutional right of parents inutile.
More re ned applications of this doctrine re ect this position. In these instances
where the State exercised its powers over minors on account of parens patriae, it was
only because the children were prejudiced and it was without subverting the authority
of the parents themselves when they have not acted in manifest offense against the
rights of their children.
Thus, in Bernabe v. Alejo , 1 0 9 parens patriae was exercised in order to give the
minor his day in court. This is a matter beyond the conventional capacities of parents,
and therefore, it was necessary for the State to intervene in order to protect the
interests of the child.
In People v. Baylon 1 1 0 and other rape cases, 1 1 1 this Court held that a rigorous
application of the penal law is in order, since "[t]he state, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully." 1 1 2 In these criminal cases where minor
children were victims, this Court, acting as the representative of the State exercising its
parens patriae power, was rm in imposing the appropriate penalties for the crimes —
no matter how severe — precisely because it was the only way to mitigate further harm
to minors. Parens patriae is also the reason why "a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse," as this
Court held in People v. Malto . 1 1 3 Again, these State actions are well outside the
conventional capabilities of the parents and in no way encroach on the latter's authority.
Such assistive and justified regulation is wanting in this case.
VIII
In my view, the interpretation that this Court gives to Section 4, item (a) of the
Quezon City Ordinance will su ciently narrowly tailor its application so as to save it
from its otherwise apparent breach of fundamental constitutional principles. Thus, in
the ponencia of Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe:
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes
his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during
the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly
considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian," as
accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its
constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable
construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure
with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only
complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself
prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Of course, nothing in this decision will preclude a stricter review in a factual case
whose factual ambient will be different.
Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in the result.
Footnotes
* Or "Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan," rollo, p. 4.
1. Id. at 3-36.
2 . Entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on April 28, 2006.
3. Rollo, p. 6.
4. Id. at 37-40.
5 . Id. at 41-43. Entitled "Ordinansa na Nag-aamyenda sa Ilang Bahagi ng Tuntunin 1, 2 at
Tuntunin 4 ng Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02, Kilala Bilang Ordinansang Nagtatakda
ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa
Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila."
6. Id. at 44-47.
7. Id. at 48-60.
8. See id. at 5-6.
9. Namely, herein petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim and John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, and
Ronel Baccutan, Mark Leo Delos Reyes, and Clarissa Joyce Villegas, minor, for herself
and as represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr, as leaders and members of the
SPARK, respectively. Id. at 4-5.
10. Id. at 4.
11. See id. at 16.
12. Entitled "AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
'JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006' AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR," approved on October 3, 2013.
13. See rollo, pp. 20-21.

14. See id.
15. See id. at 21-22.
16. Id. at 23.
17. Id. at 23-25.
18. Id. at 25.
19. Sec. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance
shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is fteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian
or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If offender is Fifteen (15) years and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:
1. for the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. for the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal
impositions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. for the THIRD OFFENSE AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day
to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court: PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be led by the Punong
Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor. (See id. at 45.)
20. Section 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local governments
concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations,
truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light
offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication,
criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and
trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on
children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any
barangay o cial at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents.
Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child
shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in con ict with the law." The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance
in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars.
22. Id. at 26-28.
23. See id. at 243-248.
24. Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 525 (2014).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 528.
28. Id. at 531; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
29. See G.R. Nos. 207132 and 207205, December 6, 2016.
30. See id.
31. See Ocampo v. Enriquez , G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, and
226294, November 8, 2016.
32. Arroyo v. Department of Justice , 695 Phil. 302, 334 (2012); emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
33. Id. at 335; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
34. Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 518-519 (2013).

35. See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., supra note 29.
36. Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 34, at 519; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
37. See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., supra note 29; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
38. Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. , 732 Phil. 1, 123-124 (2014); emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
39. See TRO dated July 26, 2016 issued by Clerk of Court Felipa B. Anama; rollo, pp. 67-70.
40. Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr. , G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA 241,
327-328; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
41. Id. at 328.

42. Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 34, at 527; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
43. Rollo, p. 5.
44. Clarissa was seventeen (17) years old (see Certi cate of Live Birth; id. at 63) at the time the
petition was filed on July 22, 2016 (see id. at 3).
45. Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) , G.R. No. 203775,
August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 100, 106.
46. Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 40, at 335-336; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
48. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452,
488 (2010); emphases and underscoring supplied.
49. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566; 94 S. Ct. 1242; 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974) U.S. LEXIS 113.
50. Dissenting Opinion of Retired Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga in Spouses Romualdez v.
COMELEC, 576 Phil. 357, 432 (2008).
51. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (1975) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477.
52. Id., citation omitted.
53. Section 16 of RA 10630 provides:
Section 16. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, ordinances and rules inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.
54. Section 11 of RA 10630 provides:
Section 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local
governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew
violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well
as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not
limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. x x x The child shall
also be recorded as a 'child at risk' and not as a 'child in con ict with the
law .' x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
55. Section 1. Short Title and Scope. — This Act shall be known as the "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006." It shall cover the different stages involving children at risk and
children in conflict with the law from prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration.
56. People v. Chong Hong, 65 Phil. 625, 628 (1938); emphasis and underscoring supplied.
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder , 406 U.S. 205; 92 S. Ct. 1526; 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972) U.S. LEXIS 144;
emphasis and underscoring supplied.
59. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622; 99 S. Ct. 3035; 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979) U.S. LEXIS 17.
60. Id.
61. 390 U.S. 629; 88 S. Ct. 1274; 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968) U.S. LEXIS 1880; 1 Media L. Rep. 1424;
44 Ohio Op. 2d 339.
62. Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
63. See Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 38, at 192 and 195.
64. Bellotti v. Baird, supra note 59.
65. See id.
66. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; emphasis supplied.
67. Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

68. 150-A Phil. 241 (1972).
69. Id. at 248, citing Mormon Church v. US , 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
70. See Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 38, at 195-196.
71. Bellotti, supra note 59, citing See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev.
605 and Ginsberg v. New York, supra note 61; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
72. See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (1998) U.S. App. LEXIS 26597.
73. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (1993) U.S. App. LEXIS 29974.
74. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; and City of Panora v. Simmons, 445
N.W.2d 363; 1989 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 254; 83 A.L.R. 4th 1035.
75. Supra note 72.
76. Id.
77. Id.
79. See id. at 21-23.
80. Supra note 48.
81. Id. at 490; emphasis in the original omitted, citation omitted.
82. Id. at 490-491.
8 3 . First Amendment (US Constitution). Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
84. 539 U.S. 113; 123 S. Ct. 2191; 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003) U.S. LEXIS 4782; 71 U.S.L.W. 4441;
2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5136; 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 347.
85. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 48, at
491.
86. Supra note 38.
8 7 . See Associate Justice Marvic M.V. F. Leonen's Dissenting Opinion; id. at 583-584;
emphases and underscoring supplied.
88. See In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile , 158-A
Phil. 1 (1974); Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 240 Phil. 219
(1987).
89. I n Marcos v. Manglapus , 258 Phil. 479, 497-498 (1989), the Court ruled that the right to
travel under our Constitution refer to right to move within the country, or to another
country, but not the right to return to one's country. The latter right, however, is provided
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory.
90. UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project 61 (1970). See Kent v. Dulles , 357 U.S. 116;
78 S. Ct. 1113; 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958) U.S. LEXIS 814. See also Rubi v. Provincial Board
of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 705-706 (1919), where the Court stated that the right of
locomotion is one of the chief elements of the guaranty of liberty.
91. See Duran v. Abad Santos, 75 Phil. 410, 431-432 (1945).
9 2 . See Salvador H. Laurel. Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention. As
Faithfully Reproduced from the Personal Record of Jose P. Laurel, Vol. III, 652 (1966).
See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra note 90, at 705.
93. See City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (1992) Iowa Sup. LEXIS 91.
94. Id.
95. S ee Leave Division, O ce of Administrative Services-O ce of the Court Administrator
(OAS-OCA) v. Heusdens , 678 Phil. 328, 399 (2011) and Mirasol v. Department of Public
Works and Highways, 523 Phil. 713, 752 (2006). See also Marcos v. Manglapus , supra
note 89, at 504. In Silverio v. CA (273 Phil. 128, 133 [1991]), the Court held that "the
[State is] not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations [on this right]," and in
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (supra note 90, at 716), it was held that "citizens [do]
not possess an absolute freedom of locomotion."
96. The State under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to executive o cers
or administrative authorities (see Santiago v. Vasquez , G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27,
1993, 217 SCRA 633, 651).
97. Silverio v. CA, supra note 95, at 133.
98. See Section 2 of RA 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND
SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise
known as "SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT" (July 27, 1992).
99. See Section 2 of RA 9775, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009,"
approved on November 17, 2009.
100. See Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR
VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
otherwise known as the "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT
OF 2004" (March 27, 2004).
101. See Section 2 of RA 9851, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, ORGANIZING JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR
RELATED PURPOSES" otherwise known as the "PHILIPPINE ACT ON CRIMES AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE, AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY," approved on December 11, 2009.
102. See Section 2 of RA 9344.
103. See Sections 3 (a) and (b) of RA 10364, entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT No.
9208, ENTITLED 'AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED
PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "EXPANDED ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF
2012," approved on February 6, 2013.
104. See Section 32 (b) of RA 9211, entitled "AN ACT REGULATING THE PACKAGING, USE,
SALE, DISTRIBUTION AND ADVERTISEMENTS OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as "TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003"
(September 2, 2003).
105. See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 8980, entitled "AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE
POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE AND
DEVELOPMENT (ECCD), PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
otherwise known as "ECCD ACT" (May 22, 2001).
106. See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9288, entitled "AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE
POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR ENSURING NEWBORN SCREENING," otherwise
known as the "NEWBORN SCREENING ACT OF 2004" (May 10, 2004).
107. See Articles 1, 3, and 8 of PD 603, entitled "THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE,"
approved on December 10, 1974.
108. See Bellotti, supra note 59. See also Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights:
Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1163 (March 1984), stating that
minors enjoy a myriad of constitutional rights shared with adults. Indeed, the Bill of
Rights under the Constitution is not for adults alone; hence, the State should not afford
less protection to minors' right simply because they fall below the age of majority.
109. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia , 188 F.3d 531; 338 U.S. App. D.C. 11 (1999) U.S. App.
LEXIS 13635; Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville , supra note 72, citing Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675; 106 S. Ct. 3159; 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986) U.S.
LEXIS 139; 54 U.S.L.W. 5054; Bellotti, supra note 59; Ginsberg v. New York , supra note
61; and Prince v. Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 804; 64 S. Ct. 784; 88 L. Ed. 1090 (1944) U.S.
LEXIS 942.
110. See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646; 115 S. Ct. 2386; 132 L. Ed. 2d 564
(1995) U.S. LEXIS 4275; 63 U.S.L.W. 4653; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4846; 9 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. S 229.
111. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V, Section 1.

112. Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 1327.
113. Labor Code of the Philippines, as renumbered, Articles 137 and 138.
114. See Section 8 (a) of RA 7610 and Section 5 (f) of RA 8239, entitled "PHILIPPINE
PASSPORT ACT OF 1996," approved on November 22, 1996.
115. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville , supra note 72, citing Prince v. Massachusetts , supra
note 109.
116. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville; id.
117. Supra note 59.
118. Bellotti, id.; to wit: "The unique role in our society of the family x x x requires that
constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and exibility to the special needs of
parents and children. We have recognized three [(3)] reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults: [1] the peculiar vulnerability of children; [2] their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and [3] the
importance of the parental role in child rearing . " (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
119. Id.
120. Supra note 109.
121. Id., citations omitted.
122. See Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP (BSP) , 487 Phil. 531 (2004); White
Light Corporation v. City of Manila , 596 Phil. 444 (2009); Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 77 (2010), citing Joaquin Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines: A Commentary 139-140 (2009). See also Concurring Opinion of
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in Garcia v. Drilon , 712 Phil. 44, 124-
127 (2013); and Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 97-98 (2014).
123. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP (id. at 693-696, citations omitted), it
was opined that, "in the landmark case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1; 93 S. Ct. 1278; 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 [1973] U.S. LEXIS 91), the U.S.
Supreme Court in identifying a 'suspect class' as a class saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process, articulated that suspect classi cations were not limited to
classi cations based on race, alienage or national origin but could also be applied to
other criteria such as religion. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that suspect
classi cations deserving of Strict Scrutiny include those based on race or national
origin, [alienage], and religion while classi cations based on gender, illegitimacy,
nancial need, conscientious objection and age have been held not to constitute suspect
classifications." See also Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 and 189305, August 16, 2016. See further White Light Corporation
v. City of Manila (id. at 463), where it was held that "[s]trict scrutiny is used today to test
the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race[,] as well as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
The [US] Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel."
124. See Dissenting Opinion of Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP, id. at 648.
125. See id.
126. See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, id.
127. In the US, courts have made several, albeit con icting, rulings in determining the
applicable level of scrutiny in cases involving minors' constitutional rights, speci cally
on the right to travel (see Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown , supra note 51; Johnson v.
City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 [1981] U.S. App. LEXIS 16939; 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
[Callaghan] 879; McCollester v. City of Keene , 586 F. Supp. 1381 [1984] U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16647; Waters v. Barry , 711 F. Supp. 1125 [1989] U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5707; Qutb v. Strauss ,
supra note 73; Hutchins v. District of Columbia , supra note 109; Nunez v. City of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 935 [1997] U.S. App. LEXIS 13409; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4317, 97
Daily Journal DAR 7221; Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville , supra note 72; Ramos v.
Town of Vernon , 353 F.3d 171 [2003] U.S. App. LEXIS 25851; and Hodgkins v. Peterson ,
355 F.3d 1048 [2004] U.S. App. LEXIS 910). These con icting rulings spring from the
uncertainty on whether the right to interstate travel under US laws is a fundamental right
(see US v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281; 41 S. Ct. 133; 65 L. Ed. 270 [1920] U.S. LEXIS 1159; and
Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618; 89 S. Ct. 1322; 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 [1969] U.S. LEXIS
3190). In contrast, the right to travel is clearly a fundamental right under
Philippine law; thus, the strict scrutiny test is undeniably the applicable level
of scrutiny.
See also In Re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83; 394 N.E.2d 368 [1978] Ohio Misc. LEXIS 94;
citing earlier cases involving curfew ordinances on minors; People in the Interest of J.M.,
768 P.2d 219 [1989] Colo. LEXIS 10; 13 BTR 93; City of Panora v. Simmons , supra note
74; and City of Maquoketa v. Russell, supra note 93.
128. See In Re Mosier, id. citing People v. Chambers , 32 Ill. App. 3d 444; 335 N.E.2d 612 (1975)
Ill. App. LEXIS 2993.
129. Nunez v. City of San Diego, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice , supra note 122, at 98. See also Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009).
132. Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice , id. See also Dissenting Opinion of Ret. Chief Justice
Panganiban and Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. BSP, supra note 122, at 644 and 688-689, respectively.
133. See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1,
97-98, citing 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Secs. 12 and 13 and Soriano v. Laguardia, 605
Phil. 43, 106 (2009).
134. Id.
135. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 131, at 298.
136. Rollo, pp. 48-49.
137. Supra note 72.
138. Id.
139. In its Comment dated August 18, 2016 (see rollo, pp. 270-313), the local government of
Quezon City attached statistical data on "Children in Con ict with Law" (CICL) incidents
from the various barangays of its six (6) districts for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015
(see id. at 330-333). The information is summarized as follows:
YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2013 2677
2014 5106
2015 4778
In 2014 and 2015, most of the reported CICL incidents were related to Theft, Curfew
violations, and Physical Injury. The local government claimed that the decline of CICL
incidents in 2015 was due to the enforcement of the curfew ordinance (id. at 298).
Also, together with its Comment dated August 16, 2016 (id. at 85-111), the local
government of Manila submitted data reports of the Manila Police District (MPD) on
CICL incidents, in Manila from 2014, 2015, and half of the year 2016 (id. at 116-197), as
follows:
YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2014 74*
2015 30
January to July 2016 75**
January to July 2016 75**
* It includes a minor who violated RA 4136 or the
"Land Transportation and Traffic Code" (June 20,
1964) and RA 10586 or the "Anti-Drunk and
Drugged Driving Act of 2013," approved on May 27,
2013.
* It includes the number of minors who violated
curfew hours.
A number from these reports involve incidents of Robbery (43), Theft (43), Physical
Injuries (12), Rape (9), and Frustrated Homicide (6).
The local government of Manila likewise attached the Department of Social Welfare and
Development's (DSWD) report on CICL for the years 2015 and half of the year 2016,
summed as follows (id. at 198-199):
YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2015 845
Further, it attached DSWD's report on minors who were at risk of running in con ict with
law and CICL as a result of the local government of Manila's Campaign on Zero Street
Dwellers in the City of Manila for the year 2016 (id. at 200-202):
Reached out Cases 2,194

** Reached out Cases with 480
Offenses (CICL)
** For the period January to August 2016 only.
See also id. at 98-99 and 298.

140. See id. at 296-298.
141. See In Re Mosier, supra note 127.
142. See People in Interest of J.M., supra note 127.
143. Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the
Constitution, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1163 (March 1984).
144. Note that the court in this US case used "no compelling interest" as the ground to declare
the ordinance unconstitutional. The reasons set forth in its discussion, however, relates
to the failure of the ordinance to be narrowly drawn as to infringe on constitutional rights
(see supra note 127).
145. See Qutb v. Strauss (supra note 73), wherein a US court ruled that the assailed curfew
ordinance employed the least restrictive means of accomplishing its objectives as it
contained various defenses or exceptions that narrowly tailored the ordinance
and allowed the local government to meet its goals while respecting the
rights of minors. In effect, the ordinance placed only minimal burden on the minors'
constitutional rights. It held:
Furthermore, we are convinced that this curfew ordinance also employs the least
restrictive means of accomplishing its goals . The ordinance contains various
"defenses" that allow affected minors to remain in public areas during curfew hours. x
x x To be sure, the defenses are the most important consideration in
determining whether this ordinance is narrowly tailored.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x It is true, of course, that the curfew ordinance would restrict some late-night
activities of juveniles; if indeed it did not, then there would be no purpose in enacting it.
But when balanced with the compelling interest sought to be addressed —
protecting juveniles and preventing juvenile crime — the impositions are
minor . x x x. Thus, after carefully examining the juvenile curfew ordinance enacted by
the city of Dallas, we conclude that it is narrowly tailored to address the city's
compelling interest and any burden this ordinance places upon minors'
constitutional rights will be minimal. (Emphases supplied)
146. Rollo, p. 44.
Sec. 2. During curfew hours, no children and youths below eighteen (18) years of age
shall be allowed in the streets, commercial establishments, recreation centers, malls or
any other area outside the immediate vicinity of their residence, EXCEPT:
(a) those accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian;
(b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like;
(c) students of night schools and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required
to stay in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 P.M.; and
(d) those working at night: PROVIDED , That children falling under categories c) and d)
shall secure a certi cation from their Punong Barangay exempting them from the
coverage of this Ordinance, or present documentation/identi cation proving their
qualification under such category.
147. Id. at 38.
Tuntunin 3. Mga Eksemsyon
a. Eksemsyon dahil sa Gawain[:]

a.1 Mga mag-aaral na may klase sa gabi;
a.2 Mga kabataang naghahanapbuhay sa gabi;
a.3 Mga kabataang dumalo sa gawain/pagtitipon ng paaralan o simbahan na may
pakikipag-ugnayan sa Tanggapan ng Sangguniang Barangay.
Ang lahat ng kabataan sa sakop ng Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila na nag-aaral
o naghahanapbuhay na ang oras ng pagpasok o pag-uwi ay sakop ng "curfew" ay
kailangang kumuha ng katibayan (certi cation) mula sa
paaralan/tanggapan/pagawaan na pinapasukan ng may pagpapatunay ng Punong
Barangay na sumasakop sa mga kinauukulan, upang ito ay magamit sa oras ng
"curfew" sa kanilang pag-uwi o pagpasok.
b. Eskemsyong [sic] Insidental:
b.1 Mga kabataang may mga gawain sa ilalim ng superbisyon o pamamahala ng
kanilang mga magulang/tagapag-alaga o mga indibiduwal na nasa hustong gulang (18
taon at pataas) na may awtoridad sa kanila.
b.2 Mga kabataang napasama sa mga aksidente, kalamidad at mga tulad nito.
k. Eksemsyong tuwing may okasyon:

k.1 Bisperas at Araw ng Pasko;
k.2 Bisperas at Araw ng Bagong Taon;
k.3 Bisperas at Araw ng Pistang Barangay;
k.4 Araw ng Santo/Araw ng mga Kaluluwa;

k.5 Huwebes Santo;
k.6 Biyernes Santo;
k.7 Sabado de Gloria; at
k.8 Pasko ng Pagkabuhay.
148. The Curfew Ordinances exempt minors from the curfews when they are engaged in night
school, night work, or emergency situations (see id. at 38, 44, and 53-54).
149. Supra note 127.
150. See Tuntunin 4 of the Navotas Ordinance (rollo, p. 42); and Section 12 of the Manila
Ordinance (rollo, p. 46).
151. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution,
while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and
be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption
that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To
justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that
it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed
that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x.
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute
dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the
statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in
which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent,
conditional, or connected must fall with them. (Tatad v. The Secretary of the Department
of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 371 [1997], citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 Ed., pp.
28-29.)
152. Rollo, pp. 53-54.
153. Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119, 139-140 (2007).

154. Rollo, pp. 57-59.
155. See amended Navotas Ordinance; id. at 41-42.
Tuntunin 1. PAMPATAKARANG KAPARUSAHAN AT MULTA.
a) Unang Paglabag — ang mahuhuli ay dadalhin sa Tanggapan ng Kagalingang
Panlipunan at Pagpapaunlad (MSWDO). Ipapatawag ang magulang o tagapag-alaga sa
kabataang lumabag at pagkuha ng tala hinggil sa pagkatao nito (Pangalan, Edad,
Tirahan, Pangalan ng Magulang o Tagapag-alaga), at pagpapaalala, kasunod ang
pagbabalik sa kalinga ng magulang o tagapagalaga ng batang nahuli.
b) Pangalawang Paglabag — Ang batang lumabag ay [dadalhin] sa MSWDO,
pagmumultahin ang magulang/tagapag-alaga ng halagang P300.00 piso, dahil sa
kapabayaan o apat (4) na oras na gawaing sibiko-sosyal o pangkomunidad ng
magulang/tagapag-alaga at ang batang nahuli .
k) Ikatlong Paglabag — pagmumulta ng magulang/tagapag-alaga ng halagang P300.00
piso dahil sa kapabayaan at apat (4) na oras ng gawaing sibiko-sosyal o
pangkomunidad ng magulang/tagapag-alaga at ang batang nahuli .
d) Para sa pang-apat at paulit-ulit na lalabag ay papatawan ng kaparusahang doble sa
itinakda ng Tuntuning 1.k ng ordinansang ito.
1.1. Sa pagkakataong walang multang [maibibigay] ang magulang/tagapag-alaga ng
kabataang [nahuli], ang Tanggapan ng Kagalingang Panlipunan at Pagpapaunlad
(MSDWO) ay magpapataw ng gawaing sibiko-social o pangkomunidad sa
magulang at ang batang nahuli katumbas ng nasabing multa tulad ng mga
sumusunod:
a. Apat (4) na oras na paglilinis ng kanal o lansangan na itinakda ng nasabing
tanggapan.
b. Apat (4) na oras na pagtatanim ng puno sa lugar na itatakda ng nasabing
tanggapan.
c. Apat (4) na oras na gawaing pagpapaganda ng komunidad bilang suporta sa
programang "Clean and Green" ng Pamahalaang Bayan. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
156. Rollo, p. 45.
157. Penalties (as punishment) are imposed either: (1) to "satisfy the community's retaliatory
sense of indignation that is provoked by injustice" (Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p.
1270) — or for retribution following the classical or juristic school of thought underlying
the criminal law system (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed.,
p. 9); (2) to "change the character of the offender" (Black's Law Dictionary, Eight Ed., p.
1270) — or for reformation pursuant to the positivist or realistic school of thought
(Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed., pp. 9-10); (3) to "prevent
the repetition of wrongdoing by disabling the offender" (Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed.,
p. 1270) — following the utilitarian theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal
Code, 2012 Ed., p. 11); or (4) for both retribution and reformation pursuant to the eclectic
theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed., p. 11).
158. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1168.
159. Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 688.
160. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1269.

161. Section 4 (f) of RA 9344 reads:
Section 4. Definition of Terms — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs provided in a community
setting developed for purposes of intervention and diversion, as well as rehabilitation of
the child in conflict with the law, for reintegration into his/her family and/or community.

162. Section 54 of RA 9344 reads:
Section 54. Objectives of Community-Based Programs. — The objectives of community-
based programs are as follows:
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of the child in con ict with
the law in case he/she is studying, working or attending vocational learning institutions;
(b) Prevent separation of the child in con ict with the law from his/her
parents/guardians to maintain the support system fostered by their relationship and to
create greater awareness of their mutual and reciprocal responsibilities;
(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in con ict with the law
and encourage community support and involvement; and
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in con ict with the law by preventing
jail detention.
163. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/admonition> (last accessed on March 14,
2017).
164. 8th Ed., p. 52.
165. 3rd Ed., p. 36.
166. See Section 52 (g), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS) (promulgated on November 18, 2011), which states that: "[a] warning
or admonition shall not be considered a penalty." See also In the Matter of the Contempt
Orders Against Lt. Gen. Calimlim, 584 Phil. 377, 384 (2008), citing Tobias v. Veloso , 188
Phil. 267, 274-275 (1980); Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Ms. Bayani for Dishonesty ,
656 Phil. 222, 228 (2011); and Dalmacio-Joaquin v. Dela Cruz, 690 Phil. 400, 409 (2012),
to name a few.
See also Section 58 (i), Rule IV of Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999 or the
"Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" (RURACCS)
(September 27, 1999). The RRACCS (Section 46 (f), Rule 10) and its predecessor
RURACCS (Section 52 (c), Rule IV), however, consider reprimand (or censure) as a
penalty imposed for light offenses.
167. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reprimand> (last accessed on March 14,
2017).
168. 8th Ed., p. 1329.

169. 3rd Ed., p. 818.
170. See Section 52 (f) Rule 10 of the RRACCS: "[t]he penalty of reprimand x x x." See also
Tobias v. Veloso, supra note 166, at 275.
LEONEN, J.:
1. Entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataun na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong
Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila." See rollo, pp. 37-40.
2. Entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following
Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of
Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes." See rollo, pp. 44-47.
3. Entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a Disciplinary Hours [sic] in Quezon City for Minors from
10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof
and for Other Purposes." See rollo, pp. 48-60.
4. Rollo, p. 6, Petition.
5. Id. at 4-5, Petition.
6. Id. at 20, Petition.
9. City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, 495 Phil. 289, 308 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
10. 343 Phil. 670 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
11. Id. at 700-701, citing La Union Electric Cooperative v. Yaranon , 259 Phil. 457 (1989) [Per J.
Gancayco, First Division] and Francisco v. Permskul, 255 Phil. 311 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En
Banc].
12. 421 Phil. 290 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
13. Id. at 342.
14. 128 Phil. 473 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
15. Id. at 475-476.
16. 727 Phil. 430 (2014) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
17. Id. at 447.
18. 706 Phil. 138 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

19. Id. at 157.
20. 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
21. Id. at 308.
22. CONST., art. III, sec. 1.
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3.
24. American Declaration of Independence (1776).

25. In the words of the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men[.]"
26. See Abraham H. Maslow's, A Theory of Human Motivation, PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 50,
370-396 (1943).
27. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 705 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
28. 99 Phil. 515 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
29. CONST. (1935), art. III, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or a rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(4) The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired.
(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise.
(6) The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
(8) No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
(11) No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
(12) No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

(13) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
(14) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases
of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which
events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist.
(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
(16) All persons shall before conviction be bailable by su cient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
(17) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
(18) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
xxx xxx xxx

(21) Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
30. People v. Hernandez , 99 Phil. 515, 551-552 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]. This
enumeration must not be taken as an exhaustive listing of the extent of constitutional
protection vis-à-vis liberty. Emphasis is placed on how the penumbra of cognate rights
evolves and expands with the times.
32. Id. at 462-463.
33. Id. at 463.
34. 487 Phil. 531 (2004). [Per J. Puno, En Banc]
35. Id. at 599-600.
36. Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2015/december2015/221318.pdf> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]
citing White Light Corporation v. City of Manila , 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc]; Concurring Opinion of J. Leonardo-de Castro in Garcia v. Drilon , 712 Phil. 44, 112-
143 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]; and Separate Concurring Opinion of C.J.
Reynato S. Puno in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC , 632 Phil. 32, 106 (2010) [Per J.
Del Castillo, En Banc].
37. CONST., art. II, sec. 12.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic e ciency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
38. Ponencia, p. 20.
39. 354 Phil. 948 (1998) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] states:
[T]he right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz.:
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
a rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." (Citations
omitted)

45. CONST., art. II, sec. 12:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic e ciency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
46. CONST., art. II, sec. 12.
48. Id. at 193.

50. White Light is notable, not only for characterizing privacy as a fundamental right whose
intrusions impel strict scrutiny. It is also notable for extending a similar inquiry
previously made by this Court in 1967, in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, et al. v. City of Manila, 128 Phil. 473 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
There, operators of motels assailed a supposed infringement of their property rights by
an ordinance increasing license fees for their motels. In upholding the validity of the
ordinance, this Court distinguished between "freedom of the mind" and property rights
and held that "if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider." Since the case only involved property rights, this Court
found that the state interest of curbing "an admitted deterioration of the state of public
morals" su ced. White Light extended the consideration of rights involved in similar
establishments by examining, not only motel owners' property rights but also their
clientele's privacy rights.

51. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 464-466 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
52. Id. at 469-471.
53. CONST. art. II, sec. 13.

54. Section 4. Definition of Terms. — The following terms as used in this Act shall be defined as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of committing
criminal offenses because of personal, family and social circumstances, such as, but
not limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical, psychological, mental,
economic or any other means and the parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or
unable to provide protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and inquiry, the parent or
guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or guardian;

(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.
(e) "Child in Con ict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or
adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws.
55. Rep. Act No. 9344, sec. 4 (e) "Child in Con ict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged
as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws.
56. Rollo, pp. 330-333.
57. Ponencia, p. 28, fn 139.
58. Id.
59. Rollo, p. 201, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.
60. Id. at 202, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.
61. 159 F.3d 843 (1998).

62. Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio-Morales in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil, 531, 697-701 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] citing
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson , 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Loving v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990); Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez , 476
U.S. 898, 903-904 (1986); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 , 395 U.S. 621
(1969); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena , 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); Chapter 9 of G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th Ed., 1991); and Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 21 (1972).
63. Rollo, pp. 317-318.
64. It should be pointed out that the statement "most of minor children become out-of-school
youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs" is an
absurd generalization without any basis.
66. Rollo, pp. 322-323.

70. Id. at 200, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.
71. See rollo, pp. 116-197, Annexes "1", "2", and "3" of City of Manila Comment.
73. 247-A Phil. 276 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].
74. Id. at 286 citing TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (1978) and Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
75. 421 Phil. 290 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
76. Id. at 354-355 citing United States v. Raines , 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 (1960);
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co. , 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193
(1912); and G. GUNTHER & K. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1299 (2001).
77. 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
78. Id. at 489 citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez,
En Banc].
80. Id. at 127 citing the Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio in Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 406 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
81. Ponencia, pp. 11-12.
82. Rollo, p. 324.
83. Id. at 326.
84. Rep. Act No. 9344, sec. 7. Determination of Age. — The child in con ict with the law shall
enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in con ict
with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a
child may be determined from the child's birth certi cate, baptismal certi cate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of
the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
85. People v. Nazario, 247-A Phil. 276, 286 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].
87. Id. at 6.
89. Kay Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to
Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO STATE L. J. 519, 526 (1996).
90. J. Ryan and D. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the Stale: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. BAR
J. 684 (1998), citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 257 (172).
9 1 . Margaret Hall, The Vulnerability Jurisdiction: Equity, Parens Patriae, and the Inherent
Jurisdiction of the Court, 2 (1) CAN. J. OF COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 185, 190-191 (2016),
citing Sir James Munby, Protecting the Rights of Vulnerable and Incapacitous Adults —
the Role of the Courts: An Example of Judicial Law-making, 26 CHILD & FAMILY LAW
QUARTERLY 64, 66 (2014).
92. 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. J Ryan and D. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. BAR
J. 684 (1998); see also Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017,
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/april2017/199669.pdf> [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
96. See Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728 (1916) [Per J.
Trent, Second Division].
97. Vasco v. Court of Appeals , 171 Phil. 673, 677 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division], citing
67 C.J.S. 624; and Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil.
728 (1916) [Per J. Trent, Second Division].
98. CONST. (1973), art. II, sec. 4.

99. CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 4.
100. 150-A Phil. 241 (1972) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
102. CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 4 was worded almost as similarly as the 1973 Constitution.
103. Nery v. Lorenzo, 150-A Phil. 241, 248 (1972) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
104. 171 Phil. 673 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

105. Id. at 677.
107. Id. at 195 citing Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention, Volume IV, pp. 401-402.
108. Concepcion v. Court of Appeals , 505 Phil. 529, 546 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
See also Dela Cruz v. Gracia , G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 [Per J. Carpio-Morales,
Second Division].
109. 424 Phil. 933 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
110. 156 Phil. 87 (1974) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].

111. See also People v. Cabodac , 284-A Phil. 303, 312 (1992) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second
Division]; People v. Dolores , 266 Phil. 724 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second
Division]; People v. Cawili , 160 Phil. 25 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division]; and
People v. Evangelista , 346 Phil. 717 (1997) [Per J. Belosillo, First Division]; People v.
Malto, 560 Phil. 119 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
112. People v. Baylon, 156 Phil. 87, 95 (1974) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
113. 560 Phil. 119 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 225442. August 8, 2017.]

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK), *

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A. Propriety of the Petition for

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement

The arguments are untenable.

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer, 1 3 7 as regards the information

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an

The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be challenged. Challenges,

Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed ordinances de ne

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant

13. See rollo, pp. 20-21.

34. Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 518-519 (2013).

41. Id. at 328.

67. Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

111. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V, Section 1.

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

Reached out Cases 2,194

See also id. at 98-99 and 298.

a. Eksemsyon dahil sa Gawain[:]

k. Eksemsyong tuwing may okasyon:

k.4 Araw ng Santo/Araw ng mga Kaluluwa;

153. Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119, 139-140 (2007).

160. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1269.

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168. 8th Ed., p. 1329.

18. 706 Phil. 138 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

24. American Declaration of Independence (1776).

(12) No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

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xxx xxx xxx

42. CONST., art. III, sec. 6.

48. Id. at 193.

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53. CONST. art. II, sec. 13.

(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or guardian;

61. 159 F.3d 843 (1998).

68. Rollo, p. 7, Petition.

98. CONST. (1973), art. II, sec. 4.

104. 171 Phil. 673 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

110. 156 Phil. 87 (1974) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].

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