The Aadhaar or UID project has grave implications for every Indian.

It will enable the government to profile every citizen and track their
movements and transactions.
There is no guarantee that intimate personal information -- pre-
existing illnesses, romantic relationships etc -- won't be shared with
other agencies, warns Praful Bidwai.
An elaborate charade has begun with the rolling out of the first Aadhaar
unique identity numbers in a tribal district of Maharashtra [ Images ] by
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ] and Congress President Sonia
Gandhi [ Images ].
At its core is the pretence that giving a unique 12-digit number to each
underprivileged citizen will achieve what hundreds of welfare schemes, and
numerous efforts to control corruption, have failed to accomplish: Namely,
pilferage-free delivery of services to the poor.
Aadhaar, meaning support, foundation or sustenance, is being projected as
a magic wand -- just what the poor need from a benevolent State. The
paternalism cannot be missed.
Aadhaar's legitimacy is pinned on benefiting the underprivileged. But as
with all magic wands, this could prove illusory.
Aadhaar is supposed to ensure that grain will not be diverted from the
public distribution system, and that corruption will be eliminated from the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in which 15 to 20 percent of
funds are pilfered.
This is to be achieved by collecting basic information (name, address,
parents' names, date of birth, etc) and biometric data (photographs, all 10
fingerprints, iris scans) for each resident.
This will be used to generate a UID to conduct all manner of transactions:
From buying rations on below-poverty-line cards, to NREGA enrolment, to
opening a bank account. It's claimed that the UID will ensure non-
duplication and hence eliminate leakage. As we see below, this claim is
excessive, if not specious.
Aadhaar's origin and real purpose are rooted in 'national security', including
surveillance, profiling and tracking of citizens.
The UIDs will be fed into a database to be shared with Natgrid (National
Intelligence Grid), which includes 11 security and intelligence agencies
(Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, CBI, Central Boards of
Excise and Direct Taxes, etc).
Natgrid, to be created by next May, will provide real-time access into 21
databases -- including bank account details, credit card transactions,
driving licences, and travel records.
An intelligence official has been quoted as saying, "Once you feed in a
person's name, you will get all the details about him, across all the
databases."
These include the colour of his/her car, the traffic fines to be paid, and the
last time he/she paid by card for a late-night dinner.
However, Aadhaar is being dishonestly marketed as a social security-
related scheme. Eminent economist and food rights activist Jean Dreze
deplores this.
From the right of the spectrum, former Intelligence Bureau director A K
Doval welcomes the deception, and admits that Aadhaar was 'intended to
wash out the aliens and unauthorised people... Now, it is being projected
as more development-oriented, lest it ruffle any feathers.'
This deception violates transparency and public trust. Yet, the chair of the
Unique Identification Authority of India [ Images ] (UIDAI), Nandan Nilekani,
claims Aadhaar is about 'inclusivity... a better quality of public service
delivery, it's about giving people, who have been denied identity, a chance.'
The claim is carried to farcical extremes by Aadhaar's apologists, who say
it is the only protection for India's 250 million migrant workers against
summary eviction.
This is rich, given the Indian State's record in displacing 45 million people
since Independence and in bundling 100,000 poor families out of Delhi [
Images ] and forcibly 'repatriating' migrant workers for the Commonwealth
Games [ Images ].
But we are asked to believe that the State has suddenly turned benign and
wants to deliver services efficiently to the poor through Aadhaar.
The NIAI starts with the premise that 'in many areas (NREGA) wages
continue to be paid in cash' and there is massive duplication of job cards.
This is factually wrong.
Since 2008, NREGA wages have been paid into bank accounts, reducing
corruption. Today, 83 percent of job-cardholders have accounts.
Yet, as economist-activist Reetika Khera points out, 'Three ways of
siphoning off money remain -- extortion, collusion and fraud. Extortion
means that when 'inflated' wages are withdrawn by labourers from their
account, the middleman turns extortionist and takes a share. Collusion
occurs when the labourer and the middleman agree to share the inflated
wages... Fraud means that middlemen open and operate accounts on
behalf of labourers...'
UID can at best help prevent 'fraud', not collusion or extortion, which are far
more common. A great deal of corruption is not wage-related, but
materials-related. Sarpanchs collude with officials to create fictitious
records of building-material supplies.
Aadhaar cannot tackle this. Only transparent accounting and supervision
and verification can.
Similarly, the UIDAI attributes PDS leakages to duplicate ration cards. But
duplication has dropped significantly after computerisation of records and
hologrammed cards. It is as low as two percent in Tamil Nadu and eight
percent in Chhattisgarh.
Khera says, 'There are two major sources of leakage within the PDS -- one,
diversion of grain, en route to the village ration shop. Dealers then appear
helpless saying that they have been issued less... Two, dealers undersell
(for example, only 25 kg out of the 35 kg entitlement) and yet make people
testify on official records that they got their full quota.'
Neither leakage can be tackled by Aadhaar. Unless people have the choice
to go to another dealer, they will remain in the grip of the corrupt
shopkeeper. But this needs a new supply-chain management system.
That demolishes the claim of portability of benefits. The claim of inclusivity
is similarly vacuous. The authority's document says that 'the NREGS
programme can be used to enrol residents into the UID programme.' But
this cannot produce inclusion.
It only admits that Aadhaar needs the existing PDS and NREGA databases
to enrol people. The PDS-NREGA do not need Aadhaar.
If the government wants to reach those excluded from social programmes
like homeless temporary migrants, it can open community kitchens.
In fact, by making Aadhaar a condition for delivering services, the
government will exclude those who don't have UIDs. This is perverse. It
ialso contradictory.
On the one hand, UIDAI officials claim Aadhaar will accurately target the
poor and break the barriers that prevent them from accessing services.
On the other, UIDAI openly says it's 'in the identity business. The
responsibility of tracking beneficiaries and... service delivery will continue to
remain with the respective agencies. The UID number will only guarantee
identity, not rights, benefits or entitlements.'
The Aadhaar project has grave civil liberty implications. It will enable the
government to profile citizens and track their movements and transactions.
There is no guarantee that intimately personal details -- pre-existing
illnesses, romantic relationships, anonymous donations -- won't be shared
with other agencies.
The designated registrars include private operators as well as state
governments, the Life Insurance Corporation and banks.
Also involved are multinational firms like Ernst and Young and Accenture.
Already, Apollo Hospital has applied for managing the health records in the
Aadhaar database.
That is not all. The draft NIAI Bill says the authority will maintain details of
every request for identity authentication and that identity information may
be disclosed in the interests of 'national security'. These clauses permit the
tracking of citizens.
Experience shows that whenever the government gets excessive authority,
it is misused. That is what happened with our anti-terrorism acts and is
happening with the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and Public Safety
Act in numerous states.
Excessive reliance on technology, especially to tackle special problems like
corruption, can be disastrous. Technologies can fail.
Biometric readings can go wrong if power supply fails -- as happens
virtually daily in most of India. Biometric readings may produce misleading
results, as the authority admits, 'in Indian environmental conditions
(extremely hot and humid climate and facilities without air-conditioning).'
People with low-quality fingerprints (construction workers) and with
cataract/corneal problems can pose problems for fingerprints and iris
scans.
Between 10 and 60 million people could be excluded from UID due to such
errors.
Aadhaar poses serious data security problems. ID card schemes, says a
London [ Images ] School of Economics study, are 'too complex',
technically unproven and 'unsafe'.
All kinds of supposedly secure databases/Web sites, including those of
India's defence ministry and the Pentagon [ Images ], have been hacked.
Data theft and transfer to intelligence agencies or corporations have
potentially horrendous consequences.
That is one reason why many countries including the UK, US and Australia
[ Images ] have abandoned national ID cards. Another is the high cost.
According to reports, UID's per person cost is estimated to have jumped
from Rs 31 to between Rs 450 and Rs 500. Aadhaar will therefore probably
cost something like Rs 150,000 crore (Rs 1.5 trillion).
The Planning Commission is already allotting it Rs 35,000 crore to Rs
45,000 crore (Rs 350 billion to Rs 450 billion) over the next five years to
cover only half the population. This is astronomical for a scheme with
dubious benefits.
Yet, the Aadhaar project is being pushed through without a legal basis, and
without public or parliamentary debate.
UIDAI was created by an administrative order -- and before any proof of
concept studies were commissioned. Aadhaar numbers are being rolled out
even before the relevant bill is tabled in Parliament.
The process is profoundly undemocratic and the project thoroughly
misconceived. It must be halted at once.