[G.R. No. 149295.

 September 23, 2003]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
CHRISTIAN DE JESUS, respondent.

FACTS:
 On 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the
questioned property. 
 Respondent had acquired a parcel of land situated in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro
 On 26 March 1993, he discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached
upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. 
 Despite two letters of demand, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
 Petitioner, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in 1981 from then
Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and to remedy the
situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to
Ignacio) to petitioner which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. 
 The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner,
Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent declaring him to be the rightful owner of the disputed portion
of the lot and ordering petitioner to surrender possession of the property to respondent.
 CA, sustained the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether PNB is a builder in good faith.

HELD:
NEGATIVE.
It should be evident enough that petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good
faith. Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of the land and
building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold to it stood on the land not covered by the land
conveyed to it.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.  The essence of good faith lies in
an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another.
Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
SAMUEL PARILLA, CHINITA PARILLA and DEODATO PARILLA, Petitioners,- versus - DR. PROSPERO
PILAR, G.R. No. 167680 November 30, 2006

FACTS:

 Petitioner-spouses Samuel and Chinita Parilla and their co-petitioner-son Deodato Parilla, as
dealers of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell), have been in possession of a
parcel of land located at the poblacion of Bantay, Ilocos Sur which was leased to it by
respondent Dr. Prospero Pilar under a 10-year Lease Agreement entered into in 1990.
 When the lease contract between Pilipinas Shell and respondent expired in 2000, petitioners
remained in possession of the property on which they built improvements.
 Despite demands to vacate, petitioners and the other occupants remained in the property.
 Hence, respondent filed a complaint for ejectment before the Bantay MTC with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with damages against petitioners and the other
occupants of the property.
 MTC ordered herein petitioners to vacate the property and to reimburse the plaintiff-herein the
value of the improvements
 Respondent appealed to the RTC of Vigan City that portion of the trial courts decision ordering
him to reimburse petitioners the amount of Two Million Pesos. 
 The RTC affirmed the MTC Decision
 CA sets aside the questioned order for respondent to reimburse applying Art. 546 of the Civil
Code

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are builders in good faith, thus, have the right of retention until reimbursed.

HELD:
NEGATIVE. Petitioners are as leases or tenants are merely holders are not builders in Good Faith who
are not entitled to the right of retention.
Article 448 and Article 546 read:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the
one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall
fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but
only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having
the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in
value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. 
Jurisprudence is replete with cases which categorically declare that Article 448 covers only cases in
which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, have a
claim of title thereto, but not when the interest is merely at of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.

 
G.R. No. 175444               December 14, 2011
JAIME ABALOS et. al,Petitioners, 
vs.
HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO, Respondents.

FACTS:
 Vicente Torio owned a parcel of land located at San Isidrp Norte Binmaley, Pangasinan, during
the lifetime of Vicente allowed Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to stay and build their respective
houses on the subject parcel of land and after his death they were also tolerated to remain on
the same land;
 Respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to vacate the subject lot, but they refused to
heed the demand of respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint.
 Jaime and the Spouses Salazar asserted that respondents' cause of action is barred by
acquisitive prescription by actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot as
owners since time immemorial;
 Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos (Jaime) and the spouses Felix and
Consuelo Salazar.
 MTC ruled in favor of the respondents
 RTC ruled in favor of Petitioners
 CA ruled in favor of Respondents

ISSUE: Whether petitioners predecessors-in-interest possessed the disputed lot in the concept of an
owner.

HELD:

NEGATIVE.
Petitioners claim that they have acquired ownership over the disputed lot through ordinary acquisitive
prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. Without
good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years.
 
Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is
received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. There is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
 
In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners
acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is
clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a
statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents' immediate
predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge
that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners'
possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject
land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession
of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest.

Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate
for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be en concepto de dueo, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should
be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.
PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners, versus FE S. FACTOR, Respondent. G.R. No. 172547
June 30, 2009

FACTS:

 Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in

Almanza, Las Pias City. The ownership of the land originated from respondents paternal
grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor who had been in actual,
continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the land
even before 1906.
 Precy Bunyi on the other hand is the new wife of her brother-in-law (Ruben Labao)
because her sister, Gloria Factor-Labao (the administrator of the property during her
lifetime) died
 When Ruben died Precy Bunyi forced open the co-owned property and took personal
property belonging to the Factors and audaciously occupied the property
 Respondents filed a Forcible Entry case, MTC ruled in favor of Fe Factor
 RTC affirmed in toto MeTC
 CA denied Pets petition for Review

ISSUE: Who, between petitioners and respondent, would be entitled to the physical possession of
the subject property.

HELD:

Respondents are entitled to the possession of the property.

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every
square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Possession can be acquired by
juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of
these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and the
inscription of possessory information title.

As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners unsupported claim of possession must yield to that of
the respondent who traces her possession of the subject property to her predecessors-in-interest
who have always been in possession of the subject property. Even assuming that respondent was
never a resident of the subject property, she could legally continue possessing the
property. Visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical
possession. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of
possession of the subject property. The law does not require one in possession of a house to reside
in the house to maintain his possession. For, again, possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession. There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine.
All things considered, this Court finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully proved the extent
and character of her possession over the disputed property. As a consequence of her ownership
thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession, considering petitioners failure to prove prior
possession. The Court stresses, however, that its determination of ownership in the instant case is
not final. It is only a provisional determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. It would not bar or prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the
quieting of title to the subject property
G.R. No. 175604             April 10, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 
vs.
SALVADOR PEÑAFLORIDA, JR., Y CLIDORO, appellant.

FACTS:

That on or about the 7th day of June, 1994, in the afternoon thereat, at Barangay Huyon-huyon,
Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to sell, possess and to deliver with the use of a
bicycle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody, [o]ne bundle estimated to be one (1) kilo more or less, of dried marijuana leaves (Indian Hemp)
without the necessary license, permit or authority to sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug from a competent officer as required by
law.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
RTC convicted appellant and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
The case was subjected to automatic review by the court in view of the gravity of penalty.

ISSUE: Whether defendant/appellant is freely and consciously in “possession” of the prohibited drugs.

HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE.

In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows
that the accused knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that  animus possidendi is
shown to be present together with his possession or control of such article.

Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence
that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not
intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of  animus
possidendi.

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an
accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is
necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking
into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each
particular case

Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in the instant case. First,
the marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first readily
saw in plain view the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous
that appellant did not ask Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do the
delivery errand since the package was wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram.
MARC SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. GR. No. G.R.
No. 184274, February 23, 2011

FACTS:

 The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Pias City, found petitioner Mark C. Soledad guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, or the Access
Devices Regulations Act of 1998 for fraudulently acquiring, possessing, and using personal
documents belonging to one Henry YU.
 He was arrested during an entrapment operation during the supposed delivery of the
Metrobank Credit Card in the name of Henry Yu upon his presentation of 2 identification cards
bearing the name of Henry Yu however, his picture appear thereon.
 He assailed the contention that he was in possession of the Credit Card supposedly to be
delivered to him.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was in possession of the said credit card.

HELD:

AFFIRMATIVE.

We use the term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is, possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right. The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the
material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on
attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the
accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.

Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess. Contrary to
petitioners contention that the credit card never came into his possession because it was only delivered
to him, the above narration shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by
presenting the identification cards purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the
intention to possess the same. Had he not actively participated, the envelope would not have been
given to him. Moreover, his signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was delivery
and that possession was transferred to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the
envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the acknowledgment receipt,
coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the identity of private complainant.
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner, vs.  COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. [G.R. No. 109595. April 27, 2000]

FACTS:

 On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a
physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or
less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred
Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was
P3,850,000.00 as against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet,
or a total shortage of P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a
re-verification of the records and documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted.
There was still a shortage of P150,000.00.
 The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the
Manager. The second was by the banks internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then,
the banks Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent investigation. Thereafter,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these investigations
concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was
the banks Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused.  Jksm
 On November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the accuseds
service with the bank was terminated.
 To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a Civil
Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment docketed
as Civil Case No. R-3733 against petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce.  E

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of ESTAFA.

HELD:

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:[23]
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a
denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the
money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1)
in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which
gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.  In
this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her
possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees.

Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence,
the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO
SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

 A certain Prof. Jose Cruz who claimed to be the dean of the De la Salle College placed an order
of 406 books with EDCA payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and
delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase
price of P8,995.65
 He later then sold 120 of these books to Pivate Respondent for 1,700 who relied on the invoice
for the ownership of the seller
 After placing another order, EDCA became suspicious and inquired to De La Salle College and
who denied the employ of Jose Cruz and Phil. Amanah Bank who denied having the accounts of
such
 EDCA sought the assistance of the Police to set an entrapment operation, further investigation
disclosed that Cruz was really Tomas de la Pena and that he sold 120 of the books to Private
Respondents
 On the night of the same day, petitioner with the help of the police forced their way to the
bookstore, threatened Leonor for prosecution of buying stolen goods and seized the books w/o
warrant and later turned over the books to the pet.
 PR sued for recover
 The petitioner contends that the private respondents have not established their ownership of
the disputed books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they had bought
the stock. And that petitioner acquired the goods not in good faith
 Lower courts ruled in favor of the Private Respondents, and upholding their good faith citing
first paragraph of Art. 559 because the PR relied on the invoice presented to them by the
impostor
 EDCA then contends that they have been unlawfully deprived of their property because the
imposter acquired no title to the books since the check paid bounced for lack of funds, they
cited cases defining unlawful deprivation which favors them the recovery or reimbursement.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents were unlawfully deprived of their property

HELD:
NEGATIVE, there was no unlawful deprivation.
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on
the subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code:
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the
law governing the form of contracts.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he
has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing sold
shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect.
Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could
then validly transfer to the private respondents.
The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
The remedy for EDCA is to go after the imposter who caused all the trouble.
BPI FAMILY BANK, Petitioner, - versus - AMADO FRANCO and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 123498,
November 23, 2007

FACTS:

 On August 15, 1989, Tevestco opened a savings and current account with BPI-FB. Soon
thereafter, FMIC also opened a time deposit account with the same branch.
 On August 31, 1989, Franco opened three accounts, namely, a current, savings, and time
deposit, with the BPI-FB. The total amount of P2,000,000.00 used to open these accounts is
traceable to a check issued by Tevestco allegedly in consideration of Franco’s introduction to
Eladio Teves to Jaime Sebastian, who was then the BPI-FB SFDM’s branch manager. In turn, the
funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of of 80K debited by BPI-FB from FMIC’s time
deposit account and credited to Tevestco’s current account pursuant to an Authority to Debit
purportedly signed by FMIC’s officers.
 It appears, however, that the signature of FMIC’s officers on the Authority to Debit were forged.
BPI-FB debited Franco’s savings and current accounts for the amounts remaining therein. In the
meantime, two checks drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB current account were dishonored and
stamped with a notation “account under garnishment.” Apparently, Franco’s current account
was garnished by virtue of an order.
 Notably, the dishonored checks were issued by Franco and presented for payment at BPI-FB
prior to Franco’s receipt of notice that his accounts were under garnishment. It was only on May
15, 1990, that Franco was impleaded in the Makati case. Immediately, upon receipt of such
copy, Franco filed a to discharge the attachment and preterminated his time deposit acct
 BPI FB deducted he amount of P63,189.00 from the remaining balance of the time deposit
account representing advance interest paid to him. Consequently, in light of BPI-FB’s refusal to
heed Franco’s demands to unfreeze his accounts and release his deposits therein, Franco file the
subject suit

ISSUE:
Whether BPI-FB was in bad faith.

HELD:
NEGATIVE.

Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonable foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
We find, as the trial court did, that BPI-FB acted out of the impetus of self-protection and not out of
malevolence or ill will. BPI-FB was not in the corrupt state of mind contemplated in Article 2201 and
should not be held liable for all damages now being imputed to it for its breach of obligation. For the
same reason, it is not liable for the unearned interest on the time deposit.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud. We have held that it is
a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. In the instant case, we cannot
attribute to BPI-FB fraud or even a motive of self-enrichment. As the trial court found, there was no
denial whatsoever by BPI-FB of the existence of the accounts. The computer-generated document which
indicated that the current account was not on file resulted from the prior debit by BPI-FB of the
deposits. The remedy of freezing the account, or the garnishment, or even the outright refusal to honor
any transaction thereon was resorted to solely for the purpose of holding on to the funds as a security
for its intended court action, and with no other goal but to ensure the integrity of the accounFranco
could not point to, or identify any particular circumstance in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, upon which
to base his claim for moral damages.
 
Thus, not having acted in bad faith, BPI-FB cannot be held liable for moral damages under Article 2220 of
the Civil Code for breach of contract.