1945-50 Volume 1

New Light on Kashmir

 S irdar P^tri together with Gandhi
and J. vvaharlal Nehru, constituted the
IV 1 hret of the great and thrilling years
leading up to India’s independence on
IS \ugust 194T. Gandhi was assassinated
withm six months of freedom. Sardar
P.itH paosrd away some three years later
n December 1950 at the age of 75. But
these few years of office, the Sardar
consolidated freedom and earned for
hiiptelt a permanent place in history
is thfcj^rchitect of India’s unity.
The S3rdar was essentially a man of
action. He believed in creating history
rather than in writing it. He wrote
sparingly. Nevertheless, between 1945 and
1950, he wrote and received over 10,000
letters. This correspondence illuminates
a critical period of Indian history from
the inside. It offers an unrivalled source
of historical material. To the politician
and the reader, it provides light on the
main actors on the Indian stage and
their response to the challenges of the
times.
Th is Volume, the first in a series of
ten, relates to the accession of Jammu
Continued on back flap
(
>
i

».
SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE
1945-50
 2

H. Nothin:: in tin- Instrument atfe. ts tin- eont iimam-c ..j mv sovereieuty a

in mill ii\i r tins St i'» , or, save hi pr« • v i« l« •• I I * \ or iiiuh i tins riMmim-nt, the
exercise •»! »i \ powers, authority ami rutlits ihim «-nj• > \«*«I t»y tin1 as Ruler
of this State or tin* validity ol any law at present in force in this State.
* 1). I hereby ihs-lare that I execute this Instrument on behalf ol tins
State ami that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Kuler of the
State is to he eonstrueil as including a reference to my heirs and successors.
Given under m\ liaml this., .J1 .£../&.dav of Woe*.
Nineteen hundred and forty seven. tf, Q £ ,

I do hereby aceept this Instrument of Aeceasion.

#1 L4 tx UW
Dated this. >. etVf*V. .day of Awjwm. Nineteen hundred and
forty seven.

AA. 4KAJO.
• •••••••••••••••••a* (L • Ff •

(Governor-General of India)

THE second page of the instrument of accession signed by maharaja

HARI SINGH AND ACCEPTED BY LORD MOUNTBATTEN ON -b OCTOBER l'»4/.

TEXT OF THE INSTRUMENT IS GIVEN AS APPENDIX NINE.

 SARDAR PATEL’S
CORRESPONDENCE
1945-50

VOLUME I
NEW LIGHT ON KASHMIR

EDITEDJBY

DURGA^DAS
Editor-in-Chief, India News & Feature Alliance
Formerly Chief Editor, Hindustan Times, New Delhi

NAVAJIVAN PUBLISHING HOUSE

AHMED ABAD-14
 First Edition, 5,000 Copies, December 1971

© The Navajivan Trust, 1971

K /

Principal collaborators:
Siiankar Prasada, igs (retd.)
Special Secretary, Kashmir Affairs (1958-65)
Chief Commissioner of Delhi (1948-54)

B. L. Sharma
Former Principal Information Officer, Government of India,
Former Special Officer on Kashmir Affairs in the External Affairs
Ministry, New Delhi, and author

Inder Jit
Director-Editor, India News and Feature Alliance and
Editor, The States, New Delhi

Trevor Drieberg
Political Commentator and Feature Writer
Former News Editor, The Indian Express, New Delhi

Uggar Sain
Former News Editor and Assistant Editor.
The Hindustan Times, New Delhi

Printed and Published by Shantilal Harjivan Shah

Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad-14
 PUBLISHERS’ NOTE

This Volume on Kashmir is the first in a series of 10 Volumes

of Correspondence of the late Sardar Patel.
The Correspondence in this series starts from 1946 covering the
period of the transfer of power process which began under Lord
Wavell’s Viceroyalty after the release of the Congress Working
Committee Members from their long detention in Ahmednagar
fort and extends up to the time of Sardar’s demise on the 15th
December 1950. This was the period leading towards the dawn
of India’s Independence leading to its partition and finally in its
emergence as a Sovereign Democratic Republic. Among the
several hands that played a historic and crucial role in this
process, the decisive hand of the Sardar was one.
The historical nature of this Correspondence and its great
value for the coming generations are, therefore, apparent. This
Correspondence sheds light on the baffling problems that stood in
the path of unity and independence of India and the part, the
Sardar along with Gandhiji and Jawaharlal played in dealing
with the policy of the British and of the Muslim League which
was hand in glove with it.
Independence came, but the country stood divided. Inde¬
pendence also brought the problems of unification of India and
consolidation of our hard-won freedom. This Correspondence
reveals in abundant measure that last and epochal phase of
Sardar’s life which earned for him an everlasting place in the
future annals of India.
We have planned to bring out this series of Correspondence
as far as possible chronologically and episode-wise so that the
reader can proceed with a full background of the events.
Briefly, this Correspondence will include papers relating to
transfer of power negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, pivotal
pre-Independence elections to the Central and Provincial Legis¬
latures, the formation of the Interim Government at the Centre
without and with the Muslim League, communal riots in Bengal,
Punjab, Sindh and N.W.F.P., the partition of India with its
boundary disputes and the division of assets and liabilities,
framing of the Constitution, functioning of the Home Ministry in
relation to law and order in the land and the working of the
 [Vi]
States Ministry in bringing about the integration of States with
India. These papers also relate to the formation and the
functioning of the various Provincial Ministries under the new
order of things. T hey also contain valuable material relating to
the reorganization of civil and military services, as also about
defence and the external relations.

In fact, through this series of Volumes the Navajivan Trust

is bringing to light that part of Sardar’s work which has so far
remained obscure so that it may receive the careful and sympa¬
thetic attention that it deserves.
There are certain strange things current about the Sardar.
One view prevalent about him is that he was an iron dictator
and ruthless to the core. But the fact was quite contrary. Those
who had an opportunity to work with him saw in him a touch of
humanity and his generosity towards his colleagues and comrades
was almost abounding. He was hard when the interest of the
country or a matter of principle were at stake. He was indeed
hard with those whom he considered to be inimical to the Nation.
No doubt, he was a man of iron who by sheer self-will and
strength of spirit steered the nation’s ship through perilous waters.
Those who had no real loyalty to India and those who looked
outside for an economic millennium of the country through class-
conflict or bloodshed tried to throw dust on the image of the
Sardar. For instance, when he took over as the Deputy Prime
Minister and the Home Minister of India there were repeated
attacks on him to besmirch him through the Press and platform to
paint him as a reactionary and a communalist. As if that was not
enough, at a time when he was straining every nerve to restore
peace in the country and taking measures as were demanded by
the particular situations, Gandhiji was being misinformed by a
few about these acts of the Sardar. The Muslim League had
achieved Pakistan, though not fully of its dream. But when the
Sardar saw that its vestiges in India were still at large and busy
with their old game to undermine the Unity of India, Sardar
dealt with them with a firm hand. Lnity of the country was
uppermost in his heart. It was due to this that Sardar restored
the sense of security throughout the land so soon after the partition.
On the economic side, the country was then passing through
a serious crisis. There was an acute food shortage and scarcity
of consumer goods. The resettlement of refugees was also a big
economic problem. Sardar’s view w'as that the country must try to
construct a national framework of economy. He also felt that they
must harness every avenue of production—private or public to
the end of maximum production on the basis of a just deal to a
producers of wealth. He was averse to loose talk of nationaliza¬
tion without first building up national character.
Another fiction that went round particularly during this
period of his life was that he had a lust for power and by
temperament, he was not a democrat. This Correspondence tells
us that at least on four occasions he tried to lay down his office
in the Government. History will record that what he held dear
was the good of his country, and when he wanted to leave
office it was also for the good of his country. The ovation he
received from all sections of his countrymen aftei an unanimous
vote on the resolution regarding minorities in the Constituent
Assembly is only one example of how as a true demociat he
worked for such unanimity.
But the Sardar was a disciplinarian to the core. That was
the reason why he could so effectively hold and run the institu¬
tions under his care and make them serviceable to the country.
The Indian National Congress during his time was a disciplined
democratic institution, and much of the credit for this goes to
the Sardar. His standards of work were high and exemplary.
Promptness, clarity and time-sense were its hallmarks. It was,
therefore, that he could wield the Governmental power effectively
and with promptitude. As an organizer and an administrator he
will always remain without any rival. The Sardar will always
remain enshrined in the hearts of his countrymen.

The Sardar had the satisfaction that he did his duty to the
country and had detachment enough to leave the question of
judging him for the future generations and historians of the
country. He knew that he was working against a strong opposite
current. That had added to his burdens and cares during his last
illness. Some of the country’s problems would disturb him even
in his sleeps.

It was naively said of him that he was no man of vision. But

this is far from correct. True, he was no Utopian in his approach.
He had a rare practical vision. That vision took stock of the past
and the future and his judgements of the time were based on
an analysis of both the past and the future in the context of the
present. His predictions about the intentions of China have prov¬
ed cent per cent correct. In the context of the changed front¬
iers of the country, he wanted to reorientate our defence strategy.
 [viii]

Unfortunately he could not achieve his purpose during the space

of life left to him.

This Correspondence sees the light of the day twenty-one

years .ifter the death of the Sardar. There were repeated
demands on us and some of them felt that we were withholding
these papers contrary to nation’s interest and also in view of the
unjust and uncharitable criticisms on the Sardar. There was
some force in this argument. In particular, after the release of
Maulana Azad’s posthumous publication, India Wins Freedom which
tried to blame Sardar for the partition and as one who could have
saved Gandhiji from crucifixion, friends and admirers of the
Sardar felt that it was time to publish this Correspondence.
And yet we waited. The Sardar was too great a personality
to be dragged into such controversies of the time born of prejudices.
Sardar moulded the history of his times and the future; let his¬
tory be his judge, we thought.
1 he country at this distance of time can now look to these
events in a more perspective mood. The policies that we have
pursued so far have cast their shadows upon us and their effects
are being felt by us. The Nation is again passing through very
critical times. We feel that this is the time for placing these
papers in the hands of his countrymen.
The Sardar wanted to build a strong and united India nurtured
by her own traditions and thought. He was of the view that
only such a dynamic nation could really contribute to the peace
of the world.
Sardar’s unique role with regard to integration of States and
of his action in Hyderabad and Junagadh are known to the
people at large. But not much is known about the part he
played in securing Kashmir’s accession to India and of his further
role in relation to the defence of Kashmir, for restoring law and
order in that unhappy valley and for paving a way towards the
establishment of popular rule in Kashmir in fulfilment of the
terms of Accession.
The reader of this Volume will note that soon after the
Cabinet Mission’s proposals for the Britain’s withdrawal from
India, Sardar began to pay his attention to Kashmir. His parleys
were in close secret. On the 4th and 5th of July 1946, he had
discussions with the Kashmir premier Kak in Bombay. One of
these was in Gandhiji’s presence. From the later correspondence
between them, it becomes clear that Sardar tried to impress upon
 [ix]

Kak the need of liberalizing the administration and of releasing

Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference workers. From
August 1946 he was nominated by the Congress Working Com¬
mittee in association with Maulana Azad to pursue this matter
from the point where Nehru had left it on account ol his pic-
occupation with the Cabinet Mission.

The Maharaja was reticent; he would not heed advice from

any quarter; due to India’s support to the Sheikh at that houi
he felt estranged. Sardar had to cut this gordian knot. How
cautiously and with what diplomatic delicacy and human touch
Sardar handled this matter for over a year and how ultimately he
could bring round the Maharaja to his viewpoint will be evident
from these pages.

The Sardar never lost sight of the reality that according to the
British Plan, after the lapse of paramountcy, the States were free
to choose their own course. It was the prudence to win Maharaja
to India’s side.

In early July 1947, he again wrote to the Maharaja and

Kak that by past history and traditions Kashmir’s interest lay in
joining the Indian Union. He had his special emissaries to meet
the Maharaja. He could by now narrow down the gulf between
the respective approaches. On Sardar’s advice, the Maharaja
agreed to replace Kak by Mahajan and then the process of
linking Kashmir with India by road, air and wireless began in
full speed. The force of events affecting Kashmir were also working
towards this end.

Kashmir acceded to India on 26th October 1947. Sheikh

Abdullah was a party to it.

Jawaharlal and Sardar both played their decisive parts towards

this consummation. The tasks ahead were the defence of Kashmir
and of granting Kashmir a popular rule on the lines agreed bet¬
ween India, the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah.

But Abdullah as the head of Emergency Administration was

now a different man. He would neither tolerate the Maharaja as
the constitutional head of the Interim Government nor his Dewan
Mahajan as a link between the two in the emerging set-up. Both
of them, therefore, retired from the scene at ^ardar’s instance.
The Government of India could not fulfil its word to the Maharaja
due to intransigence of Sheikh Abdullah. Abdullah’s further role
is well known to us,
 [x]
For Sardar, Kashmir was a subject for the States Ministry.
Nehru thought that international issues were involved in it.
1 hat caused the difference between the approaches of the two.
The Sardar, therefore, had practically little hand in the affairs of
Kashmir after December ’47.
While releasing these Volumes, we owe a word of gratitude to
Sardar’s daughter Kumari Maniben Patel. After Sardar’s death,
she preserved these papers with great care and readily entrusted
them to us for publication. Not only that, she had a hand in the
meticulous scrutiny and compilation of these papers. Only by
her efforts the authenticity of these records has been vouchsafed
and the Navajivan Trust has been able to publish them with a
sense of redeeming a part of its debt to the Sardar.
4-12-1971
 CONTENTS

v
Publishers’ Note
xiii
Outline of I-X Volumes
xv
Highlights—Volumes II-X
Chronology of Principal Events in Sardar s Life .. xxii
xxxv
Contents of Volume I
xxxviii
Foreword
xlvii
Focus on Sardar
Introduction to Volume I ..
lxi
Chronology of Principal Events in Jammu & Kashmir lxiv
Abbreviations lxviii
Glossary of Indian Terms lxix
Prologue lxxi
Background to Opening Chapter lxxxii
Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1-321
Epilogue 323
Appendices 329
Index * * .« • • •• •• •• •• • • 383

Illustrations:
The second page of the Instrument of Accession signed
by Maharaja Hari Singh and accepted by Lord Mount-
batten on 26 October 1947. Text of the Instrument is
given as Appendix Nine. Frontispiece
Facing p.
1 Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi, where Sardar Patel lived 22
With Mr Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah at Birla House,
Bombay 23
Arrival of first Indian troops in Srinagar to defend
Kashmir Valley in 1947 68
Lord Mountbatten in Srinagar with Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammad, Mr Nehru and Sardar Baldev Singh 69
With General Rajendra Singh and Mehrchand Mahajan,
Prime Minister of J & K 124
Accompanied by Defence Minister Baldev Singh, the
Sardar chats with army officers and jawans. To his
right stand General Kulwant Singh and Air Marshal
Mukherjee
 [xii]
Sardar in conversation with Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir.
Also seen are Maniben Patel and Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammad (standing) 156
With Maharaja Hari Singh in Delhi 157
Maharaja Hari Singh and Maharani of Kashmir with
Yuvraj Karan Singh and Yuvrani on the occasion of the
Yuvraj’s wedding. The Yuvraj is standing behind his
mother Maharani Tara Devi. (Picture lent by Dr Karan
Singh.) 298
Group photograph of members of UNCIP (UN Commis¬
sion for India and Pakistan) on their arrival in India in
May 1948 299
 OUTLINE OF I-X VOLUMES

Main Topics
Kashmir Problem

1945-46
Elections

Working of Constituent Assembly and its parliamentary aspects

Interim Government and its working
Negotiations with Indian States—their place in future set-up
Bretton Woods Conference and other international conferences
Indian National Army
Provincial politics—Assam, Bengal, Bihar, Bombay, Central
Provinces, Madras, Orissa, North-West Frontier Province,
Sind and United Provinces
1947
National Issues

Working of Central Government

(i) Interim Union Government
(a) Before 15 August 1947
(b) After 15 August 1947
(ii) External
(a) Ambassadorial appointments
(b) Indo-Nepal relations
(c) United Nations Organisation
Transfer of power
Partition
Communal flare-up
Refugee problem
States Politics

Hyderabad
Junagadh
Indian States
(a) Accession
(b) Integration
(c) Dcmocratisation
 [xiv]
Indian Provinces

1948
Indian States and their problems
Hyderabad State
Indian Government—its working and problems
Gandhi assassination
Refugee problem—rehabilitation
Provincial politics

1949
Indian States and their problems
Hyderabad
Provincial politics
Central Government and its working and problems
Gandhi murder, Trial of accused

1950
Indian Government and its working

Internal—Inter-ministerial correspondence
External—Commonwealth and India
China’s aggression in Tibet
Constitutional—Constitution-making
New Head of State under Constitution
Role of Governor
States Politics

Indian States and their problems

Hyderabad issue
Provincial politics
 HIGHLIGHTS—VOLUMES II-X
Vol. II: Elections to Central & Provincial Legislatures
Direction of Congress Campaign

Soon after the Congress leaders were released from detention

in 1944, negotiations opened with the representatives of the British
Raj in New Delhi and the leaders of other Indian political
parties, notably the Muslim League, on new constitutional
arrangements to suit the change in the political climate brought
about by World War II and to satisfy the aspirations of the
Indian people for freedom.

Patel’s guiding hand was evident in these negotiations as well

as in the direction and management of the Congress campaign
for the elections to the Central and Provincial legislatures under
the Government of India Act of 1935. These elections, based
on communal electorates with a restricted franchise, were an acid
test of the Congress claim to represent the Indian people and
to be the recipient of power on their behalf when the British
relinquished their authority. The Muslim League, through
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, contested this claim, asserting that it was
the sole champion of the Muslim “nation” which aspired to a
separate existence on the advent of independence.

Patel’s role as chief of staff of the Congress High Command,

indefatigably marshalling manpower and finances and selection
of suitable candidates for the big electoral battle, comes out
strikingly in the correspondence in this volume.

Vol. Ill: Guidance to Ministries—Constituent Assembly

Problems—Interim Government Deadlock—
Reforms in Indian States

Elections to the Central and Provincial Assemblies were

followed by the formation of a board consisting of Maulana
Azad, Sardar Patel and Dr Rajendra Prasad to organise elections
to the Constituent Assembly as proposed under the Cabinet
Mission plan, aiding and guiding Provincial Congress Ministries,
including the Coalition Ministry in the Punjab, and supervising
the working of the Congress party in the Central Assembly. These
tasks fell primarily on the shoulders of Sardar Patel, who
functioned as a one-man High Command.
 Uvi]

I he political situation was complicated by several factors.

The Governor of Sind, Sir Francis Mudie, manoeuvred to put
in the Muslim League in power. Direct Action Day, observed by
the Muslim League on 16 August 1946, resulted in unprecedented
communal carnage in Calcutta. There were riots in Bihar. The
League refused to agree to the Cabinet Mission plan. Mahatma
Canclhi s meetings with Lord Wavell failed to straighten matters.
I atel attributed the deadlock over the formation of Interim
Coalition Government to bungling by the Viceroy.
An Interim Government, headed by Nehru and consisting
of Congress party nominees, was formed on 2 September 1946.
It was enlarged into a Congress-League coalition in the middle
of October 1946. Soon after, Patel described the coalition, which
was functioning without joint responsibility, as an arena of party
politics and intrigue. He repeatedly drew Wavell’s attention to
the disruptionist role of the League members of the government.
He also tried to persuade him to bring Bengal under virtual martial
law to restore peace and tranquillity. Problems of Indian National
Army personnel, the Royal Indian Navy uprising, creation of the
International Monetary Fund, shipping, trade, and the Secretary
of States’ Services were firmly and constructively handled by the
Sardar.

The movement for reform in the Indian states sponsored by

praja mandals received an impetus from political developments
in British India. The meagre hope of success is revealed in a
note Nehru forwarded to the Sardar of his talks with the Nawab
of Bhopal in early April 1946. The Sardar, however, guided the
movements into the right channel. The correspondence reveals
the country in the throes of revolutionary change.

Vol. IV: Transfer of Power—Communal Holocaust and

Partition—Administration and Stability

The political deadlock dragged on from 1946 to 1947. All

efforts of the Congress to avert partition failed as the League,
instigated by sympathisers in the top echelons of the British bur¬
eaucracy in India and Britain, stuck out for Pakistan. Finally,
the Congress capitulated under heavy pressure and the twin states
of secular, democratic India and Islamic, autocratic Pakistan were
born, with Governor-General Mountbatten playing the role of
midwife.
Partition and transfer of power were accompanied by the
tragedy and turmoil of wholesale uprooting of populations, mass
 [xvii]
murder and looting and other acts of barbaiity. The entire
socio-economic structure of the affected provinces seemed on the
verge of collapse. How the problem of restoring peace and sanity
and resettling the uprooted and dispossessed victims of the
trauma of partition was handled, primarily by Patel, with courage
and firmness, is revealed in the correspondence.
While the Attlee Government in London and Mountbatten
in New Delhi appeared to play fair by the Congress and the
Indian people, British administrators continued to play politics
at the lower levels and were instrumental in pushing Pakistan
into a military adventure in Kashmir as part of their game to
weaken India economically and politically. The Muslim League,
which had grabbed power in Pakistan, eagerly collaborated in
this game.

Vol. V: Control over Congress Ministries—

Indian States’ Accession

Creating conditions for stable government and maintaining

law and order in the old provinces of British India after the dis¬
ruption of partition was a major problem which was Patel’s prime
responsibility as Minister of Home Affairs. Relations between
governors and chief ministers had to be redefined in the changed
political context, and the Sardar was often called upon to medi¬
ate in disputes resulting from conflicting interpretations of rules
and practices by those in authority.

Problems also arose from the emergence of factionalism in

the provincial Congress organisations, and the Sardar had to
exert his authority to prevent them from cracking up in the
heat of local power struggles. The most notable instance was
in Madras, where two rival factions were engaged in a bitter
struggle which resulted in the ouster of Chief Minister T. Prakasam.
Rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Paki¬
stan was the key problem encountered in East Punjab, togethe^
with the intransigence of Master Tara Singh and the Akali Dal.
n Assam, large-scale infiltration of Muslims created difficulties
for the provincial administration in the wake of the loss of Svlhet
district to Pakistan. The inclusion of the tribal hill tracts in the
province also presented difficulties as the hillsmen, ethnicallv
and cultural y Afferent from the dwellers in the Brahmaputra
Valley, wanted a separate identity. In the interests of national

region-they were ^
S. C. - II
 [xviii]
Bringing the conglomeration of Princely States within the
ambit of the new integrated nation-state the Congress leaders
envisaged after freedom also presented many problems, the solu¬
tion of which rested on Patel’s shoulders as Minister of States.

V ol. VI: Patel-Nehru Differences—Assassination of Gandhi—

Ser\ ices Reorganised—Refugee Rehabilitation

Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru came to the brink of

relinquishing office in each other s favour over differences, first,
arising out of communal disturbances in Ajmere-Marwara and
later snowballing into serious conflict over the definition of the
functions of the Prime Minister in relation to his colleagues and
the pieparation of memorandums by both for presentation to
Gandhi for his adjudication. The assassination of Gandhi at this
crucial period acted, however, as a cementing bond between
them. I he Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh and similar organi¬
sations were banned.
C. Rajagopalachari was brought to the Centre as Governor-
General in succession to Mountbatten. Restoring popular confi¬
dence after the Gandhi murder and curbing the extremist elements
responsible for it without at the same time causing civil strife
was the responsibility of Patel. The correspondence between
Nehru and Patel on this subject reveals the different styles with
which they functioned. Throughout the year, the influx of fresh
waves of refugees and their rehabilitation continued to be a major
preoccupation of the government, and it was Patel’s lot to co¬
ordinate these tasks.
The difficulties encountered in providing cohesive and effec¬
tive administrations in the provinces called for firm directive
from Patel. In the United Provinces, the major conflict was
between the veteran Congress leader Purushottamdas Tandon
and Premier Pant and their political adversary Rafi Ahmed
Kidwai. This was represented in the Press as a struggle between
supporters of Patel and Nehru and a reflection of a power tussle
at a higher level. Sharp differences arose in Assam between
Governor Akbar Hydari and Chief Minister Gopinath Bardoloi,
while Communist activities became a cause of worry in this pro¬
vince and in neighbouring West Bengal.
Vol. VII: Integrating Indian States—Police Action-
in Hyderabad
The year 1948 was significant for the introduction of responsible
government in many Princely States, and also for the attempts
 [xix]

of some princes to block this process. Integration talks were

launched and new groupings of states came into existence with
popular ministers to run them. Not long after their induction,
Patel was called upon to deal with the squabbles within these
governments as well as between them and the princely heads
of the new unions.
The papers relating to the States of Hyderabad and Junagadh
have been brought together, for their case stands apart from that of
the other states which voluntarily merged in the Indian Union
as a result of the patriotic impulse of their rulers, who read the
signs of the times. While the ruler of Junagadh fled to Pakistan,
the Nizam dreamt of carving out an independent state in the
belly of the Indian Union.
With this end in view, the Nizam’s agents went on an arms
buying spree in Europe and organised bands of thugs to terrorise
the predominantly Hindu population of his State. Secret negotia¬
tions were also started with the British for the addition of Bastar
State to his domain and the retrocession of Berar, which had been
incorporated in the Central Provinces. Advances were made to
the Portuguese Government about providing access to Hyderabad
through Goa to the Arabian Sea.
Here, as in other instances of princely opposition to joining
India, the undercover manoeuvrings of British officials and poli¬
ticians, keen on seeing India weak and divided after independence,
played an important part in stiffening the resistance of the Nizam
and the feudal clique which supported him. After vain attempts
to persuade the Nizam to agree peaceably to joining the Indian
Union, as the vast majority of his subjects demanded, the Indian
Government organised a “police action” to effect the merger. The
story ends with the Nizam’s surrender and expression of complete
confidence in Scirdcir Patel s political sagacity.

Vol. VIII: Foreign Policy in Evolution—Constitution¬

making—Political and Administrative Problems
.^ie ^Llture of India s relations with the Commonwealth of
Nations, ties with Nepal, recognition of Communist China and
disputes with Pakistan over canal waters, ill-treatment of minorities
in the country and evacuee property were important matters of

bution
TT Jv
PTbCy m W11Cih ,‘he Sardar made a siSnificant contri-
man’ task the Sardar undertook was to mer"e the
Unions of Princely States with the adjoining states of the Indian
Uinon thus creating a bigger territorial unit than ex sted under
the British or any former Raj.
 [xx]

Internally, difleiences arose over whether the first President

<’t tht Indian Republic should be CR or Dr Rajendra Prasad.
Nehru and 1 atel took different attitudes to mass agitation by
the Akalis in Past Punjab. I he Hindu Code Bill was another
issue on which eminent Congress leaders differed from the govern¬
ment’s view.

Sentence of death was passed on 12 February on Narayan

Gopal Godsc, the principal accused in the Gandhi murder case,
and Patel overruled pleas for clemency. As Minister of Infor¬
mation and Broadcasting, he laid down a policy on the use of
Hindi for the guidance of All India Radio.

Vol. IX: Political Controversies—Refugees from East

Bengal—Territorial Integration of Princely States

Factionalism continued to cause administrative snarls in the

states and provinces and to this were added charges of corruption
and abuse of power against those in authority. The Sardar was
deeply involved in trying to keep peace among the warring factions
and weeding out the corrupt. A controversy erupted in West
Bengal over the relative status of Bengali and Hindi for official
purposes, and a movement for Greater Bengal, including East
Pakistan, raised its head in the province.

Friction within the Madras Ministry was sharpened by popu¬

lar demands for a separate Andhra Pradesh. Factions within the
Punjab Congress came to be identified with Nehru and Patel.
In Hyderabad, the Communists as well as communalists became
active and caused anxiety to the State administration. The
Communist-supported uprising of the peasants of Telengana, who
employed force to dispossess the landlords and divide up their
property, led to military operations against them.

Communal riots broke out in West Bengal as more refugees

streamed in from East Pakistan with stories of atrocities perpetra¬
ted on the Hindu minority there. The Congress party split in
Andhra Pradesh at the same time as the Communists swung into
action in the region. Master Tara Singh strove hard to stir up
communal feeling in the Punjab.
Nehru visited the United States. Patel, the Deputy Prime
Minister, filled in for him. His confidential fortnightly letter
of over 10,000 words to chief ministers of states elaborating his
political, economic and administrative philosophy is in the nature
of a will and testament.
 [xxi]

Vol. X: Acute Power Struggle—Triumph of Mutual

Accommodation—Warning Against China

The highlight of foreign affairs was the Chinese invasion of

Tibet, an event which raised the problem of security along the
Himalayan border. In letters to Nehru and CR, the Sardar
underscored the potential threat to India’s sovereignty from this
source. Pakistan’s persecution of minorities, incursions into Indian
territory and general hostility were other matters of concern to
New Delhi. Efforts were even made to poison the good relations
between India and Nepal. After the election of Rajendra Prasad
as President, Nehru announced his intention of resigning the
office of Prime Minister and devote himself to party activities.
The Central Cabinet was reconstituted and CR entered it. There
were several exchanges of correspondence between Nehru and Patel
on matters of principle, including a definition of the powers of
a governor. Finance Minister John Matthai resigned on an issue
of principle, and this was followed by a bitter war of words.
In the Congress presidential elections, Nehru and Patel rang¬
ed on different sides. Nehru opposed Purushottamdas Tandon’s
nomination, and when Tandon was elected Nehru refused to join
the Congress Working Committee. The Sardar’s health began
to fail.
 CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN
SARDAR’S LIFE

1875 Born on 31 October at Nadiad, Kaira district, Gujarat.

Fourth son of Jhaverbhai Patel, a farmer of Karamsad in
the same district, and Ladbai. Belonged to agricultural
caste known as Leuva Patidar. Schooling up to English
third standard at Karamsad.

1891 English 4th and 5th standards at Petlad, a small town

seven miles from Karamsad. Lived in a rented room with
four or five other boys, with seven days’ ration. Walked
from Karamsad to Petlad every week.

1893 At the age of 18 married Jhaverba of Gana, a small village

three miles from Karamsad.

1897 Matriculated from a high school in Nadiad, Kaira district,

at 22.

1900 Passed District Pleaders’ Examination. Studied with books

borrowed from friends. Set up independent practice at
Godhra, headquarters of Panchmahals district, Gujarat.
Contracted bubonic plague from a court nazir whom he
nursed when an epidemic broke out in Godhra.
1902 Shifted practice to Borsad, where he quickly made a name
as a criminal lawyer.

1905 Saved enough money to go to England to become a barrister,

but postponed departure in deference to the wishes of his
elder brother Vithalbhai, who came to know about his plan
and wished to go first. Looked after his brother’s wife while
he was away.
1909 Wife Jhaverba died after an operation in Bombay. Received
a telegram containing news of her death while arguing
a murder case in Borsad, but continued case until hearing
was completed. In spite of pressure from friends and rela¬
tions, refused to marry again.
1910 Left for England. Admitted to Middle Temple.
1911 Passed preliminary examination with honours, standing
first in Equity. Fell ill with a tropical disease unknown in
England. Doctors wanted to amputate his leg, but a German
 [xxiii]

doctor intervened and cured him through an operation

which he underwent without chloroform.
1912 Took final examination after sixth term instead of usual 12.
Stood first in first class, winning a prize of £50 and exemption
from two terms. Sailed for India the day after convocation.
1913 Reached Bombay on 13 February. Refused post in Judi¬
cial Department as a lecturer in Government Law School,
Bombay, and left for Ahmedabad, where he established
himself as foremost criminal lawyer.
1915 Member, Gujarat Sabha, which was converted into Gujarat
Provincial Congress Committee in 1919.
1917 Elected member of Ahmedabad Municipal Board. Election
challenged and set aside. Stood in a by-election and was
returned unopposed. Mahatma Gandhi, president of the
first Gujarat Provincial Conference, appointed an executive
committee with Patel as secretary. Impressed by Gandhi’s
leadership of the agitation against the British indigo planters
of Ghamparan, Bihar.
Conducted agitation against begar (forced labour for Govern¬
ment purposes). Led agitation against the appointment of
a British member of the Indian Civil Service as Municipal
Commissioner and secured his removal.
As Chairman of the Sanitary Committee of Ahmedabad,
stayed on in city when most of the citizens went away during
an epidemic of plague. Took a leading role in helping
sufferers and enforcing precautionary measures.
1918 Organised famine relief works in Ahmedabad district.
Represented textile mill labour with Gandhi and Shankar-
lal Banker before a tribunal appointed to hear a dispute
between labour and millowners.
Put up a temporary hospital in city with grant from Muni¬
cipal Board to Gujarat Sabha to combat severe influenza
epidemic. Organised no-tax campaign in Kaira district
along with Gandhi. During campaign Gandhi said he was
testing Patel, adding later that Patel had turned out to
be “pure gold.” Chairman, Sanitary Committee and Public
Works Committee of Ahmedabad Municipality.
Helped Gandhi in recruitment drive for British Indian
Army. They used to walk together for miles and cooked
their own food.
 [ xxiv ]

1919 Boarcrran’ ManaSinS Committee, Ahmedabad Municipal

Organised movement against Rowlatt Bills designed to

strangle movement for self-rule. Led big demonstration
march in Ahmedabad on 6 April and addressed public
meeting against bills. Sold publicly Gandhi’s proscribed
books, Hind Swaraj and Sarvodaya, and published Satya-
graha Patnka in Gujarati without official declaration or
permission. Government took no action.
Helped local authorities restore peace and order after large-
scale disturbances leading to martial law in Ahmedabad
after arrest of Gandhi.

Served with a show-cause notice for cancellation of his

sanad (permit to practice law) for participating in a pub¬
lic meeting advocating satyagraha. Case ended with a
warning. Refused to pay fine imposed by Government as
penalty for riots in city. Sofa attached and auctioned for
Rs. 100.

1920 Organised campaign of Congress Party in elections to

Ahmedabad Municipal Board. Congress captured almost
all elected seats. Discarded Western dress and adopted khadi
dhoti, kurta and chappals. Burnt all his foreign clothes.
Way of life also changed to traditional pattern in Gujarat.
Organised a conference of political workers of Gujarat in
Ahmedabad and persuaded it to adopt a resolution
supporting Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement.
In response to Gandhi’s call at Nagpur session of Congress
to collect money for Tilak Swaraj Fund, promised to raise
Rs. 1 million and enrol 300,000 party members in Guja¬
rat. Fulfilled these promises within three months.

1921 Elected chairman of Reception Committee of 36th session of

Congress held at Ahmedabad. For first time, delegates sat
on floor and the session set new pattern in simplicity, auste¬
rity and businesslike proceedings.
Built a hospital and maternity home on 21 acres of land
along Sabarmati river at site of session. The fountain
built at that time is still there.

1922 Government of Bombay suspended Ahmedabad Munici¬

pality after a sharp tussle over supervision of municipal
 [xxv]

schools. Organised schools under People’s Primary Edu¬

cation Board with public contributions. Municipality
suspended. Collected Rs. 1 million for Gujarat Vidyapith
in a tour which took him up to Rangoon.

1923 All-India Congress Committee deputed him to conduct satya-

graha at Nagpur in connection with British District Commis¬
sioner’s ban on flying national flag in cantonment area.
Resisted Bombay Government’s levy of punitive tax on
people of Borsad who were charged with harbouring crimi¬
nals. Tax withdrawn. Called Suba of Borsad.

1924 Ahmedabad Municipality reinstated. Fresh elections gave

Congress Party a decisive majority in enlarged Municipal
Council. Elected President of municipality.

1924- Passed a resolution giving notice to Ahmedabad Canton-

1927 ment to pay water tax from 1920 at rate of eight annas. If
tax was not paid, threatened to cut off water connection.
Tax paid under protest.
Introduced khadi uniform in municipality. Municipal
work was conducted in Gujarati after he became Presi¬
dent. His scheme for supplying pure water passed.
Completed drainage scheme during term as President.
Collected all arrears of municipal tax not paid by high
officials, some well-to-do people and municipal councillors
by cutting water connections and attaching properties.

1927 Unprecedented rainfall caused great damage and hardship

throughout Gujarat. Saved Ahmedabad from floods by
getting culverts breached. Organised relief measures for
flood sufferers with public contributions. Promoted grow-
more food and fodder campaigns and opened shops to sell
high-quality gram, cereal and cotton seed for sowing at
low cost to farmers. Received more than Rs. 10 million
from Government earmarked for famine relief. A new
party emerged in Ahmedabad Municipality. Clashed with
it over appointment of chief officer.

1928 Resigned presidency. Led peasant agitation in Bardoli

taluka, Surat district, against increase in land revenue
rates. Bombay Government punished farmers for non¬
payment by confiscating and auctioning land, crops and
other property.
 [xxvi ]

As agitation continued unabated, Government agreed to

restore all unsold confiscated land, release satyagrahis,
reinstate dismissed village officers and reduce land tax.
Named Sardar of Bardoli and thereafter known as Sardar
atel. Presided over first local self-government conference
in Surat.

1929 Presided over Maharashtra Political Conference in Poona,

loured Maharashtra, mobilising public opinion against
enhanced land taxes and untouchability.
Presided over Kathiawar Political Conference at Morvi.
Toured Madras Presidency at request of G. Rajagopala-
chari. Presided oyer Tamil Nadu Political Conference at
\edaianyam. Reiterated support for Congress resolution
on dominion status at conference against supporters of
complete independence. Also visited Karnatak and Bihar.
At Calcutta session of Congress advocated support to all¬
party committee headed by Motilal Nehru which recom¬
mended acceptance of dominion status as India’s political
goal, provided demand was granted within two years. Moti¬
lal Nehru, Congress President, moved a resolution from
chair congratulating Patel and peasants of Bardoli on vic¬
tory over British bureaucracy. Nominated in September
as a candidate for presidency of Congress session at Lahore
but withdrew in favour of Jawaharlal Nehru.

1930 Arrested on 7 March while addressing a public meeting at

Ras village, near Borsad, a few days after Gandhi announc¬
ed march to Dandi near Surat, to break salt law. Preceded
marchers to arrange accommodation and food on way.
Sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and a fine of
Rs. 500 or three weeks’ additional imprisonment. Refused
to pay fine and lodged in Sabarmati jail, Ahmedabad.
Went on hunger-strike in jail, requesting C class diet in¬
stead of A class. Request granted. Released on 26 June.
Arrested when leading a procession in Bombay on 31
July and sentenced to three months’ jail. Taken to Yeravda
jail near Poona. On release, made a speech at Khadi Bhan-
dar, for which he was arrested. Sentenced to nine months’
imprisonment in the second week of December.

1931 Released from jail in March under Gandhi-Irwin Pact.

Presided over 46th Congress session at Karachi in las
 [xxvii]

week of March. Helped Gandhi in his discussions with

Viceroy (Lord Irwin) in Simla in last week of August on
Congress participation in First Round Table Conference
in London.

1932 Arrested at 4 a.m. on 4 January and taken by car to Yerav-

da and imprisoned with Gandhi there for 16 months.
Mother died at Karamsad.
1933 Transferred to Nasik jail on 1 August. Elder brother
Vithalbhai died in Switzerland on 22 October. Rejected
terms on which Government offered to release him on parole
for two days to perform funeral rites.
1934 Developed serious nasal trouble in jail and released on 14
July. Issued statement accepting Gandhi’s decision to leave
Congress on 24 September. Congress decided at its annual
session in Bombay in October to contest elections to Cen¬
tral Legislative Assembly. Undertook tour of many parts
of country campaigning for party candidates. British Gov¬
ernment allowed Jinnah to go to North-West Frontier.
Sardar also sought and obtained permission to do so. But
after going there was not allowed to visit Bannu district.
1935 Organised relief work in Borsad taluka where plague had
broken out in four successive summers. Organised relief
for victims of Quetta earthquake from Bombay, where
he was laid low with jaundice.
Sir Roger Lumley, Governor of Bombay, invited Sardar
to a meeting and offered him premiership of Bombay
Presidency, but added that land confiscated from farmers
in Bardoli and sold would not be returned to owners.
Sardar replied: I am not going to be premier and the
land will be returned to the peasants.”
President of Third Local Self-Government Conference at
Broach.

1936 Collected Rs. 49,000 for Harijan Fund in two days in

ebruary. Appointed Chairman of Congress Parliamentary
Sub-Committee to select party candidates for provincial
elections under Government of India Act 1935. Guided
Congress Ministries after acceptance of office.
1937 Involved in a controversy with K. F. Nariman, President
oi Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, over selection of
piemier for Bombay Presidency.
 [xxviii]

1938 Involved in July in controversy on a constitutional issue

with l)r N. B. Khare, Prime Minister of Central Provinces.
Khare accused Sardar of conspiring to oust him from office
and resigned from Government and Congress. Efforts to
impose central party discipline on provincial leaders earn¬
ed him title Dictator of India. Presided over Kathiawar
Rajkiya Parishad. Narrowly escaped attempt to kill him.
Visit to Mysore city resulted in Government of Mysore
State agreeing to flying of Congress flag in its territory.
Flew to Rajkot on 24 December for talks with Thakore
Saheb of Rajkot, who signed agreement on release of priso¬
ners in Rajkot State and offered Sardar a portfolio in his
Council of Ministers.
1939 Subhas Chandra Bose defied Gandhi, Patel and other mem¬
bers of Working Committee and got elected President of
Congress at Haripura session because Maulana Azad with¬
drew at last moment.
Thakore Saheb of Rajkot broke agreement and satyagraha
was renewed in State early in the year.
Bose’s resolution for mass civil disobedience defeated at
Tripura session in February. Bose described Sardar as
“shining light of the ruling clique” and resigned presi¬
dency.
Working Committee appointed a war sub-committee of
three, including Vallabhbhai, in August. Warned provin¬
cial Congress organisations not to force a political crisis by
hasty action.
1940 Replied in a public speech at Ahmedabad in October to
Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for the Dominions, who
had asked in House of Commons whether India was fit
for independence. Sardar said: “If you lose the war, you
will have lost everything, and even if you win, you will
have suffered so heavily that your victory will be an emptv
one. At the end of the war, I declare no nation will remain
subject to another. A great revolution is going to sweep
the people every where. We shall see a new world emerge
out of the fiery ordeal of this war.” Arrested under Defence
of India Act on 18 November for participating in satya¬
graha launched by Gandhi to press Britain for firm commit¬
ment on Indian independence. Imprisoned in Sabarmati
jail and later transferred to Yeravda.
 [xxix]

1941 Released on 20 August from detention on ground of

health. Condemned communal killing in Ahmedabad at
first public meeting after release. Treated for acute intesti¬
nal disorder.
1942 Participated in talks with Sir Stafford Cripps in New Delhi.
Favoured acceptance of constitutional proposals put foiwaid
by Cripps provided they were modified to suit political
conditions in India.
1942 Supported Quit India resolution at AICC meeting in Bombay
August on 8 August. Arrested at 4 a.m. on 9 August undci
Defence of India Act. Detained without trial at Ahmed-
nagar fort with other Working Committee members.
1945 Transferred to Yeravda. Recurrence of intestinal trouble.
Released on 15 June.
Went to Simla during political talks between Viceroy (Lord
Wavell) and Indian leaders.
Entrusted with organising Congress election campaign for
Central and provincial legislatures.
Secured G. V. Mavalankar’s election as Speaker of the
Central Legislative Assembly in December.

1946 Issued call to Ministers in Congress Governments to work

for eradication of untouchability.
Disapproved Dr B. R. Ambedkar’s proposal for mass con¬
version of members of Scheduled Castes to other religions.
If they changed religion, they could not claim benefits as
Harijans.
Persuaded revolting men of Royal Indian Navy to call off
agitation in February as “the dawn of freedom is breaking
and the sun will rise in a few months.”
If political issues between Britain and India could not be
solved satisfactorily, India would withdraw from Bretton
Woods Conference, Sardar said in March. Condemned
suggestion that sterling balances should be scaled down.
“Sterling credit is the economic foundation of India and
this country’s future progress largely depends upon it.”
Opposed Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan, saying: “It is a
monstrous thing that a man can claim a different nationa¬
lity because he changes his religion.” Hindus and Muslims
were all basically Indians and thought as such. Congress
 f xxx]

could not accept the theory of Pakistan, happen what

may. The two-nation theory would ruin all.
Declared in an exclusive interview with the political cor-
iespondent ol Reuter that India would be prepared to refer
major political issues to an international body for arbi¬
tration. Britain could not stay in India indefinitely. “Hand
over power either to the Congress or to the Muslim League
and go out of India,” he said.
Advised withdrawal of trial of leaders of Indian National
Army in Delhi.
Pleaded for fuller freedom to legislatures in Princely States
and to Praja Mandals to select representatives to Constituent
Assembly.
Appealed to Sikhs not to boycott Constituent Assembly
even though Cabinet Mission had not done them justice.
Rejected possibility of a coalition between Muslim League
and Congress.
Joined Viceroy’s Executive Council as Home Member on
3 September. Announced in Central Legislative Assembly
that foreigners would be appointed to senior administra¬
tive posts only in exceptional cases.
Accepted the principle of state control of industry, told
Central Legislative Assembly that it was not desirable to
go fast on nationalisation.

Spurned Jinnah’s proposal for an exchange of population.

Urged Muslim League to join Constituent Assembly and
abandon its Pakistan policy.

1947 Talks with British Government representatives on transfer

of control of services from Secretary of State to Interim
Government and compensation for British officials completed.

Statement on All India Radio’s language policy announc¬

ing changes in existing practice.

Rejoinder to Jinnah: “Let an impartial tribunal decide the

Pakistan issue, for Pakistan could be attained only on the
basis of justice and understanding and not by force of arms.”

Appealed to Muslim League to accept invitation to join talks

and agree to arbitration by a “free power” in case of disagree¬
ment between League and Congress.
 [ xxxi]

Told Princes to play their part in shaping India’s destiny.

Warned North-West Frontier Province Ministry headed
by Khan Abdul Qayum Khan that Centre would not submit
to rowdyism and threats.

Interim Government’s proposals on compensation to British

officials accepted by Attlee Government. Demanded domi¬
nion status for India “at once” so that a strong Centre
could deal firmly with threats to law and order. Statement
issued on outbreak of riots in Dera Ismail Khan and else¬
where in NWFP.

Rulers of Dholpur, Nabha and Nawanagar told Sardar in

New Delhi of their decision to join Constituent Assembly.
States Department created and entrusted to Sardar. Des¬
cribed Jinnah’s demand for a land corridor linking West
Pakistan with the eastern wing as “fantastic nonsense.”
Assured Princes that “internal autonomy” of their states
would be respected.

Patel Committee’s report on minorities submitted to Consti¬

tuent Assembly. Report recommended joint electorates,
representation in Ministries at Centre and in states and
other safeguards.

Insisted on stationing a brigade of Indian Army in Kathia¬

war to protect states acceding to Indian Union from ap¬
prehended attack from Junagadh.

Persuaded Government to overrule Mountbatten and en¬

trust Indian Army with operations against Nawab of
Junagadh.

Pledged Government protection to Muslims staying in

India. Said forced conversions and marriages would not
be recognised.

Announced full agreement between India and Pakistan on

all outstanding issues relating to partition, including divi¬
sion of armed forces. Said Kashmir had not been referred
to Inter-Dominion Partition Committee. Announced in
Constituent Assembly financial settlement between India
and Pakistan under which India would transfer Rs. 750
million to Pakistan as a “great gesture of goodwill.”
Addressed Orissa rulers in Cuttack. They agreed to merge
then territories with Orissa province.
 [xxxii ]

Announced at public meeting in Jammu that “everything

possible” would be done to save Kashmir, “and this assu¬
rance I am conveying on behalf of the Government
of India.” Praised Sheikh Abdullah’s role in ensuring
Kashmir’s accession to India.

1948 Appealed to labour leaders of West Bengal to support popu¬

lar Government. Warned Pakistan that if it wanted fur¬
ther division of the country, “let us do it in the open
field.” Asked Indian Muslims: “In the recent all-India
Muslim Conference, why did you not open your mouths
on the Kashmir issue? Why did you not condemn the
action of Pakistan? These things create doubts in the
minds of the people.”
Declared in a statement: “Unless the Kashmir issue is
settled, the financial pact between India and Pakistan can¬
not be implemented. . . . Let there be no mistake that
Kashmir belongs to India.”
Declared at Patna that abolition of zamindari without
compensation would be nothing short of robbery.
Appealed to Nizam of Hyderabad to respect his people’s
wishes and accede to India.
Inaugurating Rajasthan Union, said that only by coming
together could smaller states save themselves from anarchy
and confusion.
In message on formation of Vindhya Pradesh, said: “Unifica¬
tion and dcmocratisation would be purposeless if they
did not bring about improvement in the lot of the people.”
Warned British politicians and Press to halt propaganda
against India. Blamed Churchill for India’s partition and
attendant disasters.
Rejected compromise on Hyderabad. Accession and res¬
ponsible government were India’s minimum demands.
Said in an eve of independence speech: “In free India there
is no room for divided loyalties.”
Informed Parliament that “action would be taken against
Hyderabad for breach of the standstill agreement.”
Congratulated Defence Services on their remarkable suc¬
cess in the “police action” in Hyderabad.
Indicted UN for mishandling Kashmir issue. “We accepted
the UN Commission’s cease-fire proposals, but the other
 [xxxiii]

party did not. We could perform the Kashmir operation

without danger if only we could free ourselves from our
commitments.”
Referring to Pakistan and its anti-Indian propaganda,
said: “I wonder whether they are really afraid of us, or is
this outburst merely an attempt to preserve their unity ?”
Inaugurated Advisory Board of Central India States. Prais¬
ed Nehru’s leadership on his 60th birthday, saying: “Pandit
Nehru has led the country through the crisis and has by
his great leadership enhanced the prestige of India. We
want our leader to remain at the helm for many years.”

1949 Announced merger of five Princely States of Rajputana—

Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and Udaipur—to
form Rajasthan Union and hailed it as a momentous deve¬
lopment.

Advised Maharaja of Baroda to merge his State with Bombay.

Challenged contention of Nawab of Bhopal that para-
mountcy had lapsed with British withdrawal from India.
Warned Communists that if they continued to oppose
Government and create danger they would be dealt with
severely.

Opposed demand for linguistic states because consolida¬

tion of country must precede revision of boundaries.
Appealed to members of Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh
to join Congress.
Advised South Indians to learn Hindi.
Appealed for public contributions to rebuild Somnath
temple in Junagadh.

Announced in Hyderabad that responsible government

would be introduced in former Nizam’s State only after
normalcy was restored.

Warned Master Tara Singh in a speech at Amritsar that

he was following suicidal policies.

Advised RSS to concentrate on regenerating Hindu society

through constitutional and constructive methods.
Inaugurated Rajasthan State in Jaipur.
Announced take-over of administration of Bhopal State
by Centre and congratulated Nawab on his understanding
C.-III
 [xxxiv]

and self-sacrifice. Declared that welfare* of Muslims would

be prime concern of State’s new administration.
At a public meeting-at Indore, warned-.Congress politicians
in newly formed states unions that he would dissolve minis¬
tries and administer unions centrally if they did not stop
their petty squabbles and tussles for power.
Told All-India Depressed Classes Leagues Confederation:
“India’s independence will not be completed until every
Harijan claims, and actually gets, equality of status.”
Moving consideration of report of Advisory Committee
on Minorities in Constituent Assembly, said: “Minority
concessions, though not good in themselves, have to be
treated as purely temporary. Minorities should volun¬
tarily agree to abolition of reservations for them in servi¬
ces and legislatures.”
Supported grant of privy purses to princes in return for
accession to Indian Union.
1950 Warned Pakistan against pushing Hindus out of eastern
wing.
Defended in Parliament use of preventive detention to fight
terrorism and violence.
Gave details of democratic set-up for Delhi Union Territory.
Appealed at a public meeting in Calcutta for fair trial to
Nehru-Liaquat Pact on minorities.
Told public meeting at Indore that Congress “is fully
behind Nehru.” Called for revolution in system of educa¬
tion in address to Gujarat Vidyapith.
Opened newly constructed building of Navajivan Trust,
Ahmedabad. Purse of Rs 1.5 million presented on behalf
of Gujarat on his 75th birthday, which he immediately
handed over to President of the Provincial Congress
Committee.
Declared that accepting aid from United States did not
mean alignment with any power bloc. UNO should be
strengthened.
Deplored Chinese intervention in Tibet and use of force
against Tibetans.
Fell ill on 15 November. Taken to Bombay on Tuesday,
12 December. Died on Friday morning, 15 December.
 CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

Chapter i Nehru’s Visit to Kashmir .. .. .. 1

Patel’s proposal; in defence of Nehru; the agitated minority;
Patel’s attitude; Maharaja advises caution to Nehru; Maha¬
raja’s announcement; Nawab ol Bhopal’s reply to Nehru;
invitation from State Government; Sardar suggests release
of Abdullah

Chapter ii Sardar’s Assurance to Maharaja .. .. 18

Light on Kashmir; number of detenus; Kak invites Sardar
again; friendly understanding emphasised; Congress Working
Committee resolution; State Government reaction; fear of
unfair general elections; National Conference members ar¬
rested; Maharaja agrees to general amnesty

Chapter hi General Amnesty .. .. .. .. 36

Instability before accession; release of Abdullah suggested;
post and telegraph facilities; Standstill agreement; C-in-C
for Kashmir forces; air communications; appointment of
Mehrchand Mahajan as Prime Minister; meteorological and
other services; loan of wireless equipment; accession to India
best for Kashmir; request for arms and ammunition; Nehru’s
concern over accession; stationing of Indian force at Madhopur

Chapter iv The Gathering Storm .. .. .. .. 53

Amrit Kaur’s note on atrocities; Pakistani preparations for
invasion; Abdullah and accession; road communications with
Kashmir; operations in Poonch; aviation spirit; freighter ser¬
vice by air; broadcasting transmitter; importance of co-opera¬
tion with Abdullah; Muslim police and troops desert; details
of Pakistan raids

Chapter v Mountbatten-Jinnah Talks .. .. .. 67

Mountbatten-Jinnah talks; tribal invasion begins; movement
definitely organised; disclosure in House of Commons; Jin-
nah’s admission; a way to settlement

Chapter vi League-British Conspiracy .. .. 82

Time of trouble; troop movements in Pakistan; events in
NWFP, communal problem; plebiscite; economic crisis in
Kashmir; Pakistan complicity in invasion; Gilgit lost, Ladakh
in danger
 [ xxxvi ]

Chapter vii Sardar Visits Jammu .. .. .. 96

Constitutional problem; urgency of forming Interim Govern¬
ment; broadcasts in Kashmiri; military withdrawals; possible
settlement with Pakistan; form ot Interim Government; steps
proposed by Gopalaswami Ayyangar; various possibilities of
the Mysore model

Chapter viii Ruler’s Reaction .107

Sardar strikes note of caution; Mahajan willing to quit;
Maharaja criticises the Mysore model; storm over vehicles;
Sardar wants to resign; possible reference to UNO; Yuv-
raj’s visit to USA

Chapter ix Constitutional Impasse .128

Abdullah’s volte face; his idea of administration; loyalty
professed to Maharaja; Mysore model with a difference; more
difficulties; Pakistan attacks Suchetgarh; Col. Kashmir Singh
assumes command; Mangla Dam works; accession circum¬
stances recalled

Chapter x Security Council Discussion .. .. .. 147

Rival army in State; firearms for Home Guards; RSS; refu¬
gees; delegation to Security Council; tendentious reports in
British Press and BBC; another attack on Kashmir expected;
Maharaja’s objection to Security Council proceedings; mili¬
tary reverses; Maharaja’s complaints; hint of abdication;
Mahajan in suspense; Nehru on ruler’s dilemma

Chapter xi Deadlock Resolved .. .. .. .. 167

Brig. Osman; defence of Naushera; restrictions on Kashmiris;
enemy activities in various sectors; Mahajan departs; tutor
for Yuvraj; consequences of responsible government; Home
Guards and militia; State forces; constitutional procedure;
Arms Act
Chapter xii Tension between Abdullah and Maharaja 180
Maharaja invited to Delhi; resumption of jagirs without com¬
pensation; publicity problems in the State; Abdullah decides
on freedom celebrations; Sardar and Nehru advise restraint;
economic distress; military situation; need for liaison in
Kashmir; rules of business; jagirs and private estates; privy
purse; State army
Chapter xiii Pakistan Army in Kashmir
Maharaja’s rights; reserved and unreserved subjects; con¬
flict between Abdullah and Maharaja; international aspect,
 [xxxvii]

dissimilar views on military operations; Ramchandra Kak;

an unfortunate incident; Abdullah’s encounter with Maha¬
raja; control of State army

Chapter xiv Abdullah a Law unto Himself • • • • 216

Ramchandra Kak; UN Commission’s draft resolution; gun
salutes; Abdullah’s remarks at Press conference; Sardar takes
exception; Begum Abdullah supports accession to India,
Sheikh’s grievances against Maharaja; Sardar analyses
Abdullah’s complaints

Chapter xv Kashmir and Commonwealth Premiers .. 247

Informal references to Kashmir and Hyderabad; partition of
Kashmir hinted; anti-Indian propaganda in Pakistan; Azad
Kashmir Radio’s tirade; Saudi Arabian diplomatic faux pas;
Secretariat for Kashmir Affairs; arrest of Constituent As¬
sembly members; Kashmir refugees in Lahore; Jammu agita¬
tion for zonal plebiscite; future of dynasty

Chapter xvi Abdullah for Independent Kashmir .. 266

Maharaja agrees to temporary absence; his conditions; fram¬
ing of State constitution; importance of tourists; Praja Pari-
shad; Yuvraj Karan Singh arrives

Chapter xvii UN Commission Proposal for Arbitration .. 283

Control over the State Department; memorandum for Britain
and USA; British opposition; dissatisfaction over Kashmir;
audit of Dharmarth Trust

Chapter xviii Centre’s Control over Kashmir .. .. 296

Privy purse in arrears; annual session of National Conference;
draft Article 306-A (now Art 370); Abdullah repudiates
agreed draft; redraft of Art 306-A; Patel’s disapproval;
Abdullah gives ultimatum; Nehru informed

Chapter xix UN Commission Report .. .. .. 311

Anticipated recommendations; Srinagar’s reaction to Council
resolution; dangers in plebiscite; Abolition of Zamindari Bill;
private property of Maharaja
 38
sardar patel’s correspondence

table petson. I would, therefore, request that any such reasons

should give way to the overriding consideration of bavin* our own
man as Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir State Forces.

Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon ble Sardar Baldev Singh
Minister of Defence
New Delhi

40

13 September 1947
My dear Sardar Sahib,
Kindly refer to your letter of even date regarding the loan
of the services of Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch for service as
Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir State Forces. I am looking
into the matter and shall write to you about it within a few
days.

Yours sincerely,
Baldev Singh
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Minister of Home Affairs
New Delhi

41

New Delhi
2 October 1947
My dear Sarin,
With reference to the previous correspondence we had
about placing Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch on deputation to
Jammu and Kashmir State, H. M. now understands that the
State has written officially to the Defence Ministry. Strictly
speaking, of course, the request should first have come to the States
Ministry who would have arranged with the Defence Ministry
for the loan of the services of Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh. However,
in order to expedite a decision, H. M. is prepared to waive this
 GENERAL AMNESTY 39

formality and would be glad if very early orders could be passed

on this case.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar1
H. C. Sarin Esq., i.c.s.
Private Secretary to H. M. Defence
New Delhi

42
New Delhi
17 September 1947

My dear Neogy,
A representative of the Kashmir Government saw me this
morning. He came here some days ago and has been stranded
here for want of a plane service to Srinagar. I understand
that all the planes which were not running on scheduled flights
have now been taken over by your Ministry and that is why no
service can now be laid on to Srinagar.
I am sure you appreciate the necessity of maintaining com¬
munications with Kashmir State, particularly in the present
emergency. As things are, air communications are the only ones
possible. I would, therefore, suggest that you might arrange,
under arrangements with the airways company, which was ope¬
rating this service previously, to release planes for this purpose.
Incidentally, this would also assist you in making arrangements
for the non-Muslim refugees stranded in Srinagar. I would sug¬
gest that, if you agree, action on these lines may be taken imme¬
diately.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patei
The Hon’ble Mr. K. C. Neogy2
New Delhi

1 I.C.S. officer who was Sardar Patel’s Private Secretary from September 1946
up to the time of Sardar’s death in December 1950
2 Minister for Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation in Nehru Cabinet
 [xl]

by their differing approach and outlook. There is indeed hardly

a national or regional issue of consequence in contemporary history
t e origin of which cannot be traced to the five crucial years.
I he Sardar initiated correspondence in four spheres in which
ie acted as the conscience of the Congress party. One related
to the conduct of elections to the Central and provincial legis¬
latures and the Constituent Assembly, including the selection of
candidates on the party ticket and the collection and distribution
of funds to finance the electoral battle; the second sphere con¬
cerned the integration of Princely states into the Indian Union
and their democratisation; the third was about the supervision of
provincial ministries manned by Congressmen and the control of
the administrative machine, especially relating to law and order;
and the fourth was concerned with the shaping of the Constitution,
especially the chapters on Fundamental Rights and safeguards for
the Princes, the Civil Service and the minorities.
On some delicate issues, the Sardar and Nehru exchanged
correspondence bordering on acerbity. These included the powers
of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis his Cabinet colleagues, the choice
of Rajendra Prasad as President of the Constituent Assembly and
later of the Indian Republic, and the selection of Purushottamdas
Tandon as President of the Congress for its Nasik session in 1950.
Sardar Patel was known to be interested chiefly in internal
affairs and the problems of national unity. He differed with
Nehru in his basic approach to the Kashmir problem and in his
estimate of Sheikh Abdullah. But the correspondence also reveals
sharp differences in outlook on India’s foreign relations, especially
those involving Nepal, Tibet and China.
The Sardar’s letters to Lord VVavell and Lord Mountbetten
tell the story of his effort to save the Interim Government—
and how he repeatedly confronted them with proofs of breaches
of the understanding on which the Muslim League was admitted
to the Government. The reactions and explanations of the two
Viceroys throw interesting light on the inner conflict from which
they suffered.
The most significant document is perhaps the long letter—
over 10,000 words—which Sardar Patel wrote to the Premiers of
the various provinces (as Chief Ministers of States were then
called) in his capacity as acting Prime Minister. Nehru used to
write a fortnightly personal letter to the Premiers. Patel used the
opportunity presented when the Prime Minister went abroad to
spell out what now reads like his will and testament on foreign
 [xli]

and domestic affairs and on economic, social and administrative

problems confronting the nation then and to this day.
Another example of what may be described as his will and
testament in the sphere of institutional discipline may be quoted.
Addressing “a word to Congressmen,” he said: “For long years
I have worked as a soldier of the Congress. I still considei myself
a soldier though many call me a Sardar. To my fellow-soldiers, I
respectfully submit that our only claim to power and authority
springs from our having followed Mahatma Gandhi in the fight
for India’s freedom. Any further and future claim or honour
that we find shall also be through sacrifice for the poor and the
downtrodden. Humility is a Congressman’s first requisite because
that is the badge of service. Our proper place is not at vantage
points of power but at vantage points of service. Who shall be
ministers, and where shall state capitals and other things be located
are matters for small people to talk and write about. Congress¬
men will be forced and pushed into seats of power if they are
true Congressmen.
“For years I never spoke from a Congress platform. Even now
I fear to make a speech, lest some unguarded word of mine should
hurt somebody’s feelings or interests. It would be unbefitting a
servant. A soldier keeps his feet firmly on the soil. He is not
afraid to fall. But those who have risen high risk a fall if they
are not careful. Hence those in positions of authority should be
watchful day and night. Let Congressmen eschew desire for
power. Let able workers be brought forward. If it becomes
necessary for us to sit in seats of authority let our hands be clean,
our tongues mild, our hearts sound and our vision clear.”
The present and future generations may look to the Sardar’s
correspondence for answers to questions such as:
Did Nehru and Patel think and act as statesmen rather than
as politicians in handling the daily affairs of the nation and of
the party? Did they have a moral yardstick? If they did, was
it applied rigorously ? Did they place the country above the
party and the party above the individual? Did they observe
norms of behaviour so as to set an example to their contemporaries
and successors? Did they foresee the pattern of life which their
own acts would unfold ? Did they lay firm foundations for demo¬
cratic growth? Did they fashion the political and administrative
infrastructure to meet the needs of the challenging times?
Among figures around whom controversies raged were
C. Rajagopalachari, K. Kamaraj, T. Prakasam, Rajendra Prasad,
 [xlii]

Purushottamdas Tandon, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, and Mastar Tara

mgli. 1 he ti iangle of the power structure, which dealt with issues
great and small, was represented by Nehru, Patel and Maulana
Azad.

What was the Sardar’s style of work? An interesting light is

thrown on the subject by those who came in close contact with
him. Their views are recorded in a separate note entitled ‘Focus on
Sardar. These are by Maniben Patel and five members of
the ICS: C. S. \ enkatachar, H. M. Patel, H. V. R. Iengar, Shankar
Prasada and V. Shankar.

Gandhi, Nehru, Patel. These three names are inextricably

woven into the pattern of Indian history in the great and thrilling
years leading up to independence and immediately after.
Vallabhbhai, unlike Gandhi and Nehru, was born poor. He was
ol peasant stock. His early life was a struggle to get educated. A
man who matriculated at 22, an age at which other young Indians
complete their university studies, and who through laborious self-
study qualified as a district pleader, should have normally remained
in this station for the rest of his working life. But Vallabhbhai,
like his brilliant elder brother Vithalbhai, was not to be satisfied
with a pedestrian part in the life of a small town. He thought
big. His mind was fired by the desire to develop his latent talents to
their full capacity.
The civil disobedience campaign in Bardoli in 1927 was the
turning-point in Patel’s political career. It projected him on the
national scene as a man of action, clearheaded and firm of pur¬
pose and a trusted lieutenant of Gandhi. The British Raj capi¬
tulated in the face of the struggle led by Vallabhbhai and the
satyagraha was called off.
This same capacity for effective leadership revealed itself
throughout Vallabhbhai’s career of public service spread over four
decades until his death in December 1950. Whether he was arrang¬
ing relief for the victims of flood or pestilence or communal violence,
or fighting arrogant and overweening British bureaucrats for
civic rights or against unjust land taxes, or marshalling support for
mass satyagraha or for Congress candidates in local, provincial or
national elections, he showed the same initiative and organisational
ability he had successfully displayed as a rebellious schoolboy.
The Sardar gained reputation as an Iron Man because of
the manner in which he, as custodian of free India s Home
Affairs, brought about and maintained internal stability in the
wake of the holocaust that preceded and followed the country s
 [ xliii]

blood-drenched partition. His genius for organisation found full

scope in the task of forging national unity by successfully initiating
the move for the merger of the Princely States first into unions and
later for their absorption into the Indian Union. He also acquire
the reputation of an Iron Man as the party boss. Congress
members of the various legislative bodies and Pradesh Congress
committees were personally known to him and he gave no quai tei
to those guilty of indiscipline or misbehaviour.
Freedom brought with it new problems. Popularly-elected
ministers had to be schooled in their new functions. Bureaucrats
had to learn that they no longer served a foreign master but the
people of India. The feudal rule of princely India had to be
changed to mesh with the needs of a democratic structure re¬
sponsive to the wishes of the people.
Vallabhbhai Patel emerges from the correspondence as a
great organiser and consolidator of modern India. Over 70 when
he assumed ministerial office for the first time, he carried on his
ailing shoulders the crushing burden of building the political in¬
frastructure of the new India. Death prevented him from complet¬
ing his task, but what he achieved in four short years endures.
The letters are the bones and sinews of Indian history of a
crucial period. To the scholar and researcher, they offer a treasure
of source material. To the politician, they should serve as a guide.
To the citizen, they provide inspiration.
Nehru and Patel were complementary characters. Nehru was
brought up in the Fabian ideology of Sydney and Beatrics Webb
which upheld parliamentary democracy as the instrument of
human fulfilment. But the moral and ideological aspect of
Britain’s political life and public postures was like the husk on
the inner core of rice. Sardar Patel was interested in the inner
core, the British genius for organisation and administration. He
understood human psychology and what made the British Raj
click.
Nehru understood the spirit of the age, social and economic
justice for the underdog. Patel was in tune with the call of his¬
tory—India’s history beset with examples of disintegration when the
Central authority weakened and intrigue, manoeuvres and selfishness
became the motivating force of the elite. Nehru was the idealist
dreamer, Patel the stern teacher with a cane hanging on the
wall.

The plan of the volumes was settled in consultation with my

collaborators. It was decided that the letters be published in
 [ xliv]
chronological order, but that the volumes be so determined as to
provide an integrated story of the time. The decision of the
British Government to reduce from 50 years to 30 the period
of embargo on publishing confidential Cabinet matter and
state secrets has provided a fresh stimulus to this exercise. The
British documents cover the period 1942-47, when power was
transferred to India, and the first two of the proposed ten
volumes already released deal with confidential papers covering
1942-44. Where the story of the British Raj ends the letters of
Sardar Patel pick up the thread and carry it to the end of 1950.
The Congress Raj that followed was a continuation of the British
Raj in more ways than one. It was not merely a case of peaceful
transfer of power from the British to the Congress. It was also
a continuation of the moral and administrative values for which
Britons stood.
Maniben was the ideal companion—a daughter who, regardless
of her own comfort, devotedly served her father and merged her
personality with his. Her simplicity, self-effacing life and integrity
earned her wide respect. She was virtually her father’s shadow
and was a close witness to the entire drama, its shadows and its
highlights.
A brief chronology of events in the Sardar’s life pinpoints the
main events of his career, as also an illuminating account by
Maniben and five officers of the ICS on how the Sardar
organised his life and functioned as the party boss and Deputy
Prime Minister.
The letters are not quite typical of the wit -and candour and
warmth with which Vallabhbhai spoke to his numerous daily
callers. He was at his best in personal dialogue, when he spoke
briefly but with great effect. This was because he was a shrewd
judge of men and knew how to put his ideas across to them in
the most human and telling way.
Sardar Patel believed in the doctrine of finding the right
person for a job and trusting him to do it well. The correspon¬
dence unfolds his purpose or communicates his decision and bears
the stamp of his thoughts. Some letters are concise, some pre¬
cise and others verbose, while some have a touch of the pedantic.
The Sardar did not waste time on a draft so long as it conveyed
the core of his directives.
The changes made in editing the material for publication are
limited to introducing uniformity in spelling and to correcting
obvious errors in idiom and grammar. Where such amendations
 [xlv]

need to be indentified, they are shown in square brackets in the

text.
Arrangements are in chronological order and not by topic.
But the letters have been grouped to retain inter-relation of events
and negotiations. Correspondence of a routine nature has been
omitted and a few excisions have been made out of regard for
susceptibilities of the persons concerned. Such excisions aie indi¬
cated by dots.
Where an extract or extracts from a letter are published, this
is indicated by the word ‘Extracts’ at the top of the letter. The
omissions have been effected by the persons entrusted by
Maniben Patel and the Navajivan Trust with selecting the material
for publication.
In several instances, letters, enclosures and other documents
referred to in the published correspondence are not to be found in
these volumes. We have not been able to fill these gaps and
hope future researchers will be able to do so.
Each volume of the series contains an outline of the contents
of the remaining volumes. This should help researchers ascertain
at a glance what the whole series contains.

Wavell, Mountbatten, the Indian Princes and other dignitaries

to whom letters have been addressed have a string of titles. The
full title and address is given only in the first letter addressed
to each of them in the volume concerned.

Each volume contains eight to ten pictures, most of which

refer to persons or events mentioned in the text of the volume in
question. These illustrations have been obtained from Maniben’s
collection or from the Photo Libraries of the Press Information
Bureau of the Government of India and Army Headquarters in
New Delhi, the Janmabhoomi of Bombay and the Times of
India group through the courtesy of the heads of these organisations.
The Editor wishes to record his appreciation of their help.

He also wishes to express his thanks to Maniben and the

Trustees of Navajivan Trust for their co-operation in every way
in helping to bring this monumental work to fruition. Thanks are
due to the staff of the Trust office and Navajivan Press in
Ahmedabad, the numerous typists who prepared copies of the
thousands of letters and other documents which form the raw
material for reconstructing the history of the short but epoch-mak¬
ing period 1945-50, and my colleagues and friends in New Delhi
 [xlvi]

who worked long hours in assembling, classifying and preparing

the matter. &

What is published in these volumes is not exhaustive.

Research and perseverance would undoubtedly yield more source
material. The yardstick which the Sardar applied to public life
and to political and socio-economic issues was forgotten or ignored
by his successors with consequences which became apparent in the
confused state of politics in the 1960s. India has again entered
the most crucial period in the evolution of its polity. The stand
taken by the Sardar on various issues and his vision of the road
which India should take have acquired a new relevance.
2 Tolstoy Lane
New Delhi-1
9 November, 1971 Durga Das
 FOCUS ON SARDAR

Sardar Patel’s Correspondence deals with matters concerning

Congress party affairs and the business of government conducted
at a personal level. It was decided to seek the co-operation of
those persons who came in close contact with the Sardai at the
official level in giving close-up shots of him at work. Fortunately,
five such persons who held official positions of importance under
the Sardar have responded to the Editor’s request.
In addition, Maniben Patel has described how the Sardar
functioned in party affairs as Chairman of the Congress Parlia¬
mentary Board and informally in the governmental sphere.

Maniben Patel

An illuminating picture of Sardar Patel’s activities and style

of work was provided by his daughter Maniben. What follows
are extracts from the information and views given by her to
Trevor Drieberg and the Editor in New Delhi:
The Sardar was a man of few words. He wrote very little;
he hardly kept any record of his public or party work. He des¬
troyed letters addressed to him after reading them and replied by
hand, not keeping copies. But after he was appointed Chairman
of the Congress Parliamentary Board in 1934, files relating to its
transactions were kept.
When the Sardar fell ill towards the end of the Bardoli satya-
graha in 1928, it was suggested that somebody should give him
secretarial help. I said: “If someone is to be kept, why not I?”
From 1929 until his death, I preserved his correspondence whenever
possible. Once, when K. Gopalaswami, political commentator of
the Times of India, visited him in his flat on Marine Drive, Bom¬
bay, the Sardar called for a letter he had received from C. Raja-
gopalachari, forgetting that he had torn it up and thrown it in the
wastepaper basket. Fortunately, I had collected the pieces. It
took me some time to paste them together before passing it on to
him. This happened before the Interim Government was formed.
The Sardar travelled second-class by railway before he became
a Minister. I would spread his bedding at night and retire to a
third-class compartment. But from 1934, when there was much
correspondence to attend to even on train journeys and people
came to see him at stations, I kept company with him in his
 [ xlviii ]

second-class compartment. I used to make copies of important

lctteis lie wrote in hand, but he would question this, asking why
I was taking such trouble and wasting time. I also kept newspaper
clippings of important events with which he was associated.
1 he Saidar read several newspapers and listened to radio
news bulletins regularly. 4 his enabled him to keep abreast of deve¬
lopments throughout the country. He also talked to people to get
information to supplement other sources.
After 1945, the secretarial functions of the Congress Parlia¬
mentary Board were undertaken mainly by Shantilal Shah. The
Sardar was undergoing treatment for intestinal trouble at the
Nature Cure Clinic, Poona, when he sent for Shantilal Shah from
Bombay. Shah, a Congress Socialist, hesitated at first because he
did not know what was in store for him. But B. G. Klier (Premier
of Bombay) advised him to take up the work. The Sardar told
Shah he wanted him to act as his Secretary at the Parliamentary
Board office located at the headquarters of the Bombay Pradesh
Congress Committee.
The Sardar was a very shrewd judge of character. When he
met a person for the first time he looked him up and down, and the
assessment he made in that process rarely went wrong.
Once when Mathuradas Trikamji, Mayor of Bombay, asked
what kind of men he kept round him, the Sardar replied that his
was a “juggler’s basket.” He kept all kinds of people for the
single aim of winning India’s freedom. He used different people
for different purposes. He was fully aware of their weaknesses and
drawbacks but exploited their useful qualities.
The Sardar learnt punctuality in his youth when he had to
do everything for himself. This experience taught him to save time
by doing things according to schedule. This gave him self-reliance
and at the same time an appreciation of the difficulties other people
encountered. He walked on business errands rather than use trans¬
port. This habit served him well in London when he was attending
the Inns of Court. He used to walk from his lodgings to the law
library, a distance of several miles daily. He could not afford to
buy books for study, and was at the library when the librarian
opened it and left at closing time every evening.
The visit to England fulfilled two of my father’s ambitions.
He wanted to see the country from which people had come to
conquer India and to qualify as a barrister. He had seen how even
mediocre lawyers had been able to build up a large practice because
they had been to London to study for the Bar. On his return to
 [ xlix ]

Ahmedabad, he established himself as the city’s leading criminal

lawyer.
When he was a district pleader at Borsad in the early 1900s,
there was a British magistrate who kept a mirror in his court to
study the faces of witnesses. This made witnesses nervous and the
magistrate drew conclusions from their behaviour about their truth¬
fulness. The Sardar thought of a plan to make the officer behave.
He demanded transfer to the district court of a case in which he
was appearing before the magistrate. The Sardar presented him with
a sealed letter. The magistrate opened the letter and saw his name
heading the list of witnesses for the defence. He called the Sardar
to his chamber for a talk. The accused was acquitted and the
magistrate stopped using the mirror conceding that he had no right
to do so. This incident illustrates a facet of my father’s character.
He had no fear of the British magistracy or administrators.
The Sardar was a man of regular habits and disliked armchair
politicians. He read about Gandhiji’s action in Champaran and
was impressed by his methods of organising peasants to resist ex¬
ploitation and oppression. Mahatma Gandhi was preoccupied
with the agitation in Bihar and wanted somebody who would
give up everything and devote all his time to the satyagraha
campaign in Kaira district organised as a protest against exces¬
sive land revenue. My father volunteered his services, and they
were accepted.
Until that time the Sardar wore European dress. He was so
fastidious that finding no good laundry in Ahmedabad he got his
stiff collars washed in Bombay.
From early youth, the Sardar developed the qualities of lea¬
dership and discipline. In later life, these qualities were to help
him in organising large groups of people for action. Until the
Bardoli movement, he was hardly known outside Gujarat. He did
not go out of Gujarat until Gandhi’s sentence of imprisonment
for six years ml 922 when he went on a fund-raising mission for
the Gujarat Vidyapith as far east as Rangoon.
For years in Gujarat, whenever Gandhi addressed a public
meeting die Sardar did not speak at it and later, when the Sardar
of°the d-,her ,Cong"eSS lea,dfs did not sPeak- This is an illustration
e d c'pllne observed by Congressmen at the time. The leader
spoke for them and the others showed their loyalty by action
When pandhiji started the swadeshi movement and burning
of foreign clothes, the Sardar burnt all his European clothes sock!
and hats. He never wore any type of headgear,'even a ihadi ^p
S. C.-IV
..iltt i lie cast aside his black Banglori cap. From then, he always
wore dhoti and kurta and a chaddar on his shoulder, adding only
a warm jacket in winter.
The satyagraha in Borsad Taluka, Kaira district, lasted a
month. I he provincial Government had levied a punitive tax of
eight annas—a large sum at that time—per person on all the inha¬
bitants for the maintenance of the preventive police. Even chil¬
dren were taxed. The campaign succeeded and in this satyagraha
he gained the title Suba of Borsad.
Another sphere in which the Sardar helped to raise the
morale of the people of the area was connected with activities of
dacoits. People dared not leave their house after 6 p.m. for fear
of dacoits who infested the area. They appealed to the Sardar
for help. He agreed, provided they did not allow their houses
to be used for keeping stolen property.
In the Bardoli satyagraha, there was one organiser for every
big village. The Sardar set out at noon from his headquarters and
returned at midnight after visiting many villages. There was only
one car, so all the other organisers journeyed on foot or by train or
cart. The peasants accepted the Sardar as their unquestioned
leader. Every morning, he received written reports from each vil¬
lage through volunteer messengers. The title Sardar of Bardoli
was conferred on him by a party worker at a public meeting. It
gained nationwide currency when Gandhiji started referring to
him in this manner.
As head of Ahmedabad Municipality, the Sardar looked far
ahead of immediate civic needs and planned accordingly, unlike
some of his successors who made changes looking to short-term
gains.
His qualities of leadership were recognised when he organised
relief measures during the floods that hit Gujarat in 1927. He went
round Ahmedabad city with the chief engineer and ordered a cul¬
vert to be broken to let the flood waters flow into the Sabarmati
river. This saved the city from total inundation. He also persua¬
ded the Bombay Government to provide more than a crore of rupees
for relief to the flood victims. He sent help to the Collector
of Kaira when the district was cut off from the rest of Gujarat.
Only the Collector’s bungalow, which stood on a mound, was
safe, and all the townfolk had gathered there for safety. The
Sardar’s men brought food and other necessities.
The Sardar went to Calcutta for the Congress session over
which Motilal Nehru presided. Even though his name had become
a household word as the hero of Bardoli his physical appear¬
ance was not known. The volunteers of the Congress failed to
identify him and since he did not carry a ticket he was not admit¬
ted to the pandal. The next day he carried his membership card
and the volunteers were surprised when they found people shout¬
ing for the darshan of the Sardar of Bardoli and that the hero was
the person the volunteers had kept out the previous day.
The Sardar was favoured by the Provincial Congress Commit¬
tees as the next party president, but Motilal Nehru wrote to Gan-
dhiji asking that Jawaharlal should succeed him. Motilal wanted to
see his son Congress chief before he died. My father agreed with
Bapu (Gandhiji) that Motilalji’s wish be fulfilled.
It was usual for the Congress President to attend annual ses¬
sions with large retinues. The Sardar went to the Karachi session
in 1931 with only me and an aide, thus cutting drastically the
expenses of the reception committee.
The outlook of the Sardar and of Nehru was vastly different.
They agreed to differ, but at the same time worked together for the
common cause of India’s freedom. The influence of Mridula
Sarabhai and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai on Nehru was to a large extent
responsible for the rift between my father and Jawaharlal.
The Sardar became the party boss from the time he became
head of the Parliamentary Board. He was also the party’s main
fund-raiser. The Congress High Command, of which he was the
mainspring, functioned as a moral prop for the Chief Ministers
against the administrative machine directed by the British.
I used to sleep by the telephone to take calls that came at odd
hours of the night so that the Sardar’s sleep was not disturbed. I
took down messages and passed them on to him the next morn-
ing. One such call came at midnight from Biswanath Das, then
Premier of Orissa. He had decided to resign over the choice of a
provincial official to act as Governor. The Sardar backed him
and the Viceroy yielded.
I may recall a meeting the Sardar had with Bombay Governor
Lumley in 1937 at Lumley’s request. It lasted about an hour.
Lumley told the Sardar that he would be Premier of Bombay, but
the lands confiscated from the peasants of Bardoli would never
be returned. The Sardar replied: “Note it down that I am not
going to be Premier, and also that the lands will be returned to
the peasants.”

The Sardar took many unpopular decisions in party and

Government matters, but his decisions were accepted because he
 [Hi]
had no axe to grind. He was not amenable to threats or blackmail.
He had no propeity ol his own and he was above extraneous
considerations. He had nothing to lose, had no ambition and no
desire to cling to office.

Once in Y eravda jail, Gandhiji asked in good humour what

post he would like to hold after Independence. The Sardar replied
he would become a sadhu. In 1945, when it had been decided to
replace Azad as Congress President, the Sardar got the largest
share of votes in the Working Committee. But Kripalani, one of
the candidates, withdrew in favour of Nehru and handed a paper
to the Sardar to withdraw his nomination as well so that Nehru
could be elected unopposed.
Gandhiji, to whom this matter was referred, told Nehru: “I
don’t want to make you a prop of mine if people don’t want you.”
Nehru kept silent and was selected President. Gandhiji supported
Nehru’s choice as Prime Minister because he was well known
outside India. He compared the Sardar and Nehru to two bul¬
locks yoked to a cart. He felt that if Nehru was made Prime
Minister he would be prevented from “making mischief” in the
country.
When the Sardar became Home Member and later on Deputy
Prime Minister, anybody could call on him during his morning walk
from 4.30 to 6.30. He was a fast walker and few could keep pace with
him. They told him what they wanted and then they would drop
out when the dialogue was over. He gave brief answers and listen¬
ed mostly. For party workers and others this was an opportunity
for opening their hearts to him. At the end of an hour’s listening,
the Sardar would probably reply in a couple of words. He ar¬
ranged assistance for even the humblest party worker who needed
it. He provided hospitalisation if necessary. After his illness in
March 1948 his medical advisers stopped morning walks complete¬
ly and restricted his interviews.
In 1941, he was afflicted with severe intestinal trouble. He
woke around 3.30 every morning because of pain in the bowels.
He spent an hour in the toilet before setting out on his morning
walk. He had a cup of tea and breakfast, which consisted of a
piece of toast and apple juice. In these early morning hours,
before going for a walk, I did my quota of spinning. After break¬
fast, Private Secretary V. Shankar came in with office files. The
Sardar looked through the morning newspapers carefully and
rarely missed any significant news. He gave oral instructions to
Shankar. As before, he would write as little as possible. \N hen
 [liii]

in good health, he left home around 9.30 for the Home Ministry,
returned for lunch and after a nap of 15 minutes went to the
Information and Broadcasting Ministry.
I looked after the Sardar’s Gujarati correspondence while
Shankar attended to that in English. I passed on some of the
correspondence in Hindi to Shankar. Morarji Desai had re¬
commended Shankar as Private Secretary. The Sardar invited
him to lunch to look him over before selecting him for the post.
The Partition Committee set up under the Mountbatten
Plan and consisting of as many as 30 to 40 officers, would come
to the Sardar’s house and stay up to lunch receiving instructions
from him. Its members had to report back to him in the evening.
Every order he issued had to be executed within 24 hours.
He rang up Premiers at night when he had a particular issue to
discuss with them. He was against wasting money on telephone
calls on matters that were not urgent. I kept a diary of all
private trunk calls, for which Sardar paid out of his own pocket.
I recall another instance of his method of work. There was
a crisis in the jute industry. The Sardar phoned G. C. Desai,
Commerce Secretary, and M. P. Birla, Chairman of the Indian
Jute Manufacturers’ Association, Calcutta, and others every
night to check on developments. Similarly, at the time of the
Bombay riots and disturbances elsewhere, he made phone calls
at night to find out what was happening. He made calls to
Punjab and Bengal and UP at the time of the partition troubles.
The Sardar was not impolite or arrogant in his dealings
with people. He replied promptly to correspondence. He read
all the letters addressed to him personally and generally told the
officer concerned how he should reply. He never signed letters
or any other document blindly. When he was not fully satis¬
fied with a draft, he would change it himself or ask the officer
concerned to redraft it. He liked precision and conciseness
in letters. He would say that this was “not a place for essays”
or for exhibiting one’s command of English.
Mountbatten recognised the Sardar’s greatness. I was the
only other person present when the Sardar had a talk with Bapu
between 4 and 5 p.m. on the day of his assassination. Bapu
had decided to release the Sardar from the Ministry at the
latter’s instance, but Mountbatten strongly opposed this because
he felt that the Sardar “had his feet on the ground while Nehru
had his in the clouds.” He told Gandhiji " that he could not
release the Sardar. Gandhiji agreed and withdrew his decision.
 [Kv]

It was agreed at the conversation on January 30 afternoon

that Gandhiji, Nehru and the Sardar should sit together and
iron out their differences. But this meeting was never held.
I he Saidar was greatly upset by the slander campaign against
him at that time in certain Congress and Government circles.
He was worried at heart that Gandhiji had to defend him con¬
tinually against these slanders.

Previously, when Nehru lived at York Road and the Sardar

just across on Aurangzeb Road, they used to meet every day, even
though for a few minutes. Nehru would sometimes drop in after
lunch, or in the evening or at night after dinner. They walked
together and discussed matters. The Sardar would walk with
Nehru up to the gate of the latter’s house on York Road and see
him oil there or they would return together to Aurangzeb Road.

I hese daily meetings and talks cleared misunderstandings,

but this dialogue became very difficult after Nehru moved to
the house of the former Commander-in-Chief on Teen Murti
Marg. If he had not moved there on Mountbatten’s advice, much
of their later differences might never have developed. Because
of his illness, the Sardar was not able to go to Nehru’s house
frequently.

When there were party matters to be attended to, the

Sardar requested the AICC General Secretary to call at his
house for instructions. The Working Committee met at the
Sardar’s residence since there was no good AICC office build¬
ing at that time in Delhi. The provincial Premiers constantly
sought his guidance, and he was a great help to them in their
encounters with members of the bureaucracy or party dissidents.

The administrations of the new states formed after inte¬

gration lacked capable men to guide them. But in those areas
where party members had carried out constructive work under
the Sardar’s direction before independence, such men were avail¬
able. This was so in Kathiawar and Gujarat. Elsewhere in the
country, party workers in the former states had only indulged in
agitation and there was no solid foundation for their work.

The Sardar did not aspire to prime ministership or any

other high office. He once said that if India had won Swaraj
ten years earlier he would have solved the food problem as he
had solved that of the states. He added: “But I have not the
strength to do so now.” He considered food the country’s most
important problem after consolidation. He was essentially a
 [lv]

man of action, averse to writing. His philosophy of life may he

summed up in the words: “Why not create history rather than
waste time writing it?”

Mr G. S. Venkataghar (Prime Minister, Jodhpur, 1946-47,

Bikaner, 1948-49)

I find people are woolly-headed as to what happened

barely 20 to 25 years back. This amnesia of the Indian
mind to political and historical happenings is amazing. When
I tell some incidents of the India of the Sardar or Nehiu in 1946-
47, the listener gapes at me and wonders if such things happened!
The Indian mind creates a gap and then fills it with myth and
mythology of its own. Antidote to this is to pump in lecoided
printed material.
Which of the civil servants round about the Sardar composed
his letters is a matter of no importance. It is the working of his
political mind that is of historic value. He had an uncanny
instinct as to the limits within which the politician acted in
making a decision and the area in which the civil servant had
to carry it out. In the latter he allowed latitude to the officials
in the abnormal period following independence and partition.

I have some views as to how to handle your prospective

material in order that the Bismarkian stature of the Sardar may
be truly, faithfully and accurately brought out.

The Sardar fascinated me as a born politician. The material

which you may release may form grist to the mill of the politics
of 1947-50. The letters speak for themselves. Scholars can make
use of them for contemporary evidence.

H. M. Patel (Defence Secretary, 1948-50)

Sardar Patel was a great administrator and a great leader of

men. The two, in fact, go together. He had confidence in him¬
self and was therefore able to inspire and instil confidence in
those around him. Because of his self-confidence, he found no
difficulty in delegating responsibility. And characteristically, once
he delegated responsibility to anyone, he reposed full confidence
in him until he proved himself unworthy of it.

He expected those whom he entrusted with responsibility

to exercise the discretionary powers vested in them to the full
and he left them in no doubt that he would back them to the
 [lvi]

!riLrr,Ting ,rCSP°n:ibiHty himself if anythi|1g went wrong and

g tig full credit to them when things went well. The result, as
was only to be expected, was that he received efficient and
oyal semce. Ol course, he was able to do all this because he
ad the other complementary ability to select the right men for
the task in hand.

1 he Sardar sought always to select the best man for the task
to be discharged. When he appointed Sir G. P. Ramaswamy
Aiyar chairman of one of the more important commissions, many
asked him why his choice had fallen on one who had only a little
while before sought to establish Travancore as an independent
sovereign State. His reply took the form of a question: “Do
you agice that C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar is eminently suited for
this work?’’ The answer could only be in the affirmative. The
Sardar then asked: “Was there any reason why the country
should deprive itself of the services of one of its most able and
distinguished sons? Do you think I am not competent enough
to disregard any of his recommendations which I find not to
be in the best interest of the country?’’ It will be seen that
confidence in himself enabled him to take the right decision in
the interest of the country.

The Sardar also had yet another quality essential in a good

administrator. This was a sense of fairness. The fact that he
had the power to impose his decisions did not ever tempt him
to ignore fair play. While he readily agreed to give an assur¬
ance on behalf of the Congress to the British Government regard¬
ing the service conditions of the Indian members of the Civil
Service, because it appeared to him to be the fair thing to do, he
refused to agree to Indians being given the same option as the
British members of resigning. While it was understandable that
the British members wished to withdraw upon Independence,
lie could see no reason whatever for an Indian to do so, parti¬
cularly when he was given an assurance regarding his terms and
conditions of service.

Few today recollect that when the Sardar passed away civil
servants of all services assembled in the Central Hall of Parliament
under the chairmanship of Girja Shankar Bajpai not only to pay
him tribute but to pledge their devoted services to the country as
a token of gratitude for the trust and confidence he had reposed
in them. How did he win this unique affection and confidence?
One illustration may perhaps explain.
 [Ivii]
When partition was decided on, and the task of partitioning
of assets and liabilities of the country and its administrative and
other organisations was taken in hand, the Sardar invited some
40 or 50 Indian officers who had been appointed to the various
committees set up by the Partition Council of the Cabinet work-
ing through a Steering Committee of two, Mohammad Ali
on behalf of Pakistan and myself on behalf of India.
The Sardar spoke somewhat in the following terms: “I have
invited you all today to say just this. You are being entrusted
work of the greatest importance to our country. It has to be
completed in a very short period of time. I have no doubt
you will apply yourself to the task with zeal and accomplish it
with thoroughness and fairness. Let me tell you that I have
always been happiest when I have been engaged in working for
the country. I am inviting you to join me today and partici¬
pate in the same happiness.”

He won the hearts of all by those very simple words. He

was treating them as loyal Indians as anxious to work for the
country as any Congressman. It is therefore not a wonder
that not one of the decisions taken by the Partition Council
has ever been questioned by either side as unfair.

H. V. R. Iengar (Secretary, Home Affairs, 1948-50)

The Sardar expected work to be brought in and the files

on which his orders were required explained to him. He did not
regard it as necessary to go through the correspondence. He
wanted to know what the issue on which the Secretary wanted
a decision was and the pros and cons of the issue. Thereupon,
he would either immediately give an answer, or if the issue
required some further consideration by somebody else he would
postpone a decision. That was only on complicated matters.
Then he would consult the other people concerned and would
send for you and give you his decision.

I would say that his principal method of work was that he

appointed an officer in whom he had confidence and gave him
his trust. He had, of course, his own sources of finding out
whether the official really deserved his confidence. But when he
gave him his complete confidence he relied on him and never
let him down.

I usually called on the Sardar at his house on Aurangzeb

Road at three in the afternoon/ after he had had his post-lunch
 [lviii]

K'st. One day I was with him in his bedroom and discussing
official business when Maniben entered the room in a hurry
and announced in Gujarati that the Maharaja of Patiala, Raj
I ramukh ol the Patiala and East Punjab States Union, had
arrived. As he had not made an appointment, I assumed that
the visit concerned some important matter and, rising, told the
Sardar that I would wait outside while he talked with the
Maharaja.

The Sardar shook his head and replied: “It is to you I have
given an appointment, not him. Sit down.” He then asked his
daughter to invite the Maharaja to enter. As soon as he came
in, he greeted him and, pointing to a chair some distance from
him, said: “Maharaja Sahib, please sit down there.” He next
turned to me and said: “Go on, Iengar.” I completed my
work in about ten minutes and rose. The Sardar asked: “Have
you finished.” I replied: “Yes, sir.” The Sardar said: “All right,”
and pointing to a chair near the bed he was lying on, added:
“Come here, Maharaja Sahib.”

Shankar Prasada (Secretary, Kashmir AfTairs, 1958-65)

I came into contact with Sardar Patel first as District Officer,

Meerut (UP) during the 1946 Congress session held there at a
time of great communal tension and trouble. Later, as Chief
Commissioner, successively of Ajmer-Merwara and of Delhi, I
had the privilege of almost continuous contact with him till his
death.

I found that the Sardar, though stern in appearance, soon

put all at ease through unfailing courtesy, simplicity and good
humour. He was a good listener, digesting a brief easily and
disposing of business quickly. It took me time to discover that
silence with him implied assent and speech dissent. In other
words, he was remarkable for achieving the maximum results
with the minimum effort.

Perhaps the most outstanding trait in Sardar Patel which

came into evidence soon after assuming office was his capacity
to command the allegiance and unstinted loyalty of the Civil
Servants who came into contact with him. This he ensured by
respecting their allotted sphere of authority, extending to them
discriminating support and in general allowing them their head to
reach the goals he had set. Confidence begets confidence and no
wonder that the Sardar got out of men more than most.
 [lix]

It seems to me that no correspondence, however diverse and

voluminous, can do full justice to the personality of one who
relied so much on the spoken in preference to the written woid.
Nevertheless, whenever the Sardar chose to communicate by letter,
the instructions were clear and precise and based on a disco\ei-
able principle of public policy.
It is given to few to intervene as and when required and yet
be able to do it so well as to carry conviction on the other side as
well. This is only possible when the Civil Service machine as
a whole and its important components are treated as partners
in business, maybe junior partners, but all the same equally
entitled to consideration and respect. That Sardar Patel, new to
official machinery, recognised instinctively these principles as basic
to good administration so early on assuming office shows that
some men are born to lead and others to follow.

V. Shankar (Private Secretary to Sardar Patel, 1947-50)

As Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of the Con¬

gress, the Sardar had demonstrated how party discipline had to
be enforced when he dealt with the Khare episode in the Central
Provinces and the Nariman episode in Bombay. He maintain¬
ed that iron discipline throughout the first and second spells
of Congress Ministries during the British regime. Even after
Independence he strove to continue the same tradition. In the
process he disciplined himself. Neither Dr Pattabhi Sitaramayya,
who was elected Congress President in 1948 against his wishes,
nor Mr Bhim Sen Sachar who temporarily ousted Dr Gopichand
Bhargava about the same period could claim lack of co-operation
from the Sardar. Dr Prafulla Ghosh who was for some time
Chief Minister, West Bengal, also received full co-operation from
him as long as he was Chief Minister. There was no centrally-
sponsored attempt to topple any of these persons. When they
fell, they fell on their own account. When the Socialists
carried their dissent too far in the Congress and when in U.P.
Mr (R.A.) Kidwai’s group followed the same example, the
Sardar did not hesitate to bring about their exit.
* * *

It was acting on these principles and policies that in the years

1947-50, the problems that confronted the country in the criti¬
cal years after Independence were made to look comparatively
easy of solution. The reason was that hard realism, conviction,
determination and patriotism ran through thought, conduct
 [lx]

“nd beha™ur ljetwcen which there was an enviable harmony.

U was a liberal education to see that great man with a massive
mind and practical commonsense reduce complications to simpli-
cities, idealism to realism, vagueness to definiteness, vacillation
to determination and fickle-mindedness to resolution.
(Extracts from the article written by Mr V. Shankar for
the publication brought out on the occasion of Sardar Patel
Jay anti Samaroh celebrated by Delhi Citizens’ Council on 31
October 1970.)
 INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I

This volume—the first in the series—has brought together

correspondence and annexures dealing with the State of Jammu
and Kashmir.
A whole volume has had to be devoted to the subject for a
number of reasons.
First, there was no other way of ensuring the unity of the
subject.
Secondly, though no longer a burning issue, Jammu and
Kashmir, as the by-product of the partition of the sub-continent
into India and Pakistan consequent on the withdrawal of British
power, still ruffles Indo-Pakistan relations.
Thirdly, it continues to provide a convenient handle to the
Super Powers (if and when they wish) to meddle in the affairs of
the sub-continent and upset the balance of power in the region.
Fourthly, it has an intimate bearing on domestic politics be¬
cause of the emotions it arouses in India in the context of the
secular ideals enshrined in the Indian Constitution.
The correspondence between Sardar Patel, Mr Nehru and
Lord Mountbatten and that between the Sardar, the late Maha¬
raja of Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah constitutes vital source
material of contemporary Indian history. It brings into focus, for
the first time, the roles of the principal actors in this drama of
statesmanly adherence to high principles of public policy great
deeds of valour on the battlefield, sordid intrigue and treachery
that has characterised relations between India and Pakistan. It
also throws light on attempts, open or veiled, by the Super
Powers to make the dispute serve the ends first of the cold war and
later of the power blocs.

The voluminous correspondence on Kashmir shows that one

form of dictatorship namely that of the Ruler, was replaced by
another headed by Abdullah. Both depended on India for main¬
taining then-authority. However, the power which corrupted
the Prince also corrupted Abdullah. Both were subject tt/the
power of veto by India but this was seldom exercised against
Abdullah to whom Nehru had transferred authority without reser¬
vation. Gopalasvvami Ayyangar shuttled between Delhi and
Srinagar. When Abdullah decided to celebrate “liberation” from
 [lxii]

princely rule, the Sardar asked Nehru to advise Abdullah to for¬

give and forget; the British, he said, had gone and India had shown
no rancour and Abdullah should do the same. Nehru agreed to
send a telegram to Abdullah advising him against any ostentatious
display, but the latter had his way.
I he fact is that Nehru was often carried away by idealism.
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a Cabinet colleague and once Prime
Minister of Kashmir, saw everything but was helpless. The
Sardar had no illusions. The significance of the correspondence
lies in proving through subsequent events how right Patel was in
his assessment of Abdullah and of the events then taking shape.
Another point which emerges is that Mehrchand Mahajan
as Prime Minister of Kashmir proved an irritant to Nehru and
Abdullah who did not fully trust him. The Sardar, even
though heading the Ministry of States, was not in charge of
Kashmir Affairs. In the circumstances, he was handicapped in
attempting the solution of a problem for which he was not directly
responsible.
The correspondence is replete with forthright declarations
of policy by Nehru and Patel, who were playing a complementary
role in handling the Kashmir imbroglio. Nehru wrote in a letter
to Patel that “the prize we are fighting for is the Valley of Kash¬
mir,” and referring to diplomatic pressure for the appointment
of Admiral Nimitz as arbitrator he wrote: “All this barrage is, I
suppose, meant to sweep us away.” He wrote to Sardar from
London and Paris ruling out “help and co-operation from Britain”
on the Kashmir issue.
General Cariappa reported to Nehru the unhealthy effect
on the Army’s morale of the tussle between the Maharaja and
Abdullah. Nehru looked to Patel to resolve it. The correspon¬
dence shows how the Maharaja was persuaded by Gandhi and the
Viceroy to let Nehru visit Kashmir and how Abdullah in a letter
to Maharaja on 26 September 1946 stated: “I beg to assure ^our
Highness once again of my steadfast loyalty and pray that God
may grant me opportunity enough to let this country attain under
Your Highness’ aegis such an era of peace, prosperity and good
government that it may be second to none and be an ideal for others
to copy.” It also discloses how the Sardar steadily won the impli¬
cit trust and confidence” of Maharaja Hari Singh and made him
agree to release Abdullah, grant a general amnesty, install a popu¬
lar Ministry and virtually abdicate by appointing Yuvraj Karan
Singh Regent.
 [ lxiii ]
An interview given by the Sheikh to a Scottish daily made
the Sardar write that “a vehement exponent of accession to India
seems to have been converted to ‘independent Kashmir’.” He
wrote to Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who was Nehru’s special aide
in handling Kashmir affairs: “Whenever Sheikh wishes to back
out he always confronts us with his duty to the people. Of course,
he has no duty to India or to the Indian Government, or even on
a personal basis to you and the Prime Minister who have gone
all out to accommodate him.”
In another letter to Nehru the Sardar stated: “About Pakis¬
tan’s attitude regarding Kashmir as also about their attitude on
other inter-Dominion questions, I have always held one view.
They have outwitted us and if we will not be on our guard they
will steal a march on us.”
It is of some interest to mention that partition of Jammu and
Kashmir as a settlement of the problem was proposed by Nehru
in London and Paris as far back as 1948, and he mentioned this in
a letter to the Sardar written from Paris in October 1948.
The late Maharaja of Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah, who had
little in common, shared and worked in their own way for a simi¬
lar objective, namely, an independent Kashmir. If they acceded
to India it was because Pakistan, by invading the State, left them
with no other choice. Kashmiris have in the end retained their
identity within the Indian Union by adopting a constitution of
their own through a Constituent Assembly of their choice.
The revelations made in the correspondence challenge some
of the assumptions made by the spokesmen of India and Pakistan
about the sequence of events. They also throw a new light on
certain aspects of the Kashmir issue which have embittered Indo-
Pakistan relations. It is to be hoped that the publication of these
papers will promote a new spirit of inquiry and bring into proper
perspective contemporary events in Kashmir, thereby paving the
way for a better understanding of men and events, dominating
the scene at a crucial moment in the history of the sub-continent.
The letters and annexures are preceded by a Prologue and a
note on t le political background to the correspondence and are
o owed by an Epilogue describing subsequent developments,
ending with the agreement at Tashkent on 10 January 1966.
2 Tolstoy Lane
New Delhi-1
9 November, 1971
Durga Das
 CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN
JAMMU & KASHMIR
1938-1966
1938 Working Committee of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference decides to revise structure and programme of
organisation (28 June).
1939 Organisation renamed All India Jammu and Kashmir
National Conference and non-Muslims included in Working
Committee (11 June).
National Conference passes resolution demanding transfer of
power in State to popularly-elected government (October).
1941 National Conference joins All-India States Peoples’ Con¬
ference.
1946 Quit Kashmir movement launched (March).
Sheikh Abdullah and other National Conference leaders
arrested (20 May).
Jawaharlal Nehru arrested at State border on defying order
banning his entry (20 June).
Abdullah tried on charge of sedition and sentenced to three
years’ rigorous imprisonment (July).
1947 Maharaja Hari Singh agrees to negotiate standstill
agreements with India and Pakistan (12 August).
Maharaja signs agreement authorising Pakistan to operate
Kashmir’s posts and telegraphs and obligating it to supply
foodstuffs and other necessaries (15 August).
Abdullah released (September).
Tribesmen from North-West Frontier Province and Pakistan
nationals march into Kashmir (21 October).
Maharaja requests Government of India for immediate
help against tribal raiders and offers to accede to India
(26 October).
Accession offer accepted (27 October).
Indian troops rushed to Kashmir (27 October).
1948 India calls upon United Nations Security Council to stop
Pakistan from aiding raiders in Kashmir (1 January).
Security Council passes resolution requesting India and
Pakistan to desist from aggravating situation in Kashmir
(17 January).
 [lxv]
Security Council appoints three-member commission to settle
the Kashmir issue (20 January).
Maharaja announces popular interim government in State
(5 March).
Security Council asks India and Pakistan to withdraw troops
from Kashmir (21 April).
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan arrives
in India (10 July).
UNCIP presents proposals for a cease-fire to Indian and
Pakistani Governments (13 August).
1949 India orders cease-fire in Kashmir (1 January).
India and Pakistan accept UNCIP resolution on holding a
plebiscite in Kashmir (5 January).
UNCIP presents final, modified truce proposals (6 June).
Dr Alfred Lozano resigns from UNCIP for “personal and
political reasons” (24 June).
Military representatives of India and Pakistan agree in
Karachi on cease-fire line (27 July).
1950 Security Council adopts resolution winding up UNCIP
and appointing a UN representative in Kashmir (24
February).
Sir Owen Dixon, a Judge of the Australian High Court
arrives in India to take up duties as UN Representative
(27 May).
Dixon presents report to Security Council saying there was no
immediate prospect of India and Pakistan settling their
differences on Kashmir (27 October).
1951 Security Council again takes up Kashmir Issue (28
rebruary). v
Dr Frank Graham appointed UN Mediator (1 May).
The Head of the Jammu & Kashmir State issues proclama¬
tion (1 May).

December)''3111^ reP°rt ‘° the UN °n Kashmi>- Issue (19

1952 Nehru visits Karachi for talks (25 July).

1953 tta,;am l epor‘s fai,ul e °f Geneva talks on Kashmir Issue to

the Security Council (31 March).

August! AbdU"ah dismissed and arrested in Srinagar

August). (9
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad succeeds as Prime
August). Minister (9
S. G.-V
 [ lxvi ]

1955 Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Ali and Minister

for Interior Iskander Mirza visit New Delhi for talks (13
May).
Mohammad Ali says in Karachi that his talks with Nehru
on Kashmir issue had neither succeeded nor failed (18 May).
1956 J&K Constituent Assembly unanimously passes clause defin¬
ing the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part
of the Indian Union (30 October).
1957 Pakistan rejects Jarring’s proposal to refer Kashmir question
to International Court of Justice (17 November).

1960 Nehru and Ayub and the Vice-President of the World

Bank jointly sign the Indus Waters Treaty in Karachi
(September).

1962 The Chinese open fire on Indian troops near Dhola in NEFA
(20 September).
Heavy fighting begins on NEFA front (12 October).
The Chinese launch a massive attack in NEFA and Ladakh
areas (20 October).
India loses Tawang to China in NEFA (25 October).
Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir and other related matters
at the ministerial level begin at Rawalpindi (27 Decem¬
ber).
Pakistan and China sign a boundary agreement (28 Decem¬
ber).

1964 UN Security Council resumes debate on Kashmir (20

March).
Sheikh Abdullah released (8 April).
Sheikh Abdullah meets Ayub in Rawalpindi (24 May).
Nehru passes away (27 May).
Lai Bahadur Shastri sworn in as Prime Minister of India

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad arrested in Srinagar (22 Sep¬

tember).
Shastri and Ayub meet in Karachi (12 October).
heikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg interned in Ooty under
1965
efence of India Rules (May). .
akistan invades Indian territory in Chhamb sector.
idia retaliates (1 September). . , .
-curity Council adopts cease-fire resolution (20 September),
idia and Pakistan agree to a general cease-fire with effect
 [ lxvii ]
from 3.30 a.m. Indian Standard Time in response to the
UN Security Council’s call (22 September).
1966 The Tashkent Conference (4-10 January).
Tashkent Declaration signed (10 January).
Lai Bahadur Shastri passes away in Tashkent (11 January).
 ABBREVIATIONS

ADC Aide-de-Camp
CA Constituent Assembly (of India or J & K)
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
CID Crime Investigation Department
DPM Deputy Prime Minister
GOC General Officer Commanding
HG High Court
HH His Highness or Her Highness
ICS Indian Civil Service
IGP Inspector-General of Police
INA Indian National Airways
I PC Indian Penal Code
MCA Member, Constituent Assembly
MT Motor Transport
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NWFP North-West Frontier Province
Panditji Title of address for Jawaharlal Nehru who was a
Kashmiri Pandit
PIO Principal Information Officer
PM Prime Minister
RAF Royal Air Force
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
Sardar The leader; a term of respect used for Vallabhbhai
Patel
SFs State Forces
UNCIP United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India
and Pakistan
UNO United Nations Organisation
VCO Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer
 GLOSSARY OF INDIAN TERMS

Abiana Water cess on irrigation facilities.

Ary a Samaj A sect of reformist Hindus who are against

idol worship.
Azad (Kashmir) Free; refers to Pak-occupied Kashmir.
Baisakhi New Year Day in Punjab to celebrate
harvest.
Basant Panchmi The fifth day of the month of Phalgun
which announces the advent of spring. Also
called Saraswati Puja, the day on which
the Goddess of Learning is worshipped.
Dak Bungalow Government resthouse.
Darshan Audience with a person held in reverence.
Darbar-i-am Part of a royal palace where the king held
public audience.
Dharmarth Act Religious Endowment Act.
Durbar A court, an audience or levee; executive of
an Indian State.
Durga Puja Celebration usually observed in the month of
October in honour of Kali (Goddess of Shakti).
Dussehra The day Rama killed Ravana in the Hindu
epic of Ramayana.
Gaddi Throne, seat of rank or royalty.
Goondas Hooligans.
Hazur Term of respectful address, equivalent of
Excellency.
Hundies Promissory notes issued by local money¬
lenders.
Jagir A village or district originally assigned to a
person for internal government and enjoy¬
ment of its revenue. These distinctions are
however out of date and the existing jagirs
are hereditary and free of liability for service.
 [lxx]
Janam Ashtami Birthday of Krishna.
Jehad Holy war waged by Muslims for a religious
cause.
Jhelum Valley Refers to the fertile part of the Kashmir
Valley traversed by the River Jhelum.
Kanyakumari Hindu name of Cape Comorin—the con¬
fluence of three seas, Arabian, Bay of Bengal
and Indian Ocean.
Kashmiri Pandit Brahmins of Kashmir, known for their learn¬
ing and orthodoxy.
Khuda Hafiz May God be with you; a form of farewell.
Maharaja Great king, Prince; a Hindu title.
Maharani Sahiba Wife of a ruler; queen.
Mohallas Lanes.
Muslim Conference Counterpart of Muslim League in Kashmir.
Nanak Shahee The era of Guru Nanak, founder of Sikhism.
Pashmina Cloth made of soft wool.
Pathans Warrior tribes of the Frontier (NWFP) region.
Praja Subjects of a king or ruling chief.
Praja Parishad People’s Association; a political party in
Jammu and Kashmir.
Puja Days Days on which special worship is held.
Raja A king or prince.
Rajput Warrior caste among Hindus; also called
Kshatriyas.
Ram Navami Birthday of Rama.
Saraswat Brahmins A sub-caste of Brahmins found mostly in
Punjab, Kashmir, Maharashtra and Mysore.

Tamasha Entertainment, show; in sarcastic sense, an

exhibition.
Upanayana Ceremony The sacred thread ceremony of Hindu
boys, usually at the age of eight.

Tuvraj Heir-apparent.
 PROLOGUE

From Kashmir to Kanyakumari. This is how Bharat, that is

India, is mentioned in religious incantations. The populai image
of Bharat Mata (Mother India) shows its head represented by
Kashmir’s snow-capped mountains and her feet washed by the
waves of the Indian Ocean at the southern tip of the peninsula.
The Vedic religion is said to have flowered best in Kashmir, and
the Brahmin elite from this region spread the Vedic message to
various parts of the peninsula.

In a foreword written on 8 October 1962, to “A History of

Kashmir” by Prithvi Nath Kaul Bamzai, Jawaharlal Nehru
observed that Kashmir “experienced successively and sometimes
together Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim influences, creating a mixed
but harmonious culture which is so evident even today in Kashmir.”
After pointing out that this blending of culture was more evident
in Kashmir than in the rest of India, Nehru wrote: “Kashmir
has been very much in the news in the last few years and many
people talk of it as if it was just a piece of territory over which
there is a conflict and lengthy arguments take place in the Security
Council of the United Nations. But behind all these arguments
lie the people of Kashmir, an attractive people in many ways who
want to live their own lives and, now that they have tasted free¬
dom, to progress according to their own ways and maintain the
blended culture which has been their hallmark, whether they are
Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs.”

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, covering an area of 86,024

square miles, has the lowest density of population in India. But it
has a strategic importance in that its territory (the Valley, Jammu,
Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar) shares borders with
Pakistan, Afghanistan and China, apart from being close to the
Soviet border, and is the old trade route to Central Asia.

Kashmir is the only region of India which has a connected his¬

tory dating back to the earliest times. Kalhana, its first historian,
composed “Rajatarangini” (River of Kings) in Sanskrit verse in
the 12th century A.D. On account of the paucity of historical
material relating to the Hindu period of India as a whole this
book has long attracted the attention of historians, European and
Indian. Other writers took up the narrative where Kalhana left
 [ Ixxii ]

and < ompleted it up to the conquest of the Kashmir Valley by

the Moghul Emperor Akbar in 1586.
Kashmir was a part of the empire of Ashoka in the 3rd
century B.C. and it was he who introduced Buddhism into the
State. After the commencement of the Christian era, the Valley
was invaded by Tartars. In the 6th century A.D. came the White
Huns. The Chinese traveller and writer Hieun Tsang visited
Kashmir in 629-631 A.D. Lalitaditya is the most famous of the later
Hindu kings. He is said to have subdued many Indian kings in a
campaign of conquest. He then turned his attention to Central
Asia, from where he returned victorious through Tibet after 12
years. He was a patron of the arts and executed many public
works and built temples.
Mahmud of Ghazni attempted to invade Kashmir but failed.
Dynastic revolutions followed, and with the propagation of Islam
the Valley passed into the hands of Muslim rulers. The most
notable of them was Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin (1420-70), who is said
to have introduced papermaking, sericulture and shawl manufac¬
ture in Kashmir. He has been described as generous and brave
and earned the goodwill of the Hindus, who had been persecuted
by his predecessor Sultan Sikandar, known as Butshikan (icono¬
clast). Zain-ul-Abidin encouraged letters, fine arts and polytechnics.
The Moghul Emperors Jehangir and Shah Jehan were very
fond of Kashmir, using it as a retreat from the hot summer of
the northern plains. They built stately mansions, planted chinars
and laid out pleasure gardens round Dal Lake and elsewhere.
Ahmed Shah Abdali invaded and occupied Kashmir in 1750.
Afghan rule that came in his wake was harsh, and in 1819 some
of its persecuted people called upon Maharaja Ranjit Singh of
Punjab to rescue them. The Maharaja sent Raja Gulab Singh,
Dogra Rajput and founder of the last ruling dynasty of Kashmir,
to the Valley at the head of an army. The Afghan Governor was
defeated, and from 1819 to 1846 Kashmir was under the Sikhs. An
uprising took place in the Valley in 1842 and again Raja Gulab
Singh was sent to deal with it. He put down the insurrection
and left after appointing a governor, only to return a few years
later as Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir under the Treaty of
Amritsar (reproduced in Appendix I).
On assuming sovereignty, Gulab Singh found that large areas
of agricultural land belonging to the State had been alienated by
the last two Governors. An inquiry was instituted and some of the
land gifts were revoked. I he Maharaja lightened the burden on the
 [lxxiii]

peasantry of begar, a system of free labour which had existed fi om

ancient times. He also introduced rice rationing in the Valley.
Maharaja Gulab Singh, a strong ruler most of whose energies
were spent in consolidating the frontiers of the State, subdued
the turbulent border tribes in the north and brought all the
territories of the State under his direct rule.
In 1831, trouble arose on the Tibetan frontier over the
refusal of the zamindars of Ladakh to allow free movement to
certain trade missions from Tibet. The dispute was, however,
settled by an agreement between the representatives ol the
Maharaja and the Dalai Lama.
K. M. Panikkar writes in his book: “Gulab Singh—Founder
of Kashmir” (Martin Hopkins, 1930): “In a century barren of
historical achievement in India, Gulab Singh stands out as a
solitary figure of political eminence. He is the only ruler in
India’s long history who could be said to have extended the
geographical boundaries of India. No previous Indian ruler, not
even Samudra Gupta or Akbar, has ever dreamt of invading Tibet
and although Zorawar, who ventured too far, paid the penalty for
his adventure, the Maharaja’s forces routed the Tibetan army and
extended the border of India to the other side of the Himalayas.”
Gulab Singh died in 1857. Eleven years of Dogra rule wit¬
nessed the gradual establishment of order in the State. But in
the reign of his successor Maharaja Ranbir Singh the northern
frontier tribes again became troublesome and several expeditions
had to be sent against them. Thus came about the subjugation
of Gilgit and adjacent territories.
Ranbir Singh was succeeded in 1885 by his eldest son, Pratap
Singh. After the new Maharaja’s accession, a British Resident
was appointed in place of an officer on special duty. The Resi¬
dent and his assistants were empowered to try civil suits in which
both parties were British subjects or the defendant was a Briton
or an Indian subject of Britain. A council was constituted for
the administration of the State with Raja Sir Amar Singh, the
Maharaja’s younger brother, and two officers of the Government
of India as members. Amar Singh played a major part in the
administration till his death in 1907.
In 1924 a deputation presented a memorial to the Viceroy,
Lord Reading, on his visit to Srinagar. The memorial demanded
that land ownership rights be given to peasants, that more Muslims
be employed in the State services, that they be given better faci¬
lities for education, that begar be abolished and all mosques in
 [lxxiv]

tin possession of the Government handed over to the Muslims.

A new era in the history of the State began with the accession of
Maharaja Hari Singh in September 1925.

In his book, Kashmir in Crucible” (Pamposh Publications)

Premnath Bazaz observes that in the late twenties, Kashmiri
Pandits stole a march over the Muslims; they launched a
movement which is known as ‘Kashmir for Kashmiris’. Under
the leadership of Shankarlal Koul the Kashmiris started a
publicity campaign demanding recruitment of educated sons of
the soil in government services, ban on the sale of land to
outsiders, freedom of the Press, freedom of association and assembly,
and creation of an elected legislature to voice the views of the
people on all affairs of State. It was as a result of this campaign
that the Maharaja was induced to enact the State Subject Law
imposing restrictions on the entry of non-Kashmiris in Government
services and on sale of agricultural land to them. But this measure
of reform failed to adequately meet with the people’s demand.

Things were now moving very fast on the Indian subcontinent.

In December 1929 the Indian National Congress adopted on the
banks of the Ravi at Lahore a resolution setting complete indepen¬
dence as its goal. A mass civil disobedience movement followed
which electrified the subcontinent from Gilgit to Gape Comorin.
Kashmir too felt its repercussions. Its people were deeply excited
with what was taking place in the rest of the country.

In 1930 a new organisation called the Reading Room Party

was formed in Srinagar by a few Muslim graduates to discuss the
problems of the community. Among them was Sheikh Mohammed
Abdullah. The party organised meetings, at which speeches were
made emphasising the hardships of the people of the State. The
State Government responded by offering them Government jobs.
Abdullah was appointed a teacher in a Government school but
left his post after a few months. He then founded the Muslim
Conference, of which he became president.
Thus began the struggle for democratisation of the adminis¬
tration of Jammu and Kashmir. It had its origin in the wide¬
spread discontent among the Muslim masses who, like the
Hindus of Hyderabad State, were inadequately represented in the
State services and in its economic and industrial life in general,
though they constituted 78 per cent of the total population of
Jammu and Kashmir and were about 94 per cent of the
population in the Kashmir Valley.
 [ Ixxv]

Sheikh Abdullah’s fight for democratic rights for Musi ™

made him a popular figure. As the popularity oftheMu im
Conference grew, it led to tension between Hindus and Muslims
and to communal riots in Srinagar in June 1931. Hindus sufifere
heavily. The State Government arrested 300 people, including
Abdullah. But the Muslim Conference continued its agitation and
in July 1931 there was a massive demonstration against the State
Government and the Maharaja. Muslim demonstrators had
gathered outside the jail in Srinagar where another Muslim was
on trial. The crowd forced its entry into the jail, causing the
police to open fire. As a result, 21 people were killed.
Communal disturbances caused the Maharaja to appoint a
commission, with B. J. (later Sir Bertram) Glancy of the Political
Department of the Government of India as chairman and with
four non-official representatives of the Hindus and Muslims of
Jammu and Kashmir Provinces as members, to inquire into the
religious and secular grievances of the people.
After the inquiry, a reforms conference with Glancy as president
was held to give effect to the Maharaja’s desire to associate his
people with the administration of the State. The result was the
establishment in 1934 of the Jammu and Kashmir Praja Sabha.
The right to vote was given to about 6 per cent of the population,
including women.
The Sabha consisted of 75 members, over 60 of whom were
non-officials, 33 being elected. This constitution remained in
force until 1939.
Convinced that the party which challenged autocracy and
worked for the establishment of responsible government should
be non-communal so that all progressive forces in the State could
rally round it, Sheikh Abdullah moved the following resolution
in the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference in June
1938:

“Whereas in the opinion of the Working Committee the

time has now come when all progressive forces in the country
should be rallied under one banner to fight for the achieve¬
ment of responsible government, the Working Committee
recommends to the General Council that in the forthcoming
session of the Conference the name and constitution of the
organisation be so altered and amended that all such people
who desire to participate in this political struggle may easily
become members of the Conference irrespective of their caste,
creed or religion.”
 [lxxvi]

Certain members of the Muslim Conference, notably Bakshi

Ghulam Mohammad and Mirza Afzal Beg, opposed this resolution.
Ghulam Abbas (who later became leader of the Muslim Con¬
ti i cnee in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) supported it. But the
Sheikhs advocacy carried the day and the resolution changing
the organisation’s name to National Conference was adopted.
One effect of the agitation of the National Conference was
that further constitutional advance was announced by proclamation.
Its main features were:

(a) the number of elected members in a House of 75

was raised to 40;
(b) the Sabha was given the right to elect a Deputy
President from its non-official members;
(c) provision was made for appointing non-official
members as Under Secretaries to work with the Maharaja’s
Ministers;
(d) The Praja Sabha was given the right to vote on
most of the demands made by Government for budget appro¬
priations;
(e) The Sabha was given the right to legislate on taxes.
In July 1943, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed under
the presidentship of Rai Bahadur Ganga Nath, Chief Justice and
President of the Praja Sabha, and consisting principally of non¬
official members of the Praja Sabha and others representing different
interests and communities to ascertain whether the Constitution of
the State was working well and to formulate a policy for future
constitutional change and administrative reform.
Throughout the rest of India the Congress and the Muslim
League were emerging as the two principal political parties. The
question most Kashmir leaders posed to themselves was whether
the National Conference should align itself with the Congress or
the Muslim League. One section of opinion thought that it
should remain neutral, but as Abdullah and his associates drew
closer to the All-India States Peoples’ Conference and came in
contact with Indian leaders, particularly Mahatma Gandhi,
Jawaharlal Nehru and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, they were
greatly influenced by them. Thus the National Conference began
to work in close liaison with not only the States Peoples Con¬
ference but also the Indian National Congress.
In 1940 Nehru, accompanied by Khan Abdul GhafTai Khan,
visited Kashmir. The tour evoked a tremendous demonstration of
 [ lxxvii ]

popular support and increased the prestige of the National Con¬

ference. The visit proved a turning-point in the political career
of Abdullah as well as of the freedom movement in the State.
In August 1942, when the Congress launched the Quit India
movement, the Working Committee of the National Conference
adopted an official resolution supporting it. To enforce this
decision, the 23rd of August was celebrated throughout Kashmir
as National Day.
Mohammed Ali Jinnali visited the Kashmir Valley in June
1944. Contrary to his declaration that his visit was for reasons
of health and not to influence the politics of the State, he tried
to wean the National Conference leaders from the Congress but
failed.
Nehru, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad were present by special invitation at the Sopore session of
the National Conference in August 1945 when Abdullah spelt
out his programme for building a new Kashmir. He declared
that “the future and independence of Jammu and Kashmir State
are inextricably linked with the future and independence of India.”
The last phase of opposition to the State Government was the
agitation started by the National Conference in May 1946. The
slogan put forth by the Conference was Quit Kashmir. Mr. Jinnah,
reacting to this slogan, issued a statement in which he described
the movement as “an agitation carried on by a few malcontents
who were out to create disorderly conditions in the State.”
Abdullah, leader of this movement, and his lieutenants were
arrested a few days after the agitation started. To demonstrate
his support, Nehru decided to visit Kashmir in June. The State
Government banned his entry. Defying the ban, Nehru tried to
enter the State, but was arrested at Kohala Bridge. It was after
Maulana Azad’s assurance that the Congress Working Committee
would take up the matter that Nehru returned from Kohala.
On 17 June 1947 the Indian Independence Act was passed
by the British Parliament providing for transfer of power to two
newly created Dominions—India and Pakistan. A part of India
having a preponderating Muslim majority was constituted into
Pakistan which assumed power of a Dominion on 14 August 1947.
The major part of the country achieved independence on the
midnight of 14/15 August.
The future of the Princely States was defined in a memo¬
randum (dated 12 May 1946) on States Treaties and Paramountcy
piescnted by the Cabinet Mission to the Chancellor of the Chamber
 [ lxxviii]

of Princes in India. Since paramountcy lapsed on 15 August

the Princes were free to accede to one or the other Dominion or
become independent. All but three States acceded to either
Dominion by that date.
1 o apprise the Maharaja of Kashmir of the risk he was
taking by his indecision, Lord Mountbatten visited Kashmir on
19 June 1947 and stayed there for four days. He found the
Maharaja elusive, and returned to New Delhi without having had
an opportunity for a discussion.
Mahatma Gandhi who had been watching political develop¬
ments in the State, paid a short visit to Srinagar in early
August. He met the Maharaja and impressed on him the desira¬
bility of acceding to the demand of the people for a constitutional
government, but without any concrete results.
It was in these circumstances that the Maharaja sought from
both the Dominions a standstill agreement to come into force on
15 August 1947. An agreement was arrived at with Pakistan
with regard to the State’s communications, supplies and post
office and telegraphic arrangements.
The Government of India, however, telegraphed to the Maha¬
raja to come to Delhi personally or send a minister duly autho¬
rised to negotiate a standstill agreement.
Meanwhile, Sheikh Abdullah and most of his colleagues were
released from jail on 29 September. Immediately the released
National Conference leaders appealed to Pakistan not to precipitate
matters, but give them time to weigh the issue of accession.
Before the Prime Minister of the State could visit Delhi to
discuss the standstill agreement, Kashmir was invaded on 22
October by tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Province
of West Pakistan with the connivance or active support of Pakis¬
tan’s rulers. This crisis made the Maharaja listen to the advice of
Indian leaders to promote cordial relations between the ruler and
his Muslim subjects.
Abdullah flew to New Delhi to appeal to the Indian Cabinet
to despatch armed forces to help Kashmiris repel the invaders.
The Maharaja, alarmed by the early successes of the invaders and
the devastation caused by them, appealed to India on 24 Octo¬
ber for military help.
A meeting of the Defence Committee, held in New Delhi on
25 October under the chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten, consi¬
dered the Maharaja’s request for supply of arms and ammunition.
 [ lxxix ]

The Cabinet felt that it could not send troops to Kashmir unless
the State acceded to India.
V. P. Menon, Secretary of the States Ministry, was sent to
Srinagar (26 October) to explain the position to the Maharaja.
Impressed by the gravity of the situation, Menon felt that unless
India could help immediately, the valley would be lost. As a result
of Menon’s assessment of the situation, the Maharaja left Srinagar
with his wife and son.
The Defence Committee met again and decided to accept the
instrument of accession if executed by the ruler. Menon flew
back to Srinagar, and returned with the instrument of accession
duly executed and a request for troops, arms and ammunition.
When on 26 October 1947 the Maharaja signed the instru¬
ment of accession and the Governor-General of India accepted it,
the defence of Kashmir, now an integral part of the country, be¬
came the responsibility of the Government of India.
The first contingent of Indian troops landed in Srinagar on
October 27. The invaders were already in Baramulla. Thirty-five
miles of tarmac road lay between them and Srinagar.
As subsequent events showed, Indian troops arrived barely
in time. The invasion was halted and Srinagar saved from loot
and destruction.
Frustrated in his designs by the State’s accession to India
and the prompt arrival of Indian troops to repel the invaders,
Jinnah ordered the Commander-in-Chief of his forces, General
Sir Douglas Gracey, to march Pakistan troops into Kashmir.
Realising that this would mean a war between the two Dominions
involving British personnel employed in their defence forces, the
General sought the intervention of Marshal Auchinleck, the
Supreme Commander administering the partition of the Indian
Army. Auchinleck flew to Lahore at the express request of General
Gracey and succeeded in persuading Jinnah to cancel his order.
The National Conference leaders rejected the possibility of
Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan because Pakistan had committed
an act of aggression against the State and also because the principle
on which it was brought into existence and its social and economic
structure ran counter to the ideals and objectives which the popular
leaders of the State had set for themselves.
A striking illustration of the policy to set one religion against
another is provided by a letter Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of
West Punjab, wrote to Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan.
Mudie wrote: “I am telling everyone that I don’t care how the
 [lxxx ]

Sikhs get across the border; the great thing is to get rid of them
as soon as possible. There is still little sign of 3 lakhs (300,000)
Sikhs in Lyallpur moving, but in the end they too will have to go.”
Meanwhile Sardar Patel had been in regular correspondence
with Maharaja Hari Singh on the political and constitutional
problems of the State. Ihe decision on accession to India on which
Sardar’s letters throw a flood of light, was endorsed at a special
convention of the National Conference held in October 1948.
Its resolution ran: “This convention has given its serious thought
to the question of accession and has examined it in all its aspects
and detail. After mature consideration of the issue it is definitely
of the opinion that Kashmir, with its unflinching faith in New
Kashmir and with the very advanced outlook of the people on
the fundamental issues, cannot find its proper place in Pakistan,
which today has become the main citadel of reaction and
decaying feudalism. . . . Pakistan with its basis in the two-nation
theory and its persistence in the perpetuation of religious
distinctions does not and cannot accommodate a programme and
an outlook which is the very negation of its basis and conceptions
of social justice.”
Jammu and Kashmir thus became an integral part of India
in October 1947, and in their capacity as Indian nationals, the
representatives of the State took part in the deliberations of the
Constituent Assembly of India. The Constitution framed by the
Assembly conferred a special status on the State and gave it the
right to frame its own constitution. The setting up of an
Assembly for this purpose was envisaged in the Maharaja’s
Proclamation of 5 March 1948 whereby power was transferred
to the representatives of the people. Moreover, the protracted
proceedings in the Security Council showed that no democratic
solution would be found by this world body for the issues
arising from Pakistan’s aggression in Kashmir. Consequently,
the National Conference felt the time had arrived for the State
Government to take steps to end the political uncertainty in the
State Accordingly, the General Council of the National Con¬
ference issued in October 1950 a mandate to the party to convoke
a Constituent Assembly to decide on all vital issues concerning
the future of the State.
The resolution said: “The indecision and unrealistic procedure
adopted so far has condemned the people of the State to a life
of agonising uncertainty. The All Jammu and Kashm.r National
Conference is gravely concerned and cannot any longer af or
 [ Ixxxi ]

to ignore the perpetuation of these conditions of doubt and frus¬

tration. In the opinion of the General Council, therefore, the
time has come when the initiative must be recognised [resumed]
by the people to put an end to this indeterminate state of drift
and indecision.”
The resolution added: “The General Council recommends to
the Supreme National Executive of the people to take immediate
steps for convening a Constituent Assembly based upon adult
suffrage and embracing all sections of the people and all the
constituents of the State for the purpose of determining the future
shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In
this sovereign Assembly, embodying the supreme will of the people
of the State, we shall give ourselves and our children a consti¬
tution worthy of the traditions of our freedom struggle and in
accordance with the principles of New Kashmir.”

Early in 1953, there was a change in the attitude of Abdullah

towards the position of the State in the Indian Union. This
created a rift in his Cabinet and on 8 August, Abdullah was
removed from the Prime Ministership by the Sadr-i-Riyasat. The
next day, he was arrested at Gulmarg. Thus far Abdullah,
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G. M. Sadiq, President of the
Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, had constituted the
political leadership of the National Conference. After Abdullah’s
incarceration Bakshi, the Deputy Prime Minister, became Prime
Minister, and held that position for a decade. Mr. G. M. Sadiq
has been Prime Minister since February 1964.

The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir addressed

itself to four tasks. First, to devise a constitution for the future
governance of the State. Secondly, to decide the future of the
ruling dynasty. Thirdly, to carry out land reforms and the
basis of compensation to landlords divested of their estates.
Finally, to declare its reasoned conclusions on the accession of
the State to the Indian Union.

The Constituent Assembly ratified unanimously, on 6

February 1954, the State’s accession to India in October 1947.
This decision ended the feeling of uncertainty in the State. The
recommendations of the Assembly were incorporated in the Indian
ift°utltUtl0n through a Presidential Order issued on 14 May
954, thereby enabling the State to secure the assistance of the*
Government of India in economic development and other spheres
ot its choice. r
S. C.-VI
 BACKGROUND TO OPENING CHAPTER

following is a chronicle of events relating to Kashmir in May

and June 1946, culminating in Jawaharlal Nehru’s entry into
Kashmir, in spite of a prohibitory order, and his arrest. This
narrative is made up of extracts from the Hindustan Times, New
Delhi, and the Hindu, Madras, of that period. It opens with
the full text of a statement by Nehru in New Delhi on 26 May.
The statement reads:
Both as President of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference
and as a Kashmiri, I have been greatly troubled by the develop¬
ments in Kashmir. I have said little about them so far because
I wanted some facts. My first impulse was to go to Kashmir,
but I refrained from doing so till I had more information. I
knew that the kind of messages that we have been getting through
Press agencies are completely one-sided and unreliable. These
Press agencies only send out messages approved by the State
authorities. I have now had a vivid account of the happenings
in Kashmir from Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Dwarkanath
Kachru, who have recently arrived here. They will be issuing
statements themselves and so I need not repeat what they are
going to say.
Hostility to Popular Movement
Many questions have been put to me about the new orien¬
tation given to the popular agitation in Kashmir with the demand
for Quit Kashmir based on the Amritsar Treaty. It has been
and is the policy of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference to
demand full responsible government in all the States under the
aegis of the ruler, who is to act as a constitutional head of the
State. That has also been the policy of the Kashmir National
Conference, of which Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah is the President
and leader. During the last few months, however, the State
authorities have been pursuing a policy of direct hostility to the
popular movement in Kashmir and trying to disrupt it by various
undesirable methods, including encouragement of the communal
issue. The position of the popular minister Mirza Afzal Beg became
impossible and he had to resign. Subsequently, in defiance
of their own rules, they appointed another person who was till
then also a member of the Kashmir National Conference, as
minister. This was the result of an intrigue about which no one
 [ Ixxxiii]

knows. There was considerable resentment at these tactics of the

State authorities and feeling against them grew. Evidently they
were bent upon creating trouble and many weeks ago they started
bringing in the State army to the Valley and distributing it at
various strategic points.
Some weeks ago a committee of the National Conference
sent a memorandum to the British Cabinet Delegation raising the
question of the Amritsar Treaty and demanding that this treaty
be abrogated and Kashmir be ruled by the people ol the State.
This new policy reflected the growing tension in the State and
the rising temper of the people against the State administration.
There were many charges also of corruption and nepotism in the
State administration. The new policy had not been endorsed by
the National Conference or its executive. Normally it would
have been considered by their executive on the 26th of this
month. But meanwhile events marched ahead. Sheikh Mohammed
Abdullah spoke publicly about this policy. Personally, I think
that it was unfortunate that a marked variation in the policy
both of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference as well as of the
Kashmir National Conference should have been made without
full consideration of the respective bodies. But I recognise the
feeling which gave rise to the policy in Kashmir and the total
ineptitude of the State authorities which gave rise to that feeling.
States Peoples’ Conference Policy

I should like to make it clear that the policy of the All-India

States Peoples’ Conference remains what it was, that of responsi¬
ble government under the aegis of the rulers. Indeed, no one
can change it except the Conference itself, but events in Kashmir,
as also happenings elsewhere in the states, are repeatedly bringing
this issue before the people of the states and it is possible that unless
quick changes towards responsible government take place in the
states the rulers may no longer be welcome even as constitutional
heads.
There is a great deal of talk of dynastic rights and privileges,
but no dynasty or individual can claim to override the funda¬
mental rights of the people. If the rulers remain, they can only
do so by the goodwill and desire of their own people and not
by compulsion of external or any other authority. Sovereignty
will have to reside in the people and what follows will thus
necessarily be according to the wishes of the people. I am not
interested in the legal implications of the Amritsar Treaty or any
other treaty. I am interested primarily in the good of the people
 [ lxxxiv ]

and their right to decide for themselves what their government

should be.
While, therefore, I think it regrettable that the issue of the
ruler continuing or not was raised in Kashmir at this stage without
reference to the organisations concerned, I would make it clear
that it is open to any individual or group to raise that issue if it
chooses to do so on its own responsibility. If this is done in a
peaceful way, no state has a right to suppress it.
Deliberate Attempt to Humiliate It

What happened in Kashmir clearly demonstrates the desire

of the State authorities to avail themselves of any pretext to crush
the popular movement. I had requested Sheikh Mohammed
Abdullah to come to Delhi for consultation. At a public meeting
in Srinagar, he announced this fact and said that he was going
to Delhi within a few days. He further directed that no public
meeting or agitation should take place during his absence from
Kashmir. It was clear that he wished to discuss the whole situa¬
tion with me before taking any other step. Three days later he
was on his way from Srinagar to Rawalpindi when he was arrested,
and about the same time a large number of his colleagues, both
Muslim and Hindu, were arrested at various places in Kashmir.
The whole of the Valley was handed over to military administra¬
tion. The police, being Kashmiris, were withdrawn. A reign of
terrorism and frightfulness then began. Kashmir has practically been
cut off from the outside world since then and martial law prevails.
There have been conflicts with crowds and firing on numerous
occasions. My information is that far more people than officially
admitted have been killed. A much larger number who were
wounded were sent to jails instead of hospitals.
Srinagar is almost a city of the dead where movement is
difficult and a large number of people are practically interned in
their own houses apart from the many hundred who have been
put in prison. Clashes occur daily and even women have been
shot down. But what is far worse is the deliberate attempt, re¬
miniscent of the Martial Law days in the Punjab in 1919, to
humiliate human beings. I understand that people are made to
crawl in some of the streets, that sometimes they are made to
take off their turbans to clear the streets and pavements, that they
are made to shout, at the point of the bayonet, “Maharaj-ki-Jai.”
Dead bodies are not handed to the relatives for burial according
to religious rites, but are soaked in petrol and burnt. The
mosques, including their inner shrines, have been occupied by the
 [lxxxv]

military. A wall of the Jama Masjid of Srinagar has been knock¬

ed down to allow passage way for military loines. / < g
feature of the situation is the deliberate attempt to foment com-
munal trouble.
All this and very much more is happening in Kashmir today.
It passes one’s comprehension how any Indian officia s s iou e
have in this barbarous and inhuman way to their fe ow coun ry
men, but, humanity apart, surely there could be no more e ective
method to make the position of the ruler intolerable to his people.
The military forces under their British officers may for the moment
succeed in shooting and killing and overawing the people of Kashmir.
How long will they do that and what will be the results. Are
they going to make the people loyal to the Maharaja at the point
of the bayonet? That is not the way human beings function
and that certainly is not the way Kashmir is going to function.
What part the Maharaja has in this sorry business I do not
know, but undoubtedly he will have to suffer for the policy of
his administration. In any event, the Ministers of the Maharaja
must shoulder this responsibility and they will have to answer for
this before not only the people of Kashmir but public opinion
in India. What again is the part of the Resident and the
Political Department in this business? They too will have to
make it clear where they stand in this matter.
Whatever the rights and wrongs of any policy there are
certain limits beyond which no Government dare go except at its
peril. The Kashmir Government has gone beyond these limits in
its desire to crush a popular movement which is firmly established
in the hearts of the Kashmiris. Everyone who knows Kashmir
knows also the position of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah there.
He is the Sher-e-Kashmir, beloved by the people in the remotest
valleys of Kashmir. Numerous legends and popular songs
have grown around his personality. He has been and is one of
my most valued colleagues in the States peoples’ movement, whose
advice has been sought in all important matters. Does anybody
think that we are going to desert him or his comrades in Kashmir
because the State authorities have got a few guns at their disposal ?
We shall stand by the people of Kashmir and their leaders in this
heavy trial that they are going through. If they have erred in
any matter, we shall tell them so frankly, but for the moment
their blood is being shed in that lovely and fertile valley and all
talk of legal notices is quibbling. The fate of nations, when pas¬
sions are aroused, is not decided by the lawyer’s arguments.
 [ lxxxvi ]
A Bad Sign

Kashmir by itself is important, but this issue obviously

affects all the States in India and it is for all of them to consider
its significance, more specially at this time when we are supposed
to be hammering out the future of India. It is a bad sign at
this particular moment for the blood of a people to be shed
and for State authorities to display their military might in repre¬
ssing their own people. The talks that we are having about
India s future become pale and shadowy before this grim reality.
Things have gone far in Kashmir, perhaps too far already.
Yet they might grow worse. It is up to everyone concerned with
Kashmir or with the states generally to try his utmost to cry
halt to this sorrow. The Kashmir State authorities should also
give thought to the inevitable consequences of their actions. I
have postponed my visit to Kashmir for the present because I was
not quite sure that I could render effective help at this stage.
I want to help as far as I can in ending this terrible bitter conflict
and the moment I feel that I can be of such help I shall go.
Meanwhile, I would appeal to all concerned, and specially the
newspapers, to avoid giving a communal turn to what is happen¬
ing in Kashmir. I have noticed with deep regret some highly
intemperate articles in the Lahore Press. It has been the policy
of the State authorities to encourage communal troubles. We must
not fall into this trap. To the State authorities, I would say
that their actions are bringing grave discredit to their name and
no government can live with that disgrace attached to it.
They would still remember Amritsar and Jallianwala Bagh.
Are we to have yet another gruesome memory to pursue us in the
days to come? Let there be an end of all this and a calm con¬
sideration of the issues at stake. They will require all the wisdom
and forbearance that we may possess. (The Hindu, Madras,
27 May)
SRINAGAR, 1 June — The State authorities are considering
what action to take if Pandit Nehru decides to visit Kashmir.
It is also learnt that Pandit Nehru has asked the State autho¬
rities for facilities for the defence of Sheikh Abdullah and others.
The Premier of Kashmir, Mr Kak, refused to answer a question
whether the State administration would concede Pandit Nehru’s
demand for facilities to meet Sheikh Abdullah and other
National Conference leaders in detention. He also refused to
say whether the State would try to stop Pandit Nehru if he comes.
As to Pandit Nehru’s demand for an enquiry commission, Mr Kak
 [ lxxxvii ]

said only the ruler could demand or order such an enquiry.

The State authorities feel that Pandit Nehru by giving currency to
what they consider exaggerated accounts of the happenings in
Kashmir has strengthened the loyalty of the Maharaja s faithfu
subjects. (The Hindustan Times)
1 June — Mr. Nehru in his closing speech at the All-India
States Peoples’ Conference, which concluded tonight, said that
the situation in Kashmir should improve and that it was only
possible if the State authorities withdrew their repressive policy.
Mr. Nehru felt that there were some tactical mistakes in the
Kashmir movement which gave a chance to the authorities to
blame the people. In his opinion, movements in states should
not be started unless people were sufficiently strong. At the same
time he said people should not tolerate for a single moment
any attack on their liberty. “If we want to get rid of our
rulers we have to oppose them with full force. We should prepare
fully in order to launch a movement.” (The Hindu)
3 June — In accordance with Pandit Nehru’s instructions,
Kashmir Day was observed in Srinagar yesterday. (The Hindustan
Times)
Calcutta, 4 June — Mr. Ashutosh Lahiri, General Secretary
of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, in the course of a Press state¬
ment says:
Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, President, All India Hindu
Mahasabha, who has been suddenly taken ill, has received a
large number of telegrams from Kashmir, expressing strong resent¬
ment against the statement of Pandit Nehru and characterising
it as a distortion of facts, calculated to encourage the rebellious
elements who are determined to overthrow the authoritv of the
j

State and set up a Pakistan regime at a time when the Cabinet

Mission’s proposals have paved the way for the establishment of
Pakistan in the north-western zone of India.
Mr. Abdullah’s organised attempts, they alleged, are deliber¬
ately calculated to drag Kashmir State ultimately into the north¬
western Pakistan zone and they all express alarm at Pandit
Nehru’s open support to Mr. Abdullah. It is not possible for
us, however, to express a definite opinion at this stage.
The All India Hindu Mahasabha has deputed a representa¬
tive to Kashmir with a view to studying the situation there. The
All India Working Committee and the All India Committee of the
Hindu Mahasabha are meeting at New Delhi on the 14th, 15th
and 16th next, when prominent Hindu leaders of Kashmir have
 [lxxxviii]

bt t u invited to attend. We shall be in a position to make our atti¬

tude clear after hearing the representatives of Kashmir at Delhi.
In the meantime, I would ask the Hindus of Kashmir to help us
in coming to a correct decision by placing all available facts at
our disposal. (Associated Press of India report published in the
Hindu of 6 June.)

new Delhi, 8 June—A deputation from Kashmir met Pandit

Nehru, President, All-India States Peoples’ Conference, on 7
June for two hours. The purpose of the deputation was to induce
Pandit Nehru to issue a statement correcting certain allegations
made against the Kak Government’s handling of the situation
following the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. The deputation was
anxious to secure such correction in order to prevent a deterio¬
ration in the communal situation.
According to reports, the State Government’s move is designed
to explore possible chances of a truce between the Government
and the National Conference. (The Hindustan Times)
nainital, 7 June—Pandit Nehru will visit Kashmir after the
meeting of the Congress Working Committee, it is reliably learnt.
(Hindustan Times)
new Delhi, 8 June—Addressing the General Council of the
All-India States Peoples’ Conference this afternoon, Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel advised states’ subjects not to get involved in
isolated direct actions in states at the present moment but to be
patient and carry on the agitation peacefully for responsible
government. The time had arrived, Sardar Patel added, when it
was necessary for the Indian people to deal with the states’ pro¬
blem on the basis of a collective approach to the Princes as a
whole and not to fritter away their energies in isolated battles.
Over 120 members of the Council representing states all over
India attended the meeting.

Sardar Patel said that his experience for many years had
been that the British always prevented Congress intercession in
Indian states to bring about any kind of settlement between the
ruler and the ruled. The British had always sided with the rulers
in the suppression of the people’s rights. The Congress realised
that the states’ problem could not be solved unless British impe¬
rialism was eliminated from India, and today there were many rulers
who wished every success for the Congress in its struggle for the
achievement of complete freedom. In the success of the Congress
they saw freedom for themselves. There were other rulers who,
 [ lxxxix ]

while trying to be free themselves, kept their people enslaved, but

they were also changing.
The problem in the Indian states, Sardar Patel continued,
was difficult in that the people there had to fight two forces, one,
their own autocratic rulers, and the other the British authority
that backed those rulers. It was thus clear that there could e
no deliverance for subjects in the states unless the paramountcy
which protected the rulers was removed. “We do not want to start
any movement in the states,” Sardar Patel said. He added. We
are not to make settlement with individual states, but with the
entire princely order at one time. There are so many of them
and they cannot be tackled individually.”
Sovereignty, Sardar Patel said, should vest in the people and
not with individual rulers. He believed the Princes were realis¬
ing the change that was sweeping forward and would adapt them¬
selves to the new order that was coming. In spite of much repres¬
sion in many states, he was not aware of any instance in which
the subjects rose in revolt to do away with the rulers. In a free
India, Sardar Patel was sure, Princes would be guided by a real
spirit of patriotism and love of their subjects. But that change
could come only if India was free and the British quit. (The Hindu)

new Delhi, 8 June—Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing the

General Council of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference this
afternoon, said:

... I have referred to Kashmir. Many alarming reports

have come to us about recent events there. Some of them have
been contradicted. I have been trying to find out the truth of
what happened and if I find that I have been responsible for any
wrong statement, I shall certainly correct it. In such matters, there
is both exaggeration on the one side and an attempt to hide and
distort what is happening, on the other. It is difficult to find the
golden mean. Obviously, it is necessary even in the interest of the
State administration to have an impartial inquiry into these
events. But an inquiry is not enough when from day to day, com¬
plaint takes place. Our colleague and comrade, the Vice-Presi¬
dent of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference, Sheikh Moham¬
med Abdullah, is in prison with a large number of his co-workers,
and it is stated that there are going to be trials. Obviously, there
will be no peace in Kashmir if trials and convictions of popular
leaders continue. The British Government has repeatedly played
that game and failed. The Kashmir Government is hardly likely
 [xc]

to succeed. To Sheikh Abdullah and the people of Kasl imir, we

send our greetings. . . . (The Hindu)
NEW DELHI, 11 June—In a resolution on Kashmir, the stand¬
ing committee of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference today
declares that in Kashmir as in other states in India “there can be
no solution of the problems that face the people without the
achievement of freedom and full responsible government” and
that, m order to consider the changes that should be brought about
forthwith for this purpose it is necessary that the present conflict
in Kashmir should be ended and normal conditions restored.”
The resolution trusts that the State authorities will put an end
to their “policy of repression” and appeals to the people of Kash¬
mir also to help in creating a peaceful atmosphere for the consi¬
deration of the grave problems that face them.
Between the people of Kashmir and the people of other states,
there is the solidarity of common interest and common objective
and it will be their privilege to share common perils. It is the
duty of the States Peoples Conference to help in every way
possible the peoples’ movement in Kashmir. The President is
authorised to take such steps as he may consider necessary to deal
with the situation created in Kashmir.”
After commenting on the situation in the State, the resolution
proceeds: “In accordance with the policy of the All-India States
Peoples’ Conference, as well as of the Kashmir National
Conference, the objective aimed at in the State is full responsible
government under the aegis of the ruler. So long as this is not
altered formally and constitutionally, it remains. A demand for
the abrogation of the old treaties does not involve a departure from
this policy. The States Peoples’ Conference has for many years
past demanded the abrogation of these virtually unilateral treaties
which in fact have no force now. Responsible government means
that sovereignty rests with the people and it is for the people to
decide later as to what forms of government they should have.
“The General Council thinks that in the present circumstances,
no occasion has arisen for any deviation from this policy. They
are of the opinion, therefore, that states peoples’ organisations
should continue to adhere to that objective and leave the future of
the states to be decided by the people through the responsible
government that must necessarily come into being.
“The General Council have noted with deep regret the attempt
being made in various quarters to raise communal issues in Kashmir
at this critical moment. Any such attempt is obviously injurious
 [xci]

to the cause of the people as a whole and more especially to

the cause of the minorities. The States Peoples Conferencea"^
its affiliated bodies stand for the achievement of freedom by all t
people of the states and the establishment of fundamental rig
for everyone, regardless of creed or religion. Any person who bungs
in communalism in a popular movement and a popu ar stiugg
does injury to the peoples’ cause. (The Hindu)
new Delhi, 11 June—Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in a statement,
urges the Kashmir Government to release Sheikh Abdullah and his
colleagues and thus remove the root cause of the troubles. He says:
The Kashmir authorities denied almost totally many of the
statements and events that I had made previously. I have now
considered carefully a large number of reports coming in the Pi ess
as well as from individuals and eye-witnesses in Kashmir. I have
also met deputations, some officially inspired and representing
the official viewpoint, others representing another viewpoint. En¬
tirely contradictory reports were made to me as to the facts that
had happened. Obviously, a searching inquiry is necessary in
order to reach the truth. For my part, I believe that, during the
first days following the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the military
behaved in a very bad manner and many of the allegations
made against them are true or have a strong basis of fact. Later,
much of this was stopped by the Government. It is clear that one
cannot hold the Government directly responsible for every act of
the soldiery. What the Government is directly responsible for is
the use of military on this scale. When this is done, other conse¬
quences normally follow. Two incidents I mentioned. I should
like to correct. I have no present information which can substan¬
tiate them and I regret that I gave publicity to these two inci¬
dents without sufficient proof. These two allegations are the burn¬
ing of bodies of persons killed and the breaking down of a com¬
pound wall of the Jama Masjid. Very probably the deaths due to
firing were much greater than those admitted in the official com¬
munique. How all these bodies were disposed of I cannot say with¬
out much greater proof than I possess. As regards the allegation
about the wall of the Jama Masjid it appears that there is a wood¬
en gate and a military lorry passing through accidentally dislodg¬
ed some bricks of a column. This may have given rise to the story.
Anyway, I am sorry that I stated something which was not cor¬
rect.(The Hindu)
srinagar, June—Mr Nehru had sent a telegram to the
17
Maharaja of Kashmir asking for permission to visit Kashmir to
 [xcii]

secure the release of Sheikh Abdullah. It is reliably learnt that the

Maharaja has replied that no useful purpose will be served by
Mr Nehru’s visit to Kashmir at this stage. (The Hindu)
nlw Delhi, 18 June Pandit Nehru, it is learnt, will leave for
Kashmir by air tomorrow. He hopes to complete his visit in two
days. He will be present in the court on Thursday when the
Abdullah sedition case will be resumed. (API)
Lahore, 19 June—“The purpose of my visit to Kashmir is
threefold,” said Mr Nehru when he passed through Lahore this
morning by air on his way to Srinagar.
Replying to questions by reporters, Mr Nehru said: “I am
going to Kashmir firstly to arrange for the defence of Abdullah;
secondly, to see things for myself, although my visit to Srinagar
will be a brief one; and thirdly, to do all I can to put an end to
the complications arising from the policy of the State Government.”
Mr Nehru said there can be no peace unless Abdullah was
released. (The Hindu)
kohala, 19 June—An order prohibiting his entry into
Kashmir territory was served on Mr Nehru today at 2.45 p.m.
when he crossed Kohala Bridge. The order was a personal one
and did not apply to the rest of the party which included Asaf
Ali, Dewan Chamanlal, Baldev Sahai and Mohammad Yunus.
Mr. Nehru refused to obey the order. He and Chamanlal
received slight bayonet injuries when they tried to push back the
sentries armed with bayonets who tried to bar their way into State
territory after Nehru had declared that he would defy the State’s
ban on his entry.
Mr Nehru and the other leaders are at present at village
Domel, about 50 miles inside the State territory.
While the District Magistrate of Srinagar was in communica¬
tion with the State authorities by wireless on the situation that had
arisen owing to Mr Nehru’s defiance of the ban, Nehru and party
walked forward on Srinagar road about three and a half miles
followed by a small crowd from British India. Nehru and party
were again stopped near about the 4th milestone by the State police
and military. Later, Nehru’s car came up from Kohala and he
and his companions boarded the car and drove as far as Domel
without further incident. (The Hindu)
srinagar, 20 June—Mr Nehru was arrested at 9.^0 this morn¬
ing at Domel following his defiance of the ban on his entry into
Kashmir. Nehru is lodged in the dak bungalow and the State mili¬
tary is guarding the place.
 [xciii]

“It is not the intention of the Kashmir Government to detain

Mr Nehru. He is at liberty to return to British India whenever he
wishes to do so,” says the Kashmir Government in a Press note
explaining the circumstances leading to Mr Nehiu s airest.
It is believed here that Mr Nehru will be externed from
Domel within the next 24 hours.
The DM, [District Magistrate] Rai Bahadur Maharaj Kishan
Dar, is a close relation of Mr Nehru.
Mr R. Powell, I.G. of Police, left Srinagar early this morning
with warrants of Mr Nehru’s arrest. It is stated in official quar¬
ters that at the time of his arrest Mr Nehru was given the choice
of returning to British India as a free man or being arrested if he
persisted in proceeding to Srinagar. He is said to have chosen
the latter course and was placed under ariest. It is learnt the
Kashmir Government has not yet decided whether to intei n him.
A decision is expected to be taken today.
It is learned from high official quarters in Srinagar that the
Viceroy advised Mr Nehru not to go to Kashmir. (The Hindu)

new Delhi, 21 June—Maulana Azad wired to Mr Nehru

asking him to return to Delhi today for the Congress Working
Committee meeting. In a telegram to the Maharaja of Kashmir,
Maulana Azad has requested a postponement of Abdullah’s trial
to facilitate Mr Nehru’s early return to Delhi, where he said impor¬
tant decisions were still pending.

The Maharaja has replied that there is nothing to prevent

Mr Nehru from returning whenever he wishes to do so. There is
no intention of detaining him. The Maharaja, however, expressed
inability to issue orders for a postponement of the case against
Abdullah as the case was already in the hands of an independent
judicial tribunal. The Maharaja assured Maulana Azad that
his Government would not oppose grant by the court of any rea¬
sonable postponement requested by the defence.

In view of this development, it is thought possible that Mr

Nehru will return to Delhi tomorrow.

Latest reports here show that Mr Nehru has been brought

by the Kashmir Government to the dak bungalow at Uri, 60 miles
from Srinagar. (The Hindu)

srinagar, 21 June—Mr Kak, Kashmir Prime Minister, told

a correspondent today that if Mr Nehru decides the Kashmir
Government would provide an aeroplane for him to travel to
 [xciv]

Udh' He made it clear once again that the Kashmir Govern-

ment had no intention of detaining Mr Nehru.
Mr Nehru, it is stated, has declined to indicate what he
proposes to do. (T. he Hindu)

Rawalpindi, 22 June—Mr Nehru arrived at Chaklala air-

j!"!'11™ Plndl ®,4° P'm’ by car fr™ Uri and was received by
KAr othcers and Congress leaders.

In an interview, Mr Nehru said: “I received an urgent sum¬

mons from the Congress President this afternoon at Uri in which I
was told that the CWC desired my presence immediately as vari¬
ous important matters were awaiting decision. I was told I could
ieturn to Kashmir later. In view of the direction of the Congress
President and the Congress Working Committee I decided to return
to Delhi. (The Hindu)

new Delhi, 23 June Mr Nehru in a chat with reporters

this morning said he was not injured either by the police or the
military. On the whole he had no complaint against the police
or the military.
Criticising the State’s order, Mr Nehru said: “I do not consider
myself an outsider in any state. The whole of India is my home
and I claim the right to go to any part. I am not sorry for what
has happened if it makes the rulers and others think hard of the
new condition of India and her people. (The Hindu)
new Delhi, 25 June—Mr Nehru told Pressmen he may go to
Kashmir by the end of this month or beginning of next month.
(The Hindu)
SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE
 CHAPTER I

NEHRU’S VISIT TO KASHMIR

1
TELEGRAM

Jammu
4 June 1946
Sardar Patel
Bombay
JAMMU KASHMIR RAJYA HINDU SABHA RESENTS PANDIT NEHRU’S

MISSTATEMENTS ON KASHMIR BASED ON FALSE ONESIDED PROPAGANDA

THREAT OF JATHAS1 WHOLLY UNWARRANTED.

DWARKANATII GENERAL SECRETARY

2
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
4 June 1946
Sardar Patel
Bombay
THE STATEMENTS OF PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU CONCERNING

KASHMIR AFFAIRS BEING ENTIRELY UNVERIFIED AND TENDENTIOUS

ARE UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNED AND RESENTED BY HINDUS OF KASHMIR.

BY ENCOURAGING SHEIKH ABDULLAH’S2 FASCIST AND COMMUNAL

PROGRAMME HE IS DOING GREATEST DISSERVICE TO THE PEOPLE OF

KASHMIR. HIS UNWARRANTED AND WRONG STATEMENTS ABOUT FACTS

AND DEMOLISHING MOSQUE INFLAME MUSLIMS AGAINST HINDUS. SHEIKH

ABDULLAH’S AGITATION SUPPORTED BY PANDIT JAWAHARLAL AGAINST

1 An organised group of demonstrators

2 Leader of J & K National Conference

1
S. C.-l
 ^ SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

OUR BELOVED MAHARAJA1 WILL BE RESISTED TO THE LAST DROP OF

OUR BLOOD. KINDLY INTERVENE.

ALL-STATE KASHMIRI PANDIT CONFERENCE

RAINJWARI DISTRICT
SRINAGAR

New Delhi
10 June 1946
Dear Friend,
I have received your letter of 26 May along with its enclo¬
sures and I thank you for having supplied to me all this infor¬
mation about the Kashmir agitation and its background. You
must have seen my speech2 published in yesterday’s Hindustan
Times, which was delivered at the States Peoples’ Council3 meeting
where I was invited and the portion referring to Kashmir in the
speech has given a different turn to the one that was prevailing
before and I trust that things will be straightened in such a manner
as to give satisfaction to all concerned.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Shri Janki Nath Bazaz
C/o Tribune Office
Lahore

4
New Delhi
16 June 1946
Dear Friend,
I have received your letter of the 8th inst. You have given
much of the past history of Kashmir, which has been very useful
in understanding the background of the present whole unfortu¬
nate episode. I have done my best to set matters right. You must
have seen that Panditji4 has himself frankly withdrawn some ol the

1 Maharaja Hari Singh of J & K

2 See Sardar’s speech under “Developments in Kashmir following prologue.
3 General Council of All-India States Peoples’ Conference
* Jawaharlai Nehru, President, All-India States Peoples’ Conference whose object
was to agitate for constitutional reforms in Indian States with a view to achieving
responsible government under the aegis of their rulers
 NEHRU’S VISIT TO KASHMIR 0

misstatements that were made by him on false information being

supplied to him. The resolution' passed by the All-India States
Peoples’ Conference under his presidentship has also been such
as would remove tension, clear the atmosphere and bring about
an honourable settlement. I realise the difficulties and hardships
of a small community like yours in Kashmir. The question of
minorities in India has become complicated and the Hindu-
Muslim question particularly requires careful as well as tactful
handling. Political agitation should, as far as possible, be kept
apart from communal questions. The two should not be mixed
up. How far Sheikh Abdullah has erred in his present movement
and whether the error, if any, was bonafide or not, requires investi¬
gation. The excesses committed by the military and police under
orders of the State, if any, may also require investigation. Such
post-mortem examination of political upheavals or communal
troubles are not always safe. I understand that Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru is himself coming there as a messenger of peace to bring
about honourable settlement of this vexed question. After all, he
is also a Hindu and that a Kashmiri Hindu, and he is one of our
foremost patriots and one of the greatest leaders of modern India.
He is, as all human beings are, liable to err. But all his actions
are governed by considerations of highest patriotism. Therefore
you need not be afraid of him or his actions. Let us hope this un¬
fortunate trouble in Kashmir will end soon and it will leave no
bitterness behind.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Pandit Jiyalal Kaul Jalali1 2
Srinagar

New Delhi
19 June 1946
Dear Friend,
I have received your letter of the 15th inst. The situation in
Kashmir is difficult and delicate and Pandit Nehru himself has rea¬
lised that some of his early statements were not based on accu¬
rate information, and hence he has not hesitated to rectify the
errors publicly.

1 See * Developments in Kashmir” following prologue.

2 Retired Assistant Accountant General, J & K
* sardar patel’s correspondence

\ ou know, he is a Kashmiri Pandit and he would naturally

teel tor them more than any other leader would do. But by nature
and tiaining, he is a democrat. His sympathies are always with
the underdog. In Kashmir, there is Muslim majority and a large
majority of them are comparatively very poor. The Kashmiri
Pandits and the Hindus form a very small proportion of the popu¬
lation, and as they are comparatively better off, the poorer majority
which is getting conscious, is trying to assert itself and the con¬
flict of interests is creating a situation in which the minority finds
itself in an unenviable position and lives in a state of perpetual
insecurity and fear, resulting in demoralisation. The State being
a Hindu State, situated in Muslim surroundings, finds itself in a
very delicate and difficult position to take strong action against
revolt or lawlessness, as such action at once disturbs the commu¬
nal atmosphere outside, apart from its repercussions inside the
State. The extreme poverty and illiteracy of the masses present an
unpleasant picture to a foreign visitor and the State is generally
represented outside as extremely irresponsible and unprogressive.
Sheikh Abdullah is supposed to be very popular and his asso¬
ciation with Pandit Nehru has been regarded as sufficient gua¬
rantee of his being against any separatist movement. Evidently,
his present stand appears to be capable of double interpretation
and perhaps inconsistent with the policy of the States Peoples’ Con¬
ference and therefore contrary to Pandit Nehru's views on this
matter.
Pandit Nehru has left for Kashmir this morning and it is
hoped that this unfortunate and regrettable movement will end in
an honourable settlement and restore peace and harmony in
Kashmir.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

Shri C. Parmeswaram
C/o Kashmir Metal Mart
Hari Singh High St.
Srinagar
Kashmir
 6
TELEGRAM

Colombo
20 June 1946

Vallabhbhai Patel
Bombay
WE GREATLY RESENT THE ARREST1 OF PANDIT NEHRU IN KASHMIR
AND PROFOUNDLY REGRET YOUR SILENCE OVER THIS MATTER. WE
URGE UPON THE CONGRESS TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO CRUSH THE
ARROGANT AUTOCRATIC SPIRIT OF KASHMIR GOVERNMENT. WE ARE
PREPARED FOR ANY SACRIFICE AND EVENTUALITY AND READY TO
START ON THE ORDER FROM CONGRESS HIGH COMMAND. AWAITING
REPLY.

ALL CEYLON NETAJI VALIBAR SANGAM

CEYLON

7
New Delhi
25 June 1946
Dear Friend,
I have received your telegram of the 20th inst. addressed to
Bombay and redirected here. I am surprised to read its contents.
You presume to know more about the Kashmir affair from such
a long distance than we here know on the spot. You must know
that neither the Congress President2 nor any Congress leader has
expressed his opinion on this matter at all. The question of arrest
of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was also a doubtful affair and we were
arranging for his return back immediately. This has already been
done and your anxiety about this affair is out of place. About
your advice to the Congress to take immediate steps to crush the
arrogant and autocratic spirit of the Kashmir Government, I can
only say that the whole Working Committee is in session all the
while and the Committee has thought fit to express no opinion

1 See “Developments in Kashmir” following prologue.

2 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad

5
 sardar patel’s correspondence

on it nor has Pandit Nehru thought fit to consult the Working

Committee about this afTair. He has taken action individually as
resident of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference on his own
responsibility.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
lhe Secretary
All Ceylon Netaji Valibar Sangam
Colombo

8
TELEGRAM

Shriranbirganj
27 June 1946
Sardar Patel
New Delhi

KASHMIR ATMOSPHERE CALM. KINDLY ADVISE PANDIT JAWAIIARLAL

NEHRU NOT COME NOW . . .

AZIZUMAN, COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES,

JALKDOOSHAIN NARWARA

9
Srinagar
12 July 1946
Dear Sardar Sahib,
With reference to our conversation' on 4 and 5 July I en¬
close for your information copy of a letter which His Highness
[Maharaja of Kashmir] has addressed to Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru. I have sent a copy to Mahatmaji2 also.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak3
1 On the night of 4 July R. C. Kak and K. T. Shah, a professor of Bombay Univer¬
sity, called on Sardar Patel in Bombay and talked with him for an hour and a half.
Next morning they again visited the Sardar, who was running a temperature. The
same night they called on him a third time, and Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi’s private
secretary.
2 Mahatma Gandhi
3 Minister-in-waiting, appointed Prime Minister of the State in 1945; started
career as librarian of a college.
 ENCLOSURE

Srinagar
11 July 1946

Dear Mr. Nehru,

I write to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 22 June. \ our pie
vious letter of 16 June was delivered tome on the morning of 19 June and I
presume that it required no reply as only a few hours later you arrived at

Kohala.
The reason why my Government felt it their duty to prevent you fiom
proceeding to Srinagar was that they were convinced, in view of the controver¬
sial nature of what you had stated in the Press, in public and in your com¬
munications to me, that your coming at that juncture would be certain to
result in danger to the public peace.
As you have expressed your intention of coming to Kashmir again as
soon as you are free, I suggest that, while in this State, you should confine
yourself to work relating to the defence of Mr. Abdullah. For your
information I would add that orders are in force in certain parts of the State,
including Srinagar, banning demonstrations, meetings and gatherings of more
than five persons, for the time being. You will, I am sure, agree that any
order passed by a lawfully constituted authority in the State which is con¬
sidered essential for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity should be
respected.
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

7
 10
TELEGRAM

Bombay
19 July 1946
Rai Bahadur Pandit Ramchandra Kak
Prime Minister
Srinagar

SINCE YOUR DEPARTURE WAS ANXIOUSLY AWAITING YOUR LETTER

WHICH THOUGH POSTED TWELFTH WAS EVENTUALLY RECEIVED TODAY
OWING POSTAL STRIKE. THANKS COMMUNICATING WITH PANDITJI.1

VALLABHBHAI

11
EXTRACT

19 July 1946
My dear Jawaharlal,
I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter received from
[Pandit Ramchandra] Kak, Prime Minister of Kashmir. The
letter was posted on the 12th from Srinagar, but it was received
here only today owing to the postal strike. I was anxiously
awaiting his reply. I do not know whether you have received the
original letter which the Maharaja [Hari Singh] has sent to you
because there is a postal strike over there also. This letter of the
Maharaja is, I believe, the joint work of the Political Adviser,2 the
Viceroy [Lord Wavell], the Maharaja and the Nawab of Bhopal.3
I do not know what is your programme, but as the letter imposes
no condition and makes suggestions only I think if you would like
to go there there should be no difficulty at all. It is better that
you should go there once and see Sheikh [Mohammed] Abdullah
personally. We can deal with the general situation later.

1 Jawaharlal Nehru
a Sir Francis Wylie
3 Chancellor of Chamber of Princes

8
 NEHRU’S VISIT TO KASHMIR

There is a report in the Press that Maulana [Azad] and you

are both going to Srinagar, but I do not know whether the repoi t
is true.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

Anand Bhavan
Allahabad

12
TELEGRAM

Bhopal
20 July 1946

Sardar Patel
Bombay
IN REPLY TO PANDIT NEHRU’S LETTER INTIMATING HIS DECISION TO

VISIT KASHMIR HAVE WIRED REPLY AS FOLLOWS BEGINS. THANKS YOUR

LETTER FOURTEENTH INSTANT WHICH REACHED ME NINETEENTH

EVENING. HAVE JUST SEEN IN PAPERS THAT YOU PROPOSE REACHING

KASHMIR TWENTYFOURTH INSTANT. OWING POSTAL DELAYS AND

THREATENED TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH STRIKE A CONSIDERED REPLY

AFTER GETTING RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM KASHMIR NOT POSSIBLE

AT ONCE. CONSIDERING OUR VERY FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS IN BHOPAL

AND THE PART ALL THE STATES ARE SO WHOLEHEARTEDLY PLAYING

IN THE FINAL STAGES OF OUR COUNTRY’S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM.

ALSO FEARING COMPLICATIONS IMPLICIT IN SITUATION WOULD EARNESTLY

REQUEST YOU AS I HAVE ALREADY DONE MAHATMAJI NOT TO TAKE

ACTION PROPOSED BY YOU AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. MAY I AS A

FRIEND AGAIN REQUEST YOU TO DEFER YOUR DEPARTURE? I AM SURE

BY FURTHER DISCUSSION AND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WE CAN REACH

AMICABLE SOLUTION OF THIS UNFORTUNATE PROBLEM WHICH COULD

BE FAIR AND HONOURABLE TO BOTH PARTIES CONCENRNED ENDS.

NAWAB BHOPAL
 13

18 Hardings Avenue
New Delhi
20 July 1946
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Thank you for your letter of the 19th which [K. M.] Munshi1
gave me. On arrival here this morning I received a letter from the
Viceroy which was in answer to one I had written to him about
my proposed visit to Kashmir. He mentioned that the Maharaja
had written to me. As a matter of fact I have not yet received the
Maharajas letter. It is only from the copy you have sent me
that I have been able to read it.
The Viceroy wrote that il I was anxious to go to Kashmir
I could go there and there would be no ban. He hoped that I
would observe the laws of the State, etc. On receipt of this letter
I finally decided to go to Kashmir on the 24th. I informed the
Viceroy accordingly and have written and telegraphed to the
Maharaja.

After making these arrangements I got a long telegram from

the Nawab of Bhopal this evening pressing me not to go to
Kashmir at present. I have sent him an equally long reply appre¬
ciating his sentiments but pointing out that in view of what the
Viceroy had written to me and the arrangements had been made
it was difficult for me to cancel my trip; further that I was going
there on a peaceful mission and not for trouble. So I propose
to go on the 24th morning. I expect to be there about four days.
Then I shall hurry back to Allahabad, where I have some im¬
portant work.
It is not my intention to raise any major issues in Kashmir
at this stage. I shall also see Sheikh Abdullah and join in consul¬
tation about his defence. I shall also visit parts of the city and
meet some people. I do not propose to hold public meetings and
the like, though it may happen, of course, that crowds gather
occasionally where I go.

1 A leading advocate who became Minister in Congress Government in Bombay

in 1937-39

10
 NEHRU’S VISIT TO KASHMIR 11

I think we should fix a date for the meeting of the Working

Committee. Bapu1 has suggested that a meeting should be held soon
to consider the Kashmir matter. I have sent a telegram to him
asking him what date and place would suit him early in August.
There is no question of Maulana [Azad] going to Kashmir
at present. I know nothing about it.
About Sikhs and the Punjab I am absolutely and thoroughly
fed up. Colonel Gill2 has sent me a telegram asking me to meet
their delegation. As a matter of fact, my committee here meets
all day and I have no time left for any other work. I have told
him so and have suggested that he might send his representatives
to you.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Bombay

14
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
22 July 1946
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Bombay

MANY THANKS FOR TELEGRAM. GLAD POSITION APPRECIATED. HOPE

YOU ARE QUITE FIT NOW. KINDEST REGARDS.

KAK

15

15 August 1946
Dear Dewan Sahib,

settled Tri '° fi"d Uiat T am,irS in Kashmir have not been
denattmen, red-daSa p0Stal strike and al» that of the telegraph
department I did not write to you. Besides, I was waiting for
audit Jawaharlal Nehru’s report about his visit to Kashmir.”
ITcrra used affectionately for Mahatma Gandhi

Subha, B™J“ SowhF^ " a™15", °f ,h<: National Army raised by

politic, in Pu^b! dUnng W°r,d W" »■ After war he entered S.kh
 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

The Working Committee which met at Wardha last week

gave a long time to the consideration of Pandit Nehru’s report
about his visit to Kashmir. As a result of and for the sake of the
honour of the Committee as for that of Panditji, which the Com¬
mittee have made their own, they have appointed me to pursue
the matter where Panditji left it and see what was possible. The
Committee have associated Maulana Sahib with me. Maulana
Sahib left for Calcutta yesterday on urgent business and I re¬
turned to Bombay yesterday evening. I propose to visit Kashmir
as soon as I am free. I shall write to you when I may be able to
disengage myself and also to inform you if Maulana Sahib will
be able to accompany me.
I am going to Delhi on Saturday the 17th inst. and I shall
expect your reply there. You know I am staying there at Birla
House.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Rai Bahadur Pandit Ramchandra Kak
Prime Minister of Kashmir
Srinagar

16
Srinagar
25 August 1946
Dear Sardar Sahib,
I write to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 15 August.
2. It is hardly necessary for me to say that we will be glad to see
you whenever you are able to give us the pleasure of a visit. A
friend and well-wisher is always welcome. His Highness’ Gov¬
ernment will be happy if you will be their guest during your stay
here. Also, my wife1 has asked me to ask you to let her—which
of course includes me!—have the pleasure of having you as our
guest. Being the Prime Minister, I do not know which alter¬
native to press upon you, but whichever is acceptable to you will
be acceptable to us.
3. As regards Pandit Jawaharlal s views on Kashmir, all I can
say is that everything is calm and quiet here and people are going
about their normal business. The vast majority of the people arc

1 Mrs Margaret Kak, an English woman who acted as guardian to Yuvraj

Karan Singh
 NEHRU’S VISIT TO KASHMIR 10

with us in regard to our intention to suppress lawlessness and gang¬

sterism. Calcutta1 furnishes a lurid example of the ghastly poten¬
tialities of lawlessness. The policy of this Government has been
publicly announced by His Highness himself at a Darbar-i-Am
on 15 July in the presence of thousands of people who had come
from all parts of the country and who were insistent that we should
once for all declare our policy in regard to the maintenance of
peace and security. His Highness’ announcement was received
with acclamations and great satisfaction by the large gathering
and in all parts of the State. I enclose copy of this utterance which
speaks for itself.
4. When you are in a position to fix a date for your visit to
Kashmir, will you kindly send me a wire? We must insist on the
pleasure of having you as guest of the State or of my wife and my¬
self. This, I can assure you, will not in any way interfere with
your freedom.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAHARAJA OF KASHMIR

Srinagar
15 July 1946

In the last two months I have received from all quarters numerous
messages of loyalty and offers of personal assistance in connection with recent
events. I have so far been unable to send individual acknowledgements to
the senders. I intend to do so as soon as I am able, but I take this oppor¬
tunity to personally thank you, my people, for all you have done in helping
to preserve peace and tranquillity during this anxious period. Your whole¬
hearted co-operation has rendered it possible for us to deal with the disturbances
which actually occurred and to avert those which were apprehended with the
minimum use of force, in the minimum of time and with the minimum dis¬
location of normal life. I have satisfied myself that you, my people, are with
me and my Government and that I have your loyalty and co-operation. You

1 The great killing which took place on 16 August 1946 as a result of Direct
Action Day observed by Muslim League. According to British Government estimate
5,000 people were killed and 15,000 wounded.
 14
sardar patel’s correspondence

know as well as 1 do that the prosperity of the State depends on such coopera-
tton, and so long as the relations of mutual trust subsist, the welfare of the
State is ensured and its integrity cannot be impaired. It is the duty of all
of us to maintain this integrity—no matter what the cost.

I wish to add a word with regard to our policy with reference to the
recent events which have attracted a good deal of public attention. The funda¬
mental principle of that policy is to promote by all means available the welfare
of the State. Ibis can only be achieved with the co-operation of the people
and I am happy to say that that co-operation has been forthcoming in ample
measure. It is not necessary for me to tell you that any measures, which will
strengthen the link between the Raja and the Praja, provided those measures
preserve the ancient traditions, on which our policy is built, and are designed
to further the real welfare of every element in the State, have my full
support.

The second principle which guides our policy is that so far as our dom¬
estic affairs are concerned we must work out our own destiny without dicta¬
tion from any quarter which is not an intergral part of the State. There are
many organisations in the State representing the different interests and opinions
of the people of the State. These organisations are free to operate within the
law and to express their views in a constitutional manner. Their views are al¬
ready represented in the Praja Sabha,1 which has an elected majority. Freedom
of association is assured, and all such views are given and will continue to be
given their due weight. But the balance must be maintained, and no single
interest can be allowed to dictate even within the State, unless constitutional
government is to become a mockery.

Naturally we are interested in the progress of India as a whole. My

views on the subject are well known and on more than one occasion I
have given expression to them. They are briefly that we look forward to
taking our due place in the new constitutional structure of India, whereby we
hope that India will be able to take its proper place as a great nation, one
of the brotherhood of nations, and to wield great influence in the affairs of the
world, thus adding to human civilisation those aspects of our great culture
which will help to solve the problems of mankind. But our concern for the
progress of India does not imply acceptance by us of dictation in our internal
affairs, particularly when such a course entails interference with the full and
free operation of the law, and thereby endangers the security and orderly
course of life to which every peaceful and law-abiding citizen is entitled.
Kashmir is renowned for its beauty throughout the world, and I least of all
would wish to deny to any person free access to it. But if we are con¬
vinced that such access in any case will lead inevitably to strife, disorder and

1 A legislative body created by the Maharaja consisting of elected and nominates!

members as the first instalment of constitutional reforms
 nehru’s visit to kashmir
15

consequent bloodshed amongst my people, it is our bounden duty to take

all steps necessary to avert those consequences and this duty we will continue
to discharge at all costs. But when we feel satisfied that any visit will not
lead to such consequences, no let or hindrance will be imposed.
I once more thank you for your loyalty and again express my determi¬
nation to work with my people for the welfare and prosperity ol the State.
Instructions have been issued that this message be circulated to each
village in the State so that all my people may know how deeply I appre¬
ciate their loyalty and what the ruling principles of our policy are.

17
TELEGRAM

New Delhi
28 August 1946
Rai Bahadur Kak
Prime Minister
Srinagar
MY LETTER FIFTEENTH AUGUST REMAINS UNACKNOWLEDGED. WONDER¬

ING WHETHER MISLAID. PLEASE WIRE REPLY.

VALLABHBHAI

18

New Delhi
28 August 1946
Dear Friend,
I wrote to you on 15 August a letter from Bombay, the receipt
of which has not been acknowledged as yet and I am wondering
whether you have received it or not. I have therefore sent you a
telegram today as under:
MY LETTER FIFTEENTH AUGUST REMAINS UNACKNOWLEDGED.
WONDERING WHETHER MISLAID. PLEASE WIRE REPLY.”

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the letter in case it has

not reached you.
The case of Sheikh Abdullah is over and perhaps by the time
this reaches you, he may have been convicted and sentenced to
some term of imprisonment. I am sure you will agree with me
that this will not solve the difficulties of the State, as there are a
 1G
sardar patei/s correspondence

large number of other people either in detention or under trial

he Secretaty ot 1 andit Jawaharlal Nehru, President of the All-
ndia tales Peoples Conference, is also in prison. The president
ol the rebel committee formed by him is also under arrest. Is it
no time now to think of some amicable settlement, which would
not alfcct the prestige of the State but at the same time would result
in restormg normal relations between the State and its subjects’
After all, you know that most of the people who fought with the
British Government for all these years have now been placed in
charge of the Government of India. Would it not be in the intc-
rest ol the State to follow the same policy in Kashmir?2
I understand that elections are to take place in the near future
in the State. What useful purpose would be served by holding the
elections for the legislature in the State when a large number of
people who ought to be in the Assembly are debarred from taking
pait in these elections by being imprisoned? I trust you will consi¬
der these suggestions from a sincere friend of the State and advise
the Maharaja to end this trouble now when the authority of the
State has been vindicated already.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Rai Bahadur Ramchandra Kak
Prime Minister of Kashmir
Srinagar

19

New Delhi
4 September 1946
Dear Friend,
I have to thank you for your letter of 25 August. It is not
helpful. I have no desire to go to Kashmir on a pleasure trip.
I would go only if, in your opinion, there is any prospect of a settle¬
ment along the lines suggested by me. I am most anxious to
avoid trouble over this Kashmir question. As you know, the

1 Dwarkanath Kachru, who was a confidant of Nehru and a link between

Nehru and Abdullah
a This has reference to the Viceroy’s announcement of 24 August regarding
personnel of the Interim Government which took office on 2 September 1916.

16
 NEHRU’S VISIT TO KASHMIR 1 '

Working Committee of the Congress has taken over the matter and
it did so when there was every prospect of a flare-up all over
India. I expect to hear from you soon.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

Rai Bahadur Pandit Ramchandra Kak

Srinagar

20
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
4 September 1946
Sardar Patel
New Delhi
THANKS YOUR PERSONAL LETTER OF 28 AUGUST. REPLY FOLLOW’S.
HOPE YOU RECEIVED MY LETTER OF 25 AUGUST AND TELEGRAM OF
28 AUGUST. REGARDS.

KAK

21
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
12 September 1946
Sardar Patel
New Delhi

YOUR LETTER DATED FOURTH SEPTEMBER. HAVE POSTED TODAY.

KAK

S.C.-2
 CHAPTER II

SARDAR’S ASSURANCE TO MAHARAJA

22
Srinagar
12 September 1946
My dear Sardar Sahib,
I have two letters of yours to acknowledge, dated 28 August
and 4 September.
2. I can assure you that I was under no misapprehension that
your visit to Kashmir would be a mere pleasure trip. Obviously
such a thing could not be, in view of your great responsibilities and
of the character and extent of the flare-up in India. I welcomed
your idea of a visit to Kashmir as I conceived that first-hand
knowledge of the conditions here and of the background of
recent events, as of those of the immediately preceding years,
would enable you to arrive at a correct appraisal of the situation.
I feel that the premises upon which the assumptions contained in
your earlier letter are based are incomplete and I would therefore
like to make a few points clear.
3. The following is an analysis of the arrests made since Sheikh
Abdullah’s arrest on 19 May:
The total number of persons arrested was 924. At present
there are 106 persons under detention, 55 are undergoing im¬
prisonment for various offences. In only 6 cases the sentence ex¬
ceeds six months. The number of undertrials is 47. The rest have
all been released.
As our total population is over 40 lakhs, I leave you to judge
whether this movement could properly be called popular.
4. You mention two people who are at present under detention.
As regards Kachru [Dwarkanath Kachru, Secretary, States
Peoples’ Conference], I do not know the exact details, but I shall
find out what the facts are and if they permit, you may depend on
me to take suitable action. As regards the second man, he was
wanted by the police on a charge of common assault against a
Muslim journalist who differed from him politically. He absconded

18
 19
sardar’s assurance to maharaja

and it was, I am told, during his absence from Kashmir that he

was nominated president of the relief committee. Who nominated
him is not clear. On his return to Kashmir, he was arrested and
detained in the interest of law and order.
5. You suggest that steps should be taken to restore normal
relations between the State and its subjects.” It was particularly
in this connection that I should have been glad of your presence
in Srinagar, in order that you might not have to accept at sec°nd-
hand the fact that these relations are satisfactory and that the bulk
of the people are with the Ruler and his Government.
6. I must repeat that the governing principle of our policy is up¬
holding the free operation of the law. His Highness Address to the
people of which I sent you a copy with my letter of 25 August
makes this fully clear. If, however, our affairs still give the Work¬
ing Committee cause for concern even in the Press of India s so
much more urgent needs, I can only say that your visit here
would not be fruitless. But I owe it to you to make it clear that the
policy of this Government is clear-cut as regards this matter and
that we have not sought, nor would we accept, the arbitration of
any third party. There is in fact no case for arbitration outside
the competent courts, where any aggrieved person can seek redress.
We have a High Court presided over by a retired judge of the Cal¬
cutta High Court and from this court also appeals lie to the
Board of Judicial Advisers composed of three retired judges of
British Indian High Courts.
7. The analogy you draw between the British Government and
the Interim Government on the one side and this Government on
the other is misleading. This Government is fundamentally of this
country. Its history is our history, its hills and valleys were traversed
and occupied by our forebears countless centuries ago. The Govern¬
ment is indigenous and broad-based and its members are not drawn
from any single section, class or community. It contains a substantial
popular element. From the Ruler downwards we have the advan¬
tage of generations of local associations and knowledge behind us.
8. Your suggestion that our policy should be changed now “when
the authority of the State has been vindicated already” moves
me to point out that “authority” and “honour” are both abstrac¬
tions and have no reality except in so far as they are based on
right thought and right action. There is nothing to justify
change in our opinion that what was right in May is right now,
and also that our “authority” remains only if no deviation is made
from the right course.
20 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

9. There are one or two other things which I should have liked
to mention but which are difficult to write about. Before, how¬
ever, I conclude, I wish to remind you of the conversations which
took place in your room on 4 and 5 July and particularly that
between Mahatmaji and myself. The upshot of this conversation,
as you will remember, was that Mahatmaji dropped everything
with the exception of the one question of the removal of the ban
on Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru’s entry into the State. At Mahatmaji’s
instance, His Highness’ letter which Mahatmaji saw at the time
was eventually modified. A copy of the new letter was arranged to
be delivered to Mr. Nehru through His Excellency the Viceroy
as, owing to the postal strike, the letter had not reached him. I sent
copies of this letter to Mahatmaji, yourself and Maulana Azad.
You acknowledged receipt in your telegram dated 19 July which
reads as follows:
“since your departure was anxiously awaiting your
LETTER WHICH THOUGH POSTED TWELFTH WAS EVENTUALLY
RECEIVED TODAY OWING POSTAL STRIKE. THANKS COMMUNICATING
PANDITJI.”

From Mahatmaji a reply came in which I was more than

gratified to read his commendation in the following terms:
“ JT5KT3U Sifter sk S'ltTT $1
afa $r
[Maharaja’s reply appears to be correct. His success would
depend on your tact and forbearance.]
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

23
New Delhi
16 September 1946

My dear Vallabhbhai,
I enclose a copy of a letter I have addressed to the Viceroy

today. Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
 ENCLOSURE

New Delhi
16 September 1946

Dear Lord Wavell,

There is one matter which I should like to bring to your attention
as it is going to have widespread repercussions all over India, and more
especially among the States’ people. This is the recent sentence of three years’
imprisonment given to Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah in Kashmir. You know
a good deal of the background of this case and of the events in Kashmir.
You know also that I have been personally involved in this matter and the
Congress Working Committee assumed responsibility in regard to it. The
committee was reluctant to take any steps which might lead to further com¬
plications, but at the same time it felt strongly about it and I believe a com¬
munication was sent on their behalf to the Maharaja of Kashmir. Now that
this trial has resulted in what is, I believe, the maximum sentence and con¬
ditions in Kashmir continue to be as bad as ever, the Congress Working
Committee at their next meeting, which will be held soon, will no doubt
give attention to Kashmir and take such steps as they may consider suitable.
There are several cases still pending in Kashmir. One of these is against
our secretary, Pandit Dwarkanath Kachru, who was arrested simply because he
was with me when I went there on the first occasion. For months now he has
been in imprisonment and his trial does not begin. Indeed, I do not know
what the case is about because all he did was to be with me.

I understand that next month elections to the Kashmir State Assembly

will take place. A large number of members of the Assembly and prospective
candidates are in prison, or in detention, and I am told that every obstruction
is being placed in the way of the Kashmir National Conference1 in order to
prevent them from taking any effective part in these elections.

All these matters, as well as other happenings, are producing a sense of

anger in Kashmir itself and outside. We are trying to avoid as far as possible
any step which might lead to unpleasant happenings in the hope that matters
would adjust themselves and the State authorities might change their policy
in a manner which will not affect their prestige. They have evidently not
done so and things will take their course now. I cannot remain a silent spec¬
tator of these events when my own colleagues are concerned and when I

1 See Prologue.

21
22 sardar patel’s correspondence

believe the State authorities have functioned in a most objectionable manner.

Nor can the Congress remain silent and impassive.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

H. E. Field Marshal Right Honourable

Viscount Wavell, GCE, GMSI, GMIE, CMG, MC,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India
Viceroy’s House
New Delhi

24
New Delhi
28 September 1946

Dear Friend,
Thanks for your letter of the 12th instant. I purposely delay¬
ed sending you my reaction to it as I wanted to know what
Pandit Nehru had to say. The result was the enclosed resolution
of the Working Committee. I tried to arrive at a friendly and
honourable understanding on the Kashmir question. I had no
other interest in coming to Kashmir at present. I felt that I could
render a service to H. H. the Maharaja Sahib and you by placing
my services at your disposal. But your reply betrayed a cold, offi¬
cial touch-me-not attitude. I do hope, however, that the Maha¬
raja Sahib will not fail to reciprocate the very friendly approach
made by the Working Committee. The State can lose nothing by
allowing daylight to shine on the doings of Kashmir.
No State can treat itself as outside the purview of India or
regard Indians outside its boundary as strangers or foreigners.
I may add that the Working Committee left off references to
many things that were put before it in an emphatic manner.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

Pandit Ramchandra Kak

Srinagar
AURANGZEB ROAD, NEW DELHI, WHERE SARDAR PATEL LIVED
WITH MR. NEHRU AND SHEIKH ABDULLAH AT BIRI.A HOUSE, BOMBAY
 ENCLOSURE

CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE’S RESOLUTION ON KASHMIR

25 September 1946

Recent events in Kashmir have been repeatedly considered by the Work¬

ing Committee and the Committee have been greatly affected by them. They
refrained, however, from expressing any opinion as they hoped that the situa¬
tion could be handled satisfactorily by friendly mediation. Their approaches,
however, to the State authorities had an unfriendly response, and the situation
has progressively deteriorated, involving repression of, and suffering for, the
people.

Recently, the popular leader of the people and the President of the
Kashmir National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah, was sentenced to three years’
imprisonment. This has added to the gravity of the situation and distressed
and angered large numbers of people within and outside the State.

When Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru went to Kashmir and was arrested there,
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the then President of the Congress, asked him to
come back in order to continue the valuable work he was doing for the
Congress in connection with the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission.

Maulana Azad had assured him then, with the consent of the Working
Committee, that the Congress would make his cause in Kashmir their own.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru willingly returned, though not without misgivings.
The Working Committee regret to find that his misgivings were justified.

From all accounts received by the Committee, repression of an open as

well as a subtle type is continuing, and the people connected with the Kashmir
[National] Conference are being harassed in many ways.

It is reported that while elections have been announced for the State
Assembly, large numbers of names are being struck off the electoral rolls, and
many prospective candidates for the election have been disqualified. No
attempt is being made to liberalise the Constitution and to make it more demo¬
cratic and responsible.

In view of these reports, the Working Committee feel it necessary to send

a deputation, consisting of persons of unquestioned ability and impartiality,
to inquire into the reports of repression and suppression of civil liberties.
The Committee, therefore, earnestly recommend to Kashmir State that they
should invite such a deputation.

23
 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

Recent events in Kashmir have a large significance affecting the rulers

and peoples ol all the States in India and the Committee trust that the States
will welcome the step that they are taking in regard to Kashmir.

While noting with deep regret the sentence passed on Sheikh Abdullah,
the Committee would consider his incarceration as a worthy sacrifice if it
results in the achievement of the freedom for which he was labouring. The
Committee express their sympathy for all those who have suffered or are
suffering for the cause of freedom in Kashmir.

25
Srinagar
13 October 1946
My dear Sardar Sahib,
Will you please refer to your letter dated 28 September,
forwarding therewith a copy of the resolution of the Working
Committee of the A.I.C.C. dated 25 September 1946? With regard
to this I have already stated in my letters what the policy
of His Highness’ Government is. The enunciation of this
policy is contained in His Highness’ Address to his people
of which I sent you a copy. Our attitude has, I maintain, been
throughout one of accommodation. I am confident that a
man of your wisdom and experience will appreciate our diffi¬
culty when I say that where matters of policy are concerned,
it is impossible to concede the principle that one authority shall
determine the policy when a different authority is to face the conse¬
quences of its enforcement. In this connection it may interest you
to know that the following adjournment motion was moved in the
State Assembly on 16 September 1946 by Choudhri Hamidullah
Khan, leader of the Muslim Conference Group in the Assembly:
“I move that the House do adjourn to discuss a definite matter of urgent
public importance, namely, the alarm caused amongst the Muslims of
the State by the reports widely circulating in the State that the Prime
Minister of Kashmir has given an undertaking to the Executive Councillor,
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, that he will implicitly follow the policy of the
Indian Congress in the administration of the State and that he will
suppress all tendencies towards the growth of Pakistan ideology in the
State.”

After the Congress Working Committee passed their resolu¬

tion, Dr. Balramdas, an elected member, asked permission to move
the following adjournment motion:
 sardar’s assurance to maharaja 25

“The House do stand adjourned in order to discuss a definite matter

of urgent public importance, namely, the keen dissatisfaction resulting
from an attempt made by the Working Committee of the Indian
National Congress to interfere in the internal affairs of the State as
evidenced by the announcement recently made on the radio legal ding
sending a delegation to Kashmir—a course which is opposed to theii
declared policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

He withdrew it on being told that the policy of the Govern¬

ment was as declared in His Highness’ Address referred to above.
I am puzzled by your statement that “the State can lose no¬
thing by allowing daylight to shine on the doings of Kashmir.
Kashmir is not and has never been shrouded in mystery. This
season we have had nearly 25,000 visitors from outside—India and
abroad—who have traversed every nook and corner of the coun¬
try. Among them have been several prominent Congressmen,
e.g. Mr. Baldev Sahai, ex-Advocate General of Bihar, for two
weeks; Mr. Asaf Ali for about seven weeks; Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan1 and Dewan Chamanlal2 for a number of days; and lastly
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who was here for five days; and went
everywhere he wanted without let or hindrance and saw everything
and everyone he wanted to see, including Sheikh Abdullah. It is
particularly puzzling why it was that in the resolution the Working
Committee omitted all reference to this second visit, and indeed
seemed to infer that Mr. Nehru having returned to Delhi after his
first visit never carried into effect his intention to return to Kashmir.
With regard to the alleged tampering with electoral rolls, I
am afraid, those people on whose reports reliance had been placed
have once again belied the trust reposed in them. I enclose copy
of a Press note3 on the subject issued by our Publicity Officer
which speaks for itself. Copy of another Press note with regard to
certain statements attributed to Dr. P. Sitaramayya4 is also enclosed.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

Member, Congress Working Committee, popularly known as Frontier Gandhi

, Member, Central Assembly, a Congress labour leader of Punjab
Pr.ess r^otcAr°- 135 dated 9-10-46 stressed that the electoral rolls had not
bv Hr p"??hh- <£”“ Note No- 136 °r thc same da" challenged a statement
,J. SlUralnayya, a member or the Congress Working Committee, on
anount of fines imposed on National Conference workers and on the alleged
murder of persons detained for political purposes.
4 Member, Congress Working Committee
 26

Jammu
30 October 1946
Dear Friend,
As you know that in January next there will be general elec¬
tions in Kashmir State for the State Assembly. Also we want to
inform you that the Kak Ministry feels diffident, as every bureau¬
cratic Government does, to face the national groups in the State
Assembly and is, therefore, trying its level best to see the National
candidates defeated in the coming elections.
I he Government have even issued secret instructions to their
officers to use all possible means at their disposal to undermine
the election campaign of the national groups; so mucli so that they
have joined hands with the Rajya Hindu Sabha1 and the Muslim
Conference2 against the National groups, and the latter two have
formed themselves into a formidable block which is not easy to
assail unless all the national groups form themselves into a joint front.
We thus had joint meetings of the National Conference workers,
the Congress Committee workers and the progressive Hindus and
have come to the conclusion that the elections should be fought
jointly and preferably on the Congress ticket in Jammu province
because of the following reasons:
1. The National Conference holds little influence in Jammu
province because of their having not been able to do sufficient field
work here.
2. Because of the misgivings about the National Conference as a
turncoat of the Muslim Conference, the National Conference in
Jammu enjoys little influence over the Hindus.
3. There has been a strong-founded doubt of the public here
that the general directions of the National Conference are being
controlled by Communists. The doubts have since recently been
affirmed by the open confession of that of the chief workers of
the National Conference of being Communist. One of them is
a member of the Executive Committee of the All Jammu and
Kashmir National Conference.

1 A branch of Hindu Mahasabha, J & K

2 See Prologue.

26
 sardar’s assurance to maharaja 27

4. If elections are fought on the Congress ticket a \eiy stiong

group of progressive Hindus is expected to join the Congress en bloc
and the Government-Rajya Hindu Sabha alliance is bound to
tumble down to pieces.
5. If at such places in Jammu province, where the National Confe¬
rence has little influence, elections are fought on the Congress ticket,
we have all chances to secure four out of seven Hindu seats, and
one out of two Mohammedan seats, and if elections in these places
are fought on the National Conference ticket, we are losing all.
We thus, in the light of the above circumstances, propose to
form a joint election board wherein nominees of the National
Conference (sitting as common national-minded citizens), mem¬
bers of the progressive Hindus, and nominees of the Congress
Committee will be included. The board will select the best candi¬
dates on the basis of a joint manifesto. The election will be fought
on the Congress ticket. Only Communist members of the National
Conference are pressing for a separate manifesto because they
foresee themselves to be [cast] out if the Congress takes the cam¬
paign in hand.
We hope that in the light of the above cited circumstances,
you will very kindly permit, as a special case, the Congress Com¬
mittee, Jammu, to take in hand the parliamentary activities.
In order to explain the matters and get your further guidance
a special deputation will wait upon you soon.
Yours sincerely,
A. N. Vaid
General Secretary,
State Congress Committe,
Jammu
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
President
Parliamentary Committee
All-India Congress Committee, Delhi
 27

New Delhi
5 November 1946
Dear Friend,
I have received your letter of 30 October.
The Congress Parliamentary Board docs not deal with parlia-
mentary activities in the Indian States. It has confined its activities
to British India so far as parliamentary matters are concerned.
In this matter you must take the advice of Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru as President of the All-India States Peoples’ Conference
or Acharya Kripalani, the President of the Indian National Con-
gress.

Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The General Secretary
Congress Committee
Jammu

28
TELEGRAM

Lahore
18 November 1946
Sardar Patel
New Delhi

ELECTION BOARD MEMBERS ARRESTED YESTERDAY. REMAINING WORKERS

BEING HOURLY HARASSED. NORMAL ELECTION WORK RENDERED
IMPOSSIBLE. PREMIER AND MINISTERS TOURING AND EXERCISING
OFFICIAL PRESSURE. POLLING IN KASHMIR FIXED FOR JANUARY WHEN
WEATHER CONDITIONS RENDER MOVEMENT IMPOSSIBLE. MOST UNFAIR
TACTICS ADOPTED TO THREATEN NATIONAL CONFERENCE ELECTION
WORK.
GHULAMMOHAMMAD BAKSIII1

1 Ilakshi Ghulam Mohammad, a prominent member of National Conference

and deputy of Sheikh Abdullah until latter’s removal in 1953. Succeeded him as
Prime .Minister and held office until 1963.

28
 29
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
5 January 1947

Sardar Patel
New Delhi
KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE MUSLIM FOLLOWERS ONLY INTER¬
FERED ELECTIONS TWO SRINAGAR HINDU CONSTITUENCIES YESTERDAY.
KASHMIRI PANDIT CONFERENCE VOTERS IN LORRIES AND ON FOOT
PELTED WITH STONES AND SNOWBALLS AND PREVENTED FROM
REACHING POLLING BOOTHS. PROVOCATIVE SLOGANS AGAINST RULER
AND KASHMIRI PANDIT CONFERENCE PARTICIPATING IN ELECTIONS
RAISED IN DIFFERENT PARTS CITY PARTICULARLY IN FRONT POLLING
STATIONS. TURBANS BLANKETS OF HINDU VOTERS SNATCHED AWAY BY
NATIONAL CONFERENCE HOOLIGANS. LORRIES CARRYING OUR VOTERS
DAMAGED. ACCORDING PREARRANGED PLAN DOCTOR SHAMBOONATH
[Pershan] national conference sponsored candidate feeling
HOPELESS TO SECURE VOTES WITHDREW ON BASELESS GROUNDS WHILE
SOCIALIST PARTY CANDIDATES CONTINUED PARTICIPATION. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE MUSLIMS FOUND RAISING SLOGANS IN FAVOUR DOCTOR
PERSHAN. STRONGLY PROTEST AGAINST NATIONAL CONFERENCE
PLANNED FASCIST ACTIONS.

PRESIDENT
ALL STATE KASHMIR PANDIT CONFERENCE

30
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
G January 1947
Sardar Patel
New Delhi

COPY OF TELEGRAM TO HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA BAHADUR JAMMU

BEGINS YOUR HIGHNESS LOYAL SUBJECT WHO HAD COURAGE TO
STAND AGAINST PREMIER CUM ARMY MINISTERS BROTHER PANDIT

29
30 sardar patel’s correspondence

AMARNATH KAK IN PRAJA SABIIA ELECTIONS WITHDREW TODAY AT

11-15 A.M. FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: SCANDALOUS OFFICIAL INTER¬
FERENCE. AT BADMIBAGH CANTT. SOLDIERS WERE ASKED TO VOTE
FOR MAHARAJA BAHADUR MEANING THEREBY AMARNATH AS IF HE
WAS YOUR HIGHNESS REPRESENTATIVE AND YOUR HIGHNESS PARTY.
B. K. BIIAN PRINCIPAL AMARSINGH COLLEGE AND EX-PRINCIPAL MILY.
SCHOOL WAS REPRESENTING AMARNATH KAK AT CANTT. AT MAIN
STATION ALL POLLING OFFICERS ON DUTY PROPAGATED FOR KAK.
COLLEGE PROFESSORS DRAGGED STUDENTS. EVEN BEFORE ELECTION
DAY THEY WERE HIS UNOFFICIAL ELECTION AGENTS. MY WORKERS
HARASSED BEATEN AND TEMPORARILY ARRESTED BY POLICE.
JAGOIIARZADOO NANDLAL WAZIR R. C. PANDIT NANDLAL DARBARI
MUKHIAR POLLING OFFICERS BEHAVED MOST SCANDALOUSLY. THEY
ACCOMPANIED VOTERS TO THE BALLOT BOXES AND FORCED THEM
TO CAST THEIR VOTES FOR KAK. GOONDA PARTIES BEAT MY
WORKERS AND POLICE LOOKED AT IT WITH TRAGIC APATHY. MYSELF
ALSO ABUSED AND ASSAULTED BY POLICE AND POLLING OFFICERS AT
THE POLLING STATION. EVEN BEFORE POLL DAY MY HOUSE WAS
SEARCHED BY POLICE AND MILY IN MY ABSENCE. ALL FURNITURE
BROKEN AND INMATES HARASSED. AT THE POLLING BOOTH AND IN
PUBLIC STREETS GOVT. OFFICERS OPENLY AND LOUDLY PROPAGATED
FOR KAK SAYING VOTE CAST FOR KAK IS VOTE CAST FOR PREMIER.
MANY OTHER COMPLAINTS TOO NUMEROUS TO BE DETAILED HERE.
CONSTABLE NO. 1028 ALONG WITH OTHERS BRUTALLY ASSAULTED
VOTERS AND MYSELF. MEETING HELD IN CAMERA BY POLLING OFFICERS
RETURNING OFFICERS AND AMARNATH KAK AT POLLING STATIONS.
MYSELF EXCLUDED. ALL THIS REDUCES ELECTION TO A FARCE. AS
OUR BENIGN LORD AND RULER PRAY INTERVENE AND COMMAND
FRESH ELECTION. PREPARED FORFEIT RS. 10,000 IF FAIL IN CASE
ELECTION UNDER IMPARTIAL SUPERVISION AND NOT UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF PREMIER WHO IS BROTHER TO AMARNATH KAK.
SIIAMBOONATH PERSIIAN
 31
Jammu
7 April 1947

Dear Sardar Sahib,

Thank you for your letter dated 21 March 1947 on the sub¬
ject of the Punjab Relief Fund. I shall do whatever I can to fur¬
ther your request.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

32
New Delhi
11 April 1947
Dear Friend,
Thank you for your letter of the 7th instant and for your
promise to do whatever you can to help in the matter. You
know I have also written to the Maharaja Sahib about it.
I had a mind to talk to you about Kashmir affairs when you
came here on the last occasion, but on the second day of our
meeting you were found to be absent and on enquiry I was told
that you had left Delhi. May I now enquire whether your attitude
towards Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues still remains the same,
or whether you consider that the time is now ripe for reconsider¬
ing the whole question?
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Rai Bahadur Pandit Ramchandra Kak
Jammu

31
 33

Delhi
3 July 1947
My dear Prime Minister,
I am addressing this letter to you after a long time with a
heavy sense of responsibility. I invite your attention to the second
paragraph of my last letter of 11 April 1947, after which I have
not written to you, as you did not choose to send any reply. Condi¬
tions in India have since changed considerably, and I do not know
how your mind is working at present.
You are aware that on 15 August, India, though divided, will
be completely free, and you also know that by this time a vast
majority of States have joined the Constituent Assembly of India.
I realise the peculiar difficulties of Kashmir, but looking to its his¬
tory and its traditions, it has, in my opinion, no other choice.
Do you still think that Sheikh Abdullah should continue to
remain in jail? I am asking this question purely in the interest of
Kashmir State. You know my attitude all along and my sympathy
towards the State. I am once again advising you as a friend of
the State to reconsider the matter without any delay.
His Excellency’s visit was the proper time when this should
have been done, but if it is not done now, perhaps it may be too
late. I do not wish to write anything more.
Hope you are doing well.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Pandit Ramchandra Kak
Srinagar

34
New Delhi
3 July 1947
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Rai Bahadur Gopaldas [a prominent Hindu of Lahore] saw
me today and conveyed to me the substance of your conversation
with him. I am sorry to find that there is considerable misapprc-

32
 sardar’s assurance to maharaja 33

hension in your mind about the Congress. Allow me to assure Your

Highness that the Congress is not only not your enemy, as you
happen to believe, but there are in the Congress many strong sup¬
porters of your State. As an organisation, the Congress is not op¬
posed to any Prince in India. It has no quarrel with the States.
It is true that recent events resulting in the arrest of Pandit Jawa-
harlal Nehru and the continued detention of Sheikh Abdullah have
created a feeling of great dissatisfaction amongst many Congress¬
men who wish well of your State. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru belongs
to Kashmir. He is proud of it, and rest assured he can never be
your enemy.
It is unfortunate that none of the Congress leaders has got any
contact with Your Highness. Personal contact would have remov¬
ed much of the misunderstanding, which probably is based largely
on misinformation gathered through sources not quite disinterested.
Having had no personal contact, my correspondence has been
with your Prime Minister since the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, and
my efforts have been to persuade him to have a different approach
to the problem, which in the long run would be in the interest of
the State.
Is it necessary to assure you that in your domestic affairs the
Congress has no intention whatever of interfering? If it had not
been so, the Constituent Assembly would not have been able to
attract a vast majority of Princes who have joined it, and I have
no doubt that the rest will also join with very few exceptions who
have no choice owing to peculiar circumstances, for instance Bhawal-
pur, Kalat, etc. In the Negotiating Committee, your Prime Minister
was present, and our decisions were unanimous in the four meet¬
ings that he attended. In these meetings, all the Princes got com¬
plete satisfaction from us about their special rights, privileges,
etc. which they enjoyed.
I fully appreciate the difficult and delicate situation in which
your State has been placed, but as a sincere friend and well-wisher
of the State, I wish to assure you that the interest of Kashmir
lies in joining the Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly
without any delay. Its past history and traditions demand it, and
all India looks up to you and expects you to take that decision.
Eighty per cent of India is on this side. The States that have cast
then lot witli the Constituent Assembly have been convinced that
their safety lies in standing together with India.
I was greatly disappointed when His Excellency the Viceroy
leturned without having a full and frank discussion with you on
S. C.-3
34 sardar patel’s correspondence

that fatal [fateful] Sunday, when you had given an appointment

which could not be kept because of your sudden attack of cholic
pain. He had invited you to be his guest at Delhi, and in that
also he was disappointed. I had hopes that we would meet here,
but I was greatly disappointed when His Excellency told me that
you did not avail of the invitation.
May I take the liberty of suggesting that it would be better if
you even now come to Delhi, when you will certainly be his
guest? We want an opportunity of having a frank and free discus¬
sion with you in an atmosphere of freedom, and I have no doubt
that all your doubts and suspicions, of which I have heard from
Gopaldas, will completely disappear. In Free India, you cannot
isolate yourself, and you must make friends with the leaders of
Free India who want to be friends with you.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

Lt. Gen. His Highness Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj

Sir Hari Singh
Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir

35
Srinagar
15 July 1947

My dear Sardar Sahib,

I write to thank you for your letter dated 3 July 1947.
The matter you mention is a complicated one. As I am go¬
ing to Delhi in about a week’s time, I hope to have the pleasure
of meeting you and shall have a talk with you on this and other
subjects.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak

Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi
 36
G/o A.I.S.A.
Srinagar
14 July 1947

Respected Sardar Sahib,

I have written to Dada [Acharya J. B. Kripalani]1 and
Panditji [Jawaharlal Nehru] about Kashmir affairs [and] copy
of one of the letters sent to Dada was forwarded to you also.
I am enclosing herewith a document giving out in brief the
general outline of the present position of developments here. The
question of joining the Indian Union has not been taken up just
now. He will join soon after the items contained in the enclosure
have been carried out.
It is obvious that I have written this at the instance of Gopal-
dasji. I have not added even an iota of my own. If anything,
I have tried to say less.
I am arriving at Delhi on the 17th. I hope to see you also
then. I shall explain things at length if you care for details.
With pranams,
Yours sincerely,
Ramadhar2

ENCLOSURE

The Maharaja has given his word for the following:

1. General amnesty to be proclaimed within a week or ten days’ time.

2. Kak to go as soon as possible. The task of finding out his substitute has
devolved upon Gopaldasji. He hopes to get the new person within a fortnight.

Now two things are expected from the other side. The weekly agitation
should remain suspended and that Gandhiji should visit Kashmir only after
the intended general amnesty has been proclaimed and not before that. The
Maharaja is apprehensive of trouble if Bapu visits Kashmir during Kak’s
presence in the ministerial gaddi.

Ramadhar
1 General Secretary, All India Congress Committee
2 Secretary, All-India Spinners’ Association

35
 CHAPTER III

GENERAL AMNESTY

37

New Delhi
18 July 1947
My dear Javvaharlal,
I wrote a letter to Rai Bahadur Ramchandra Kak about
the release of Sheikh Abdullah and other workers of the National
Conference. I enclose a copy of the reply which I have received.1
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

NOTE FOR SARDAR PATEL FROM DEWAN CHAMANLAL

23 August 1947

It is understood that Kashmir State have told the Indian P & T

Department that they wish to be connected with them for the Post and
Telegraph arrangements in Kashmir State. It is also understood that the
Pakistan Government have refused to recognise the claim of the Indian P
& T Department to control the Post and Telegraph offices situated in the
State as they have been informed by Kashmir State that they wish the
“existing arrangements” to continue. It seems that the contention of
the Pakistan Government is based on the fact that Lahore and other post
offices which used to control and provide the postal, telegraph and telephone
facilities to Kashmir State have been transferred to the control of Pakistan
and therefore they presume that the term “existing arrangements” means con¬
nection with Pakistan. On the other hand, so far as Kashmir State and the
users of the post and telegraph and telephone facilities are concerned there has
been no change whatever since 15 August 19-17; and therefore by existing
arrangements” the State really meant the arrangements existing hitherto. The
users of the service really do not know what happens behind the scenes and
therefore Kashmir State do not seem to have realised the full implications

1 See 35.

36
 GENERAL AMNESTY 37

of what they were telling the Pakistan Government. The easiest solution now
would seem to be to request the Kashmir Government to clarify their position
further to the Pakistan authorities and thus join the Indian P & 1 Department
for post and telegraph and telephone arrangements.

38
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
26 August 1947

Statesind
New Delhi
REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM OF 23RD REGARDING COMPLETION OF
STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS. HIS HIGHNESS GOVERNMENT WOULD AS
DESIRED DEPUTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DULY AUTHORISED MINISTER
TO DO THE NEEDFUL.

PRIME MINISTER SRINAGAR

39
New Delhi
13 September 1947
My dear Baldev Singh,
I have received a request from the Kashmir Durbar to
arrange for the loan of the services of Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh
Katoch for services as Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir Forces
vice Major-General Scott who is retiring.
2. You know the difficulties of the State, and I feel that at this
juncture it would be most useful to have an officer of our own Army
as Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir Forces. The officer select¬
ed is the son of the Prime Minister of Kashmir, General Janak
Singh, and has opted for service with the Indian Dominion. It
would be best, therefore, to lend his services for a period of three
years on condition that, if the State decides to join the other
Dominion, Col. Katoch will revert to the Indian Dominion.
3. It is possible that, owing to the fact that the India Com¬
mand has recently been set up, you might find it difficult to spare
Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch. While it is possible for us to find
substitutes, I am doubtful whether Kashmir could get a more
 sardar patel’s correspondence
suitable person. I would, therefore, request that any such reasons
should give way to the overriding consideration of having our own
man as Gommander-in-Chief of the Kashmir State Forces.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Sardar Baldev Singh
Minister of Defence
New Delhi

40

New Delhi
13 September 1947
My dear Sardar Sahib,
Kindly refer to your letter of even date regarding the loan
of the services of Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch for service as
Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir State Forces. I am looking
into the matter and shall write to you about it within a few
days.
Yours sincerely,
Baldev Singh
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Minister of Home Affairs
New Delhi

41
New Delhi
2 October 1947
My dear Sarin,
With reference to the previous correspondence we had
about placing Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch on deputation to
Jammu and Kashmir State, H. M. now understands that the
State has written officially to the Defence Ministry. Strictly
speaking, of course, the request should first have come to the States
Ministry who would have arranged with the Defence Ministry
for the loan of the services of Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh. However,
in order to expedite a decision, H. M. is prepared to waive this
 GENERAL AMNESTY 39

formality and would be glad if very early orders could be passed

on this case.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar1
H. G. Sarin Esq., i.c.s.
Private Secretary to H. M. Defence
New Delhi

42
New Delhi
17 September 1947
My dear Neogy,
A representative of the Kashmir Government saw me this
morning. He came here some days ago and has been stranded
here for want of a plane service to Srinagar. I understand
that all the planes which were not running on scheduled flights
have now been taken over by your Ministry and that is why no
service can now be laid on to Srinagar.
I am sure you appreciate the necessity of maintaining com¬
munications with Kashmir State, particularly in the present
emergency. As things are, air communications are the only ones
possible. I would, therefore, suggest that you might arrange,
under arrangements with the airways company, which was ope¬
rating this service previously, to release planes for this purpose.
Incidentally, this would also assist you in making arrangements
for the non-Muslim refugees stranded in Srinagar. I would sug¬
gest that, if you agree, action on these lines may be taken imme¬
diately.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patei
The Hon’ble Mr. K. C. Neogy2
New Delhi

1 I.C.S. officer who was Sardar Patel’s Private Secretary from September 194fi
up to the time of Sardar’s death in December 1950
2 Minister for Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation in Nehru Cabinet
 43

Delhi
21 September 1947
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Justice Mehrehand Mahajan1 met me yesterday and I am
glad to learn that Your Highness had decided to appoint him
as your Prime Minister. It is a wise choice and I have no doubt
that he will be able to handle the affairs of the State in this
critical period, firmly and in a statesmanlike manner.
He has discussed with me about the immediate require¬
ments of the State and I have promised him full support and
co-operation on our behalf. We fully realise how difficult the situa¬
tion there is, and I can assure Your Highness that we will do
our best to help your State in this critical period. Justice Mehr¬
ehand will convey to you personally the gist of our conversa¬
tion on all matters affecting the interests of Kashmir.
I have also written a letter to Mr. Batra [R. L. Batra, the
Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir] today on matters
on which he had asked for our assistance.
I trust Your Highness is keeping good health.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Lt. General His Highness
Raj raj eshwar Maharaj ad h iraj
Maharaja Sir Hari Singhji Bahadur
O.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., LL.D.
Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir
Srinagar

1 Judge of Punjab High Court who succeeded Thakur Janak Singh as Prime
Minister of J & K in November 1947

40
 44
Imperial Hotel
New Delhi
23 September 1947

Dear Sardar Sahib,

I arrived yesterday from Kashmir and am in Delhi for two
days on my way to Bombay en route to England. I would like
to talk to you for a few moments about my husband who is still in
Kashmir, if this is at all possible.
With many apologies for troubling you,
Yours sincerely,
Margaret Kak
[Mrs. R. C. Kak]

45
New Delhi
23 September 1947
Dear Mrs. Kak,
Please refer to your letter of 23 September 1947 addressed to
the Hon ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. I am writing to request
you to come and lunch with Sardar tomorrow, 24 Sept., 1947
at 1 p.m. He hopes it will be possible for you to come.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
Private Secretary to
Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Mrs. R. C. Kak
c/o The Imperial Hotel
New Delhi

41
 46

Gulab Mahal
Srinagar (Kashmir)
26 September 1947
My dear Sardar Patel,
Thank you for your letter of 21 September. I am glad to
know that you had a generally satisfactory talk with Justice
Mahajan. I trust that a little further elucidation of the points of
view regarding the essential requirements of the moments would
result in a satisfactory solution.
As regards communications, R. B. R. L. Batra is writing to
you in detail.
With all good wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
Maharaja
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

47
New Delhi
2 October 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of 26 September 1947. I went to
Amritsar on 30 September and delivered to Justice Mahajan the
letters which Thakur Harnam Singh had brought from \our
Highness. I had also a further talk with Justice Mahajan and
understand that he is joining your service very shortly.
I need hardly say how pleased we all are at the general
amnesty which Your Highness has proclaimed. I have no doubt
that this would rally round you the men who might otherwise
have been a thorn in your side. I can assure \our Highness
of my abiding sympathy with you in your difficulties, nor need I
disguise the instinctive responsibility I feel for ensuring the safety
and integrity of your State. I can, therefore, assure \ou that in

42
 GENERAL AMNESTY 43

everything that we do we shall pay the highest regard to the

interests of your State. Sheikh Abdullah will be coming to
Delhi shortly and we shall endeavour to reach a satisfactory solu¬
tion of the difficulties which you have from that quarter. I shall
then suggest to Your Highness how best we can proceed further.
In the meantime, I am expediting as much as possible the
linking up of the State with the Indian Dominion by means of
telegraph, telephones, wireless and roads. We fully realize the
need for despatch and urgency and I can assure you that we
shall do our best.
With best wishes,
Yours very sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Lt. General His Highness Rajrajeshwar
Maharajadhiraj Maharaja Sir Hari Singhji
Bahadur, g.s.c.i., g.c.i.e., g.c.v.o., ll.d.
Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir
Srinagar

48
Srinagar (Kashmir)
1 October 1947
My dear Sardar Patel,
I am grateful for your letter of 23 September and am to
convey to you the thanks of our Government for your very kind
help in procuring for the State the loan of the requisite wire¬
less equipment for making Srinagar and Jammu landing well-
equipped for all-weather air service.
Mr. Ahuja, the bearer of your letter, has taken great pains
to examine the situation again and to discuss all details. The
proposals as finally evolved have been agreed to by our Govern¬
ment and a formal intimation on the subject is being sent to the
Dnector General of Civil Aviation in Delhi. It is trusted that
no time would now be lost in sending the requisite apparatus and
deputing the stafl which Mr. Ahuja has undertaken to select for
the purpose.
Mr. Ahuja has very kindly suggested that for purpose of
secrecy of certain important administrative messages which may
have to be sent from here to you or others at New Delhi, it
44 sardar patel’s correspondence

would be advisable to use a special code. This is an excellent sug¬

gestion and I trust the authorities concerned would agree to this.
I hope you will agree that side by side with the development
of air services and aeronautical communication it would be
desirable if suitable meteorological observations could also be se¬
cured. We will greatly appreciate your very kindly asking some
ofFicer of the Meteorological Department to visit this place for
advising the State as well as for actually setting up the installation.
I have also explained to Mr. Ahuja the immediate neces¬
sity of having a transmitter for enabling the Publicity Depart¬
ment of the State to contradict and effectively counteract the
mischievous and false propaganda which Pakistan Radio is
permitting to be broadcast. In my view it would be far more effi¬
cacious if it is done from here than from any other place. The
Government shall be grateful if the necessary apparatus is loaned
at an early date. It should be powerful enough to let the broad¬
casts be audible at least in every nook and corner of the country
if not actually abroad. In case a Special Officer be needed to
work it, the services of one may kindly be lent for the purpose.
Mr. Ahuja informs me that the installation could either be worked
conjointly with the wireless apparatus to be fitted at the aerodrome
or independently. There would be no difficulty in working it in
the manner in which it may be more efficacious.
A separate self-contained letter is being sent to the Hon’ble
Defence Minister for supplying arms and ammunition. Part of
these was requisitioned long ago through the Resident and the
remaining represents our immediate present needs. It is request¬
ed that you may kindly use your good offices to have the indents
supplied immediately. The reason for this need hardly be stiess-
ed as you must be well aware of the dangers which are being
manufactured and threatened against the State. In case we are
fully equipped we are resolutely determined to face, if forced.
Thanking you again and with best regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi
 49
New Delhi
27 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,
I am writing to you about Kashmir. I met Mahajan be¬
fore he went there and had a talk with him. I felt that his ap¬
proach might not be wholly successful.
2. It is obvious to me from the many reports I have received
that the situation there is a dangerous and deteriorating one.
The Muslim League in the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. are making
preparations to enter Kashmir in considerable numbers. The
approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of
India. The only normal route then is via the Jhelum valley. The
Jammu route can hardly be used during winter and air traffic
is also suspended. Therefore it is important that something should
be done before these winter conditions set in. This means practi¬
cally by the end of October or, at the latest, the beginning of
November. Indeed, air traffic will be difficult even before that.
3. I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into
Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is
more or less isolated because of the coming winter.
4. Whether this strategy succeeds or not depends upon the
forces opposed to it. I rather doubt if the Maharaja and his State
forces can meet the situation by themselves and without some
popular help. They will be isolated from the rest of India and
if their own people go against them, it will be very difficult to
meet the situation. Obviously the only major group that can side
with them is the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah’s
leadership. If by any chance that is hostile or even passive, then
the Maharaja and his Government become isolated and the Pakis¬
tani people will have a relatively free field.
5. It becomes important, therefore, that the Maharaja should
make friends with the National Conference so that there might
be this popular support against Pakistan. Indeed, it seems to me
that theie is no other course open to the Maharaja but this: to
release Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference leaders, to
make a friendly approach to them, seek their co-operation and
make them feel that this is really meant, and then to declare

45
46 sardar patel’s correspondence

adhesion to the Indian Union. Once the State [accedes] to India

it will become very difficult for Pakistan to invade it officially or
unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union.
If, however, there is delay in this accession, then Pakistan will go
ahead without much fear of consequences, specially when the
winter isolates Kashmir.

6. It seems to me urgently necessary, therefore, that the accession

to the Indian Union should take place early. It is equally
dear to me that this can only take place with some measure
of success after there is peace between the Maharaja and the
National Conference and they co-operate together to meet the
situation. This is not an easy task; but it can be done chiefly be¬
cause Abdullah is very anxious to keep out of Pakistan and relies
upon us a great deal for advice. At the same time he cannot
carry his people with him unless he has something definite to place
before them. What this can be in the circumstances I cannot
define precisely at the present moment. But the main thing is
that the Maharaja should try to gain the goodwill and co-opera¬
tion of Abdullah. This is the belief also of various minorities in
Kashmir who have no other support to lean upon. I do not think
it is possible for the Maharaja to function for long if no major
section of the population supports him. It would be a tragedy
if the National Conference remains passive owing to frustration
and lack of opportunity.
7. Nobody can guarantee what will happen in this complicated
situation. But the course I have suggested seems to me the wisest
one and the most likely to produce results. But it is important
that there should be no delay. The time element cannot be
forgotten and delay itself may cut us off completely from Kashmir
owing to the approach of winter.
8. I tried to explain much of this to Mahajan. But I fear he
only partly appreciated what I said. I do not know what advice
you gave to him. Your advice will naturally go a long way cither
to the Maharaja or to Mahajan.
9. At the present moment Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues
are still in prison. It seems to me very injurious to future
developments. Unfortunately the Maharaja cannot make up his
mind easily.
10. I hope you will be able to take some action in this matter
to force the pace and to turn events in the right direction.
We have definitely a great asset in the National Conference pro¬
vided it is properly handled. It would be a pity to lose this.
 GENERAL AMNESTY 47

Sheikh Abdullah has repeatedly given assurances of wishing to

co-operate and of being opposed to Pakistan; also to abide by my
advice.
11. I would again add that time is [of] the essence of the
business and things must be done in a way so as to bring about
the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as pos¬
sible with the co-operation of Sheikh Abdullah.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

50
TELEGRAM

28 September 1947
Sardar Patel
New Delhi
EXTREMELY URGENT GOVERNMENT WORK NECESSITATES IMMEDIATE
RELEASE OF ONE DALMIA JAIN AIRCRAFT FOR CHARTER SERVICE TO
SRINAGAR AND BACK TO DELHI. SHALL BE GRATEFUL IF IT IS KINDLY
ARRANGED IMMEDIATELY.

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF KASHMIR

51
TELEGRAM

28 September 1947
Deputy Prime Minister
Kashmir

YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING CHARTER SERVICE TO SRINAGAR AND

BACK. I HAVE ARRANGED WITH COMMUNICATION MINISTER [R. A.
Kldwai] TO ACCEDE TO YOUR REQUEST. ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE
ACCORDINGLY.

VALLABHBHAI PATEL
 52

Srinagar
3 October 1947
My dear Sardar Sahib,
An indent for military equipment was sent to you on 1
October, and another letter connected therewith is being sent
today. I trust this would receive your earliest attention.
I am writing this to say that Mr. Justice Mahajan after meet¬
ing you at Delhi conveyed the hope that it would be possible for
the Indian Dominion to concentrate some military forces at
Madhopore or at any equally near and convenient centre for
rendering this State succour in case it is needed.
In my letter being sent today the situation which appears to
be developing requires strengthening of all resources. The State
is determined to face the menace squarely but in case occasion
arises for the Government here to avail of the help promised
above it trusts that it can confidently rely on the fulfilment of
the same.
Thanking you in anticipation for the same and with best
regards,
Yours sincerely,
B. L. Batra

The Hon’ble Sardar Baldev Singh

New Delhi

53
New Delhi
3 October 1947

Dear Sardar Sahib,

I again enquired what steps are being taken to remove neces¬
sary stores for the construction of telephone and telegraph lines
from Pathankot to Jammu. I was told the load to be carried is too
heavy for aeroplanes, but eight wagons loaded with all the neces¬
sary material have been despatched from Calcutta and will reach
the border as soon as the bridges on the Eastern Punjab Railways

48
 GENERAL AMNESTY 49

have been repaired. But if there is any delay in the tepaiis, the
Eastern Punjab Railway authorities have agreed to arrange for
transhipment and provide a special train to carry the load to its
destination.
A special officer is already surveying the route and as soon as
the material reaches the border the construction will start; and
although the normal time for the completion of such construction is
two months, it may be possible to complete it much earlier.
I have also suggested that a wireless transmitter may be in¬
stalled at Jammu immediately. Amritsar has already a transmit¬
ter and a receiver and thereby important messages from Srinagar
may be telegraphed to Jammu from where they will be wirelessed
either to Amritsar or to Delhi. This will give us immediate con¬
nection and we will not have to wait for the completion of tele¬
graph and telephone lines.
Yours sincerely,
Rah Ahmed Kidwai1
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

54
New Delhi
4 October 1947
My dear Rah Sahib,
Thank you for your letter dated 3 October 1947. I am grate¬
ful to you for the prompt action you have taken.
2. I presume that you are arranging for the wireless transmit¬
ter to be installed at Jammu. If you want me to approach
Jammu and Kashmir State, please let me know and I shall do it
at once.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Mr. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai
New Delhi

1 Minister for Communication in Nehru Cabinet

S.C.-4
 5o

Prime Minister’s Secretariat

5 October 1947
My clear Vallabhbhai,
I enclose a copy of a note on Patiala which Amrit Kaur1 has
sent me. She received it from Gyan Chand, who is a reliable
worker living in Patiala territory near Simla.
I enclose also a brief statement by Dewan Shiv Saran Lai,2
who has been Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan in the
Frontier. He is on leave and is in Delhi at present. He is a very
straight and reliable man and knows the Frontier thoroughly.
What he says must be based on knowledge. I am going to see
him tomorrow to discuss the matter with him.
Shiv Saran Lai’s statement demonstrates the immediate
danger to Kashmir State. What we can do about it, I do not
know. Anyhow, we should think about it jointly and devise some
plan. I think you should also inform the Maharaja of Kashmir.
The Maharaja has some knowledge of it already. These further
details might help him to get a true view of the situation.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

NOTE FROM RAJKUMARI AMRIT KAUR

1. Story of designs and resistance of Muslims false and fantastic. 1 hey died
like goats and sheep. About a lakh murdered in whole State; about 12,000
in Patiala alone. Whole families wiped out. Only innocent and helpless ones
killed. Rape, abduction and processions of naked women and other atrocities
on them. Wholesale looting, with police and military help; the lion’s share
looted by military itself. Recoveries are being made from public alone and
not military and civil officials.

1 Health Minister in Nehru Cabinet. First came to prominence as personal

aide to Mahatma Gandhi.
2 Retired Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan

50
 GENERAL AMNESTY 51

2. Conversion of Muslims to Sikhism alone permitted.

3. Open threats by Sikhs of looting Hindus before disturbances. 1 hreats

and actual stray cases of looting, assault and murder of Hindus now.

4. Already discrimination in giving business facilities and contracts to Sikhs

(refugees and State subjects). Now Hindus being ousted and facilities given to
local and refugee Sikhs.

5. Rehabilitation of Sikh agriculturist refugees only announced.

6. Almost all vacancies of Muslims being given to unqualified Sikhs.

7. Hindus panic-stricken and ready to quit. Waiting for restoration of

means of communications.

8. Census figures (of Sikhs) already inflated. Now it is going to be made

a purely Sikh State. Two districts—Narnaul (beyond Delhi) and Kohistan
(Simla Hills)—predominantly Hindu.

Census Figures

Between 1881-1921 H. -13%

S. + 28%
M. + 3%
Between 1921-1931 H. -3.6%
S. + 21%
M. + 9.4%
Between 1931-1941 H. - 8%
S. + 8%
M. + 1%

STATEMENT BY DEWAN SHIV SARAN LAL

Deputv Commissioner Dera Ismail Kiian (on leave)

1. About a fortnight back a scheme had been started to send armed tribal
people to the Pakistan Kashmir border from Malakand to Sialkot.

About five lakhs have moved — more are moving in large numbers.

Transported by lorries (civilian as well as military) provided by Pakistan

Government.

Arms confiscated and seized from non-Muslims in these areas are being
supplied to the tribal people.

Factories in Frontier are producing more arms and ammunition.

Kash813'? °f the
Kashmir from ^’ north-west.
SWat and Chhral arC alS° PreParinS for an attack on

The Wali of Swat has been

promised Kashmir.
52 sakdar patel’s correspondence

3. Intense propaganda is being carried out in the Frontier.

4. Mr. Shiv Saran Lai thinks that it is possible to create internal tribal
dissensions which would keep the tribes occupied and divert their attention from
projects planned by the Pakistan Government.

V. H. Coelho*

5 October 1947

1 I.C.S. ofTicer in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat

 CHAPTER IV

THE GATHERING STORM

56
New Delhi
11 October 1947

My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter dated 5 October 1947. I have
had a discussion with Shiv Saran Lai already. Apart from what
he told me about Kashmir, he seemed to hold some queer views
about retaliation on this side. If educated and responsible per¬
sons from amongst the people who have come here fiom the
Frontier and West Punjab hold such views you can imagine what
an average refugee must be feeling.
2. I find that the information which he gave us about Kashmir
is already known to the Kashmir authorities.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

57
New Delhi
5 October 1947
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I enclose a letter I have received from Dwarkanath Kachru
[Secretary, All-India States Peoples’ Conference] from Srinagar.
A subsequent message says that he is staying on for a few more
days.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi
Enel. 1

53
 ENCLOSURE

Srinagar
4 October 1947
My dear Panditji,

I am now here for the last four days. Probably I will fly back on Monday.
The position here can briefly be summarised thus:

1. Sheikh Sahib and his close associates have decided for the Indian Union.
2. But this decision has not been announced yet and the impression is
being given that so far the National Conference have taken no decision.
3. The leaders of the National Conference are mostly in jail and only Sheikh
Sahib has been released so far.

4. The stand taken by Sheikh Sahib is that the political prisoners must be
released and the Working Committee and the General Council must be al¬
lowed to meet to consider the problem and to place their decision before the
people.
5. Meanwhile Sheikh Sahib is delivering speeches to educate public opinion
and to prepare the people for what seems to be the inevitable decision of the
National Conference.

6. Speeches are delivered to show that killings of Hindus and Muslims are
un-Hindu and un-Islamic; that the issue of accession cannot be decided by a
religious sentiment and that the friends and sympathisers oi Kashmiris during
these years of struggle or sufferings have been Gandhiji, Jawaharlalji and the
Congress and not the Muslims or the League or Mr. Jinnah. Attempts
are being made to show that Jinnah and the League have done great harm
to the popular movement in Kashmir and that the objective ol the League
and Mr. Jinnah is the preservation of the Princely Order and feudal
oppression.
7. It is also emphasised that the objective of the Kashmir National Con¬
ference is the attainment of people’s sovereignty with the Maharaja enjoying
a constitutional position and that this would be the main factor determining
the decision of the Conference in the matter of accession. In short, they would
join the Dominion which enables them to achieve these objects or helps them
in the achievement of their objective.
8. Another important fact which must be borne in mind is the utter
collapse of the administrative and governmental machinery. An atmosphere
of fear and insecurity pervades the place. There is no competent or reliable

5t
 THE GATHERING STORM 55

person to talk or negotiate on behalf of the Government or the Maharaja and

so far no step has been taken to begin talks with Sheikh Sahib.

9. The Maharaja is incapable of taking a decision and though Sheikh Sahib

has written a nice letter to him and the Maharaja too has expiesscd a dcsiie
to meet Sheikh Sahib and his wife, there has really been no move from the
Government or the Maharaja.

10. All this has made Sheikh Sahib very uneasy and the continued imprison¬
ment of his colleagues adds all the more to the seriousness of the position.

11. Sheikh Sahib feels that unless there is a transfer of power to a substantial
degree the National Conference may find itself in a difficult position. To
fight the League, to maintain law and order inside the State and to carry the
masses with them it is highly essential that a settlement with the National Con¬
ference should be brought about simultaneously with the accession to the Union.

12. Alternative to the National Conference is undiluted Muslim communalism

of the most militant type and the National Conference urges that it be taken
into confidence and be closely associated with the governance of the country.

13. This is the demand of the progressive elements amongst the minorities and
they also urge that all progressive sections should stand behind Sheikh Sahib
and strengthen his hands.

14. The threat to Kashmir is real and unless the Congress takes up a strong
stand and forces the Maharaja to come to some agreement with the National
Conference Kashmir is doomed and there will be nothing to pi'event the con¬
quest of Kashmir by Muslim League leaders and private armies. The Maharaja
is doomed and so are the National Conference and the minorities.
15. Sheikh Sahib has received your letter today and tomorrow a reply will
be prepared for you.

16. I shall most probably fly back on Monday and shall bring it along with
me. This letter will be a detailed one and will explain the case of the
National Conference.

17. Sheikh Sahib was most anxious to fly to Delhi to meet you but the
situation here is such that he cannot leave the place for some days more.
He has therefore asked me to go back in order to explain the whole case to
you and Sardar Patel.

18. I hope you will realise the urgency of the situation here and bear it in
mind while talking with the representatives of the Maharaja.

19. I need hardly repeat that you realise the whole position much better than
most of us but I hope your colleagues will also take a similar view of the
situation here.

Yours,
Dwarkanath
 58

New Delhi
8 October 1947
My dear Jawaharlal,
I am returning herewith Kachru’s letter to you, which you
so kindly sent to me for perusal. After you received this letter,
Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir State!
was here. He told me that Sheikh and Begum Abdullah were
to meet His Highness the Maharaja that day, i.e., 6 October.
He also told me that about half the political prisoners had already
been released and the other half were to be released within the
next two or three days.
2. We all realise that the position is full of dangerous potentia¬
lities. \\ e are giving the Kashmir Government as much assistance
as possible within the limited resources available. There are all
sorts of difficulties in our going all out to assist the State. But I
am sure things would improve when Justice Mahajan takes over
the Prime Ministership. He is at least keenly alive to the dangers
which surround Kashmir and knows his own mind. I hope there
would be an end to the almost fatal indecisiveness which has so
far been the bane of the Kashmir Government. In the meantime,
all that we can and should do is to assist the State to the best
of our capacity. I have also impressed upon Batra the need for
mobilising popular opinion on the side of the Government. I am
sure they themselves realize it.
3. Para 19 of Kachru’s letter has a (ling which is obviously
aimed at me. I do not think that anything which could have
been done for Kashmir has been left undone by me; nor am I
aware of any difference between you and me on matters of policy
relating to Kashmir. Still it is most unfortunate that persons
down below should think that there is a gulf between us. It is
also distressing to me.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

56
 59
New Delhi
7 October 1947
My dear Baldev Singh,
I hope arrangements are in train to send immediately suppl¬
ies of arms and ammunition to Kashmir State. II necessary, we
must arrange to send them by air.
I think the question of military assistance in time of emer¬
gency must claim the attention of our Defence Council as soon
as possible. There is no time to lose if the reports which we
hear of similar preparation for intervention on the part of the
Pakistan Government are correct. It appears that the inter¬
vention is going to be true to Nazi pattern.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Sardar Baldev Singh
New Delhi

60
New Delhi
12 October 1947
My dear Gadgil,
You remember I wrote to you regarding a conference with
officers of the Kashmir State Government on the question of
road communication. The Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir
was here the other day and he has asked me to arrange for
our officers to reach Madhopur on the 19th for this conference.
Please arrange accordingly and ask your officers to be at Madhopur
on that date. If the officers will report to the States Ministry
they would be told the names of officers who would be coming
from Kashmir State to have discussions with them. I am sending
a similar letter to Rafi [R. A. Kidwai].
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Mr. N. V. Gadgil
Minister for Works, Mines Power
New Delhi

57
 61

New Delhi
12 October 1947
My dear Batra,
\ on remember you spoke to me about Mansehra bridge.
I thought you would speak about it to the Defence Depart¬
ment representative at the Inter-Department meeting but under¬
stand you did not do so. I have spoken to Baldev Singh and
he is quite agreeable to assist us. Please let me know what you
want us to do in detail and whether you would like the matter
to be treated officially or otherwise.
I am arranging to send our officers about telegraphs, tele¬
phones and road to Madhopur on the 19th. Please make arrange¬
ments accordingly at your end.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Rai Bahadur B. L. Batra
Deputy Prime Minister
Jammu and Kashmir State
Srinagar

62
Srinagar
17 October 1947
My dear Sardar Patel,
I hope my previous letter sent through I hakur Harnam
Singh has reached [you]. Since then Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh
Katoch has reached here but neither any ammunition has reach¬
ed nor any probable date of its arrival has been communicated.
Operations going on in Poonch necessitate immediate equipment
of our forces with full complement of arms and ammunition. I
have therefore requested the Hon’blc Defence Member to ar¬
range to release stocks from Delhi immediately and if some ha\c
to be obtained from other places then these may also be sent
immediately by air direct without transhipment at Delhi.
The nature of the country in Poonch has shown that bridges
on hill terrain which are being destroyed by enemy action require

58
 THE GATHERING STORM 59

urgent replacement. This can be done easily if one mile long of

Bailey bridging material is supplied on payment to the State. It
is understood that this stock is lying at Calcutta and the easiest
way to get it would be by a priority transit by rail via Pathankot.
As motor petrol is also immediately needed for operations
and climatic conditions are very uncertain, it is requested that in
place of sending petrol by one plane, two planes of Dalmia Jain
Airways may be allowed to bring it at least for one week.
In the memo which I left with Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh to
be handed to Mr. Shankar, aviation spirit was also asked for.
I gave my copy of it to the latter when I met him at yours a
few days ago. No intimation has as yet been received whether
this is going to be supplied. We want this also very immediately,
particularly as reconnoitring by air of various operations of the
State has become a necessity.
As you must be aware, owing to breakdown of communica¬
tions valuable commodities like silk, pashmina, dry and fresh
fruit and walnuts are held up here. It will be in the interest of
purchasers and the consumers if the Government of India could
kindly help by allowing a freighter service to be run for at least
a fortnight by Dalmia Jain Airways, who are already running a
chartered passenger service here. Goods worth millions of rupees
will be exported in this way. Some of these goods if not exported
will perish here, while people in consuming centres will be deprived
of the use of the same. I have directed the managing committee
of the Dalmias to apply for permission for this freighter service.
I have already requested you more than once to kindly let
us have, though it be temporarily only, a broadcasting set for
counteracting the propaganda which, as you must be aware, is
being set against us by Pakistan Radio for a major portion of the
time of the news service period. We are very keen on telling the
people in this country of the fallacious and baseless propaganda
which is being raised against us. At present the only source
through which we can counteract news is through the Indian
Dominion broadcasting station and although we are"kindly allowed
to do this, it is realised that we could not justifiably claim more
of your time than at present could be spared for us.
With regard to the Kishenganga bridge, I thought the matter
was so secret that it had better be talked to the department concern¬
ed only. I therefore did not refer to it in the meeting. Since through
your kindness and of the Defence Department, Lt. Col. Kashmir
Singh has been relieved and has arrived here, he will study the
 sardar patel’s correspondence

situation and if necessary inform me of what is desired to be done.

I will address you and the Hon’ble Defence Minister about it later.
Our Road and Telegraph Chief Engineers have already reach¬
ed Jammu and will be at Madhopur tomorrow. I hope your
officers will also be there on due date. Government is very keen
to push on the works under contemplation and I am sure this
will be done at the earliest practicable date.
Hoping to be excused for the trouble and with best regards,
Yours sincerely,
B. L. Batra
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

63
New Delhi
20 October 1947
My dear Rafi Sahib,
Batra, Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir State, has written
to me that owing to the breakdown of communications, valuable
commodities like silk, pashmina, dry and fresh fruit and walnuts
are held up there and that it would be best if the Government
of India could help by allowing a freighter service to be run for
about a fortnight between Srinagar and Delhi.
2. I do not know whether it would be feasible, but since the
season for Srinagar is only a fortnight more, I think it would be
better if immediate arrangements could be made for this service.
You could probably select some other suitable service and ar¬
range that a freighter flies every day to Srinagar and back with
these articles.
3. The Kashmir officer is due to leave tomorrow morning by
air. I would, therefore, be grateful if you could let me know
some time today whether anything would be possible, and, if so,
what further action or assistance you would require from the
Kashmir Government sponsored flight and any arrangement for
payment of freight etc. would be with the Kashmir Government.
It would be for them to recover whatever amount may be nece¬
ssary from the actual consigners. .
7 Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Rafi Ahmed Kidwai
New Delhi
 64
New Delhi
20 October 1947

My dear Chakravarty,
You remember you had a discussion with Batra, Deputy
Prime Minister of Kashmir, regarding the supply of petrol and
aviation spirit. Batra lias written to H. M. again suggesting that
in place of sending petrol by one plane two planes of Dalmia
Jain Airways may be allowed to bring it at least foi one week.
I think he also mentioned about the supply of petrol and avia¬
tion spirit, how much is being flown per day, what is the total
quantity that has already been sent and how much has been
earmarked for Kashmir State at Pathankot and Amritsai.
2. Since the Kashmir representative is leaving tomorrow by
air, I should be grateful if a reply could be sent some time to¬
day.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
S. Chakravarty, Esq., m.b.e., i.c.s.
Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Transport
New Delhi

65
New Delhi
21 October 1947
My dear Mahajan,
I hope you have already received a letter from Bakshi Tek
Chand [a former Judge of the Lahore High Court] which must
have been sent to you after I had a talk with him subsequent to
my first discussion with Sheikh Abdullah.
Since then I have had further discussions with him. He
seems to me genuinely anxious to co-operate and sincerely desirous
of assisting the State in dealing with the external dangers and inter¬
nal troubles with which it is threatened. But, at the same time,
as is natural, he feels that unless something is done and is done
immediately to strengthen his hands both in popular eyes and in
61
62 sardar patel’s correspondence

dealings with those dangers, it would be impossible for him to

do anything substantial.

I myself feel that the position which Sheikh Abdullah takes

up is understandable and reasonable. In the mounting demands
for the introduction ol responsible government in States, such
as you have recently witnessed in Travancore and Mysore, it is
impossible for you to isolate yourself. It is obvious that in your
dealings with the external dangers and internal commotion with
which you are faced, mere brute force is not enough. We, on
our part, have pledged to give you the maximum support and we
will do so. But I am afraid, without some measure of popular
backing, particularly from amongst the community which repre¬
sents such an overwhelming majority in Kashmir, it would be
difficult to make such support go to the farthest limit that is
necessary if we are to crush the disruptive forces which are being
raised and organised. Nor do I think it would be possible for
you to maintain for long the exclusive or the predominant mono¬
poly ol any particular community in your security services. It is
as necessary for you to treat those who are willing to co-operate
with trust and confidence in respect of these services as in respect
of others which are generally termed nation-building departments.
In all these circumstances, it is my sincere and earnest ad¬
vice to you to make a substantial gesture to win Sheikh Abdullah’s
support. I have no desire to suggest that you should do so in a
manner which would be completely revolutionary in character.
Such a step may undermine the loyal and willing support of the
body politic. I fully realise that His Highness would like to
safeguard his position and that of the State in certain matters.
I have no doubt that human ingenuity, statesmanship and con¬
ciliation can find a solution in which Sheikh Sahib’s position can
be safeguarded without in any way jeopardising that of His
Highness.
I feel that it would be in our mutual interests for you to
rellect calmly and dispassionately on what I have said above.
It would, in my opinion, be best if you could come here for
consultation and, if possible, His Highness could be persuaded to
come here as well. We could then hammer out something which
would rally popular support in defence of the State both from
without and from within.
Dewan Shiv Saran Lai, formerly Deputy Commissioner of
Dcra Ismail Khan, who has recently come to Delhi from the
Frontier, is also coming by this plane. He has his own ideas
 TIIE GATHERING STORM

how he can be of service to the State. You can hear him and
decide for yourself to what extent his ideas are practicable or
would suit your requirements.
With kind regards, .
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

Mehrchand Mahajan, Esq.

Prime Minister of Kashmir
Srinagar

66
Srinagar
23 October 1947

My dear Sardar Patelji,

After I had written to you a letter, I received yours of 21
October 1947.
I note your views about the constitutional position in the
State but the situation in the State at the present moment is such
that one cannot get a single moment to think of politics. We are
practically working on a war basis and every minute of our time
is taken up with the border situation which is worsening every
day. Practically the whole of our Muslim military and police
has either deserted or has not behaved in the proper manner.
The help that you kindly promised has not arrived and we are
surrounded on all sides. You will agree with me that it is
hardly the time to think of any constitutional issues. As soon as I
get breathing time I will come to you and discuss these matters.
All I pray is that kindly implement the promise you made for
sending equipment to us but which has not so far arrived.
Expecting an immediate implementation of your very kind
promise,
Yours very sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Home and States Minister
New Delhi
 67

Jammu Tawi
23 October 1947
My dear Sardar Patelji,
I am enclosing herewith a draft of a Press Note that I pro¬
pose to issue. I seek your advice in the matter. A reply by
the earliest airmail will be appreciated. I may mention that we
have not yet received the assistance that was promised and the
situation is worsening every day. I am sure that on receipt of
this letter you will kindly see that the equipment required by us
is flown to Srinagar immediately.
With kindest regards,
Yours very sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

His Highness and the Premier visited the border of the State with
Pakistan from Kathua to Bhimbar. The whole border was in smoke and
(lames. It was a story of burnt houses, loot, abducted women and mass
massacres. Over 75% houses of Hindus and Sikhs within 4 miles of the
border have been looted, burnt; men, women and children have been killed,
303 rifles and ammunition have been recovered from some of the raiders.
There is evidence of the use of mortar as well. Pathans with passports have been
found raiding the State. Photographs of some persons killed have been taken.
Leaflets printed on cloth have been dropped from the air and they arc from a
band who threatens to invade Jammu & Kashmir. Several Muslim military per¬
sonnel and police have deserted under communal pressure from outside and some
are under arrest at Sialkot with the Pakistan Army as deserters. Clearest evidence
of an invasion from outside and an attempt to create an internal revolution
on a well-thought-out plan is available. Kotli and Poonch are being similarly
invaded and there are signs that Mirpur and Bhimbar may be the next objec¬
tive. Kotli has been besieged. There is a similar story of villages being looted
and burnt. Hindus and Sikhs have been massacred and converted and women
being abducted. A Minister of Government is on the spot at Poonch. I he

64
 THE GATHERING STORM
65

result of these raids and attempt to create disturbances and disorder and com¬
munal frenzy within the State which was free from it has been that ret a 1a-
tion and revenge have started from the local Hindu and Sikh population. Some
houses of Muslims have been burnt and looted and there have been a few
casualties. Bands of Muslims going to Pakistan en route have attacked Hindus
and Sikhs and have killed some persons and some have themselves been killed
in this attempt. The Government of Jammu & Kashmir and its officers are
doing their best to protect Muslim houses and give free and safe passages to
those who do not owe allegiance and loyalty to His Highness. His Highness’
Government wishes to make it plain that if these raids from the Pakistan side do
not stop, it will become very difficult to further control the local population
which is in a great rage. Hindus and Sikhs cannot stand dishonour and
abduction of their womenfolk and killing of their women and childien and scenes
that have been witnessed in the Punjab may be witnessed in the State in spite
of the best efforts of the Jammu and Kashmir Government to protect life,
property and honour of women. His Highness Government again appeals to the
rulers of Pakistan to avert this crisis. This is not the time of charges and counter¬
charges. The Ruler and his Prime Minister have themselves seen all this with
their eyes. Let the Governor-General and the Premier of Pakistan come and
visit our border and see for themselves whether the reports on which they
repudiate our allegations are true or not. It seems local Pakistan officials are
not giving correct information and are encouraging these raids. It is not credi¬
ble that the West Punjab Government is so incompetent as not to be able to
allow passage of petrol, cloth etc., to reach the State border. The Government
has enough material to prove that all their actions are well planned. The
Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot, the Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi,
have both been told all these facts. The Sialkot Brigadier met the State Brigadier
at the border and he was given all details. State officials are meeting the
Pakistan officials and informing them of all that is happening but with no
effect. The result is that raids increase in intensity. No raids could take place
if the Pakistan authorities wished to stop them. The Pakistan military was
informed by the police that 3,000 refugees had been killed inside the State in
a refugee camp. They came and were shown by the State authorities the camp
and they discovered the information was a myth. The refugees were being
well cared for in the camp.
The telegram of the Pakistan Premier threatens the Jammu & Kashmir
Government with serious consequences. The Government of His Highness is
not used to such threats and these threats, if repeated, will result in a com¬
plete deadlock between Pakistan and the State. It is for His Highness to
decide whether he will remain independent or will join any Dominion. He
has at present assumed an attitude of neutrality. Is it consistent with the
assertions of the rulers of Pakistan to coerce and threaten His Highness not
to join the Indian Dominion if he so decides? It has been asserted quite often
S.C.-5
66 sardar patel’s correspondence

by the Pakistan rulers that it is for the rulers of States to decide as they
like without external pressure as to the course of action to be adopted and
this is in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Independence Act.
The assertion of free communications between Jammu & Kashmir and
Pakistan is denied. No Hindu or Sikh can pass on these roads. Even Kashmiri
Muslims who went to Rawalpindi for trade came back empty-handed and
deprived of the sale proceeds of their goods. There have been a number of
casualties of Hindus and Sikhs who attempted to use these roads. Both these
roads are completely blocked for use as ordinary trade routes and communica¬
tion channels.
The Government appeals to the Governor-General, Pakistan to intervene
and order restoration of friendly relations. It also assures the people of the
State not to get panicky. There is no cause for it. The situation is well in
hand.
 CHAPTER V

MOUNTBATTEN-JINNAH TALKS

68
Government House
New Delhi
25 October 1947

N My dear Deputy Prime Minister,

General Rees1 has managed to obtain some further informa¬
tion about Kashmir confidentially. It appears that Kohala has
not been attacked so far. Tribesmen advancing at Uri were
intercepted by Kashmir State troops, and a heavy battle appears
n to be in progress there.
There are now rumours that tribesmen from Dir and Chitral
<i may be advancing on Srinagar.
There are reports that villages in Jammu have been attacked
by non-Muslims, and there are rumours that Muslim villages
across the border have now been attacked by non-Muslim
crowds who are said to have been supported by State troops
and police. As General Rees obtained this information on a
confidential basis, I would be glad if you would keep this to
> yourself.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister.
Yours very sincerely,
Mountbatten of Burma
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

1 Thomas Wyndord Rees, Major General, head of Military

Engineering Staff
attached to Emergency Committee of Cabinet

67
 69

Government House
New Delhi
27 October 1947
My dear Deputy Prime Minister,
I have just heard from General Rees that our troops landed
successfully at Srinagar and are advancing to meet the tribesmen
who are approaching from Baramulla.
I here is no doubt that if we could have sent our forces a
fortnight ago to Srinagar or could have relieved the State Forces
in Jammu to go to Srinagar, the position could have been held
with comparative ease. Now I must remind you that the risk is
great and that the chances of keeping the raiders out of Srinagar
are not too good.
Fourtunately the tribesmen are presumably out for loot, and
since the Valley has a very small proportion of non-Muslims they
are bound to loot and massacre their own co-religionists whilst the
forces of India support Sheikh Abdullah against them. This, I
feel, will gain us a political advantage, and if Sheikh Abdullah’s
forces can be rallied in this way the tribesmen can probably be
repulsed before they have done too much looting.
The supply by air or road at this time of year is a hazar¬
dous proceeding, as was pointed out by the Chiefs of Staff at
the Defence Committee.
General Rees today spoke to a demobilised British officer who
three days ago motored from Srinagar to Abbottabad.
He was held up and robbed by an advancing lashkar [band]
of tribesmen who robbed him and also robbed and shot a retired
British officer travelling with him. A Muslim ex-INA officer
then intervened and helped to have these two British officers
motored safely through to Abbottabad, together with the wife and
daughter of the badly wounded officer to look after him.
The British officer gained the impression that the movement
was very definitely organised; that there were ex-INA officers
involved; that a staff for controlling Srinagar (e.g. Deputy Com¬
missioner designate, etc.) was en route to Srinagar; that the
Muslim League is involved.

68
ARRIVAL OF FIRST INDIAN TROOPS IN SRINAGAR TO DEFEND KASHMIR VALLEY IN 1947
 mountbatten-jinnah talks

The M T. used were civilian buses and petrol is very short.

Heavy casualties had been inflicted on Kashmir State troops
from whom there had probably been a number of desertions.
There was no indication anywhere of Pakistan Army ofliccis
taking part.
The tribesmen included Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds; and it was
clearly impossible to prevent them looting.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Piime Minister.
Yours very sincerely,
Mountbatten of Burma

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

70
Jammu
27 October 1947
My dear Sardar Patelji,
His Highness and myself are deeply grateful to you for what
you did1 for Kashmir yesterday. H.H. asks to me to convey to
you personally his sense of deep obligations for this timely help
which was so quickly given. I only depend on your valuable
advice and guidance. I apologise for any foolish words I may
have said. Now the whole matter is in your hands. Kindly send
me the Mysore model and I will send my views how far it can
be adopted to a backward State like Kashmir. You can yourself
with Bakshiji [Bakshi Tek Chand] finalise it and I will come
when called for discussions.
With kindest regards and my thanks once again. It was a
most momentous and quick decision ever taken by politicians in
India.
Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan

1 Landing of Indian troops in Srinagar

 71

Government House
New Delhi
31 October 1947
My dear Prime Minister,
I know I do not need to assure you that no sort of information
was given from Government House which could possibly have
been used by [Philip] Noel Baker' in his statement in the House of
Commons that there would be a meeting on Kashmir at Lahore on
Saturday; but I think you would like to know that I have verified
that the L .K. High Commissioner here, [Sir Terence] Shone, had
no knowledge of this meeting.
The only possible source, therefore, must be from Pakistan.
You saw how my letter was worded, which was based entirely
on the meeting of the Joint Defence Council and our readiness to
discuss Kashmir after this meeting, since Liaquat’s illness prevented
him from travelling to Delhi.
I am fully aware that this makes the position difficult,
but I feel that a statement on the lines of the attached draft
may help to restore the position.
I am coming round to see you about this as soon as the
Emergency Committee meeting is over, and to discuss the line
we should take up at Lahore, not only to expose the complicity
of Pakistan but to clear ourselves of Liaquat’s fantastic charges
that wc have in some way engineered the situation.
I have never been so certain in my life that the future
welfare of millions depends upon the skilful handling of this
all-important meeting, and I am proud to be able to accompany
you and offer my assistance in a constitutional manner.
Yours very sincerely,
Mountbatten of Burma
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
Copy to the Hon’blc Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

1 Conservative British Nl.P., often displayed anti-Congress attitude whil speak

ing in Commons.

70
 72
New Delhi
2 November 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

Ismay1 and I have been working most of the day trying to
reconstitute as fairly as we possibly can the burden of our joint
conversations with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr Jinnah, and
we both think that the enclosed accounts are as fair as can be
produced considering that no notes were taken at the time and
the conversation with Mr. Jinnah alone lasted over 3 hours. 1
should be delighted for you to show these to the Deputy Prime
Minister but would be grateful if you would not show them to
anyone else without consulting me, because the whole basis of our
talk was unauthorised and unofficial.
When we arrived there is no doubt that both Liaquat and
Jinnah felt that from beginning to end this was a deliberate, long
worked out, deep laid plot to secure Kashmir s permanent acce¬
ssion. We worked hard to dispel this illusion but do not guaran¬
tee we were successful.
I enclose a very rough note as a possible basis for discussion,
after which I would suggest that you should draft a telegram to
Liaquat sending your proposals for stopping this fighting.
Perhaps you and the Deputy Prime Minister would stay back
after the Defence Committee tomorrow morning to discuss it.
May I congratulate you on your broadcast which I have just
read and which is admirable and in striking contrast to Mr.
Jinnah’s statement?
Yours very sincerely,
Mountbatten of Burma
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
PS.
The enclosures referred to in the notes on the discussions are
from my private files, but you of course are well aware of them.
M. of B.

1 Lord Hasting [smay, Chief of Staff to Lord Mountbatten, March-November

1947; Military Secretary to Lord Willingdon, 1931-33; Secretary, Committee of Imperial
Defence, 1938

71
 ENCLOSURE
NOTE OF A TALK WITH MR. LIAQ.UAT ALI KHAN AT LAHORE ON
1 NOVEMBER 1947

Having made the excuse of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan’s illness to enable
me to take Pandit Nehru to Lahore for a Joint Defence Council meeting, I felt it
was essential that part of the J.D.C. meeting should take place in Mr. Lia¬
quat Ali Khan’s presence. On arrival at Lahore, however, I discovered that he
was still too ill to come to Government House. I therefore got rid of 24 of the
26 items on the agenda with Mr. Nishtar as the Pakistan Government’s re¬
presentative, and then the whole J.D.C. moved down to the Pakistan Prime
.Minister s House and continued the meeting in his bedroom. Liaquat was sit¬
ting up with a rug round his knees still looking very ill.

After the two controversial items had been disposed of everyone left the
room excepting Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Lord Ismay and myself.

I began by giving him the statement by the Indian Chiefs of Staff on the
sequence of events in Kashmir (copy attached) which I took back from him
after he had read it.

I then proceeded to explain the position as I saw it, beginning with the
accession ofJunagadh and going on through the whole history of the Kashmir
situation.

As so much of this is the same as I was later to repeat to Mr. Jinnah, it

is not recorded here at length.

The burden of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan’s contention was that the Maha¬
raja had categorically refused any form of negotiations or even discussions
with Pakistan and that he had brought about a serious situation by allow¬
ing his Hindus and in particular his State forces, to massacre Muslims in the
Poonch and Mirpur areas and across the border of Jammu. This had been
more than the tribes could stand and this was the origin of their raid on
Srinagar.
I asked him whether he expected us to believe that Afridis and Mahsuds
could have come from beyond Peshawar in motor transport without the Gov¬
ernment of Pakistan being at least aware of this. He did not deny knowledge
of the movement but defended himself by saying that if they had made any
attempt to interfere with the movement of tribes in their own buses, this
would have precipitated trouble with the rest of the tribes on the frontier.

I told him that my Government were quite sincere in their offer of a

plebiscite, and showed him the draft formula which would also co'cr Junagadh.

72
 MOUNTBATTEN-JINNAH TALKS •O

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan appeared to be very depressed and almost dis¬
inclined to make any further effort to avoid war. Lord Ismay and I did oui
best to cheer him up, the former pointing out that, if the leaders on either
side abandoned hope of peace, all was indeed lost.
As time was getting on and as Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan looked very tired,
we said we would go back to lunch with Mr. Jinnah at Government House
and after discussions with him, we would, if he wished, come back and conti¬
nue our conversation with the Prime Minister. This he gladly accepted and
bade us a very friendly au revoir.
{Note: Owing to the great length of the discussion with Mr. Jinnah
time did not permit of our returning to see his Prime Minister, but we sent
a message excusing ourselves.)

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION WITH MR. JINNAH IN THE PRESENCE OF

LORD ISMAY AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, ON
1 NOVEMBER 1947

Introduction

In the course of 3^ hours of the most arduous and concentrated conver¬

sation, Kashmir took up most of the time; Junagadh took next place and
Hyderabad the least. We darted about between these three subjects as well
as talking about the over-all policy affecting States. I have divided this note
into four parts, although this was not necessarily the order in which the sub¬
jects were discussed nor of course were all the remarks made consecutively.

Part I: India’s Policy towards States Whose Accession Was in Dispute

I pointed out the similarity between the cases of Junagadh and Kashmir
and suggested that plebiscites should be held under UNO as soon as condi¬
tions permitted. I told Mr. Jinnah that I had drafted out in the aeroplane
a formula which I had not yet shown to my Government but to which I
thought they might agree. This was the formula:—

“The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of
a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his
subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion
whose majority community is the same as the State’s, the question
of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the
Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to
the will of the people.”

Mr. Jinnah’s first observation was that it was redundant and undesirable
to have a plebiscite when it was quite clear that States should go according
to their majority population, and if we would give him the accession of Kash¬
mir he would offer to urge the accession of Junagadh direct to India.
74 sardar patel’s correspondence
I told him that my Government would never agree to changing the ac¬
cession of a State against the wishes of the ruler or the Government that made
the accession unless a plebiscite showed that the particular accession was not
favoured by the people.

Mr. Jinnah then went on to say that he could not accept a formula if
it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that
Hyderabad did not wish to accede to cither Dominion and he could not be
a party to coercing them to accession.

I offered to put in some reference to States whose accession was in dis¬

pute “to try and get round the Hyderabad difficulty” and he said that he
would give that his careful consideration if it was put to him.

I then pointed out that he really could not expect a principle to be

applied in the case of Kashmir if it was not applied in the case of Junagadh
and Hyderabad, but that we naturally would not expect him to be a party
to compulsory accession against the wishes of the Nizam.

Part II: Hyderabad

I told Mr. Jinnah how much I regretted that at this serious moment
he should have been compromised by the behaviour of the Itttehad-ul-Mus-
lmin’s delegation to Karachi.

He asked me what I meant. I told him that the two delegates, Yamin
Zuberi and his companion, who had been reported by the Press as having
seen him in Karachi, had returned to Hyderabad and were alleged to have
influenced the Nizam into going back on his word to accept the standstill
agreement which his Executive Council had passed by six votes to three. The
inference had been drawn that they had carried a message to H.E.H. from
Mr. Jinnah, and that this was the cause of the latter’s reversal of his decision.
Mr. Jinnah assured me categorically that he had merely seen these two
men out of courtesy, for a matter of five or perhaps seven minutes. They
had told him that H.E.H. was about to sign an instrument of accession to
India, and they begged Mr. Jinnah to intervene. Mr. Jinnah had replied that
it was outside his power to intervene and that it was only a question for the
Nizam and his own Government to decide.
I then recounted to Mr. Jinnah briefly the events which Sir Sultan
Ahmed1 had related to me on 31 October, and Lord Ismay substantiated this
account from a letter he had received from Sir Walter Monckton.2
Mr. Jinnah once more affirmed most solemnly that he had nothing what¬
ever to do with the recent reversal of the Nizam’s decision. He had sent no
verbal message whatsoever to Hyderabad, rhe advice he had tendered to
H.E.H. in writing some time ago was that he was between the devil and the

1 Legal Adviser to Nizam

* Constitutional Adviser to Nizam
 MOUNTBATTEN-JINNAH TALKS '3

deep blue sea. If he acceded to India, there would be bloodshed in Hydera¬

bad; and if he did not accede, there would equally be bloodshed. Thus an
agreement, but not accession, seemed to be the only hope.
I told him that the Nizam had sent me a letter through Sir Sultan
Ahmed, dated 30 October, in which he implied that if negotiations now broke
down with a new negotiating committee he might have to consider entering
into an agreement with Pakistan.
Mr. Jinnah laughed and said, “That looks to me as though he is threat¬
ening you. It has nothing to do with me. I have never discussed any form
of agreement with the Nizam.”
I asked him straight out whether he would be prepared to sign a stand¬
still agreement with Hyderabad if he were asked to by the Nizam. He replied
that a standstill agreement implied that there were relations or intertwining
factors which formed the basis for a standstill [agreement]. He could not
think of any such factors between Pakistan and Hyderabad, and whereas he did
not envisage wishing to sign such an agreement, he would have to examine
the matter carefully, if it were put to him, before refusing.
I drew his attention to the unfortunate effect it would have if in fact
he were to start negotiations with the Nizam after they had been broken off
with the Dominion to which he was irretrievably linked geographically and by
majority of population.
Mr. Jinnah said he would bear this in mind.

Part III: Junagadh

I read out to Mr. Jinnah the following extract from a statement made
by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, which had been published in the Statesman of Friday,
21 September:

“The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has
left all Indian States completely free to join either one Dominion or the
other or to enter into treaty relations with either. Legally and con¬
stitutionally there can be no question of putting limitations on this right
of the States. Muslim League leaders before 15 August and the official
spokesmen of the Pakistan Government thereafter have publicly declared
their agreement with this view; and have since rigorously stood by it.
No objection has been raised by Pakistan to any State acceding to the
Dominion of India.”

I asked Mr. Jinnah if he still stood rigorously by his Prime Minister’s

statement. He looked somewhat uneasy but admitted that it represented the
legal position. I told him I woud revert to this when talking about Kashmir,
but in the meanwhile wanted to know what he proposed to do about
Junagadh.
76 sardar patel’s correspondence

He admitted that there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion

of Pakistan, and said that he had been most averse from accepting this acce¬
ssion. He had in fact demurred for a long time, but had finally given way
to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan.

I told him that in the case of Babariawad and Mangrol, it was clearly
the wish of the people that they would be in the Dominion of India, and that
they had in fact signed instruments of accession to that effect. How then could
he refuse them the right of accession ? He said that Mangrol’s accession had
been forced on him, and withdrawn almost before the ink was dry. In any
event, he had persuaded the Nawab of Junagadh to accept legal arbitration.
I told him that the Government of India would not have minded the
position so much if Junagadh had played the game and not interefered inter¬
nally in these small States; but that they were oppressing the people, impos¬
ing fines and removing their grain. I pointed out that repeated telegrams
had been sent protesting at this. Mr. Jinnah denied this, and stated cate¬
gorically that neither Pakistan nor Junagadh had sent any soldiers or
armed police into these States.
I told him that we had definite information that Junagadh had sent
armed police into both of them, and that they were oppressing the people.
Pandit Nehru had telegraphed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan about this, and the
latter had undertaken to ask Junagadh to withdraw their forces.
When they had failed to do so, the Government of India had telegraph¬
ed, a few days back, saying that we would have to protect the interests of these
States if the Junagadh forces were not withdrawn. Since they had not been
withdrawn, India were going to put in forces to protect their interests, subject
to a plebiscite being subsequently held in these States about final accession.
They would go in under a flag of truce, with loud-hailers and inviting the co¬
operation of Junagadh authorities.
Mr. Jinnah lamented that the Government of India had not invited the
co-operation of Pakistan beforehand. I pointed out that they had in fact
been unable to enforce their own orders and that so far as I was aware,
Indian forces had been sent into these two States that very day.

Part IV: Kashmir

I handed Mr. Jinnah a copy of the statement of events signed by the

Indian Chiefs of Staff, which I had shown to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. He
asked if he could keep it, but I made him return the original and gave him
an unsigned copy. Although he expressed surprise at the remarkable speed
at which we had been able to organise sending troops into Srinagar plain, he
did not question the document or my statement.
Mr. Jinnah’s principal complaint was that the Government of India had
failed to give timely information to the Government of Pakistan about the
action that they proposed to take in Kashmir.
 MOUNTBATTEN-JINNAII TALKS ' /

I pointed out the speed at which events had moved. It was not until
the evening of the 24th that reliable reports had been received of the tribal
incursion, and it was not until the 25th that observers had been sent up to
confirm these reports. Thus the decision to send in troops had not been taken
until the 26th, by which date the Maharaja had announced his intention of
acceding to India. There had not been a moment to lose. I added that I
could not recall the exact time, but that it was my impression that Pandit
Nehru had telegraphed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on the 26th, immediately
the decision to send in troops had been taken.
Mr. Jinnah complained that this information should have been sent much
earlier—in fact on 24 October. “If,” he said, “they had on that date tele¬
graphed saying that a critical situation was reported to be developing in
Kashmir and they had sent in observers to confirm these reports and suggested
that Pakistan should co-operate in dealing with the situation, all the trouble
would have been ended by now.”
Lord Ismay agreed that the Government of Pakistan should have had the
earliest possible notification. This was the first thing that had occurred to
him on his return to Delhi from the United Kingdom, and, indeed, he was
under the impression that it had been done. To the best of his recollection.
Pandit Nehru had told him on the 28th that he had kept Mr. Liaquat Ali
Khan in touch with what was happening all the time. If this had not
been done, the oversight must have been due to the pressure of events, and not
because the Government of India had anything to hide.
Mr. Jinnah looked up his files and said that the telegram had arrived after
the troops had landed, and that it did not contain any form of an appeal for
co-operation between the two Dominions in this matter; it merely informed
him of the accession and the landing of troops. Continuing he said that the
accession was not a bonafide one since it rested on “fraud and violence” and
would never be accepted by Pakistan. I asked him to explain why he used
the term “fraud,” since the Maharaja was fully entitled, in accordance with
Pakistan’s own official statement, which I had just read over to him, to make
such accession. It was therefore prefectly legal and valid.
Mr. Jinnah said that this accession was the end of a long intrigue and
that it had been brought about by violence. I countered this by saying that
I entirely agreed that the accession had been brought about by violence; I
knew the Maharaja was most anxious to remain independent, and nothing
but the terror of violence could have made him accede to either Dominion;
since the violence had come from tribes for whom Pakistan was responsible, it
was clear that he would have to accede to India to obtain help against the
invader. Mr. Jinnah repeatedly made it clear that in his opinion it was
India who had committed this violence by sending her troops into Srinagar; I
countered as often with the above argument, thereby greatly enraging Mr.
Jinnah at my apparent denseness.
78 sardar patel’s correspondence

I' rom this point, he went on to say that the Government of India autho-
tities had encouraged the Kashmir Government to massacre Muslims in the
Poonch and Mirpur areas. I repudiated this as obvious nonsense. He then
said, "Very well, it was the Congress party that did it.” I pointed out that
if there had been any such massacre by Hindus in the Poonch area (which
I did not deny) this had been done entirely by Kashmir Hindus and could
hardly have been done with the object of inciting the tribes to invade Kashmir
and come so close to capturing Srinagar, merely to afford the Maharaja an
excuse for acceding to India for the purpose of obtaining help.
I then explained to Mr. Jinnah, at some length, the policy which I had
consistently pursued in regard to Kashmir, namely—trying to persuade the
Maharaja to institute progressive government, ascertain the will of the people
and then accede to the Dominion of the people’s choice before 15 August.
I recounted how I had tried to persuade H.H. to do this during my visit to
Kashmir in July, and how I had told him my views privately whilst driving
in the car with him; but that when I had wished to have a formal meeting
with him in the presence of his Prime Minister and my Private Secretary
(Sir George Abell) on the last day of my visit, he had pleaded illness and
gone to bed to avoid the meeting. On leaving Srinagar, I had instructed the
Resident (Colonel Webb) to continue to give the Maharaja this advice officially;
and finally Lord Ismay had gone up at the end of August with instructions
to advise the Maharaja to hurry up and ascertain the will of the people. But
the Maharaja had invariably avoided the issue, and had always turned the
conversation to lighter topics.
Mr. Jinnah paid a handsome tribute to the correctness of my policy
and admitted that it was I who had put the ex-Prcmier of Kashmir (Pandit
Kak) in touch with him when he came to Delhi.
Mr. Jinnah next referred to the statement which he had issued to the
Press that day (copy attached) and enlarged on his difficulties in not being
able to have any reasonable conversation, either personally or through repre¬
sentatives, with the Maharaja or even with his Prime Minister; and that, not
only had the Maharaja brought his troubles upon himself by this attitude, but
had greatly aggravated them by the massacres to which he had incited his
Dogras against innocent Muslims. He said that even today at Jammu 90,000
Muslims were in danger of being massacred.
I told Mr. Jinnah that Pandit Nehru had expressed horror at the mass¬
acres that had taken place and had issued stringent orders that everything
possible was to be done to stop them. Only the night before I had supple¬
mented those instructions myself through an Indian Brigadier who had just
returned from Kashmir and who fully agreed with the necessity for stopping

any further killing of Muslims.

I informed Mr. Jinnah that we already had a Brigade Group of -,000
in Srinagar; that a 4th Battalion would be flown in that day, and a
men
 MOUNTBATTEN-JINNAH TALKS 'v

5th Battalion within the next two days. I said that we should have no diffi¬
culty in holding Srinagar and that the prospect of the tribes entering the
city in any force was now considered remote.
Lord Ismay suggested that the main thing was to stop the fighting; and
he asked Mr. Jinnah how he proposed that this should be done. Mr. Jinnah said
that both sides should withdraw at once. He emphasised that the withdrawal
must be simultaneous. When I asked him how the tribesmen were to be called
off, he said that all he had to do was to give them an order to come out and
to warn them that if they did not comply, he would send large forces along
their lines of communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar
with him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within 24
hours.
I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control that he appeared
to exercise over the raiders.
I asked him how he proposed that we should withdraw our forces, observ¬
ing that India’s forces were on the outskirts of Srinagar in a defensive role;
all the tribes had to do was to stop attacking. I also pointed out that we
could not possibly afford aeroplanes to fly the Indian troops back. Lord
Ismay suggested that they should march back via Banihal Pass.
I asked Mr. Jinnah why he objected so strongly to a plebiscite, and he
said he did so because with the troops of the Indian Dominion in military
occupation of Kashmir and with the National Conference under Sheikh Abdu¬
llah in power, such propaganda and pressure could be brought to bear that the
average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan.
I suggested that we might invite UNO to undertake the plebiscite and
send observers and organisers in advance to ensure that the necessary atmosphere
was created for a free and impartial plebiscite. I reiterated that the last thing
my Government wished was to obtain a false result by a fraudulent plebiscite.
Mr. Jinnah repeated that he and I were the only two who could orga¬
nise a plebiscite and said that we should do it together. Lord Ismay and I
went to great tiouble to explain that I was a constitutional Governor-General
and a Britisher, and that even if my Government would trust me sufficiently
to see this through, I was sure that Mr. Attlee would not give his consent.
Mr. Jinnah complained bitterly that after the extremely generous gesture
on the part of the Government of India in accepting his invitation to come
to discussions at Lahore, the illness of one man should have prevented some
other Minister from coming to conduct the negotiations; why, for example,
could Sardar Patel not have come? It was a matter of the greatest urgency
to get together on this problem, and he asked me how soon Pandit Nehru
could come to Lahore.
I countered by saying that it was now his turn to come to Delhi since
I had come to Lahore, and I invited him cordially to stay as my guest, when
I would take him to see Pandit Nehru in his bedroom.
80 sardar patel’s correspondence

lie said that this was impossible. I pointed out that I had been to see
Pandit Nehru personally in his bedroom and that I had now been to see his
Prime Minister in his bedroom, and that I failed to see what was improper
in this suggestion. He assured me that it was not a question of going to
anybody s bedroom, but that he was so busy he simply had no time to
leave Lahore while his Prime Minister was on the sick list.

I asked him afterwards if there was any single problem more serious or
urgent than Kashmir. I pointed out that when one was so busy one had
to arrange work in order of priority. If he admitted that Kashmir was top
priority, then all other work should stand aside for it and he should come to
Delhi at once. He said he regretted that this was impossible, for the whole
burden of events was on his shoulders at Lahore. I explained that he need only
be gone for the inside of a day and that I was anxious to return his hospi¬
tality. He said, "I would gladly come a hundred times to visit you; I just
cannot manage it while my Prime Minister is ill.” I asked him to ccome as
soon as his Prime Minister was well enough to travel, and he said, “We
shall have to see.”

Lord Ismay pointed out that the best way to stand well in world opinion
was for him now to come and return my visit and discuss Kashmir with
Pandit Nehru. Mr. Jinnah said that he had lost interest in what the world
thought of him since the British Commonwealth had let him down when he
had asked them to come to the rescue of Pakistan.

I ended the meeting, as I had started it, by making it quite clear that
I had come unbriefed and unauthorised to discuss Kashmir, since I had not
had a chance of seeing Pandit Nehru after he had informed me he would
be unable to accompany me. I told him I was speaking not as Governor-
General of India but as the ex-Viceroy who had been responsible for partition
and was anxious to see that it did not result in any harm coming to the two
Dominions. He said he quite saw this but hoped that I would be able to
discuss the various proposals which we had been talking about with Pandit
Nehru and send him a firm telegram. I undertook to convey this message
to Pandit Nehru.

Round about 5.00 p.m. it was obvious that we were going to be too
late to go and see Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan again, so Lord Ismay left the room
to telephone our apologies to him. I took the opportunity of Lord Ismay’s
absence to ‘tell off’ Mr. Jinnah. I told him that I considered it was unstates-
manlike, inept and bad mannered for him to issue a statement which directly
accused the Government of India of ‘'fraud and violence in Kashmir a few
hours before he expected the Prime Minister of India to come and discuss
this very question in a friendly manner; and that had he been feeling "ell
enough to come, such a studied and ill-timed insult would have been enough
to send his temperature up again. I finally pointed out that Pakistan was in
 MOUNTBATTEN-JINNAH TALKS °1

my opinion in a much weaker position than India, not only from the obvious
military point of view, but I was sure, the world would think they were in
the wrong; and that this form of abuse before a discussion commenced could
only put Pakistan even deeper in the wrong.
At the end Mr. Jinnah became extremely pessimistic and said it was quite
clear that the Dominion of India was out to throttle and choke the Dominion
of Pakistan at birth, and that if they continued with their oppression there
would be nothing for it but to face the consequences. However depressing the
prospect might be, he was not afraid; for the situation was already so bad
that there was little that could happen to make it worse.
I pointed out that war, whilst admittedly very harmful lor India, would
be completely disastrous for Pakistan and himself.
Lord Ismay tried to cheer him up out of his depression but I fear was
not very successful. However, we parted on good terms.

SUGGESTED PROPOSALS TO PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT TO FORM

THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION

1. It is of paramount importance, not only to the Government of India,

Pakistan and Kashmir, but also to the cause of world peace, that the fighting
in Kashmir should cease at the earliest possible moment.
2. The best, if not the only, hope of achieving this object is a very early
meeting between accredited representatives of the two countries.
3. The Government of India, for their part, have no desire to maintain
troops in Kashmir, once the valley is safe from attack and law and order
have been restored. They are therefore prepared to give an undertaking to
withdraw their troops immediately the raiders have left the country and
returned to their homes.

4. It is the sincere desire of the Government of India that a plebiscite should

be held in Kashmir at the earliest possible date and in the fairest possible
way. They suggest that UNO might be asked to provide supervisors for
this plebiscite, and they are prepared to agree that a joint India-Pakistan
force should hold the ring while the plebiscite is being held.

5. The Government of India suggest that both Governments should agree

on the form of the public announcement to be made in regard to the pro¬
cedure for accession of those States in which this matter is in dispute. A
draft1 is attached as a basis of discussion.

6. They suggest that the above proposals should be the subject of a round¬
table discussion at the earliest possible date.

1 This is included in the Note on page 73.

S.C.-6
 CHAPTER VI

LEAGUE-BRITISH CONSPIRACY

73

New Delhi
2 November 1947
My dear Baldev Singh,
I he D.I.B. has intercepted a telephone message which shows
that there are no regular train services in Pakistan except special
trains moving Pakistani troops. It might be worth our while
going rather deeper into this matter. While developments in
Kashmir might explain this movement to some extent, the causes
might be far deeper than these. I do not know whether your
military intelligence are sufficiently posted with troop movements
in Pakistan.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Sardar Baldev Singh
New Delhi

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO SARDAR PATEL, DEPUTY PRIME

MINISTER, ON 31 OCTOBER 1947 BY SHRI G. L. PURI, DEPUTY
SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

With reference to my interview with you this morning I beg to submit

the following memorandum for your consideration:
The part that certain sections of the NWFP and tribal Pathans have
played in the recent invasion of Kashmir and Khan Abdul Qayum Khan,
League Premier, NWFP’s recent utterances regarding Kashmir are clear
proof that there is an organized conspiracy on the part of the Leaguc-cum-
British ruling clique to attack and capture a peaceful neighbouring State.
These events have proved beyond a shadow of doubt that Sir George Cunnin¬
gham, Agent to the Governor-General, Pakistan, for tribal areas, has utterly
failed to keep in check the tribes. This is just what was expected. It appears

82
 LEAGUE-BRITISH CONSPIRACY 83

I that the Pakistan Dominion is unable to maintain subsidies to the tribes to

fc keep them quiet. They have instigated them to attack minorities in the
| Frontier and Kashmir State to enable them to fill their empty bellies with
|| plunder and loot. VVe can be sure that after Kashmir they will not hesitate
1 to create trouble in the East Punjab. In fact newspaper reports show that the
5 Political Department has been encouraging tribesmen to settle in very large
jl numbers near the Radcliffe Line [RadclifTe Line—Boundary line between India
H and Pakistan under award given by Sir Cyril B. RadclifTe] and asking them
J to “protect the property of Muslim evacuees from East Punjab.” This amounts to
a direct invitation to the tribes to carry on their plunder and raids in the East
Punjab. It is quite clear from these facts that the financial burden of the tribal
H administration remains on the shoulders of the Indian Dominion and the
transference of power to the two Dominions does not absolve the Indian
Dominion of their great responsibility towards the tribes,
j 2. As you are aware, Mr. Jinnah by an autocratic order amended Section
51, sub-section 5 of the Government of India Act to empower himself to dis¬
miss Dr. Khan Saheb’s Ministry which still enjoys a substantial majority in
the Legislative Assembly. In a House of 50 Dr. Khan Saheb commands 31
votes and Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, Leader of the League Party, only 15.
Two by-elections are pending and Sardar Partap Singh, the only Akali member
of the Frontier Legislative Assembly, is not likely to associate himself with
the League Party in the present circumstances. It was under Mr. Jinnah’s
autocratic order that Dr. Khan Saheb’s Ministry was dismissed and Khan
Abdul Qayum Khan was called upon to form a Ministry though he had no
backing in the House to do so. The developments since the formation of the
League Ministry in the Frontier on 23 August have clearly proved that this
usurper Ministry is not only a menace to the peace and tranquillity in the
NWFP but a danger to world peace. Tragic happenings resulting in the
murdei of thousands of innocent Hindus and Sikhs, wholesale conversions, loot
and arson on an unprecedented scale and the part which the various officials
and the League Prime Minister played in this tragic drama, clearly show that
the Ministry wanted and wants to get rid of every member of the minority
community in the Frontier. The dislocation of trade and industry resulting
from these disorders has brought upon the poor peasants and working classes
throughout the province terrible misery and hardships. As stated by Mr.
Abdul Qayum, every effort is being made to disarm every one of his political
opponents and hound them out from the economic life of the province. There
is no chance of the autumn session of the Assembly being called, nor is there
any chance ot Dr. Khan Saheb’s challenge to hold general elections being
accepted.
3. On the top of this black record of unconstitutional procedure, murder, loot
and arson of the minorities and misery and starvation for the Pathan masses
comes this open complacency in the uncalled for invasion of Kashmir. Khan
 84 sardar patel’s correspondence

Abdul Qayum Khan’s latest speech, in which he calls upon every Pathan to
assist the raiders and appeals to every Muslim State to do likewise, does not
leave even a shadow of doubt that this usurper is bent upon using his
official position to engineer this attack and all the resources of the State are
being harnessed to that end. It may be pointed out here that after the for¬
mation of the League Ministry many discredited British officials who all their
lives had opposed the national movement and whose services Dr. Khan Saheb
dispensed with, have been reimported into the province. A typical case is
that of Major Drink, who was the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar district
when Pandit Jawaharlal visited the NWFP in October 1946. Dr. Khan
Sah( b suspected him ot having organised a violent hostile demonstration at the
aerodrome when Panditji arrived. He, therefore, threw him out of the pro¬
vince; but the League Ministry has brought him back as Chief Secretary.

4. Sheikh Mahboob Ali, ex-Political Agent, Malakand, who was accused of

engineering a violent attack upon Panditji during his visit to Malakand and
was suspended, has also been reinstated by the League Ministry. According
to Lala Mehrchand Mahajan, Prime Minister, Kashmir, a Muslim ex-Political
Agent has been behind the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen. He is no other
than Sheikh Mahboob Ali, who is notorious for the part he played in the
Afghanistan rebellion against King Amanullah while he was working in the
British Legation in Kabul.

5. The least that the Indian Union Government, which is championing the
cause of Kashmir, can do is not to recognise this usurper Government in the
NWFP. They should impose a strict economic blockade against this Govern¬
ment and should insist that a session of the Frontier Assembly be immediately
called so that the Opposition, consitutionally, may have a chance to function.
In case this demand is not met with and Dr. Khan Saheb and his party
decide to throw out Qayum’s Ministry by direct action and form a
Government of their own, the Indian Union Government should at once
recognise it.
6. Qayum’s Ministry in the Frontier has not only proved a menace to
Kashmir, but there is a growing feeling in Afghanistan that the Hitlerian tactics
of the British-cum-Lcaguc ruling group in the Frontier may jeopardise the peace
and tranquillity in Afghanistan also. The appointment of Sir Giles Squire
as Representative of the Indian Union in Kabul is interpreted as an unfriend¬
ly act because Sir Giles is a part and parcel of the ruling clique in the NWFP
who are threatening the internal security of Afghanistan. The Indian Union
Government should therefore take the earliest opportunity to establish their
independent diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan and develop a joint
policy with Afghanistan regarding the tribes who are being used by the
British against every progressive and democratic neighbour.

7. To sum up, I submit that—

 LEAGUE-BRITISII CONSPIRACY
85

Direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan should at once be

(1)
established and a joint tribal policy worked out.
Immediate economic blockade should be imposed against League
(2)
Ministry in NWFP.
Mr. Jinnah should be asked to allow a session of the NWFP
(3)
Assembly to be held, failing which Dr. Khan Sahcb should be
helped to throw out the League Ministry by direct action.
Dr. Khan Saheb should be empowered to negotiate with tribes.
(4)

New Delhi

74
Camp Residency Guest House
Jammu
7 November 1947

My dear States Minister,

I wish to explain the psychology of the people I am now
supposed to deal with. His Highness is extremely bitter. I neither
praise nor condemn his attitude, which is easily understood. ihe
Prime Minister is a man of ability and straightforwardness. He is
however an Arya Samajist with all the mentality and fanaticism
of that body, the I.G. of Police is talkative and intelligent, but
he does not impress me as reliable. The Governor [of Jammu
Province], Mr. C. R. Chopra, is an intelligent man and I find
him the most reasonable and unbiassed of officials here. The
State’s Brigadier Rawat is a good man according to Brig. Paran-
jpe under whose orders he is working. I have not had any
occasion to test his mentality.
The refugees from West Punjab and of the local villages are
extremely bitter. It is impossible to control their lust for vengeance
and retaliation whenever possible. I arranged a scheme with the
approval of the Governor for the evacuation of refugees from West
Punjab to East Punjab. They have made the scheme unworkable
by collecting opposite the Indian Brigade Headquarters causing
confusion and trouble and endeavouring to board the military
lorries en masse, with the result that the evacuation has been delay¬
ed. They refused to leave the ground occupied even though the
Brigadier wanted it for camping the rest of a battalion expected
here. The I.G. of Police telephoned me and I told him that,
if necessary, force must be used, however regrettable, because the
military must not be hampered. The refugees themselves, whom I
86
sardar patel’s correspondence

tned to address, declared that they had suffered untold grievances

at the hands of the State Administration and preferred to lie down
and die at the hands of the military. No appeals to them that
without the military no evacuation was at all possible and if the
military were hampered their lives were in great danger, afTect-
ed them at all. The officials here fully realise the danger of all
this kind o thing or at any rate agree with all the arguments I put
forward while in my presence. I have a strong suspicion that
they agree only seemingly with a few exceptions. Whether they
agree or not, however, it is extremely difficult to cope with the
refugees who can neither be made to understand nor will listen
and are so blinded by self-interest that they would not have eva¬
cuation rather than see some fortunate person get ahead of them
in the process of evacuation.
I have formed a high opinion of Brig. Paranjpe’s abilities and
straightforwardness. Even he however told me that his experience
showed that a Muslim could not be trusted where the cry for reli¬
gion was raised. He told me of two Muslim officers who worked
admirably under him in what is now Pakistan and saved many
Hindus and Sikhs, but when they came to Ferozepur and saw what
had happened to their co-religionists, they went completely
“haywire” and forgot all duty as officers. I can fully appreciate
this Muslim attitude. It is not altogether blameworthy though
again I neither praise nor condemn.
The troops, the Brigadier assures me, arc unable to give pro¬
tection to Muslim citizens in Jammu city. The Muslims were con¬
centrated in two mohallas (localities). Mahajan tells me that he
asked them to come out and reopen their shops and he would post
pickets to prevent any danger to their persons. But perhaps right¬
ly they realised that they could not be protected and refused to
do so. Their concentration in two mohallas was certainly danger¬
ous in the sense that shots used to be exchanged between them
and Hindus round about and much alarm and panic caused. It
was in these circumstances that it was decided to evacuate them
to Pakistan. I went to their camp today and one man came up to
me and said that he, a member of the National Conference and a
loyal subject of His Highness, was being treated the same as a
Leaguer. I believe he was telling the truth. But I can think of no
method of keeping back selected persons and giving them protec¬
tion from Hindus and Sikhs in the city. As you know already,
the Muslim districts of Jammu near the frontier arc really in the
hands of raiders and mobs with a few pockets where State troops
and non-Muslims are shut up and surrounded. In these
 LEAGUE-BRITISII CONSPIRACY 87

circumstances, it is impossible to promote friendly feeling

between Muslims and Hindus or to give protection to Muslims
in Hindu areas and I am unable to see what more can be
done. Severe action involving the death of 150 attackers was
taken yesterday. This, I believe, is the largest number of attack¬
ers ever shot. It was due to the death of a Rajput trooper that his
comrades went mad and opened fire with L.M.G.’s and rifles,
causing severe casualties. As far as I can ascertain, 300 Muslims
were killed due to the connivance of the Sikh lorry drivers who
deliberately stopped the lorries. The occupants in alarm jumped
out and tried to escape making it impossible for the escort to
guard them. The rest were brought back safely. As soon as this
becomes known, I fear repercussions in Kashmir State and weak¬
ening of Sheikh Sahib’s authority there. As I have repeatedly
stated, it is impossible, however, to do more. These are the cir¬
cumstances which make me feel that my mission is hopeless.
H. H. personally dislikes Sheikh Sahib and Sheikh Sahib’s
endeavours to try and maintain authority in Jammu without
reference to H. H. are merely causing friction and tension. No
result is obtained as he is not in touch and to appoint a Muslim
LG. of Police would probably mean that he would be murdered
or his authority would be defied with the connivance of his own
men.

The Muslim police have largely deserted and hence only

Hindu police are functioning. I am glad to say that these police
have dealt humanely with the evacuees. I have this from an
evacuee, who does not inspire me with any confidence and who
privately admitted that he was a Leaguer and a Pakistani. All
this however is probably due to the personal influence of one or
two officials and does not disturb the general picture which I have
sketched above.

I got the wire informing me of Mr. Brijlal Nehru’s going to

Srinagai. As no reference was made to my going there and as Mr.
Nehru was to contact me here, I did not go to Srinagar today
either. I should be obliged if I am given clear instructions as to
the evacuation of the second mohalla of Muslims from Jammu.
I should also like clear instructions as to what is meant by the
Kashmir Government. I would suggest that where Sheikh Sahib
is concerned, he should be mentioned by name; where LI. H. is
concerned he should be mentioned by name; and where the con¬
currence of both is desired, the phrase “Kashmir Government”
might be used. I have already explained the difficulty arising in
 88
sardar patel’s correspondence

carrying out instructions where this phrase is used. It is not al-

ways possible to contact Sheikh Sahib on the phone and everyone

over the*wire. P “ HenCe 1 Cannot SPcak vcrV

I have, etc.,
^ our most obedient servant,
Dalip Singh
[Agent to the Government
of India in J & K]
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhaiji Patel
Minister for States
New Delhi

Copy to: The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

Prime Minister
New Delhi

75

New Delhi
9 November 1947
My dear Dalip Singh,
Thank you for your letters.
I fully realise what a difficult and delicate situation you
have to face, but I hope every one there will realise that in the
difficult circumstances in which we are placed we have to tread
warily. Our first aim is to preserve the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. I his can only be done by a spirit of accommodation,
forbearance and statesmanship. Standing on old ideas of dig¬
nity and prestige will not avail us. We have to be particularly
careful until the plebiscite is completed. We have to make sure
that our interests are not prejudiced by anything that would pro¬
duce adverse results in the plebiscite. Once the plebiscite is as¬
sured in our favour, we can tackle other matters in such a manner
as might be most expedient and desirable. I hope therefore that
you will impress this upon Mahajan and His Highness. Our every’
move at present should be directed to this end and whatever
steps we take should be judged in this light.
Jawaharlal will himself be coming to Jammu and Srinagar
day after tomorrow and we can leave the strained relations between
His Highness and Sheikh Abdullah to be tackled by him when he
comes.
 LEAGUE-BRITISII CONSPIRACY 89

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Kunwar Sir Dalip Singh
Agent to the Govt, of India
Jammu & Kashmir

76
New Delhi
9 November 1947
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Thank you for sending me the note on Kashmir [See enclo¬
sure.] It is interesting and shows insight. I entirely agree that
the problem is very much a political one and an economic one.
It is because of this that I have been anxious to send proper
people there.
On the economic side we must send essential supplies,
namely, salt, sugar, kerosene oil and tea. I might mention that
tea can easily be arranged from Kangra where the special kind of
tea, i.e., green tea, which has a market in Kashmir, is grown. We
have also to help in getting out the produce of Kashmir which
includes textiles, fruits, etc. I propose to look into this matter
when I go to Srinagar. It might be desirable to station a represen¬
tative of ours in Srinagar to control this traffic, both ways.
I do not know who the writer of the note is. He refers to his
Association. Is this the Spinners’ Association? I should like to
know so that I can get into touch with him. He may be able
to help in making the necessary arrangements.
I am returning the note to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
Enel. 1
 ENCLOSURE

EXTRACTS FROM NOTE PREPARED BY RAMADHAR ON

CONDITIONS IN KASHMIR

• . . Along with military action some political action is also necessary

o wean the Muslim masses out of the League influence. As things arc at
present one finds that there is a vicious circle at work in Kashmir, which will
ultimately undermine all our eflbrts in the Happy Valley. The raiders, with
the help of local Muslims, arc harassing Hindus and Sikhs as also some
National Conference men and this has its repercussion, on the soldiers of our
army who are Hindus and Sikhs. They in turn would be inclined to deal
sternly with local Muslims where they are operating and this again will affect
the attitude of Muslims who are at present supporting the National Con¬
ference. This process will be repeated to the limits of absurdity and no one
can foretell the results that will follow in the event of a free and fair plebi¬
scite. That is why a very careful consideration of the situation and some
kind of political and economic measures are called for.

\\ e all know that Kashmir is facing an economic crisis of unparalleled

magnitude. For the last two years there has been almost no tourist traffic
and therefore no trade; the Punjab disturbances and subsequent partition of
the province and the inevitable results thereof have hampered the timber
trade of the State which depended on the Western Punjab. Ever since the
establishment of Pakistan, Kashmir has been practically cut ofT from the
Indian Union and therefore there has been no exchange of commercial commo¬
dities between the two. I his has brought about a virtual collapse of the
economic structure of the State. No trader has any money to enter into even
very minor transactions. Whatever he had has been locked up in the goods.
Besides, essential supplies of the State of salt, sugar, cloth, kerosene oil and
tea etc. have also been suspended which has brought the people of Kashmir
to the brink ol misery and ruin. If nothing is done to relieve the situation
immediately the discontent and disaffection will spread and the party in power
will begin to lose its ground all the more. Along with the defence of the
territory this also must have the topmost priority. Both should go hand in
hand. Our Association wanted to help the new Government in organising
this and we submitted a scheme for this. But they too seem to be suffering
from the traditional suspicion complex of the old regime. The result was that
whenever we approached them in the matter the reply was “we have not
taken any decision in the matter yet.” I made it clear to them that we
merely wanted to be helpful and had no idea of sharing the power they had

90
 LEAGUE-BRITISH CONSPIRACY 91

acquired. Even so they neither set up their own organisation nor availed of
our offer to help them. From the 4th inst. onwards all the planes are leturn-
ing empty but no effort has been made to send the merchandise of the State.
This is in spite of the fact that we offered to load the planes within 20
minutes of their landing. They could have at least given it a trial. This is
the only way one can function at revolutionary times. But I have probably

deviated from the main point.

I personally feel that the Government of India should guide these affairs
there for it is a tremendous undertaking that they have taken up in Kashmir. . . .

77
New Delhi
10 November 1947
My clear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter of 9 November 1947 about
Kashmir. The writer of the note is Ramadhar of the Spinners’
Association. I believe he is in Delhi. He is a level-headed and
unassuming person and has considerable knowledge of men and
material in Kashmir.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

78

Jammu
9 November 1947
My dear Sardar Patel,
. 1. am sending herewith a statement for perusal and publica¬
tion, if necessary. A copy of this statement has been sent to the
Director, All India Radio, for being broadcast as soon as possible.
1 he plans will be sent shortly.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
 ENCLOSURE

Pakistan Radio and the responsible Ministers of Pakistan have

been issuing broadcasts and statements to the effect that the present
struggle in Jammu & Kashmir is a struggle of the people of the State
against the aggression of the Dogra rulers. This statement is totally
incorrect. His Highness and his Prime Minister are receiving countless
telegrams from Muslim subjects of the State declaring their unflinching
loyalty to the person of His Highness and protesting against this aggression
by outside persons into the State engineered by the Paskitan Govern¬
ment. Not only mere offers of loyalty are coming forth but a large
number of Muslim subjects have offered themselves for actually fighting the
raiders even apart from those who belong to the National Conference
under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah.

A positive proof of the fact that the present struggle in Kashmir has been
instigated by the agents of the Muslim League and is being strongly helped
by the Pakistan Government has been discovered from the possession of certain
Muslims who under the pretext of “safety” desired to go temporarily to
Pakistan. As early as 1945 and 1946, a conspiracy seems to have been hatched
for the establishment of a Muslim State by the Muslim League in Jammu &
Kashmir. A number of these detailed plans for providing residences for the
Muslim League leaders and for other activities in the State when it comes
under the domination of the Muslim League have been discovered. These
plans are authentic, bear proper seals and names and details in them clearly
show that a plot was hatched against His Highness and his Government by
the Muslim League agents in London and these plans were subsequently sent
to India and were found in the possession of certain Muslim Government
servants of the State. One of these was a design of a residence named “Masha-
Allah” apparently for the Qaid-i-Azam. It consists of 6 sheets. There is
a coloured prospective design and a chart C.S.J. calculations as well. I he
plan has been drawn by Haji Roshan Din of Bhopal according to speci¬
fications given by Norman F. Kingham of Wellesy Cheshire (England), ibis
evidence conclusively proves that the designs of the Muslim League against
Kashmir were hatched as early as year 1945 and the present act of aggression
is the culminating point of those designs.
Let the world judge whether the State has acted fraudulently in adopting
underhand methods for acceding to the Indian Dominion or the Pakistan
progenitors are clearly guilty of the conduct which they now seem to attribute
to others.

92
 LEAGUE-BRITISII CONSPIRACY 93

For the purpose of facilitating inspection by those who may wish to satisfy
themselves of the genuineness of the plans of “Masha-Allah buildings, one
set out of the three recovered has been forwarded to the States Department,
New Delhi, for being exhibited suitably at New Delhi. Another set is avail¬
able for the purpose in the office of the Governor, Jammu.
Mehrchand Mahajan
Jammu & Kashmir Prime Minister

9-11-47

79
New Delhi
10 November 1947
My dear Mahajan,
Thank you for your letter dated 9 November 1947. I have
gone through your proposed broadcast but feel that it had better
not issue. We have already said more than enough to controvert
Pakistan’s propaganda. We should keep something up our sleeves
and I suggest that the evidence which you have collected had
better be so treated. I hope you will agree.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Shri Mehrchand Mahajan
Jammu

80

New Delhi
21 November 1947
My dear Sardar Sahib,
I enclose for your information a copy of a letter received from
Mehrchand Mahajan, Dewan of Kashmir, regarding the general
situation in the State.

Yours sincerely,
Baldev Singh1
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

1 Defence Minister in Nehru Cabinet

 enclosure

Jammu
18 November 1947

My dear Buldcv Singhji,

I do hope that you will be soon visiting Jammu as the situation here
also requires your personal attention. Though you are very busy, still I must
encroach to a certain extent on your time in order to keep you in touch with
the whole situation. I have personally discussed it with Major-General
Kulwant Singh as well.

I wish to impress upon you the extreme necessity of more troops in

Jammu. The emergency is the following:

1. There is satisfactory evidence to the effect that across the border on

the Sialkot side a very substantial number of Pathans are being collected.
1 renches are being dug. Women and children are being evacuated. It is
difficult to say what the object of all this is, but we cannot lose sight of the
fact that an attack on Jammu itself similar to the one that was made in
Srinagar may be under contemplation. For the defence of Jammu, at present
we have not even a full battalion available. That is hardly sufficient for the
purpose.

2. The road from Kathua to Jammu, as you know, is within three to four
miles of the border. Daily trouble and attacks and counter-attacks arc going
on there. You have not more than two companies on that border which
again is insufficient in view of the preparations on the other side.

3. The border from Jammu to Bhimber and Mirpur is completely un¬

protected at the present moment. No army whatsoever is available for the
purpose and unless Bhimber is recaptured immediately, you will require a
much larger number of troops later to do so. A battalion or a battalion and
a half is required for the purpose. Later on you will require much more
troops than at present to get it back and save the Hindu and Sikh population
in that part of the State. I have impressed [on] Major-General Kulwant
Singh the necessity of this but it seems to me that things are not appreciated
as much as they should be. Rajouri would have been saved and thousands of
people would have been kept alive if what I told the authorities a week be¬
fore was realised. The trouble about Mirpur would have been much less, had
the military moved earlier towards that side. This has all been due to the
fact that enough forces were not available in Jammu.

94
 LEAGUE-BRITISH CONSPIRACY 95
4. For internal security and to stop internal killing of Hindus by Muslims,
I have no troops whatsoevei'. If you could give me two companies, that
killing would have been easily saved.
5. We have already lost Gilgit. For the next six months we can do
nothing to recapture it. There is another province of Ladakh, which, if not
protected at the present moment, we may lose it and to recapture it, it will
take a division. At present it may be saved by two or three companies. The
position is this. At Kargil, which is a crucial point and where two bridges
are important, we have a Sikh company. In Skardu, which is the winter
capital of Ladakh province, we have only two platoons. The Chitralis or the
Swati people may infiltrate into Skardu via the Rondu side. In order to
save any such infiltration, it is necessary that the garrison at Skardu is stren¬
gthened. It could be so done by ordering the company at Kargil to proceed
to Skardu but Kargil is also a crucial point and if a company or two could
be sent there that will protect that province.

I have discussed all these matters with your Major-General and I also
mentioned these to General Cariappa1 when he was here. If you can push
two or two and a half battalions more to Jammu, most of these matters may
be solved. Later on, you will have to put in a much larger effort.
Please do not misunderstand that I have in any way underjudged what
you have done so far or do not realise your own commitments and difficulties,
but when you have undertaken a job it has to be done and done as expedi¬
tiously as possible. I shall feel grateful if you could kindly study the situation
yourself as indicated by me and order more troops to be sent to Jammu
immediately. I understand Major-General Kulwant Singh has also asked for
more troops.

With kindest regards and best wishes. When should I expect you in
Jammu? If you do not come, I shall have to come to Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan
The Hon’ble Sardar Baldcv Singh
New Delhi

1 GOC, Western Command

 CHAPTER VII

SARDAR VISITS JAMMU

81

Jammu
22 November 1947
My"][dear Sardar Patelji,
Kindly excuse these few lines amongst your multifarious
engagements. As advised I am quietly watching the trend of
events without in any way interfering in the administration, but
I wish to emphasise two things:
1. There should not be further delay in the formation of an
Interim Government. Sheikh Sahib, I suppose, is in no hurry about
it having got dictatorial powers which are being exercised in a
dictatorial manner regardless of all rules and forms of law. This
will not be in the interests of the administration. There is no
reason why an Interim Government on the Mysore model should
not be formed. I will however act as advised.
2. The Indian Dominion forces in Jammu province should
be immediately strengthened and reinforced. At least two more
battalions are needed. In spite of repeated signals nothing is com¬
ing through.
3. Would you advise me to visit Mysore and sec Sir Ramaswami
Mudaliar1 and get a complete picture of the recent Mysore
constitution and its working and its future plans?
I entirely depend on your advice.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Mchrchand Mahajan

1 Dewan of Mysore State, a former Member of Viceroy’s Executive Council

96
 82
New Delhi
24 November 1947

My dear Mahajan,
Many thanks for your letter dated 22 November 1947.
I fully appreciate your position and realize how honourably
you have fulfilled the agreements reached. I also agree that
proper constitutional functioning of the Government should be
secured as soon as possible. It is, however, unnecessary for you
to go to Mysore for this purpose. The Mysore Dewan is here
and, if necessary, we can always call him for advice and assistance.
I am thinking of coming to Jammu for a day on 28 November.
I wanted to come earlier but unfortunately my hands are full with
urgent matters of State as well as the Assembly session. We can
go into these matters further when we meet. I shall let you
know the timings of my departure, arrival etc., as soon as I fix
up the details.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Mehrchand Mahajan Esq.
Jammu

83

New Delhi
24 November 1947
My dear Sheikh Sahib,
Many thanks for your letter which I received the other day.
It is vciy nice of you to speak of us in such generous terms,
but we feel that what we have done is what we owed to His
Highness, yourself and the people of the State. We hope that
with the combined effort of all of us, we shall succeed in ridding
Kashmir State of these barbarous raiders and in ensuring that
the people of the State make their unfettered choice of their
future.

97
S. C.-7
98 SARDAR PATEl.’s CORRESPONDENCE

I have been thinking of coming to Jammu and Srinagar for

some time past, but urgent matters of State here and the
Assembly session have prevented me from doing so. I have
found an opportunity of getting away on 28 November just for the
day when the Assembly would not be sitting. But it is impossible
for me to cover both Jammu and Srinagar, though I would have
very much liked to visit the latter place as well. I am, therefore,
having to content myself with a visit to Jammu that day. I shall
be returning the same afternoon.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah Sahib
Head of the Administration
Government of Jammu and Kashmir
Srinagar

84
New Delhi
24 November 1947
My dear Jawaharlal,
From the enclosed cutting from the Hindustan Times of yes¬
terday, it appears that in Srinagar people are under the impres¬
sion that Rao Saheb Patwardhan is being sent to Srinagar as an
official observer at your suggestion. I know nothing about it and
would like to know if there is any truth in this report.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

85
New Delhi
26 November 1947

My dear Chaudhuri,
It has been suggested to H. M. that we should ha\e a pro¬
gramme in Kashmiri consisting of news, topical information and
suggestions and cultural songs and poems from the Delhi station.
The present Jammu wireless unit is weak in comparison to
 SARDAR VISITS JAMMU 99

Peshawar Radio which apparently is broadcasting regular prog¬

rammes. Would you kindly give very early consideration to this
proposal ? The importance of propaganda for Kashmir can hardly
be overestimated.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
P. S. to H. M. States
P. C. Chaudhuri Esq., i.e.s.
Director General
All India Radio
New Delhi

86
Jammu
30 November 1947
My dear Sardar Patel,
I am sending a copy of my letter which I have written to¬
day to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru for your kind information.
Yours sincerely,
Mchrchand Mahajan
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
Enel. 1

ENCLOSURE

30 November 1947
My dear Panditji,

On my arrival here, I found that there was great panic in the town
owing to the Indian troops abandoning Kotli after relieving the garrison and
evacuating the population and also owing to Mirpur having been abandoned
an estioyed by the enemy. These were two important stations in the State
It will not be very easy to re-occupy them unless strong action is taken.

been ^ “* WMe 'mdtt fr°m Bhimb“ Rajouri has

be occupied by the enemy who is pushing forward towards Akhnur This

XTs'™ PaniC' Tr ' Wh°'e HaS bC'n '™d “"d s of

g are pouring into Jammu town where itself there is great panic and
people are leaving the town as well.
100 sardar patel’s correspondence

The position now is this. Gilgit is in enemy hands. MuzafTarabad dis¬

trict is in their possession. The Poonch area, excepting the town of Poonch, is
also in their occupation and the district of Mirpur and part of Jammu district
have been taken by them. This is rather a very unsatisfactory state of affairs
and it is only by a directive from you that these positions can be regained.
It is felt here that with this vast area of the State in enemy hands, even
negotiations on our side with Pakistan will not be very successful. It appears
that unless we have a whiphand these negotiations may not be satisfactory.

The tentative reactions to the proposal which you gave me are like this:

“We are in the hands of the Indian Dominion and are bound with
whatever decision they take. We have acceded to them and wish to
remain with them. If the plebiscite goes against us, there is no other
alternative but abdication. We shall never remain with Pakistan. The
Hindu and Sikh population will be annihilated and as that eventuality
is anticipated, Indian troops should not leave the State till that population
is evacuated. There is pessimism about the result of the plebiscite here.
Even if the plebiscite goes against Pakistan, it is felt that the trouble will

still not end and the fighting will go on.”

I intend to come to Delhi on 5 December for discussion with the Prime

Ministers and the rulers of other States on the question of privileges of rulers.

I will then personally explain to you the whole situation.

Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

87
Jammu
30 November 1947

My dear Sardarji,
I hope you kindly write to Kherji [B. G. Kher, Chief Minister
of Bombay] about Kashmir House, Bombay.
As discussed at your lunch H. H. is thinking of sending Yuv-
raj [Karan Singh] to America. Could the States Ministry ar¬
range the following and in what time.
1. Plane from Jammu to Bombay. He can only go on the
stretcher [chair]. The party will consist of four persons.
2. Plane from Bombay to the U.S.A. Service goes from Bombay
to the U.S.A. H. H. does not like to send the prince from
Karachi.
 SARDAR VISITS JAMMU 101

3. Passports for four persons.

With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

88
New Delhi
2 December 1947
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to the Maharaja of
Kashmir by air today.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
Enel. 1

ENCLOSURE

New Delhi
1 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

I have twice written to you during the last few days but each letter has
been brief. The stress of work is so great that I find it difficult to write
at some length. I presume Mr. Mahajan has given you some account of
what took place here. Sheikh Abdullah will give you a further account.

2. We have arrived at a stage when we must come to rapid and more or

less final decisions about Kashmir with the Pakistan Government. The choice
is between some kind of a settlement and continuing on a more intensive scale
the military operations that are going on. Obviously, from both the narrow
and the wider points of view, a settlement is to be preferred, provided it is a
satisfactory one. In some ways the time is suitable for a settlement, in other
ways it is more difficult.

3. During the last week there have been discussions between the Governments
of India and Pakistan about all manner of vital and controversial issues bet¬
ween us, quite apart from Kashmir. Surprisingly enough, we have come to a
sett ement in legard to nearly all of these, although previously we had failed to
102 sardar patel’s correspondence

do so. All financial issues have been thus resolved, and these were the most
tricky ones. We had appointed an Arbitral Tribunal to give a final decision
on such points of dispute. That tribunal has now very little work to do
because we have arrived at a settlement ourselves.

4. Because of this I feel that the time is propitious for a settlement about
Kashmir also. The pressure of events is all in favour of such a settlement and
I feel sure that we should try our utmost to achieve it. The alternative is no
settlement and carrying on this little war indefinitely and at the same time
tension and conflict all over India with consequent misery to numberless per¬
sons. In Kashmir State itself these military operations against the raiders will
mean, as they have meant, grave difficulties and suffering for the people of the
State. Mr. Horace Alexander, [noted British pacifist who took keen interest
in India] who has just come from Jammu, informed me that the raiders are
burning many villages and, no doubt, killing people. The terrain is such that
it is not easy for large-scale armies to function satisfactorily. The land is all in
favour of the raiders’ tactics. With the approach of winter our difficulties
increase. The only policy we can adopt is to protect the Kashmir Valley and
the Jhelum Valley route on the one side, and Jammu and the neighbourhood
on the other, holding in check the raiders in the Poonch area. It is difficult
for our troops to drive out the raiders from the whole of the Poonch area
during this winter season. They may be hit occasionally and repulsed. Air
action will also be difficult during winter.

5. All this is not through lack of troops but rather because of the terrain
and the climate. In spring, we could drive out the raiders from the Poonch
area also. But that means another four months; and meanwhile the raiders
and the Poonchi rebels will remain in possession of that area and harass the
people of the State. Pakistan troops will be stationed on the Sialkot and
other borders and will thus constitute a menace to the State. That is the
military appreciation. Purely in a military sense we arc not frightened of
this position; but, as I have said above, we cannot undertake to deal with the
whole Poonch area during winter. Meanwhile the stress and strain of conflict
will fall on the State and the economic conditions of the State, already bad,
will rapidly deteriorate. It is important that we remember this economic back¬
ground, for even military persistence depends largely on economic conditions

and the morale of the people.

6. While a settlement is good and must be sought after, obviously we cannot

do so to the injury’ of Kashmir or India. We have thus to balance various
factors. Even if a settlement comes, there is no surety of good behaviour on
the Pakistan side and even less on the part of the tribes. \Ne have thus to

be wary and vigilant.

7. You must have seen the draft proposals which were discussed by us with
Mr. Liaquat All Khan. These involve a plebiscite under UNO. I know that
 SARDAR VISITS JAMMU
103

you do not like the idea of a plebiscite; but we cannot do away with it with¬
out harming our cause all over the world. We are bound down to that pro¬

posal provided, of course, there is a settlement.

8. If there is going to be a plebiscite, then obviously we have to work in

such a way as to gain the goodwill of the majority of the population of the
State, which means chiefly the Muslims. The policy recently pursued in Jammu
province has alienated the Muslims there very greatly and has created a great
deal of ill-feeling in certain parts of the country. The only person who can
effectively deal with the situation is Sheikh Abdullah. I do not suppose he can
convert the confirmed Muslim Leaguers and the like. But there is always a
middle mass of opinion which is influenced by events and experiences.

9. From our point of view, that is India’s, it is of the most vital importance
that Kashmir should remain within the Indian Union. I need not go into the
reasons for this as they are obvious, quite apart from personal desiies in the
matter which are strong enough. But however much we may want this, it
cannot be done ultimately except through the goodwill of the mass of the popu¬
lation. Even if military forces held Kashmir for a while, a later consequence
might be a strong reaction against this. Essentially, therefore, this is a pro¬
blem of psychological approach to the mass of the people and of making them
feel that they will be benefited by being within the Indian Union. If the aver¬
age Muslim feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union, then obvi¬
ously he will look elsewhere. Our basic policy must keep this in view, or
else we fail. We have to take a long view of the situation and not be carried
away by momentary urges nor by personal considerations.

10. The present position is that in Kashmir proper the mass of the popula¬
tion, Muslim and Hindu, is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In
the Jammu area, all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in
favour of the Union. In the Poonch area, however, there is little doubt that
the mass of the population is likely to be against the Indian Union. In the
balance probably an overall majority will be in favour of the Union. But
this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months.
I repeat this because this is of the highest importance and we must face facts
as they are.

11. The military situation is not too good, though I have no doubt that
we can hold it in check. But we cannot expect to do much more during
the winter. Meanwhile all manner of developments are likely to take place
all over India and Pakistan and they are likely to govern the situation. What¬
ever these developments may be, we have to be prepared for them and at
the same time take a realistic view of the situation.

12. In discussing a possible settlement with Pakistan, these are the pro¬
posals which have already been considered and which Mr. Mahajan took with
him. Some people have suggested that Kashmir and Jammu provinces must
104 sardar patel’s correspondence

be split up, one going to Pakistan and the other to India. I do not at all
like this for many reasons, among them being that it is Kashmir that is of
essential value to India. Then it has been suggested that the Poonch area
might be cut ofl and go to Pakistan. There is something in this as that area
is linguistically allied to the Punjab. It has also been suggested that Kashmir
State as a whole might be more or less an independent entity with its integrity
and defence guaranteed by India and Pakistan. This is likely to give trouble
in the future and the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir might
well continue.

13. As I was dictating this letter I received Mr. Mahajan’s letter of 30

November. In this he mentions that your reactions to various proposals are
that you are prepared to leave the future in the hands of the Indian Dominion,
but if the plebiscite goes against the Union, you will have no alternative but
to abdicate. In no event do you wish to remain with Pakistan. I appreciate
this attitude.

14. Further it is feared that if the State accedes to Pakistan ultimately, the
Hindu and Sikh population will be in danger of being annihilated. I do not
think you need fear any such result because, whatever happens, we cannot
see the destruction of Kashmir in this way or the annihilation of any part
of the population, whether Hindu or Muslim or Sikh. Effective steps can be
taken against any such possibility. The question does not arise at present as
the immediate issue is a military one and, if a settlement is arrived at, a
plebiscite many months later. During this period our troops must necessarily
remain here and the State Forces and Home Guard should be built up.
Economically the State should be helped.
15. You have mentioned the possibility of your abdication. The question of
Kashmir is, of course, not a personal one and concerns the fate of nations. If
you feel that it is desirable in the interest of the State and the people there
to abdicate or to leave the State for a while, I have no doubt you will do so
because the interest of the people will be uppermost in your mind. In that
way, as a matter of fact, you might even draw nearer to your people.
16. From Mr. Mahajan’s letter I gather that you leave this matter of
negotiations with Pakistan entirely in the hands of the Indian Union. I think
you are wise in so doing because there is no other way of dealing with the
situation. I have had long talks with Sheikh Abdullah and known his general
viewpoint. That is highly important as he can judge best of the reactions of
his people and what can be done with them and what cannot. We have to
rely on him in regard to every step that we might take, otherwise that step
will be infructuous.
17. The situation in Kashmir is, of course, a difficult one. We all know
that. But I can assure you that none of us is terribly disheartened about it. U e
have faced many difficulties before and we shall face this and overcome it.
 SARDAR VISITS JAMMU 105

The all-India position is definitely better so far as we are concerned. The

whole point is how to proceed in Kashmir so as to lay the basis of future
happiness and prosperity for Kashmir and the Indian Union and to end
the fighting if this can be done with security and honour.

18. The economic position of Kashmir is of vital importance and, therefoie,

it is necessary that Kashmir goods should come to India and find a market
here and Indian supplies should go to Kashmir. Kashmir officials have dis¬
cussed these questions with our officials here and some arrangements are being
made. I hope these will be expedited and an immediate exchange arranged on
a businesslike basis. This will immediately be a visible evidence of benefits
before the Kashmir people and will affect them powerfully as well as strengthen
the State’s economy. That economy has been shattered and every step must
be made to prevent wasteful expenditure. Such an effort will also impress the
people. When the people are suffering, any overhead waste is bitterly resented.

19. In my brief letter today I referred to the desirability of forming an

Interim Government very soon in Kashmir. I know that you have been
anxious to do so. I think that the time has come when there should be no
further delay in this matter and a stable government should be established.
This will have a good effect on the people of Kashmir, and others outside
Kashmir will also realise that enduring arrangements are being made there.
We have agreed that this Interim Government should be on the model of
Mysore. In Mysore the leader of the popular party was asked to choose his
colleagues, he himself being the Prime Minister or Chief Minister. The
Dewan was also one of the Ministers and he presided over the meetings of the
Cabinet. In following this precedent, Sheikh Abdullah should be the Prime
Minister and should be asked to form the Government. Mr. Mahajan can
be one of the Ministers and can formally preside over the Cabinet. But it
would introduce confusion it Mr. Mahajan continues to be styled as Prime
Minister. This Interim Government, when formed, should be in full charge
and you will be the constitutional head of that Government.

20. We have to deal today in Kashmir, as elsewhere, with the minds of

people. We have to influence them by convincing them of changes in policy
and outlook so that they might realise that something entirely new and to
their advantage has taken place. They have to feel that they themselves are
functioning in Government through people whom they trust. Obviously the
only possible policy in Kashmir State (and I would say in the whole of India
also) is a non-communal policy where every citizen is treated equally and
there is absolutely no harassment of one community against another. In the
pi evading atmosphere if this fact had been realised and acted upon, our prob¬
lems in India and Kashmir would have been far simpler. We have a hard
task ahead, but we have also the strength and energy needed for it. We are
going, I have little doubt, to solve our problems one by one. But we shall
106 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

do so only if wc proceed on the right lines which we can justify to the

world. It we act rightly, we need not be afraid of the consequences.
With my regards to the Maharani Sahiba,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru
His Highness
The Maharaja Bahadur of Jammu and Kashmir
Jammu-Tawi
 CHAPTER VIII

RULER’S REACTION

89
New Delhi
10 December 1947

My dear Gopalaswami Ayyangar,

I have seen your letter dated 9 December 1947 addressed to
H. H. the Maharaja of Kashmir. (See enclosure)
I am afraid you have probably misunderstood me on these
matters. The proposals which you have made may ease matters
from the point of view of Sheikh Abdullah, but whether they
would ease matters from the point of view of the Maharaja is
difficult for me to say. We have to bear in mind that it was we
who suggested to the Maharaja to agree to the Mysore model and
unless the Maharaja can be persuaded to agree to alter it, I feel
that we cannot insist on him to accept any change. We have also
to take into account that it is the Maharaja who has entered into
a commitment with Mr. Mahajan and, therefore, it is for him to
decide whether or not he could release himself from that com¬
mitment. All we can do is to persuade him to agree to this
position.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
Minister without Portfolio
New Delhi

107
 ENCLOSURE

New Delhi
9 December 1947
My dear Maharaja Sahib,

As desired by your Highness when Pandit Nehru and I were in Jammu

last Saturday, I indicate below for your consideration my views on the change*
which, in the present critical situation of the State, are immediately called for
in the existing constitutional and administrative set-up there.
2. For the reasons which we explained to you in person, the present ar¬
rangement under which the organisation and control of the administration to
meet the emergency are in the hands of a separate head of Emergency Admi¬
nistration with honorary heads of departments chosen by and working under
him and the ordinary civil administration which nominally continues with a
Council of Ministers writh a Prime Minister as its chief, but does not in reality
function at all with any effectiveness, is not only unworkable any longer but
is fraught with both danger and disaster. Emergency administration and
ordinary administration cannot be segregated from each other. They are so
inextricably intertwined that it is imperative that there should be the maxi¬
mum unity of policy and control over both, if the emergency is at all to be
successfully handled. To keep them segregated is to invite friction and the
consequent confusion and chaos. I do not wish to elaborate this point further
especially as you entirely agree in this view yourself.
3. The obvious solution is the formation without further loss of time of an
Interim Government, a step to which again you have already agreed. The
Mysore pattern was mentioned when you, Sheikh Abdullah and Mahajan
agreed to the setting up of an Interim Government. I have given much
thought to this and, after examining all its aspects, have come to the conclu¬
sion that, while the broad outlines of the Mysore pattern should be adhered
to, it is necessary that some adjustments and modifications should be made
in it, in order to adapt it to the situation as it has developed in Kashmir.
The events that have compelled the transfer of power to Sheikh Abdullah,
the facilities he needs for exercising that power for the maximum good of the
State, the alignment of communal and political opinion in the State, the un¬
representative character of the present membership of the Praja Sabha and,
above all, the supreme need of encouraging and expediting the triumph of the
elements which stand for a national, non-communal, secular State over those
which seek to establish a communal, theocratic Muslim State in Kashmir,
demand a slight reorientation of the Mysore pattern. I have no hesitation in

108
 ruler’s reaction 109

saying that realising, as you no doubt will, the full implications of all that I
have condensed in the previous sentence, you will not only be doing the right
thing but acting with wisdom in agreeing to such reoi ientation.

4. I would indicate briefly the steps that seem to be immediately needed.

(1) In place of the present Emergency Administration and the conti¬

nuing Ministry, a unified Interim Government should be set up in
the shape of a Council of Ministers under the Jammu and Kashmir

Constitution Act.
(2) Sheikh Abdullah should be appointed Prime Minister and the other
Ministers should be chosen on his advice.
(3) I believe that under the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act—
unless it has been substantially amended since I left Kashmir—
the entire civil administration of the State is vested in the Council
subject only to rules of business and allocations of portfolios
approved by the Ruler on the Prime Minister’s advice. The Ruler
may also, I think, place restrictions on the powers of the Council
by special directions in respect of certain subjects.

(4) The new Council of Ministers will have to include an Army Minister,
but conventions should be established and understandings arrived
at with Sheikh Abdullah as to the manner in which the Army
Minister is to function vis-a-vis the Ruler who, by virtue of his
position, is the Commander-in-Chief of the State Forces. It will
not be possible in the present circumstances in Kashmir to contem¬
plate a Cabinet of the State having nothing to do with the Army;
that will incapacitate it altogether in dealing with the emergency,
in expelling the invader and in putting down internal rebellion.

5. I am not going into further details; these will be best tackled in personal
discussion.

6. The Interim Government will be responsible for the time being to the
Ruler. Though its personnel need not be derived from the existing Praja
Sabha, it should be representative of the national-minded elements in the
population of the State and will presumably have, among political parties, the
largest volume of public support.

7. Your Highness has already recognised the inevitability of the establishment

of responsible government in the State. The steps necessary for fashioning a
constitution are perhaps not so immediately urgent; but from every point of
view it is imperative that towards the Interim Government you should from
its inception function as the constitutional head of a State and act on its advice,
though like other such heads, you will place your knowledge and experience
at the disposal of the Ministers and influence their advice, if you felt that
they required guidance. In such matters trust on either side begets trust in
the other and opportunities for friction are effectively avoided.
110 SARDAR PATELS CORRESPONDENCE

8. The position of Mr. Mahajan in this new set-up requires to be squarely

faced. I am satisfied after my talks with Sheikh Abdullah in Jammu and
Mr. Mahajan in Delhi

(a) that Sheikh Abdullah cannot reconcile himself to the interposition of

any person between Your Highness and himself as your Chief Constitutional
Adviser; and

(b) that Mr. Mahajan would hardly appreciate being a member of

Abdullah’s Cabinet or functioning outside the Cabinet without power or
responsibility as a mere personal adviser to you.

9. The only solution of this difficulty is for Mr. Mahajan to terminate his
connection with the State. I have reason to think that Mr. Mahajan will
probably feel relieved if he is saved from the embarrassment of being pressed
to carry on as he is doing now.

10. I would like to mention that I have had the advantage of discussing the
whole matter with Pandit Jawaharlal, Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev Singh
and all of them agree in the views I have indicated above as regards the
immediate establishment of the Interim Government and also as regards
Mr. Mahajan.

11. Pandit Jawaharlal, Sardar Baldev Singh and I were yesterday in Lahore
and along with Lord Mountbatten had a five hours’ talk with Messrs. Liaquat
Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammed of the Pakistan Cabinet about the Kashmir
situation. We are convinced that the Pakistan authorities are thick as thieves
with the rebels and raiders in Kashmir and are actively encouraging and
assisting them. In spite of all that we could say by way of fact and argument,
they would not agree even to the issue of a statement asking the raiders to
withdraw from Kashmir, to prohibit them even on paper from using Pakistan
territories as a base of operations for their campaign in Kashmir. On the
other hand, they pretended that the whole of the North West frontier was
aflame with hatred against Kashmir, and that the tribesmen had gone out to
Kashmir to support fellow Muslims who, they honestly believed, were being
oppressed by a cruel and tyrannical Maharaja. I hey added that, even if they
by a public statement asked the raiders to desist from passing through Pakistan
territories to Kashmir, the tribesmen would probably not listen to them and
that they themselves were powerless to implement any assurances in that re¬
gard made to us or effectively to prevent Pakistan areas being used as bases
for concentration of invaders and rebels. They made it plain that they wanted
the Maharaja’s rule to end, the Indian troops who arc now in Kashmir to
be entirely withdrawn from there and Sheikh Abdullah’s administration to be
replaced by what they called a ‘colourless regime’ under the headship of neutral
administrators before they could agree to a plebiscite even under UNO
auspices. They are out to upset all that has been achieved in Kashmir during
the recent weeks and to create conditions there which would ensure the vote of
 ruler’s reaction 111
the people being in favour of accession to Pakistan when the plebiscite comes to
be held. I feel that Kashmir’s only chance to be saved from what I consider to
be a calamity of this description is for Your Highness to act courageously and
generously towards those elements amongst your subjects, both Muslim and
Hindu, who are nationally-minded and whose objective is the establishment of
a responsible government in comibination with constitutional monarchy. If the
designs of Pakistan are not to be effectively countered by mobilising within
the State the strength of the national forces now operating therein, the all-out
effort that the Dominion of India is now making will lose all its justification, the
safety and integrity of the State will be gravely endangered and the monster
of communal hatred will rear its head with its inevitable aftermath of mas¬
sacres and unspeakable outrages. It is my visualisation of this grim prospect
that is responsible for my giving this considered advice to you. I need hardly
mention that I would not give any advice to you in respect of Kashmir
State unless I sincerely felt that that advice was in the best interests of the
population of the State and its Ruler.

12. I can arrange to come over to Jammu next Saturday, prepared to

stay there on that day and the following day so as to enable me to return
here on Sunday evening. I request you will please send me a telegram on
receipt of this letter if this will be convenient to you. I shall, on receipt
of the telegram, communicate with Sheikh Abdullah and ask him to be in
Jammu during my stay there so that he may be available for consultations.
With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami1
His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir
Jammu

90

10 December 1947
My dear Mahajan,

. «Wiih ,referenTce t0 the toter which Gopalaswami lias written

to His Highness, I am sending herewith a copy of the letter which
I have written to Gopalaswami (See 89). You might show it to

1 Gopalaswami Avyangar, Minister

without Portfolio in Nehru Cabinet . A
former Prime Minister to Mahar
aja Hari Singh
1*4 sardar patel’s correspondence

His Highness. If your presence is an obstacle, I am sure you will

not hesitate to accommodate them.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Mehrchand Mahajan Esq.
Prime Minister
Jammu

91
Jammu
11 December 1947
My dear Sardar Patelji,
I am indeed grateful for your kind letter of the 10th with a
copy of the letter you have written to Shri Gopalaswami. I have
shown it to H. H. and he very sincerely expresses his gratitude
for this kind act.
As regards myself, if I am the obstacle, let it be removed.
I had said so to H.H., to you and to Panditji. I came here
to serve Kashmir and H.H. and if I am regarded as doing dis¬
service I do not wish to stay here; but I do assert that I have
brought Abdullah and H.H. more together than anyone else; and
have not only got him released but installed him [on] an auto¬
cratic gaddi. I am sure there will be a deadlock unless someone is
there to bridge the differences. Trust cannot be brought about by
force and command and threats. I do not want to put in a
special pleading on my behalf. I think you by now know what I
am worth; therefore please do let me go away if that alone is the
solution. But I should get my release from H.H. Without his
word I will not go, as he thinks I am letting him down, but he
will require someone else even if I go. I feel highly embarrassed
that I have become the issue of a political controversy.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan
 92
Jammu- Tawi
11 December 1947

My clear Sardar Patelji,

I hope you had a good trip to Cuttack. Mr. Gopalaswami
came here and had a discussion with H.H. He is writing a reply
to him in a day or so. As I wrote to you, I am under your
command. I came here with your advice and I will quit as
and when you advise. The difficulty is H.H.’s attitude. He insists
on my staying, while in the situation that has arisen I do not
wish to stay. I seek your advice and if you advise I should go,
kindly do get me released nicely and honourably. I do not wish
to remain in a state of suspense.
The administration here is on Hitlerian methods and is getting
a bad name and the sooner I am out the better, as I do not in
the least wish to be associated with gangster rule. There is no
rule of law at all. Take a few instances out of a large number:
(1) The High Court is not being allowed to function. C.J.
[Chief Justice] asked that H.C. [High Court] should open
in Jammu. The order is not being carried out. For over
a month and a half there is no High Court. One judge
is but idling away, the other is at Srinagar and C.J. is in
Calcutta. Head of Administration has no power to interfere
in the High Court’s business, yet he is doing all this.
(2) Governor of Jammu was transferred to Srinagar and
then suspended and interned. Large number of officers
are in jail. I suggested a commission to enquire into
charges but the order was not yet [carried out]. People
and high officials cannot be kept in jail indefinitely and
without trial and enquiry and even a remand.
(3) Large number of other persons are confined in jail. No
enquiry or trial or orders. It is worse rule than in any
autocratic country.
(4) H. H. ordered offices should come to Jammu. No
heed is paid to his orders. A month has passed.
(5) Abdullah discussed with H.H. about certain officials
whom H.H. suspected as Pakistanis and he retained

113
S. C.-8
A 1 * SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

them. I hey have been returned to office and one ap¬

pointed Governor against H.H.’s wishes and express
direction.
(6) Laws are being made by Abdullah himself.
These are a few instances of misrule. They can be multiplied.
T hreats are held out of arrest to everyone including myself. How
long will this misrule last?
With kindest regards,

Yours affectionately,
Mehrchand Mahajan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

93

New Delhi
12 December 1947
My dear Sardarji,
Thank you very much for your letter regarding Kashmir dated
10 December which I saw only late in the evening yesterday.
There is no question of our imposing anything on the
Maharaja. As you must have noticed and as I explained at the
informal meeting of the Cabinet, the whole tenor of my letter to
the Maharaja was calculated only to persuade him to accept what
we consider to be the proper thing to do in the existing circum¬
stances.
Yours sincerely,
Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
 94
The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
17 December 1947

My dear Sardar Patel,

I am sending herewith a copy of a letter that I have wiittcn
to Shri Gopalaswami for your perusal. I depend on your ad¬
vice in this matter.
I hope you got my letter about the Yuvraj’s1 visit to America.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
17 December 1947

My dear Gopalaswami,

I am thankful to you for the visit you paid us from Saturday to

Sunday last. I was glad to have a free and frank talk with you in a cordial
and friendly manner regarding reforms to be introduced in the State.

On the various points that were discussed between us I record for

your information my considered and final views on them.

As regards the formation of an Interim Government, I pointed out that

the Mysore model was not my idea but was suggested by the Government
of the Indian Dominion. The Prime Minister of India wrote to me in the
accession letter that I should form an Interim Ministry on the Mysore model.

Previous to this, negotiations towards grant of responsible government

were going on between political parties and my Prime Minister. The reforms
then acceptable to the parties did not go as far as the Mysore model.2

1 Karan Singh, now Minister in Union Cabinet

2 Scheme of reforms adopted by Ruler of Mysore State

115
 116 sardar patel’s correspondence

When I received .he Prime Minister of India', le.ler, I aceep.ed the

Mywre model became my view was that the early formation of a popular
Ministry was necessary in all States, and the Ruler, should grant responsible
government to their people. I stand by the promise and declaration I made.
Sheikh Abdullah in some of his speeches—that came to my notice—accepted
the Mysore model as agreed to by me.

As the matter now stands, I am firmly of the opinion that an Interim

Ministry should be formed on that model and I am not prepared to deviate
from it except in very minor matters.

The most important essential of the Mysore model is contained in two

schedules : Schedule I & II. Matters contained in Schedule II are reserved
by the Ruler to himseff. The Ministry cannot interfere in those matters. This
Schedule contains the following subjects:

a. I he Ruler and his prerogatives, ruling family, succession to the

throne, palace and privy purse.

b. Constitutional relationship of the State with the Dominion of

India as defined in the Instrument of Accession and constitutional
relationship on all matters not governed by the Instrument of
Accession.

c. High Court and appointment of judges, Chairman and Members

of the Public Service Commission, and Auditor-General.
d. The military.

e. Protection of legitimate interests of minorities.

f. Summoning and dissolving of the Legislature.

g. Superintendence, direction and control of elections.
h. Residuary powers and emergency powers in case of breakdown of
the Constitution.
All these matters must be reserved subjects in our new Constitution and
the Interim Ministry cannot interfere in these matters.
The second matter in the Mysore Constitution is that the Interim Ministry
is to function as a Cabinet and act along with the Dewan. The decisions of
the Cabinet are to be arrived at by a majority vote. The Dewan is to preside
over the meetings of the Cabinet. The leader of the popular party in Mysore
is designated as Chief Minister.
As suggested by you, I am prepared to designate him as Prime Minister
and my nominee as Dewan but I must insist that the Dewan should preside
over Cabinet meetings. I agree to your suggestion for a change of desig¬
nation in spite of the fact that in the fundamental Letter of Accession that
I wrote to Lord Mount batten and in his reply to me it is stated in clear terms
that Sheikh Abdullah will form an Interim Government and work with my Prime
Minister. It was then understood that Sheikh Abdullah will not be Prime
 117
ruler’s reaction

Minister. I am prepared to make an alteration in this comnnhnen. because

in your opinion it is necessary to satisfy the view of Shetkh Abdulla .
As regards meetings, I feel that unless the Dewan is a member of the
Cabinet and presides over the meetings, no man of standing or posit,on could
accept the post of Dewan and as I mentioned to you I must insist on aving
a Dewan who enjoys my full confidence. This is in accor ance wit
Mysore model. Moreover my commitments made before Sheikh Abdul a i

administration came into being have to be respected.

You said just before leaving for Delhi that the Dewan should be a per¬
son who enjoys my confidence and can work with Sheikh Abdullah. But I
cannot give the veto of this appointment to Sheikh Abdullah. The Dewan
must be a man of my choice who enjoys my confidence and I cannot
allow anyone to sabotage my selection under any excuse.
tViof fDman
In the letter of 1 December, Panditji wrote to
should formally preside over Cabinet meetings and be a member of the
Cabinet. I do not see that anything has happened between 1 and 10

December to alter the situation.

The last matter in the Mysore Constitution is the formation of a Consti¬
tuent Assembly to draft an Act for responsible government. The Constituent
Assembly has to frame an Act in accordance with the principles enunciated
in Schedule I of the Mysore Constitution. This schedule contemplates a
bicameral Legislature. It also mentions the franchise and the constituencies
and provides specially for protection of the rights of depressed classes and
minorities. It also lays down that the Council of Ministers formed from
the elected members of the Legislature will advise on all subjects except
on those contained in Schedule II, and that members of the minority com¬
munities must find place in the Council of Ministers which will have to be
jointly responsible to the Legislature.

In my view the Praja Sabha should be entrusted with this work and
declared a Constituent Assembly, of course after fresh elections have been held
because the present elections were held when the National Conference was not
in the picture. The Praja Sabha after it has been newly elected should be
charged with that duty but can have no power to interfere with the reserved
subjects.

The matter of the number of Ministers should also be considered. In

Mysore there are nine Ministers, six nominted by the Congress and three by
other parties. In my view six Ministers are quite enough for Jammu &
Kashmir State, specially as the Muslim Conference, I understand, will not
be asked to join the Ministry as it has supported Pakistan. The leader of the
National Conference should be asked to form a Ministry. The leader of this
party should also take Ministers from the minority communities, who are not
represented on the National Conference, and from Jammu province which is
not adequately represented on the National Conference.
118
sardar patel’s correspondence

As I mentioned to you, it is essential that the Interim Government on

the lines suggested above, i.e., on the Mysore model, should be immediately
formed, as the present state of affairs which is virtually one of dictatorship is
causing considerable discontentment amongst a great number of people and I
am consequently not satisfied with this administration although I don’t wish
to interfere. I would ask you to ask Mr. [V.P.] Menon to kindly draw up a
proclamation for my benefit on the lines of Mysore, so that I may issue a
proclamation as soon as possible and invite Sheikh Abdullah to suggest a
panel of names for the formation of a Ministry.

Concerning the suggestion of proportion of Muslims in the Army, my consi¬

dered view is that this is the most inopportune time to make any sort of a
declaration on this point. In the Jammu and Kashmir Army, the proportion
of Muslims was 1 /3rd. It is well known how the Muslim officers and other
ranks behaved during the crisis. Most of them deserted; others had to be
disarmed. Some of the deserters ran away with considerable sums of money;
and some with arms and ammunition. The deserters are fighting against us.
It is difficult to discover many loyal Muslims in Jammu province or the Poonch
area at the present moment. No question can arise at present of taking them
in the Army. As regards Kashmiris, if suitable men are willing to come for¬
ward, I may give a trial to this experiment, but the proportion and policy
cannot be declared in the present circumstances. The defence forces must be
loyal, if they are disloyal at a time of emergency, then it is not worth keeping
an army, as such an army will defeat itself.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

PS.
To save time I am sending this letter by hand of the Comptroller of
my Household. I am sorry for the delay but I have not been well for the
last day or two.

95
22 December 1947
My dear Gopalaswami,
I have seen your express telegram dated 19 December 1947
addressed to the Premier, East Punjab, and General Ihima\\a
regarding the Kashmir Civil Administration’s requirements of
150 motor vehicles.
2. I feel that this question should have been referred to and
dealt with by the Ministry of States who would, if necessary,
have utilised your Ministry and made the desired arrangements. I
 ruler’s reaction
119

papers may now be

would, therefore, suggest that the relative
future the Kashmir
transferred to the States Ministry and m
Administration may be asked to deal with that Ministry direct.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

96
Ministry without Portfolio
New Delhi
22 December 1947

My dear Sardarji,
I acknowledge with thanks receipt of your D.O. of date
re: my instructions regarding the supply of motor vehicles to
Kashmir.
2. It came upon me as somewhat of a surprise, especially
from you. I had thought my intervention in urgent matters
of this nature relating to Kashmir State, to which I had made
two visits at request, would be welcomed. When requests for
help of this nature are made to me, it is the easiest thing in the
world for me to refer the authorities making the requests to the
Ministry concerned. I recognise, however, that strict official
correctness would require the course suggested by you.
3. If, as Minister without Portfolio, I can, in cases of this
kind, act merely as a post office between a Ministry with a port¬
folio and persons or authorities outside, the situation is one
which I cannot regard as consistent with my position as a Mem¬
ber of the Cabinet.
4. I shall, as desired by you, issue instructions to my office
to transfer the papers relative to the motor vehicles matter to
your Ministry for being further dealt with at its discretion. Your
Ministry will, I trust, directly attend to any further arragements
that may be required in connection with this matter and will,
I hope, not seek to utilise my Ministry for the purpose.
5. I note further that you desire that in future the Kashmir
Administration may be asked to deal with your Ministry direct.
I am the last person to wish to poach into any other Ministry’s
preserves and shall proceed to disconnect myself and my Ministry
from all matters relating to Kashmir, including the negotiations
now in progress connected with the setting up of an Interim
Government there.
1^ sardar patel’s correspondence

6. You are a frank and direct man and will, 1 am sure,

appreciate my frankness and directness in this letter.
Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

97

New Delhi
23 December 1947
My dear Gopalaswami,
I am rather pained to read your letter dated 22 December
1947.

It was far from my intention to do anything which would

cause annoyance to you. My letter was intended merely to
ensure that the subject matter was dealt with in the Ministry
concerned. There is a background to it. A transaction of as
large as Rs. 20 lakhs was put through by the Prime Minister’s
Secretariat with Sheikh Abdullah without the Ministry J
concern-
ed coming to know of it until at a late stage. I do not know
whether you are aware that the Ministry of States has its own
Financial Adviser and therefore it makes it all the more incum¬
bent that a transaction involving any financial commitment
either on the part of a State or of ourselves should be centred
in the Ministry of States. What I wrote to you was precisely
on the same lines as I wrote to the Prime Minister in regard
to the matter referred to by us. There was no desire—indeed
I should be the last person—to insist on official correctness for
the sake of correctness.
2. I hope I have made my position clear, but if you still have
reason to be dissatisfied with the line I have taken, I would
rather withdraw my letter and let you deal with matters as you
deem best than give you any cause for annoyance.
3. I should also explain that my letter was intended to cover,
as indeed the origin of the whole matter would indicate, trans¬
actions of ordinary administration between the Kashmir autho¬
rities and the Government of India. There was no question of
its affecting in any way the conduct of negotiations over which
you are engaged; that the Prime Minister is already managing
 ruler’s reaction 121

with your collaboration and in consultation with me wherever

necessary in supersession of the normal ministerial responsibility.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

New Delhi

98
New Delhi
23 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Gopalaswami Ayyangar has sent me copies of correspondence
which has passed between him and you last night regarding 150
motor vehicles being sent from East Punjab to Kashmir.
I must confess that I am greatly surprised to read this. I
do not appreciate the principle which presumably the States
Ministry has in view in regard to its work. That Ministry, or
any other Ministry, is not an imperium in imperio, jealous of its
sovereignty in certain domains and working in isolation from the
rest. If that was so then the Government would not be a close-
knit organism working together with a common purpose, and the
P.M. would have no function to perform. But I do not wish to
consider the wider question of principle at this stage though it
may have to be discussed later.
The present issue relates to Kashmir. This raises all man¬
ner of connected issues — international, military and others —
which are beyond the competence of the States Ministry as such.
That is why it has to be considered by the Cabinet as a whole
frequently and by various Ministers separately or together. And
that is why I have to take personal interest in this matter as
P.M. to bring about co-ordination in our various activities.
Gopalaswami Ayyangar has been especially asked to help in
Kashmir matters and at our request has visited the State twice.
He has to deal with East Punjab also and the MEO organisa¬
tion thei e. Both for this reason and because of his intimate know¬
ledge and experience of Kashmir he has to be given full latitude.
Accordingly, after repeated talks with representatives of the Defence
Ministry, all manner of arrangements have been made about
supply of arms and equipment etc. In this connection the urgent
need of motor vehicles has been repeatedly raised. Ultimately it
122 sardar patel’s correspondence

was decided to ask the East Punjab Government to relieve a

number of these for Kashmir and steps were taken accordingly.
I really do not understand where the States Ministry comes
into the picture, except that it should be kept informed of steps
taken. In any event I do not understand why the States Mini¬
stry should intervene and come in the way of arrangements being
made. All this was done at my instance and I do not propose to
abdicate my functions in regard to matters for which I consider
myself responsible.
May 1 say that the manner of approach to Gopalaswami was
hardly in keeping with the courtesy due to a colleague?
Yours,
Jawaharlal
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

99
DRAFT1

23 December 1947
My dear Jawaharlal,
Your letter of today has been received just now at 7 p.m.
and I am writing immediately to tell you this. It has caused me
considerable pain.
Before I received your letter I had already written to Gopala¬
swami a letter of which a copy is enclosed herewith. If I had
known [that] he had sent you copies of our correspondence I
would have sent to you a copy of my letter to him straightaway.
In any case, your letter makes it clear to me that I must
not or at least cannot continue as a Member of Government and
hence I am hereby tendering my resignation. I am grateful to
you for the courtesy and kindness shown to me during the period
of office which was a period of considerable strain.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

1 The letter is marked ‘draft’. It was not sent presumably because Sardar
was persuaded to drop the controversy.
 100
New Delhi
24 December 1947

My dear Gopalaswami,
This is in continuation of my letter of yesterday s date. I
was surprised to hear from the Prime Minister that you had for¬
warded to him a copy of the correspondence. I feel rather hurt
that you should have done so without even informing me. I
thought relations between us permitted of ourselves settling this
matter without the intervention of the Prime Minister.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

New Delhi

101
Minister without Portfolio
New Delhi
24 December 1947
My dear Sardarji,
I am most thankful to you for your letter dated yesterday
in reply to mine of the previous day. It has taken a great
burden off my mind and I feel immensely relieved.
The Kashmir Administration wanted a number of motor
vehicles for use in their present emergency in transporting supplies
into the State and evacuating refugees from the State. There were
a number of such vehicles lying idle with our MEO at Lahore
and due to be returned to the East Punjab Government. The
Kashmir Government were prepared to bear all expenses. The
Premier, East Punjab, and Sardar Swaran Singh, whom I
spoke to, were agreeable to about 150 of those vehicles being
made available to the Kashmir Government for a few days. I used
my good offices in arranging this transaction and in the formal
telegram to the Premier, East Punjab, it was definitely indicated
that the Kashmir Government would bear all expenses and that
financial details might be settled between that Government and

123
124 sardar patel’s correspondence

the East Punjab Government. These facts hardly require the con¬
sent of the Financial Adviser of any Ministry at the Centre to the
transaction between two other Governments who independently
were competent to make the arrangement themselves. I have
enough of administrative experience to realise that, if any such
Financial Adviser had to be consulted, no directions of the kind
could be issued without reference to him. It is, however, not
necessary for me to argue this trivial point out with you.
The terms of your letter, so characteristic of you, have made
me come to feel much nearer to you than I was before. I shall
from now forget that any such incident happened between us and
put it entirely out of my mind.
I have since received your second letter of date. My letter
to the Prime Minister did not seek his intervention between us;
in the long [course] of administrative life in various capacities
that I have gone through, I have never believed in the interven¬
tion of higher authorities in my favour in my differences—they
were many—that I have had with colleagues in office. I thought
that, as Head of the Government, the Prime Minister ought to be
informed of what had passed between us; and that is the only rea¬
son for my sending him a copy of your letter to me dated 22nd
and my letter to you of the same date. Perhaps, I could have re¬
frained from sending him even these copies for information. I
am sorry to have caused you hurt.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

COPY
New Delhi
21 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar has shown me the correspondence he has
had with you during the last few days. I am very sorry to find that it has
not been possible so far for the parties concerned to agree in regard to the
next steps to be taken. Meanwhile the situation changes from day to day and
what is said today becomes rather out of date tomorrow.
We have to face an exceedingly dynamic and changing situation both in
the military and the political sense. Decisions are governed far more by what
WITH GENERAL RAJENDRA SINGH AND MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN,
PRIME MINISTER OF J & K
 ruler’s reaction 125

is happening than by what we may desire to happen. In recent weeks there

has been some deterioration in the military situation. There is no danger of
any major event happening to our disadvantage. But it is true that all
manner of small events happen which increase the morale of the invaders and
correspondingly affect the morale of our people. The problem is a military
one and political one. On the political side it is both internal to Kashmir
and external, that is, as between the Dominion of India and Pakistan. We
have been giving a great deal of thought to it, more especially in so far as
inter-Dominion relationships are concerned.
It is patent that the present position in which the Pakistan Government
and army, though remaining officially in the background, play a dominant
role in the invasion of Kashmir, is most disadvantageous to us. We are justi¬
fied in considering the acts and omissions of the Pakistan Government as hostile
acts and omissions which we are entitled to counter by military or other means.
We have thus far avoided doing so for various political reasons, among them
being that both India and Pakistan are members of the United Nations Orga¬
nisation. It is prima facie improper for two members to come into direct con¬
flict with each other without reference to the UNO. The fact that Pakistan
has acted as an aggressor country is well known to us, but the manner of its
doing so has been such as not to be known by the outside world.
The Government of India are now thinking of taking early steps to inform
the Security Council of the UNO that the Pakistan Government have been
directly or indirectly encouraging and aiding aggression on Indian Dominion
territory, that is, Kashmir State. Pakistan territory is used for transport, as
a base of operations against Kashmir and in many other ways, for this purpose.
We propose to ask the Security Council of the UNO to call upon Pakistan to
desist from doing so. Further, we propose to say that in view of what
Pakistan has been doing we consider ourselves entitled to take such other and
further action to stop this invasion which is bringing ruin and desolation to
Kashmir State. This action may involve our entering Pakistan territory.

Our present intention is to make this limited reference to the UNO with¬
out committing ourselves in any way. Meanwhile, of course, we shall continue
to fight the invader and to drive him back. The reference will not stop us from
our present activities in any way. But once reference is made it is possible
that other developments might take place for which we have to be prepared.

Although our Government is clear on the line of action to be taken now,

we shall finalise our decisions in two or three days’ time after our talks with
the Pakistan Ministers who are due to reach here tonight in connection with
the Joint Defence Council. We have to proceed correctly from a national and
international point of view so that any action that we might take in future
might not only be effective but above-board and in conformity with inter¬
national procedure.
126 sardar patel’s correspondence

Sheikh Abdullah and Hakshi Ghulam Mohammad arrived here last night
and I have informed them of the proposed action of ours. I am writing this
letter to you to keep you fully informed of this matter also. As soon as any
final decision is taken, I shall, of course, communicate it to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru
His Highness
The Maharaja Sahib of Jammu & Kashmir
Jammu-Tawi

Copy to:
1. The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
2. The Hon’ble Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

COPY

New Delhi
23 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

I sent you a letter three or four days ago on the subject of our talks
with the Pakistan Ministers regarding Kashmir.
Our Cabinet came to the conclusion that the best course for us to adopt
in the circumstances was to draw the attention of the United Nations Organi¬
sation to the aggression on Indian Dominion territory by people coming from
or through Pakistan with the aid and encouragement of the Pakistan Govern¬
ment. The UNO would be asked by us to call upon the Pakistan Government
to stop this aggression as in the alternative we will have to take such steps
as we might think fit and proper to do so. Prior to our approaching the UNO
it was considered desirable to send a formal request to the Pakistan Govern¬
ment asking them to stop giving any aid or encouragement to the invaders.
This was the line we took up in our conversation with the Prime Minister
of Pakistan and I gave him a letter to this effect. A copy of this letter is en¬

closed.
We shall now wait for a few days, which are not likely to exceed four or
five, for Pakistan’s reply. We shall then refer the matter to the Security
Council of UNO. All this procedure need not take very long. The Security
Council will probably have an early hearing of our representative and may
then call upon Pakistan to reply to the charges made against them. They
may thereupon send a commission to India.
Meanwhile, of course, we shall carry on our military operations as we
are doing. Indeed, we hope to carry them on more vigorously. Future action
will depend on other developments.
 ruler’s reaction 127

This matter has to be kept perfectly secret at this stage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

High Highness
The Maharaja Sahib of Jammu & Kashmir
Jammu-Tawi

Copy to:
1. The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
2. The Hon’ble Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

102
New Delhi
23 December 1947
My dear Maharaja Hari Singh,
Many thanks for your two letters regarding the Yuvraj’s visit
to America. Everything has now been fixed up for his departure
on 29 December. The Dakota plane to take him to Bombay [has]
also been arranged. I hope he will have a comfortable journey.
I have also received your letter enclosing a copy of your letter
to Gopalaswami. Your stand is quite consistent with your previous
commitments. I have had talks with Gopalaswami about it also.
Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi [Ghulam Mohammad] are both
here for the last two days. I intend to run down to Jammu for
a few hours on the 25th.
With kindest regards to Her Highness, yourself and the
Yuvraj,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
His Highness Maharaja Sir Hari Singh
Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir
Jammu

1 One of the two letters dated 21 and 23 December 1947 is the enclosure
referred to in the letter of 30 December 1947 on page 135.
 CHAPTER IX

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE

103

Jammu
24 December 1947
My clear Sardar Patelji,
I sent you a copy of Sheikh Abdullah’s letter to H. H. before
his release on the 20th. I wonder why it has not reached you. I
send herewith another copy of the same letter.
This humble subject who promised steadfast loyalty now
wants to prosecute H. H. before the people’s tribunal and
demands his abdication. His latest offer is that H.H. can have
the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur and leave the rest
of the territory to a Muslim republic like Pakistan. He is active¬
ly canvassing support of Muslim Conference leader Abbas who
is in jail and with whom he is having interviews.
Practically in all matters he is ignoring and bypassing H.H.
and is daily showing increased communal tendencies.
If you permit I will send you specimens of his administrative
skill and knowledge and communal tendencies and where he has
ignored H.H. with the help of National Guards in Srinagar. He
thinks he can do what he likes. On hearing from you I will send
you some instances of complete misrule and maladministration
on fascist lines.
I am in a most embarrassing position. I wish you could
somehow get me out. I have tried but without success. H.H. will
not let me out.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan

128
 »

ENCLOSURE I

SOME INSTANCES OF ABDULLAH ADMINISTRATION

1. President of the Praja Sabha has been removed without reference to

H. H. though under law only H.H. can remove him.
2. High Court is not functioning. H.H. or Chief Justice are the only
authorities above High Court, but under his orders the High Court is not
allowed to come to Jammu as it ought to under H.H.’s order. One Judge is
a Muslim and as he does not wish to come here we have no High Court for
over 2 months. His attention was drawn by H.H. to this but he ignored the
order. C. J. is in Calcutta, one jury here and one in Srinagar.
3. Governor Jammu was transferred to Srinagar and suspended and kept
under restraint there without any specific charge or any enquiry and without
previous reference to H.H. Once H.H. was consulted and certain decision
was made but this was ignored.
4. [J.N.] Zutshi,1 dismissed for corruption after enquiry, has been allotted
to a responsible post.
5. An accounts officer has been appointed Chief Secretary though the office
of Chief Secretary is reserved for the executive and judicial branch of service.
Considerable number of officers will be superseded.

6. Court Chief Inspector has been appointed Tahsildar without any exe¬
cutive training. Sub-Inspector Police made A.S.P. without being even an
inspector, on communal consideration. Income-tax officer appointed Wazir.
Parties of one profession appointed in different branches of services on
communal grounds.

7. Large number of officers and men are in custody without charges and trial.
8. Corruption in National Conference workers is rampant in selling transport
and giving trade concessions.

9. Gazetted and non-gazetted officers are made to obey orders of volunteers

on threats of dismissal or arrest.

10. Emergency officers are appointed who are not public servants with no
powers and duties. They are said to be advising men but wield real power.
The whole administration is thus in chaos.

11. Shomiri, Adalatkhan, Dar were retired by H.H. before I came on grounds
of disloyalty. Against express direction of H.H., they have been reinstated.

1 Confidant of Sheikh Abdullah; he and Baldcv

Prasad Sharma, Director of
Information, J & K, were arrested with Abdullah in 1
953 and released later.

129
S. C.-9
 ENCLOSURE II

26 September 1947
May it please Your Highness,

It is after about one and a half years’ incarceration as long wished—I had
an opportunity of having detailed talks with Thakur Nichantchandji [brother
of the Maharani]. What unfortunate things happened during this period
in the State I need not mention. But this is now realised by every wellwisher
of the State that many of the regrettable happenings of the past have mainly
been due to the misunderstandings which appear now to have deliberately
been created by interested people in order to achieve their own ends. R. B.
Ramchandra Kak, the ex-Prime Minister, through his mischievous methods
and masterly manoeuvrings, brought these misunderstandings to a climax and
succeeded in his attempt, though temporarily, to a certain extent. He painted
me and my organisation in the darkest colours and in everything that we did
or attempted to do to bring Your Highness and your people closer, base and
selfish motives were attributed to me. But God be thanked that all these
enemies of Your Highness and State stand exposed today.

In spite of what has happened in the past, I assure Your Highness that
myself and my party have never harboured any sentiment of disloyalty towards
Your Highness’ person, throne or dynasty. The development of this beautiful
country and the betterment of its people is our common aim and interest and
I assure Your Highness the fullest and loyal support of myself and my organi¬
zation. Not only this but I assure Your Highness that any party, within or
without the State which may attempt to create any impediments in our efforts
to gain our goal will be treated as our enemy and will be treated as such.
In order to achieve the common aim set forth above, mutual trust and
confidence must be the mainstay. Without this it w’ould not be possible to
face successfully the great difficulties that beset our State on all sides at present.
Before I close this letter I beg to assure Your Highness once again of my
steadfast loyalty and pray that God may grant me opportunity enough to let
this country attain under Your Highness’ aegis such an era of peace, pros¬
perity and good government that it may be second to none and be an ideal
for others to copy.
Your Highness’ most obedient subject,
S. M. Abdullah

130
 104
New Delhi
29 December 1947

My dear Sardarji,
I send herewith a copy of the letter dated 28 Decembei
received by me today from the ^Maharaja of Kashmir, togethci
with a copy of the telegram which I have just sent him.
2. I have the greatest personal regard for Mr. Mahajan,
but I am convinced that the interests of Kashmir in the present
situation make it impossible for him to continue there in the
capacity of Dewan with the right of presiding over a Cabinet
of Ministers appointed on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah
as Prime Minister and entrusted with the conduct of the entire
civil administration of the State. I have failed to persuade
Sheikh Abdullah to [accept] the Maharaja’s views on this
matter. The situation in the State, both in the immediate
present and in the near future, demands that we should strengthen
Sheikh Abdullah’s hands.
3. I hope that, after he receives my telegram, the Maharaja
will agree to act on the advice that I gave him in my letter dated
24 December.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

131
 ENCLOSURE I

The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
28 December 1947
My dear Gopalaswami,

I am thankful to you for your letter of 24 December [See 109.] and for
the interest you have taken in our affairs.

I have carefully considered the suggestions made by you, especially in

view of the weight of opinion behind them. I assure you that I desire to be
most helpful. After weighing all the considerations I have come to the view
stated below

1. As regards the reserved subjects contained in Schedule II of the Mysore

model there is piactically an agreement between us. They are almost those as
are contained in Sections 24, 48, and 15 of our Constitution Act. I am thank¬
ful to you for suggesting an addition of Section 71 about the Board of Judicial
Advisers. Sections 5 and 6 of our Act are in accord with Section 8 of the Mysore
model. I am glad you agree that the protection of minorities should be men¬
tioned in the proclamation as a reserved subject in Schedule II. About elec¬
tions, some pait of this must be in the reserved subjects, e.g. nomination of
election tribunals. A Council of Ministers usually tries to interfere with elec¬
tions in their own favour. The Ruler should have the power to see that free
elections are conducted.

Kindly ask Mr. [V.P.] Menon to draw out a schedule on these lines
and incorporate the schedule of reserved subjects in the proclamation.
2. Your suggestion regarding the Army meets with my approval. But
the proclamation must only say that all sections of the people will have oppor¬
tunities of service, whether civil or military, and these will be open to all
creeds and communities on their merits.
3. I am quite willing to accept your suggestion of nine Ministers though
I feel the number is really too large. As regards representation of the mino¬
rities, this cannot be left entirely in the hands of the new Prime Minister,
who must give me a panel of names so that the true representatives of the
minorities come in and not only figureheads are taken. Low salaries for
Ministers are most dangerous which may lead to corruption.
4. I am agreeable to your suggestion that the Interim Ministry should
put up proposals for the election of the Constituent Assembly and its composi¬
tion but I would like to add that besides the elected elements I must have the

132
 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE 133

right to nominate a few persons to the Constituent Assembly out of the mino¬
rity communities and other persons having substantial interest in the State if
the result of election does not show their adequate representation.
5. I am glad you agree that I should have a Dewan who enjoys my
confidence and that Sheikh Abdullah wishes to exercise no veto on my choice
and that the Dewan can advise on administration of the reserved subjects and
can be in the Cabinet.
6. There are two matters however which I find extremely difficult to
accept. I must insist that the Dewan should be the President of the Cabinet.
This is so in Mysore, where the leader of the Congress Party is the Chief
Minister. In most of the earlier letters and verbal conversation Pandit Nehru
and Sardar Patel accepted the view that Mr. Mahajan as Dewan can for¬
mally preside over Cabinet meetings. Mr. Menon also gave me the same
impression. I went back on my commitment when I agreed to give Sheikh
Abdullah the designation of Prime Minister and I cannot appease him further
on the point that he should preside and not the Dewan, who is a man of
my confidence.
7. As regards the [position] of Mr. Mahajan, again I cannot accept the
suggestion in spite of the fact that he feels embarrassed and has no personal
desire whatever to continue under the present condition, but I must have
regard for my word and commitment. I have complete confidence in
Mr. Mahajan and value his integrity. I am not going to appease anyone by
being false to myself and my word. Let me add that this is now absolutely a
point of honour with me.

8. Kindly get the proclamation drawn up on the lines agreed to and

suggested by me. It is now for you to get Sheikh Abdullah to agree to my
considered and final views. I cannot stand more distress than I actually have,
with half my people and half my country ruined. Sheikh Abdullah should be
told that he cannot drive too hard a bargain. This is not in the interest of
either himself or the State. I have gone to a limit beyond which I cannot go.
With kind regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
 ENCLOSURE II

TELEGRAM

29 December 1947
Maharajadhiraj
Jammu

THANKS VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF YESTERDAY’S DATE DELIVERED TO

ME THIS MORNING. HAVE MADE AN ATTEMPT AS SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH EIGHT

OF \ OUR LETTER AND THE ATTEMPT HAS FAILED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE

AGREEMENT OF THE PARTY CONCERNED TO ACCEPT YOUR VIEWS ON THE TWO

MATTERS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPHS SIX AND SEVEN OF YOUR LETTER. THE

RECOMMENDATIONS I MADE TO YOU ON THOSE TWO MATTERS ARE OUR UNITED

CONSIDERED ADVICE AND YOU WILL I HOPE BELIEVE ME WHEN I SAY THAT THEY

WERE DELIBERATELY MADE TO YOU IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF YOURSELF, STATE

AND PEOPLE. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT HESITATION OR DELAY IN ACTING

ON THE ADVICE I HAVE TENDERED TO YOU IN RESPECT OF THESE TWO MATTERS

MIGHT PRODUCE UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENTS AND IS BOUND TO WEAKEN OUR

HANDS IN THE GREAT EFFORT WHICH THE DOMINION, YOURSELF AND YOUR PEOPLE

ARE JOINTLY AND UNITEDLY ENGAGED IN NOW. I WOULD AS A SINCERE FRIEND

OF THE STATE MAKE A FINAL APPEAL TO YOU TO ACCEPT W’HAT I HAVE ADVISED

YOU ALREADY. I AM COMMUNICATING COPIES OF YOUR LETTER TO BOTH THE PRIME

MINISTER AND THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF THIS

TELEGRAM.

GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR

105
New Delhi
30 December 1947
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Gopalaswami Ayyangar showed me the Maharaja of
Kashmir’s reply to him. I was surprised to read this as the Maha¬
raja had practically told us that he would agree to Mahajan going
away. Mahajan himself had told us that he would no longer
stay there. Apart from this I have received very disturbing new's
from Bakshi through the telephone about the way the arms that
we have sent for him have been kept back and distributed to RSS1
1 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh—volunteer organisation founded in Maha¬
rashtra in 1925 with object of protecting religion and culture of Hindus. In course
of time it spread to other parts of country.

134
 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE

people. While Jammu was in imminent danger a large part 01

the consignment of arms was just held back and Bakshi s Home
Guards were fighting often without rifles and always with too
little ammunition and dying in the process.
It seems from a number of reports that have reached me
that the RSS is being supported and armed at the cost of Bakshi’s
Home Guards and that propaganda is being openly carried on
by posters and otherwise against Sheikh Abdullah. In some dis¬
tant parts of the State where there are no invaders the RSS is
creating trouble by sending their emissaries. I am inclined to
think that Mahajan sympathises with these activities and per¬
haps helps them.
The situation is a serious one and obviously cannot conti¬
nue as it is. It will lead to internal conflict which will be disas¬
trous from every point of view. The Maharaja, unfortunately, is
terribly shortsighted and has a way of doing the wrong thing. He
has suffered sufficiently in the past by his own errors and yet he
has not benefited by that lesson. I fear he will get into great
trouble if he does not appreciate the present situation and act
accordingly. I am sending a letter to the Maharaja, a copy of
which I enclose.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

106
New Delhi
30 December 1947
My dear Jawaharlal,
I have just received your letter of today and I hasten to send
you a reply as I am going away tomorrow early morning to Assam.
When I saw the Maharaja yesterday, the Maharaja showed me
the letter he had received from Gopalaswami and a copy of his
reply. I told the Maharaja that he had given an impression to
Gopalaswami that he was willing to release Mahajan, but he said
that he had not done so and if Gopalaswami carried any such
impression it was wrong. The Maharaja’s position is that it was
not a question of personality but of principle. I argued with him
that it would be in the interest of all to replace Mahajan by
some other acceptable man, who can be found, but he seemed
136 sardar patel’s correspondence

to be very unwilling. Mahajan himself is in an embarrassing

position, but if the Maharaja could be persuaded he would certain¬
ly be willing to leave. Last night when I met Gopalaswami at
your place, I communicated all that had passed between me and
the Maharaja to him and I thought that he must have talked to
you about it.
2. In brief, the Maharaja’s position is that he is prepared to
fulfil entirely his part of the agreement that he has made with
us, and expects us on our part to stand by it. We know his
nature and we must handle him tactfully.
3. Bakshi [Ghulam Mohammad] was practically the whole day
with me yesterday. He took me to a public meeting and also to
receive two or three deputations of Hindus and Muslims, but he
never mentioned to me that he had any difficulty about his get¬
ting arms from the State authorities or that they were held back
by them. In fact, I did not know that the consignment of arms
was in charge of the State authorities.
4. Neither Bakshi nor anybody in Jammu informed me about
the RSS activities there. Whatever may have been done by
the RSS in the beginning, there seemed to be no evidence of
their activities now.
5. The situation is undoubtedly serious. Both Menon and my¬
self tried to argue with him [the Maharaja], as far as possible, but
he had a catalogue of grievances against Sheikh Abdullah for
several orders that he had passed ignoring him altogether, in¬
cluding the High Court being completely sidetracked. It is a
very difficult situation, but you can send Gopalaswami again and
let him have one more go at it.
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

107
New Delhi
30 December 1947

My dear Mahajan,
Since your telephone talk this evening, I had two letters,
one from Gopalaswami and the other from Panditji. Both are
very distressing. They had a complaint from Bakshi that his
Home Guards are not getting the firearms. I do not know how
 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE 137

far this complaint is true. It would not be wise to give them any
cause for complaint in such matters. It seems he has also com¬
plained that RSS people are being armed. You did not mention
anything about it when I met you at Jammu. But you must make
sure that no such thing happens.
Both the Maharaja and you must once more think over the
question of the Interim Government. [V. P.] Menon will explain
to you more fully what I have got in my mind. There is no
doubt that a solution must be found. I am going to Assam to¬
morrow and will be returning on 6 January. Menon will come
with this letter as soon as he is able to do so.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Mehrchand Mahajan Esq.
Jammu

108
New Delhi
30 December 1947
My dear Gopalaswami,
I got your letter just now and I had got one from Panditji
also, on the same subject. Panditji is very much distressed about
this affair. I do not know how to solve this riddle. The utmost
that can perhaps be done is to get Mahajan out of the way if
we can find an acceptable man in his place; but even after that,
the problem will not be solved because the Maharaja will insist
on the Mysore agreement being fulfilled in all other respects.
Sheikh Abdullah is not perpared for it.
I am going away tomorrow to Assam. I have asked Menon
to come and see you. I propose to send him to Jammu to speak
to the Maharaja once again, but I am not sure whether he will
be successful. But the Maharaja has a feeling that he is not being;
fairly treated. s

Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon ble Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
New Delhi
 109

The Palace
Jammu
30 December 1947
My dear Sardar Patel,
I am sending herewith a copy of Shri Gopalaswami’s letter
sent to me for your information. Copy of my reply to this letter
has already been sent to you.
I am most thankful to you for your visit to Jammu and for
the interest you have taken in our affairs. I shall be grateful if
the matter of the Interim Government is settled as soon as possible.
I understand that Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch,1 whose
services have been taken on loan by us from the Indian Army
and is working as Military Adviser, is being recalled, possibly at
the instance of Sheikh Abdullah or Lt. Col. Attal. I am afraid I
cannot release him as I require his services for reorganisation of
the State Army. I shall be obliged if you will very kindly ask the
Military Headquarters to withdraw this.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

ENCLOSURE

New Delhi
24 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

I am most grateful to Your Highness for your letter of 17 December. \Ne
have given anxious consideration to all the points mentioned in that letter and
during the last two days we have had the advantage of further discussion on
several of those points with Sheikh Abdullah.
2. I have set out below our considered conclusions. In our opinion
they are in the best interest of Jammu and Kashmir State, its Ruler and its

1 Special Adviser to J & K State forces; son of General Janak Singh who
was Prime Minister of J & K for a short period.

138
 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE 139

people. I earnestly hope that you will find yourself able to accept and give
effect to all of them.
3. The Government of India do not desire that you should deviate from
the Mysore model except in respect of matters which are considered minor
and which are necessitated by the different conditions, which ordinarily, and
particularly now, prevail in Kashmir. For the Interim Government which you
are anxious to set up immediately, the model should undoubtedly be the Mysoi e
one but, in adapting that model to the present situation in your State, its
peculiar conditions and the provisions of its existing constitution deserve to be
taken into account. These have been kept fully in view by us.
4. You have laid stress on the reservation of subjects listed in Schedule
II of the Mysore Proclamation dated 24 September 1947 as being its most im¬
portant essential. Most of the items in this schedule are reserved matters
under the J & K Constitution Act. Items 1, 2 and 4 are reserved from the
cognisance of the Praja Sabha under Section 24 of the J & K Constitution Act,
1896, though the description is not identical. They can be included in the
list of subjects in the administration of which you are not bound to obtain
the advice of your Ministers. The powers of the Ruler under item 3 in
regard to the High Court are to be found in Sections 48 and 49 of that Act. In
addition, similar powers are reserved to the Ruler in Section 71 as regards the
Board of Judicial Advisers. The Ruler’s powers to summon and dissolve the
Legislature (item 6 of the Mysore model) are provided for in Section 15 of
the Act. The residuary and emergency powers (item 8 of the Mysore Sche¬
dule) are reserved to the Ruler under Sections 4 and 5 of the J & K Act
The only matters in the Mysore Schedule which do not find specific mention
in the J & K Act are:

(a) Protection of legitimate interests of minorities; and

(b) Superintendence, direction and control of elections.
* * * *

(a) May be reserved in the proclamation to issue. It seems unneces¬

sary to reserve also.

(b) The matter referred to therein is one which could well be left to
the Council of Ministers.

5. The Interim Ministry will, as suggested in your letter, function as a

Cabinet with a Prime Minister as may be fixed by you in accordance with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Constitution Act.

6. There may be a Dewan in addition to the Council of Ministers. It

is desirable that he should have the right to attend meetings of the Cabinet,
so that he might be closely associated with the work of the Cabinet, and might
function as an effective liaison officer between the Cabinet and the Ruler,
interpreting the one to the other and aiding and advising the Ruler in
the transaction of business connected with reserved subjects. Not only does
140 sardar patel’s correspondence

Section 6 of the Constitution Act require that the Prime Minister should
preside over the Council of Ministers, but it is on the merits essential that he
should do so. To direct that a person other than the Prime Minister should
preside over the Cabinet would not make for that perfect understanding and
intimate association between the Ruler and his Prime Minister, which are so
essential for efficiency of administration.

7. I agree entirely that the person to be selected for the post of Dewan
should be a man who enjoys your full confidence. It is, however, at the same
time desirable that that man should not be one to whom the leader of the
Government has any violent objection. The two have to get on with cor¬
diality and good understanding if Your Highness’ government of the State
is to achieve the maximum beneficial results for the people that it ought to
achieve. There can be no question of anybody attempting to sabotage your
selection of the proper man for the Dewan’s post. I am in a position to
assure you that Sheikh Abdullah himself is only too anxious to have, as liaison
between him and you, a Dewan who enjoys your fullest confidence, so that his
relation with you might be of the smoothest possible description. Should
Your Highness so desire, I shall be glad to be of assistance in selecting a
Dewan who will be the best possible choice from all points of view.

8* We—and in ‘we’ I include myself, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar

Vallabhbhai Patel —are convinced that it is not possible for Sheikh Abdullah
and Mr. Mehrchand Mahajan to work together in the same Government
hereafter and that it is best in the circumstances that Mr. Mahajan should be
allowed to terminate his present connection with the State. I have already
informed you that I have good reason to think that Mr. Mahajan would
probably himself be glad to be relieved from the embarrassment of Your
Highness asking him to stay on in the State.

9. In ordinary circumstances I should certainly have agreed in your

view that six Ministers should be adequate for a State like Kashmir. The
State is, however, in great turmoil. The invader has to be expelled, rebellion
has to be quelled, law and order have to be established and normal economic
life revived. For a considerable time to come, the burden of government in
Kashmir will be much heavier than in ordinary times. I have discussed this
question with Sheikh Abdullah. He considers that there is more than enough
work for each of 12 or 14 Ministers and he urges that this number need not
scare anybody, as the salaries that will be taken by them will be very much
smaller than the salaries you have been paying your Ministers hitherto. The
pitch of the salaries is not wholly relevant in this connection. It is desirable
to avoid a crowd of Ministers. Responsibility will get too scattered and unity
of policy and close collaboration in administration might not be fully achieved
if the number of Ministers is too large. Taking all circumstances into consi¬
deration, I should recommend for the Interim Government, which will function
 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE 141

only till the new Constitution is fashioned and conies into force, a strength of
9 Ministers. This would incidentally provide room for adequate representa¬
tion in the Ministry of minorities and the different areas of the State. On
this latter matter, namely, representation of minorities and provinces, Sheikh
Abdullah is as keen as you yourself are. His immediate object is so to con¬
stitute his Government that he will be able to rally to his support the
maximum proportion of the population, especially in view of the threatened
plebiscite.
10. On the question of the Army I thought I had made it clear to
Your Highness that there was no need to fix proportions for the recruitment
of the different communities into the Army. I am glad that you are prepared
to take Kashmiris, both Hindu and Muslim, into the Army, provided that
suitable material offers for recruitment. For the rest, no more is necessary than
to apprise all sections of population in the State of the policy of Your Highness
and Your Government to provide opportunities of service, whether civil or
military, to members of all creeds and communities in the State on their
merits. I agree and I am in a position to assure you that Sheikh Abdullah
agrees, that, for some time to come and until things have completely settled
down and normal life has been in full swing for a considerable period, we
should hardly think of recruiting any large number of Muslims from
Jammu province (including the Poonch area) which has contributed the largest
number to the rebel ranks in the present disturbances. The population of
these areas have first to be won over and their loyalty to the State proved
beyond cavil before recruitment to the Army from their ranks can be safely
allowed to take place. It is, however, important that, in order to win them
over, they should have the expectation from now that, if they become and
remain loyal to the State, opportunities for service to the State, whether in a
civil or a military capacity, will not be denied to them.
11. The Mysore Proclamation dated 24 September 1947 laid upon the
Dewan the duty of framing a Constitution Bill and directed that, in doing so,
he should obtain the advice and counsel of a committee elected by the Legis¬
lature and of such other experts and expert bodies as might be found suitable
and desirable. There was some controversy on this matter in Mysore State
and, in the final understanding that was arrived at between the Dewan and
the President of the Mysore Congress and embodied in the Mysore Maharaja’s
Proclamation dated 28th day of October, the direction in this respect was
that the Interim Ministry should set up a Constituent Assembly composed of
e ected representatives of the people and entrust to it the task of framing a
onstitution Bill providing for responsible government under the aegis of the
Maharaja. I think that, so far as Kashmir is concerned Your Highness gives
the direction that the Interim Ministry should submit to you, as soon as
possible proposals for bringing into existence a Constitution-making body com¬
posed of elected representatives of the people for the purpose of framing, for
142 sardar patel’s correspondence

your approval and promulgation, a Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir State.
The Constitution of the present Praja Sabha provides for a large fraction of
nominated members and will therefore not be acceptable either to the National
Conference or even to other political bodies in the State. It would seem,
therefore, best to ask the Interim Ministry itself to submit for your considera¬
tion proposals as regards the composition ol the Constitution-making body and
the method of choosing its members.

12. This letter has become longer than I originally intended. I hope,
however, I have met all the points raised in your letter.

13. With a view to saving time, the States Ministry is being asked to
prepare a dralt of the proclamation and to send it on to you as early as
possible for your consideration. If you desire, in the meanwhile, to give any
instructions in connection with such drafting, will you kindly have them com¬
municated to that Ministry direct by telegram or by letter?

14. The actual personnel of the Ministry has to be proposed by Sheikh

Abdullah for your acceptance. If, in connection with this matter or for the
purpose of further discussion of what I have said in this letter, my services
should be required, they are always at your disposal.
With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami

His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir

Jammu

110
New Delhi
30 December 1947
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I have just received your letter of today’s date about
Kashmir. I have also received a note from Gopalaswami Ayyan-
gar enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Maharaja of Kash¬
mir, in which he says that he cannot agree to Gopalaswami’s
suggestion. There is thus a complete deadlock and I just do not
see what we are to do about it.
I quite agree with you that the matter has to be dealt with
tactfully with the Maharaja as with others. I have used up all
the tact at my disposal in this matter without achieving substantial
results. Considering everything, I think that Sheikh Abdullah
and Bakshi have taken a very sensible view of the situation
and they have tried to appreciate the position of the Maharaja.
 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE

But it must be remembered that they cannot function with¬

out popular backing, both Muslim and Hindu. 1 hey have tried
hard to gain this popular backing of the Hindus and succeeded
wholly in Kashmir and partly in Jammu. There is evidence of
this by the fact that the leaders of the Hindu Yuvak Sabha move¬
ment which in the past were opposed to Sheikh Sahib are sup¬
porting him completely. That is to say that the local Hindus
are with him to a large extent. But the RSS and the [Hindus]
from the Punjab are of a different type and between them and
Sheikh Abdullah there is a big gulf. I do not see how that
gulf can possibly be bridged, especially as the RSS is accused with
reason of having organised killing of the Muslims in Jammu.
Sheikh Abdullah has to keep the goodwill of the Muslims to some
extent at least even in Jammu. He has succeeded in a measure
and the latest evidence of this is that the local Muslim Confe¬
rence is coming into conflict with the Azad Kashmir movement.
Today’s Civil & Military Gazette contains a full report of this.
All these developments are taking place because of a belief
that there has been a change in the administration and Sheikh
Abdullah is really in charge. Mahajan’s presence is a constant
irritant to these various elements as well as to Sheikh Abdullah’s
party. I have no doubt that even if we patch up something for
the moment and Mahajan remained, there will be constant trouble
and friction. That will be no solution to any problem. I repeat
therefore that I see no way out of this impasse except something
drastic happening. I propose to do nothing for the present till you
return from Assam. But events are moving fast and I do not
know what might happen.
The trouble about the distribution of arms is a fairly old one
and has been discussed with the military authorities here several
times. Bucher is very annoyed that the arms specially sent for
Bakshi were not given to him. He has asked Kulwant Singh for
an explanation.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
PS.
I have just had a telephone message from Jammu (Bakshi)
to the effect that a big attack has been made by the raiders on
Suchetgarh and another some distance away. Reinforcements
weie sent by our army and fighting is proceeding.
 Ill

New Delhi
30 December 1947
My dear Sardarji,
Herewith copy ot the telegram I have just received from the
Maharaja ol Kashmir in reply to mine of yesterday.
2. I cannot proceed further with this foolish man, not having
any powers for putting pressure on him. I thought I could
persuade him, but I have not succeeded.
3. It is for you to take the matter up now and solve the
inconvenient and gratuitous riddle that the Maharaja has created
for himself and that he expects us to solve for his benefit.
Yours sincerely,
Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

30 December 1947

N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

YOUR MESSAGE OF 29TH RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON. SINCE MY LAST LETTER,

MATTER DISCUSSED WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WHO IS IN FULL POSSESSION

OF MY VIEWS. SORRY CANNOT AGREE.

MAHARAJADHIRAJ

112
New Delhi
30 December 1947

My dear Baldev Singh,

I understand that there is a move to recall Col. Kashmir
Singh Katoch from Kashmir. You know the circumstance in
which his deputation was arranged. It was at my personal

144
 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE 145

request that you kindly agreed to let him go. I feel that, unless
there are substantial reasons, his previous deputation should
stand. In any case, I should be grateful if you would consult me
before agreeing to his reversion.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Sardar Baldev Singh
New Delhi

113

Jammu
30 December 1947
My dear Sardar Patelji,
As desired by you, I send herewith a copy of my note
regarding Mangla Headworks, which I sent to Panditji, for your
information.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan
The Hon’ble Vallabhbai Patel
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

The note says that “the land under the town of Mangla is in State
territory and has never been leased or given to Pakistan.” In 1904 the Jammu
and Kashmir Government permitted the Punjab Government to construct a
cannal Within State territory on condition “that it shall always remain the
property of the Durbar and that the Punjab Government will pay annually
o the Durbar a sum equivalent to the total amount of revenue at present
levied m respect of the cultivated portion of the land.”

S.C.-10
EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM R. C. KAK TO MAHATMA GANDHI
DATED 31 DECEMBER 1947

“ . . . Deputy Prime Minister had been sent to Delhi to get the help
of the Indian Dominion to stop this act of aggression from the Pakistan side
on the Dominion of His Highness. No help, however, came immediately.
Mr. Menon, the Secretary, States Ministry, flew to Srinagar on that date for
talks with His Highness. The next day I accompanied Mr. Menon to Delhi
and personally requested the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister
of India for military aid on behalf of His Highness. The Indian Dominion
provisionally accepted the accession of Kashmir and also advised His
Highness to form an Interim Government in the State under the leadership
of Sheikh Abdullah. His Highness agreed to this and on the 27th the Indian
Dominion took over charge of the defence of the State. The State forces
were put under the control of the Commander of the forces of the Indian
Dominion.
On 30 October, Sheikh Abdullah was made the Head of the Administra¬
tion on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of
India and His Highness vested him virtually with the powers of a dictator
and stepped aside.”

146
 CHAPTER X

SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION

114
The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
1 January 1948
My dear Sardar Patel,
I enclose herewith a copy of Panditji’s telegram dated 31
December received this morning. I have given no reply to the first
part of the telegram.
According to rumours I hear the supply of modern arms
to the Home Guards is dangerous. I also hear the raiders snatch
them away and they are wholly unfit to handle arms. But obviously
a great effort to create a rival army in the State is being made.
I am not of course in confidence about these matters. I am not
even told what arms are ordered and by whom and for what
purpose, who is to receive them and distribute them and what
the policy in such matters is.
About mosques etc. I have no knowledge. Sheikh Abdullah and
Bakshi aie virtual dictators and they have complete power. I
wonder what we are expected to do and what the suggestion is.
Even when Mr. Mahajan and I have stepped aside are we to be
blamed or coerced? This seems to me to be only deep propa¬
ganda in disguise to drive me to desperation by being bullied
11g it and left. Already there is no rule of law here and if the
present policy continues it will be worse.
Sheikh Abdullah or Bakshi has to explain these matters and
not myself You as head of the States Department know my
views and I need not waste your time dilating further on these
matters.
With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

147
 115

New Delhi
7 January 1948
My clear Vallabhbhai,
During your absence the Kashmir situation, more specially in
regard to the reference to the UNO, had developed and we have
had to take a number of decisions. VVe have missed you here
because your advice would have been valuable but we could not
afford to postpone our decisions owing to the urgency of the
matter. A part of our delegation to the UNO, including
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, is leaving Delhi this afternoon at 1-30
p.m. for Bombay. From Bombay they will go tomorrow morning
by TWA straight to New York. We have had considerable
difficulty in getting accommodation in the TWA plane for New
York. We have avoided sending any of our men by BOAC via
Karachi. Our delegation will have to be split up because of this
lack of accommodation. Probably three will go tomorrow from
Bombay, the others will go later.
We do not yet know what the Security Council might do
and how long these preliminary hearings will last. Today’s news
announces that the first hearing might be on the 11th or 12th or
latest 13th. Our first batch will reach there on the 10th.
You will remember that it was our first intention to send
[M.C.] Setalvad [Attorney-General, India] plus one or two assis¬
tants. Then we thought that Gopalaswami Ayyangar should also
go and if possible Sheikh Abdullah. Gopalaswami is going today;
Sheikh Abdullah is expected to arrive here today. He cannot
proceed immediately and therefore he can only go [with] the
second batch which probably will leave on the 10th from Bombay.
Our delegation has progressively grown. Apart from Gopala¬
swami, Setalvad and Abdullah, there will be Colonel [B.M.] Kaul
and [P.N.] Haksar of the External Affairs Ministry. Kaul and
Haksar have been thoroughly prepared and have collected all the
necessary maps, papers and reports. Kaul has specialised on the
military side; Haksar has been dealing with these matters in our
Ministry for the last 2-3 months and knows all about them. He
is a very capable young man and a competent lawyer who had a
rising practice in Allahabad.

148
 SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION 149

In addition to these, Gopalaswami was very anxious that

we should send with him [M.K.] Vellodi* and his own Private
Secretary and [G.] Parthasarthi ;1 2 the latter he required more or less
to look after him. I was rather reluctant to go on adding to this
delegation but because of Gopalaswami s wishes I felt it difficult
to refuse. So we have asked Vellodi and Parthasarthi also to go.
They will have to go by a subsequent plane as only three seats
are available tomorrow. These three seats will probably be occupied
by Gopalaswami, Setalvad and Kaul.
Setalvad again wanted to take a senior lawyer from Bombay,
named Joshi, with him. I tried to dissuade him but felt ultimately
that if Setalvad is really keen we should respect his wishes. We
have pointed out to him, however, that accommodation is limited
to begin with. Joshi can go by a later plane or he could wait till
he receives instructions from New York after Setalvad’s arrival.
You will thus see that our delegation has been swelling up
and I do not know if it is complete even now. Of course, the
matter is most important and we should not do anything which
might impair the work of our delegation. Only I do not want
to send wholly unnecessary extras.
In your absence I had a talk with V. P. Menon and told
him of these developments. I have been wondering whether you
would like some special representative of the States Ministry to
accompany this delegation. There is no doubt that the States
question will be raised there in various ways. Junagadh, of course,
will come up in some form or other in spite of our desire to
limit the issue. We have therefore instructed our men to take
all necessary papers relating to Junagadh.
From Mr. Ghazanfar Ali’s3 statement in today’s papers it
appears that they are likely to raise in some form or other the
question of massacres in some of the Indian States which have
acceded to the Indian Union, for instance, Patiala, Nabha,
Kapurthala, Alwar and Bharatpur. All these are, of course,
entirely outside the reference and irrelevant issues but we should
be prepared for everything so as to counter it effectively. In
these circumstances, would you like to send someone specially
representing the States Ministry with this delegation? I fear he
will have to go by a subsequent plane.
1 ICS; Secretary, Union Ministry of States, October 1947—November 1949
2 Son of Gopalaswami Ayyangar, now Vice-Chancellor, Jawaharlal Nehru
U niversity
3 Minister, Pakistan Government
150 sardar patel’s correspondence

On behalf of Pakistan, Zafrullah Khan,1 Mohammad Ali2 and

another person are going.
Another question arises. Lord Mountbatten spoke to me two
or three days ago insisting on proper publicity arrangements being
made for our delegation. At that time I said that we might
ask Kaul to function also as our Public Relations Officer with
the delegation and help the delegation. I sent a cable to [N.R.]
Pillai3 in New York to ask [Dr. K. S.] Shelvankar4 to assist the
delegation in publicity work.
At the instance of Lord Mountbatten I sent Kaul to see
[Alan] Campbell-Johnson [Press Attache of the Viceroy]. I have
now received a letter from Lord Mountbatten in which he says
that as a result of the talk between Colonel Kaul and Campbell-
Johnson, it seems clear to him that we must send a first-class and
fulltime Public Relations expert with the party. At Campbell-
Johnson’s suggestion he recommends that B. L. Sharma of the
Information Department should be sent. He says that he is
completely convinced that someone like Sharma should be there
to cope with the urgent publicity problems that are bound to
arise.
In view of Lord Mountbatten’s insistence, and that insistence
is in our interest, it might be desirable to send Sharma if you
agree. I myself do not know Sharma well and I am not clear
how useful he will be, nor do I know whether he is particularly
in touch with the Kashmir situation. I should myself have thought
that between Kaul and Shelvankar they might be able to deal
with the situation, although Kaul of course is not a specialist in
this kind of work. But Lord Mountbatten is so anxious about
this that I do not like saying no to him. In any event if Sharma
goes, he will have to wait for the next batch.
I should like you to consider these matters and to let me
have your views soon.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi
1 Foreign Minister of Pakistan; at present Judge of International Court of

Justice
2 Cabinet Secretary, Pakistan Government
3 Senior officer of External Affairs Ministry; India’s Permanent Representative
at UN and later Cabinet Secretary
4 London correspondent of the Hindu, Madras
 116
New Delhi
7 January 1948

My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter dated 7 January 1948. Perhaps
any comment from me at this stage, when part of the delegation
has already left and arrangements for others have already been
made, is unnecessary; but I agree with you that the delegation
has grown unwieldy and I feel that the inclusion of Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah in the delegation might lead to some com¬
plication. For instance, the Pakistan Government might press for
an invitation to issue to the Head of the Azad Kashmir Government.
2. As regards a representative from the States Ministry, I under¬
stand from Menon that full material has already been supplied
to the delegation in regard to other matters. I have asked him
to find out if any further material is required and if so to furnish
the same. I do not feel that the association of a representative
from the States Ministry with the delegation would be of any
particular advantage.
3. As regards publicity arrangements, for some time past I have
felt that our publicity needs an overhaul. Recently we have
taken some decisions to improve the publicity organisation. As
part of those arrangements we have appointed B. L. Sharma to
be Publicity Co-ordination Officer in the Information & Broad¬
casting Ministry. His departure at a time when we have just
started would, of course, dislocate the whole work and disturb the
pace at which I wanted the work to proceed. We have just now
suffered a blow, in that Bhalja [Secretary to the Ministry] has had
to take leave under medical advice owing to a serious eye trouble.
He will have to leave for the U.K. or the U.S.A., as soon as he
can. I am really extremely doubtful whether we would be able
to spare him [Sharma] even for a short period of a fortnight or
so that might be required; but if you feel that we must accede to
Lord Mountbatten’s wishes, I have no objection to letting him go.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

151
 117

New Delhi
8 January 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
Before I left on tour for Assam, you wrote to me about a
complaint (rom Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad that the Home
Guards were not getting firearms sent by us, and that the latter
were being directed to the RSS. There was a suggestion that His
Highness and Mahajan were to blame for it.
I have now had enquiries made of Mahajan, and the position
seems to be as follows. Neither His Highness nor Mahajan nor
the Military Adviser of the State was told about the supply of
these arms, and they had no information as to who got and dis¬
tributed them. Subsequently, Mahajan ascertained that the arms
were supplied to Major-General Kulwant Singh, and he has been
giving them to Bakshi. Apparently, he has not complied with
Bakshi’s request for light machine-guns and mortars on the ground
that there were no Home Guards fit to use these arms. It also
appears that Bakshi ordered these arms for the Home Guards
without any reference to His Highness or Mahajan.
As regards the complaint that the RSS were being armed,
both His Highness and Mahajan have not ordered directly or
indirectly any arms to be supplied to these people. There were
complaints against some of the RSS people that they were creat¬
ing mischief against the Muslims in the State. Mahajan called
all the leaders and told them that this could not be tolerated.
No arms were supplied whatsoever; actually there were not even
sufficient arms to supply to the State forces. Some RSS men
joined the militia which was raised by the State, but they were
under military discipline and fought certain battles on the border.
Sheikh Abdullah had taken charge. Mahajan says he has virtually
had no connection whatsoever with this aspect of the State
Administration.
As regards the relief committee appointed by His Highness,
it appears that His Highness gave a donation of Rs. 30,000 for
the benefit of refugees from Mirpur and other places, and had
appointed a committee to administer this fund. The committee
consists of the Chief Emergency Officer, Jammu (chairman),

152
 SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION 130

Colonel Baldev Singh Pathania, Lala Dina Nath Mahajan (a

member of the Praja Sabha) and another member who is a local
resident of great eminence and also president of the RSS.
Mahajan contends that His Highness is entitled to appoint a
committee of his own for distribution of his private funds.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

118
New Delhi
8 January 1948
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Lately there has been a spate of messages in the English
Press about the Kashmir situation. Many of these messsages have
been tendentious; in particular the Daily Telegraph and the Daily
Mail have been repeatedly giving news about attacks on Jammu
town by the invaders as well as breach of our communications
between Pathankot and Jammu. These items of news have often
been completely false or grossly exaggerated. The BBC has also
announced on two or three occasions that Jammu has either
fallen or that street fighting was going on in Jammu.
I do not know how these foreign correspondents get these
stories. I imagine that they got them from Pakistan sources.
Something has to be done about this false and tendentious pro¬
paganda. I do not know what contacts we have with these
foreign correspondents. I suppose that the Information Depart¬
ment keeps in touch with them individually as well as a group.
May I suggest to you to look into this matter?
If you so desire we can deal with it also. We have in fact
drawn the attention of the High Commissioner of the U. K. to
this business of dissemination of false news by English papers.
We are also communicating with our High Commissioner’s office in
London on this subject.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
 119

New Delhi
9 January 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter dated 8 January 1948 about
tendentious messages sent by foreign correspondents regarding
Kashmir.

2. I myself have been noticing a tendency on the part of some

foreign correspondents to introduce personal or party prejudices
in the despatch of news about Kashmir. You will recall that
some time ago we had a conference with the Foreign Journalists
Association at Government House. It was clearly recognised
that censorship was out of the question and that these correspon¬
dents had to be handled tactfully and at a high level. Since
then we have been trying to secure an improvement by means
of friendly personal contacts either between myself and individual
correspondents or between Bhalja and them. We have succeeded
in our objective to some extent.
3. But the difficulty is that foreign papers have representatives
in Karachi and they also send their despatches to their papers in
the U.K. Their counterparts here are powerless to control
them. I took up this matter with Norman Cliff, who is now the
President of the Association, some time ago and he pleaded his
inability to control the representatives of these papers in Pakistan.
I am calling for a report from our P.I.O. [Principal Information
Officer] on these despatches of foreign correspondents and will
see how far the blame rests with the Karachi respresentatives
and to what extent the New Delhi representatives are involved.
1 shall then see what more we can do to bring them round. In
the meantime I am asking Menon to approach Campbell-Jolmson
to secure that our views get across to these correspondents.
4. Yesterday, on my return from tour I learnt that the BBC
had put out news regarding the fall of Jammu and fight in its
streets. I immediately took steps to have a contradiction issued
and also to have that contradiction broadcast on our own radio.
5. I am glad you have drawn the attention of the U.K.
High Commissioner to these matters and that you have also

154
 SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION

High Commissioner’s office in London on this

written to our
subject.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

120
New Delhi
9 January 1948

My dear Jawaharlal,
You will be interested in the enclosed report which I have
received from Bombay.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

A Pathan who arrived in Bombay a couple of days ago and who is known
to me for the last several years, has now informed me that during the 2nd or
3rd week of January 1948 when there will be bitter cold, the Afridis, assisted
by other Pathan tribes from the tribal area, have decided to attack Kashmir.
He also told me that the Premier of the NWF Province has permitted the
Afridis and other Pathans to pass through the NWFP to Kashmir in small
groups in the guise of traders etc., taking precautions to conceal their arms.
I submit that this information may be passed on to Government for
whatever it is worth.
The Pathan does not wish to disclose his identity.
 121

Bombay
18 January 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
You will be interested in the enclosed intercept.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhhai Patel
I he Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

EXTRACT FROM AN INTERCEPTED LETTER DATED ll-12-’47 FROM

MOHAMMED FEROZE KHAN, KOHAT CANTONMENT, ADDRESSED
TO MUQARRAB ALI KHAN, S/O ALEM-UD-DIN PATHAN, CHAK
NO. 7, SOUTHERN SAYADANWALA, P. O. BHAIWAL, DISTRICT
SARGODHA, RECEIVED THROUGH EAST PUNJAB C.I.D.

“I have already applied for leave, but it has not been sanctioned for
our regiment is going to be transferred, but I do not know where. But from
the Signals Group it has been learnt that the regiment will go to ‘Palestine’.
I was too anxious to meet you all but the men already on leave are being
recalled. Please inform that when you went on leave to Sialkot was there
any cavalry stationed there or one was expected to reach there? If not, then
my regiment will surely come to Sialkot. I know well about Kashmir as I am
near to it. All persons of our cavalry of Kashmir, Jammu and Poonch have
been sent to their home with arms. Pathans there are numberless and those
who were mainly engaged in loot have been turned back. Now Pathans from
Kabul are being sent to Kashmir, which is considered as ‘Pakistan’. If
God wished, we would be successful.
“Further I do not also like to come on leave as I fear that I may not
be transferred to battalions which are now being formed, as all surplus men
are attached to them.”

156
SARDAR IN CONVERSATION WITH SHEIKH ABDULLAH IN KASHMIR. ALSO SEEN

ARE MANIBEN PATEL AND BAKSHI GHULAM MOHAMMAD STANDING)

WITH MAHARAJA IIARI SINGH IN DEI.HI
 122
The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
25 January 1948

My dear Sardar Patel,

I have been perusing with some interest the proceedings that
are taking place before the Security Council. I must say that I
am not fully satisfied with what is happening there. It is true
that I left this matter in the hands of the Indian Government
but I expected that I will be fully informed of all that was
happening before the Security Council and the attitude taken up
by our delegation before that Council. Unfortunately I have
been more or less ignored in this matter.
It should not be forgotten that the matter of accession is
either for me or, according to the view of the Government of
India, for me and my people. It is not a matter either for the
Government of India or for the Pakistan Government’s decision.
To which Dominion the State should accede—strictly speaking—
according to the Government of India Act, I alone am the autho¬
rity to decide and this is the view that Pakistan has always main¬
tained. However, the Government of the Indian Dominion is
supported by the people. This matter again is wholly foreign and
antecedent to accession and is not a matter in which Pakistan
is entitled to interfere. As to how the plebiscite is to be taken
and under what authority it has to be taken and what will be the
franchise, are again matters which I am the final authority to
decide in consultation with my Government for the time being.
I hope this position is being realised by the Government of the
Indian Dominion while they are presenting the case before the
Security Council. It seems to me that the Ruler of the State
and the Government of the State and their wishes in the matter
foi settling the issue are not having the proper regard as they
should. y

As I have already mentioned to you and Panditji, I will

certainly be guided in all these matters by your advice and I
still maintain that position. I consider my position is quite safe
in the hands of both of you, but at the same time I do expect
that I should be kept fully in touch and without consulting me

157
158 sardar patel’s correspondence

and my Government no commitment should be made before the

Security Council. As I have mentioned for the last fortnight I
have not received any communication on this important subject
cither from the Government of the Indian Dominion or from
their delegation in America.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

123
New Delhi
28 January 1948
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Thank you for your letter dated 25 January 1948. I was
out of Delhi for some time.
I too have been following with some anxiety the proceedings
of the Security Council, but I was not fully in the picture as
I was most of the time absent on tour. I fully realise your desire
to be kept informed of the developments, which, however, are
taking place so fast that I doubt whether it is at all possible for
us to keep you fully and promptly posted from this distance. We
shall, however, do our best.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

H.H. Maharaja Sir Hari Singh

Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir
Jammu

124
The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
31 January 1948

My dear Sardar Patel,

Since your departure from Jammu I have been watching
developments of events here and outside. News from New York [has]
been very depressing. Several thoughts have been turning round
 SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION

mv mind and I have decided to lay them before you for sympa¬
thetic consideration and friendly advice. I do not wish to take
any step except with your agreement.
The military situation as you know has been quite depressing
since the arrival of Indian troops. Except the first gains in the
Kashmir Valley there has been a debit balance throughout so lar
as achievements are concerned. The Indian troops arrived in the
Valley on 27 October. At that time we were in possession of
about 3/4th of Poonch and the whole of Mirpur district. We
had by then lost only small bits of Poonch and Muzaffarabad
district. After the recapture of Baramulla and Uri there has been
a standstill. Two months have passed and the Indian troops are
still at Uri. They attempted a venture to the town of Poonch
and though they reached it was at great cost and the road was
eventually lost. In the Poonch Jagir which was held by the
State troops inch by inch we had to withdraw and eventually lost
the whole of the Jagir except the town itself where about 40,000
people are besieged along with 4 battalions (3 State and 1 Indian).
The situation is by no means satisfactory. I may mention that in
the August disturbances with two battalions of the State troops
we cleared the whole of the Poonch Jagir, peace was restored, the
whole of the revenue was realised and the Administration was
functioning normally. It was only in the second week of October
that trouble again began in Poonch and our troops resisted it till
about the end of December. But as no help was given they had
eventually to fall back on Poonch town. If the Indian troops
had ventured forward along with the State troops in Poonch,
there would have been no difficulty in clearing that area of the
raiders. I feel that the Indian military advisers take an exagger¬
ated view about the difficulty of fighting in Poonch. I know some
of that area myself and as a soldier can say that it is not difficult
to clear Poonch of the raiders in the course of a fortnight or so
if a strong military venture (with modern weapons and equip¬
ment) is undertaken, but they would have to act mercilessly and
not leniently.
In Mirpur district at the time when the Indian forces arrived
we were still holding Mangla and our territory along the Jhelum
Canal bank, but during the last two months we have lost Mangla,
Alibeg, Gurdwara and the town of Mirpur, the town of Bhimber
and the villages of Deva and Battala, the town of Rajouri and
the whole of the area adjoining Chliamb and Noshera. Jhangar,
a key-place both for Mirpur and Kotli, was lost after a defeat.
These defeats have been a heavy blow to us and have also
160 sardar patel’s correspondence

undermined the prestige of the Indian forces. Not a single town

has so far been recovered by the Indian troops. The people judge
an army from results and not from propaganda carried on about
it. On the Kathua-Sialkot border attacks have intensified. Every
day there is one raid or another. A number of villages have been
burnt, people have been looted, women abducted and there have
been killings also. The result is that all the border villages have
been vacated and we have about 70,000 to 80,000 refugees in the
city of Jammu. Crops, houses and valuables have been lost.
Most of the people are also now vacating Jammu and its suburbs
and are going to East Punjab. The situation, therefore, is worsen¬
ing every day.
I he name of the Indian Army is getting into the mud in
spite of its brilliant record. I was a member of the War Cabinet.
I travelled in war zones during the Great War. The name of the
Indian Army was at its highest pitch and it pains me to see that
the name of that Army has become a topic of every tongue during
these days and it is daily losing prestige. Some people think that
it is not the fault of the Army but the fault of the policy that is
being followed; others feel that it is the fault of the commanders
who are quite new to the job. People who would have had to
wait for 10 to 15 years have become generals and have been
put in charge of operations. Opinions differ, but the fact is that
the name of the Army is in the mud. Sardar Baldev Singh was
here for a day. He has heard from our politicians, members of
the public and from me and my Prime Minister all that everyone
had to say. He told me secretly that he had ordered certain
actions to be taken. I told him that a mere order is nothing
unless it is implemented. When you kindly spent two days with
us here a number of decisions were taken and you gave instruc¬
tions in certain matters. Since your departure nothing has been
done and as I have said, we had more serious attacks. The effort
on the part of Pakistan is gaining ground every day. Their morale
owing to success is going up. They loot property, they take away
cattle and women and when they go back to Pakistan they incite
people and tell them how much loot and what benefits there arc
to raid our territory. On the other hand our morale is rapidly
going down. So far as the people are concerned they arc thorou¬
ghly demoralised and they start fleeing as soon as there is even a
rumour of a raid. Even people living at distant places start fleeing
when they sec a fire five or six miles lrom their villages. So lar
as the Indian forces are concerned they do not leave their
apportioned places to meet the raiders. There arc no mobile
 SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION 1U1

columns to meet them. The work is left to a few Home Guards or

to a platoon or so of very tired State forces. How can it be
possible for them to engage 500 or 1,000 raiders? Last time, you
ordered guerillas to come into the State and take o\ ei this work.
As far as I know no guerillas have arrived so far. Some Home
Guards have been raised, but they have to look after theii homes
and they live in those very localities. Moreover, they are mostly
not trained and cannot be expected to meet trained people. The
work has mainly to be done by the Army and supplemented by
the Home Guards and by organised guerillas.
In the situation, therefore, my position as Ruler has become
very anomalous and one of great perplexity. People in the State
continue sending me telegrams and asking for help. Our civil
administration is now in the hands of the National Conference
and military operations in the hands of the Indian Union. I
have no voice or power either on the civil or the military side.
The State forces are under the Indian Army Commander. The
result, therefore, is that I have just to watch the terrible situation
in a helpless manner, to look on at the abduction of women, killing
and loss of my people without power to give them any redress
whatever. People continue to approach me every day and still
think that it lies in my power to give them relief and redress.
You will realise that my position is getting most awkward every
day, so long as the military situation is adverse to us and refugees
continue pouring into the city and daily raids from Pakistan keep
on coming without any reply from us.
Apart from the military situation the reference to the UNO
and the proceedings that are hanging fire there are causing great
uncertainty and perplexity not only to me but to every Hindu
and Sikh in the State as well as to those who belong to the
National Conference. The feeling is strongly gaining ground
that the UN Security Council will take an adverse decision
and that the State will eventually have to accede to Pakistan as
a result of what the Security Council will decide. The Hindus
and Sikhs have therefore started going away from the State as
they anticipate that their fate as a result of the UNO decision
will be the same as what happened in West Punjab and therefore
it is much better to clear out of the State before that eventuality
arises. The National Conference leaders also feel that they may
eventually be let down by accepting the decision of the Security
Council and that would be disastrous for them. My position in
this matter is also precarious. You know I definitely acceded to
the Indian Union with the idea that the Union will not let us
S. C.-l1
1^2 sardar patel’s correspondence

down and the State would remain acceded to the Union and my
position and that ot my “^dynasty would remain secure. It was
for this reason that I accepted the advice of the Indian Union in
the matter of internal administration. If we have to go to Paki¬
stan it was wholly unnecessary to accede to India or to mould
the internal administration according to the desire of the Indian
Union. I feel that the internal administration or the question of
accession is wholly foreign to the jurisdiction of the Security
Council. The Indian Union only referred a limited question to the
Security Council, but the whole issue has been enlarged and not
only the matter of aggression by one Dominion over the other is be¬
ing considered by the Security Council but internal questions of
the formation of Interim Government and the matter of accession
have all been taken notice of by them. It was a wrong step in
going on the limited issue to the Security Council and then
agreeing to the enlargement of the agenda before that Council.
As soon as the Council enlarged the agenda the Indian Union
should have withdrawn the reference and ended the matter.
In the situation described above a feeling comes to my mind
as to the possible steps that I may take to make, so far as I am
concerned, a clean breast of the situation. Sometimes I feel that I
should withdraw the accession that I have made to the Indian
Union. The Union only provisionally accepted the accession and
if the Union cannot recover back our territory and is going even¬
tually to agree to the decision of the Security Council which may
result to handing us over to Pakistan then there is no point in
sticking to the accession of the State to the Indian Union. For the
time being it may be possible to have better terms from Pakis¬
tan, but that is immaterial because eventually it would mean an
end of the dynasty and end of the Hindus and Sikhs in the State.
There is an alternative possible for me and that is to withdraw
the accession and that may kill the reference to the UNO because
the Indian Union will have no right to continue the proceedings
before the Council if the accession is withdrawn. The result may
be a return to the position the State held before the accession. The
difficulty in that situation, however, will be that the Indian troops
cannot be maintained in the State except as volunteers to help
the State. I am prepared to take over command of my own forces
along with the forces of the Indian Army as volunteers to help
the State. I am prepared to lead my Army personally and to com¬
mand, if the Indian Union agrees, also their troops. It would
certainly hearten my people and the troops. I know my country
much better than any of your generals will know it even during
 SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION

the next several months or years and I am prepared to take the

venture boldly rather than merely keep on sitting here doing no¬
thing. It is for you to consider whether the Indian Union will
accept this in both the situations, whether after the withdrawal
of the accession or even if the accession continues. I am tired of
my present life and it is much better to die fighting than watch
helplessly the heartbreaking misery of my people. So far as the
internal political situation is concerned I have left the matter en¬
tirely to you personally. I am prepared to be a constitutional
Ruler of the State and when a new constitution is framed I am
quite willing to give responsible government, but I am not pre¬
pared to go beyond the ^Mysore model because I am not satis¬
fied that the leaders of the National Conference are for the time
being very fit administrators or command the confidence of the
Hindus and Sikhs and even of a large section of the Muslims. I
must therefore keep certain reserved powers of which you are al¬
ready aware and I must have a Dewan of my free choice as a mem¬
ber of the Cabinet and possibly as President.
Another alternative that strikes me is that if I can do nothing
I should leave the State (short of abdication) and reside outside
so that people do not think that I can do anything for them. For
their grievances they can hold the civil administration responsible
or the Indian forces who are in charge of the defence of the State.
The responsibility will then clearly be either of the Indian Union
or of the Administration of Sheikh Abdullah. If there is any criti¬
cism those responsible can have it and the responsibility for the
suffering of the people will not be mine. Of course, I well antici¬
pate that as people started saying when I left Kashmir only on
Mr. Menon’s advice that I had run away from Srinagar they will
say that I have left them in their hour of misery, but it is no use
remaining in a position where one can do nothing merely to avoid
criticism. Of course, if I go out of the State I will have to take
the public into confidence and tell them the reasons why I am
going out.
The third alternative in the situation that has arisen is that
the Indian Dominion discharges its duty on the military side effec¬
tively and makes an all-out effort to stop the raids from Pakistan
and to drive out of the State not only the raiders but also all
rebels. This can only be done if the Dominion really fights. It has
avoided fighting so far. Two or three courageous battles will more
or less end this situation, and if it is delayed there is bound to
be a catastrophe. Pakistan is more organised against Kashmir
than the Indian Dominion, and as soon as snow melts it will start
164 sardar patel’s correspondence

attacking Kashmir on all sides and the province of Ladakh will

also come into the hands of the enemy and the Valley and the
whole border will be raided and even double the number of troops
at present in Jammu and Kashmir will not be able to save the
situation. What should have been done and achieved a month
before can still be achieved during the next month, but if matters
are delayed and if owing to the UNO reference and the attitude
of compromise the situation remains at a standstill it would become
terribly grave after the expiry of a month. Therefore, unless the
Indian Union makes up its mind to fight fully and effectively, I
may have to decide upon the two alternatives mentioned above.
I have mentioned all that I have been thinking about to you
and this may be treated as a secret and private letter. The object
of writing this is to place all my feelings, right or wrong, foolish
or wise, before you so that you may be in full possession of the
situation and may be able to advise me properly. 1 am sending
this letter by hand of a special messenger and I hope you will
kindly send me an early reply so that I may be well guided in this
hour of crisis and distress.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

125
New Delhi
9 February 1948

My dear Jawaharlal,
You remember you spoke to me the other day about a letter
from His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir [See No 124]. I
received the letter only yesterday and send herewith a copy of the
same. You will find that it differs from the account which Bakshi
gave you of its contents.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi
 126
New Delhi
9 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Thank you for your letter of 9 February sending me a copy
of the Maharaja of Kashmir’s letter.
It seems to me-that the wisest policy he can pursue at the pre¬
sent moment is to do nothing at all. Certainly the idea of his
cancelling the accession is completely wrong. That will only lead
to trouble for him and for us. As for his going out of Kashmir
for a while, this might be feasible, but I rather think that he
should just stay on for the present. You will have noticed the
repeated references made in the Security Council about the so-
called autocratic rule of the Maharaja. The system of Indian
States finds little favour in foreign countries and [Sir Mohd.] Zaf-
rullah1 [Khan] has tried to make the most of this.
As for his advice that the Indian Dominion should carry on
operations more effectively, certainly we have not desired to tone
down our operations in any way. Indeed, we have done our utmost
to push them on and have given these directions to our mili¬
tary commanders. If something has come in our way, it is not the
fault of the Government. Our recent success in the Naushera
region is an important one and should have considerable results
in that region.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

127
New Delhi
9 February 1948
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Thank you for your letter of 31 January delivered to me
at 10 a.m. on 8 February by your ADC.
1 Sir Mohd. Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan Foreign Minister who led Pakistan
Delegation to Security Council

165
166 sardar patel’s correspondence

I fully realise what an anxious time you must be having. I

can assure you that I am no less anxious about the Kashmir situa¬
tion and what is happening in the UNO, but whatever the present
situation may be, a counsel of despair is entirely out of place.
I have been somewhat out of touch with the current military
position as well as the UNO situation owing to my tours and the
ghastly tragedy which has overtaken all of us.1 I shall write to
you again after some time.
I hope you have had good news from the USA about the
Yuvraj.
With kindest regards to both of you,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
H is Highness Maharaja
Sir Hari Singh
Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir
Jammu (Tawi)

128
New Delhi
10 February 1948

My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter of 9 February 1948. Regarding
the Maharaja of Kashmir’s letter, I have already written to him
that a counsel of despair is entirely out of place. I agree with you
that withdrawal from accession would only land him in worse
difficulties and that for the time being he had better stay where he
is. The latest military success is most reassuring and ought to raise
the morale of the people in Jammu.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

1 On 30 January Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated at Birla House, New Delhi.

 CHAPTER XI

DEADLOCK RESOLVED

129
New Delhi
10 February 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I should be grateful if you would kindly convey to Brigadier
Osman1 and his men my heartiest congratulations on their suc¬
cess in the recent operations against the raiders and my warmest
appreciation of the courage, valour, resourcefulness and determi¬
nation with which they have repulsed such serious attacks on our
position in Naushera. Their achievement on this occasion is in
the best traditions of the Indian Army and we are all pioud of it.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Sardar Baldev Singh

New Delhi

130
New Delhi
1 February 1948

My dear Sardar Sahib,

Last evening I mentioned to you that a circular had been is¬
sued by the Government making the production of certificates of
eligibility obligatory in the case of Kashmir “nationals” seeking
employment under the Governments in India. You desired me
to send you a copy of the circular. The copy I was given is
enclosed. It is not clear from which department it has been
issued, but I am told that applicants are in fact being asked to
produce such certificates. The provisions of the circular cause a

1 Hero of battle of Naushera; distinguished himself as outstanding soldier

and fearless leader. He was first Brigadier to be killed in Kashmir campaign by
Pakistani Army on night of July 3-4 1948 at Jhangar.

167
168
sardar patel’s correspondence

great deal of hardship to residents of Kashmir, who are nowa¬

days compelled by circumstances to seek their livelihood in India
in increasing numbers. It will be an act of kindness—and it would
remove a real hardship—if the circular—assuming that it is
genuine and is based on competent authority—is cancelled.
J. I here is another matter which I should like to bring to your
notice, viz. the restrictions on the movements of residents of
Kashmir. At present both for air passages as well as for road
journeys permits are necessary for egress from and ingress into
Kashmir. Though there may have been some justification for the
restriction when it was originally imposed, its continuance now
greatly hampers normal traffic and thereby causes considerable
economic and psychological distress to the people. In fact, the
present urge among certain classes of people in Kashmir to leave
their homes is largely due to this restriction. If traffic were free and
people could feel that they could come and go as they liked, the
probability is that the urgency of their desire to leave for India
would be substantially diminished. Even if regulation of traffic
is still considered desirable, it should not be difficult to devise
suitable safeguards without impeding traffic.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ramchandra Kak

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

131
PLAN OF ATTACK

Simla-E
2 March 1948

Forwarded to the Hon’ble Deputy Prime Minister, India,

with the compliments of the Premier, East Punjab.
 ENCLOSURE

There is a lot of activity on the Uri front. At Rawalkot, about 8,000

Pathans were seen on 27 February 1948. It is reported that they are moving
up to Sanghola where a base has been established. At Rawalkot, according
to information received, some kind of landing ground has been prepaicd and
two small size aeroplanes were landed there as an experimental measui e. The
intention is to deliver ammunition at Rawalkot for use on the Uri fiont.

2. A certain number of Pathans have been seen visiting Lahore Fort [since]
the last four days. It is stated that small batches ol intelligent Pathans aie
being given training in the use of wireless apparatus and hand-grenades.

3. A squadron of 25 desperadoes has been trained in Lahore Fort and is being

sent to Poonch. The intention is that they should manage to [infiltrate]
into Poonch city and at a fixed date and time should set the city ablaze. In
all probability this time and date will coincide with a fresh attack on the
Uri front.

Four thousand Pathans were seen at Rajori in Mirpur vicinity.

Muzaffarabad has a big concentration camp and a base is being established

at this place to back up the expected attack next month. Twenty jeep cars
and other light transport have also been supplied.

At village Baral where there is an old fort, which falls on the route to
Sainsar and Mirpur, large stocks of ammunition are reported and there are also
about 3,000 local men to join hands with the armed Pathans.

4. According to the recent plan, the intention is to cut Srinagar road near
Ramsu.

5. The 1/14 Punjab Regiment that left Lahore is reported to have passed
Gujarat towards the Bhimbar side.

6. A large building belonging to Kashmir State in Lahori Mandi is in the

occupation of Ch. Hamid Ullah, President, Muslim Conference. About 60
armed Pathans are also staying there to provide escort for transport carrying
ammunition from Chatral House on Queen’s Road, Lahore, to out-stations. As
already lepotted, ammunition brought from Lahore Cantonment is first taken
to this place and then is carried in trucks to various destinations outside Lahore.
Escort is supplied from Lahori Mandi for these trucks.

7. Pathans have now been pushed out of Chaprar and are concentrating at
village Naria towards the border.

169
170 sardar patel’s correspondence

8. An observer reports the presence of troops at the following places:

1. Salapur 200
2. Ghaprar 200
3. Head Marala 100
4. Large concentrations near Suchetgarh.

9. Two big guns, presumably 25-pounders, have also been seen in addition to
anti-aircraft guns near Suchetgarh.

A telephonic message has been intercepted by Mr. T. R. Bhasin, Regional

Liaison Officer. It runs as follows:

“Sardar Ibrahim speaking—2.25 lakhs have been sanctioned—Ghulam

Mohd. (presumably a military officer) should come from Gujarat and
attend the conference. We will round up the country by 16 March 1948.”

This information ... in connection with sending a desperado squad

to Poonch and the general activity to back up the Uri front, will go to show
that a well-oraganised attack is likely to be directed on 16 March 1948.

132
Jammoon (Jammu)
2 March 1948

My dear Sardarji,
I am writing this to express my sincerest thanks to you for
the kindness and affection shown to me during the last five
months. I hope you will always regard me as a younger brother.
Manibenji has always treated me as a member of the family. I
hope to get my release in a day or two and I will go to my
family at Pathankot and take a little holiday before going to my
court at Simla. With kindest regards,
Assuring you of loyal service always,
Yours sincerely,
Mehrchand Mahajan

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi
 133
New Delhi
4 March 1948

My dear Mahajan,
Thank you for your letter of 2 March 1948 which was deli¬
vered to me by Shankar. It is very nice of you to have written
to us in such affectionate terms. I need hardly say that we fully
reciprocate those sentiments.
I know how difficult it must have been for His Highness to
come to this decision to relieve you. You have been his main
support during the last few critical months. We ourselves have
found you most helpful to and co-operative with us. I am there¬
fore sorry, for myself, that your association with the State should
have come to an end so soon, but you know the circumstances as
well as I do.
I hope you will have some well-earned rest after the exciting
and difficult times through which you have recently passed. I am
sure you will look us up at Delhi some time.
I am sending herewith a signed copy of our photograph
which was taken by one of my staff.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Mehrchand Mahajan Esq.
Jammu

134

New Delhi
11 March 1948
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
I have been wanting to write to Your Highness since my re¬
turn from Jammu, but something or the other has always stood
in my way. I had the most busy two days immediately on my
return because so many things about the proclamation etc. were
required to be tied up and there were also heavy accumulations;
then Sardar s illness took practically all my time until yesterday.

171
172 sardar patel’s correspondence

2. I am glad to say that he is much better, but he has been

advised complete rest. We had one or two most anxious days
on account of his illness.
3. On Sardar’s behalf I have already written to Dr. Gopichand
Bhargava1 about Mr. Kathpalia whom Mahajan mentioned as
a tutor for the Yuvraj. I am sorry, however, I have been un¬
able to send a suitable man as Your Highness’ private secretary.
Sharma, whom we had discussed, is unwilling to go. We have
been thinking hard whom else to send to you and have consider¬
ed more than a dozen names, but have had to discard them for
one reason or the other. Menon has gone on tour and is return¬
ing here on the 17th. We will try to suggest one shortly after his
return; but we can assure you that we are all keenly alive to the
urgency of the matter. In fact, Sardar has mentioned more than
once even in his sick-bed that we have to send a suitable man as
Your Highness’ private secretary.
4. I hope Sheikh Sahib has by now reached Jammu and has had
a discussion with Your Highness in regard to the formation of the
Ministry and the terms and conditions of their service as well as
of the Dewan. Menon told me that he has had a talk with him
and that he was quite reasonable.
5. I am sending herewith a cutting from the Statesman, which
I hope you have already seen. The item appeared in all the leading
newspapers and indicates how progressive Your Highness’ atti¬
tude has been on the question of reforms in the State. I spoke to
Her Highness in some detail about the lack of publicity for what
she and Your Highness have done and have been doing for the
State. This is the first result of enlightening people here about
one aspect of the previous history of Kashmir. I hope very soon
it will be possible to do something more.
V. Shankar

Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir

Jammu

1 Congress worker of Punjab since 1919; was elected to Punjab Legislative

Assembly 1937 and again 1946. Premier of Punjab, 1947-51
 135
East Punjab Education
Department
Simla-E
March 1948

My dear Sliri Shankar,

The Premier, Dr. Gopichand [Bhargava], has passed on to
me your letter of 9 March 1948 on the subject of a tutor for
the Yuvraj of Kashmir for necessary action. I have enquired from
Shri Harish Chandra, M.A., P.E.S. (Class I), Inspector of Train¬
ing Institutions, East Punjab, who is willing to undertake the
work of tutor to the Yuvraj of Kashmir provided suitable terms
can be settled. Shri Harish Chandra is likely to be in Delhi bet¬
ween 5 and 7 April. I suggest that he may have a personal inter¬
view with the Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel or with yourself
so that details can be settled. The East Punjab Government will be
prepared to lend his services for a period of six months, if so desired.
Yours sincerely,
R. C. Chaterji
Education Secretary,
East Punjab Govt.

136
New Delhi
26 March 1948
Dear Mr. R. C. Chaterji,
Thank you for your letter of no date regarding Shri Harish
Chandra, Inspector of Training Institutions, East Punjab.
I shall be glad to see him when he comes here. Please ask
him to get in touch with me as soon as possible after his arrival.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
R. C. Chaterji Esq.
Education Secretary
East Punjab Government
Simla

173
 137

Amar Mahal Palace

Jammu-Tawi
22 March 1948
My dear Maniben,
Respects from both of us. You are already aware how wor¬
ried we must be during these days. And since we learnt of
Sardar Sahib’s illness, our anxiety has grown still. Let us hope
that by God’s grace Sardar Sahib will recover from his illness
and will resume his work as early as possible. Since the forma¬
tion of responsible government here we were planning to
come to you. But on hearing of Sardar’s illness, we have
abandoned this plan. I can well realise how deeply worried you
must be and how, day and night, you must be looking after your
father. At this time I had no mind to trouble you on any ac¬
count. But the circumstances here are so shaping that I feel con¬
strained to write to you. My request is that Mr. Shankar, with
Sardar Sahib’s approval, be sent over here for a day at the earliest.
We would like to talk to him and acquaint him with the situa¬
tion here, so that he may talk it over to Sardar and seek his
advice for us. I cannot write more at this stage. Upon your
and Sardar Sahib’s words, we have entirely placed ourselves in
your hands. Convey our respectful pranams to Sardar Sahib.
With best wishes,
Yours,
Tara Devi
[Maharani of Kashmir]

Maniben Vallabhbhai Patel

(Original in Hindi)

174
 138
New Delhi
3 April 1948

Dear V. Shankar,
I have given [Dwarkanath] Kachru a letter for the Maha¬
raja, a letter for Sheikh Abdullah and a brief note foi Bakshi.
I should like you to read these letters and then deliver yourself the
letter addressed to the Maharaja.
From these letters you will see what my general approach is.
In the course of your talks with him you should speak firmly, but
of course politely, about this general approach and about the dan¬
gers of anything being done which leads to conflict between the
Maharaja and his Cabinet. Nothing can be more dangerous than
the possibility of such a conflict. It may lead either to a resig¬
nation of the Cabinet and a complete deadlock or to a defiance
of the Maharaja by the Cabinet which will not be good for the
Maharaja and which may lead to unfortunate consequences for
him and others. That is the basic situation and I wish the Maha¬
raja would realise it. Any impression which the people or the
Security Council may get that the Maharaja is still strong enough
to obstruct and oppose the people’s representatives will weaken
our case very greatly and come in the way of our winning the people
of Kashmir to our side.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru
Shri V. Shankar
New Delhi

139
6 April 1948
My dear Patel,
Please see the attached papers which you sent to me. I dis¬
cussed this matter with Bakshi and his reactions are contained
in the attached note. What Bakshi seemed to be concerned about
was to maintain the separate entity of the Kashmir National
Home Guards though he was prepared to comply with all the terms

175
176 sardar patel’s correspondence

and conditions which the Government of India had laid down

for the East Punjab Militia. He would thus agree to an ordi¬
nance being issued as you suggest, and to raise the Militia.
1 he reafter such parts of it as are required would be placed at
the disposal of the GOG for operational purposes in the same
way, as he said, the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces were being
placed. He said he was prepared to agree to the GOC, J & K
Forces exercising the same powers over the Militia as he exer¬
cised over the rest of the State Forces which were not on opera¬
tional duty. His main objection to item 3 of your note was that
this would reduce the Kashmir Government to the position of a
contractor and he said that it was too much to expect any self-
respecting Government to do that. He is prepared to reorganise
the Militia, if necessary, in the manner as you suggest in item 4
of your note. He was a bit difficult about it, but I explained
to him that once the ordinance was passed, the whole force would
have to be embodied under that ordinance and, therefore, its re¬
shuffling was necessary. As regards finances, the arrangement
would be the same as in the case of Jammu and Kashmir
State Forces.
2. If you would want to have a further discussion with me, I
could come at any time convenient to you.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar

H. M. Patel Esq.
Secretary, Ministry of Defence
New Delhi

FUTURE OF STATE FORCES OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

5 April 1948

As commanded by His Highness, the Offg. Chief of Staff and the

Military Adviser discussed the above subject with Hon ble the Deputy Prime
Minister on 4 April 1948. The following points were considered at this

meeting:
1. The DPM in opening the discussion said that the first point to be
considered was whether the SFs [State Forces] should be handed over in
toto to the Govt, of India as a feeler in this direction had been put forward
by the Govt, of India. The DPM, giving his personal views on the subject,
stated that he was against such a move as besides other implications this
would mean that the J & K SFs would lose their identity as such for ever.
 DEADLOCK RESOLVED 177

The Military Adviser being asked to give his opinion stated that this was
a matter which required very careful consideration before a decision could be
given. In his opinion if the SFs were brought up to the same level in con¬
dition of service etc. as the Indian Army no material object would be served
by handing over the SFs to the Govt, of India.

2. The DPM produced a signal from the Govt, of India which stated
that it has been agreed that all SFs be brought up to the same scale of pay
as the Indian Army in accordance with the new pay code, the difference being
made up by the Government of India. The Olfg. Chief of Staff suggested
that this should be made applicable with retrospective effect from 1 Nov. ’47.

The Military Adviser stated that he would get a copy of the new pay
code from Delhi and then the matter would be put up for His Highness’ com¬
mands. In the meantime the Military Adviser would inform all SFs regard¬
ing this decision.

3. The DPM stated that the Government of India had also agreed to
make up the SF scale of ration to that of the Indian Army. Owing to trans¬
port difficulties on the L of C between Pathankot and Jammu it was not
possible for the Indian Army to supply all rations for the SFs in kind. They
would, however, supply such items which were not at present admissible to
the SF. This would mean that an agency was still necessary to procure all
such items of rations which could not be supplied by the Indian Army. It
was, therefore, a matter for consideration as to whether this should be done
by contractors or some other organisation.

The Military Adviser was of the opinion that there should be a J & K
Army Supply Service which should handle this. This would be based on
similar organisation to that of Supply and Purchasing sections of the RIASC.
This was agreed to and the Offg. Chief of Staff was asked to work out the
details of this organisation and put up his proposals.

4. The DPM asked as to how it was intended that His Highness’ pro¬
clamation of 5 March ’48 declaring that equal opportunities should be given
to all State subjects in the Army as well as civil was to be given effect. The
Military Adviser stated that he had already been commanded by His Highness
to submit his recommendations. He pointed out that in giving practical effect
to this order several factors have to be considered, the most important being
that in no way was the efficiency and the morale of the Army affected by
any changes which were brought about. Other limiting factors such as the
availability of trained VCOs and NCOs from the new classes and the capacity
of the existing training establishments to train fresh intakes would regulate the
speed at which the new classes were to be absorbed. It was essential, how¬
ever, that a start in this direction should be made immediately. In view of
this it was suggested that:

S.C.-12
178 sardar patel’s correspondence

(«i) applications be invited from eligible candidates irrespective of class

oi creed lor selection as cadets to be trained for commissions in the
State Army.

(b) a recruiting organisation be set up in Srinagar to start enlistment

of the new classes with a view to replacing all the shilpkars of one
of the two Pioneer Companies recently raised and the deficiencies of
6th J & K Inf. the remnants of which were expected to be re¬
lieved from Skardu in the near future.

1 he DPM accepted these proposals provisionally and suggested that

final orders should not be issued till his return from Srinagar in 4 or 5 days’
time. The Military Adviser suggested that in the meantime the Chief of
Staff should work out details with regard to the above proposals so that no
time is lost in carrying out once the final decision is obtained.
Submitted for information.

Lt. Col.
Military Adviser

His Highness

Copy to:
1. Deputy Prime Minister, Jammu
2. Dewan Sahib, Jammu
3. Offg. Chief of Staff, Jammu

POINTS TO BE TAKEN UP WITH SHEIKH ABDULLAH

It is the privilege of a constitutional Ruler to advise and warn his

Ministers, but he cannot overrule them. It is, therefore, impossible to expect
the Maharaja to sign on the dotted lines on every paper that is put up to
him. Where the Maharaja feels that a particular viewpoint should be speci¬
fically brought to the notice of the Ministry, he is within his rights, consistent
with constitutional practice, to mention it to the Prime Minister either verbally
or in writing.
2. Reserved subjects cannot form part of allotment of portfolios. The
procedure again in accord with constitutional practice would be that these
matters would initiate with the Diwan but would be referred to the Prime
Minister of the Council of Ministers for advice. It will be then that the Prime
Minister or the Council of Ministers would be formally seized of these matters.

3. In regard to both (1) and (2) above, it would be best to have

mutual consultations between the Maharaja and the Prime Minister and if
necessary other Ministers, so that each may be kept informed of what is
happening and by these mutual contacts there may develop that mutual
 DEADLOCK RESOLVED 179

confidence and reliance which are the foundation of all good democratic Govern¬
ments. It is, therefore, to be hoped that both the Prime Minister and his
Minister and His Highness would develop these mutual consultations rather
than written notes as the normal means of acquainting themselves with each
other’s views, problems etc. Even in India the Governor-General has fixed
weekly or fortnightly meetings with the Prime Minister and other Ministers
apart from other consultations which take place on an ad hoc basis if and
when necessary.
4. In regard to the repeal of the Arms Act, it does not seem to have
been realised that in view of the present military operations the Government
of India are also an interested party. Even normally in every country certain
types of weapons are forbidden to the civilian populations. These are what
are known as prohibited categories or bores. People are allowed to possess
freely only certain categories of arms. The total repeal of the Arms Act would
seem to have given the right to the people to possess arms of any descrip¬
tion. They may be cannon, bren guns, machine-guns or even weapons of
more offensive power. This is an aspect in which the Ministry is equally
interested and which should, therefore, command their immediate attention.
I am sure they themselves would want to see that the ordinary civilian popu¬
lation is not allowed to get armed to an extent that it can challenge on a
more or less equal footing its own armed forces.
 CHAPTER XII

TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA

140
New Delhi
11 April 1948
My clear Maharaja Sahib,
As Your Highness is aware, I am not in a position now
to travel to Jammu to see you. I propose going to Mussoorie on
or about 21 April for a change. I wonder whether Your Highness
and the Maharani would care to come down to Delhi. This will
be a change for you and I can also get an opportunity of having
a talk with you.
His Excellency and Lady Mountbatten have told me that they
would be delighted to put you up. If it is convenient would it
be possible for Your Highness to start on the 16th or 17th?
H.E. is going on tour on the 21st but this need not affect Your
Highness’ stay in Government House.
I am getting better and a change to Mussoorie will, I hope,
do me a lot of good.
Looking forward to seeing you and with kindest regards to
you both,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

His Highness
Maharaja of Kashmir

141
Jammu-Tawi
13 April 1948

My dear Sardar Patelji,

Thanks for your kind letter of 11 April. We are glad that
you are now feeling much better and are leaving for Mussoorie
for a short holiday which is sure to do you a lot of good. We are

180
 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA
181

of course disappointed that you are not coming to us for a change

and rest.
You have very kindly asked Her Highness and myself to
come down to Delhi. We shall do so with pleasure and shall
be delighted to see you. You have further suggested that we
should leave on the 16th or 17th, but unfortunately it is not pos¬
sible for us to leave on these dates. These are Pooja days and
Her Highness performs Durga Pooja1 during these days and Ram
Navami2 is on the 17th and on that day Her Highness and I visit
the principal temple in Jammu, also the last Pooja is on the
18th morning. So we can only leave on the 18th after lunch,
which I hope will be all right.
You have suggested that we can stay at Government House
while we are in Delhi and that you have had a talk with Lord
Mountbatten in this connection. In that case I think there should
be an invitation from Lord Mountbatten asking us to stay with
them. This invitation can, of course, come by telegram. Our
party will be seven—Her Highness, myself, one A.D.C., one
clerk and three servants. We would like to return to Jammu on
the 22nd, leaving Delhi in the morning and arriving here in time
for lunch.
There is a personal request on the part of Her Highness and
that is that a special plane, if possible, may kindly be made avail¬
able for our journey from Jammu to Delhi and back, which she
hopes you will very kindly be able to arrange.
I shall be grateful if you ask Shankar to kindly arrange a
hired car for us which we can use when we do not want to use
the Government House car and which can also be used by our party.
Looking forward to meeting you soon and with kindest
regards,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

1 Hindu festival
2 Birthday of Lord Rama (of Ramayana)
 142

New Delhi
18 April 1948
My dear Miss Patel,
Many thanks for your kind invitation to lunch tomorrow,
19 April, which we have much pleasure in accepting.
Thanks for your kind enquiries. We have had a comfortable
journey.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Tara Devi
Maharani of Kashmir
Miss Maniben Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

143
Mussoorie
4 May 1948
My dear V. P. Menon,
Please see the letter from H. H. of Jammu and Kashmir, sent
to H. M., (Honourable Member—Sardar Patel) about which I
spoke to you last night. H. M. has asked me to request you to
see Panditji about it, inviting his attention in particular to the fact
that these jagirs1 are being sought to be resumed without any pay¬
ment of compensation whatsoever, which is quite contrary to
anything that we are doing in the Indian Dominion, and that
measures of this kind would merely create avoidable discontent
and unhappiness, whereas the present is the time when there
should be complete unity among the people of Jammu and
Kashmir. It is also to be borne in mind that probably the jagir-
dars would be mostly non-Muslims and that this measure would
probably create a certain amount of discontent and ill-feeling
against the Government among the minority community. If
Sheikh Sahib could be persuaded not to push on with this measure,

l Lands gifted to loyal supporters of ruling family

182
 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA

and instead if we could ask His Highness to exercise his influence

with the jagirdars to persuade them to contribute one yeai s m
come towards the State to help the Government to relieve the
present financial stringency, as suggested by His Highness, we
would have secured some assistance^ for the present Government
without in any way raising a hornet’s nest.
I should be glad if you would kindly advise H. M. as to the
terms of a reply after contacting H. P. M. [Honourable Prime
Minister],
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar

V. P. Menon Esq., esi, cie,

Secretary to Government of India
Ministry of States
New Delhi

144
Mussoorie
4 May 1948
My dear V. P. Menon,
Hussain1 told me a couple of weeks ago that he had met
Brig. Usman and some other military officers, including Unni
Nair,2 who had all complained about publicity arrangements in
Jammu & Kashmir. From my own experience of the publicity
work being done by the Jammu & Kashmir Government I felt
that something should be done to put matters right. I, therefore,
wrote to Bakshi Sahib to ascertain if the Jammu & Kashmir
Govt, would be willing to a suitable officer of ours going there and
investigating on the spot and submitting proposals.
I have received the attached letter from Sh. Mohd. Abdullah
which shows that they would welcome such a visit. If you agree,
I would ask Hussain to go to Jammu & Kashmir for two or three
days, stay there and to let us have his report. He would be the
most suitable person for this purpose. He has a flair for publi¬
city himself and is fully familiar with the publicity methods of
those who are doing publicity work in Pakistan or Azad
Kashmir.

1 Azim Hussain, ICS; son of late Sir Fazli Hussain and member of Indian
Foreign Service
2 Public Relations Officer, Defence Ministry
184 sardar patel’s correspondence
I understand that Hussain had submitted a note to Mehta'
on this matter, but Mehta was disinclined to do anything. I
believe he spoke to you and after consultation with you, said that
the matter had better wait for some time. It is quite clear from
Sheikh Sahibs letter that it is one of great urgency and the
sooner we put our publicity right the better. I wonder whether
you are aware that publicity in Azad Kashmir [territory in
J & K in illegal occupation of Pakistan] is in the hands of Dr.
M. D. Tasser, one of the most competent publicity men in Pakis¬
tan. He was employed in the Counter-Propaganda Directorate
here during the war and has naturally learnt a great deal from
both our own methods and those of the British Information Servi¬
ces, who were mostly responsible for counter-propaganda.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
V. P. Menon Esq., csi, cie
New Delhi

145
Srinagar
27 April 1948
My dear Sardar Sahib,
Responsible government in Jammu and Kashmir State has
been secured after a bitter struggle extending over seventeen years
by the people of this State. Although we are fighting a war against
an unscrupulous and savage enemy intent upon depriving us of
our newly-won freedom, we have decided to hold freedom celebra¬
tion during the week beginning from 7 May 1948. Our object is
to show to the world the fine morale which the ordinary man and
woman in Kashmir is possessed of and the tenacity with which
the people of Kashmir are holding fast to their freedom.
You have all along supported us in our endeavours to free
Kashmir and today when the country has been invaded, you are
in no small measure helping us to win victory. Consequently when
we are celebrating our freedom, we would very much appreciate
if you make it convenient to be present at and participate in the
various functions during the celebrations. The bonds of com¬
radeship in struggle which have held us together so far would be
considerably strengthened and cemented by your presence at the
celebrations.
1 N.C. Mehta, ICS; Secretary, Information Department, Government of India
 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA 185

Let me assure you that although we are facing great hardships,

we will not be found sparing of efforts to welcome you and make
your stay in Kashmir comfortable.
I should feel grateful if you inform the Kashmir Trade Com¬
missioner (5, Prithviraj Road) in New Delhi of the date of your
arrival in Srinagar. The Trade Commissioner would be able
to help you in the matter of passage etc.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
S. M. Abdullah

146
Mussoorie
4 May 1948
My dear Sheikh Sahib,
Thank you for your letter of 27 April and your very kind
invitation to me to attend the celebrations.
I should have been very delighted to attend, but medical
advice is against it and I have, therefore, to content myself with
following the report of your celebrations with deep interest from
such a distance. At this juncture, when not only are we facing a
determined and unscrupulous enemy, the success of whose efforts
would put in peril everything that is decent and precious in life,
but when we have also been able to arrange by a spirit of mutual
accommodation and a display of statesmanship on the part of
His Highness the grant of responsible government, we need not
reflect on the bitterness of the past but on the happy and cordial
relations of the present and on the glory and prosperity of the
future. This thought is prompted by a reference to the bitter
struggle which you have made, and I thought I might as well
emphasise this, particularly in the light of our own history.
After all, few struggles could have been so prolonged and so
bitter as ours, but eventually the British Government did the
right thing by us and almost overnight the bitterness and hatred
of the past were converted into mutual respect and friendship.
Although I shall be away from your celebrations, I need hard¬
ly say that my heart will be with you all. Our sympathies were
throughout with you in the fight for freedom which you put up.
In recent months, we have come closer and closer together till there
is now a spirit of comradeship, which has been engendered by
186 SARDAR PATEI.’s CORRESPONDENCE

common dangers as well as common ideologies. Our friendship

is now settling down into an enduring affection, and let us hope
that in future the bonds that will bind Jammu & Kashmir State
and its people to us will mature into a permanent association in
all spheres ot life. Trade or mutual interests alone will not render
affections vital, but vital affections will render mutual benefits
ample.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah
Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir
Srinagar

147
Mussoorie
5 May 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
It was only the other day when I received an invitation from
Sheikh Sahib that I came to know of the celebrations that are go¬
ing to be held in Srinagar from the 7th to 12th of this month. Had
I come to know of it earlier, I would certainly have expressed my
view that these celebrations would be inappropriate, at least on
the scale on which they are planned, in present circumstances
when we are still defending the freedom and integrity of Jammu
& Kashmir State and are losing lives almost every day in that
effort. It is now too late to put off the celebrations, but even then
I would urge upon you to exercise your influence to ensure that
the celebrations are pitched in as sober a key as possible. \\ e
should particularly take care that there is as little triumphant
spirit about these celebrations as possible. From this point of view,
I feel that it is particularly inappropriate that there should be
any salutes of guns at all during these celebrations. Those guns
would sound hollow, for only less than a hundred miles away our
men are losing their lives in order to protect the Valley where the
celebrations would be held. I hope you will be able to do some¬
thing about it.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi
 148
New Delhi
6 May 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,
I have your letter of 5 May about the Kashmir celebrations.
I entirely agree with you. When I decided to go to Kashmir I
had no idea of these celebrations except that I had vaguely heard
of some celebrations, chiefly to attract visitors. I was rather
taken aback when I saw the programme. Lady Mountbatten was
also due to go with me, but Mountbatten did not like the idea
of her associating herself with political functions and so she has
dropped out.
When Sheikh Abdullah was here a few days ago, I spoke to
him somewhat on the lines of your letter and more particularly
said that there should be no gun firing. I am now sending him
a telegram, a copy of which I enclose. I am afraid, however, that
there is bound to be some kind of a tamasha,1 for the Kashmiris
love this kind of thing.
Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Mussoorie

ENCLOSURE

TELEGRAM

New Delhi
7 May 1948
Sheikh Abdullah
Prime Minister
Srinagar

EXPECT REACH SRINAGAR 9 MAY AT 9 MORNING. MAHARAJA HAS INVITED ME TO

LUNCH AT SRINAGAR ON 9th. I WOULD LIKE TO ACCEPT THIS INVITATION. IF

YOU AGREE KINDLY ARRANGE ACCORDINGLY AND INFORM MAHARAJA.

l Festivities (Nehru used this term in derogatory sense)

187
188 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

SARDAR PATEL AND I HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED PROGRAMME OP YOUR CELE¬

BRATIONS. WE FEEL THAT IN VIEW OF STRUGGLE GOING ON AND GENERAL

SCARCITY AND POVERTY IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO HAVE TOO MUCH OF A

TAMASHA. I TRUST THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL TONE DOWN THIS ASPECT OF

CELEBRATIONS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE IN TUNE WITH PRESENT CONDITIONS AND

MIGHT NOT BE WELCOMED BY MANY PERSONS. GENERALLY SPEAKING FUNCTIONS

MIGHT BE FEW. IN PARTICULAR FIRING OF GUNS SHOULD BE GIVEN UP.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

149
New Delhi
12 May 1948
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I returned from Kashmir today after a very tiring but stimu¬
lating visit. On the whole the celebrations there were successful
and impressive. There can be no doubt that Sheikh Abdullah’s
popularity in Srinagar and the Valley is very great. I paid a
visit to our Uri front also and found our soldiers full of spirit and
in great mettle. The general situation, both political and mili¬
tary, appeared to me on the whole satisfactory, though the machine
moves more slowly than I would like. We may have some
substantial results by the end of the month.
On the political side there is a great deal of confusion. Ob¬
viously the most efficient person is Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad,
who gets things done, though in doing this he does not always
follow rules and regulations. A great deal of stress has been paid
to what might be called psychological preparation of the
people. This is of course very necessary and the effort has
succeeded in the Valley at least. But the administrative side
is probably weak though I had no occasion to examine it or go
into it in any way. The strain on the administration because of
lack of funds is very great and the refugee problem is a great
drain. Indeed, the Government is at its wit’s end how to meet
the expenses on the refugees. Sardar Budh Singh, a very fine
and upright man, is the Relief Minister and he was almost in
tears when he spoke to me of his difficulties.
The transport problem is also a very great difficulty. Trans¬
port is practically monopolised for military purposes. I passed
hundreds of lorries on the Jammu-Banihal road carrying mili¬
tary equipment and supplies. Civil transport suffers accordingly
 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA

both to send salt and other necessaries and to take away Kashmir
products which are accumulating there.
There continues to be an undercurrent of tension between
the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah. There was no incident
while I was there and Sheikh Abdullah was courteous throughout
to the Maharaja, who participated in some of the functions. But
the fact remains that there is this tension. The Maharaja means
well but cannot easily get out of the habits of a lifetime. His
reluctance to meet people helps in creating misunderstandings. I
do not think he will deliberately do anything to create trouble. The
difficulty is that he is frightfully unpopular not only with the
common people but with almost everyone he meets, including
foreigners. I have advised Sheikh Abdullah to treat him with all
tact and courtesy.
You must have seen Ghulam Abbas’1 statement which indi¬
cates that Azad Kashmir is in a pretty bad way. All our own
accounts confirm this.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Mussoorie

150

Srinagar
16 May 1948
My dear Sardar Patelji,
Her Highness and I had come to Srinagar in connection with
the celebrations here and Panditji’s visit. Panditji’s visit went
off quite well except that on the first day it rained very heavily
and the programme arranged was disturbed.
I wrote to you a letter from Jammu but have not had any
reply yet. Col. Baldev Singh, my Dewan [adviser], as you are
aware, has applied for leave and wants to be relieved at once.
From his conversation it appears that he really wants to retire as
soon as there is some one to relieve him. I have already requested
you to suggest the names of persons from whom I could select
some one as Dewan. I shall be most grateful if you could kindly
find me one or two persons of outstanding ability. I am sorry to

1 Leader of Muslim Conference, migrated to Pakistan and joined Azad Kashmir

190 sardar patrl’s correspondence

trouble you again but I feel that you alone can help me in this
matter. An early reply to my address at Jammu will greatly
oblige.
I hope you are steadily improving your health by your stay
in Mussoorie.
With kindest regards from Her Highness and myself,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

151
New Delhi
20 May 1948
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Your letter. I have seen the Pakistan pamphlets to which
you refer. As soon as I saw them we put an officer on special
duty to deal with them. But it would be desirable to have
a small organisation as you suggest. Ultimately the writing work
has to be done by one man, though it may be checked by others.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Mussoorie

152
EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF JAWAHARLAL TO VALLABHBHAI
IN DEHRA DUN DATED 30 MAY 1948

The military situation, except for Ladakh, appears to be

progressing fairly satisfactorily. I hope that within a week we
might capture Domel and Muzaffarabad. That w'ill be a major
gain and it may be followed by our advance to Kohala. In
Ladakh we have for the moment lost ground and the raiders are
on the doorsteps of Leh [capital of Ladakh province]. This
has no great military significance, and we can recapture all the
lost ground. But it is irritating that on the map a huge province
may be shown as under the enemy. This province of course is
 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA 191

very sparsely inhabited. Another unfortunate feature may be the

loot of Leh, for Leh is a big and fairly rich centre. We have
taken steps to send troops by two routes. I fear however that
it will take us a month to clear Ladakh of the enemy. The
State troops in Ladakh and Skardu had behaved in a most
cowardly and disgraceful manner. They had not only run away
at the slightest provocation, but have handed over our weapons
and ammunition to the enemy. Indeed, without this ammuni¬
tion the enemy could hardly have functioned for long.
The Security Council Commission may reach India about
the end of June. It may also be delayed longer.
I am worried about the internal political situation in Kashmir.
Owing to lack of supplies and trade and continuous radio and
other propaganda from Pakistan, the moral of the civil population
is rather low. Pakistan’s radio from Murree carries on vicious
and intensive propaganda and there is nothing to meet it on our
side. I regret to say that many of the older generation of
Kashmir Pandits are not behaving well. They are grousing all
the time and talking almost as if they were agents of Pakistan.
They seem to have convinced themselves that ultimately Pakistan
will come in. If so, then why fight Pakistan? All this is largely
due to our lack of propaganda approach.
It is urgently necessary that we should install a good trans¬
mitter in Srinagar with technical personnel. Further that the
broadcasts both from Srinagar and Jammu should be carefully
planned so as to appeal to the people and strengthen the present
Government. Other steps indicated by Azim Hussain in his report
on Kashmir are also needed. Some of them should be given
effect to immediately.
I feel that it is very necessary to have a real first-class man
to represent us in Kashmir. No person other than a first-class
man with knowledge of Kashmir and of both the Maharaja and
Sheikh Abdullah can fit in. I cannot think of a suitable person and
on no account would I send a second-rater. Gopalaswami
Ayyangar is obviously the right person. But we cannot spare him
for this purpose and I do not think he would care to go. But
at any rate he might go there for a week or so and try to help
in straightening out matters. I am suggesting this to him. If
you could also make this suggestion, perhaps he might agree.
The Maharaja continues to remain in Jammu. This is very
unfortunate. It creates a bad impression on the people and it
comes in the way of consultation between him and Abdullah’s
*' - sardar patel’s correspondence

Government. Urgent decisions have to be taken and these have

to be delayed because the Xlaharaja cannot be reached, or they
are taken without consulting the Maharaja and then a complaint
follows. Even the long-distance telephone does not help, as the
Maharaja says that he cannot use it properly. I feel that the
Maharaja should be pressed to go to Srinagar, which is the centre
both of military operations and the Government. I suggest that
you might write to the Maharaja to shift to Srinagar.

153
EXTRACT FROM A LETTER DATED DEHRA DUN 4 JUNE 1948 FROM
SARDAR PATEL TO JAVVAHARLAL NEHRU IN NEW DELHI

3. As regards Kashmir, I must confess I am not happy

about the military position at all. We do not seem to make much
headway in spite of pouring men and material. Like Oliver Twist,
the military commanders always ask for more and their estimates
of requirements are constantly changing. What held good in
December 1947 changed only four/five weeks later when I went
there in the middle ol January. What held good then was probably
changed two months later. At last the offensive was taken, but
we do not seem to have achieved as much and as soon as we
expected. Now comes the threat to Lch and the capture of Kargil
and Dras; both I believe are strategic points.
4. You speak of the desertion of the State troops in Ladakh
and Skardu. This is not surprising as it is in keeping with the
traditions of the State troops since the struggle commenced.
5. As regards the internal situation in Kashmir, you have
rightly laid stress on the utility of propaganda and the attitude
of Kashmiri Pandits. The latter makes me particularly distressed.
If these people have lost faith in the efficacy of our arms or the
ability of the local administration to survive, what must be the
attitude of less sophisticated persons in the villages. Unfortu¬
nately nothing much in the matter of internal propaganda could
be done by us as the Jammu and Kashmir Government were
in sole charge of the propaganda media. They issued pamphlets
and used both the radio and the platform. I did not think it
fit to intervene though I was feeling very dubious about the
ability of the administration to do any effective propaganda. I
felt that the agency of Sheikh Sahib and his Conference1 would be

1 National Conference of which Sheikh Abdullah was President

 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA 1

the best medium and that he knew best how, when and where
to approach his men. I have now asked [P.C.] Chaudhuri
[Director-General, AIR], with whom I discussed this question
yesterday when he came for his weekly interview, to con\ ene a
conference of the Ministries concerned, so that they can consider
suggestions made by Azim Hussain in his report. I have asked
for their recommendations at a very early date, so that we can
devise a suitable scheme for the purpose. I hope I shall get it
some time next week.
6. I entirely agree with you that we should have a real
first-class man to act as a sort of bridge between His Highness and
Sheikh Sahib. In fact, this problem of differences and tension
between the two has been worrying me very much. I have written
several letters to Sheikh Sahib about easing this tension and im¬
proving relations, but I regret to say that I have had no reply.
From all accounts it appears that the arrangements regarding
reserved and non-reservecl subjects to which Sheikh Sahib had
agreed in March last are now being treated as a nullity and that
the presence of the Maharaja and the existence of the reserved
subjects are both being ignored. Even the Private Department of
the Maharaja is being interfered with and action is being taken
which, while it might bring back a few stragglers, would alienate
the sympathies of non-Muslims who, whatever reasons there may
be, still seem to regard the Maharaja as a symbol of their safety.
I have impressed upon Sheikh Sahib as well as Bakshi the nece¬
ssity of maintaining the prestige, the rights and privileges of the
Maharaja, but the manner in which the questions of his privy
purse, jagirdars and commandeering of office accommodation of his
Private Department have been dealt with has left on my mind a
most painful impression. Then there is the question of the
Jammu & Kashmir Army. I am inclining to think that it would
be by far the best arrangement to let the State Forces remain an
autonomous unit, so that if and when any question of withdrawal
of these Indian forces comes about, this autonomous existence
would enable us to maintain friendly forces on the spot. If, how¬
ever, we merge their identity with the Indian Dominion forces, even
though it might continue as a separate wing, we run the risk of
their being treated more or less as Dominion-trained forces and,
therefore, deserving of being sent in order to ensure a free and
impartial plebiscite. It is partly for this and other reasons that
Sheikh Sahib wishes to keep the identity of his Home Guards
sepai ate, but somehow or the other he does not seem to see the
validity of those very points when the question of the Army is raised.

S.G.-13
194 sardar patel’s correspondence

7. I fully recognise the essential difference between the two,

one is under popular control and the other is still under the
exclusive control of the Maharaja, but I would be prepared to use
my influence on the Maharaja to agree to consult his Ministry or
if Sheikh Sahib would prefer it, an individual Minister, Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammad, in all important matters concerning the
Army and while I should not ask the Maharaja to commit himself
to it in writing I think 1 would be able to persuade him generally
to agree to accept the advice tendered unless in any particular
case there is a serious difference of opinion, when matters could be
referred to me for final decision.
8. On the whole, I feel it would be best if discussions could
be held in Srinagar or Jammu itself and we could bridge the
difference between the Maharaja and Sheikh Sahib. For this
purpose, I suggest that both Gopalaswami and Menon might
visit Srinagar or/and Jammu and try to effect a settlement on the
various outstanding matters. It might interest you to know that
we sent a Draft Rules of Business which had been accepted by the
Maharaja some time in April, but despite reminders we have not
yet had Sheikh Sahib’s reactions on them. I am writing to
Gopalaswami to ask him to go there and help in straightening
matters.
9. As regards the Maharaja remaining in Jammu, I entirely
agree with you that he should frequently visit Srinagar. It would
not be possible for him to spend all his time in Srinagar, be¬
cause Jammu is equally important from the point of view of mili¬
tary operations. Shankar has already written to the Maharaja
suggesting that he might stay for a fortnight in Jammu and for
a fortnight in Srinagar. I hope the Maharaja will heed this ad¬
vice. If this fails, I shall of course be writing to him personally.

154
Dehra Dun
1 June 1948
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Lt. Kamal Singh [A.D.C. to the Maharaja] came and saw
me today. I have gone through the papers and told him the
changes which I thought were necessary.
I am afraid Your Highness and Her Highness must have given
me up for lost. I have not been able to write to Your High¬
ness, nor has Sardar been able to reply to any of your letters, but
 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA 195

I can assure you that neither he nor I have ever been unmind¬
ful of the difficult situation in which both of you must be finding
yourselves. In fact, even from this distance, we have been trying
our best to find a very early solution of those difficulties. Unfortu¬
nately, however, we are up against almost a complete silence from
the other side. I should have written to Your Highness long ago,
but for the fact that Sardar’s illness and the pressure of work have
kept me completely tied down to my duties here. I had thought
of coming to Your Highnes some time, but for the same reasons,
it was impossible for me to do so.
Regarding your letters, I should like to explain the position
as follows:
(a) Rules of Business: These were sent to Sheikh Sahib
long ago. Actually, they were taken by Bakshi Sahib, as I told
Your Highness. But up to date, in spite of reminders, one or two
from Sardar himself, there has been no reply. I understand from
V. P. Menon, however, that he is also pressing for a reply. As
soon as we get it, we can go ahead. You will be interested to
know that the Rules of Business have evoked support from quar¬
ters from which Your Highness would least expect it.
Apart from this, in two or three letters, Sardar has reiterat¬
ed the position that was settled in the correspondence between
Your Highness and himself, and in so far as we are concerned,
there can hardly be any possibility of going back upon those
arrangements.
(b) Jagirs: Regarding jagirs, Sardar wrote to Panditji
and the latter had taken up the matter with Sheikh Sahib. Per¬
haps he is also not getting any reply. That is why things are
in a stalemate. I shall take an early occasion of reminding him.
(c) Private Estates, etc.: Your Highness had raised
matters regarding private estates, etc. On that question also,
Sardar has written to Sheikh, but has yet had no reply.
(d) . Privy Purse: Regarding privy purse, Sheikh Sahib
has written to Sardar, who has sent an interim reply pointing
out that the procedure followed by him was wrong and that it
was not proper for him to have anticipated Your Highness’
approval. There are certain matters out of this question of privy
purse, in which I should have liked to have made personal en¬
quiries of you. Ultimately, it is quite clear that we shall have
to intervene in this issue, because after all the balance of money
is being paid by us and we can easily direct what sum should be
paid to Your Highness. There is, however, this difficulty, that we
196 sardar patel’s correspondence

shall have to reduce the expenditure to the essential needs in the

manner in which I have made the amendment in the papers you
sent to me. \\ hat those essential needs are would require personal
discussion. Unfortunately, I cannot come away and am completely
tied down to this place. V. P. Menon told me that he would be
going to Jammu and Srinagar shortly in order to settle these
and other matters. It is possible Shri Gopalaswami [Ayyangar]
may also go in an effort to improve matters.
(e) Army: Sheikh Sahib has sent a memorandum on which
no action has been taken so far, because Sardar has yet to consi¬
der it. It is quite possible, however, that this point may be raised
during the visit of Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Menon. I
know full well that, out of sheer kindness and consideration for
me, Your Highness woud like me to be there and I myself would
wish to be present, but I am sure Your Highness will appreciate
the difficulty of my coming away from Dehra Dun. Even then, I
shall cautiously mention it to Sardar and see if he can let me go.
d here is one matter on which I have expressed myself at
length to your Assistant Private Secretary, and that is about Your
Highness’ going to Srinagar. I feel that that is essential. Your
stay in Jammu is bound to give rise to difficulties and all sorts of
conjectures and surmises. It is also likely to give a handle to the
Ministry to ignore you even where consultation was enjoined in
accordance with the constitutional arrangements. If you are
on the spot, no such excuse would be open to them. At Srinagar,
you would be in touch with the military authorities there as well.
Actually, you could easily make out a case for a fortnight’s stay
at Srinagar and another fortnight’s in Jammu in a month on
the ground that both places are equally important from the point
of view of military operations. I hope it will be possible for Your
Highness to accept my advice.
We are sending a Special Correspondent of All India Radio
to cover Jammu & Kashmir. His name is Mr. K. L. Sharma,
whom I called here this morning to give instructions. I have
told him to see Your Highness at Jammu on his way to Srinagar.
I hope Your Highness will find it possible to meet him for a short
while. During his stay in your State, he will be contacting Your
Highness on occasions. He will be visiting Jammu, though he
would be stationed at Srinagar. If Your Highness would wish
anything of interest to be broadcast about the activities of Your
Highness or Her Highness, he would do the needful. As soon as
a telephone is installed at Srinagar, he would get in touch with
Your Highness’ ADC whenever necessary.
 TENSION BETWEEN ABDULLAH AND MAHARAJA
197

Lastly about the Dewan. We are very sorry indeed that we

have not been able to make much progress. Unfortunately, men o
the type who would be suitable as Dewan for Your Highness are
few and far between. In the present manpower shortage, they
are all holding key jobs here and no Ministry is prepared to
spare any of them. However, V. P. Menon has been able to get
two or three good men whom he would want me to interview,
am waiting for them to come to Dehra Dun, and as soon as t ley
do come and if I find them satisfactory, I shall send whoever is
suitable on to Your Highness.
I hope Your Highness and Her Highness would believe me
when I say that both of you are constantly in our thoughts and
that we shall do our best to lighten your burden. There aie cer¬
tain compulsions out of which we cannot extricate ourselves.
These Gordian knots cannot be cut at one stroke, they have to
be smilingly unravelled. We have to tread cautiously. For the
time being, we may have to suffer much. Whatever fiimness 01
definiteness is required is being adopted by us; it is possible
matters may prolong for a bit, but I have no doubt that sooner 01
later we shall find a satisfactory solution.
I hope the Yuvraj is making very satisfactory progress.
With kindest regards to Her Highness and yourself,
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
His Highness Maharajadhiraj
Sir Hari Singh
Jammu

155
The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
10 June 1948
My dear V. Shankar,
Thanks very much for your letter of 1 June.
I am pleased to know that the Rules of Business have evoked
support from quarters we least expected, but I am sorry to say
they are not being followed yet. I do wish that these rules
are agreed to and acted upon without further delay.
I have noted what you have said in regard to jagirs and pri¬
vate buildings.
 198
sardar patel’s correspondence

With regard to the privy purse, it was good of Sardar to have

pomted out to Sh. Abdullah that the procedure adopted by him
r -T- JUt ,X d‘d n0t know whether Sh. Abdullah has
r r,’ tcd llls mistake or not. In any case no amendments have so
ar* reilimade m thlS bebalb 1 do hoPe Sardarji’s intervention will
recofy the wrong done by the Ministry and restore my prestige
which has been affected by their indiscreet act.
Regarding the State Army I might mention again that in
no case am I prepared to part with the administrative control. I
have given sufficient reasons for the stand I am taking in the
matter. The Army is a reserved subject and the position in regard
to the reserved subjects has already been clarified.
I realise that it is necessary for me to go to Srinagar in order
to be available to my Cabinet for consultations and advice. But
so far, as you are aware, I have been completely ignored even
in most important matters. I don’t see what guarantee there is
in future that I will not be similarly ignored. Anyway I have
decided to stay at Srinagar and Jammu alternately as both the
places are important from the point of view of military opera¬
tions and Her Highness’ activities.
It is nice of you to send Mr. Sharma with instructions
that he should see me. I shall be glad to see him when he calls
and will utilise his services whenever considered necessary.
I have told both Sardarji and you that work is badly suffer¬
ing in the absence of a competent man as Dewan. The present
Dewan is unwell and I think realises that he is not suited to this
post.
In these circumstances may I ask you again to please remind
Sardarji to very kindly suggest some names as early as possible
so that I may select one of them as my Dewan? Please treat it
as most urgent and do your best in the matter.
I have been hearing from the Yuvraj regularly, and I am
glad to say he is making satisfactory progress. It is very kind of
you to make enquiries about him.
Her Highness and I are grateful to you for your good wishes
which we heartily reciprocate.
Please remember us to Sardarji and Miss Maniben. We
hope Sardarii is greatly improving in health.
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
Shri V. Shankar
New Delhi
 156
Dehra Dun
4 June 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,
We have not met since you left for the UNO, and after your
return I was told that you would some day run up to Mussoone.
But you were all very busy, and hence we had no opportunity
to meet.
2. I have followed the Kashmir proceedings of the UNO,
with considerable surprise and pain. I thought things were stiaigi-
tened before you left, but it seems we are almost where we were
before you left. It is difficult to follow British diplomacy in this
affair. However, for good or evil, we are in it and we must do
our best.
3. The military position is none too good, and I am afraid our
military resources are strained to the uttermost. How long we
are to carry on this unfortunate affair, it is difficult to foresee.
4. On the civil side, the relations between the Maharaja and
Sheikh Abdullah have not improved in spite of several efforts
on my part. Perhaps [V.P.] Menon will be able to acquaint
you with all that has happened during your absence. The Maha¬
raja has been asking for an adviser, and we must find out a good
man for him, who could carry the confidence of both and could
be able to ease the situation. In the meanwhile, it would be
desirable if you and Menon would go there for a couple of days
and try to bring about agreement between the two. It is difficult
to deal with this situation by correspondence. I had a mind to
talk to you about this, but as you could not come, I am writing
this now to you, as it is not possible to continue the present state
of tension without serious detriment to the Kashmir cause.
Hope you are doing well.
Yours sincerely,
Valiabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
New Delhi

199
 CHAPTER XIII

PAKISTAN ARMY IN KASHMIR

157
EXTRACT
5 June 1948
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I have pressed Gopalaswami Ayyangar to go to Jammu and
Srinagar for two or three days and he has at last agreed to do
so. He will go on the 8th first to Jammu. While it is true that
Sheikh Abdullah is not always tactful and sometimes says and does
things which he should not, my last visit to Kashmir convinced
me that he was trying hard to meet the Maharaja more than
half way. He has to deal with a very difficult situation, the
essence of which is to gain popular goodwill. Whatever happens,
the ultimate decision in Kashmir will be greatly influenced by
this popular feeling. If the present Kashmir Government cannot
succeed in this then it fails utterly. The Maharaja is completely
oblivious of this aspect or the international implications of the
Kashmir issue. He behaves in a manner which is completely
inexplicable to me and which irritates the people. There is at
present a vitally urgent problem of arranging for the destitute
refugees in Jammu—40,000 or more. Cholera has begun and
typhoid is feared. Our Relief and Health Ministry people visited
Jammu and came to the conclusion that the Maharaja’s stud farm
was ideally suited for a relief camp. The horses there could easily
be put somewhere else or sent to Srinagar for a few months. The
Maharaja refused to permit this even though Amrit Kaur and
Lady Mountbatten begged him for it. Meanwhile children are
dying in Jammu streets. You can imagine the public reaction to this.
Again about certain barracks in Srinagar. They were empty
and were urgently wanted for our troops. The Maharaja would
not agree. He is unapproachable and cannot be reached even by
telephone. Meanwhile, urgent situations develop which must be
handled with rapidity. What is to be done then ?
Jammu has ceased to have any great importance from the
military point of view. Srinagar is the nerve centre for all
200
 PAKISTAN ARMY IN KASHMIR 201

activities, civil or military. It is essential for the Maharaja to

be there and to remain in constant touch with his Government.
Otherwise work suffers and things are hung up, and inevitably he
is ignored where urgency demands it. 1 he effect on the public
of his remaining away from Srinagar is also very bad.
About the army (State) I fear it can never improve if the
Maharaja has anything to do with it. It is in a hopeless mess.
I wrote to you about the disgraceful behaviour of the State
troops in Ladakh etc. There are Hindu Dogra troops. They,
or their officers, have lost all morale and discipline and any further
association with the Maharaja will worsen the position. If any
effective State army is to be built up, as it must be, it must be
by our officers and men. The matter is too serious for it to be
left to the discretion of the Maharaja. We are playing for high
stakes and we dare not take risks. This is the opinion of our
army men also.
I cannot write more now as I have to go.
I hope you are progressing well.
V. P. Menon will accompany Gopalaswami to Jammu and
Srinagar, unless the wretched Hyderabad affair1 comes in the way.
Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

158
New Delhi
5 June 1948
My dear Sardar Sahib,
I am so grateful to you for your letter of the 4th.
2. Nothing has caused me greater disappointment than my
inability to proceed to where you are, spend a little time with
you and talk over many matters. I programmed a visit to
Mussoorie more than twice since my return from New York, but
at the last moment something or other stood in the way and I
was obliged to postpone it. I cannot find time to get away to¬
morrow and go over and see you at Dehra Dun, but I trust I
shall be able to do so the following week-end.
3. The ways of the Security Council have been extraordinary
and in dealing with the Kashmir question it has behaved in a
’Nizam s stubborn opposition to accession to Indian Dominion and insistence
on some form of independent status
202 sardar patel’s correspondence

manner which lias surprised even a person like me with three

months’ day-to-day contact and experience with its members. Its
last resolution giving the Commission the discretion to make
enquiries about Junagadh, genocide and implementation of inter-
Dominion agreements is a dishonest surrender to Pakistan intrigue.
4. As you say, we have entangled ourselves with a set of
persons who will not see things straight and we have to do our
best under the circumstances in which we find ourselves today.
We are today informing the Secuirty Council that in view of our
previous clear indications to it, its Commission cannot, on arrival
here, proceed to take steps to implement the tasks cast upon it
by a resolution which we have declined to accept in essentials.
But we have only intimated our willingness to confer with it if it
comes over in spite of our objections. We are asking it further
to let us know in advance the point or points on which it proposes
to confer with us. The Council apparently wants to push its
Commission out, to plant it in India and slowly to hustle us into
agreeing to all things recommended in its resolution. I am not
sure even the telegram we are sending today will have the intended
effect of making it hesitate to carry out the programme of the
Commission coming out to this country.
5. Since returning from New York^ and especially after my visit
to Srinagar during the freedom celebrations, I have not been
feeling too happy about the internal affairs of the State. I have
had more than one talk with V.P.[Menon] about Kashmir. 1 here
are a number of matters to be straightened out and I shall be
only too glad to carry out your wishes. I am arranging to pro¬
ceed to Jammu and Srinagar on the 8th and am asking V. P.
to accompany me. I hope his Hyderabad pre-occupations will
permit of his doing so. We shall jointly try to do our best and
hope that at the end of our visit things there would look more
satisfactory than they do now.
6. I am daily getting myself posted with the state of your
health and am glad to learn that it has much improved. I
trust this improvement will be even more rapid in the future
than in the past and that you will be able to resume your normal
activities here to the full at the earliest possible date.
With kindest regards,
Yours very’ sincerely,
Gopalaswamy

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

Dehra Dun (U.P.)
 159
EXTRACTS

New Delhi
6 June 1948
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Our experience in Kashmir has shown us that it is easier to
begin military operations than to end them. I think on the
whole our army in Kashmir, officers and men, have not done
badly. I have gone fairly deeply into this question and balanced
the enormous difficulties they have had to face. They have
erred and made mistakes, they have also shown sometimes an
unnecessary caution. Nevertheless on the whole they have done
well. I do not think most people realise the tremendous difficulties
of the undertaking. At the present moment there is little
doubt that the Pakistan army, or a part of it, is functioning
against us in Kashmir territory. They have a tremendous geogra¬
phical advantage over us. Kashmir is a very big area and
possesses most difficult terrain from the point of view of military
operations. Also the climate in winter is a very hard one and
large areas like the Ladakh Valley are completely unapproach¬
able in winter. The first lesson that a military commander is
taught is that of concentration. Nothing is more dangerous in
war than a dispersal of forces. This concentration leads to large
areas being left unguarded, unless the forces we use are tremen¬
dous in numbers. Even so it is practically impossible to
guard every mountain valley or cave. We fight to win and to
break the enemy. They fight to harass and annoy and cause us
injury. The latter method does not need concentration. In any
event we have to think of our army as it is and not as it might
be. We have, in technical matters, to take advantage of our
military experts. Our policy, specially when it involves military
operations or the possibility of them, cannot ignore the hard facts
of the situation, as judged by the military experts. I have little
°uit that our officers are exceedingly anxious to produce results
m Kashmir. Their own reputation depends upon that. We
cannot bring them about by expressing our dissatisfaction of the
?n °nl? d° What k is caPable of doing and no more.
Ihe hght that is going on near Domel-Muzaffarabad is of great

203
204 sardar patel’s correspondence

significance and that is the reason why Pakistan has thrown its
forces and some armour into it. Our victory there will no doubt
make a great difference to our campaign. Because of this Pakistan
will try its utmost to prevent that victory.
I have written to you about Kashmir already. I found there
that quite a good effort in the shape of propaganda has been
made by the Kashmir Government. They have published attrac¬
tive pamphlets and have very effective popular plays about the
struggle which are performed in large numbers of urban and rural
areas. I heir difficulty is lack of paper and lack of broadcasting
equipment. Pakistan radio repeats the most infernal lies by leaf¬
lets etc. 1 he only way to check it is to have our own broadcasting.
Therefore the urgency of this.

Propaganda in Kashmir must obviously take into considera¬

tion the psychology of the Kashmir people, both Muslim and non-
Muslim. It must be largely addressed to large masses of people
who can make a difference this way or that way. I am told that
Kashmiri broadcasting from A.I.R. is rather colourless and does
not appeal to the listeners in Kashmir. It seems necessary to
associate a competent Kashmiri to give the background to our
broadcasts.
My study of the Kashmir situation has led me to believe
that the Maharaja cannot play. He just does not know how
to. When there is an obvious possibility of his losing everything
he still wants to hold on to relatively simple things, not realising
that this has a bad effect both internally among the people as
well as on external observers. His mere absence from Srinagar
is bitterly resented because everybody of any consequence functions
from Srinagar now. Even the military situation requires this.
This leads me to the State Forces which have become not
only not helpful but a tremendous nuisance. By their passivity
and sheer funk, they have done injury to our cause. The only
way to pull them up is for the Indian Army to take complete
control over these forces. This of course will not mean that
the State army will lose its identity or will become absorbed in
the Indian Army. The State army will be kept distinct and will
certainly stay on in Kashmir even when our troops decide to with¬
draw. Our own officers feel this strongly and they cannot make
full use of existing State troops in present circumstances. It has
thus become an urgent necessity, from the point of view of mili¬
tary operations as well as the possibility of a plebiscite, that qmc
action be taken in such matters. It is equally important that the
 PAKISTAN ARMY IN KASHMIR 205

Maharaja should live in Srinagar for the greater part of the sum¬
mer months, as Srinagar is the place now where important deci¬
sions have to be taken both by civil authorities and oui military
commanders. Unless he lives in Srinagar he cannot keep in touch.
From some other points of view too it is not desirable loi him to
live long in Jammu during summer. This would be entirely
opposed to the old policy when the Maharaja spent the whole
summer in Srinagar.
Yours,
Jawaharlal

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

Dehra Dun

160
Dehra Dun
30 June 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
I have seen the telegraphic correspondence between you and
Liaquat Ali Khan about the participation of Pakistan units in
Kashmir. It is quite clear that whatever we might do the
Pakistan Prime Minister will not make a reply to the charges
which we have made. He is now hanging on to your reference to
Zaffrullah in order that he may get an excuse for not replying to
the specific allegations. I feel it is now profitless to pursue the
correspondence which has now degenerated into personal charges
against each other.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

161

New Delhi
9 July 1948
My dear Bakshi Sahib,
Some time ago, I sent to you a cheque of Rs. 50,000 for
refugee relief [to be handed to] Maharani Saheba. I now under¬
stand that the amount which I sent to Her Highness has been
taken over by you. I am rather surprised at this, and would
206 sardar patel’s correspondence

bC £‘ad ,kn°W ‘f the amount has since been returned by you

to Her Highness.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad Esq.
Deputy Prime Minister
Govt, of Jammu & Kashmir
Srinagar

162
Srinagar
12 July 1948
My dear Sardar Sahib,
Thank you for your letter dated 9 July 1948.
I was surprised to learn that it has been reported to you that
the amount sent by you to Her Highness the Maharani Saheba
for refugee relief work was taken over by me. This amount was
sent by you direct to the Maharani Saheba and I have no know¬
ledge [whatsoever] about its receipt or disbursement.
Of course a cheque for a sum of Rs. 50,000 which was handed
over to me was sent by me to the Relief and Rehabilitation Depart¬
ment, Jammu & Kashmir State.
Yours sincerely,
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Hon’ble the Deputy Prime Minister
India

163
New Delhi
17 July 1948
My dear Bakshi Sahib,
Thank you for your letter dated 12 July 1948.
Shankar will be going to Kashmir some time next week and
I have asked him to discuss this matter with you.
With kindest regards.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad
Srinagar
 164
14-E Ferozeshah Road
New Delhi
17 July 1948
My dear respected Sardar Sahib,
Last time when I saw you at Dehra Dun in connection with
my brother, Pandit Ramchandra Kak,1 ex-Premier, Kashmir,
you were pleased to express that you will look into the matter
personally with a view to secure justice and fair treatment. You
were kind to me in listening to me. I do hope that you have
been able to look into the matter and to take such action as
would secure justice and fairplay.
I am most reluctant in writing to you and troubling you once
again, but as my aged and ailing father as well as my sister-in-
law in Kashmir are suffering a great deal because both my broth¬
ers, Pandit Ramchandra Kak and Pandit Amarnath Kak, advocate,
are put in prison and there is nobody to look after them in this
condition. I feel compelled to remind you of your kind assur¬
ance to me at Dehra Dun to help me relieve my parents and
family from suffering.
I am bringing this note to deliver to you personally if I am
not fortunate enough to get a personal interview immediately.
I trust and pray that your health is daily improved.
With respects,
Yours obediently,
P. N. Kak

165

New Delhi
27 July 1948
Dear Sir,

,, „ \ 'fS ,l° re,cluest y™ kindly to request Hon’ble Sardar

Vallabhbhai Patel to grant me an interview at his earliest con¬
venience and oblige. My purpose to see him is in connection with
1 Ramchandra Kak and Amarnath Kak were charged with corruption and held
m prison pending trial by the popular Government beaded by Sheikh AMullah

207
208 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

my brother, Pandit Ramchandra Kak, cx-Premier, Kashmir, and

make certain submission to him on his behalf. I have today before
him a certain matter which is absolutely necessary for me to submit
to him.
I may further mention that both of my brothers, Pandit Ram¬
chandra Kak and Amarnath Kak, advocate, and whole of our
family are put to great suffering directly and indirectly by orga¬
nised persecution and harassment and we are in great distress.
This also compels me to take the liberty of approaching you to
request Hon’ble Sardar Patel to grant me an opportunity of seeing
him at his earliest convenience.
I do realise that Hon’ble Sardar Patel is extremely busy but
l trust that among his manifold preoccupations he will very kindly
favour us by sparing a few moments for us.
Thanking you for your kindness and courtesy,
Yours faithfully,
P. N. Kak
The Private Secretary to
Hon’ble the Deputy Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

166
New Delhi
28 July 1948

DearJMr. P. N. Kak,
Thank you for your letter of 27 April 1948, which I have
placed before Sardar Patel.
He is very sorry he cannot be of any further assistance to
you. He has done all he could, and no useful purpose will, there¬
fore, be served by your seeing him, particularly in the present state
of his health.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar

P. N. Kak
14-E, Ferozeshah Road
New Delhi
 167
New Delhi
30 July 1948
Dear Mr. Shankar,
Thank you very much for your letter dated 28 July 1948.
I am very thankful to Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel for the
sympathy he has for my brother, Pandit Ramchandra Kak, and
the trouble he has so kindly taken in helping us to come out of the
distress we have fallen in. I am very sorry that he is not keeping
well. I always pray for his good health and long life.
The main purpose for which I had sought an interview in my
letter dated 27 July 1948 (which may have been wrongly dated
as 27 April through an oversight) was to hand over a sealed cover
personally to him as per my brother’s instruction to me.
Through his defence counsel, my brother had sent to me a
sealed cover, containing a statement which he would wish to make
in his defence, detailing the background and the reasons of the
flimsy and false charges made out against him and the persecution
he and the rest of his family have been subjected to. He has direct¬
ed me to hand over the sealed envelope to Hon’ble Sardar Patel
and lequest him on his behalf whether (a) he should give the
statement or not and (b) if there is no objection in giving it,
whether he should give it as it is, or amend it in some vital parti¬
culars.
Hon ble Sardar Patel is no doubt aware that the charges
framed against Mr. Kak, under Section 409 I.P.G., and 161
I.P.C. are flimsy and are utterly lacking in substance. The real
intention is to persecute him and his relatives in a malicious man¬
ner. The trial is now being hurried through in a very ugly fashion
without affording any facilities for proper defence. It is there¬
fore imperative for my brother to have the benefit of such gui¬
dance and advice in respect of his proposed statement as re¬
quested above, as soon as possible.

i • m thJrefore enclosing the sealed envelope which may very

kindly be submitted to Hon’ble Sardar Patel for his kind instruc¬
tions I will come to receive his instructions for the guidance of

C°nVenient t0 him Which kindly

S.C.-14 209
210 sardar patel’s correspondence

I am very sorry to bother Hon’ble Sardar Patel, but 1 am

helpless and the only hope we have is in him. We are indeed very
gratelul to him for all the kindness which he has shown to us. I
trust and pray that his health improves daily.
Thanking you once again,
I am,
Yours sincerely,
P. N. Kak
V. Shankar Esq., ics
New Delhi

168
New Delhi
2 August 1948
Dear Mr. Kak,
Thank you for your letter of 30 July 1948. I shall be glad
if you will kindly see me tomorrow at 3.00 p.m. at 1 Aurangzeb
Road.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
Shri P. N. Kak
New Delhi

169
New Delhi
1 August 1948
My dear V. P. Menon,
Please see the attached letter H.M. has received from H.H.
of Kashmir. H.M. feels there is a great deal of force in what H.H.
says. In any case, we should have been consulted by the Defence
Ministry before they decided to hand these men over to the civil
authorities in Kashmir. I have reasons to believe that if we do
hand these men over there would be considerable discontent in
the } & K Army and in our own. 1 he whole case arose out of
a report received by Indian Army men at Ramsu that some wan¬
dering graziers had Hindu women with them. These men were
sent on a mission to recover them and whatever they did was
during that mission. At the time, therefore, these men were under
the command of Indian Army officers.
 PAKISTAN ARMY IN KASHMIR 41 1

H.M. will speak to H.M. Defence (Sardar Baldev Singh)

about it. In the meantime, he wants that you should take this
matter up officially with the Defence Ministry.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar

V. P. Menon Esq.
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

Srinagar
31 July 1948

My dear Sardar Patelji,

It is possible you have heard of the most unfortunate incident at Verinag1
in which some of the Jammu & Kashmir and Indian troops are reported to have
been involved. The troops, both State and Indian, went out under the
orders of the Coy Commander of the 2nd Rajput Regt. as a part of the Indian
Army detachment under an Indian Army V.C.O. The State Army authorities
have not been informed of the mission on which these troops were sent and
presume that it was part of their operational duty.
I understand that after some enquiries the Indian Army authorities have
decided that the 11 men of the State Forces who are alleged to be involved,
should be handed over to the civil authorities. I am unable to comprehend
the reasons underlying this decision of the Judge Advocate of HQ Western
Command. I have already signed a warrant some two months ago authorising
the Commander JA Div to convene courts martial in my name. Like their
fellow Indian Army men, these men could and should have been dealt with by
a court martial in the usual way. Any discriminatory treatment is bound to
result in bitterness [and affect the] morale of the State troops which, am I
sure you will agree, is so essential at the present critical state of our operations.
I would also add that the attitude of the civil authorities on a matter
of this kind and in present circumstances is unlikely to be unbiased and I
would much rather that the whole matter is dealt with by an Indian Army
court martial. If this were done, the persons involved would have confidence
in a fair trial and impartial judgment.

I do hope it will be possible for you to do something about it.

Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

I Famous spring in Kashmir frequented by tourists and pilgrims

 170

Srinagar
6 August 1948
My dear Sardar Patelji,
My Prime Minister1 and Deputy Prime Minister2 came to
see me on 5 August and had a talk in regard to the administra¬
tive control of the State Army.
For your information I am enclosing herewith the gist of the
talk which took place between us.
We are leaving for Jammu on Wednesday 11 August, and
can come to Delhi from there if and when you require us.
With our kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

MAHARAJA HARI SINGH’S SUMMARY OF HIS TALKS ON 5 AUGUST

WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Bakshi came on Monday 2 August and suggested that I should get an

ADC to telephone and ask Sheikh Sahib to come to see me on the next
day. I told him that I was engaged on Tuesday afternoon, and on Wednes¬
day both Her Highness and I were going to Baramulla and Uri for the day.
He then suggested between 6 and 6.30 on Thursday the 5th. I told
him that I had nothing particular to discuss, so there was no occasion for
me to have a telephone message sent, but if Sheikh Sahib wished to see me he
could come. Bakshi said that Sheikh Sahib also had nothing particular to
discuss. He only wanted me to ask Sheikh Sahib to come to the Palace as he
was feeling a bit hurt at not having been asked to dinner on the night
Panditji and his party dined at Karan Mahal3 and if I asked him to see me
it would smooth matters.

1 Sheikh Abdullah
2 Bakshi Gulam Mohammad
3 Palace named after Maharaja’s son and heir Karan Singh

212
 PAKISTAN ARMY IN KASHMIR
213

On Thursday 5 August a telephone message came from D. P. Dhar1

saying that 6 would be too late for Sheikh Sahib to come, so could he come
earlier. A reply was sent asking if 5 would do. A little later D. P. Dhar
telephoned again saying that 5 would also be too late as Sheikh Sahib had
to offer prayer before opening his Roza [fast] and asked if 4 would suit. A
reply was sent in the affirmative.

In spite of this Sheikh Sahib and Bakshi turned up at 5. After about

15 minutes’ general conversation I said that I had come to know that Sheikh
Sahib was feeling hurt as he had not been asked to dinner on the night
Panditji and his party dined here. I explained that the table only took 16
and as Panditji’s party (a list of which we had got from Chashmashahi )^ consist¬
ed of 14, there was no room except for Her Highness and myself (all the staff
dined later). Moreover it was only an informal and private dinner. There
was no intention to ignore either Sheikh Sahib or Bakshi. Bakshi cut in and
said that he had been told that the list had come from the Palace and even
personal assistants were included. I told him that this was quite wrong, the
names had been obtained from Chashmashahi. How could I have made out the
list when I did not know the names of the people who had accompanied
Panditji? As far as I was concerned I had not even thought of asking
Generals Cariappa, Kulwant Singh and Thimayya (whom I had met at
Chashmashahi that day) for want of space.

The conversation then switched on to the administrative control of the

State Army. Sheikh Sahib (frequently prompted by Bakshi) came out with
a full list of the so-called rape, loot and atrocities being systematically com¬
mitted by the State troops. I said every incident I knew of had been or was
being enquired into by the Indian Army authorities under whose operational
control the State troops were. In every case found proved and in which
punishment had been recommended I accepted the recommendation and direct¬
ed that the punishment should be executed. Sheikh Sahib then got a bit
excited and said that the administrative control must be bad as these atrocities
were being systematically committed. Bakshi added he had seen and spoken
to the men and junior officers and he did not find any fault with them but
according to him something was radically wrong higher up, and instructions
seemed to emanate from there. Sheikh Sahib then said that the State Army
was a monopoly for Rajputs and added that Kashmiris must have their proper
share in the Army. I repeated that the Army never was and would not be
the monoploy of Rajputs. I had already issued orders for recruitment of
Kashmiris who are found fit for the Army. There is an Indian Army officer
in charge of the Militia. He could pick out persons from the Militia he con¬
sidered suitable and who could be turned into soldiers. There was*no objection

1 Member of Abdullah Ministry

2 Name of guest house in Srinagar where Nehru was staying
214 sardar patel’s correspondence

whatsoever in enlisting them in the State Army and training them. But by
pressing a button only one could not be turned into a soldier.

Before I could reply Sheikh Sahib switched on to the so-called massacre

of Muslims in Jammu and started hinting that I had a hand in that.
Bakshi intervened and tried to bring the conversation back to the State Army.
I said that the matter regarding the Army had been referred by Sheikh Sahib
to Delhi and I also had expressed my views on the subject. I did not think
that the conversation as it was going on would help matters and no decision
could be arrived at in this room. Bakshi again cut in and said that this was
a domestic matter [and] why shoud the States Ministry be brought into it?
Who are they after all? Only outsiders. I replied that the States Ministry
dealt with all differences of opinion that arose in the acceding States. Ours
was also an acceding State.

Sheikh Sahib then said, “Why should Your Highness not have Bakshi as
your Army Minister? He would put the administrative side right in no time.
Your Highness can of course remain C-in-C.” He added that I should have full
confidence in the Ministry. They were loyal to me. Trust begets trust. Before
I could reply he started off on the Verinag incident and again started hinting
that the Palace had a hand in the murder of Muslims.

At this stage Her Highness could not help countering by saying, “Why
talk about loyalty when I understand you said in Delhi that you could not
carry on with His Highness and demanded his removal?” Addressing Bakshi,
she said, “You have said in connection with the Verinag incident that His
Highness, myself, Brig. Bikram Singh and Col. Ranbir Singh were conspiring
to have Muslims killed in the Valley also.”
After a pause Sheikh Sahib said that as things were he had not only
said this in Delhi but had also given it in writing. Bakshi admitted having
said what Her Highness had stated, only after Col. Balwant Singh (Admin
Com) had told him that he knew definitely that this was so. Her Highness
then remarked that she doubted this statement and addressing Bakshi she said,
“You can say what you like about us but why drag in the Indian Army
officers?” Bakshi said, “But I know Brig. Bikram is persona grata at the palace.”
Her Highness replied, “You cannot say this as we have had no more to do
with Bikram Singh than with any other Indian Army officers. In this way you
can accuse any officer who comes to the palace. We invite them to the
palace with a view to show our appreciation of what they are doing for the
State.”

At this stage Sheikh Sahib again started off regarding the massacre of the
Muslims in Jammu and said that even C. R. Chopra (then Governor) and
Brig. Udey Chand (then I.G.P.) had admitted that I must have had a hand
in this. I said, “It has taken them several months to say this. Anyway, it
is no use discussing the matter here and if you really believe in what they
 PAKISTAN ARMY IN KASHMIR
215

say why not have an impartial enquiry by unbiased and independent persons?”
Sheikh Sahib heatedly said, “What is the good of saymg that. I started
enquiry [but] it was stopped from Delhi.”
Bakshi again intervened and tried to bring the conversation back to the
administrative control of the Army. But Sheikh Sahib would not stop and
went on to say, “I have got to turn the minds of Muslims of the State 10m
Pakistan to the Indian Dominion. If the Muslims feel their lives are not
safe and things are not done in the way I want them to be done then it is no
use my carrying on and I had better resign. There can be no reserved and
non-reserved subjects. Everything must be in my hands.”
I felt he was trying to goad me into saying something on which he could
hang his resignation. I only said, “Sheikh Sahib, please let the States Minis¬
try deal with all these issues. Considering all you have said, I cannot deal
with such matters.” He retorted by saying, “If the States Ministry wants
me to drown myself in the Dal [lake], I for one am not going to do so. I
will resign and tell the people that I have done so because I have been
hampered both here and in Delhi and they can go to Pakistan or the Indian
Dominion as they like.” After this there was about 5 minutes silence.
Bakshi then said something to Sheikh Sahib about opening his Roza.
I offered to get some tea for Shiekh Sahib, but he refused saying that there
was still time for him for offering his prayers and opening his Roza in his
own home.
After a minute or two Sheikh Sahib and Bakshi left the room saying
“Khuda Hafiz”1 in a curt manner without even looking either towards Her
Highness or me. As they went near the door Sheikh Sahib said to Bakshi,
“It is no use. We will have to deal with Delhi and force their hands.”
JST.B. This conversation took place in Urdu and English, with Urdu pre¬
dominating.

1 May Gcd protect you

 CHAPTER XIV

ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’

171
TELEGRAM

New Delhi
9 August 1948
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah
Prime Minister
Srinagar
reference my letter sixth august, owing to my preoccupa-
I IONS WITH ASSEMBLY SESSION WOULD SUGGEST SEVENTEENTH AUGUST
INSTEAD OF TWELFTH. HOPE THAT SUITS YOU.

VALLABHBHAI

172
TELEGRAM

Ministry of States
New Delhi
10 August 1948
His Highness Maharaja Bahadur of Kashmir
Srinagar
DISCUSSIONS START ON SEVENTEENTH INSTEAD OF TWELFTH. HAVE
ASKED SHANKAR ARRANGE FOR YOUR HIGHNESS* PLANE FROM
JAMMU ON SIXTEENTH. PLEASE TELEGRAPH TIME AT WHICH YOU
WOULD LIKE LEAVE JAMMU. KINDEST REGARDS.

VALLABHBHAI

21'i
 173
The Laurels
Balton
England
13 August 1948
My dear Sardar Sahib,
It is now almost eleven months since I saw you in Delhi on
the eve of our departure for England. They have been and are
months of bitter anxiety for us. But I cannot help writing to say
how grateful I am not only for the sympathy you showed to me
then, but [also] for your continued help and sympathy about which
my brother-in-law, Pandit Prem Nath Kak, has on several occa¬
sions written to me.
I hear that charges have now been framed against my husband
on all three counts, in spite of the fact that the evidence produced
before the Special Magistrate by the prosecution was of the
flimsiest nature. A revision against the framing of the charges is
now being argued in the Sessions Court, but my husband has warn¬
ed me that the outcome is very doubtful in view of the fact that
in spite of the inadequate evidence produced, charges have none¬
theless been framed. I need not, I know, tell you how intensely
grateful I should be to you for anything you can do to ensure that
the trial is conducted freely and fairly and above all for anything
which can be done which would bring the time nearer when we
can rejoin him, and we can begin to build up a joint life once
more.
I trust that your health is now fully restored, in spite of the
heavy burdens you are required to shoulder in the service of the
country.
With heartfelt thanks for the sympathy you have shown, and
in full confidence of the continuance of your help,
Yours very sincerely,
Margaret Kak

217
 174

New Delhi
20 August 1948
Dear Mrs. Kak,
Thank you for your letter of 13 August, 1948.
I quite realise your predicament. I have seen your brother-
in-law several times, and I have also tried to help him. But I
am afraid I have failed. It is not possible for me to influence the
course of events in regard to your husband’s trial.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Mrs. Margaret Kak
The Laurels
Balton
England

175
The Laurels
Balton
England
21 September 1948

Dear Sardar Sahib,

Though your letter of 20 Aug. brought no new hope I cannot
omit to say how grateful I am to you for your prompt reply and
I still rest in the assurance that you have some interest in our
affairs and will not fail to help us, if the opportunity arises.
I need not say how urgent our need is in view of the fact that
the final arguments in my husband’s case were to have begun on
II Sept.
With grateful thanks for understanding and sympathy,
Yours sincerely,
Margaret Kak

218
 176
New Delhi
14 August 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,
This evening some members of the U.N. Kashmir Commis¬
sion called on me and presented a copy of a resolution they had
passed yesterday in Karachi [Appendix Fourteen]. We did not
discuss this resolution at all. I told them that we shall have to
consider it very carefully before we could say anything about
it. We may require further elucidation.
I am enclosing a copy of this resolution. You will notice that
it raises very important and vital issues and we shall have to give
it the most careful consideration. It will have to be considered
by the Cabinet. But before we take it there, a few of us might meet
together to discuss it. I am arranging a small meeting for this
purpose in my room at the Council House on Monday morning
at 12. To this meeting I am inviting Sardar Patel, Sardar Baldev
Singh, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the Secretary General,1 Mr.
V. P. Menon and Mr. Vellodi. I suggest that for the present no
others need be brought into this consultation. I trust you will keep
this resolution completely secret till then.
Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

177
New Delhi
30 August 1948
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Some days ago I received a personal and confidential letter
from Lord Mountbatten. I showed it to the Governor-General
today. He was of opinion that as this letter dealt with important
and grave matters, all the Members of the Cabinet should see it.
I am therefore sending a copy of it to you. . . .
Jawaharlal
1 G. S. Bajpai, Secretary-General, External Affairs Ministry

219
 ENCLOSURE
COPY OF A LETTER FROM LORD MOUNTBATTEN TO PANDIT NEHRU
DATED LONDON 15 AUGUST 1948

We have just come back from a great meeting at the Albert Hall where
over 1,000 people joined together to celebrate the first anniversary of India’s
independence. No doubt you will see the full report in the Press, but I
thought you would like to know that every time your name was mentioned it
brought all proceedings to a standstill; so long and so genuine was the
applause.

Edwina and I are off tomorrow morning to Ireland and after that to
Canada, and will not be back until the end of the month, and I know that
you will have in the meanwhile to take some very vital decisions. How I wish
I could still be with you in Delhi and help you to make them by giving you a
chance to discuss all the points with me as you used to in the old days.

Although I have no right whatever to make any comments, let alone give
you any advice now, I feel in a way a continuing responsibility for the situa¬
tion you are now faced with, for it was I who encouraged you to take the
Kashmir case to UNO.

Since I have been over here, I have had an opportunity of discussing

this problem with every sort of person and all shades of opinion. I have been
struck by the unanimity of thought over here that India was absolutely right
to go to UNO. I know that you (and I) have been criticised in India for
having gone to UNO because UNO handled the matter in a way that
caused disappointment in India. But in the comparatively detached atmo¬
sphere of London it is more than ever clear that the alternatives before
India were and still are open war or a decision by UNO. There are really
no other alternatives except perhaps a continuation of undeclared war with
all the risks that entail of eventually turning into a declared war.

I think you will agree with [me that] Pakistan is in no position even to
declare war, since I happen to know that their military commanders have put
it to them in writing that a declaration of war with India can only end in
the inevitable and ultimate defeat of Pakistan.

Therefore a declared war can only come about by India making the
declaration.

I know that you will instinctively shrink from taking such a course, but I
also know that there are some of your colleagues in the Cabinet and the more
noisy and unthinking elements in the country who will press you to declare

220
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’ 221

war. I therefore feel it may be of some use if I enumerate again the disastrous

consequences of such an act on the part of India.

After all that the leaders of free India have said and stand for, after
having won your long battle against Imperial rule, can we honestly contem¬
plate that India’s first major international act should be a declaration of
war, and the final and open abandonment of all other methods of settling an
international dispute? This will inevitably be of the gravest possible preju¬
dice to India’s future international position; indeed UNO might well
outlaw her, in my opinion, naming her as the aggressor. What a paradoxical

tragedy that would be!

I am certain I do not need to reassure you as to the sincere friendship
which HMG feel towards India. The decisive voices in the British Cabinet
are extremely sympathetic and well disposed towards India. If there was any
doubt, surely Attlee’s remarks in the recent debate in the House on Hydera¬
bad and Stafford’s remarks at the Albert Hall today would reassure you.
But whatever their feelings would be, they would have no option, in my
opinion, but to conform with UNO’s decision if they were to name India

as the aggressor.

The converse seems equally true to me; if the United Kingdom were named
an aggressor by UNO, the Government of India would be bound to conform to
UNO unless indeed they were to abandon UNO.

I need not remind you that you have 4 crores of Muslims spread all over
India to whom communal peace was given by Gandhiji’s teaching and finally
by his death. Can anyone doubt that all Gandhiji’s teaching would be thrown
by the board, and that communal massacres which would make the Punjab
look mild by comparison would follow open warfare with a Muslim State. A
declaration of war would be signing the death warrant of a great number of
innocent women and children within India and not merely within the war zone.
In this respect I submit that India is in an almost unique position.

This would be a most inglorious end to the whole conception of the

secular State for which you and Gandhiji and your followers have devoted
your whole life’s work.

Have you asked your Chiefs of Staff Committee to give you the advan¬
tages and disadvantages of declaring war ? If you had a thousand heavy bom¬
bers, or a hundred, or even fifty, which could completely flatten out the
Pakistan bases, then I could understand the military temptation to declare
war. But what have you got? A few old Dakotas with a somewhat doubtful
Harry Tate contraption to drop bombs which I have seen for myself at the
Hindustan Aircraft Factory. To hit the target with this arrangement would en¬
tail flying at so low a height that the Pakistan anti-aircraft gunners could not
miss. And we know from our own experience in England how ineffective even a
first-class bombing force can be until after years of training and war experience.
222 sardar patel’s correspondence

If therefore you will agree that no sane man could subscribe to a decla¬
ration of war, what is the alternative? Apart from going on with an un¬
declared war, which is so likely to lead to ultimate disaster, the alternative
must be UNO.

I think that India should show some patience with UNO, for after all
it is the first time humanity has got together to try and find an alternative
to war. All my discussions here have convinced me that it was not malice,
power politics or any sinister motive which brought about the unsatisfactory
treatment of our case. I admit that they took a long while to send the Dele¬
gation; that they failed to deal with India’s complaint against Pakistan as
you would have wished them to, and that things have dragged on inter¬
minably; but now you have the Delegation with you, and now is your opportu¬
nity to bring all possible legitimate pressure to bear to make them under¬
stand your position. I know that you, unfortunately, did not share my view
that the last resolution of UNO was not unfavourable for India, but if you
will look at it again, I think you will find that if UNO were to implement
it, it can provide a reasonable solution for India. Certainly an infinitely better
solution than plunging all the rest of India into the consequences of war.

If UNO, as Krishna [Menon] seems to think likely, order a cease-fire,

with all the forces in their present positions, you might feel that this was
giving an unfair advantage to Pakistan. But is it? If there are enough compe¬
tent and honest observers, they can prevent the forward movement of troops
and ammunition, and they can prevent any form of consolidation by Pakistan,
or at least report any infringement which would finally put Pakistan out of
court before UNO and the world.
The only satisfactory conclusion that I can see would be for UNO
to condemn Pakistan publicly for sending their army into Kashmir on the
ground that this is Indian territory. I do not myself see how such a con¬
demnation could precede the acceptance of the order to cease fire. As I said
just now, the act of complying with the cease-fire order could in no way preju¬
dice India’s military position, as your military advisers will tell you, but the
condemnation of Pakistan by UNO which can then follow would be the
justification of the policy which you have pursued from January and the
beginning of peace in Kashmir. In effect this would enormously strengthen youf
position with your followers, and public opinion would certainly establish
India’s rightful position in the world.
For God’s sake don’t get yourself plunged in ‘war’ however great the
internal pressure, for once in you cannot get out of the consequences.
 178
New Delhi
6 September 1948

Dear Mr. Shankar,

Kindly refer to my last letter dated 17 August 1948. The
position regarding the case of my brother, Pt. Ramchandra Kak,
is that
(a) the court has disallowed re-cross-examination of important

prosecution witnesses;
(b) the court has refused to summon important defence witnesses;

(c) the court insists on arguing the case without giving facilities

to complete the evidence;

(d) the revision applications for framing of the charge has been
rejected by the Sessions Judge and similarly others without any legal justi¬

fication to do so;
(e) the prosecutor has not been able to produce, on being asked
to do so, any proper authority conducting legal proceedings against

Pt. R. G. Kak;
(f) the whole trial so far has been carried on in an unfair way,
evidently with malicious intentions to convict my brother as soon as possi¬
ble, not only with a view to satisfy the sense of their revengefulness but
also to tarnish the unblemished name and character of my brother.

I shall be grateful if you will very kindly place these facts

before Hon’ble Sardar Patel. He has been sympathetic and kind
to us all through. I would request you that you may very kindly
place before him the following submissions on my behalf.
1. That even if the trial has to be proceeded with, the proceed¬
ings may kindly be stayed pending appointment of an impartial judge
from India to conduct the trial. His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur
can do that very easily under law prevailing in Kashmir or the Govern¬
ment of Kashmir can appoint any outsider to try this case.

2. In the alternative the file can be got examined by any judge

in India or the Law Department of the Government of India. Our
claim is that such opinion will substantiate that

(a) the trial is illegal; (b) the trial is unfair and (c) that the pro¬
secution evidence does not justify the framing of charges, much less

223
224 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

conviction. If impartial legal opinion is in any way contrary, my

brother is prepared to accept the guilt and receive conviction with¬
out any further defence and appeal.

I may mention here that I met Sheikh Abdullah on 22 August

and while relating to him how the trial was conducted in an° il¬
legal and shabby way, he said let the file be seen by any judge
in the Indian Union and he will abide by [his] opinion. He
further said that the Government of India could call for the file
and refer [it to] any judge here for his opinion. So I feel he will
have no objection in the procedure suggested above.
I may submit that arguments are starting on the 11th instant,
five days hence, and the case will thus be ready for judgment next
week, though, as briefly stated above, the whole trial has been il¬
legal and unfair. In these circumstances we have no hope of just-
tice unless a definite directive regarding one of the suggestions
above is issued by the States Ministry before that date.
I have fervent hope that with the sympathy and kindness
Hon’ble Sardar Patel has shown towards my brother, he will kindly
issue urgent instructions before it is too late, and see that justice
is meted out to Mfi. Kak and he is not convicted only because the
present administration in Kashmir chooses to do so out of revenge
and vindictiveness.
I may further submit that my brother through his defence
counsel has in a confidential cover sent to me a revised copy of the
statement which he may have to submit if necessary in his defence
before the arguments start on the 11th instant. The statement has
been revised according to the instruction conveyed to me by you
on 3 August 1948. If you so desire, I shall submit the revised
copy for any further instructions Hon’ble Sardar Patel may have
to give. All the instructions will be strictly adhered to. In this con¬
nection I will come at any time you desire me to come.
I shall be very obliged to you if you will kindly thank Hon’ble
Sardar Patel on my and on behalf of my brothers and the whole
family for his kindness and sympathy towards us.
Praying for his long life,
I am,
Yours sincerely,
P. N. Kak
hankar Esq., ics
 179

New Delhi
10 September 1948
Dear Mr. Kak,
Thank you for your letter of 6 September 1948, which I have
placed before Sardar Patel.
Sardar Patel feels that there is nothing he can do in the mat¬
ter. You would appreciate that His Highness the Maharaja
Bahadur cannot act except on the advice of his Ministry. In
view of the correspondence between Sardar and Sheikh Sahib,
it is most unlikely that the Ministry would be inclined to inter¬
fere with the course of justice.

Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar
P. N. Kak Esq.
New Delhi

180

Imperial Hotel
New Delhi
9 September 1948
My dear Sardar Patelji,
It is usual in the State to fire gun salutes on the following days:
1. Baisakhi
2. Janam Ashtami
3. My birthday
4. Dussehra
5. Basant Panchmi
6. Yuvraj’s birthday
7. Ram Naumi
8. Departures and arrivals of myself and Her Highness
There was no difficulty about this when the control of the
Army was with me, but now as the control has been transferred

225
S.C.-15
226 sardar patei.’s correspondence

to the Indian Army for the duration of hostilities I should be

grateful if you will very kindly issue instructions to the autho¬
rities concerned to fire the gun salutes on the above-mentioned
days in accordance with such programmes as may be intimated
to them.
My birthday is on 27 Sept. Therefore early instructions may
very kindly be issued.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

181
New Delhi
24 September 1948

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Please refer to your letter dated 9 September 1948 addressed
to Sardar Patel regarding the firing of gun salutes on certain days.
Instructions have now been issued to the Western Command
that this should be continued on the days mentioned in Your
Highness’ letter.
Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar

Maharaja Sir Hari Singh

Jammu

182
The Palace
Jammu-Tawi
5 October 1948

My dear Shankarji,
Many thanks for your letter of 24 September.
I am grateful for the prompt action taken on the requests
contained in my letter to Sardar Patel. I have also written to
General Cariappa thanking him for his ofTer of help.
The question of the transport of widows and orphans from
Jammu to Udhampur has, I am glad to say, ceased to be of
immediate importance.
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’

I appreciate the suggestion that I can be of greater assis¬

tance in the event of a sudden emergency in Jammu if 1 am
attached to the Tactical HQ. in J & K instead of being attached
to the Jammu Division. In fact there was no Corps Commander
in J & K when I expressed a desire to be attached to the Jammu
Division.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

183
New Delhi
30 September 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
I was surprised to read this morning an account of the Press
conference which Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah is reported to have
held here yesterday. He said he would be seeing me today and
I was waiting for him, but since he did not turn up, I am writ¬
ing to you as well as to him about it.
It is rather odd that he should have found the venue of a
Press conference to ventilate his alleged grievance against the
Maharaja. No one should know better than he that the Maha¬
raja is not in a position to resist the demands of the popular
Ministry. We, the Maharaja and Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah
himself came to a settlement last March. That settlement has not
only been faithfully adhered to by the Maharaja but, in certain
respects, he has acquiesced in departures from that settlement to
the advantage of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and his Ministry.
[I] refer in particular to the position regarding the reserved
subjects of which the jagirdars form one. I am not aware of any
single instance—at least Sheikh Sahib has not brought it to my
notice—in which the Maharaja has obstructed or resisted any of
the popular reforms. As a constitutional head, he may have asked
for reconsideration in one or two matters, but this could hardly be
treated as the subject of a grievance. It is undignified and consti¬
tutionally improper for a Prime Minister to attack the constitu¬
tional head of his administration, knowing full well that the
latter is not in a position to defend himself or to retaliate. On
top of it, to insinuate that he is trying to retain power, or that
he has strong friends in India or that he could buy friends is,
in my opinion, to say the least, most unfortunate.
228 sardar patel’s correspondence

Sheikh Sahib has also referred to certain people in India who

believe in surrendering Kashmir to Pakistan. I should like to be
enlightened who they are. As far as my information goes, there
are many more oi such people in Jammu and Kashmir State than
in the whole of India put together.
Sheikh Sahib also refers to the Hindu fanaticism of the East
Punjab. I his again is a generalisation which, I hope, Sheikh
Sahib in calmer moments will regret. It certainly is a most un¬
fortunate attack on a neighbouring province of the Dominion to
which his State has acceded.
I hope Sheikh Sahib realises that nobody has been more
accommodating to him than the Government of India and none
has extended to him greater understanding and sympathy in his
struggle than the people of India. In spite of the fact that he
has departed Irom an accepted position from time to time, we have
tried our best to put pressure on the Maharaja and make him
concede the position which he has taken up. I thought that,
having made the Maharaja accept the position regarding the
Army, he would now accommodate himself to the Maharaja and
would not at least carry controversy in public. He has, however,
thought it fit to do so, without having any regard for the fact
that he is, after all, constitutionally the Maharaja’s Prime Minister.
I think it would be difficult to find a parallel in constitutional
history to the sort of attack which he has made on the Maharaja.
I hope you will succeed in impressing upon him the mistake he
has made. We shall have gained something if at least it is not
repeated. I thought I would let you have my reactions so that
if an opportunity arises you might speak to him some time. I
am sending herewith a copy of my letter to Sheikh Sahib.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

New Delhi
30 September 1918

My dear Sheikh Sahib,

I have seen a report of your yesterday’s Press conference which has ap¬
peared in today’s Statesman. You made no reference to it when you saw me
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’

yesterday nor did you give me any indication that you were going to deal
with certain controversial matters with which we, in the States Ministry, are un¬
doubtedly concerned. Indeed, in respect of some matters we are seized already.
I thought, as you told me yesterday, you would be coming to see me, but

since you did not come, I am writing this to you.

I had hoped that with the Army question now out of the way and
with practically no resistance or obstruction from the Maharaja m regard to
the many schemes of reforms which you have introduced and are introducing,
you would now accommodate yourself to your new constitutional relationship
with him. I had never imagined that you would ventilate your grievance in
public and I had thought that at least in fairness to ourselves and, having
regard to the agreed arrangements between ourselves, if you had any grie¬
vance, you would first come to the States Ministry and seek a satisfactory solu¬
tion through our medium. In fact, so far whenever you have had any difficulty
we have not hesitated to put pressure on the Maharaja to accept a position,
even though in certain matters it went against the arrangements agreed to last

March.

No one knows better than you that today the Maharaja is powerless to
resist your wishes. Even if he feels inclined differently, on merits he has to
endorse your wishes if you pressed them. It is within my knowledge that he
has deferred to your wishes in matters which concerned him intimately such
as allowances to the family of the Raja of Poonch or to the handing over of
guest houses or in regard to tenancy reforms. I am, therefore, unable to com¬
prehend your reference to his trying to retain power.

I am also rather mystified at your reference to his having strong friends in

India, or his being in a position to buy friends. During the three or four weeks
that he was in Delhi he was quite inaccessible to interviewers and to the Press
because he felt that, constitutionally, it was improper for him to deal in public
with any matters affecting his State. If you have any particular information
about these strong friends, I would be glad if you could communicate it to
me. You have also referred to certain people who believe in surrendering
Kashmir to Pakistan. I should like to be enlightened on this point as well.
You will agree that we should know who these traitors are. You have also
referred to the Muslim fanaticism of Pakistan and the Hindu fanaticism of
East Punjab. As far as I know none of the Hindus or even Sikhs of East Punjab
would like Kashmir to go to Pakistan. There has undoubtedly been some dis¬
satisfaction in India with certain measures which have been put into force, but
such dissatisfaction is by no means so general as to justify your dubbing a
whole province as having succumbed to any kind of fanaticism, particularly
when that province happens to be your neighbour and one whose goodwill and
assistance would be of some help to you. You have also referred to the view
that we deserted the Frontier.” This is probably a criticism of our attitude to
230 sardar patel’s correspondence

the referendum in the Frontier. Jawaharlal would know best how to deal with
this criticism of yours which, I can only say, is based on complete ignorance
of facts. I don’t blame you for it because you were in jail at the time.

I hope you will not mind my speaking to you frankly about your inter¬
view because I do feel that now when we are engaged in a common struggle
against a foreign foe this sort of interview or thinking aloud does no one any
good. On the other hand, it merely gives a loophole to our enemies to harp
on dissensions and dissatisfactions and to pick out phrases here and there
which could be magnified into more serious proportions on which a great
deal of hostile propaganda can be built. It is much better our trying to solve
our difficulties round a table in an atmosphere of friendliness and cordiality
than to try to discuss them in public in an attempt to collect popular support
for it. You know very well that our relations are such that any propaganda or
publicity for your views in India is unnecessary. You also know that whenever
you have had any difficulties we have tried our best to help you to overcome
them and have mostly succeeded. Either the difficulties which you experience
in India are formidable or they are not. If they are formidable, we have the
right to be told what they are before you take the public into confidence.
If they are not, they are hardly worthy of public notice.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Y’allabhbhai Patel

Hon’ble Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah

C/o The Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

184
New Delhi,
1 October 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,
I wonder if you have seen the report of Sheikh Abdullah’s
Press conference which appeared in yesterday’s Statesman. If
you have not, I shall be glad if you will kindly see and let me
have your reactions to it. I myself feel bitterly that, after all
that we have done for him and the sympathy and understanding
which we have extended to him, he should have indulged in such
direct and unbecoming attacks on the Maharaja who, he knew,
would be unable to hit back and who has, to the best of my
information, done nothing to obstruct or to resist the many
reforms which he is reported to be introducing in the State
 231
ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’

administration and should also have made unwarranted

about ‘his strong friends’ in Delhi, about lus beingabl® °
friends,’ about ‘Hindu fanaticism of East Punjab etc A
Jd
settled the Army question on the basis to which he had agreed^
I thought that the controversy between him and < J
would end, at least in so far as its serious aspects were concerned.
But it seems that he gets a position of vantage niere|y to fight
for another and his latest attempt is intended to mobilise pub i
opinion in India. I have myself written to him separately, but
I thought it would help me if you could let me know how you
feel about it. __ *
Yours sincerely,

The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

New Delhi

185
5 Queen Victoria Road
New Delhi
2 October 1948

My dear Sardarji,
I have received your letter of the 1st, regarding the Pi ess
conference which Sheikh Abdullah addressed on 29 September.
Before I saw an account of it in the newspapers, I had been told
orally by persons who had been present there of a good deal
that he had said but had not appeared in the newspapers. What
was not reported in the papers, I gathered, was even more un¬
justifiable than what did appear.
Sheikh Abdullah came to see me the next morning and I
asked him myself whether he had not said worse things than what
had been reported. He replied that there were some things
which he had said, but which had not been reported, but they
were not worse, in his opinion, than what had been reported.
I told him that he might have avoided certain things which
some of the audience he addressed might have welcomed, but
which obviously in the circumstances it was unwise for him to
have given expression to. I added that I had one consolation in
reading that morning’s newspapers, for they reported that Begum
Abdullah1 had publicly committed herself to the proposition that

1 Sheikh Abdullah’s wife

232 sardar Patel’s correspondence

Kashmir should permanently accede to India and that any other

course would be ruinous to that State. I reminded him that, as
he himself knew, the general opinion was that Begum Abdullah
was actively pro-Pakistani and I therefore welcomed a statement
ol that soit horn her. It was strange, I added, that this piece of
news was obscured by his own Press conference which was dis¬
played under bold headlines. I do not think I need say any¬
thing more as to my reactions to Sheikh Abdullah’s part in that
Press conference.
Yours sincerely,
Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

186
New Delhi
3 October 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
In continuation of my letter of 30 September regarding
Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s Press conference, I send herewith
a copy of the letter which I have received from Gopalaswami,
whom I had invited to give his reactions on the report [See 185].
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

187
New Delhi
4 October 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Thank you for your letter of 3 October about Sheikh
Abdullah’s Press conference. I did not reply to your previous
letter as I was leaving for Kashmir. I entirely agree with you
that some of the statements that Sheikh Abdullah made in regard
to the Maharaja were very indiscreet and should not have been
made.
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’
233

In Srinagar I had a long talk with Sheikh Abdullah and

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad about a large number of matters,
more specially the whole background of our approach to these
problems. I hope this did some good. Sheikh Abdullah is, I
am convinced, a very straight and frank man. He is not a very
clear thinker and he goes astray in his speech as many of our
politicians do. He is of course obsessed with the idea of meet¬
ing the challenge of Pakistan and keeping his own people from
being influenced by Pakistan’s propaganda. I made it clear to
him that while I entirely agree with this, the approach should
be different.
Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

188
Srinagar
7 October 1948
My dear Sardarji,
I thank you for your d.o.1 dated 30 September 1948.
1. While I fully appreciate your anxiety to seek clarification on
certain aspects of my address to the Press conference referred to
in your d.o., I may hasten to assure you that there was in my
mind absolutely no idea of withholding my views from you or
bypassing the States Ministry. When I met you, the talk chiefly
centred on affairs connected with the UN Commission and my
attention was wholly taken up with them. I was myself very
keen to discuss other matters also with you and it was therefore
that I asked for another interview with you the next day. On
the day following I expected to get some notice from your
Secretary as to the time that would be convenient to you to meet
me at your residence. I got no initimation and concluded that
owing perhaps to pressing engagements and also your indifferent
health it was not possible to spare time for another meeting.
2. I am sony to have to say that my stand upon the various
points dealt with by me in the Press conference has been, in a
great measure, misunderstood and there has been little apprecia¬
tion of the peculiar position in which I and my colleagues are
placed in the present critical situation in the State. I shall try
1 Demi-official letter
234 sardar patel’s correspondence

to give here as full a picture of the present state of affairs here

as possible, particularly in its relation to the points raised in
your d.o.
3. It will not be quite the whole truth to say that the question
ot the administration of the Army has been settled. Even such
settlement as has been arrived at, which took full six months to
materialise, has not so far been implemented in its entirety. With
the taking over of the State forces by the Indian Government
it was agreed that steps would be taken to reorganise and rebuild
our Army so that when the present emergency is over and the
Indian Forces are withdrawn, the State will be left with a pro¬
perly organised army of its own to fall back upon. This
request was made as early as March last and has been repeated
several times since. During my discussion of the matter with
Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Mr. [V.P.] Menon at New
Delhi on 20 and 21 June last it was agreed between us that an
Indian Army officer will be appointed to reorganize the State
forces. Nothing, however, has been done in that direction so far
to my knowledge.
4. It need not be reiterated here that the J & K Army has virtually
been a close preserve of a very small coterie of the favourites of the
ruling family, namely, the Hindu Rajputs. All other classes and
communities of people inhabiting the country have been eliminated
for this purpose. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that
the Army has not been able to inspire any confidence in the
people of the country either as a fighting force against outside
aggression or as a protective arm within. In fact, the Army ques¬
tion has been the main grievance of all the various communities
of the State and there has been persistent agitation against its
class composition. It was after a careful consideration of the
whole matter that I had urged a complete transfer of the Army
administration to a popular Minister of my Cabinet. Io my
mind that alone was the real and effective solution of this thorny
problem. To my great regret this was not agreed to and it was
only a compromise that I accepted the transfer of the State forces
to the Government of India on the condition that the forces will
be soon reorganised on a broader and more liberal basis. As I
have stated above, even this compromise decision has not been
implemented and it is therefore futile to say that the Army ques¬
tion is solved and is “out of the way.”
5. I am astonished to have it from you that there is practically
no restriction or obstruction from the Maharaja in regard to the
 ABDULLAH A *LAW UNTO HIMSELF
235

many schemes of reforms” which I have introduced or am intro¬

ducing Nor did I expect from you the remark that today the
Maharaja is powerless” and that he has shown deference to my
wishes in matters “such as allowances to the Raja of Poonch or to
the handing over of guest houses or in regard to tenancy re¬
forms.” Nothing is indeed farther from the facts than the com¬
placency contained in this assertion and I may be pardoned if I
have to say that it has really grieved me to know that the States
Ministry should be so ignorant of the real position.
Just a few instances will illustrate my meaning. As early as
April last my Cabinet formed the resolution that rakhs
[government land used as common pasture] and military farms
should be handed over to the “Grow More Food Department”
to be utilised for cultivation of the much needed foodgrains. This
was with a view to relieve, in some measure, the virtual famine
conditions prevailing in the State. You cannot be unaware of the
fact that we had to import large quantities of foodstuffs from
India at a price nearly five times more than that prevailing in the
State. This has obviously involved us in huge financial commit¬
ments. And it should not be lost sight of that the Kashmir
Valley faced a series of serious crop disasters, owing to repeated
floods. In spite, however, of the dire necessity to find space
where we could grow our own food, His Highness’ Military
Farms Department did not transfer the rakhs and farms nor has
he to this day confirmed our resolution. It would not be difficult
to imagine that our food difficulties in the forthcoming year will
be considerably enhanced by this attitude of non possumus.
The Cabinet recommendation regarding resumption of jagirs
and mukarraries has not been confirmed by His Highness even
though several months have passed since the case was submitted
to him. This matter was subsequently referred to the States
Ministry of the Government of India, but in spite of certain
agreements arrived at in our discussion at New Delhi on 20
and 21 June last no orders have so far been communicated.
With regard to our new tenancy reforms, a new Bill was
submitted to His Highness some time ago. He wanted some
elucidations which were supplied by me immediately. His assent
to this measure, however, has not been received so far and I am
really at a loss to know on what basis you say that he has agreed
to our tenancy reforms.
The matter of allowances to the family of the Raja of Poonch
is in the same situation. Excepting the allowance to the Raja
236 sardar patel’s correspondence

himself, the case of the other members [of his family] is still hang¬
ing fire. 6

The Kashmir Alienation of Land Act—a matter of great

importance locally—was to expire on the 2nd of October. We
sent a draft ordinance to His Highness by the middle of September
proposing prohibition of alienation for a period of six months to
enable us to examine the whole question and prepare suitable
legislation. His Highness has not given his assent to this ordi¬
nance also and the existing law of alienation has now expired.
I do not desire to trouble you with other instances of a glaring
nature in which co-operation has been withheld from us or even
obstructions placed in our way. I would earnestly request you to
consider the position to see for yourself if the Maharaja is really
“powerless.”

6. I have done my utmost during the past 7 months to explain

the whole position to you and to Panditji. It will be recalled
that in June last in one of my communications to you in
reply to certain queries made by you I dealt at length with the
position of the Maharaja and the feeling that the public here
entertains for him. I regret that in spite of my repeated attempts
in this behalf the sentiments of the people of this State with
regard to the unmistakable part which the Maharaja and his
satellites took in the general massacre of Muslims at Jammu are
but insufficiently appreciated. Even at the risk of adding to the
volume of this letter I would reproduce here some portions from
my note of 1 June. I then said:
“I have made no secret of it so far and I repeat it that the Maharaja
has generally lost the confidence of the people of the State and Kashmiris
in particular entertain bitterness against him. The reasons for this are not
far to seek. In a moment of supreme crisis when Kashmir was actually
facing annihilation in October 1947 His Highness left the Kashmiris at
the mercy of raiders without giving a moment’s thought to the question
of protection of their lives. At that moment a fairly large portion of the
State had fallen into the hands of the enemy and thousands of men,
women and children of his “beloved subjects” were being butchered
every day. In this testing hour his only anxiety was to collect his be¬
longings, commandeer transport and bolt ofT stealthily with his kith and
kin and a few chosen favourites. The Indian Army had not yet arrived
and he was then feeling that Kashmir had gone out of his hands and he
had better run away with his own life. He did not thus throw [to the
enemyl only his Muslim subjects . . . about whom, it was patent, he
never had any soft corner, but he completely betrayed the Kashmir people
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’ 237

as a whole. The rude shock it gave the people can better be imagined
than described. And what happened in Jammu after his arrival there is
an unutterable tale. As early as December 1947 I referred to this in some
detail in my communications to Panditji and Gandhiji. As he moved
down from the tunnel [on the road from Srinagar to Jammu], there was
enacted in every village and town through which he passed an orgy ol
arson and loot and murder of Muslims. In Jammu, the killing of Muslims
all over the province continued unabated for weeks under his very nose,
the town having been converted into a veritable hell. Innocent children
and girls were not spared and the display of sadism to which they were
subjected would render insignificant anything that happened on the two
sides of the divided Punjab in its hour of madness. All this staggering
tragedy on such a vast scale is alleged to have been accomplished by
the participation of high-ranking Hindu officials and Dogra military in
Jainmu as well as His Highness’ own trusted relations and his then Prime
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. A widespread belief, certainly
not without basis, was that the killing was carried on in pursuance of an
organised plan of genocide under which free distribution of arms and
ammunition was made to communalist organisations like RSS through
Hindu officials, high and low. Thousands of Muslims besieged in the
town of Jammu were asked to march in convoys to death under the
very escort of State forces who themselves actively participated in the
shooting and killing. This was done only at a distance of a few miles
from His Highness’ Palace. As against this I and every worker of the
National Conference in Kashmir Province at that moment of grave peril
were fighting the raiders and protecting the life and honour of the
microscopic minority here. The general belief that this large-scale
tragedy could not take place without active participation or connivance
of the authorities that mattered in Jammu receives support from these
facts. I made earnest appeals to His Highness then that the Rashtriya
Seva Sangh, whose creed was based on violence and which had executed
its plan of genocide far and wide, could be declared unlawful and
ruthlessly suppressed. He pointblank refused to do it. This is the
co-operation and support that I have been receiving from him and under
these circumstances I am expected to restore the people’s confidence in
him and carry the people with me in the successful prosecution of the
war that we are fighting. The sober-minded Gandhiji was so moved by
this tragedy that he several times in his prayer meetings referred to the
carnage perpetrated in Jammu. After inquiry through impartial agencies
he located the responsibility for this killing in unmistakable terms.”

And here the point of distinction must not be lost sight of

1 do not for a moment deny that our Hindu brethren have been
victims of regrettable slaughter, arson and loot in those parts of
238 sardar patei/s correspondence

the State which have been overrun by our enemies. Whereas

there this miserable carnage was perpetrated by the raiders with
whom we are fighting, in the State these unspeakable crimes on the
Muslims were committed by those who stood charged with the
duty of defending the people, i.e., the Dogra Army and the high
officials of the Maharaja’s Government. I rounded up by saying:

“I am therefore constrained to aver once again that the choice is

finally between the Maharaja and the people and if the choice is not
soon made, it might land us into very serious trouble both militarily and
politically. The only alternative is that His Highness should abdicate
in favour of his son and that there should be no reservations whatsoever
in the administration of various subjects under the Ministers. This is
my considered opinion after taking stock of the whole situation in the
last seven months. I have on a number of occasions apprised Panditji,
Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and other high-ranking officials of the
Government of India of this. Recently I had a frank talk about this
with Rajkumari Amrit Kaur. I am therefore giving here my considered,
decisive and final opinion in this behalf. It is now up to the States
Ministry and Panditji to decide how this object is to be achieved.”

This is the view to which I still adhere. On getting in¬

adequate response from the States Ministry in this matter and
thinking that they are perhaps right in not forcing this issue at
the present moment, I conceived the idea of starting an inquiry
into the happenings at Jammu with a view that the very fact
of my taking such a step would assuage in some measure the
outraged feelings of the people of the State. Indeed, I was al¬
ways of the opinion that if the Maharaja was innocent, it was
for him to institute an inquiry and even face a public trial to
defend his honour and set at rest the serious allegations made
against him. Instead of doing so the only course that he thought
fit to adopt was to withdraw himself in his own shell, snapping
all possibility of contact with the public, and engage himself in
torpedoing the Government below the waters. The enquiry was
instituted but had to be stopped at the pressure brought to bear
upon me that it would be inopportune and would adversely affect
other interests. I am still of the opinion that the baulking of this
matter in this fashion is to keep the public mind on the tenterhooks
and forefeit their wholehearted co-operation with my Government
in its attempt to rehabilitate the shaking structure of the State. I can¬
not refrain from reiterating that as long as something is not done
by way of an enquiry in this behalf, we shall continue to be
treading on slippery ground.
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’
239

7. Our economic programme is only too well known. It is my

firm conviction that it was our rigid adherence to that programme
that has saved us from the orgy of communalism during the last
crisis. That programme hits feudalism and lays the axe at the
root of vested interests. It was only to be expected that the
elements affected by that programme will try to resist it both from
inside and outside the State. It will be conceded that these
nefarious vested interests, so inimical to the larger welfare of the
poor people, are still stalking the land and have not been liqui¬
dated either in the State or in India. They have strong sympa¬
thisers both here and in India. Nor is it to be surprised at that
these vested interests would prefer Pakistan to India in the hope
that they can flourish there at least for the time being. I see
unmistakable signs that these vested interests have combined
and are engaged in an attempt to so manipulate the position that
Kashmir be surrendered to Pakistan. You may have recently
read an article in the Eastern Economist of 15 August under the
caption ‘Kashmir and Hyderabad’. On the Kashmir question
the suggestion is that a gift of a part of our territory should be
made to Pakistan. The article says that the prospects are very
dark and advocates a friendly settlement with the organisers of the
raiders because, according to the author, large areas in Kashmir
may opt for Pakistan. And I may quote yet another instance of a
similar nature. A certain Mr. A. M. Thakur writing in the
Times of India, Bombay, says, “As India’s right over Hyderabad
is unquestionable, so is Pakistan’s over Kashmir . . . the example
of the NWF Province is sufficient for our guidance. Let us not
be misled by wishful thoughts and mere hopes.”
I cannot imagine a more glaring example of creating a sense
of frustration than this. I had persons like this in view when I
said that there are people in India who are trying to bring about
a surrender of Kashmir to Pakistan. Is it wrong to conclude
that pseudo-journalists like Mr. Thakur mere play the piper [and]
the tune is called by someone else who pays?
8. The story of the communal disturbances of March and August
1947 and the misery of the millions of Hindu and Muslim refugees
in the two parts of the Punjab is still green. A large number of
these refugees passed through the State territory in their aweful
plight. These unfortunate victims repeated their tales of woe
and misery in the Province of Jammu, thus radiating bitterness
which is taking root, and what is happening in the East and
West Punjab today as a result of this bitterness is known to every¬
body. Whoever perpetrated these nefarious crimes, whether they
240 sardar patel’s correspondence

are °* ^lc onc or ^ie other part of the Punjab, are fanatics of
the worst type and we have to fight them wherever they arc.
My reference was to such elements and in my opinion it was
both opportune and necessary. We have, all of us, to hold
alolt Gandhiji’s banner of love and truth. It is only with this
noble ideal uppermost in our hearts that we can make India a
truly secular State.

9. Last of all you have made reference to the case of the NWF
Province. I did say that “we deserted the Frontier.” The facts
that we know are such that to my mind the Congress stand
vis-a-vis NWFP cannot be justified. Every province decided to
opt for either Dominion on the basis of the majority vote of her
legislature. Why was not this done in the case of the NWFP
and why was a decision taken on the basis of a referendum in
this case alone? Why did Congress agree to this discriminatory
treatment? Again, since West Punjab had opted for Pakistan
and the NWFP had no access left to India, why was not
Badshah Khan’s [Khan Abdul GhafTar Khan] demand for Azad
Pathanistan supported by Congress? I see no answer to these
questions and therefore I said that “we deserted the Frontier.”
10. This is the background of my Press conference. In this per¬
spective you will see that I said nothing which was new or was
not fully within your knowledge or that of the States Ministry.
I feel intensely on these matters. We are engaged in a life and
death struggle. This is not the time to mince matters. You
cannot expect me to watch unmistakable attempts to sabotage
us and remain quiet. To my mind a policy of laissez fairc
would not suit the temper of the time. You have yourself been
all your life a political worker among the masses and can easily
appreciate the difficult position in which I am placed. The
public have a right to know from me that power has now finally
passed into the hands of the people; that the subterfuge of
“reserved” and “non-reserved” subjects, the crippling encum¬
brances of the privy purse and royal family allowances and a host
of other unconscionable burdens doubling to breaking-point the
backs of the poor, starving, famine-stricken people are now lifted
for once and all and that I am in a position to deliver the goods.
That alone can give the lie direct to the Pakistan propaganda,
linking my name with all the misdeeds of the previous regime and
out to show that His Highness has parted with the shadow and
not the substance of power. We have to carry the people with us
and I have always appealed to you and the Government of India
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF’
241

to back us without stint and without reserve. Kashmir can be

saved only in this way, and this is the only way to vindicate the
noble ideals for which the war of Kashmir is being fought.
11. I would beg to be pardoned for this somewhat lengthy letter
which has [grown] out of proportion only because ol my anxiety
that there may be no misunderstanding in your mind and my
ever-present desire that my point of view may be fully appreciat¬
ed and its implications completely implemented.
Yours sincerely,

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

189
DRAFT1

My dear Sheikh Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of 7 October 1948 which was
received here on the 10th.
2. You seem to have misunderstood the point of my reference.
My grievance was and still remains that before apprising us of
your intention you sought a public forum for ventilating your
so-called grievances against the Maharaja and gave expression to
certain views which were bound to embarrass us. My impression
was that you would yourself come or ask for some time the next
day. Had I known that you expected me to fix a time, I would
have had it conveyed to you.
3. You seem to be in the peculiar position of having been
misunderstood, apart from many others, by all the three of us,
Jawaharlal, Gopalaswami and myself. Jawaharlal has written to
me and I believe has spoken to you also, taking exception to your
attitude at the Press conference. Similarly Gopalaswami has done
the same and spoke to you the very next day. From his letter
to me it appears that even when he spoke to you the next day,
you did not appreciate the reasons why he considered the report
of your Press conference as particularly embarrassing. Your letter
seems to show that, even now, you do not appreciate the entire

1 The copy of the reply sent by Sardar Patel is not available. The draft
letter is produced here after ascertaining from Miss Maniben Patel that the reply
based on this draft was sent.

S. C.-16
242 sardar patel’s correspondence

position. I put several pointed questions in my letter. You have

avoided answering them and even where you have answered a
tew, it is a repetition of the old, old story. There is no disposition
on your part either to understand our point of view or to strike
a new line as demanded by the changed situation. I am quite
convinced that the grossly prejudiced view which you have taken
ot the matters referred to is not likely to mend matters; instead
it is likely to make them worse and more complicated.
4. \ ou take exception to my remark that the question of the
administration of the Army had been settled. Obviously, my re¬
mark i eferred to a settlement in so far as the outstanding point
between you and the Maharaja was concerned. The problem of
reorganisation remains and you can hardly expect us to produce
miracles in that line within the short period of three weeks that
the Army has been formally transferred to us; nor do you seem
to be aware ol the extent of our Army’s preoccupations with the
military operations. If you were, you would not have found fault
with them for failure to secure a reorganisation of these forces.
I also notice that both on this question and on other outstanding
matters you have scant appreciation of our difficulties and pre¬
occupations. Otherwise you could hardly have referred to delays
in these matters in the manner you have done.
5. It is surprising that you should charge us with ignorance of
the real position. The fact is that, while you see only one side
of the picture, we see both the sides, and that, while you are
content to regulate your conduct and your views according to that
one-sided appreciation of facts, we have to weigh matters on a
balance of both sides. You have omitted many matters in which
you have taken actions which were contrary to the arrangements
of last March and yet to which the Maharaja has taken no objec¬
tion and has made no opposition. In the case of the Ruler of
Poonch the Maharaja has already agreed to the reduction in the
allowances of the Raja of Poonch and has also agreed to the non¬
payment of any allowance to two or three relations of the Raja.
It is only in 2 or 3 cases that he has asked you to reconsider
the matter in view of the fact that their circumstances are indigent
and they would be thrown on the streets. If this is obstruction,
I am afraid we shall have to define the word quite differently.
6. In regard to the tenancy reforms also, there has been no
obstruction, but if you feel that seeking clarification or consider¬
ing this important matter for some time with a view to placing
His Highness’ own views before the Cabinet for consideration is
 ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF
243

“obstruction,” I am afraid I am not prepared to agree. Apart

from this, you met no obstruction from him at least not that I
am aware of—in regard to earlier measures which you introduced
for the amelioration of the tenancy. The Cabinet recommendations
regarding resumption of jagirs and mukarraries cannot be held
against the Maharaja. The question was referred to the States
Ministry by the Maharaja. It was discussed with [V.P.] Menon
and Gopalaswami Ayyangar in July, but unfortunately it has not
been possible to finalise the views of the States Ministry because
obviously it has certain all-India considerations from which you
may be immune but [by] which we are bound.

7. You seem to doubt my statement that the Maharaja is power¬

less. Nothing is more symptomatic of his being powerless than
the fact that his Prime Minister can openly make repeated
charges against him; yet he cannot reply. Apart from this, I
am sure you will not be able to recall a single instance, within
your own sphere, in which the Maharaja has, in any way, inter¬
fered or has gone against your wishes. As a constitutional head,
he is entitled to advise and warn you but if you insist, he has to
submit to it. As far as I am aware, so far he has complied with
these requirements.

8. You have again harped upon incidents which, I thought, you

had discreetly avoided persisting in, viz., the allegations against
His Highness about atrocities. You do not seem to realise that
both you and we ourselves owe the technical correctness of our
position in regard to Kashmir to the Maharaja’s signing the
Accession and his calling upon you to form the Ministry. Without
that, neither we nor you would have been where we are. It is
possible he might not be there too but that does not affect the
issue. In one’s political life or career, one has to face allegations
of many kinds from one side or the other. If an open enquiry
were the only means of settling these allegations, one’s lifetime would
be spent in facing enquiries and answering charges or counter¬
charges which would at worst be found either without any foun¬
dation or with a small sub-stratum of truth. You have charged the
Maharaja with withdrawing into his shell and snapping all possi¬
bility of contact with the people. What else could he do if
every time he came out he has to face rumours and allegations
that he was intriguing against his own Government. We have
throughout succeeded in securing from the Maharaja almost
everything that you wanted. Even the arrangements embodied in
the proclamation and correspondence of March last were secured
244 sardar patel’s correspondence

by us in order to help you on your political front. You accepted

those ai i angements. We thought that those arrangements would
at least make you reconcile yourself to the constitutional posi¬
tion of the Maharaja. The Army was the only question that
remained potentially a bone of contention. For reasons which we
have explained to you several times, but which you do not seem
to appreciate, a decision was delayed. But finally a decision
which was ultimately accepted by you was taken. Wc again
thought that this would keep matters quiet; but within less than a
month we find you again expressing your discontent, not to us,
as would have been correct, but openly in public, knowing full
well that neither the Maharaja nor we were really in a position
to enter the arena of controversy.

9. I am surprised that a political leader of your experience should

have attached so much importance to an infinitesimal section of
the people in your State or here and to the article in the Eastern
Economist or the contribution in the Times of India as to prompt
you to make such sweeping and general remarks to which I had
called pointed attention in my previous letter. I am also surpris¬
ed that you should have been compelled to recall events, and parti¬
cipants in these events, of March to August 1947 to add some
interest to your Press conference. It is patent and well known
that the elements which indulged in those disturbances are very
much weaker today than a year ago. There was hardly any
occasion for you or for us to dig them out from comparative in¬
significance.

10. As regards the NWFP, I am afraid you are completely

ignorant of what took place and what the reasons were for our
agreeing to a referendum in the NWFP. Before rushing to the
Press with your views based on such ignorance, I wish you had
discussed this matter with Jawaharlal or myself. I am also surprised
that you should refer to the “subterfuge” of “reserved” and
“noil-reserved” subjects. Unfortunately, this distinction forms part
of the correspondence of March last and of the arrangements to
which you then agreed. If you had any objections . . . you should
have pushed those objections to a logical conclusion then instead
of making a grievance ol them now. Nor do you seem to appreciate
that any persistent harping on the so-called deeds ol omission and
commission of the past regimes” merely gives the Pakistan propa¬
gandists further material for calling the activities of the Azad
Kashmir Govt, as aimed at Dogra tyranny and to that extent
supplying them with a justification for their existence and for their
 ? o 4-S
ABDULLAH A ‘LAW UNTO HIMSELF

claims to sympathy from abroad. I am also surprised that you who

had a different attitude towards H.H. when you were m jat. as
is typified in your letter to him, a copy of which
should now speak in such terms of him.
11 I hope you will not misunderstand my frankness. I have
only tried to put before you that there .s another side to the pic¬
ture and that it would be well for you to bear in mind that other
side as well. In politics a one-track mind does not ul mate y
rain. It is only when we have the generosity to forgive and the vir-
tue to forget that we can achieve our objectives. Attacking one
who is not in a position to defend himself or repeatedly dwelling
upon the past which had better be buried is, in my judgment, un¬
likely ultimately to succeed. I would, therefore, once again appea
to you to change your mind in an effort to secure that balance anc
accommodation which are the essential requirements of the situa¬
tion in Kashmir today. I have every confidence that you will not
find His Highness wanting in reciprocity and that you will find that
that would also go a long way towards ensuring a really inte¬
grated and unified people in Jammu and Kashmir. You know
very well that we have nothing but friendship and co-operation for
you and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. My earnest endea¬
vour is to ensure that everything moves towards a happy conclu¬
sion, efficiently and smoothly, without a trace of bitterness fiom
the past or regrets in the future. I am quite convinced that until
you can see your way, as suggested by Jawaharlal, to a different
approach, such an object will not be achieved.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallahhbhai Patel

Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah

New Delhi
 190

New Delhi
13 October 1948
My dear Gopalaswami,
I am sending herewith a copy of the correspondence which
has passed between me and Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah on the
question of his Press conference.

Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon. Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
New Delhi

191
TELEGRAM

Srinagar
29 October 1948
Sardar Patel
Deputy Prime Minister
India

BEG1 INAUGURATING JAMMU AND KASHMIR UNIVERSITY SECOND

NOVEMBER. REGRET VERY SHORT NOTICE. WOULD BE GRATEFUL
FOR MESSAGE.

SHEIKH ABDULLAH

1 Afzal Beg, Member of Abdullah Ministry

246
 CHAPTER XV

KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH PREMIERS

192
CABLE

19 October 1948

Primindia London
Foreign New Delhi
FROM JAWAHARLAL NEHRU FOR GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR. SO

FAR NO TALKS ABOUT KASHMIR EXCEPTING THE VAGUE HOPES

EXPRESSED BY BRITISH MINISTERS IN FAVOUR OF SETTLEMENT. HAVE

NOT MET LIAQUAT ALI KHAN EXCEPTING AT CONFERENCE.

2. DURING LUNCH TODAY WITH BEVIN1 AND CRIPPS2, FORMER

BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF KASHMIR. NOEL BAKER WHO WAS ALSO

PRESENT TOOK UP HIS USUAL LINE OF SOMETHING BEING DONE WHICH

IS AGREEABLE TO BOTH PARTIES CONCERNED. I COMMENTED THAT I

WAS THOROUGHLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM

WITHOUT REGARD TO ETHICS OR DECENCY. WE HAD NO DOUBT

ACCEPTED IDEA OF PLEBISCITE BUT SUCH PLEBISCITE WOULD IN ANY

EVENT BE GREATLY DELAYED. MORAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM MUST

BE CONSIDERED AND WE WERE NOT GOING TO PUT UP WITH AGGRES¬

SION AND GANGSTERISM. PAKISTAN’S AGGRESSION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED

AND YET WE WERE BEING ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE

SOLUTION ON SOME VAGUE BASIS OF GENEROSITY. WE HAD ACCEPTED

COMMISSION’S CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION WHILE PAKISTAN HAD REJECTED

IT. THERE WAS NOTHING MORE TO BE DONE ON OUR SIDE IN THIS

RESPECT. BEVIN SAID HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE FACTS. HE

CAME INTO THIS BUSINESS BECAUSE MATTER WAS BEFORE THE SECURITY

COUNCIL AND HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SETTLEMENT. CRIPPS SAID

THAT PRIMARY EFFORT MUST BE TO GET PAKISTAN TO ACCEPT

U.N. commission’s RESOLUTION ON CEASEFIRE AND TRUCE. NOEL

BAKER SAID THAT SINCE COMMISSION WOULD SOON BE REPORTING

WE MIGHT AWAIT THEIR REPORT. FINALLY I WAS ASKED WHETHER

1 Ernest Bevin—Foreign Secretary in Attlee Government

2 Sir Stafford Gripps—-Chancellor of the Exchequer in Attlee Government

247
248 sardar patel’s correspondence

I COULD MEET LIAQUAT ALI KHAN. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT SEE
MUCH GOOD COMING OUT OF SUCH A MEETING. WHEN ASKED
WHETHER MEETING COULD DO ANY HARM I SAID PROBABLY NOT
AND I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO IT. IT IS PROBABLE THEREFORE
THAT MEETING MIGHT BE ARRANGED BETWEEN ATTLEE, BEVIN, LIA¬
QUAT ALI KHAN AND ME. I DO NOT EXPECT ANYTHING TO COME
OT THIS AND YOU NEED NOT POSTPONE ANY ACTION BECAUSE
OF IT. SUCH ACTION SHOULD BE JUDGED ENTIRELY BY LOCAL
CONSIDERATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES.

3. PLEASE PASS COPY TO SARDAR PATEL AND DEFENCE MINISTER.

193
CABLE

20 October 1948
Primindia London
Foreign New Delhi
FOR PAI1 FROM JAWAIIARLAL NEHRU. YOUR TELEGRAM TO BAJPAI
DATED 18 OCTOBER. HAVE ALREADY SENT TELEGRAM ABOUT
KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH POSITION. AM MEETING LIAQUAT
ALI KHAN TONIGHT AT DINNER WITH ATTLEE.

2. HYDERABAD ISSUE.

WE HAVE INFORMED SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WE CONSIDER THIS ISSUE

AS ENDED AND IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR OUR REPRESENTATIVE
to appear before it. [Sir Ramaswami] mudaliar will
THEREFORE SOON RETURN TO INDIA. PRESUMABLY MATTER IS STILL
FORMALLY ON SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA LIKE MANY OTHER
MATTERS WHICH HAVE CEASED TO HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANCE. WE
MAY TAKE FURTHER ACTION ABOUT THIS LATER.

3. COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE HAS DEALT WITH ECONOMIC

FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE MATTERS. ALSO MACHINERY FOR CON¬
SULTATION BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS. PLEASE PASS COPY
TO SARDAR PATEL AND GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR.

1 A. V. Pai, ICS, Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minuter

 194
EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO
SARDAR PATEL

Paris
27 October 1948
Both Hyderabad and Kashmir have troubled people a lot here
and in London. It is recognised, of course, that the Hyderabad
affair is over from the international point of view. It was very
fortunate that we could dispose of it rapidly. Otherwise reactions
would have been very much adverse to us as it is difficult to
explain everything and the simple fact of a large country attacking
a small one impressed people unfavourably. So far as Kashmir is
concerned, I think it is generally recognized that our case is a
good one; nevertheless this business of a plebiscite and the con¬
ditions governing it fills people’s minds. Of course people cannot
get rid of the idea that Kashmir is predominantly Muslim and
therefore likely to side with Muslim Pakistan. They say that if
it is agreed that there should be a plebiscite, why is there any
difficulty in having a ceasefire and truce? Liaquat Ali has laid
stress on one fact only, i.e. that the conditions of the plebiscite
should be fixed now and then he will gladly agree to the cease¬
fire, etc., in accordance with the UN Commission’s resolution.
He says those conditions should be according to the Security
Council’s resolution. I have made it clear that we cannot ac¬
cept this for obvious reasons. The next suggestion is to come to
some other agreement about the conditions. I do not think all
this will lead to anything at present at least. We cannot possibly
agree to any outside intervention in the Government of Kashmir.
I am mentioning all this to you just to keep you in touch
with the developments here. I might mention also that the posi-
taken.uP about Kashmir is either a full acceptance of
e Commission’s resolution on ceasefire, or a partition on
the lines we have previously talked about, i.e. Western Poonch
etc., Gilgit, Chitral, most of Baltistan, etc. to go to Pakistan. Neb
ther of these is acceptable to Liaquat Ali.
The whole point I should like to impress upon you and mv
colleagues is that the Kashmir affair as well as Hyderabad deve^
lopments are being very closely followed in other countries, though

249
250 sardar patel’s correspondence

they may not say much about them. They follow them in order
to judge of what India stands for and is going to be. We have
therefore to keep this fact in mind in regard to any steps that we
take in both these places.

195
CABLE

27 October 1948
Prime Minister India Paris
Foreign New Delhi

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU FOR PAI. PLEASE COMMUNICATE FOLLOWING

TO SARDAR PATEL, DEFENCE MINISTER AND GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR.
begins: have discussed kashmir situation with liaquat ali
KHAN, ATTLEE AND BEVIN JOINTLY AND SEPARATELY WITH ATTLEE,
BEVIN AND STAFFORD CRIPPS. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE YIELDED
NO RESULTS AND HAVE LEFT THINGS AS THEY WERE. I DO NOT
THINK ANYTHING ELSE CAN BE DONE HERE AT THIS STAGE. PROBABLY
REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON KASHMIR WILL COME
OUT SOON.

196
New Delhi
21 December 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,
The Pakistan Press has been full of comments on what you
are alleged to have said in Jaipur. I enclose one such comment.
I think something should be said to clear this up. Perhaps a part
of your speech can be published or some brief statement, which¬
ever you consider proper.
Yours,
Jawaharlal

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

 ENCLOSURE

PATEL SABOTAGING EFFORTS AT INTER-DOMINION AMITY

SHAHABUDDIN CONDEMNS JAIPUR STATEMENT
SARDAR CANNOT INTIMIDATE PAKISTAN
APPEAL TO PEACE-LOVERS TO WORK FOR GOODWILL

Karachi 18 Dec.: On his attention being drawn to the speech made at

Jaipur by the Deputy Prime Minister of India regarding refugee rehabilitation,
Khwaja Shahabuddin, Minister of the Interior in the Pakistan Government,
stated in an interview here today that Sardar Patel’s statement, coming as it
did immediately after the inter-dominion conference at Delhi, was particularly
unfortunate and could have no effect other than that of sabotaging the efforts of
those who only recently examined at Delhi, at such considerable length, the
problem of minorities in Pakistan and India, including that of the Hindu
minority in East Bengal.
Khwaja Shahabuddin, however, hoped that the lovers of peace in the two
dominions would not be discouraged by such utterances and would continue
to work for promoting goodwill between the two dominions and ironing out
mutual problems amicably. He added: “It would, however, be best for all
concerned if Sardar Patel realises that statesmen who work for peace and
goodwill do not employ the tone and the language used by him at Jaipur.
If he thought that by using such language he could intimidate Pakistan, he
was grievously mistaken.”
Referring to the minorities, Khwaja Shahabuddin stated that Sardar
Patel must be knowing full well that they were much better off in Pakistan than
in India and therefore Sardar Patel’s remarks that the minorities in East Bengal
must be assured that their lives would not be in danger in Pakistan, were un¬
called for. It was an incontrovertible fact that in Eastern Pakistan there was
no communal riot, but unfortunately in India several communal riots took place
in which a number of Muslims were killed.

As regards the reference made by the Deputy Prime Minister of India to

the exodus of Hindus from East Bengal, Khwaja Shahabuddin said that Sardar
Patel was fully aware that the extent of exodus and causes responsible for it
were quite different from what was being stated in a section of the Indian
Press.—API.

Pakistan Times
Lahore
20-12-48

251
 197

New Delhi
21 December 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter dated 21 December 1948. I have
separately sent you a monitored report of a broadcast on the
Azad Kashmir Radio. I have also referred in that letter to the
distorted and mischievous comments which the Pakistan Press has
made on my Gwalior speech. It seems to me that Pakistan
Press is determined to twist and distort anything that I say and
to exploit it for its own nefarious purpose. I do not think,
therefore, that any statement from me would be of any use.
2. However, I have separately sent to Gopalaswami an extract
of my speech which has been commented upon in the cutting en¬
closed by you and to which Ghulam Mohammad1 had referred
in his telephone message to Gopalaswami. Gopalaswami has sent
it to Ghulam Mohammad and has probably already issued it to
the Press. I think that should be adequate.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

198
New Delhi
21 December 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Thank you for your two letters of today’s date.
What a blood-thirsty extract from the Azad Kashmir Radio
you have sent me! I do not suppose it is any good sending this
to the Pakistan people because they will deny connection with
the Azad Kashmir Radio. Nevertheless I am sending it to Ghulam
Mohammad. (See enclosure).

I Finance Minister of Pakistan

252
 KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH PREMIERS

Pakistan Press and Radio appear almost beyond redemption.

Our own Press is certainly much better, but it does not appear to
be conducted by very intelligent people. The editors arc fairly
careful, but the sub-editors allow their pens to run away with
them and give sensational headings which are not justified ->y ie
context. Your own speech at Jaipur was reported fairly well, but
the headlines gave a completely wrong impression of what you
had said. Many people go by the headlines. You will have noticed
that the foreign Press people also went by these headlines and sent
messages accordingly to their papers abroad.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

ENCLOSURE

New Delhi
21 December 1948

My dear Ghulam Mohammad,

I notice that there has been a great deal of fuss about a speech Sardar
Patel delivered in Jaipur. Shahabuddin [Minister of Interior, Pakistan] has
issued a statement on it and the Pakistan papers have also had much to
say. I was very much surprised at this, as not only I but the people present
there at the time did not notice anything of the kind criticised in his speech.
Newspapers have a habit of giving sensational headlines which have no bearing
on the text of the speech. As a matter of fact Sardar Patel said something
the very opposite of what he is supposed to have said. Instead of using any
threats, he laid stress on a peaceful settlement of our problems with Pakistan.
I believe Gopalaswami Ayyangar has sent you a copy of the relevant extract
from his speech.

I do not wish to enter into a controversy about our respective Presses.

But I must say that the Pakistan Press, in referring to Sardar Patel as well
as others, uses the most intemperate and objectionable language. So does the
radio sometimes.

I understand that the Azad Kashmir Radio is under the control of the
Pakistan Government and is run by Pakistan officers. The enclosed extract
from the Azad Kashmir Radio programme is a specimen of the kind of stuff
 254 sardar patel’s correspondence

they broadcast. (See enclosure with Sardar’s letter to Pandit Nehru of 21

December 1948.)

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru
1 he Hon’ble Mr. Ghulam Mohammad
Finance Minister
Pakistan Government
Karachi

Copy to: The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

199

New Delhi
21 December 1948
My dear Jawaharlal,
\ ou will be interested in the attached monitored report
of a broadcast on the Azad Kashmir Radio. The Azad Kashmir
Government is under the control of the Pakistan Government. As
far as we are aware, their whole publicity is being conducted by
officers lent by the Pakistan Government. The Pakistan Press has
indulged in a similar vein, though in less strong language, in com¬
menting on my Gwalior speech in which I exhorted the audience
to treat loyal Muslims on the footing of brotherhood.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

EXTRACT FROM “AZAD KASHMIR” RADIO (TRARKHEL) KASHMIR

PROGRAMME 19.30 HRS. DATED 19 DECEMBER 1948
SARDAR PATEL EXPOSED

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel—the enemy of freedom and democracy, the

guardian of cold-blooded nationalists of India, the dictator of the Indian
National Congress, the hated enemy of democracy and freedom—his very
name evokes hatred for him in the hearts of the Muslims.
Speaking at the annual session of the Indian National Congress, Sardar
Patel declared: “We will not allow our Government to go communalist or
religious. Under our regime, every individual shall have equal opportunity
for self-advancement and progress.” Such words from the mouth of Sardar
 KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH PREMIERS
255

Vallabhbhai Patel sound strange. He is the guardian of communahsts, he is

the man who patronized the RSS, who tried to annihilate the followers of
Islam and who compelled nearly 7,000,000 Indian Muslims to leave for Pakis¬
tan. It was his communalist and factious outlook that led to the disintegra¬
tion of India. It is he who distributed arms amongst the Hindus and Sikhs
to massacre Muslims. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel is a savage and cold-blooded
human being. He has stated that the Indian Government is guided by princi¬
ples of equality. This “enemy of Islam and India” talks of equality in his
country, where the heads of lakhs of Muslims were treated like footballs and
where lakhs of Muslims were forcibly converted. Hindu capitalists are seen
enjoying, while the life of Muslims has been made impossible. In the cities and
villages of India, Muslims are being massacred. This is the condition of Mus¬
lims! In his attitude towards Pakistan, he has once again revealed his preju¬
diced mind and the spirit of vengeance. His lust for power has gone into
his head. He loves cruelty and oppression and is an avowed enemy of free¬
dom. His utterances are full of lies. He is a man who can never be trusted.
“Islam Zindabad.”1

200
Amar Mahal
Jammu-Tawi
10 January 1949
My dear Manibenji,
I have not been able to write to you earlier as I had been
much busy with the refugee relief work which got much accumu¬
lated due to my absence from Jammu in October-November.
Through the efforts of Sardarji I have been able to alleviate
the troubles of the refugees to a great extent and we are all so very
grateful to him.
Captain Kanwal Singh [ADC to the Maharaja] is coming to
Delhi for some discussions and as desired I am sending herewith a
recipe for preparing pickle which I hope you will find quite useful.
We are confident that Sardarji and you are keeping well.
Kindly convey kindest regards to him from both of us.
The Yuvraj is maintaining his progress and is now able to
walk with one cane. We hope that he will be back with us towards
the end of February perfectly well.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Tara Devi
1 Long live Islam.
 201
New Delhi
12 January 1949
My dear Maharani Saheba,
Thank you for your letter of 10 January 1949 and for the
recipe, which I shall try when I have some leisure. I am sure the
result would be satisfactory.
I am very glad to hear that you have been able to do such
good work for refugee relief and hope that it would be possible
for you to keep it up.
We are also pleased to hear about the satisfactory progress of
the Yuvraj. Shri Mehrchand Mahajan told us yesterday that he
hopes to come here by the end of February. I am sure you must
be looking forward to his return and to meeting him after such a
long time.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Maniben Patel
Her Highness the
Maharani Saheba of Jammu & Kashmir
Amar Mahal
Jammu-Tawi

202
Bardoli
17 January 1949

My dear Jawaharlal,
You must have seen Kripalani’s report from Karachi dated
15 January 1949. In that report he has referred to an extempore
poem recited by the Saudi Arabian Minister Plenipotentiary.
It appears that he called the Kashmir war a Jehad1 and drew a
very objectionable analogy between the fight in Kashmir and the
battle of Badr.2 I feel that this misbehaviour should be brought

1 Holy war
2 Holy war in Islamic history

256
 KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH PREMIERS
257

authorities through our Consul-

to the notice of the Saudi Arabian
General.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

203
New Delhi
21 January 1949

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Your letter of the 17 January about a certain poem which the
Saudi Arabian Minister recited in Karachi. We have no Consul-
General in Saudi Arabia. We have only a Consul at Jedda for
the pilgrims. His status is not high enough to take any such
action. We are, however, communicating with our Ambassador
in Cairo to register our protest with the Saudi Arabian Govern¬
ment through their Ambassador in Cairo. We are also asking our
High Commissioner in Karachi to inform the Saudi Arabian
Minister there of the action we are taking.
Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
c/o His Highness the Maharaja of Jamnagar
Jamnagar

204
New Delhi
3 February 1949
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I have spoken to you already about the necessity of our having
some first-class man here to look after Kashmir affairs, more
especially with the possibility of a plebiscite etc. Kashmir is a
highly intricate problem and we play for high stakes there. We
cannot afford to do this work in an inadequate and second-rate
manner. I have given a great deal of thought to this matter and
cannot think of a suitable person. I mentioned [B.K.] Gokhale1 to

1 Senior ICS officer

S.C.-17
 258 sardar patel’s correspondence

y°u. He is g°°d in his way, a solid conscientious, hard-working

individual, but not exactly the kind of man for this job. Any
way I am told he is ill and wants four months’ leave.
I was thinking if it was possible for H. M. Patel' to be relieved
ol Ins present work in the Defence Ministry and to undertake this
Kashmir business for the next few months. He would be
first-rate.

There are two other highly important matters which require

immediate attention. One is food. As we discussed this morning, we
must set up some high-powered authority to deal with this food
business. Again, the whole economic set-up requires, I think, a
closer day-to-day [review] in a variety of Ministries. For this also
H. M. Patel would be eminently suitable.
I should like you to consider this and we can talk about it
later.

Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

205
EXTRACT

New Delhi
4 February 1949
My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter dated 3 February 1949. I entirely
agree that the problems to which you refer require very careful
consideration. A separate secretariat set-up to look after Kashmir
afTairs, with particular reference to plebiscite and other relevant
matters, is absolutely necessary. We ourselves have been feeling
its necessity and have given some thought to it. I contemplate the
appointment of an Officer on Special Duty in the States Ministry
of the status of Secretary. He can be given suitable assistance in
the matter of his staff etc. for the discharge of his duties. But the
problem is of personnel. It would be a whole-time job and it will
not be possible to combine it with any other job. There is so
much dearth of really good officers. Whenever we have to think
of these things, it merely means a permutation or combination

1 Secretary, Defence Ministry

 KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH PREMIERS 259

amongst a handful of the officers available for important

appointments. Addition or supplementing from outside becomes a
baffling problem.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

206
New Delhi
17 February 1949
My dear Gopalaswami,
I am sending herewith a copy of a telegram which I have
received from Jammu regarding the arrest of some prominent non-
Muslims and another of a report of a visit to Jammu by two
Members of the Constituent Assembly. I presume the arrests are
in preparation for a plebiscite as also the agitation regarding the
abdication of the Maharaja. Jammu and Kashmir, however, seems
to be an independent State and the Government of India appear
to have abdicated their functions in advance of the abdication
of the Maharaja!
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
Minister of Transport and Railways
New Delhi

207
TELEGRAM

Jammu-Tawi
15 February 1949
Hon’ble Deputy Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

THE UNWARRANTED ARRESTS OF PANDIT PREMNATH DOGRA1 MLA

SHYAMLAL SHARMA THAKAR DHAWANTARSINGH MLA SHIVRAM GUPTA
SHIVNATH NANDA AND OTHERS HAVE CREATED ALARMING [situation]

1 Founder of Praja Parishad, a political organisation primarily of Hindus in

Jammu
i 1260 sardar patel’s correspondence

THROUGHOUT THE STATE. WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT BEING EXPRESSED

THROUGH HARTALS RESOLUTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIONS. PRAY
INTERVENE.

PRESIDENT, PRAJA PARIS HAD

208
New Delhi
25 March 1949
My dear Gopalaswami,
It appears from the latest report of our Deputy High Com¬
missioner in Lahore that refugees from Kashmir are stranded at
Lahore. They include a number of women and children without
any adult male member as also some composite families. It appears
that, in the absence of an inter-dominion agreement, it will not
be possible to evacuate them. I should like to suggest that we
might make an attempt to arrive at an agreement on this point
as quickly as possible so that we may try to rescue these people
from their present plight with the least possible delay.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

New Delhi

209
New Delhi
14 April 1949

My dear Gopalaswami,
You will be interested in the attached monitored version of
a broadcast from Azad Kashmir Radio on 11 April 1949. This
comes after the last inter-dominion conference on publicity and
information which was held in Karachi some time last month and
at which, I understand, a reference was made to previous ins¬
tances of such broadcasts.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

New Delhi
 enclosure

11/12 April 1949

Vallabhbhai Patel, the dictator of India, ... on whose account the life
of Muslims in India has been made impossible, whose existence is a great
danger to the Muslims, who knows nothing except how to . . • asked the
Muslims to ... so that they might sacrifice their lives, so that they might
render their children orphans, turn their homes into houses of mourning, find
place for themselves in graveyards and . . . have their hearts pierced through
by bullets, so that they might play their lives into the hands of foreign mas¬
ters. To have his regime established Patel was the first man to preach unity
among the people in the name of national strength. By taking recourse to
pretended hatred for . . . Patel fixed firmly the . . . of his regime. ... To
achieve his ends he made a dictator out of each one of the Congress leaders. . . .
He is not today the same Vallabhbhai Patel who gave promises of religious free¬
dom and prosperity to the people, nor do those promises of his survive any
longer. He is no longer a leader now, but a dictator, his are not appeals,
they are orders which have to be carried out, at whatever cost. . . . He expos¬
ed himself in true colours before the people. . . .
The leaders of the so-called responsible Congress said that after the Bri¬
tish quit India the country would be free in the true sense of the word, every¬
one would have the freedom to demand his rights; but the policy adopted by
the Government shows how far their promises were true. The recent proof
given in the Indian Parliament of political freedom in India indicates what
freedom is enjoyed by people in India under Vallabhbhai Patel. Patel disclosed
recently in the Indian Parliament that 4,000 Communists had been arrested
in Hyderabad. Vallabhbhai Patel should remember that by arresting 4,000
people. . . . [Talk headed ‘Exposition’ broadcast by “Azad Kashmir” Radio]

210
New Delhi
17 April 1949
My dear Vallabhbhai,
Two days ago, H. V. R. Iengar [Home Secretary] sent me a
copy of a report of one of our intelligence officers who had been
sent to Kashmir. This report was a very interesting and reveal¬
ing document. There was nothing very new in it, in the sense that
261
262 sardar patel’s correspondence

we did not know, but still it brought out certain important points.
sent this report to Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who will return it
to H. V. R. Iengar.
In this report, among other things, a reference was made to
a growing Hindu agitation in Jammu province for what is called
a zonal plebiscite. This idea is based on the belief that a plebiscite
for the whole of Kashmir is bound to be lost and therefore let
us save Jammu at least. You will perhaps remember that some
proposal of this kind was put forward by the Maharaja some
months back. It seems to me that this kind of propaganda is
very harmful indeed for us. Whatever may happen in the future,
I do not think Jammu province is running away from us. If we
want Jammu province by itself and are prepared to make a pre¬
sent of the rest of the State to Pakistan, I have no doubt we could
clinch the issue in a few days. The prize we are fighting for is the
valley of Kashmir.
This propaganda for a zonal plebiscite is going on in Jammu,
in Delhi and elsewhere. It is carried on by what is known as the
Jammu Praja Parishad. Our intelligence officer reported that
this Praja Parishad is financed by the Maharaja. Further, that the
large sums collected for the Dharmarth Fund1, which are control¬
led by the Maharaja, are being spent in propaganda for him. All
this is resulting in producing a most peculiar and unfortunate
situation.
We know that Sheikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues
have been very unwise in their public remarks and they have im¬
properly criticised the Maharaja and asked for his removal. I had
a long talk with Abdullah last night and again pointed out to him
very forcefully how unfortunate and wrong his attitude was in this
particular matter and how it was creating difficulties not only for
us but for himself. He repeated his old complaints, which inclu¬
ded the very facts that our intelligence officer has stated. He
promised that he would say nothing about the Maharaja in future,
but he was very unhappy about it.
This morning Cariappa came to see me. He has recently been
to Jammu and Kashmir and he gave me his report. He said that
this tussle between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah was
having a very bad effect not only in the State but in the Army. He
said that the Maharaja’s brother-in-law was openly carrying on
a campaign against Sheikh Abdullah and his Government and
issuing pamphlets of this kind. It was not for him to judge, he

1 Fund set aside (by Maharaja) for charitable purposes

 KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH PREMIERS

added, who was to blame in this matter, but the consequences

were bad. . .
The consequences are undoubtedly bad and I feel that it is
no longer safe for us to allow matters to drift. You will remem¬
ber that we discussed this matter fully some time ago in your
house. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and others were present. Ulti¬
mately we came to the conclusion that the proper course to adopt
was for us to take the attitude that it was for the people of Kashmir
in the Constituent Assembly to decide about the future of the
Maharaja. But even now it was highly desirable that the Maharaja
should take some kind of leave and not remain in Kashmir. It
was proposed to put this matter to the Maharaja and to ask him
to come to Delhi for the purpose. As he has not been here since
then, I suppose nothing has been done. Meanwhile, the situa¬
tion deteriorates and an open conflict is going on in the State
between the adherents of the Maharaja and the adherents of
Sheikh Abdullah.
This conflict gets mixed up with relief work, which is con¬
ducted on communal lines. In the intelligence report mention
was made of the Yuvraj getting mixed up with this business. This
will be unfortunate, as the Yuvraj is fairly popular at present. If
he gets tied up with these conflicts, he will also become unpopular.
The next two or three months are going to be rather critical
in regard to Kashmir and many possible developments may take
place. We have to be ready for all of them in so far as we can.
But that readiness for developments will be powerfully affected
by this growing and open conflict between the Maharaja and
Abdullah. I think that we should seize ourselves of this matter, in
the manner suggested previously, and take steps accordingly. As
I am going away day after tomorrow, I wanted to put this to you
so that you might consider it. I am rather anxious about it and
feel very much that something should be done.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Gopalaswami Ayyangar.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
 211
New Delhi
18 April 1949
My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter of 17 April 1949.
I think, as we all realise, the problem of the Maharaja and
Sheikh Sahib is bristling with difficulties and we cannot say that
only one side is to be blamed. As the report makes clear, Sheikh
Sahib’s administration has adversely affected so many interests
that it is impossible to lay the entire blame for the feeling of dis¬
content and restiveness on one individual. The report which the
intelligence officer has made contains more than one disquieting
feature. Of these, the problem of the Maharaja is one of the
most important, and I agree that it requires to be tackled urgent¬
ly. I am glad you have found the report interesting and revealing
and have passed it on to Gopalaswami Ayyangar. None of the
problems raised in that report is new, nor is the information given
anything exclusive. We have to tackle all of them in a short time
and the sooner we do it the better.
You seem to be under the impression that nothing has been
[done] to follow up the discussion we had last time about the
Maharaja. I have already sent three or four messages to him to
come here. About four or five days ago, his Assistant Private Secre¬
tary [Captain Kanwal Singh] was here. Shankar impressed upon
him the urgent necessity of his [the Maharaja] coming here as
quickly as possible, but there has been no response so far. Shan¬
kar was told that the Maharaja had commitments and that he
would come here in the second week of May. A message was then
sent to His Highness that he should come here some time this
week at the latest. I have a feeling that His Highness has got
scent somehow of what is impending and he is averse to facing
the ordeal. This is quite in keeping with his characteristics as
we know them. I am sending him a rather peremptory telegram
which, I hope, will help him to come to a decision about coming
here soon.
As regards relief work, I believe Thimayya has told you about
the plight of non-Muslim refugees in Srinagar. You will recall that
we had to intervene at your instance in regard to non-Muslim

264
 KASHMIR AND COMMONWEALTH PREMIERS ^UJ

refugees in Jammu province and to set up a separate camp at

Nagrota. It seems no one cares or looks after Srinagai refugees,
in that case, somebody must look after them. Why should they
then [complain] that relief work is being conducted on communal
lines ?
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

212
TELEGRAM

New Delhi
18 April 1949
His Highness
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir
Jammu
I HOPE YOUR HIGHNESS RECEIVED MESSAGES SENT BY SHANKAR ON MY
BEHALF [by] TELEGRAM AND THROUGH YOUR ASSISTANT PRIVATE
SECRETARY ABOUT NECESSITY OF YOUR COMING AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.
I AM SORRY TO NOTE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE FROM
YOUR HIGHNESS SO FAR. MATTERS WHICH I PROPOSE TO DISCUSS WITH
YOU ADMIT OF NO DELAY AND I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL
IF YOU COME HERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THIS WEEK.

VALLABHBHAI
 CHAPTER XVI

ABDULLAH FOR INDEPENDENT KASHMIR

213

New Delhi
1 May 1949
My dear Gopalaswami,
You have probably seen the interview by Sheikh Sahib to
Michael Davidson which was published in the Scotsman of 14
April 1949. A vehement exponent of accession to India seems
to have been converted to an “independent Kashmir.” He wants
absentee landlords, most of whom have gone to Pakistan, to be
expropriated. At the same time, he has got, according to the
information brought here by Sethi of the Agriculture Ministry,
large tracts of valuable irrigated lands vacant lest non-Muslims
should settle down on them, and this is at a time when elsewhere
we are asking for every inch of land to be cultivated. [See
enclosure]
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT OF AN INTERVIEW WITH SHEIKH

ABDULLAH BY MICHAEL DEVIDSON PUBLISHED IN
THE SCOTSMAN

“Accession to either side cannot bring peace,” he [Sheikh Abdullah] de¬

clared. “We want to live in friendship with both Dominions. Perhaps a middle
path between them, with economic co-operation with each, will be the only
way of doing it. But an independent Kashmir must be guaranteed not only
by India and Pakistan but also by Britain, the United States and other mem¬
bers of the United Nations.”
“Yes, independence—guaranteed by the United Nations—may be the
only solution. But why do you talk of partition ? . . .

266
 ABDULLAH FOR INDEPENDENT KASHMIR 267

“During the communal riots in the Punjab after partition, we tried in our
humble way to stem the wave of fanaticism. That is why I urged we should
wait before deciding our affiliation. I pleaded with both Dominions to help us
fii’st to win internal emancipation before asking us to choose! India replied by
refusing to make a standstill agreement with the Maharaja; Pakistan did so.
When, during the crisis India accepted the Maharaja’s accession, Pandit Nehru
insisted that it was only provisional and that the people must decide later. . . .’

214
New Delhi
11 May 1949
My dear Rajaji,
I had a talk with you the other day about the Maharaja of
Jammu and Kashmir. I am sending herewith a copy of the letter
(6 May 1949) which I have received from him. [See enclosure
with No. 216.]
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
His Excellency Shri Rajagopalachari
Governor-General of India
Government House
New Delhi

215
New Delhi
1 May 1949
My dear Sardarji,
I have just received your letter about the interview given
by Sheikh Abdullah to Michael Davidson of the Scotsman. My
attention was drawn to the contents of this interview earlier in the
day. It is a most astonishing performance. Kachru, who is going
to Kashmir tomorrow, has just been to see me, and I am sending
a message through him to Sheikh Abdullah. I have asked him to
tell the latter that I condemn the Sheikh’s action and that I feel
that what he has told Michael Davidson and what the latter has
published will have the most serious and mischievous consequences
S* ,in India and abroad- I have asked him to inform the
Sheikh that, reading between the lines, I suspect a plan, the first
step of which is this blessing by the Premier of Kashmir of the
268 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

idea ol an independent Kashmir and this public expression of his

conviction that accession to India will not bring peace, and the
final step of which may well be perhaps one of the greatest betrayals
in history. He will also be told that India will expect him publicly
to repudiate some of the things attributed to him by Michael Davidson.
It is all so distressing.
Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

216

New Delhi
11 May 1949
My dear Jawaharlal,
You will recall that, just before you left for the UK, you
wrote to me regarding His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir. I
sent for His Highness who has been here since 28 April. I had a
talk with him on 29 April and 1 May, when I explained to him
the whole position and commended to him my view that, in the
circumstances of his relations with the Ministry and the situation
created by the reference to UNO and the plebiscite issue, it would
be best for him to absent himself from the State for some time
and to make the Yuvraj Regent. Both of them [Her Highness was
also present] were visibly taken aback by this proposal, and I could
notice that there was a sense of shock and bewilderment at the
end of my discussion with them on 29 April. However, I asked
him to reflect over the matter. I asked Shankar also to have
a talk with him, and he had two or three long discussions both
with His Highness the Maharaja and Her Highness separately.
They now seem to be reconciled to the proposal, and I send
herewith a copy of the letter which I have received from His
Highness and which would require our very careful and urgent
consideration. I suggest that we meet some time tomorrow to
discuss our final attitude in this matter. I am, therefore, sending
copies of His Highness’ letter and of my letter to you and to
Gopalaswami.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi
 ENCLOSURE I

Imperial Hotel
New Delhi
6 May 1949

My dear Sardar Patelji,

With reference to the discussions I had with you on 29 April and 1
May 1949, I have been revolving the matter in my mind and am now in
a position to let you have my settled reactions to the proposal in regard to my
temporary absence from the State which you put to me.
I should like to say at the outset that I was completely taken aback by
this proposal, but coming as it did from you, in whom I have since the
very beginning placed implicit trust and confidence and whose advice I have
throughout followed on the many questions affecting me personally and my
State both in the present and in future, I have been able somehow to adjust
myself to it. I would not, however, be human if I did not express my sense of
keen disappointment and bewilderment at having been called upon to make
such a sacrifice of personal prestige, honour and position when all along I
have been content to follow, sometimes even against my own judgment and
conscience, the advice in regard to the constitutional position in the State
which I have been receiving from the Prime Minister of India or yourself,
sometimes even against arrangements which were agreed to only a few
months before. Nor would it be fair on my part to conceal from you my own
feeling that while Sheikh Abdullah has been allowed to depart, from time to
time as suited his inclinations, from the pledged and written word, to act
consistently in breach of the loyalty which he professed to me prior to his
release from jail and the oath of allegiance which he took when he
assumed office, and to indulge openly along with his colleagues in a campaign
of vilification and foul calumny against me, both inside the State and outside,
I should have had to be driven from position to position—each of which I
thought I held on the advice of the States Ministry.
The contrast naturally fills me with poignant feelings. However, once
again putting my complete trust in your judgment and benevolent intentions
towards us, I might be prepared to fall in with your wishes and to absent my¬
self from the State for a period of three or four months in consideration of
the fact as emphasised by you, namely, complications created by the reference
to UNO and the plebiscite issue.
There are, however, certain questions arising out of this proposal on
which I would venture to make my position clear to you and on which I

269
270 sardar patel’s correspondence

would be grateful to have your assurance. I hope you will kindly appreciate
the necessity of my seeking these assurances. I have to think of the imme¬
diate luture in the light of my bitter experiences of the last several months and
I owe it to myself, my family and dynasty to procure a clear declaration in
respect of these matters:

1. I should like to be assured that this step is not a prelude to any idea
of abdication. I should like to make it clear now that I cannot entertain
the latter idea even for a moment and am fully prepared to take the
consequences. I regard such a demand from my Prime Minister and his col¬
leagues as a clear breach of the many understandings on which constitutional
arrangements have been based from time to time and a positive act of his
disloyalty, treachery and deception.
2. Sheikh Abdullah should be clearly told to stop the campaign of vilification
against me and to abandon all activities, both on his part and that of his
followers, aimed at securing my abdication. I feel that the sacrifice which
I am being called upon to make would be in vain if I continued to be the
target of their public and private attacks.
3. There should be a clear assurance of protection of myself and my
adherents against any victimisation. In this connection I should like especial¬
ly to draw your attention to the facts that have been reported to me about
persons having been detained in jail for their failure to sign for my abdication.
4. The question that I should remain out of the State for three or four
months for reasons of health, will, I am afraid, not be believed by anybody and
is likely to give rise to many misgivings and speculations within and outside
the State as
(i) everybody knows that I am not in such a state of health as would
necessitate a long rest outside the State. I have, on your advice,
been recently touring parts of Jammu province in the heat of April;
(ii) for everybody in bad health Kashmir is considered to be the best
health resort and it will certainly look strange if I went outside
the State giving out that I am doing so for reasons of health;
(iii) wherever I take [up] my temporary residence I cannot confine my¬
self to the four walls of the house. I am bound to meet people,
who, when they meet me, will never believe that I am staying there
for reasons of health;
(iv) some other reason which may be plausible and may also at the same
time not compromise my dignity and position should be given out.
The best thing would be that the Government of India should find
a suitable position for me in Delhi where my services may be
utilised in a fitting manner during the above period of 3 to 4
months.
 ABDULLAH FOR INDEPENDENT KASHMIR
271

5. It is a matter of paramount necessity that Her Highness should remain

with the Yuvraj in the State during the period of my absence. He is young
and impressionable and requires paternal guidance and personal supervision
of at least one of his parents. I can see no reason either of political
expediency or justice in insisting on the separation of a mother from her
only child, whom she is seeing after thirteen months of absence abioad.
Considerations of humanity alone should suffice to rule out this altogether.
6. My private estates, houses and other property should be protected against
the aggressive acts of Sheikh Abdullah’s party. They will attempt to take pos¬
session of my houses, gardens, lands and other property. The Indian Domi¬
nion should guarantee against that act of aggression. While I am there they
dare not do these things, but in my absence they will attempt this. I have
received information that even during the last few days, aftei I left Jammu
for Delhi, encroachments have been made on my lands at Srinagar.
7. No change should be made without my consent in the present arrangements
regarding the State forces or the constitutional position, prerogatives, etc., of
the Ruler as now subsisting. Arrangements will continue for me to draw my
staff (both State and Private Deptts.) from amongst officers of my forces,
guards mounted by my forces at my palaces will also continue as at present
as per agreement reached, vide my letter of 30 August and Mr. [V. P.]
Menon’s reply of 3 September thereto. I shall also take whatever staff etc. I
require with me outside.
8. I should be entitled during my stay in India to suitable strength of mili¬
tary guards wherever I stay.
9. Yuvraj’s safety and protection should be the concern of the Indian Domi¬
nion. State and Indian military should guard his person.
10. Outstanding matters with the State Ministry, Civil Lists, Hazur Depart¬
ments,1 etc., should be decided with me immediately.
In conclusion I wish to say that I shall take the final decision on getting
assurances from you on the points above mentioned.
With kindest regards,

Yours very sincerely,

Hari Singh

1 Departments under personal control of Maharaja

 ENCLOSURE II

Dehra Dun
23 May 1949

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Thank you for your letter dated 6 May 1949.

2. I am very glad to know that Your Highness has reconciled yourself to the
proposal which I put forward at my discussion with you. It was with no
light heart that I did so. None can be more cognisant than myself of the
attitude which Your Highness has adopted ever since you signed the Instrument
of Accession. I am grateful to Your Highness for the spirit of co-operation and
understanding which you have always extended to me and also for the kind
sentiments which you have expressed. I can assure Your Highness that, before
putting forward my proposal, I had, after careful consideration, come to the
conclusion that the interests alike of Your Highness, the dynasty and the coun¬
try demanded the step which you have now agreed to take. I know full well
the personal sacrifice involved in it, but I am sure, along with so many other
changes to which Your Highness has accustomed yourself, you will under¬
take this step also with a sense of duty to your country and in a spirit
of calm resignation to the superior dictates of events.
3. Regarding the points which Your Highness has referred to me, I should
like to state that the question of Your Highness’ abdication does not arise.
We have made the position quite plain to Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, and
we hope there will be an end to the public controversies centring round this
matter as well as to the derogatory references to Your Highness in the Press
and on the platform in the State. Your Highness will, of course, appreciate that
the future constitution of the State would be determined by the duly elected
Constituent Assembly. I am afraid, in the absence of any specific instances of
victimisation to which Your Highness refers in paragraph 4, it may not be
possible for me to give any assurance, but I can tell \our Highness that, if
any such instances are brought to our notice, we shall look into them and try

to see that justice is done.

4. I appreciate what Your Highness says in regard to the reasons for your
remaining outside the State, but I feel that it would be best just to say that
Your Highness has decided, after the strain of the last so many months and
continued ill-health, to stay out of the State for a few months. The actual

period need not be stated. . ...

5 We have carefully considered the question of Her Highness staying wi
the Yuvraj during your absence, but for a variety of reasons we feel that .t

272
 ABDULLAH FOR INDEPENDENT KASHMIR
273

would be best, for the present, for her also to stay away for a while. Later,
she can certainly visit the Yuvraj from time to time and the Yuvraj can also visit
Your Highness and Her Highness occasionally.
6. We would be grateful if Your Highness would let me have a list of the
private estates, houses and other property belonging to Your Highness and
referred to in para 6 of your letter. On receipt of the list we shall take up
the matter with your Ministry. In the meantime, I hope that, with the under¬
standing that has been reached with Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah on the
various controversial issues, he will himself take steps to safeguard \our
Highness’ property against encroachments. In particular, I hope that the
feelings which he entertains for the Yuvraj will succeed in closing the
chapter of the past several months and in introducing a healthy change in
the approach of both the Government and the National Conference workers
to these and other problems affecting Your Highness and the family
personally and the dynasty in general. I hope that no need for a change in the
arrangements to which Your Highness has referred in paragraph 7 would arise,
but should any such need arise, we would of course consult Your Highness.
We would also make necessary arrangements for guarding you [and], for the
Yuvraj’s safety and protection.
7. As regards outstanding matters, we have already informed Your Highness
separately that your Civil List has been fixed at Rs. 15 lakhs, out of which Rs. 6
lakhs would be paid by the State and Rs. 9 lakhs by the Government of India
during the period of the emergency. Out of this sum, Your Highness will have
to make allotment to Her Highness and the Yuvraj. The latter’s expenses
would, of course, be larger than before on account of his being Regent. I hope
Your Highness will agree to make a suitable allowance for him, bearing in
mind his needs. I should be glad to know your suggestion in this respect.
Similarly, I should welcome Your Highness’ proposal regarding Her Highness’
allowance. As regards Huzur Departments, Sheikh Sahib has already agreed
to our suggestion that an allowance of Rs. 5 lakhs should be made to Your
Highness for this purpose. A list of items, which will be controlled by Your
Highness, and, during your absence, by the Yuvraj as Regent, has been
furnished to Sheikh Sahib, and he has promised to let us have his comments
as soon as possible. After his comments are received, we shall finalise the whole
matter, but in the meantime Your Highness can make suitable allocations to
major and other heads of the expenditure on State Departments from out of
the allotment of Rs. 5 lakhs.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
His Highness Maharaja Sir Hari Singh
Imperial Hotel
New Delhi

S. C.-18
 217

New Delhi
18 May 1949
My dear Vallabhbhai,
V. P. Menon showed me your suggestions for correcting
Gopalaswami’s draft about Kashmir. Those suggestions have been
incorporated. I have, however, changed the phraseology some¬
what, simply with a view to better drafting. I enclose a copy
of the letter which I am sending to [Sheikh Abdullah].
I hope that this will be an end to the squabbles that have been
going on in public. This has been impressed upon Sheikh Abdullah
and I am pointing this out to him again in a separate letter.
I take it that the Maharaja and the Maharani will keep out
of the State, as agreed upon, for some months. The Bombay
house will be at their disposal. It would have been better if they
had gone out of the country for a period, say two or three
months, but that is a matter for them to decide. I do not think
any period should be fixed for the Maharaja’s absence from
Kashmir. The matter had better be left vague.
The Maharani naturally dislikes intensely the idea of being
away from her son. I do not think it is necessary for her to be
kept absolutely away and she can certainly visit her son later
from time to time. But for the present, I think, it would be to
the advantage of all concerned, including the Maharaja and the
Maharani, for both of them to stay away for a while.
I hope you will explain to the Maharaja and the Maharani
as well as the Yuvraj the agreements arrived at between us and
Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues. The written agreement right¬
ly does not say anything about the Maharaja going out of the
State. But this was a private assurance given by us and we have
naturally to stand by it.
1 am thinking of going to Srinagar for two days on Saturday,
28 May.
I shall see you of course next Friday evening at about 7.30.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’blc Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
274
 218
Dehra Dun
23 May 1949

My dear Jawaharlal,
Please refer to your letter of 18 May 1949 and the^subse-
quent discussion we had about Kashmir. I am sending herewith
a copy of the letter which I have sent to His Highness the
Maharaja in reply to his letter of 6 May, a copy of which I sent
to you on 11 May 1949 [See enclosure II with No. 216]. My
letter covers all the points to which you have referred relating to
the Maharaja and the Maharani.
As regards the Yuvraj, we have had a very detailed talk
with him and I have impressed upon him the significance and
importance of the agreements reached and the consequences which
flow therefrom. He is a sensible lad and I think he appreciated
the situation fairly well and realises his responsibilities. He is, of
course, still in his teens and would require some guidance. I am
looking out for a suitable adviser for him on whose advice he
can lean. We shall have to be very careful in the choice of a
suitable person.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

219
New Delhi
17 May 1949
My dear Sardarji,
Herewith the draft. Jawaharlalji has seen and approved of it.
2. Will you kindly let Jawharlalji know direct as to your approval
of it? He will issue the letter to Sheikh Abdullah only after
receiving your approval.
Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

275
 ENCLOSURE

New Delhi
18 May 1949
My dear Sheikh Sahib,

In the course ol the talks at Sardar Patel’s residence on 15 and 16 May

1 J1J between some ot my colleagues and me and you and your colleagues, im¬
portant issues raised by you in regard to the future of Jammu and Kashmir
State were discussed.

2. Among the subjects that were discussed were: (i) the framing of a consti¬
tution for the State; (ii) the subjects in respect of which the State should accede
to the Union ol India; (iii) the monarchical form of government in the State;
(iv) the control of the State Forces, and (v) the rights of the citizens of the
State to equality of opportunity for service in the Indian Army.

3. As regards (i) and (iii), it has been the settled policy of the Government
of India, which on many occasions has been stated both by Sardar Patel and
me, that the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir State is a matter for deter¬
mination by the people of the State represented in a Constituent Assembly
convened for the purpose. In the special circumstances of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir, the Government of India have no objection to the Constituent
Assembly of the State considering the question of the continuance of the associa¬
tion of the State with a constitutional monarchy.

4. In regard to (ii), Jammu and Kashmir State now stands acceded to the
Indian Union in respect of three subjects, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Communications. It will be for the Constituent Assembly of the State,
when convened, to determine in respect of what other subjects the State may
accede.

5. Regarding (iv), both the operational and administrative control over the
State Forces has already, with the consent of the Government of Jammu and
Kashmir State, been taken over by the Indian Army. The final arrange¬
ments in this connection, for the duration of the present emergency, including
financial responsibility for the expenditure involved, were agreed to between
us on the 16th inst.

6. As regards (v), the citizens of the State will have equality of opportu¬
nity for service in the Indian Army. Under Article 10 of the draft of the new
Constitution, as passed by the Constituent Assembly of India, equality of
opportunity for employment under the State, including employment in the

276
 ABDULLAH FOR INDEPENDENT KASHMIR

Indian Army, is declared to be amongst the fundamental rights of all Indian

citizens.
7. I trust that the Government of India’s position, as stated above, will give
you the clarification that you have asked for. .
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

The Hon’ble Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah

Srinagar

220
TELEGRAM

Dehra Dun
29 May 1949

Jawaharlal
Srinagar
I LEARN FROM HIS HIGHNESS THAT YUVRAj’s THREAD CEREMONY IS
TO TAKE PLACE IN DELHI ON FIFTEENTH JUNE. IT WOULD THEREFORE
NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO VISIT SRINAGAR UNTIL AFTER THE
CEREMONY. HAS TO BE PERFORMED NOW. OTHERWISE THERE IS NO

AUSPICIOUS DATE FOR TWO YEARS.

VALLABHBHAI

221
New Delhi
30 May 1949
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I received your telegram about the Yuvraj’s Upanayana1
ceremony. I informed Sheikh Abdullah. Of course he should stay
here for the ceremony. It would be desirable to fix a definite
date, soon after the ceremony, for the Yuvraj’s going to Srinagar.
This will enable suitable arrangements to be made in time.
During my two-day visit to Srinagar, I visited a large number
of places and offices. I saw how the transport system is now work¬
ing, how civil supplies are kept and distributed, co-operative farms
with tractors working and the beginnings of some new industries.
On the whole I was favourably impressed by the improvement that

1 Sacred thread-wearing ceremony of Hindu boys

278 sardar patel’s correspondence

had been made since I went there last, more especially in regard
to transport and civil supplies.
Srinagar had a more normal air and there were some visitors
about too. In fact, about half a dozen of our Ambassadors or other
foreign representatives have also gone there. Because of all this,
the general economic outlook was somewhat better and I think
public feeling had reacted to this.
I met for the first time the Czech representative on the United
Nations Commission. I had a very long talk with him, and he
struck me as a man of intelligence and strength of character. He
appreciated our viewpoint entirely.
Gopalaswami spoke to Sheikh Abdullah about the four re¬
presentatives for the CA [Constituent Assembly]. In a day or
two Vishnu Sahay [Secretary for Kashmir Affairs] will bring
Sheikh Abdullah’s recommendation of these four names and will
then take them or send them to Dehra Dun for the Maharaja’s
formal endorsement. I hope this will be done soon so that some
Kashmir representatives might begin to take part in the CA.
It seems to me very desirable to encourage bona fide tourists
to go to Kashmir. This is necessary both from the point of view
of the economy of the State and to produce better psychological
conditions and normalcy. At present the rules are too difficult.
Even wives of senior officers cannot easily get permits, because
of the round-about procedure. Of course we have to check un¬
desirables. But a way should be found to permit bona fide people
to go there without trouble. I am writing to the Defence Ministry
about this.
As I told you, I have promised to go to Leh early in July.
On further enquiry I found that the place I am supposed to
visit is 25 miles from Leh. This means marching along a moun¬
tain path, and is normally two days’ march, though it can be
done in a day. A visit thus will take longer than I had thought
at first. At the same time I discovered that the occasion for this
visit is important from the point of view not only of Ladakh but
of larger areas all round, including Tibet. 1 here is a big Buddh¬
ist fair held at the chief monastry at Ladakh. I think I should
go there. Altogether it will mean six days’ absence from Delhi
from 3 July to the 9th.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi
 222
Dehra Dun
2 June 1949

My dear Jawaharlal,
Thank you for your letter dated 30 May 1949.
2. I am glad to hear all about your trip to Srinagar I was
somewhat disturbed over Sheikh’s letter to you, a copy of which
you sent me before you left for Kashmir In that letter aga
there was some loophole for disturbing the finality of the arr g
ments we had reached after so much effort on the last occasion.
I hope you have been able to deal effectively with it at Srinagar
The Yuvraj proposes to leave for Jammu in the third week of
June. After three days’ stay in Jammu he will leave for Srinagar.
He has to stop at Jammu because there are many matters
which would require his attention there. Moreover, he will have
to take staff and certain other things from Jammu to Srinagar.
3. I hope your programme for Leh would not be vei>
exacting; otherwise I agree that it is worthwhile going there and
cultivating the Ladakhis.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi

223
New Delhi
9 June 1949

My dear Vallabhbhai,
I enclose a cutting from Pakistan Times [Lahore] which might
interest you. It shows how the Praja Parishad of Jammu is
playing into the hands of Pakistan.
Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
279
 ENCLOSURE

ABDULLAH S POPULARITY DWINDLING: PRAJA PARISHAD’S

BITTER OPPOSITION

RAWALPINDI, 6 June: With the temporary exist of Maharaja Hari

Singh from the political scene in the Indian-held Kashmir, political observers
believe the way has been paved for Thakur [Nachantchand], Sheikh Abdullah’s
rival for political supremacy, to gain ascendancy in Kashmir politics. The
Thakur, it may be pointed out, is a brother of the Rani and has at his back
the support of the militant Praja Parishad and the Mahasabha, besides the
active assistance of the Rani herself and many sympathisers in the East
Punjab State and Imperial Delhi.

Political observers say that the Thakur, who regards the accession of Hari
Singh’s son, his nephew, to the “gadi” instrumental to the realisation of poli¬
tical power, has won a real diplomatic victory over Sheikh Abdullah. Abdullah’s
jubilation over the removal of Hari Singh — an event which he publicised as
his personal triumph over Hari Singh —is gradually dying out under the impact
of a very stiff position from the Praja Parishad, the Mahasabha and the
RSS, all of which avowedly stand for the consolidation of Hindu rule in areas
lying [on] the Indo-Kashmir border. It is interesting to note that Sheikh
Abdullah’s attempt to popularise the National Conference in Jammu has been
foiled by the Praja Parishad. Abdullah’s slogan of nationalism was vehem¬
ently opposed by supporters of Dogra rule. Only recently the President of
the Praja Parishad in an outspoken speech at a public meeting in Jammu
declared that the Dogras were waiting for a suitable opportunity to display
once again the strength of the sword.

Sheikh Abdullah, who is now a tegular target of the Praja Parishad’s

ciiticism, observers further point out, has swung his truncheon from Hari
Singh to his brother-in-law, Thakur [Nachantchand]. A demand is now
being made to arraign the Thakur before a court of law. In a charge-sheet
published in a recent issue of the Ranvir of Jammu, [Nachantchand] has been
accused of planning the Jammu massacre in collaboration with RSS gangsters
in 1947 and creating bad blood between the Government and the refugees.
It is yet to be seen how the Praja Parishad reacts.

[Pakistan Times]

280
 224
Hotel Imperial
New Delhi
14 June 1949
My dear Sardar Patelji,
This is just to tell you how very much I enjoyed my three
weeks’ stay with you in Dehra Dun, and how grateful I am to
you and Manibenji for your hospitality in putting me up for so
long and making me so comfortable. It was a real pleasure stay¬
ing with you, and I also enjoyed revisiting my old school and
going up to Mussoorie.
I am proceeding on the 20th direct to Srinagar. Previously
I was thinking of going to Jammu first and then going up to
Srinagar. However, I met Panditji and he said I should go to
Srinagar first.
Difficult though my job is, I have great confidence in the
fact that I know I shall always have your blessings and support.
I may come to Delhi for a few days after a month or two,
when I hope I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again.
Hoping this finds you and Manibenji very well.
With respectful regards,
Yours very sincerely,
Karan Singh

225
Dehra Dun
18 June 1949
My dear Yuvraj,
Thank you for your letter of 14 June 1949.
I am glad to hear that you enjoyed your visit to Dehra
Dun and your stay with us.
occasion of your first visit to Srinagar as Regent I
should like to send you my best wishes and blessings. Nobody
realises the difficulty and delicacy of your task better than myself.
A great responsibility rests on your young shoulders and I do hope
you will discharge it with tact, ability and vision. Unfortunately,

281
282 sardar patel’s correspondence

we have not been able to find a suitable adviser so far. We shall

continue our efforts and send one as soon as possible. Till then,
you can write to me, to Shankar or to Vishnu Sahay' without
any reserve.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Yuvraj Shri Karan Singh
Yuvraj of Jammu and Kashmir
Imperial Hotel
New Delhi

226
Karan Mahal
Srinagar
26 June 1949
My dear Sardar Patelji,
Thank you very much indeed for your kind letter of the 18th
which I received just before I left Delhi, and for your blessings
and best wishes for which I am very grateful.
As scheduled, I left Delhi on the 20th. Our programme was
to land direct at Srinagar and not stop anywhere en route.
However, the weather over the Banihal Pass was bad and so we
had to land at Jammu. Luckily we did not have to stay there
too long. After two hours we took off again and ultimately
reached Srinagar at 12 noon instead of 10 a.m. as scheduled. At
Srinagar aerodrome Sheikh Sahib and Ministers were there to
receive me and I was introduced to them and other top officials,
both civil and military.
Mr. Vishnu Sahay stayed here with me for a few days. He
left on the 23rd. He said he was going to Dehra Dun to see
you and discuss with you certain matters, including the problem
of an adviser.
The weather here is wonderful—such a pleasant change from
Delhi!
Hope^this finds you very well indeed.
With-respectful regards, .
Yours very sincerely,
Karan Singh

1 Secretary, Kashmir Affairs

 CHAPTER XVII

UN COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRATION

227
EXTRACT
New Delhi
29 June 1949

My dear Vallabhbhai,
The situation in Kashmir, that is, Pakistan’s military move¬
ments, is getting more and more odd. From all accounts that we
receive, Pakistan troops are being concentrated in Azad Kashmir
and on the border. This can only lead to one conclusion, that
Pakistan intends mischief. If suddenly they started an invasion
with tanks etc., it is quite possible that they could break through
and cut our lines of communications, etc., round about Naushera.
It is not difficult for an army taking the initiative to go ahead.
We are discussing this matter with our military chiefs. Personally
I cannot conceive how Pakistan can take any forward step of this
kind just at this moment when the [UN] Commission is sitting
there. But internal conditions in Pakistan are bad and they
might want to gamble.
Cariappa and Vishnu Sahay wanted to accompany me to
Ladakh. I am however asking them to stay on here in case there
are developments.
We are preparing a special memorandum on recent develop¬
ments in Kashmir for the U.K. and U.S. Governments. I am
inclined to think that it might be worthwhile to send [Girja
Shankar] Bajpai1 to England with this memorandum, so that he
can personally see Attlee2 about it. If this has to be done, it will
have to be fairly soon.
I do not particularly like the idea of my going to Ladakh
just at this moment, though I do not expect anything unusual will
happen. In the balance I think it is as well that I should go.
Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
1 Secretary-General, External Affairs Ministry
2 Prime Minister of U.K.

283
 228
EXTRACT

Dehra Dun
30 June 1949
My dear Jawaharlal,
About Pakistan’s attitude regarding Kashmir, as also about
their attitude on other inter-Dominion questions, I have always
held one view. They have outwitted us and if we will not be
on our guard they will steal a march on us. It is better to be
fully prepared for all eventualities.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

229
EXTRACT

Dehra Dun
9 July 1949

My dear Jawaharlal,
I hope you have had a comfortable trip to Ladakh. I have
been following your visit through the papers. It seems you have
created a great impression among the Ladakhis.
I have seen Attlee’s reply to our approach in regard to the
possibility of Pakistan’s attack on Kashmir. It is a disappoint¬
ing reply and in some ways rather makes matters worse in that
Pakistan will now come to know of this approach. I am afraid
we can rule out any help and co-operation from Britain in
settling this point. Indeed, it seems that they are determined not
to disturb British military officers who are in Pakistan.
Yours,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi
284
 230
56 D. Mount
Kasauli
18 July 1949

My dear Sardar Sahib,

I was very glad to read about the improvement in your health.
I always pray to God Almighty for your long life. May He give
you the best of health. Please let me know your present condi¬
tion by the return of mail.
I have liked this place very much and there has been a great
improvement in my health ever since my arrival at this place.
Please convey my namaskars [greetings] to Maniben Patel.
With kindest regards.
Yours sincerely,
Tara Devi
Maharani of Jammu and Kashmir

231

New Delhi
30 July 1949
My dear Jawaharlal,
I am sending herewith a copy of a letter which I have re¬
ceived from Shibbanlal Saksena [Member, Constituent Assembly],
You may have received one similar letter from him already, but
I thought, in case you had not, this letter might interest you.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi

285
 ENCLOSURE

13-E Fcrozcshah Road

New Delhi
27 July 1949

My dear Sardarji,

I do not wish to put a burden upon you by writing any letters, but
the way in which the Kashmir issue is being handled pains me deeply. You
know how deeply India is interested in the Kashmir issue. We have spent
about 100 crores of rupees in the war there, and the flower of our army
has sacrificed their lives for it. The country will not forgive us if we lose
Kashmir, but I think we are still continuing our blunders. The agreement
arrived at today regarding the ceasefire line at Karachi has pained me deeply.

I recently visited Kashmir to see things for myself. It is midsummer

madness to believe that we can win the plebiscite. Sheikh Abdullah has un¬
doubtedly influence over the Muslim masses. But, just as in spite of
Gandhiji’s and Jawaharlalji’s advocacy of Hindustani, the masses would vote
for Hindi, so nobody can hope to win the plebiscite in Kashmir. We created
difficulties ourselves by unnecessarily volunteering for a plebiscite, then taking
the case to the UNO and then ordering ceasefire when we were winning.
The military forces are terribly dissatisfied with our politicians. But they are
a wonderful lot and in high spirits. Still, repeated blunders by politicians will
undermine their morale. I am definitely of the opinion after a very careful
and deep study of the situation in Kashmir that if we want to retain Kashmir,
we must fight to drive out the aggressor from our soil. And we can fight
only if we break off negotiations. Instead, I find that we always go on yielding.

You never take the Assembly or the party into confidence with regard
to the Kashmir issue. I know that is the general feeling amongst party
members. But, on account of our respect for you and for Panditji, we suffer
all you do without protest. My conscience pricks me when I find such mis¬
takes being made. And when I give expression to what I feel so intensely,
you all begin to talk of disciplinary action and what not. But, after having
spent 30 years out of my 42 years of age in the service of the Congress ever
since 1919 when I was a child of 12, you can imagine how deeply I am dis¬
tressed when I see such blunders as we have committed in Kashmir being

persisted.

If your health permits and you can give me a lew minutes of your time,
I can come to you and teU you what I saw in Kashmir. My report will be

286
 UN COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRATION

a bare factual narration of what I saw with my own eyes. It will be neither
alarmist, nor full of flattery for those in authority. If you care to know

what I have seen, I may be given some time.

With regards,
Yours sincerely,
Shibbanlal Saksena, m.a.
M.G.A.

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

232
Srinagar
7 August 1949

My dear Yuvraj Sahib,

As you are aware, the question of the administrative control
over the State Department has been the subject of discussion for
some time between His Highness, the Ministry and the States
Ministry. At one stage, the idea held the field that it should be
bifurcated; one part to be administered by the Ruler and the
other by the Ministry. On further consideration it is found that
this would give rise to a number of difficulties. Consequently, we
have reached the conclusion that the department should be
maintained, for the time being, as one administrative unit and
that it should be administered by the Ruler in consultation with
the Prime Minister. The attached note sets out the formula
which we have evolved after careful consideration. I trust it
will be acceptable to you.
2. I also attach a note setting forth the concessions and perquisites
which the Ruler will enjoy in future. The decisions contained in
the note have been agreed to by the Ministry.
3. We have also had under consideration the desirability of insti¬
tuting a thorough audit into the transactions of Dharmarth Coun¬
cil in respect of which there have been certain allegations. I have
discussed this matter with Sheikh Sahib and we both agree that
it would be most useful to appoint an auditor with instructions
to conduct a thorough audit of the accounts of the Trust for the
last tlnee years. The name of Mx. Dilbagh Roy has been sug¬
gested in this connection. I shall be grateful if you will kindly take
necessary action.
288 sardar patel’s correspondence

4. I shall be grateful if you will kindly signify your acceptance

to these proposals at your earliest convenience.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
V. P. Menon
Shri Yuvraj Karan Singhji Bahadur
Srinagar
Enel. 2

ENCLOSURE I

1. The State Department deals with the administration of properties and

services which form part of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. The Ruler has a special interest in the administration of the department
as it is concerned with services and items essential to the dignity, status
and position of the Ruler as the Head of the State.
3. It is inconvenient from an administrative point of view to break it up
and consequently it should be administered as one unit.

4. The State Department will be administered by the Ruler in consultation

with the Prime Minister. The detailed administration will be entrusted
to an officer appointed by the Ruler on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister. In regard to financial and audit control, it will be treated as
any other department of Government. For the year S [Sravan] 2006 a
provision of Rs. 5 lakhs will be made for this department in the budget.

ENCLOSURE II

CONCESSIONS AND PERQUISITES TO BE ENJOYED BY THE RULER

OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE

I. Exemption from Custom Duty

Exemption will be granted in respect of such goods as are imported for

the personal use or consumption of the Ruler and the members of his family,
including food, drinks and tobacco, imported for the use of the Ruler, his
family and their guests, whether official or not.

II. Supply of Electricity

There will be free supply of electrical energy to the official residence of

the Ruler, it being understood that consumption will be reasonable.

III. Supply op Water to Palaces at Srlnaoar and Jammu

There will be free supply of water to the official residence of the Ruler
i, being undestood that the consumption will be reasonable. Water requtred

for other purposes will be paid for.

 UN COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRAI ION
289

IV. Telephone Connections in the Palaces and Trunk Calls

Telephone connections in the official residence of the Ruler, trunk calls

and use of telegraph services for official purposes will be exempt from all
charges; otherwise payment should be made at the usual tariff rates.

V. Supply of Water for Lands, Rakhs and Farms of the Private Depart

MENTS FROM P.W.D. CANALS

Abiana will be charged at the usual tariff rates.

VI. Exemption from the Payment of Road Toll in Respect of Vehicles

Exemption from road toll will be limited to the cars and vehicles of
the Ruler. He and his family, including servants, travelling with them, will
be allowed the use of dak bungalows belonging to Government without the
payment of any rent.
VII. Pension and Provident Fund Benefits for Personnel Employed in
the Private Department

Pensions and gratuities sanctioned or due to be sanctioned to staff

retired before 20 June 1949, will continue to be paid from State revenues.
Government will also assume liability lor that portion of pensions or gratuity
as might accrue in respect of services rendered up to 20 June 1949, in regard
to personnel in service on that date. For service after this date liability for
pension and gratuity will be met from the Civil List. If the services of any
Government official are required for employment in the Private Department,
leave and pension contributions will be payable on the usual scale.
The liability of Government for interest charges on G.P. Fund deposits
will be limited to the period before 20 June 1949, thereafter if the staff in the
Private Department are to be allowed Provident Fund benefits, the cost of
such benefits will be met from the Civil List.

VIII. Hundies Issued by the Private Department

These will continue to be accepted at par.

IX. Medical Facilities for the Ruler, His Family and Servants

The dispensary now located within the Palace grounds will be continued
for the time being. State Government will be free to arrange for the utilisa¬
tion of the services of the medical staff and of the dispensary for other purpo¬
ses to the extent to which it may be possible to do so.

X. Guards for Palaces

Police guards for the palaces will be provided by Government. If

guards are required for the private properties of the Ruler, the cost of such
guards should be met from the Civil List.

S. C.-19
 233
Karan Mahal
Srinagar
8 August 1949
My dear Mr. V. P. Menon,
I am in receipt of your letter dated 7 August regarding the
State Department and other matters.
The question of the State Department has been discussed by
you with Sheikh Sahib, and as these recommendations have been
made after careful consideration by you both, I of course accept
them. In this, as in any other matter, I can assure you and
Sheikh Sahib that my aim will always be to strengthen the hands
of my Government.
2. I also note the list of concessions and perquisites which will be
enjoyed by the Ruler in future and which have been agreed to
by my Ministry.
3. As regards your suggestion for an audit of the accounts of the
Dharmarth Trust for the last three years, I agree with you that
it will be a good thing to do. However, as I have not got a
copy of the Dharmarth Act, I am not sure whether I am compe¬
tent to pass the necessary orders. Will you or Sheikh Sahib
therefore please let me know the legal position in this respect?
4. As you know, His Highness has up till now been dealing with the
State Department and has recently passed several orders in this
connection. I would therefore be grateful if you will notify him
of this new arrangement.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Karan Singh
Mr. V. P. Menon
Adviser, States Ministry
New Delhi

290
 234
9 August 1949

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your Highness will remember that before you left for Bombay
in June last, we had agreed on the following arrangements in
regard to the State Department properties.
(a) Your Highness had given a list of property which should
be retained in the State Department;
(b) It was also agreed that a budget provision of Rs. 5 lakhs
should be left for the State Department.
2. As regards the property list furnished by Your Highness,
it was generally accepted as reasonable but this was to be discussed
further with Sheikh Sahib.
3. We have had some further discussions with Sheikh Sahib on
this point. Sheikh Sahib’s attitude was that, first, he thought that
only a small number of the properties listed was really necessary
for the Ruler’s dignity, and second, that he was at liberty to press
on the Ruler that many of these properties should be utilised for
important public purposes. Obviously, the Yuvraj cannot, if
he wishes to maintain cordial relations with his Prime Minister,
overrule the latter on any such recommendations: an arrangement
of this kind would therefore result soon in the State Department
being reduced to practically nothing.
4. We have therefore had to reconsider the whole situation
afresh, and work out what would be the best method of safeguarding
the interests of the Yuvraj and the properties of the State De¬
partment. I have had long discussions both with the Yuvraj and
with the Sheikh Sahib. The formula which we have now worked
out is embodied in the correspondence between the Yuvraj and
myself (copies of which are attached). In brief, the position is that
there will be no more divisions of the State Department property.
The whole of it will be under the management of the Yuvraj, but
the Yuvraj will, in their administration, act in consultation
with Sheikh Sahib as the Prime Minister of the State. Sheikh
Sahib himself, I may tell you, was not at first in favour of this
proposal. After some difficulty, however, I have been able to
persuade him not to insist on a division, but to leave all these

291
 292 sardar patel’s correspondence

properties in the State Department under the control of the Ruler.

He has also assured me that he would be very careful to safe¬
guard the interests and the dignity of the Yuvraj and would not
give any advice which would prejudice the position of the Ruler
as the head of the State, and Sheikh Sahib has also assured that
he would now agree to a budget provision of Rs. 5 lakhs being
made.
5. I realise that to a certain extent this represents a variation from
the arrangements which we agreed upon in June last; but the
substance of the arrangement by us, viz., that the State Depart¬
ment remains under the control of the Ruler, has been agreed
to. Both in the interests of the State Department and in the inte¬
rests of the Yuvraj, I think the formula I have now induced
Sheikh Sahib to accept is a solution best capable of enduring, and
it is also one which preserves the position of the Ruler in respect
of the State Department.
6. The audit of the accounts of the Dharmarth Council was a
step which we agreed to earlier; and Your Highness will, I am
sure, agree that it will be useful for all points of view.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
V. P. Menon
H.H. The Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir
Copy forwarded for information to:
Shri V. Shankar, ics
P.S. to H.M., States

ENCLOSURE

Bombay
16 August 1949

My dear Menon,
There are one or two points about your settlement regarding Kashmir
about which I want to say something. I could not get an opportunity so far,
so I am writing to you now.
2. I had a visit from Kamal Singh [ADC to Maharaja] today. He told me
about the first reactions of His Highness. They were, as I expected, entirely
adverse. He felt that we were going back upon the commitments into which
we had entered with him and that it was most embarrassing for him to be con¬
fronted with an agreement from the Yuvraj on this matter. He also said that
 UN COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRATION 293

it was with a view to avoid this embarrassment that he stipulated for a settle¬
ment of these issues in advance of his leaving the State and the Yuvraj join¬
ing. In his usual vein, he was prepared to quit rather than submit. I have
sent word to him that he should not approach this matter on this basis. After
all, the property which he would have managed as Ruler under State Depart¬
ments really belongs to the State. It is not his personal property. The grants
which he would get would be grants from the State. Technically, it is an un-
contestable proposition that the State Government should have a measure of
say. On the other hand, our position has been to retain as much as we can
hold and to give [in] only when we have to. In this particular case, I told him
that both logic and precedents were entirely on the side of Sheikh Sahib.
After all, in this year of grace 1949 it would be difficult to find any sane
person in India who would agree that fishing rights or fishing lodges or rakhs
were essential for the dignity of a Ruler. Furthermore, nobody could contest
that the rakhs would be better utilised for the Grow More Food campaign.

I told him that in our settlements with our rulers we have not provi¬
ded for a single property except a palace to be maintained out of the State
funds. All the other properties such as shooting lodges etc. were all treated
as pi ivate property or were looked after by the State Government, with the
Ruler having special rights. If he was prepared to have this position, no¬
thing could please Sheikh Sahib more. I then explained that in the settle¬
ment which we had reached, we had preserved for the Ruler the whole of
the State property and secured a grant of Rs. 5 lakhs. In return all that
he had to do was to administer it in consultation with the Prime Minister.
Tnis obviously did not mean day-to-day management, but it only meant that
in major matters he could keep the Prime Minister in touch. As regards the
officei whom he would appoint on the recommendation of the Prime Minister,
personally if I were the Ruler I would tell the Prime Minister that I propose
to do it .41 myself and there was no point in having unnecessarily another
officer. I could justify it on the ground that I had ample time of my own
and wanted to keep myself busy. I think H.H. will now agree, but if there is
any difficulty, as I wrote to you, I would tackle H.H. either in Poona or here.

3. As regards the Dharmarth Trust, the position is that the Yuvraj has no locus
standi. I think, according to the Ain, i.e., the Deed of Trust, the Ruler in
his personal capacity is the chairman of the Trust. H.H. would, I think, be
quite prepared to have an audit done, but it must be by an officer of the Govern¬
ment of India. This would be better in the interests of everybody because
insofar as the allegations against the Dharmarth Trust are concerned, Govern¬
ment is a party to the dispute and, therefore, it would not be proper to leave
•he audu to an officer of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. If you approve
o e i ea t at it should be audited by one of our own accounts officers, then
can prevai upon H.H. to accept our proposal regarding audit.
294 SARDAR PATEI.’S CORRESPONDENCE

4. H.H. also sent word to me about his privy purse for last year which is
owing to him both irom the State as well as from us. I hope you would be
able to fix up at least the latter. I believe Sheikh Sahib is objecting to the
payment of Rs. 6 lakhs on the ground of some adjustments which he has to
make. He seems to be inclined to bleed the Maharaja to the last drop.

Yours sincerely,
V. Shankar

V. P. Menon, Esq., csi, cie

Adviser, Ministry of States
New Delhi

235
New Delhi,
30 August 1949
My dear Vallabhbhai,
I am sorry I have not written to you for some days. I went
to Kanpur and then I had to go to Allahabad for a brief visit
owing to Indira’s1 illness.
There are a host of matters of importance on which I should
like to have a talk with you. But it becomes difficult to write
lengthy letters on each subject. H. V. R. Iengar came to me to¬
day and gave me your message about my visiting Bombay. I
shall certainly try to do so. I am going to Allahabad on
Saturday and Sunday next, 3 and 4 September. I shall try to come
to Bombay early on the morning of the 5th from Allahabad, re¬
turning the next day. I do not want any engagement in Bombay
except to meet you.
The UN Kashmir Commission people came to see Bajpai
today and put forward their proposal for arbitration regarding the
truce, [Admiral] Nimitz as arbitrator. The U.S. Ambassador is
coming to see me tomorrow with a special message from President
Truman about this matter. The U. K. High Commissioner is
also seeing me tomorrow, probably with the same object in view.
All this barrage is, I suppose, meant to sweep^us away. But I
am quite clear in my mind that we should not accept this pro¬
posal. I am sure you must be of the same opinion. I shall meet
the Commission myself day afterj^tomorrow.

Prime Minister of India

I Mrs Indira Gandhi, daughter of Nehru, now
 UN COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRATION 295

I should have liked to send you our draft reply. But perhaps
this cannot be delayed too long. I could send someone like Vishnu
Sahay with it to you, or Bajpai could go.
Indira was suddenly taken ill with some infection. She is a
little better now, but she is still in hospital now in Allahabad.
Here the interminable debates in the Congress Party go on.
The C. A. [Constituent Assembly] is likely to last till at least 22
September.

Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Bombay
 CHAPTER XVIII

CENTRE’S CONTROL OVER KASHMIR

236

Bombay
3 September 1949
My dear Dr. John Matthai,
I believe the question of arrears of privy purse of His
Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir is pending with your Minis¬
try. We have fixed his privy purse at 15 lakhs, out of which 6
lakhs would be paid by the Jammu & Kashmir Government and
9 lakhs by us. The Maharaja has not received any privy purse
during, I believe, the whole of last year. This was because
Sheikh Sahib said that he could not afford to pay anything more
than 6 lakhs, whereas the Maharaja used to be entitled to some¬
thing like 20-21 lakhs or more. I am sure you will realise the diffi¬
culty of the Maharaja’s position. He has been putting his trust in
us and has always deferred to our views every time that the
Sheikh Sahib has been making demands on him. I feel that it
would be a breach of faith on our part if we could not give
him an amount which we felt was the minimum necessary ac¬
cording to the standards which we have applied to other Princes.
Indeed, if we fixed his privy purse on the basis of the scales ap¬
plied to other Princes, his privy purse would be much higher. I
hope, therefore, that in these circumstances you will kindly see
your way to apply the existing arrangement with retrospective
effect and sanction the additional payment of Rs. 9 lakhs for
last year as well. This is a commitment which I feel we should
honour. Where crores are being spent on Kashmir, I think we
should not mind these few lakhs.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Dr. John Matthai

Minister for Finance
New Delhi

296
 237
New Delhi
7 September 1949

My dear Sardar,
This is to acknowledge your personal letter of the 3rd ins¬
tant regarding the privy purse for the Maharaja of Kashmir.
This matter was discussed at the Cabinet meeting last week. The
decision arrived at was that we should accept the obligation to
pay the Maharaja Rs. 9 lakhs a year until such time as the Kashmir
problem is finally settled. In pursuance of this decision, I have
already instructed the Finance Ministry to pay Rs. 5 lakhs,
which we can supplement by an additional Rs. 2 lakhs, should
the Maharaja require more money immediately. As regards
payment for 1948-49, I have looked through the relevant papers
both in the States Ministry and in ours, and the question as to
whether a decision has been arrived at on this matter appears to
be not free from doubt. What we have to do is to defer a
final decision until your return to Delhi. As the immediate re¬
quirements of the Maharaja will be met by the payments al¬
ready made, and the additional payments that we are prepared
to make, I hope you will agree that there is no serious objec¬
tion to this question being left over for further discussion with
you in the light of the recorded discussions.
I am glad to learn that you are feeling better and able to
apply your mind to current problems. We are hard at work on
the economic situation, and hope to be able to come to some
definite decisions in the course of a fortnight. I would like very
much to take an opportunity of meeting you in Bombay to dis¬
cuss some of these matters before we finalise our views. I shall
give you sufficient notice of my programme.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
John Matthai
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Bombay

297
 238
Bombay
9 September 1949

My dear Dr. John Matthai,

Thank you for your letter dated 7 September 1949.
I am glad that you have already made arrangements for
immediate payment to His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir of
a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs and that you are prepared to supplement it
by an additional sum of Rs. 2 lakhs. I have no objection to the
question relating to 1948-49 being kept pending until my return
to Delhi.
I am looking forward to meeting you when you come here.
I myself have been very worried about the economic situation and
wrote to Jawaharlal about a week or fortnight ago asking him to
consult you about the deteriorating situation. I hope he has done
so because he told me when he was here that he was going to fix
up an appointment for discussing the matter with you.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Dr. John Matthai

New Delhi

239
56 The Mount
Kasauli
6 September 1949

My dear Sardar Patelji,

This is to intimate you that the wedding of my son, Yuvraj
Karan Singh, has been fixed for the month of January 1950. The
wedding arrangements have to be made well beforehand. Ac¬
cording to the State traditions and customs, the State sanctions
the wedding expenses and also fixes an allowance for the Yuvram.
I shall be obliged if these two matters are taken up by the Mate
Government and the Government of India and a sum [for] wedding

298
MAHARAJA 1IARI SINGH AND
MAHARANI OF KASHMIR WITH YUVRAj KARAN SINGH AND
YUVRANI ON
I HE OCCASION OF THE YUVRAJ S WEDDING
GROUP PHOTOGRAPH OF MEMBERS OF UNCIP (UN COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
ON THEIR ARRIVAL IN INDIA IN MAY 1948
 centre’s control over kashmir 299

expenses (a minimum of Rs. 10 lakhs) is sanctioned and paid to

the Yuvraj, and an allowance of Rs. 50,000 per year fixed for
the Yuvrani. As you know, he is our only son, and what is more
he is marrying in the very wealthy independent Kingdom of
Nepal; therefore 10 lakhs will barely meet the expenses which we
will have to incur for the wedding.
I shall be extremely grateful if you will kindly move in the
matter at your earliest convenience.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
[Tara Devi]
Maharani of Kashmir

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

240
Bombay
9 September 1949
My dear Maharani Saheba,
Thank you for your letter of 6 September 1949 regarding a
grant from the State for wedding expenses and an allowance for
the Yuvrani.
I am sure you will agree that the request should have come
from His Highness the Maharaja. However, we have this matter
already under consideration.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
Her Highness Maharani Tara Devi
Maharani of Kashmir
56 The Mount
Kasauli
 241
Srinagar
17 September 1949
My dear Sardarji,
Jai Hind.
I pray and hope that you are progressing to better health.
God must spare you to the country for many years to come be¬
cause vve need you so desperately.
As probably you may be aware, we are holding the annual
session of the National Conference on the 24th of this month
in Srinagar. We all wish you could pay us a visit to Srinagar on
this occasion. Kashmir longs for your darshan. Your presence at
the annual session would lend us more courage and greater deter¬
mination to face the numerous difficulties which beset our path.
But probably your recent illness will not permit you to take
the arduous journey to Kashmir. But we all expect you to lend us
your blessings on the occasion and advice to guide us to right
decisions.
With sincerest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Ghulam Bakhshi

Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

Bombay

242
New Delhi
14 October 1949

My dear V. Shankar,
I saw H. M. Transport [N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar], who
told me that Sheikh Abdullah had written to him that the draft
Art. 306-A (to which Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues had
agreed) had not met with the approval of the Working Committee
of the National Conference. Sheikh Abdullah has sent an alter¬
native draft which merely says that the provisions of the Constitu¬
tion shall apply to Kashmir only in regard to the acceded subjects

300
 centre’s control over kashmir
301

and that the Dominion Parliament shall be entitled to legislate

in regard to Kashmir only in respect of the acceded subjects.
A further proviso is made that the Government of Kashmir shall
mean His Highness the Maharaja acting on the advice of the
Council of Ministers as at present constituted and not on his
individual judgment or discretion.
2. Parts II, III and IV of the Constitution would apply auto¬
matically to Kashmir unless the position is expressly saved. These
refer to Fundamental Rights, Citizenship and Directive Principles.
What is worrying Sheikh Abdullah and the Working Committee
of the National Conference is that if these general provisions
become applicable to Kashmir also, their legislation against
other citizens of India in respect of acquisition etc. of property will
become invalid. The Kashmiris are perhaps worried about the
occupation of their country by Punjabis ! ! H. M. Transport told
Mr. Beg that Kashmir’s accession to India would imply its accep¬
tance of at least these general conditions.
3. The Sheikh’s argument regarding the present draft of Art.
306-A is more involved. He says that the preamble says that
it will be short-lived and the Constituent Assembly of the State
can terminate the Article and thereupon all the provisions of the
Constitution would apply. H. M. Transport has told Mr. Beg that
the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir can be expected to act
reasonably. (I do not follow the intricacies of Sheikh Sahib’s
arguments on this point.)
4. The position at present is that H. M. Transport has sent for
Sheikh Abdullah and will persuade him not to go back on the
draft which was agreed to in the presence of the Prime Minister.
As I understand it, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is of the view
that if the Sheikh persists in moving amendments, on his head
be it—we cannot do anything more in the matter.
5. I mentioned the above to V. P. Menon, who asked me to
convey this to you.
Yours sincerely,
Vishnu Sahay
Shri V. Shankar, ics
 243

New Delhi
15 October 1949
My dear Sardarji,
Sheikh Abdullah and two colleagues of his had a talk with
me for about an hour and a half this morning. It was a long
drawn out argument, and, as I told you this morning, there was
no substance at all in the objections that they put forward to our
draft. At the end of it all, I told them that I had not expected
that, after having agreed to the substance of our draft both at
your house and at the party meeting, they would let me and
Panditji down in the manner they were attempting to do. In
answer, Sheikh Abdullah said that he felt very grieved that I
should think so but that in the discharge of his duty to his own
people he found it impossible to accept our draft as it was. I told
him thereafter to go back and think over all that I had told them
and hoped that he would come back to me in a better frame of
mind in the course of the day or tomorrow.
I have since thought over the matter further and dictated a
draft which, without giving up the essential stands we have taken
in our original draft, readjusts it in minor particulars in a way
which I am hoping Sheikh Abdullah would agree to.
I discussed this draft with the Drafting Committee in the
evening and one or two small suggestions which they made have
been incorporated in it. I enclose a copy of this redraft as
also of my letter to Sheikh Abdullah for your information.
I trust that this will meet with your approval.
Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi
Enel.: 2

302
 ENCLOSURE I

REDRAFT OF ARTICLE 306-A

306-(A) (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution—

Provisions with respect to the State (a) the provisions of Article 211-A

of Jammu and Kashmir. of this Constitution shall not

apply in relation to the State
of Jammu and Kashmir;
(b) the power of Parliament to
make laws for the State shall be
limited to
(i) those matters in the Union
List and the Concurrent
List which are declared by
the President to correspond
to matters specified in the
Instrument of Accession
governing the accession of
that State to the Dominion
of India as the matters
with respect to which the
Dominion legislature may
make laws for that State,
and
(ii) such other matters in the
said lists as with the
concurrence of the Govern¬
ment of that State, the
President may, by order,
specify
(c) the provisions of Article 1 and
Part II of this Constitution shall
apply in relation to that State;
(d) the other provisions of this
Constitution shall apply in
relation to that State subject to
such exceptions and modifica¬
tions as the President may, by
order, specify

303
304 sardar patel’s correspondence

(i) after consultation with the

Government of that State,
in cases where such excep¬
tions or modifications arc
necessary by reason of, or,
are incidental to, or are
consequential upon, the
provisions of clause (a) or
clause (b) of this article;
and
(ii) with the concurrence of
that Government, in other
cases,

(2) not withstanding anything in the preceding clause of this article,

from such date as he may specify, the President may, on the recommendation
of the Constituent Assembly, constituted for the purpose of framing the Consti¬
tution for the State, direct that this article shall cease to be operative, or shall
be operative only with such exceptions and modifications as may be agreed on.
N. Gopalaswami
15-10-49.

ENCLOSURE II

New Delhi
15 October 1949

My dear Sheikh Abdullah,

Our discussion this morning, as I indicated to you, left me even more
distressed than I have been since I received your last letter from Srinagar.
But this personal reaction of mine is irrelevant when I feel weighted with
the responsibility of finding a solution for the difficulties that, after Panditji
left for America and within the last few days, have been created, from my
point of view, without adequate excuse.
In spite of this personal feeling, I am as anxious and keen now as ever I
have been to see that you are not given any cause for genuine or even imagined
grievance in regard to the policy that the Government of India are following
in relation to Kashmir. I have, therefore, since you left me this morning,
tried to find a way out of the present situation in regard to Article 306-A.
I enclose a draft of Article 306-A with the language of it readjusted
so as to meet practically all your main points.
I do not wish to write a thesis on the changes that I have made. \ou
wiU be able to recognise them easily. If you wish to have any further eluadauon
 centre’s control over kashmir 305

in the matter, I would request you to come over and discuss it frankly
with me.
I do hope you will appreciate the gesture I am making. If you aic
agreeable to this new draft being substituted for the one of which the Draft¬
ing Committee has already given notice, I shall ask the Drafting Committee
to give notice of this draft in substitution of the other one. Personally, I should
like you to move this draft yourself in the House. We shall be there to support
you, and I hope the debate would be maintained at such a high level that a
report of it, when cabled to America, will have an effect on the discussions
of the Kashmir problem, that may there be going on, which will be of the
maximum help to Panditji.
I am looking forward to your rising to the occasion.
Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami

The Hon’ble Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah

New Delhi

244
New Delhi
16 October 1949
My dear Gopalaswami,
Thank you for your letter of 15 October, which I received
only this afternoon on my return from the Constituent Assembly.
I find there are some substantial changes over the original
draft, particularly in regard to the applicability of fundamental
rights and directive principles of State policy. You can yourself
realise the anomaly of the State becoming part of India and at
the same time not recognising any of these provisions.
I do not at all like any change after our party has approved
of the whole arrangement in the presence of Sheikh Sahib himself.
Whenever Sheikh Sahib wishes to back out, he always confronts
us with his duty to the people. Of course, he owes no duty to India
or to the Indian Government, or even on a personal basis, to you
and the Prime Minister who have gone all out to accommodate him.
In these circumstances, any question of my approval does not
arise. If you feel it is the right thing to do, you can go ahead with it.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
New Delhi

S. C.-20
 245

New Delhi
18 October 1949
My dear Sardarji,

Herewith for your information copies of a letter from Sheikh

Abdullah, dated yesterday, and my reply to it.

Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE I

LETTER FROM SHEIKH ABDULLAH TO MR. N. GOPALASWAMI

AYYANGAR

17 October 1949

The events that took place this morning in the Constituent Assembly have
deeply distressed me and my three colleagues, representing Kashmir in the
Constituent Assembly.

2. In my letter of 12 October 1949 I had told you that the draft Article
306-A handed over by you to Mr. Beg [Mirza Afzal Beg]1 was not acceptable
to us, as it failed to implement the pledges given to us by Panditji on behalf
of the Government of India and was totally opposed to the stand taken up
by the National Conference in this matter right from the beginning and
approved by Panditji and Sardar Patel in a number of public speeches, and we
submitted our alternative draft, which restricted the power of Parliament to
make laws for the State and the application of the provisions of the Consti¬
tution in relation to the State in matters which directly related to the three
subjects specified in the Instrument of Accession in accordance with the assu¬
rances given to us by Panditji. After that, the position was discussed several
times with you by my representatives, and during the night of 15 October, I
received another draft from you along with the letter of that date. In reply,
on the 16th morning, I informed you that it was not possible to accept your
revised draft, and, in order to accommodate your viewpoint to the maximum
extent possible, I submitted another draft to you, which, as I stated in my

1 Member of Abdullah Ministry

306
 307
centre’s control over kashmir

letter dated 15 October, went far beyond the sphere in respect of which we had
acceded to India. I clearly told you in that letter that it was not possible for
me to go beyond this draft and requested you to accept it. You further discussed
the matter with my representatives, and another draft, prepared by you in con¬
sultation with them, was sent to me by you through them. Yesterday after¬
noon this draft was finalised, and, on the assurance given by you to Mr. Beg
that this finally revised draft will be put up before the Constituent Assembly
on behalf of the Drafting Committee, he withdrew his amendment, about the
moving of which in the Constituent Assembly he had given notice to the Secre¬
tary of the Assembly. I also wrote to you a letter expressing my gratefulness
to you for the pains you had taken in the matter and for the final draft, which
had been accepted by you on behalf of the Government, and I informed you
therein that Mr. Beg had written to the Secretary of the Constituent Assembly

for withdrawing his amendment.

3. This morning when we expected the final draft, which had appeared
in the List of Amendments circulated by the Secretary of the Constituent
Assembly, to come up before the Assembly, you and Maulana [Azad] Sahib came
to me and asked me if I could accept an important change in the Explanation
to Sub-clause (b) of Clause (I) of the draft Article 306-A, as appearing in
the List of Amendments. After careful consideration of the proposed amend¬
ment in the Explanation, my colleagues and I told you both in the lobby
that it was not possible for us to accept this change in the final dtaft and you
and Maulana Sahib left us. While we were still discussing the matter in the
lobby amongst ourselves, the draft Article 306-A was moved by you in the
Constituent Assembly, and, when part of your speech was over, we were told
by someone that the draft Article had been taken up by the Assembly, and,
therefore, we took our seats in the Assembly Hall. We could not conceive that
any amendment in the final draft, as circulated in the List of Amendments,
would be made by you without conveying your final decision in the matter
to us, and so we took it for granted that the final draft Article 306-A was
presented before the Assembly in the form in which it had our consent; and,
therefore, when it was passed by the Assembly, we did not take part in the
debate. While Maulana Sahib and you came to us to discuss the matter
with us in the lobby, I clearly told you that, in the event of any change in
the finalised draft Article 306-A, we should be at liberty to move the amend¬
ment, of which notice had been given by Mr. Beg and his two other collea¬
gues and which had been withdrawn on the express assurance given by you
yesterday. In these circumstances, it was not possible for us to move any
amendment and we did not get an occasion to express our views on the
matter before the open House.

4. As I have told you before, I and my colleagues have been extremely

pained by the manner in which the thing has been done, and, after careful
 sardar patel’s correspondence

consideration of the matter, we have [arrived] at the conclusion that it is not

possible for us to let the matter rest here. As I am genuinely anxious that
no unpleasant situation should arise, I would request you to see if even now
something could be done to rectify the position. In case I fail to hear from
you within a reasonable time, I regret to say that no course is left open for us
but to tender our resignation from the Constituent Assembly.

ENCLOSURE II

New Delhi
18 October 1949
My dear Sheikh Abdullah,

I opened and read your letter dated 17 October 1949 when I returned
home after the close of the prolonged sitting of the Constituent Assembly yes¬
terday.

2. It would be too mild a description of my first reaction to your letter

if I said that it was a painful surprise to me that you should have chosen
to write to me in the terms you have done. It is clear that behind all that
you have said in the letter there is an undercurrent of feeling that the only
person that has, and could have, a sense of grievance in connection with
this matter is yourself. Nothing could be farther away from a correct,
balanced appreciation of the facts.

3. You have ended up your letter with a sentence which reads like an
ultimatum. I am sure that, after you had slept over what you had written
to me yesterday evening, you have yourself come to realise that you should
not have written to me in that way.

4. I do not propose to deal with the history of the drafting of Article

306-A which, in its final form the Assembly adopted unanimously and without
a single dissentient voice and without a speech from anybody raising any note
of criticism. It is true that after having unsuccessfully attempted, along
with Maulana Azad, to persuade you to agree willingly to the substitution
of the words “for the time being in office” for the word “appointed”, I did
move the article with that amendment after obtaining the permission of the
President to do so. The whole House accepted this. I am sorry that you
could not move any amendment of your own as against the one I moved.
There was, however, nothing to prevent you or any of your colleagues from
opposing the amendment that I did move, and as a matter of fact, wc were
looking forward to your making a speech on the whole of the article, and
believe the President waited for a minute or two for Members to rise lor mak¬
ing speeches before he put the draft article to the House.
 309
centre’s control over kashmir

5. Article 306-A, as finalised in the agreement between us, was given

notice of on the evening of the 16th after I got your letter of that date and
it was immediately circulated to the Members of the House. The attempt
made by me and Maulana Azad the next morning, when the House was
sitting, to persuade you to accept a trivial change was due to the desire ex¬
pressed by a large number of the leading Members of the House. All of us,
including myself, Maulana Azad and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, were of the
opinion that it was necessary from many points of view that the change sugges¬
ted should be accepted. Personally, having agreed with you to the language
of the original draft, I felt a special responsibility in agreeing to this change.
And I may tell you at once that I agreed to it because I was, and am, con¬
vinced that the change in the actual words used in that particular connection
did not alter the meaning of the draft agreed to between us.

6. I should think that it is impossible to escape the correctness of what

I have just now said. The words in the Explanation as agreed to between
us are “Council of Ministers appointed under the Maharaja’s Proclamation
dated 5 March 1948.” The words appearing in the Article as passed yester¬
day are “the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the
Maharaja’s Proclamation dated 5 March 1948.” Under the Article, the
Council of Ministers has to be consulted on certain matters and its con¬
currence has to be obtained in other matters. It is obvious that members of
this Council appointed under the Maharaja’s Proclamation cannot give their
advice or concurrence unless they happen to be functioning, that is, in office,
at the time when such advice or concurrence has to be given. Nor can there
be any members of the Council competent to give their advice or concurrence
unless they were persons appointed under the Maharaja’s Proclamation. I
hope you will, on reflection, realise that the change of words does not con¬
stitute the slightest change in sense or substance.

7. In the circumstances, I am unable on the merits to appreciate your

suggestion that something should be done “to rectify the position.” There is
nothing, so far as I can see, which needs rectification. But if you think other¬
wise, you and your colleagues, who are Members of the Assembly, might take
such steps as the rules of the House may allow for carrying out any rectifica¬
tion that you may desire and, if any concrete proposal is made, I can assure
you, on behalf of the Government of which I am a Member, that your pro¬
posal would receive our best consideration on its merits. I am bound to add,
however, that there was nothing in the manner in which the Article was
moved and passed which laid itself open to any criticism. It was both politi¬
cally and parliamentarily unexceptionable.

8. I do not consider, therefore, that there is any justification for your

entertaining any idea of resignation from the Constituent Assembly. The
step, if taken, would produce the most unwelcome and serious repercussions in
310 sardar patel’s correspondence

Kashmir, India and the world, and I must ask you to communicate with
die Prime Minister before you decide on anything like it. For myself, I shall
pass on to him your letter and this reply of mine to it.
With very kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
N. Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah
New Delhi

246
EXTRACT

New Delhi
3 November 1949
My dear Jawaharlal,
There was some difficulty about the provision relating to
Kashmir. Sheikh Sahib went back on the agreement which he had
reached with you in regard to the provision relating to Kashmir.
He insisted on certain changes of a fundamental character which
would exclude in their application to Kashmir the provisions re¬
lating to citizenship and fundamental rights and make it necessary
in all these matters as well as others not covered by the
accession to three subjects to seek the concurrence of the State
Government which is sought to define as the Maharaja acting on
the advice of the Council of Ministers appointed under the pro¬
clamation of 8 March 1948. After a great deal of discussion, I
could persuade the party to accept all the changes except the last
one, which was modified so as to cover not merely the first
Ministry so appointed but any subsequent Ministries which may be
appointed under that proclamation. Sheikh Sahib has not re¬
conciled himself to this change, but we could not accommodate
him in this matter and the provision was passed through the
House as we had modified. After this he wrote a letter to
Gopalaswami Ayvangar threatening to resign from the membership
of the Constituent Assembly. Gopalaswami has replied asking
him to defer his decision until you returned.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

Prime Minister
 CHAPTER XIX

UN COMMISSION REPORT

247
New Delhi
4 December 1949

My dear Vallabhbhai,
I enclose a note on Kashmir and the Security Council. I
prepared this after a talk with Gopalaswami to discuss the matter
with Sheikh Abdullah. There is general agreement about this
line. I should like to fix up a meeting at which you, Gopala¬
swami, Sheikh Abdullah, Bajpai and I will be present.
Yours,
Jawaharlal
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

KASHMIR AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

From such information as we have been able to gather, the UN Com¬

mission is going to present its report to the Security Council on or about the
16th of December. This report is likely to be largely a narrative, avoiding
criticism of India or Pakistan and, generally, taking credit to itself for any
good that might have been achieved. They confess that the possibilities of
mediation open to them have been exhausted within the strict limits of the
present terms of reference and that the framework was too narrow. While
the situation was a changing and dynamic one, the old restricted framework
continued and came in the way of any new approach.
They still talk in terms of a plebiscite and say that this can only take
place when the large numbers of troops in the State have been removed.
According to them a demilitarisation of the State is essential to permit a speci¬
fic settlement ot the dispute. Therefore, in order to make possible the hold-
ing of a plebiscite, conditions favourable to it should be established as early as
possible and thus the wishes of the people may be ascertained.
The Commission is likely to recommend a single mediator, instead of the
present five-member body. This single person should have ample authority

311
312 sardar patel’s correspondence

and undivided respomibili.y to approach the parties and bring about a com-
promise.

Further that they have not quite given up the idea of arbitration and
think that this might be considered as a possible method.

They have been considering putting forward recommendations to the

Security Council on the following lines:

(1) 1 he present cease-fire line should be maintained, pending final

settlement of the future of the State, and both Governments should
abstain from any extension of military or civil control beyond the present
cease-fire line.

(2) A single mediator be appointed with broad authority from the

Council. He should take into consideration

(a) the basic principles contained in the resolutions of the

UN Commission which [have] already been agreed to by both
Governments,

(b) bringing about the necessary conditions for the conduct of

a plebiscite, and

(c) the Security Council should consult representatives of the

two Governments in order to determine the terms of reference of the
mediator. This should include the possibility of arbitration in regard
to any issue involving demilitarisation.

Taken as a whole, this approach is unsatisfactory. It does not differ greatly

from the previous approach, except for the fact that there is one mediator
instead of five members of the Commission. If the old approach is followed,
then the old deadlock continues. So far as arbitration is concerned, we have
made it clear that this is not applicable in the present circumstances.

The whole point of a reconsideration of the position by the Security

Council is that a way might be found out of the present deadlock. If a
mediator has to be appointed, then he must have full authority to explore
every possible avenue which might lead to a settlement. He must not be
bound by what has taken place previously. Of course he will no doubt take
into consideration past history and the resolutions of the Security Council and
the Commission. But, otherwise he should be given a free hand. Arbitration
should be ruled out completely.

We cannot rule out a plebiscite, however impracticable it may have

become.

Thus our objective should be to get broader and briefer terms of reference
for the single mediator. The mediator should be instructed, with due regard
to the resolutions of the Council and the Commission, to suggest a just and
peaceful settlement of the dispute over Kashmir, taking into account the
 UN COMMISSION REPORT 313

present situation in all its aspects, and the basic facts of history, geography,
language and culture of the State.

New Delhi
4 December 1949

248
New Delhi
4 February 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,
I enclose a copy of a telegram received today about an article
in the New York Times on Kashmir. Anything more poisonous
it is difficult to imagine.
Yours,
Jawaharlal

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

Washington D. C.
3 February 1950
Press Foreign
New Delhi

FOR MENON FROM SEN. UNDER CAPTION “DANGEROUS KASHMIR” NEW YORK TIMES

TODAY HAS HALF-COLUMN LEADER CRITICAL OF INDIA. EDITORIAL SAYS INDIA

AND PAKISTAN ARE IN PROCESS OF COMMITTING NATIONAL SUICIDE AFTER

DISMISSING ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AS BEING IRRELEVANT. EDITORIAL SAYS THAT

PAKISTAN SUGGESTED MINOR CHANGES OF NO IMPORTANCE TO MCNAUGHTON’s

PROPOSAL WHILE INDIA “SUBMITTED AMENDMENTS WHICH IN EFFECT WERE

REJECTION OF PROPOSAL.” EDITORIAL SAYS PLAIN FACT OF MATTER IS THAT FOR ALL

PRACTICAL PURPOSES INDIA IS REFUSING ARBITRATION. INDIANS CANNOT BLAME

OUTSIDERS FOR DRAWING CONCLUSION THAT THEY CONSIDER THEIR CASE TOO

WEAK TO BEAR TEST OF SOLUTIONS THAT IMPARTIAL FIVE NATION UN COMMISSION

AND EQUALLY IMPARTIAL NEGOTIATOR HAVE PUT FORWARD. INDIA SEIZED

HYDERABAD BECAUSE IT WAS RACIALLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY HINDU STATE

WITH A MOSLEM PRINCE. SHE IS CLAIMING KASHMIR AN OVERWHELMING MOHAM¬

MEDAN STATE RACIALLY BECAUSE ITS HINDU RULER SIGNED INSTRUMENT OF

ACCESSION TO INDIA. IT LOOKS LIKE GETTING BEST OF BOTH WORLDS. INDIANS

314 sardar patel’s correspondence
CONTEND THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT JUST PARTY TO KASHMIR DISPUTE. UN REPRESEN¬

TATIVES DO NOT AGREE. IF INDIA IS IN GOOD FAITH SHE WILL ACCEPT UN MEDIATION.

TIME HAS COME FOR BOTH STATES TO SHOW MORE GOODWILL ON ISSUE THAT

IS PERILOUS FOR MORE NATIONS THAN THEIR OWN.

INDEMBASSY

249

New Delhi
1 March 1950
My dear Sardarji,
I hope you must have seen the latest proposals put forward
by the Chairman of the Security (Council) in regard to the
Kashmir issue. In this connection I ascertained the views of
my colleagues and handed over a note to the Prime Minister
stating our reactions to these proposals. I am herewith sending a
copy of this note for your perusal.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
S. M. Abdullah
Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi

ENCLOSURE

HAVING CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE LATEST DRAFT RESOLUTION

OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND
KASHMIR HAVE ARRIVED AT THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

1. Ever since India lodged her complaint in the Security Council, the
Representatives of the UK Government have attempted to avoid a clear decision
on the basic complaint and tried to shift the position in favour of Pakistan.
The Government of USA and those under its influence have also from time
to time endorsed this attitude of the UK Government. The Kashmir dispute
has, therefore, come to be viewed in the context of the present international
situation with its compelling necessity upon the Governments of IK and LSA
to make concessions to the Pakistan Government with a view* to gaining its
goodwill and support. Naturally, whatever proposals have emanated from these
Governments for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute have, overtly and
covertly, favoured the position of the Paskistan Government.
 UN COMMISSION REPORT
315

Unfortunately, the conflict in the points of view of the major Powers

inside the UNO greatly influences and prejudices its decisions on various matters.
It will be recalled that at the time of the appointment of the UNCIP by the
Security Council, when the Government of India nominated Czechoslovakia
on the Commission, the membership of this Commission was expanded to
include two more nominees favourable to the Governments of USA and UK.
The purpose of this expansion, decided upon at the last minute, was to swamp
the views of the Czechoslovakian member with an overwhelming majority vote.
The UNCIP, then, proceeded to settle the dispute by negotiations during which
it steadily conceded one point after another to Pakistan, ignoring the basic
issues of the dispute, and manoeuvred in such a way that India, and not
Pakistan, was made to appear to be in the wrong in its stand.
From the Commission’s report, as well as from the minority report of
the Czech member, it is clear that the presence of representative of a Govern¬
ment not favouring the foreign policy of the Governments of USA and UK
was felt to be very embarrassing and the Commission suggested the appoint¬
ment of a single mediator on the ground that a Commission with a composite
membership was fettered in its decisions by the differences of opinion amongst
its various members. The McNaughton proposals and the latest resolution,
viewed in this context, reveal that the dissolution of the UNCIP and the
appointment of a one-man mediator have been stressed for the obvious
purpose of presenting a uniform decision conforming to the requirements of
the avowed policies of the Governments of USA and UK.

Thus a decision on the merits of the case has been sought to be avoided.
All along Pakistan, against whom the complaint was directed, was being con¬
ceded one point after another, so that India at present stands in a guilty
position in the eyes of several members of the UNO. The latest proposals
are a final attempt to push India out of her argument, so that Pakistan,
having scored so much so far, would be afforded the means to be ultimately
an absolute master of the situation in Kashmir. It is a matter of great con¬
cern to us that the fundamental points in dispute have thus been hedged by
considerations of power politics and the basic issues are entirely clouded. The
Security Council has even shelved the Commission’s report for fear that its
discussion might lead to the discussion of the minority report also, which
exposes in no uncertain terms the [discreditable] methods in the functioning of
the Commission. To avoid this, the operative parts of its decisions were sought
to be incorporated in the McNaughton proposals. We have already rejected
them for obvious reasons, and now that the latest resolution is based upon
these proposals nothing has happened to change substantially our opinion about
them.

A perusal of the resolution reveals, amongst other things, that the one-
man mediator, whose functions are supposed to bridge the area of disagreement
316 sardar patel’s correspondence

between the two Governments, has been invested with arbitrary powers to ar¬
rogate to himself the position of a final arbitrator in the outstanding points ol
dispute, as well as the authority to interpret the terms of the agreements so
far reached between the two Govts. From the experience of the past, there
should be no doubt that the appointment of an independent and impartial per¬
son, however high his standing may be, cannot be expected in view of the
present mood of the Security Council. Since all the suggestions for the settle¬
ment of the dispute which have come from the Govts, of USA and UK as well
as from their proteges have consistently favoured Pakistan, there is reason to
believe that the appointment of the mediator will also be influenced by this
consideration. The principle of mediation can be acceptable to us only if the
Commission for mediation has wider terms of reference, including the investi¬
gation of the basic causes of India’s complaint, and if its composition is based
upon the representation of the major parties to the dispute as well as the
two major powers inside the Security Council.

In seeking India’s agreement to the latest proposals, it is clear that she is

sought to be hustled into a commitment, from which she will not be able to re¬
tract later. The absence of the Soviet delegation from the Security Council is
being taken advantage of in order to cut off all support to India’s case on its
merits. We feel that the Govts, of USA and UK are keen on taking the matter
out of the Security Council, so that the cleavage in the points of view of the
two major sides may not expose the proposals to the risk of their discussion
and possible rejection at the hands of the Soviet delegation. We also feel that
India should avail herself of the opportunity of the absence of the Soviet
delegation and press for a unanimous and concurrent vote of the perma¬
nent members of the Security Council on the acceptance or otherwise of these
proposals, without which their validity is in question. Acceptance at this stage
would be undesirable for another reason also. The Soviet delegation has
made it clear that any decision arrived at in their absence would be unaccep¬
table to them and in case India agrees to the proposals she will unnecessarily
antagonise them and at the same time gain nothing in return.

It is, therefore, our considered opinion that the present resolution of the
Security Council, based as it is on the untenable assumptions of the Mc-
Naughton proposals, is totally unacceptable to us. We want to make it clear
once again that any solution which ignores the basic complaint of India and
seeks to violate the integrity of the State and the sovereignty of its lawful Govt.,
will only perpetuate the conflict in Kashmir and such concessions would consti¬
tute a breach of the basic principles of the UN Charter.
Abdullah
Prime Minister,
Jammu & Kashmir State

28-2-50
 250
EXTRACT

Dehra Dun
3 July 1950

My dear Jawaharlal,
I am getting rather worried about Kashmir, particularly the
attitude of Sheikh Sahib, his failure to deal with the Communist
infiltration in the State, and the dissensions in the National
Conference. I have had a talk with P. C. Chaudhuri.1 From
what he tells me it appears that both the National Conference and
Sheikh Sahib are losing their hold on the people of the Valley
and are becoming somewhat unpopular. At the same time, it
appears that there is a marked appreciation of what we have done
for the Valley though they naturally feel that they deserve more.
In such circumstances and in the world situation today, I agree
with you that a plebiscite is unreal. Not only that, it would
be positively dangerous because my own feeling is that once the
talk starts, the non-Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir would start
feeling uneasy and we might be faced with an exodus to India.
This would be an additional point to emphasise in respect of our
stand that the conditions preliminary to plebiscite should be fully
and effectively fulfilled before we can talk of it.
Yours
Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon’ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

251

Ministry of States
New Delhi
4 October 1950
My dear Shankar,
Reference the Abolition of Zamindari Bill sent by Sheikh
Sahib. When I was at Srinagar he was most anxious that this

1 Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

317
318 sardar patel’s correspondence

Bill should become kiw at once as their Kharif [summer harvest]

has begun and people were very uncertain as to who is to pay
what and to whom. Sheikh Sahib was also very difficult over a
provision being put in the law expressly exempting His Highness
the Maharaja s orchards. He argued that an express provision of
that sort would put him wrong with his people and since it was
not obligatory on his Government to take all the orchards in the
State, the matter ot the Maharaja’s orchards could well be left
over lor further consultation between the Government of India
and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. I took the case to
H.M. Transport1 and we went into the various points raised by
me and by the Law Ministry (the latter have not raised any new
important point beyond drafting points). H.M. Transport said
that the best plan would be to invite Sheikh Abdullah to Delhi
along with his legal adviser and I have written to the Sheikh
accordingly. The two points of substance for settling with the
Sheikh are (1) His Highness’ orchards and (2) an enabling provi¬
sion for the landlord to acquire khud kast2 in the land left to him.
2. H.M. Transport has also asked that I should put up the case
to the Foreign Affairs Committee. If this meets with H.M.’s
approval, I shall prepare the case for submission to this Committee
of Cabinet.
Yours sincerely,
Vishnu Sahay
Shri V. Shankar, ics
Private Secretary to H.M. States

252
New Delhi
10 October 1950

My dear Sardarji,
With reference to our talk last evening, I have since been
informed that V.P. [Menon] will not be returning today and that
he might return tomorrow or the day after.
Sheikh Abdullah came to see me last night and I have asked
him to stay on for today. I did so in the hope that V.P. would
be here and yon would be in a position to settle the matter today.
For more reasons than one, I shouldn t like to ask Sheikh Abdullah

1 N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
2 Self-cultivated land
 UN COMMISSION REPORT 319

to stay on here indefinitely. The sooner we close this controversy

the better.
As I told you, the only matter that is sticking is the one
relating to lands which are the private property of the Maharaja.
Most of these are orchards and the new law will not affect or¬
chards. In the list that I have seen, there are only two properties
which could be land cultivated with agricultural crops. These
have since last year been assessed to land revenue. They are,
therefore, practically on the same footing as agricultural land be¬
longing to any other private person. The new law affects owner¬
ship of all agricultural land [although] under orders issued by the
Maharaja himself over twenty years ago all property belonging
to him was exempt from any kind of tax. Unless he is permitted
to give himself this exemption even in the future, these lands
cannot be treated differently from lands belonging to others. As I
told you, the number of properties affected is small and it seems to
me that to bring cultivated land belonging to the Maharaja under
the new law could not reasonably be considered to be unfair.
I am sorry to trouble you, but it would be helpful if you
can consider this matter today so that final instructions could issue
to the Yuvraj about the assent to this new piece of legislation.
As I told you, other matters relating to this legislation, about
which there was some difference of opinion between the J & K
Government and the Government of India, have been satisfactorily
settled.
Sheikh Abdullah urges that this is a matter of urgency be¬
cause the kharif crops are due for harvest very shortly and this
law has to be in force in order that the Government’s grain collec¬
tions might go through smoothly.
Yours sincerely,
Gopalaswami
The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
New Delhi
 253

New Delhi
10 October 1950
My dear Gopalaswami,
Thank you for your letter of 10 October 1950.
Frankly speaking, I do not understand why there should be
an urgency in regard to the private property of the Maharaja.
I can understand some reasons for urgency about the proposed
legislation, but it should not be difficult to separate the question
of the Maharaja’s property from that legislation and to pursue it
further in consultation with the Maharaja himself.
After all, the Jammu & Kashmir Government has no legis¬
lature. One point on which I felt quite strongly when the case
came up before me was that the Jammu & Kashmir Government
should consult public opinion before they pushed through such
controversial legislation. There can be no getting away from the
fact that at present legislation in Jammu & Kashmir is a mere
fiat of the Government. If for some reason or the other we are
forced to concede that public opinion need not be consulted, it is
impossible to do so in the case of the Maharaja, having regard to
the settlements which we have reached about private property
both with him and other Princes. We have no information as
to the purpose for which these various lands are being used,
whether there are any tenants and whether His Highness can part
with them. There is also the question that, for the time being,
the Maharaja is the Ruler of the State and as such there can be
some justification for the view that his lands should not be covered
by legislation but by separate negotiations.
On all these grounds, I feel that if the matter has to be dealt
with in a hurry the least we can do is to exempt these lands from
the proposed legislation, but if the legislation can wait, it would
be best to discuss this matter with the Maharaja and try to come
to an amicable settlement, as we have done in the case of other
Rulers, though not in any similar transaction. I have no doubt
myself that, if things were properly put to the Maharaja having
regard to the actual uses to which various lands are being put, we
might be able to settle this matter without the need for the legis¬
lation covering those lands.

320
 UN COMMISSION REPORT

We have also to bear in mind that under the formula which

you have proposed the lands which will be taken away from the
Maharaja come to about 1,500 acres; the lands which will be left
with him after this transaction may not come up to this figure.
In other words, we would be adversely affecting the Maharaja’s
interests to the extent of at least half the landed propci ty which
we have acknowledged as his private property.
Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

New Delhi

S.C.-21
 EPILOGUE

Although Sardar Patel was the Minister of States, Kashmir affairs

were largely handled by Nehru because of their bearing on India’s
international relations. This did not mean, however, that Patel
did not influence governmental policy on the subject. Indeed, as
the correspondence reveals, it was his major task to persuade the
Maharaja and his advisers to play their part in bringing about the
required adjustments in the constitutional and administrative spheres.
After long and fruitless correspondence with Liaquat Ali, Nehru
in a letter dated 22 December 1947 informed the Prime Minister
of Pakistan that if Pakistan did not deny the invaders assistance
and the use of Pakistan territory for operations against Jammu
and Kashmir, India would take such action as was consistent
with the provisions of the UN Charter to protect its interests.
There was no response from the Pakistan Prime Minister. On
1 January 1948 India submitted a formal complaint to the
Security Council.
When the Council took up the matter, Pakistan emphatically
denied that it had any part in the invasion.
Between 22 January and 4 February, the Security Council
held eight meetings. A number of draft resolutions were put for¬
ward by its members.
On 21 April the Council adopted a resolution recommending
inter alia the setting up of a Commission (the membership of which
had already been established by the Council in its resolution of
20 January 1948) to proceed at once to the Indian sub-continent.
India informed the Council that it would not be possible to im¬
plement those parts of the resolution to which it had already
objected. If, however, the Commission was sent, the Government
of India would be glad to confer with it.
When the Commission landed in Karachi on 5 July 1948, Sir
Zafrullah Khan confessed to the Commission that three Pakistani
brigades had been on Kashmir territory since May. He explain¬
ed this incursion as an act of self-defence.
Two years later, on 15 September 1950, Sir Owen Dixon
who succeeded the Commission as UN Representative for India
and Pakistan, reached the conclusion:

323
324 SARDAR PATEL S CORRESPONDENCE

“ . . . when the frontier of the State of Jammu and

Kashmir was crossed ... by the hostile elements, it was
contrary to international law and when in May 1948 units
of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the
State, that too was inconsistent with international law.”
The legality of the State’s accession to India was not ques¬
tioned by the Security Council or the Commission. In fact, on 4
February 1948, the U.S. Representative in the Security Council said:
“The external sovereignty of Kashmir is no longer under
the control of the Maharaja. . . . With the accession of
Jammu and Kashmir to India, this foreign sovereignty went
over to India and is exercised by India, and that is how
India happens to be here as a petitioner.”
The UN Commission achieved little except to bring about a
cease-fire on 1 January 1949 followed by a cease-fire line for the
observance of which a group of UN observers was posted on each
side. Its resolution required the withdrawal of Pathan tirbesmen
and Pakistani nationals and its armed forces from the State.
India’s responsibility for internal security as well as the legality
of the Jammu and Kashmir Government was recognised by the
Commission. After Pakistan had carried out its obligations and in
consultation with India, arrangements were to be considered for
the holding of a plebiscite. As Pakistan never honoured its obli¬
gations, the resolution about plebiscite became infructuous.
In April 1954, the Council appointed another representative,
Dr Frank Graham, to bring about demilitarisation of Kashmir in
co-operation with the Governments of India and Pakistan. Dr
Graham toiled for two years to induce India and Pakistan to agree
to a plan of demilitarisation and withdrawal of Indian and Pakis¬
tani troops. The negotiations floundered on the quantum and
character of Indian forces remaining in Kashmir after the with¬
drawal of Pakistani troops.
The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met in August
1953 for direct negotiations. They agreed that preliminary
measures concerning demilitarisation would have to be under¬
taken and when this task was done, a plebiscite administrator
should take the necessary steps to secure a fair and imparti
plebiscite throughout the State. Once again a is an
honour its obligations.
Meanwhile, Pakistan agreed to accept U.S. mil*,a^
Nehru, reacting to this development, told the Indian Parliament
 EPILOGUE
325

on 1 March 1954: “This grant of military aid by the U.S. to Pakis¬

tan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds
to our tensions. It makes it much more difficult to solve the pro¬
blems which have confronted India and Pakistan. . . . There
has thus far been no agreement on this issue (demilitarisation in
Kashmir). Now the whole issue has to be considered from an
entirely different point of view when across the border, across the
cease-fire line on the other side, large additional forces aie being
thrust from outside in Pakistan and put at the disposal of Pakistan.
It does make a difference.”
Addressing a Press Conference in Srinagar in July 1955, Pandit
Pant, then Home Minister, said that the Government of India
had made certain statements when Kashmir acceded to India
namely that the future of the State would be decided by a plebis¬
cite. But circumstances were then different. The time factor was
important and many things had happened since, which ruled out
a plebiscite. He made the statement when Mr Nehru was on a
foreign tour.
Dr Gunnar Jarring, Sweden’s representative in the Security
Council, said in the Council on 24 January 1957: “Thus, for the
time being, the present demarcation line must be respected. This
implies that the use of force aimed at changing the status quo must
be excluded.” This official attitude to the cease-fire line was later
repudiated by President Ayub Khan in an attempt to seize Kashmir
by force in August 1965. This led to Indo-Pakistan war. However,
before the development, Jarring, as Council Representative, and
once again Dr Graham, tried their hand at finding a solution.
But both failed because of their unrealistic attitude to the issue.
A new dimension has been added to the Kashmir problem
by the changing attitude of Mao’s China. At a Press Conference
in Calcutta on 9 December 1956, Prime Minister Chou En-lai
characterised the Kashmir question as “an outstanding issue between
India and Pakistan.” A fortnight later he stated at Karachi: “I
hope Pakistan and India will settle the question directly between
themselves.” It is significant that a joint statement issued by Chou
En-lai and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz of Poland in Peking
on 11 April 1957 expressed the view that the Kashmir question
“should be settled by the countries concerned through peaceful
negotiations and should not be allowed to be made use of by
external forces to create new tensions.”
Even as late as 31 May 1962, the Chinese Government stated
in a note sent to the Government of India: “This attitude of the
326 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

Chinese Government of never getting involved in the dispute over

Kashmir can in no way be distorted and is well known throughout
the world. . . . The Chinese Government only hopes that the
dispute between India and Pakistan will be settled by them peace¬
fully; it has always been against anyone taking advantage of it to
sow discord in the relations between the two countries.”
Mr B. L. Sharma has recalled in his book “The Story of Kash¬
mir” (Asia Publishing House), a significant development that took
place earlier on 16 May 1959, when the Chinese Ambassador in
New Delhi called on the Foreign Secretary and said: “On the
whole India is a friend of China, this has been so in the past thou¬
sand and more years and we believe will certainly continue to be
so in one thousand, ten thousand years to come. The enemy of the
Chinese people lies in the East—the U.S. imperialists have many
military bases in Taiwan, in South Korea, Japan and in the Philip¬
pines which are all directed against China. China’s main attention
and policy of struggle are directed to the East, to the West Pacific
region, to the vicious and aggressive U.S. imperialism, and not to
India or any other country in South-East Asia and South Asia.
Although the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan have joined SEATO
which is designed to oppose China, we have not treated these
three countries as our principal enemy; our principal enemy
is U.S. imperialism. India has not taken part in the South-East
Asia Treaty; it is not an opponent, but a friend to our country.
China will not be so foolish as to antagonise the United States in
the East and again to antagonise India in the West.”
And then the Chinese Ambassador went on to ask the Foreign
Secretary: “It seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts. Is
it not so?”
This was an obvious hint that if India did not agree to
China’s territorial demands it should be prepared to face two
enemies. This coincided with moves behind the scenes for Sino-
Pakistan collusion against India.
In 1960, President Ayub visited Delhi and had inconclusive
talks with Mr Nehru. Pakistan, in the meantime, was building
up its armed strength with U.S. military hardware, and trying
to focus world attention on Kashmir by reviving the controversy
in the Security Council in June 1962.
On 5 August 1965, several thousand Pakistani soldiers in
civilian disguise crossed the cease-fire line and the international
border, meeting with stiff resistance. When the operation did
not succeed, on 1 September the Pakistan army with armour,
 EPILOGUE 327

supported by artillery, committed another aggression in Kashmir

across the cease-fire line and the international border. The Indian
Army hit back by marching towards Lahore, a diversionary
tactic to relieve pressure in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector in Jammu.
The hostilities lasted 21 days. The issue was discussed by the
Security Council and the Secretary-General, U Thant, visited
India and Pakistan to find a formula acceptable to both countries.
The resolution of the Security Council is given in Appendices
twenty-three and twenty-four.
Meanwhile Peking in a note addressed to the Government of
India on 16 September 1965 had stated: “The Chinese Government
has consistently held that the Kashmir question should be settled
on the basis of respect for the Kashmir people’s right of self-
determination as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. That
is what is meant by China’s non-involvement in the dispute between
India and Pakistan.”
Three days later Peking sent another note in which it said:
“The Chinese Government gives all-out support to the people of
Kashmir in their struggle for the right of national self-determi¬
nation.” The note unabashedly converted the Indian citizens of
Kashmir into a nation with a right to have an independent,
sovereign existence. This meant a major shift in Peking’s policy.
The Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Kosygin, in an attempt to
bring about peace between the two countries, invited Mr Lai
Bahadur Shastri, Indian Prime Minister, and Pakistan President
Ayub Khan for talks at Tashkent. The parleys resulted in an
agreement (Tashkent Declaration) signed by the heads of the three
Governments on 10 January 1966. The Declaration provided
for the withdrawal of forces and laid down conditions for promo¬
ting friendly relations between India and Pakistan. Its text is
given in Appendix twenty-five.
The Declaration has been registered with the United Nations
and is an international agreement.
 APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

THE TREATY OF AMRITSAR, 1846

TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT on the one part and
MAHARAJA GULAB SINGH OF JAMMU on the other concluded on the part of
the BRITISH GOVERNMENT by FREDERICK CURRIE, Esquire, and
BREVET-MAJOR HENRY MONTGOMERY LAWRENCE, acting under the
orders of the RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR HENRY HARDINGE, G.C.B., one
of HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL,
GOVERNOR-GENERAL of the possession of the EAST INDIA COMPANY, to
direct and control all their affairs in the EAST INDIES and by MAHARAJA
GULAB SINGH in person—1846

Article 1 : The British Government transfers and makes over for ever
in independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of
his body all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated
to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi
including Chamba and excluding Lahaul, being part of the territories ceded
to the British Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of
Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.

Article 2 : The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing

article to Maharaja Gulab Singh shall be laid down by the Commissioners
appointed by the British Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh respectively
for that purpose and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey.

Article 3 : In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs

by the provisions of the foregoing article Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the
British Government the sum of 75 lakhs of rupees (Nanukshahee), 50 lakhs to be
paid on ratification of this Treaty and 25 lakhs on or before 1 October of the
current year, A.D. 1846.

Article 4 : The limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall

not be at any time changed without concurrence of the British Government.

Article 5 : Maharaja Gulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the

British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself
and the Government of Lahore or any other neighbouring State, and will abide
by the decision of the British Government.

Article 6 : Maharaja Gulab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join,
with the whole of his Military Forces, the British troops, when employed with¬
in the hills or in the territories adjoining his possessions.

329
330 sardar patel’s correspondence
Article 7 : Maharaja Gulab Singh engages never to take or retain in his
service any British subject nor the subject of any European or Amcrcian State
without the consent of the British Government.

Article 8 : Maharaja Gulab Singh engages to respect in regard to the

territory transferred to him, the provisions of Articles V, VI and VII of the

separate Engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar,
dated 11 March 1846.*

Article 9 : The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab
Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies.

Article 10 : Maharaja Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the

British Government and will in token of such supremacy present annually to
the British Government one horse, twelve shawls-goats of approved breed (six
male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.

The treaty of ten articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie,
Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under direc¬
tions of The Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General
on the part of the British Government and by Maharaja Gulab Singh in per¬
son, and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of The Right
Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.G.B., Governor-General.

(Done at Amritsar sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the seventeenth day
of Rubee-ul-Awal 1262 Jigree).
H. Hardinge (Seal)

F. Currie
H. M. Lawrence

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

F. Currie
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General

• Referring to jagirdars, arrears to revenue, and the property in the forts

that are to be transferred
 APPENDIX TWO

MEMORANDUM ON STATES’ TREATIES AND PARAMOUNTCY

PRESENTED BY THE CABINET MISSION TO HIS HIGHNESS
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE CHAMBER OF PRINCES ON
12 MAY 1946

1. Prior to the recent statement of the British Prime Minister in the House
of Commons an assurance was given to the Princes that there was no intention
on the part of the Crown to initiate any change in their relationship with the
Crown or the rights guaranteed by their treaties and engagements without
their consent. It was at the same time stated that the Princes’ consent to any changes
which might emerge as a result of negotiations would not unreasonably be
withheld. The Chamber of Princes has since confirmed that the Indian States
fully share the general desire in the country for the immediate attainment by
India of her full stature. His Majesty’s Government have now declared that
if the successor Government or Governments in British India desire indepen¬
dence, no obstacle would be placed in their way. The effect of these announce¬
ments is that all those concerned with the future of India wish her to attain
a position of independence within or without the British Commonwealth. The
Delegation have come here to assist in resolving the difficulites which stand
in the way of India fulfilling this wish.
2. During the interim period, which must elapse before the coming into
operation of a new constitutional structure under which British India will
be independent or fully self-governing, paramountcy will remain in operation.
But the British Government could not and will not in any circumstances
transfer paramountcy to an Indian Government.
3. In the meanwhile, the Indian States are in a position to play an important
part in the formulation of the new constitutional structure for India, and
His Majesty’s Government have been informed by the Indian States that they
desire, in their own interests and in the interests of India as a whole, both
to make their contribution to the framing of the structure, and to take their
due place in it when it is completed. In order to facilitate this they will
doubtless stengthen their position by doing everything possible to ensure that
their administrations conform to the highest standard. Where adequate
standards cannot be achieved within the existing resources of the State they
will no doubt arrange in suitable cases to form or join administrative units
large enough to enable them to be fitted into the constiutional structure. It
will also strengthen the position of States during this formulative period if the
various Governments which have not already done so take active steps to

331
332 sardar patel’s correspondence

place themselves in close and constant touch with public opinion in their
State by means of representative institutions.

4. During the interim period it will be necessary for the States to conduct
negotiations with British India in regard to the future regulation of matters of
common concern, especially in the economic and financial field. Such negotia¬
tions, which will be necessary whether the States desire to participate in the
new Indian constitutional structure or not, will occupy a considerable period
of time, and since some oi these negotiations may be incomplete when the new
structure comes into being, it will, in order to avoid administrative difficulties,
be necessary to arrive at an understanding between the States and those likely
to control the successor Government or Governments that for a period of time
the then existing arrangements as to these matters of common concern should
continue until the new agreements are completed. In this matter, the British
Government and the Crown Representative will lend such assistance as they
can should it be so desired.

5. When a new fully self-governing or independent Government or Gover¬

nments come into being in British India, His Majesty’s Government’s influence
with these Governments will not be such as to enable them to carry out the
obligations of paramountcy. Moreover, they cannot contemplate that British
troops would be retained in India for this purpose. Thus, as a logical sequence
and in view of the desires expressed to them on behalf of the Indian States,
His Majesty’s Government will cease to exercise the powers of paramountcy.
This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to
the Crown will no longer exist and that all the rights surrendered by the
States to the paramount power will return to the States. Political arrangements
between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India
on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled
either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor
Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into
particular political arrangements with it or them.

APPENDIX THREE

STATEMENT MADE BY HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT, 3 JUNE 1947

THE STATES

His Majesty’s Government wish to make it clear that the decisions an¬
nounced above relate only to British India and that their policy towards
Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12 May
1946 remains unchanged.
 APPENDIX FOUR

CROWN REPRESENTATIVE LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN S ADDRESS

TO A SPECIAL FULL MEETING OF THE CHAMBER OF PRINCES ON
JULY 25 1947

It is a great pleasure and a great privilege for me to address so many

Rulers, Dewans and Representatives of the States of India in this historic
Chamber of Princes. It is the first and the last occasion that I have the
privilege of addressing you as Crown Representative.
I would like to begin by giving you a very brief history of the negotiations
I had conducted since I have been out here and the line that I have taken
up about the States.
There were two distinct problems that faced me. The first was how to
transfer power to British India and the second, how to fit Indian States into
the picture in a manner which would be fair and just to all concerned.
I dealt first with the problem of British India, because you will realize that
until that problem was solved it was quite useless to try to start on a solution
of the problem of the States. So I addressed my mind to the former.
There had been universal acceptance among the States of the Cabinet
Mission’s Memorandum of 12 May and when the political parties accepted the
Statement of 3 June they fully realized and accepted [that] the withdrawal of
paramountcy would enable the States to regain complete sovereignty. That
gave me a starting point from which to try and deal fairly with the States.

But before I got down to dealing with the States there was one other thing
that I clearly had to do. I had to address myself to the problem of the mecha¬
nics of partition—a plan against my personal desires. As you all know, it took
three years to separate Burma from India, in spite of the fact (as I can testify,
as also His Highness of Bundi and others who fought in Burma) that there are
no roads running between India and Burma. Nevertheless, it took three years
to arrange that partition. It took two years to separate the province of Sind from
Bombay. It took two years to separate the province of Orissa from Bihar. Gentle¬
men, we decided that in less than two and a half months we shall have to go
through the partitioning of one of the biggest countries in the world with 400
million inhabitants. There was a reason for the speed. I was quite certain
that while the British overlordship remained no satisfactory conclusion could
be reached psychologically between the parties. So once we got the two
Governments set up and separated, they would be able to try and finish off
the details in an atmosphere of goodwill.

333
334 sardar patel’s correspondence

Now, the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all their obli¬
gations to the Crown. The States will have complete freedom—technically and
legally they become independent. Presently I will discuss the degree of in¬
dependence which we ourselves feel is best in the interests of your own States.
But there has grown up during the period of British administration, owing to
the fact that the Crown Representative and the Viceroy are one and the same
person, a system of co-ordinated administration on all matters of common
concern which meant that the subcontinent of India acted as an economic entity.
1 hat link is now to be broken. If nothing can be put in its place, only chaos
can result, and that chaos, I submit, will hurt the States first—that bigger the
State the less the hurt and the longer it will take to feel it—but even the biggest
of the States will feel the hurt just the same as any small State.

The first step was to set up some machinery by which it was possible to put
the two future Governments of India—the Dominions of India and Pakistan—
into direct touch with the States. So I conceived the scheme of setting up two
States Departments within the future Governments. Please note that these
States Departments are not successors of the Political Department. They have
been set up simultaneously and side by side. While the Political Department
exercised functions relating to paramountcy on behalf of the Grown Representa¬
tive, the States Departments are to take over those subjects gradually which have
nothing to do with paramountcy but which will be concerned with relations
with neighbouring States and also provide the machinery to negotiate in such
matters. In India, the States Department is under the admirable guidance of
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel with my own Reforms Commissioner, Mr. V. P.
Menon, as Secretary. In Pakistan the Department is under Sardar Abdur Rab
Nishtar with Mr. Ikramullah as Secretary.

It was necessary to set up two States Departments, one in each Govern¬

ment, because the States arc theoretically free to link their future with which¬
ever Dominion they may care. But when I say that they are at liberty to link
up with cither of the Dominions, may I point out that there are certain geogra¬
phical compulsions which cannot be evaded? Out of something like 565 States,
the vast majority are irretrievably linked geographically with the Dominion of
India. The problem therefore is of far greater magnitude with the Dominion
of India than it is with Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan the States, although
important, are not so numerous, and Mr. Jinnah, the future Governor-General
of Pakistan, is prepared to negotiate the case of each State separately and
individually. But in the case of India where the overwhelming majority of
the States are involved, clearly separate negotiation with each State is out of
the question.

The first step that I took was to suggest that in the Bill before Parliament—
the Indian Independence Act—a clause should be put which would enable
 appendices
335

certain essential agreements to continue until renounced by either side. That \ a

only done to ensure that there should be some continuity if in the short time
available it was not possible to get the agreement through with every State re¬
presentative. It does not replace the need for standstill agreements; it gives a
very slight breathing space.

Now, I think it is no exaggeration to say that most Rulers and Dewans

were apprehensive as to what their future would be when paramountcy lapsed.
At one time it appeared that unless they joined the Constituent Assembly and
accepted the Constitution when it was framed, they would be outside the orga¬
nisation and left in a position which, I submit, no State could view with equani¬
mity—left out and having no satisfactory relations or contacts with either Domi¬
nion Government. You can imagine how relieved I was, and I am sure you
will yourselves have been equally relieved, when Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on
taking over the States Department made, if I may say so, a most statesmanlike
statement of what he considered were the essentials towards agreement between
the States and the Dominion of India.

Let us turn for one moment to the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16 May 1946.
In this Plan the proposal was that the States should surrender to the Central Gov¬
ernment three subjects—Defence, External Affairs and Communications. That
was a Plan which, to the best of my belief, every Ruler and every State accepted
as reasonable, fair and just. I talked with so many Rulers and everyone felt that
Defence was a matter that a State could not conduct for itself. I am not talking
of internal security but of defence against external aggression. I submit that if
you do not link up with one or the other of the Dominions, you may be cut off
from any sources of supplies of up-to-date arms or weapons.

“External Affairs” is inextricably linked up with Defence. “External

Affairs” is something again which is outside to boundaries of India in which
not even the greatest State can operate effectively. You can hardly want to go
to the expense of having ambassadors or ministers or consuls in all foreign coun¬
tries; surely you want to be able to use those of India or Pakistan. Once more
I suggest that External Affairs is something that you have not dealt with since
the formation of the East India Company. It would be difficult to operate and
will also be a source of embarrassment for you to have to take it up and it can
only be managed by those who manage the defence of the country. I submit
that if you take it up it will be a liability and not an asset.

The third subject is communications. “Communications” is really a means

of maintaining the life-blood of the whole subcontinent. I imagine everybody
agrees that the life of the country has got to go on. The continuity of communi¬
cations is already provided for to a certain extent in the Indian Independence
Act; and most of the representatives here have come to discuss it as Item 2 on
the agenda.
336 sardar patel’s correspondence

Therefore I am sure you will agree that these three subjects have got to be
handled for you for your convenience and advantage by a larger organisation.
This seems so obvious that I was at a loss to understand why some Rulers were
reluctant to accept the position. One explanation probably was that some of
you were apprehensive that the Central Government would attempt to impose
a financial liability on the States or encroach in other ways on their sovereignty.
If I am right in this assumption, at any rate so far as some Princes are con¬
cerned, I think I can dispel their apprehensions and misgivings. The Draft Inst-
trument of Accession which I have caused to be circulated as a basis for discuss-
sion (and not for publication) to the representatives of the States provided that
the States accede to the appropriate Dominion on the three subjects only
without any financial liability. Further, that instrument contains an explicit
provision that in no other matter has the Central Government any authority to
encroach on the internal autonomy or the sovereignty of the States. This would,
in my view, be a tremendous achievement for the States. But I must make it
clear that I have still to persuade the Government of India to accept it. If
all of you will co-operate with me and are ready to accede, I am confident
that I can succeed in my efforts. Remember that the day of the transfer of power
is very close at hand and, if you are prepared to come, you must come before
15 August. I have no doubt that this is in the best interests of the States, and
every wise Ruler and wise Government woud desire to link up with the great
Dominion of India on a basis which leaves you great internal autonomy and
which at the same time gets rid of your worries and cares over External
Affairs, Defence and Communications.
The whole country is passing through a critical period. I am not asking
any State to make any intolerable sacrifice of either its internal autonomy or
independence. My scheme leaves you with all the practical independence that
you can possibly use and makes you free of all those subjects which you cannot
possibly manage on your own. You cannot run away from the Dominion Gov¬
ernment which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the
subjects for whose welfare you arc responsible. Whatever may be your decision, I
hope you feel that I have at least done my duty by the States.

APPENDIX FIVE

CONSEQUENCES OF THE SETTING UP OF THE NEW DOMINIONS

EXTRACT FROM THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT, 1947

(1) As from the appointed day—

(a) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have no responsi¬
bility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately
before that day, were included in British India;
 APPENDICES 337

(b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with
it all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act bet¬
ween His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by
His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His
Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States oi the rulers thereof, and
all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that
date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or other¬
wise; and
(c) there lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the
passing of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority in the
tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such per¬
sons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority or juris¬
diction exercisable at that date by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal
areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise;
Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (b) or paragraph
(c) of this subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to the
provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which relate to customs,
transit and communications, posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until
the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or
person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Domi¬
nion or province or other part thereof concerned on the other hand, or are super¬
seded by subsequent agreements.

(2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is hereby given
to the omission from the Royal Style and Titles of the words “India Imperator”
and the words “Emperor of India” and to the issue by His Majesty for that
purpose of His Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm.

APPENDIX SIX

ARTICLE 370 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

370. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,—

(a) the provisions of Article 238 shall not apply in relation to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir;

(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall
be limited to—

(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List
which, in consultation with the Government of the State,
are declared by the President to correspond to mat¬
ters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing
the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the
S.C.-22
338 sardar patei.’s correspondence

matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature

may make laws for the State; and

(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concur¬
rence of the Government of the State, the President may
by order specify.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this Article, the Government of the State

means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maha¬
raja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers
for the time being in office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth
day of March 1948;

(c) the provisions of Article I and of this article shall apply in

relation to the State;

(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in

relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifica¬
tions as the President may by order specify:

Provided that no such order which relates to the matters

specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred
to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in
consultation with the Government of the State:

Provided further that no such order which relates to

matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso
shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.

(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in

paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub¬
clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the pur¬
pose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed be¬
fore such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Article,

the President may, by public notification, declare that this Article shall cease to
be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifica¬
tions and from such date as he may specify:
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the
State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such
a notification.

APPENDIX SEVEN

ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the
Union of India.
 APPENDICES 339

ARTICLE 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The territory of the State shall comprise all the territories which on the
fifteenth day of August, 1947, were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the
Ruler of the State.

ARTICLE 147 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduc¬

tion of a Bill for the purpose in the Legislative Assembly, and when the Bill
is passed in each House by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total
membership of the House, it shall be presented to the Sadar-i-Riyasat for his as¬
sent and, upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand
amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:
Provided that a Bill providing for the abolition of the Legislative Council
may be introduced in the Legislative Assembly and passed by it by a majority
of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not less than two-
thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting:
Provided further that no Bill or amendment seeking to make any change
in—
(a) this section; or
(b) the provisions of sections 3 and 5; or

(c) the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in relation

to the State;

shall be introduced or moved in either House of the Legislature.

APPENDIX EIGHT

LETTER OF 26 OCTOBER 1947, FROM MAHARAJA SIR HARI SINGH

TO LORD MOUNTBATTEN, REQUESTING THE ACCESSION OF
THE STATE TO INDIA

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my

State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As Your Ex¬
cellency is aware, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either
the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous with
both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and with China. In their external relations the Domi¬
nions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to
340 sardar patel’s correspondence

decide to which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best inte¬
rests of both the Dominions and of my State to stand independent, of course with
friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly approached the Domi¬
nions of India and Pakistan to enter into a standstill agreement with my State.
1 he Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India
desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not
arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan
Government under the standstill agreement is operating the post and tele¬
graph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill agreement with
the Pakistan Government, that Government permitted a steady and increasing
strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons

have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area, then
from Sialkot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining Hazara district on the
Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the dis¬
posal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at seve¬
ral points simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton
destruction of life and property and the looting of the Mahura power house,
which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and which has been
burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my
heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with
the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a first
step to overrunning the whole State. The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn
from distant areas of the North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in
motor trucks, using the Mansehra-MazafTarabad road and fully armed with
up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the
Provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Govern¬
ment of Pakistan. In spite of repeated appeals made by my Government no
attempt has been made to check these raiders or to stop them from coming
into my State. In fact, both the radio and the Press of Pakistan have reported
these occurrences. The Pakistan radio even put out the story that a provisional
government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims
and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emer¬
gency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from
the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me
without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly deci¬
ded to do so, and I attach the instrument of accession for acceptance by your
Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and the people to free¬
booters. On this basis no civilised Government can exist or be maintained. This
alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the State
and I have life to defend my country.
 APPENDICES 341

I may also inform Your Excellency’s Government that it is my intention

at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry
the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.
If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Sri¬
nagar. Mr. V. P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the situation and will
explain it to you, if further explanation is needed.
In haste and with kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh

REPLY OF 27 OCTOBER 1947 FROM LORD MOUNTBATTEN TO

MAHARAJA SIR HARI SINGH

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your Highness’ letter dated 26 October 1947 has been delivered to me
by Mr. V. P. Menon. In the circumstances mentioned by Your Highness,
my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the
Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any
State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question
of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of
the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have
been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of
the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.
Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness’ appeal for military aid, action
has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir, to help
your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property,
and honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that
Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim
Government to work with your Prime Minister.
Mountbatten of Burma

APPENDIX NINE
INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE

The following is the text of the Instrument of Accession executed by the

Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State on 26 October 1947.
Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the
fifteenth day of August 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion
known as India, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such
omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General
may by order specify be applicable to the Dominion of India;
 342 sardar patel’s correspondence

And whcrws the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by dte

Governor-General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion
o India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof:
Now, therefore,

I, Shriman Indar Mahandar Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari

Smghji, Jammu Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipathi, Ruler of
Jammu and Kashmir State, in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my
said State Do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and

1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent
that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal
Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the
Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession, but subject always
to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in
relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as “this
State ) such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government
of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India on the 15th day of
August 1947 (which Act as so in force is hereafter referred to as “the Act”).

2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due eficct is given to

the provisions ol the Act within this State so far as they are applicable there¬
in by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.

3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule hereto as the matters with
respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.

4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance

that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler
of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this
State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of
this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this
Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

5. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by

any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless
such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this
Instrument.

6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to

make any law for this State authorising the compulsory’ acquisition of land for
any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purposes
of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to acquire any
land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land
belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in
default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief
Justice of India.
 appendices 343

7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to

acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fettei my discretion to
enter into arrangements with the Government of India undei any such futuie
constitution.
8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in
and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exer¬
cise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this
State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.
9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and
that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to
be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.
Given under my hand this twenty-sixth day of October, nineteen hundred
and forty-seven.
Hari Singh
Maharajadhiraj of Jammu and
Kashmir State

ACCEPTANCE OF INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF JAMMU & KASHMIR

STATE BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA

I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.

Dated this twenty-seventh day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven.
Mountbatten of Burma
Governor-General of India

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

THE MATTERS WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE DOMINION
LEGISLATURE MAY MAKE LAWS FOR THIS STATE

A. Defence

1. The naval, military and air forces of the Dominion and any other
armed forces raised or maintained by the Dominion; any armed forces,
including forces raised or maintained by an acceding State, which are attached
to, or operating with, any of the armed forces of the Dominion.
2. Naval, military and air force works, administration of cantonment areas.
3. Arms, fire-arms, ammunition.
4. Explosives.

B. External Affairs

1* External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements with

other countries; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused
persons to parts of His Majesty’s dominions outside India.
344 sardar patel’s correspondence

2. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, India, including

m relation thereto the regulation of the movements in India of persons who are
not British subjects domiciled in India or subjects of any acceding State; pil¬
grimages to places beyond India.
3. Naturalisation.

C. Communications

1. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and

other like forms of communication.

2. Federal railways; the regulation of all railways other than minor

railways in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station
and services terminal charges, interchange of traffic and the responsibility of
railway administrations as carriers of goods and passengers; the regulation of
minor railways in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administra¬
tions ot such railways as carriers of goods and passengers.

3. Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on

tidal waters; Admiralty jurisdiction.
4. Port quarantine.

5. Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports,
and the constitution and powers of Port Authorities therein.

b. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulation and

organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes.

7. Lighthouses, including lightships, beacons and other provisions for the safety
of shipping and aircraft.

8. Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air.

9. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force

belonging to any unit to railway area outside that unit.

D. Ancillary

1. Elections to the Dominion Legislature, subject to the provisions of the

Act and of any Order made thereunder.

2. Offences against laws with respect to any of the aforesaid matters.

3. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the aforesaid matters.
4. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the aforesaid
matters but, except with the consent of the Ruler of the acceding State, not so
as to confer any jurisdiction or powers upon any courts other than courts
ordinarily exercising jurisdiction in or in relation to that State.
 APPENDIX TEN

INDIAN COMPLAINT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED 1 JANUARY 1948 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
INDIA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/628)

The Government of India have instructed me to transmit to you the fol¬

lowing telegraphic communication:

“1. Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any Member
may bring any situation whose continuance is likely to endanger the mainte¬
nance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security
Council. Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to
the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from
the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the north-west, are drawing
from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which has
acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India. The circumstances
of accession, the activities of the invaders which led the Government of India
to take military action against them, and the assistance which the attackers
have received and are still receiving from Pakistan are explained later in this
memorandum. The Government of India request the Security Council to call
upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance,
which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the
Government of India may be compelled, in self-defence, to enter Pakistan
territory, in order to take military action against the invaders. The matter is,
therefore, one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the
Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace.

2. From the middle of September 1947, the Government of India had

received reports of the infiltration of armed raiders into the western parts of
Jammu province of Jammu and Kashmir State; Jammu adjoins West Punjab,
which is a part of the Dominion of Pakistan. These raiders had done a great
deal of damage in that area and taken possession of part of the territory of the
State. On 24 October, the Government of India heard of a major raid from
the Frontier Province of the Dominion of Pakistan into the Valley of Kashmir.
Some two thousand or more fully armed and equipped men came in motor
transport, crossed over to the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
sacked the town of Muzaffarabad, killing many people and proceeded along
the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and
Kashmir State. Intermediate towns and villages were sacked and burnt, and
many people killed. These raiders were stopped by Kashmir State troops near
Un» a town some fifty miles from Srinagar, for some time, but the invaders

345
346 sardar patel’s correspondence

got around them and burnt the power house at Mahora, which supplied electri¬
city to the whole of Kashmir.

“3. The position, on the morning of 26 October, was that these raiders
had been held by Kashmir State troops and part of the civil population, who
had been armed, at a town called Baramulla. Beyond Baramulla there was
no major obstruction up to Srinagar. There was immediate danger of these
raiders reaching Srinagar, destroying and massacring large numbers of people,
both Hindus and Muslims. The State troops were spread out all over the State
and most of diem were deployed along the western border of Jammu pro¬
vince. They had been split up into small isolated groups and were incapable of
offering effective resistance to the raiders. Most of the State officials had left
the threatened areas and the civil administration had ceased to function. All
that stood between Srinagar and the fate which had overtaken the places en
route followed by the raiders was the determination of the inhabitants of Sri¬
nagar, of all communities, and practically without arms, to defend themselves.
At this time Srinagar had also a large population of Hindu and Sikh refu¬
gees who had fled there from West Punjab owing to communal disturbances in
that area. There was little doubt that these refugees would be massacred if the
raiders reached Srinagar.

“4. Immediately after the raids into Jammu and Kashmir State commenc¬
ed, approaches were informally made to the Government of India for the
acceptance of the accession of the State to the Indian Dominion. (It might
be explained in parenthesis that Jammu and Kashmir form a State whose
ruler, prior to the transfer of power by the United Kingdom to the Domi¬
nions of India and Pakistan, had been in treaty relations with the British
Crown, which controlled its foreign relations and was responsible for its
defence. The treaty relations ceased with the transfer of power on 15 August
last, and Jammu and Kashmir like other States acquired the right to accede to
either Dominion.)

“5. Events moved with great rapidity, and the threat to the Valley of
Kashmir became grave. On 26 October, the ruler of the State, His Highness
Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, appealed urgently to the Government ol India for
military help. He also requested that the Jammu and Kashmir State should
be allowed to accede to the Indian Dominion. An appeal for help was also
simultaneously received by the Government of India from the largest popular
organization in Kashmir, the National Conference, headed by Sheikh
Mohammed Abdullah. The Conference further strongly supported the request
for the State’s accession to the Indian Dominion. The Government of India
were thus approached not only officially by the State authorities, but also on
behalf of the people of Kashmir, both for military aid and for the accession of

the State to India.

 APPENDICES
347

“6. The grave threat to the life and property of innocent people in the
Kashmir Valley and to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmn that
had developed as a result of the invasion of the Valley demanded immediate
decision by the Government of India on both the requests. It was imperative
on account of the emergency that the responsibility for the defence of Jammu
and Kashmir State should be taken over by a Government capable of discharging
it. But, in order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had utilised
the State’s immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Government
of India made it clear that once the soil of the State had been cleaied of the
invader and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their
future by the recognized democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum
which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under intei-
national auspices.
“7. The Government of India felt it their duty to respond to the appeal for
armed assistance because:
“(1) They could not allow a neighbouring and friendly State to be
compelled by force to determine either its internal affairs or its external
relations;
“(2) The accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to the Dominion
of India made India really responsible for the defence of the State.

“8. The intervention of the Government of India resulted in saving Srinagar.

The raiders were driven back from Baramulla to Uri and are held there by
Indian troops. Nearly 19,000 raiders face the Dominion forces in this area.
Since operations in the Valley of Kashmir started, pressure by the raiders
against the western and south-western border of Jammu and Kashmir State
had been intensified. Exact figures are not available. It is understood, however,
that nearly 15,000 raiders are operating against this part of the State. State
troops are besieged in certain areas. Incursions by the raiders into the State
territory, involving murder, arson, loot, and the abduction of women continue.
The booty is collected and carried over to the tribal areas to serve as an in¬
ducement to the further recruitment of tribesmen to the ranks of the raiders.
In addition to those actively participating in the raid, tribesmen and others,
estimated at 100,000, have been collected in different places in the districts
of West Punjab bordering Jammu and Kashmir State, and many of them are
receiving military training under Pakistani nationals, including officers of the
Pakistan Army. They are looked after in Pakistan territory, fed, clothed, armed
and otherwise equipped, and transported to the territory of Jammu and
Kashmir State with the help, direct and indirect, of Pakistani officials, both
military and civil.

9. As already stated, the raiders who entered the Kashmir Valley in Octo¬
ber came mainly from the tribal areas to the north-west of Pakistan and, in
order to reach Kashmir, passed through Pakistan territory. The raids along the
348 sardar patel’s correspondence

south-west border of the State, which had preceded the invasion of the valley
proper, had actually been conducted from Pakistan territory, and Pakistan
nationals had taken part in them. This process of transmission across Pakistan
territory and utilisation of that territory as a base of operations against Jammu
and Kashmir State continues. Recently, military operations against the
western and south-western borders of the State have been intensified, and the
attackers consist of nationals of Pakistan as well as tribesmen. These invaders
are armed with modern weapons, including mortars and medium machine-guns,
wear the battle dress of regular soldiers and, in recent engagements, have
fought in regular battle formation and are using the tactics of modem
warfare. Man-pack wireless sets are in regular use and even mark V mines
have been employed. For their transport the invaders have all along used
motor vehicles. They are undoubtedly being trained and to some extent led
by regular officers of the Pakistan Army. Their rations and other supplies are
obtained from Pakistan territory.

10. I ht se facts point indisputably to the conclusion

(a) that the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan territory;

(b) that they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of

operations;

(c) that they include Pakistan nationals;

(d) that they draw much of their military equipment, transportation,

and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and

(e) that Pakistan officers are training, guiding, and otherwise

actively helping them.

“There is no source other than Pakistan from which they could obtain such
quantities of modern military equipment, training or guidance. More than
once, the Government of India had asked the Pakistan Government to deny
to the invaders facilities which constitute an act of aggression and hostility
against India, but without any response. The last occasion on which this request
was made was on 22 December, when the Prime Minister of India handed over
personally to the Prime Minister of Pakistan a letter in which the various
forms of aid given by Pakistan to the invaders were briefly recounted and the
Government of Pakistan were asked to put an end to such aid promptly; no
reply to this letter has yet been received in spite of a telegraphic reminder sent
on 26 December.
“11. It should be clear from the foregoing recital that the Government
of Pakistan arc unwilling to stop the assistance in material and men which the
invaders are receiving from Pakistan territory and from Pakistan nationals,
including Pakistan Government personnel, both military and civil. This attitude
is not only un-neutral, but constitutes active aggression against India, of which
the State of Jammu and Kashmir forms a part.
 appendices
349

“12. The Government of India have exerted persuasion and exercised

patience to bring about a change in the attitude of Pakistan. But they have
failed, and are in consequence confronted with a situation in which their defence
of Jammu and Kashmir State is hampered and their measures to drive the inva¬
ders from the territory of the State are greatly impeded by the support which
the raiders derive from Pakistan. The invaders are still on the soil of Jammu
and Kashmir and the inhabitants of the State are exposed to all the atrocities
of which a barbarous foe is capable. The presence, in large numbers, of
invaders in those portions of Pakistan territory which adjoin parts of Indian
territory other than Jammu and Kashmir State is a menace to the rest ol India.
Indefinite continuance of the present operations prolongs the agony of the
people of Jammu and Kashmir, is a drain on India’s resources and a constant
threat to the maintenance of peace between India and Pakistan. The
Government of India have no option, therefore, but to take more effective
military action in order to rid Jammu and Kashmir State ol the invader.

“13. In order that the objective of expelling the invader from Indian
territory and preventing him from launching fresh attacks should be quickly
achieved, Indian troops would have to enter Pakistan territory; only thus
could the invader be denied the use of bases and cut off from his sources of
supplies and reinforcements in Pakistan. Since the aid which the invaders are
receiving from Pakistan is an act of aggression against India, the Government
of India are entitled, under international law, to send their armed forces across
Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders. However, as such
action might involve armed conflict with Pakistan, the Governmet of India,
ever anxious to proceed according to the principles and aims of the Charter
of the United Nations, desire to report the situation to the Security Council
under Article 35 of the Charter. They feel justified in requesting the Security
Council to ask the Government of Pakistan:

“(1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil,

from participating or assisting in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State;

“(2) to call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking any
part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State;

“(3) to deny to the invaders: (a) access to any use of its territory for
operations against Kashmir, (b) military and other supplies, (c) all other
kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

“14. The Government of India would stress the special urgency of the Security
Council taking immediate action on their request. They desire to add that mili¬
tary operations in the invaded areas have, in the past few days, been develop¬
ing so rapidly that they must, in self-defence, reserve to themselves the freedom
to take, at any time when it may become necessary, such military action as
they may consider the situation requires.
 350
sardar patel’s correspondence

15. The Government of India deeply regret that a rerious emir ,hould kvt
b,.n readied in their relations with Pakistan. Not only is Pakistan a neigh-
boor but. in spite of the recent separation, India and Pakistan have many

: ,rw,r- C™ 'mer“U- Indi» nothing more earnestly than

live with her neighbour-state on terms of close and lasting friendship Peace
is to the interest of both States; indeed to the interests of the world. The Govern¬
ment „i India’s approach to the Security Council is inspired by the sincere
hope that, through the prompt action of the Council, peace may be preserved.
“lb. The text of this reference to the Security Council is being telegraphed to
the Government of Pakistan.”

APPENDIX ELEVEN

RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE 29TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY

COUNCIL, 17 JANUARY, 1948 (S/651)

The Security Council having heard statements on the situation in Kashmir

from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan;

Recognizing the urgency of the situation; taking note of the telegram

addressed on 6 January by its President to each of the parties and of their
replies thereto; and in which they affirmed their intention to conform to the
Charter;

Calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of

Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public
appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation and to refrain from
making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting
any acts which might aggravate the situation;

And further requests each of those Governments to inform the Council

immediately of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears
to cither of them to be about to occur while the matter is under considera¬
tion by the Council, and consult with the Council thereon.

APPENDIX TWELVE

RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 20 JANUARY 1948

(Setting forth terms of reference of the Commission)

The Security Council

Considering that it may investigate any dispute or any situation which
might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security; that, in the existing state of affairs between India and Pakistan,
such an investigation is a matter of urgency;
 351
appendices

Adopts the following resolution:

A A commission or the Security Council is hereby established, composed
of representatives of three members of the United Nations, one to be seketed
by India, one to be selected by Pakistan, and the third to be des.gnatcd by

the two so selected.

Each representative on the Commission shall be entitled to select his alter¬

nates and assistants.

B. The Commission shall proceed to the spot as quickly as possible.
It shall act under the authority of the Security Council and in accordance with
the directions it may receive from it. It shall keep the Security Council cur¬
rently informed of its activities and of the development of the situation. It shall
report to the Security Council regularly, submitting its conclusions and propo¬

sals.
C. The Commission is invested with a dual function:

(1) to investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter;

(2) to exercise, without interrupting the work of the Security Council,

any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties; to carry out the
directions given to it by the Security Council; and to report how far the
advice and directions, if any, of the Security Council have been carried out.

D. The Commission shall perform the functions described in Clause C:

(1) in regard to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir State set out
in the letter of the Representative of India addressed to the President of the
Security Council, dated 1 January 1948, and in the letter from the Minis¬
ter of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 15
January 1948; and (2) in regard to other situations set out in the letter from
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General,
dated 15 January 1948; when the Security Council so directs.

E. The Commission shall take its decision by majority vote. It shall

determine its own procedure. It may allocate among its members, alternate
members, their assistants, and its personnel, such duties as may have to be ful¬
filled for the realization of its mission and the reaching of its conclusions.

F. The Commission, its members, alternate members, their assistants

and its personnel, shall be entitled to journey, separately or together, wherever
the necessities of their tasks may require, and in particular, within those terri¬
tories which arc the theatre of the events of which the Security Council is seized.

G. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall furnish the Com¬

mission with such personnel and assistance as it may consider necessary.
 APPENDIX THIRTEEN

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF 21 APRIL 1948

(Additional terms of reference of Commission and terms of plebiscite)

The Security Council

Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning

the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the Represen¬
tative of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-com¬
plaints of the Representative of Pakistan;

Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order
in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their
utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting;

Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the
question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be
decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite;

Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger

international peace and security;

Reaffirms the Council resolution of 17 January;

Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by the reso¬

lution of the Council of 20 January 1948 shall be increased to five and shall
include, in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution, represen¬
tative of . • . and . . and that if the membership of the Commission has
not been completed within ten days from the date of the adoption of this reso¬
lution the President of the Council may designate such other Member or Mem¬
bers of the United Nations as are required to complete the membership of five;

Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian subcontinent

and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Govern¬
ments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the neces¬
sary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to
the holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with
one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission
to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution, and to
this end;
Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following mea¬
sures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring
about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and

352
 appendices 353

impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to

accede to India or Pakistan.

A. Restoration of Peace and Order

1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:

(a) to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have
entered the State for the purposes of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into
the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting
in the State.

(b) to make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this
and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State,
regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the
question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate
in the maintenance of peace and order.
2. The Government of India should:

(a) when it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in

accordance with the Council’s resolution of 20 January that the tribesmen are
withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have
become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a
plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducin'*
them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil
power in the maintenance of law and order;

(b) make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and an¬
nounce the completion of each stage;

(c) when the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum
strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission
for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with
the following principles;

(i) that the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or
appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State,

(ii) that as small a number as possible should be retained in forward

areas,

(iii) that any reserve of troops which may be included in the total
strength should be located within their present base area.

3. The Government of India should agree that, until such time as the
Plebiscite Administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the
powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and police provided for
in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite
Administrator.

S.C.-23
 351
sardar patel’s correspondence
After the plan referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above has been put into
operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be
utilized lor the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due
regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional requirements as may
be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7.

5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission

subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government
of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it
deems effective for the purpose of pacification.
B. Plebiscite

G. I he Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Govern¬

ment of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible
representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the adminis¬
tration at the Ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and
carried out.

7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established

in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon
as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.

8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated

by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers
necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite, including, for that
purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police.

9. The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Admini¬

stration make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite
Administration may require for the performance of its functions.

10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebis¬
cite Administrator.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of
lamniu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other
subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Such nominees
should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally
promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government
of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the
Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial
system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have
a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct of a free and im¬
partial plebiscite.
(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of
a separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations
 355
appendices

and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of

service for his assistants and subordinates.

(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate direct with
the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council,
and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Govern¬
ments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commis¬
sion. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any of all of the fore¬
going (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may
tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite.

H. The Government of India should undertake to prevent and to give full

support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion
or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite,
and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the
Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international
obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.

12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Govern¬
ment of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free
in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the
State and that there will be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and
freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.

13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the
Government of the State also use their best endeavours to effect the withdrawal
from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resi¬
dent therein or who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for a lawful
purpose.

14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the
State release all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that:

(a) all citizens of the State who have left it on account of distur¬
bances are invited, and are free, to return to their homes and to exer¬
cise their rights as such citizens;

(b) there is no victimisation;

(c) minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate

protection.

15. The Commission of the Security Council should, at the end of the
plebiscite, certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been
really free and impartial.

C. General Provisions

16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to

nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance
as it may require in the performance of its task.
J sardar patel’s correspondence

17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers
as it may require lor any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures
indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.

18. I he Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned
to it herein.

APPENDIX FOURTEEN

UNCIP RESOLUTION OF 13 AUGUST, 1948

(S/1100, PARA 75)

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan having given
careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives of
India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
and

Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correc¬
tion of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international
peace and security arc essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the
Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation,
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and
Pakistan the following proposal:

PART I

CEASE-FIRE ORDER

A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective

High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to
apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as
of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within
four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.
B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to
refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of
the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(For the purpose of these proposals “forces under their control” shall be
considered to include all forces, organised and unorganised, fighting or parti¬
cipating in hostilities on their respective sides.)
C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall
promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions
which may facilitate the cease-fire.
D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the
Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the
 appendices
357

Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands, will supeivise the
observance of the cease-fire order.
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to
appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an at¬
mosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

PART II

TRUCE AGREEMENT

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate

cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following
principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details
of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives
and the Commission.
A
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was
represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council,
the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the
withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan
nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the
purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani
troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of
the Commission.
B
1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India
that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part IIA-2 hereof
have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by
the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the
presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further,
that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of
their forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the
situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will
maintain within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire the minimum
strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered
necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The
Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
 358
SARDAR PATEL’s CORRESPONDENCE

3. rhc Government of India will undertake ,o enture that the Govern-

^ °f |ammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its

ixmtr to make It publicly known that peace, law and order will be safe¬
guarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.

c
'• ,Up°n Sifnalure- the ful1 °f <>'* truce agreement or a communique
containing the prmciples thereof as agreed upon between the two Govern, net ns
and the Commission will be made public.

PART III

1 he Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their

wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be
determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon
acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into
consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions
whereby such free expression will be assured.

APPENDIX FIFTEEN

LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TO THE CHAIRMAN

IN REPLY TO THE COMMISSION’S RESOLUTION OF 13 AUGUST, 1948
(S/IIOO, PARA 78)

Excellency,

On 17 August, my colleague, the Minister without I’rotfolio, and I dis¬

cussed with you and your colleagues of the Commission now in Delhi the
resolution which you had presented to us on the 14th instant. On the 18th,
I had another discussion with you, in the course of which I tried to explain
to you the doubts and difficulties which members of my Government, and
representatives of the Government of Kashmir whom wc consulted, had felt as
the result of a preliminary but careful examination of the Commission’s pro¬
posals.

2. During the several conferences that we had with the Commission when
it first came to Delhi, we placed before it what wre considered the basic fact of
the situation which had led to the conflict in Kashmir. This fact was the un¬
warranted aggression, at first indirect and subsequently direct, of the Pakistan
Government on Indian Dominion territory in Kashmir. The Pakistan Govern¬
ment denied this although it was common knowledge. In recent months, very
large forces of the Pakistan regular army have further entered Indian Union
territory in Kashmir and opposed the Indian Army which was sent there for
 appendices
359

the defence of the State. This, we understand now, is admitted by the Pakistan
Government, and yet there has been at no time any intimation to the Govern¬
ment of India by the Pakistan Government of this invasion; there . ias een
continual denial and the Pakistan Government have evaded answering repeatc

inquiries from the Government ol India.

In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of the United

Nations adopted on January 17, 1948, the Pakistan Government should have
informed the Council immediately of any material change in the situation
while the matter continues to be under the considciation of the Counci .
invasion of the State by large forces of the regular Pakistan Army was a very
material change in the situation, and yet no information of this was given,

far as we know, to the Security Council.

The Commission will appreciate that this conduct of the Pakistan Gov¬
ernment is not only opposed to all moral codes as well as international law
and usage, but has also created a very grave situation. It is only the earnest
desire of my Government to avoid any extension of the field of conflict and
to restore peace that has led us to refrain from taking any action to meet the
new situation that was created by this further intrusion of the Pakistan Army
into Jammu and Kashmir State. The presence of the Commisson in India has
naturally led us to hope that any arrangement sponsored by it would deal
effectively with the present situation and prevent any recurrence of aggression.

3. Since our meeting of August 18, we have given the Commissions icso-
lution our most earnest thought. There are many parts of it which we should
have preferred to be otherwise and more in keeping with the fundamental
facts of the situation, especially the flagrant aggression of the Pakistan Go\ em¬
inent on Indian Union territory. We recognise, however, that i( a successful
effort is to be made to create satisfactory conditions for a solution of the
Kashmir problem without further bloodshed, we should concentrate on certain
essentials only at present and seek safeguards in regard to them. It was in this
spirit that I placed the following considerations before Your Excellency:

(1) That paragraph A3 of Part II of the resolution should not be

interpreted, or applied in practice, so as:

(a) to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir
Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops;

(b) to afford any recognition of the so-called “Azad Kashmir

Government”; or

(c) to enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the

period of truce to the disadvantage of the State.

(2) That from our point of view the effective insurance of the security
of the State against external aggression, from which Kashmir has suffered so
much during the last ten months, was of the most vital significance and no
 sardar patel’s correspondence

forc.Thrwhh^ral'of "" T* "d ““•* ,htr'-

r?- “-* - “ t
,tss —is
the IH- Sh°uld ** *- decided ,„ seek a solution of
' ‘ °f the Sta" ^ mcan* °fa Plebiscite, Pakistan should have no
part n the organs,on and conduct of the plebiscite or in any other matter
of internal administration in the State.

envisage 1 U"dOTto°d *°u “erectly, A3 of Par. II of the resolution does not

envisage the creat.on of any of the conditions to which we have objected in
paragraph 3 (I) of this letter. In fact, you made i, clear that the Commission

c ° . COmP',c"t ,0 recognise the sovereignty of any authority over the

evacuated areas other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.

I A* regards paragraph 3(2), the paramount need for security is recognised

y e Commission, and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from
the State ts to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength
of Indtan forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between
the Commission and the Government of India.

Finally, you agreed that Part III, as formulated, docs not in any way
recognise the right of Pakistan to have any part in a plebiscite.
4. In view of this clarification, my Government, animated by a sincere desire
to promote the cause of peace, and thus to uphold the principles and prestige
of the United Nations, have decided to accept the resolution.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION TO THE

PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA

New Delhi
25 August 1948
Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication

dated August 20, 1948, regarding the terms of the resolution of the United
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which the Commission presented
to you on August 14, 1948.

1 he Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that

the interpretation of the resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter
coincides w'ith its own interpretation, it being understood that as regards
point (1) (c) the local people of the evacuated territory will have freedom of
 APPENDICES 3G1

legitimate political activity. In this connection, the term “evacuated tenitoiy

refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at
present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command.
The Commission wishes me to express to Your Excellency its sincere satis¬
faction that the Government of India has accepted the resolution and appre¬
ciates the spirit in which this decision has been taken.
I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency
the assurances of my highest consideration.

APPENDIX SIXTEEN

LETTER DATED 20 AUGUST, 1948, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF

INDIA TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNGIP CONCERNING
NORTHERN TERRITORIES

(S/1100, PARA 80)

Excellency,

You will recall that in our interview with the Commission on 17

August, I dealt at some length with the position of the sparsely populated and
mountainous region of Jammu and Kashmir State in the north. The autho¬
rity of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole
has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or
in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars of Pakistan
troops. The Commission’s resolution, as you agreed in the course of our
interview on the 18th, does not deal with the problem of administration or
defence in this laige area. We desire that, after Pakistan troops and irregulars
have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration
of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and
Kashmir and that for defence to us. (The only exception that we should
be prepared to accept would be Gilgit.) We must be free to maintain garri¬
sons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the in¬
cursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority, and to guard the main trade
routes from the State into Central Asia.

Accept, Excellency, etc.

Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of India
 LETTER DATED 25 AUGUST, 1948, FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
UNCIP TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA, CONCERNING
NORTHERN TERRITORIES
(S/1100, PARA 81)
Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 20 August

1048, relating to the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir in the north.

I he Commission wishes me to confirm that, due to the peculiar con¬

ditions of this area, it did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the
problem in its resolution of 13 August 1948. It believes, however, that the
question raised in your letter could be considered in the implementation of
the Resolution.

Accept, Excellency, etc.

Josef Korbel

APPENDIX SEVENTEEN
AIDE MEMOIRE NO. 1 (21 DECEMBER, 1948)

His Excellency Dr. Lozano, accompanied by his Alternate, Mr. Samper,

and His Excellency Mr. Colban, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, met the Prime Minister yesterday. The Hon’ble Shri
Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Sir G. S. Bajpai were also present. The discu¬
ssions of the Commission’s plebiscite proposal fell into two parts: (1) General,
(2) Particular in reference to individual clauses.

2. The Prime Minister drew attention to Pakistan’s repeated acts of

aggression against India. In spite of the presence of Pakistan troops in Jammu
and Kashmir, which is Indian territory now, and the offensive action of I akis-
tan troops, the Government of India had accepted the Commission s Resolu¬
tion of 13 August; Pakistan had not accepted the Resolution. In paragraph
143 of its Report, the Commission has referred to its conference with the
Prime Minister on the conditions attached by the Government of Pakistan to
its acceptance of the Resolution of 13 August. .As stated in paragraph 144 of
the Report, the Prime Minister had informed the Commission that he stood
on his original premises that the Pakistan forces must be withdrawn from the
State before the Government of India could consider any further steps. I his
had specific reference to an amplification of Part III of the Resolution of 13
August. Nevertheless, the Government of India had agreed to informal

362
 APPENDICES
363

conversations in Paris which had resulted in the formulation of the proposals

now put forward by the Commission. The Government of India naturally
wondered how far this process of rejection of proposals put forward by the
Commission by Pakistan and the adoption of a responsive attitude on the pai t
of the Government of India towards the Commission’s proposals could continu« .
The Commission must realise that there were limits to the forbearance and
spirit of conciliation of the Government of India. The Prime Minister em¬
phasised (1) that, if the Government of India were to accept the Commi¬
ssion’s plebiscite proposals, no action could be taken in regard to them until
Parts I and II of the Commission’s Resolution of 13 August had been fully
implemented; (2) that in the event of Pakistan not accepting these proposals,
or having accepted them, not implementing Parts I and II of the Resolution ol
13 August, the Government of India’s acceptance of them should not be
regarded as in any way binding upon them; (3) Part III of the Commission’s
Resolution of 13 August provided “that the future status of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the
people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Gov¬
ernments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine
fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.”
The present proposals appeared to limit the method of ascertaining the will of
the people regarding the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
through a plebiscite. While the Government of India adhered to their position
in regard to a plebiscite, they had pointed out that, in view of the difficulties
of holding a plebiscite in present conditions in Kashmir, other methods of
ascertaining the wish of the people should also be explored. The Commi¬
ssion had itself recognised the difficulties of carrying out a plebiscite in
Kashmir. The Government of India feel that the exploration of other methods
should not be ruled out.
3. As regards (1), Dr. Lozano enquired whether there should be objection
to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator until Parts I and II of the
Resolution of 13 August had been implemented. Both he and Mr. Colban
thought that the Plebiscite Administrator could do useful exploratory work
even before arrangements for holding a plebiscite could be taken in hand.
The Prime Minister pointed out that it was always open to the Commission
to employ advisers or experts for work within its terms of reference. The
Government of India, however, would regard the appointment of a Plebiscite
Administrator, as such, premature until Parts I and II of the Resolution of 13
August had been implemented. Dr. Lozano accepted (2). As regards (3), he
said that the Commission wished the possibility of a plebiscite to be explored
first. Should the Plebiscite Administrator, however, find a plebiscite to be
impracticable, the way would be open to consider other methods for ensuring
a free expression by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of their wish regard¬
ing the future status of the State.
364 SAKDAR PA IK I.S CORRESPONDENCE

® ^ 1 reamble. lhe phrase “I he Governments of India and Pakistan

simultaneously accept is incorrect in that either Government may not accept
the principles supplementary to the Resolution of 13 August. Even if both
Governments accept them, the acceptance cannot be simultaneous. The word¬
ing should be changed accordingly.

B.3(b). The question was raised whether the form of words employed
was intended to give to the Plebiscite Administrator powers of interference in
the administration of the State, e.g. by ‘‘direction and supervision of the State
Forets and I olice, mentioned in paragraph B.8 of the Security Council’s
Resolution of 21 April, 1948. Dr. Lozano said that this was not the intention
of the Commission and that the words quoted above had been deliberately
omitted. The Prime Minister pointed out that all that the Plebiscite Admi¬
nistrator could in reason expect was that, for the purpose of organising and
conducting the plebiscite and ensuring its freedom and impartiality, the Govern¬
ment of Jammu and Kashmir should give him such assistance as he might
require. Dr. Lozano said that a Plebiscite Administrator of international stand¬
ing and commanding general confidence, who would be appointed after consul¬
tation with the Government of India, could be expected to act reasonably and
that the Commission did not intend that he should usurp the functions of the
State Government in the field of normal administration and law and order. Ilis
functions and powers would be limited to ensuring that the plebiscite was free
and impartial.

B.4(b). The Prime Minister drew attention to the fact that the Azad
Kashmir forces which had been armed and equipped by Pakistan and were
under the operational command of the Pakistan Army ran into tens of thou¬
sands. Their presence in the territories referred to in A.3 of Part II of the
Resolution of 13 August, even after demobilisation, would be a constant threat
to the territory under the control of Indian and State forces, a deterrent to
the return of many refugees, and an obstacle to the free expression of opinion
regarding the future status of the State by those who might be opposed to
the accession of the State to Pakistan. Dr. Lozano pointed out that it was
the Commission’s intention that there should be large-scale disarming of these
forces, though it would not be possible to require withdrawal from th^se t» rn-
tories of genuine inhabitants of these areas.
B.6(a). Dr. Lozano agreed that it was not the Commission's intention
that the Pakistan Commission should operate outside Pakistan. Thus, the
Pakistan Commission would not operate in the territory referred to in A.3
of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August. The Prime Minister then raised
the question of the “free return” to the State of all citizens who had left
it on account of the disturbances. He said that the tendency of Pakistan would
be to push as many people as possible into Jammu and Kashmir. If the ple¬
biscite was to be limited, as it should be, to genuine citizens of the State, the
 APPENDICES 365

entry of persons claiming to be citizens into the State will have to be most
carefully checked. How was this to be achieved? Dr. Lozano said that the
Commission fully realised the necessity of an accurate and effective check but
had not gone into details. Possibly those returning to the State could be
stopped and examined at the frontier. The Prime Minister pointed out that,
considering the length of the frontier and the ease with which people could
slip across the border over mountain tracks, a check on the frontier would
be neither easy nor effective, except by the employment of large forces.

Apart from the problem of entry, there is the even more important
problem of the rehabilitation and protection of those who have left the State
on account of recent disturbances. Homes have been destroyed; property has
been lost; there has been wholesale dispossession of persons from the land that
they used to cultivate. It is not enough to “invite” these persons to return to
the State. They have to be given full security and to be housed, fed and put
in a position to maintain themselves. It may be necessary to lodge these return¬
ing citizens of the State temporarily in camps for distribution to their homes.
They could not, however, be expected to remain in relief camps for long or to
take part in a plebiscite from such camps. The administrative and economic
implications of this task were at once significant and onerous. They must
receive full attention.

B.6(b). It is assumed that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will

decide whether or not a person entered the State for a lawful purpose.

B.7(b). India is a secular State; the United Nations also are a secular
organisation. Pakistan aims at being a theocratic State. An appeal to reli¬
gious fanaticism could not be regarded as legitimate political activity. Dr.
Lozano agreed that any political activity which might tend to disturb law and
order could not be regarded as legitimate. The same test would apply to
freedom of the Press and of speech.

As regards the freedom of lawful entry and exit, this must obviously be
governed by B.6 of the proposals. It is assumed that in the territory under
their control, entry and exit will be regulated by rules framed for the purpose
by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, with due regard to the security
of the State and the maintenance of law and order. Dr. Lozano said that
a system of permits would probably be necessary.

B.7(c) Persons guilty of ordinary offences against law and order will
not be regarded as political prisoners.

5. In all then- negotiations the Government of India have emphasised the

paramount need of ensuring the security of the State. The Commission re-
cogmsed th,s in then- Resolution of 13 August; they have also provided in
4(a) of the plebiscite proposals that measures with regard to the final disposal

" a'ld Sta‘e Forccs wi“ bc ,ak™ with due regard to the security „f
36G sardar patel’s correspondence

the State. I lie Government o! India wish to emphasise the supreme impor¬
tance which they attach to adequate provision for the security of the State in
all contingencies.

APPENDIX EIGHTEEN

UNCIP RESOLUTION OF 5 JANUARY 1949

(S/1430, PARA 143)

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, having received
from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in communications dated 23
December and 25 December 1948, respectively, their acceptance of the following
principles which are supplementary to the Commission’s resolution of 13 August
1948:
1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free
and impartial plebiscite.
2. A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission
that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the
Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948, have been carried out and arrange¬
ments for the plebiscite have been completed.
3. (a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with
the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a per¬
sonality of high international standing and commanding general confidence. He
will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and

Kashmir.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu
and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organising and conducting
the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.
(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such
staff of assistants and observers as he may require.
4. (a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission’s re-
solution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful
conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite
Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India
the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with
due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite;
(b) A, regards the territory referred to in A-2 of Part II of the resolu-
tion of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be
determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consulta-

tion with the local authorities.

 APPENDICES 367

5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal
political elements of the State will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite
Administrator in the preparation for and the holding of the plebiscite.
6. (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the dis¬
turbances will be invited and be free to return and to exercise all their
rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall
be appointed two commissions, one composed of nominees of India and
the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commission shall operate under the
direction of the Plebiscite administrator. The Governments of India and
Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will colla¬
borate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into effect.
(b) All persons (other than citizens of the State) who on or since 15
August 1947, have entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required
to leave the State.
7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake
to ensure, in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator, that:
(a) there is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue
influence on the voters in the plebiscite;

(b) no restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout

the State. All subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall
be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of
the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom of the
Press, speech and assemby and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom
of lawful entry and exit;
(c) all political prisoners arc released;

(d) minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protec¬
tion; and
(e) there is no victimisation.

8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Com¬

mission foi India and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance
and the Commission may in its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator
to carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has been
entrusted.

9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall

report the result thereof to the Commission and to the Government of Jammu
and Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security Council whether
the plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial.

10. Upon the signature of the truce agreement the details of the foregoing
proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in Part III of the
Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will
be fully associated in these consultations;
368 sardar patel’s correspondence

Commends the Governments of India and Pakistan for their prompt

action in ordering a cease-fire to take effect from one minute before midnight
of January 1, 1949, pursuant to the agreement arrived at as provided for by
the Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948; and

Resolves to return in the immediate future to the subcontinent to dis¬

charge the responsibilities imposed upon it by the resolution of 13 August
1948, and by the foregoing principles.

APPENDIX NINETEEN

AGREEMENT BETWEEN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF INDIA AND

PAKISTAN REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE
LINE IN THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR (ANNEX 26 OF
UNGIP THIRD REPORT—S/1430 AND ADD 1 TO 3)

29 July, 1949

I. Introduction

A. The military representatives of India and Pakistan met together in

Karachi from 18 July to 27 July 1949 under the auspices of the Truce Sub-
Committee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

B. The members of the Indian delegation were: Lieutenant-General S.

M. Shrinagesh, Major-General K. S. Thimayya, Brigadier S. II. F. J Manek-

shaw. As observers: Mr. H. M. Patel, Mr. V. Sahay.

C. The members of the Pakistan delegation were: Major-General W. J.

Cawthorn, Major-General Nazir Ahmed, Brigadier M. Sher Khan. As obser¬

vers: Mr. M. Ayub, Mr. A. A. Khan.

D. The members of the Truce Sub-Committee of the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan were: Mr. Hernando Samper (Colombia),
Chairman; Mr. William L. S. Williams (United States); Lieutenant-General
Maurice Delvoie, Military Adviser; Mr. Miguel A. Marin, Legal Adviser.

II. Agreement

A. Considering:
1 That the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, in its
, * trr datcd 2 July, 1949, invited the Governments of India and Pakistan to
a military repr«enta,ives to meet jointly in Karachi under

the auspices of the Commission's Truce Sub-Committee to estabhsh a cease¬

fire linr in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, mutually agreed upon by the

Governments of India and Pakistan;

2 That the United Nation, Commission for India and Pak.stan m its
letter stated that “The meetings will be for military purposes; political mu
will not be considered," and that “They will be conducted without prejud.c

to negotiations concerning the truce agreement ;

 APPENDICES

3. That in the same letter the United Nations Commission for India and
Pakistan further stated that “The cease-fire line is a complement of the sus¬
pension of hostilities, which falls within the provisions of Part I of the tesolu-
tion of 13 August, 1948, and can be considered separately from the questions
relating to Part II of the same resolution”;
4. That the Governments of India and Pakistan, in their letters dated
7 julyj i9495 to the Chairman of the Commission, accepted the Commission s
invitation to the military conference in Karachi;
B. The delegations of India and Pakistan, duly authorised, have reached

the following agreement:

1. Under the provisions of Part I of the resolution of 13 August, 1918,
and as a complement of the suspension of hostilities in the State of Jammu
and Kashmir on 1 January, 1949, a cease-fire line is established.

2. The cease-fire line runs from Manawar in the south, north to Keran and
from Keran east to the glacier area, as follows:

(a) The line from Manawar to the south bank of the Jhelum River at
Urusa (inclusive to India) is the line now defined by the factual positions
about which there is agreement between both parties. Where there has hither¬
to not been agreement, the line shall be as follows:

(i) in the Patrana area: Kohel (inclusive to Pakistan) north along the
Khuwala Kas Nullah up to Point 2276 (inclusive to India), thence to Kirni
(inclusive to India).
(ii) Khambha, Pir Satwan, Point 3150 and Point 3606 are inclusive to
India, thence the line runs to the factual position at Bagla Gala, thence to
the factual position at Point 3300.
(iii) In the area south of Uri the positions of Pir Kanthi and Ledi Gali
are inclusive to Pakistan.
(b) From the north bank of the Jhelum River the line runs from a point
opposite the village of Urusa (NL 972109), thence north following the Balla-
seth Da Nar Nullah (inclusive to Pakistan), up to NL 973140, thence north-east
to Chhota Qazinag (Point 10657 inclusive to India), thence to NM 010180,
thence to NM 037210, thence to Point 11825 (NM 025354, inclusive to
Pakistan), thence to Tutmari Gali (to be shared by both sides, posts to be
established 500 yards on either side of the Gali), thence to the north-west through
the first ‘‘R” of Burji Nar to north of Gadori, thence straight west to just north
of point 9870, thence along the black line north of Bijidhar to north of Batarasi,
thence to just south of Sudhpura, thence due north to the Kathaqazinag Nullah,
thence along the Nullah to its junction with the Grangnar Nullah, thence along
the latter Nullah to Kajnwala Pathra (inclusive to India), thence across the
Danna ridge (following the factual positions) to Richmar Gali (inclusive to
S.G.-24
370 sardar patel’s correspondence

India), thence north to Thanda Katha Nullah, thence north to the Kuhao-
ganga River. I he lme then follows the Kishanganga River up to a point
situated between Fargi and Tarban, thence (all inclusive to Pakistan) to
Bankoran, thence north-east to Khori, thence to the hill feature 8930 (in Square
9053), thence straight north to Point 10164 (in Square 9057), thence to Point
10323 (in Square 9161), thence north-east straight to Guthur, then to Bhut-
pathra, thence to NL 980707, thence following the Bugina Nullah to the
junction with the Kishanganga River at Point 4739. Thereafter the line
follows the Kishanganga River to Reran and onwards to Point 4996
(NL 975818).

(c) From Point 4996 the line follows (all inclusive to Pakistan) the Famgar
Nullah eastward to Point 12124, to Katware, to Point 6678, then to the
north-east to Sarian (Point 11279), to Point 11837, to Point 13090 to Point
12641, thence east again to Point 11142, thence to Dhakki, thence to Point
11415, thence to Point 10301, thence to Point 7507, thence to Point 10685,
thence to Point 8388, thence south-east to Point 11812. Thence the line runs
(all inclusive to India) to Point 13220, thence across the river to the east to
Point 13449 (Durmat), thence to Point 14586 (Anzbari), thence to Point 13554,
thence to Milestone 45 on the Burzil Nullah, thence to the east to Ziankal
(Point 12909), thence to the south-east to Point 11114, thence to Point 12216,
thence to Point 12867, thence to the cast to Point 11264, thence to Karo
(Point 14985), thence to Point 14014, thence to Point 12089, thence following
the track to Point 12879. From there the line runs to Point 13647 (Karobal
Gali, to be shared by both sides). The cease-fire line runs thence through
Retagah Chhish (Point 15316), thence through Point 15889, thence through
Point 17392, thence through Point 16458, thence to Marpo La (to be shared
by both sides), thence through Point 17561, thence through Point 17352, thence
through Point 18400, thence through Point 16760, thence to (inclusive to

India) Dalunang.

(d) From Dalunang eastwards the cease-fire line will follow the general
line Point 15495, Ishmam, Manus, Gangam, Gunderman, Point 13620, Funkar
(Point 17628), Marmak, Natsara, Shangruti (Point 17531), Chorbat La (Point
16700), Chalunka (on the Shyok River), Khor, thence north to the glaciers.
This portion of the cease-fire line shall be demarcated in detail on the basis of
the factual position as of 27 July, 1949, by the local commanders assisted by

United Nations military observers.

C. The cease-fire line described above shall be drawn on a one-inch map

(where available) and then be verified mutually on the ground by local com¬
manders on each side with the assistance of the United Nations military observers,
so as to eliminate any no-man’s land. In the event that the local commanders
arc unable to reach agreement, the matter shall be referred to the Commi¬
ssion’s Military Adviser, whose decision shall be final. After this verification,
 appendices 371

the Military Adviser will issue to each High Command a map on which will

be marked the definitive cease-fire line.

D. No troops shall be stationed or operate in the area of the Burzil

Nullah from south of Minimarg to the cease-fire line. This area is bounded
on the west by the ridge leading north-east from Dudgaikal to Point 13071,
to Point 9447, to Point 13466, to Point 13463, and on the east by the ridge
running from Point 12470 to Point 11608, to Point 13004, to Point 13976, to
Point 13450. Pakistan may, however, post troops on the west of the above

ridges to cover the approaches to Kamri Bal Pass.

E. In any dispositions that may be adopted in consequence of the present

agreement troops will remain at least 500 yards from the cease-fire line except
where the Kishanganga River constitutes the line. Points which have been
shown as inclusive to one party may be occupied by that party, but the troops
of the other party shall remain at a distance of 500 yards.

F. Both sides shall be free to adjust their defensive positions behind the
cease-fire line as determined in paragraphs A through E, inclusive, subject to
no wire or mines being used when new bunkers and defences are construct¬
ed. There shall be no increase of forces or strengthening of defences in areas
where no major adjustments are involved by the determination of the cease¬

fire line.
G. The action permitted by paragraph F above shall not be accomp¬
anied or accomplished by the introduction of additional military potential by
either side into the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

H. Except as modified by paragraphs A to G, inclusive, above, the mili¬

tary agreements between the two High Commands relating to the cease-fire
of 1 January, 1949, shall continue to remain operative.

I. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan will station
observers where it deems necessary.

J. The delegations shall refer this agreement to their respective Govern¬

ments for ratification. The documents of ratification shall be deposited with
the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan not later than 31
July 1949.

K. A period of thirty days from the date of ratification shall be allowed

to each side to vacate the areas at present occupied by them beyond the
cease-fire line as now determined. Before the expiration of this thirty-day
period there shall be no forward movement into areas to be taken over by either
side pursuant to this agreement, except by mutual agreement between local
commanders.

In faith whereof the undersigned sign this document in three original

copies.
 372 sardar patel’s correspondence

Done in Karachi on 27 July, 1949.

For the Government of India:

S. M. Shrinagesh

For the Government of Pakistan :

J. Cawthorn
Major-General

For the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan:

Hernando Samper
M. Delvoie

APPENDIX TWENTY

TEXT OF THE PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY THE HEAD OF

JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE ON 1 MAY 1951

Whereas it is the general desire of the people of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir that a Constituent Assembly should be brought into being for the
purpose of framing a constitution for the State;

Whereas it is commonly felt that the convening of the Assembly can no

longer be delayed without detriment to the future well-being of the State;

And whereas the terms of the proclamation of the Maharaja dated 5

March 1948 in regard to the convening of a national assembly as contained in
clauses 4 to 6 of the operative part thereof do not meet the requirements of
the present situations;

1, Yuvraj Karan Singh, do hereby direct as follows:

(1) A Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives of the people,

elected on the basis of adult franchise, shall be constituted forthwith for the
purpose of framing a constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

(2) For the purpose of the said elections the State shall be divided into
a number of territorial constituencies, each containing a population of 40,000 or
as near thereto as possible, and each electing one member. A delimitation com¬
mittee shall be set up by the Government to make recommendations as to
the number of constituencies and the limits of each constituency;

(3) Elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be on the basis of adult

franchise, that is to say, every person who is a State subject of any class, as
defined in the notification No. . ., is not less than twenty-one years of age on
the first day of March, has been a resident in the constituency for such period
as may be prescribed by the rules, shall be entitled to register in the electo¬
ral rolls of that constituency, provided that any person who is of unsound mind
or has been so declared by a competent court, shall be disqualified for regis¬

tration ;
 appendices 373

(4) The vote at the election shall be [by] direct and secret ballot;

(5) The Constituent Assembly shall have power to act notwithstanding

any vacancy of the membership thereof;

(6) The Constituent Assembly shall frame its own agenda and make rules

for the governing of its procedure and the conduct of its business;

The Government shall make such rules and issue such instructions and

orders as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of this proclamation.

APPENDIX TWENTY-ONE

TEXT OF MEMORANDUM, DATED 14 AUGUST 1951, SUBMITTED BY

FOURTEEN MUSLIM LEADERS OF INDIA TO DR. FRANK P.
GRAHAM, UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE

It is a remarkable fact that, while the Security Council and its various

agencies have devoted so much time to the study of the Kashmir dispute

and made various suggestions for its resolution, none of them has tried to

ascertain the views of Indian Muslims nor the possible effect of any hasty

step in Kashmir, however well-intentioned, on the interests and well-being of the

Indian Muslims. We are convinced that no lasting solution for the problem

can be found unless the position of Muslims in Indian society is clearly under¬

stood.

Supporters of the idea of Pakistan, before this sub-continent was partitioned,

discouraged any attempt to define Pakistan clearly and did little to anticipate

the conflicting problems which were bound to arise as a result of the advocacy

of the two-nation theory. The concept of Pakistan, therefore, became an emo¬

tional slogan with little rational content. It never occurred to the Muslim

League or its leaders that if a minority was not prepared to live with a majo¬

rity on the sub-continent, how could the majority be expected to tolerate the
minority.

It is, therefore, small wonder that the result of partition has been dis¬

astrous to Muslims. In undivided India, their strength lay about 100

million. Partition split up the Muslim people, confining them to the three

isolated regions. Thus, Muslims number 25 million in Western Pakistan,

35 million to 40 million in India, and the rest in Eastern Pakistan. A single

undivided community has been broken into three fragments, each faced with
its own problems.

Pakistan was not created on a religious basis. If it had been, our fate

as well as the fate of other minorities would have been settled at that time.

Nor would the division of the sub-continent for reasons of religion have left
large minorities in India or Pakistan.
374 SARDAR FATEI.’S CORRESPONDENCE

This merely illustrates what we have said above, that the concept of Pakistan
was vague, obscure, and never clearly defined, nor its likely consequences fore¬
seen by the Muslim League, even when some of these should have been obvious.

When the partition took place, Muslims in India were left in the lurch by
the Muslim League and its leaders. Most of them departed to Pakistan and a
few who stayed behind stayed long enough to wind up their affairs and dis¬
pose of their property. Those who went over to Pakistan left a large number
of relations and friends behind.

Having brought about a division of the country, Pakistan leaders proclaim¬

ed that they would convert Pakistan into a land where people would live a life
according to the tenets of Islam. This created nervousness and alarm among
the minorities living in Pakistan. Not satisfied with this, Pakistan leaders went
further and announced again and again their determination to protect and
safeguard the interests of Muslims in India. This naturally aroused suspicion
amongst the Hindus against us and our loyalty to India was questioned.

Pakistan had made our position weaker by driving out Hindus from Wes¬
tern Pakistan in utter disregard of the consequences of such a policy to us and
our welfare. A similar process is in operation in Eastern Pakistan from which
Hindus are coming over to India in a larger and larger number.

If Hindus are not welcome in Pakistan, how can we, in all fairness, expect
Muslims to be welcomed in India? Such a policy must inevitably, as the past
has already shown, result in the uprooting of Muslims in this country and their
migration to Pakistan, where, as it became clear last year, they are no longer
welcome, lest their influx should destroy Pakistan’s economy.

Neither some of those Muslims who did migrate to Pakistan after partition,
and following the widespread bloodshed and conflict on both sides of the Indo-
Pakistan border in the north-west, have been able to find a happy asylum in
what they had been told would be their homeland. Consequently sonn ol them
have had to return to India, e.g. Mcos who are now being rehabilitated in their
former areas.

If we are living honourably in India today, it is certainly not due to

Pakistan which, if anything, has by her policy and action weakened our position.

The credit goes to the broadminded leadership ol India, to Mahatma Gan¬

dhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, to the traditions of tolerance in this country,
and to the Constitution which ensures equal rights to all citizens of India,
irrespective of their religion, caste, creed, colour, or sex.
We, therefore, feel that, tragically as Muslims were misled by the Mus¬
lim League and subsequently by Pakistan and the unnecessary suffering which
we and our Hindu brethren have had to go through in Pakistan and in Indi*
since partition, we must be given an opportunity to settle down to a life of
 APPENDICES 375

tolerance and understanding to the mutual benefit of Hindus and Muslims in

our country—if only Pakistan would let us do it. To us it is a matter ol no

small consequence.

Despite continuous provocation, first from the Muslim League and since
then from Pakistan, the Hindu majority in India has not thrown us or mem¬
bers of other minorities out of Civil Services, Armed Forces, the judiciary, trade,
commerce, business, and industry. There are Muslim Ministers in the Union
and State Cabinets, Muslim Governors, Muslim Ambassadors, representing
India in foreign countries, fully enjoying the confidence of the Indian nation,
Muslim members in Pai'liament and State Legislatures, Muslim judges serving
on the Supreme Court and High Courts, high-ranking officers in the Armed
Forces and Civil Services, including the police. Muslims have large landed es¬
tates, run big business and commercial houses in various parts of the country,
notably in Bombay and Calcutta, have their share in industrial production and
enterprise in export and import trade. Our famous sacred shrines and places of
cultural interest are mostly in India.

Not that our lot is entirely happy. We wish some of the State Govern¬
ments showed a little greater sympathy to us in the field of education and em¬
ployment. Nevertheless, we feel we have an honourable place in India. Under
the law of the land, our religious and cultural life is protected and we shall share
in the opportunities open to all citizens to ensure progress for the people of this
country.

It is, therefore, clear that our interest and welfare do not coincide with
Pakistan’s conception of the welfare and interests of Muslims in Pakistan.

This is clear from Pakistan’s attitude towards Kashmir. Pakistan claims

Kashmir, first, on the ground of the majority of the State’s people being Muslims
and, secondly, on the ground, of the State being essential to its economy and
defence. To achieve its object it has been threatening to launch “jehad” against
Kashmir and India.

It is a strange commentary on political beliefs that the same Muslims of

Pakistan who would like the Muslims of Kashmir to join them invaded the
State, in October 1947, killing and plundering Muslims in the State and dis¬
honouring Muslim women, all in the interests of what they described as the
liberation of Muslims of the State. In its oft-proclaimed anxiety to rescue the
3 million Muslims from what it describes as the tyranny of a handful of
Hindus in the State, Pakistan evidently is prepared to sacrifice the interests of
40 million Muslims in India—a strange exhibition of concern for the welfare
of fellow-Muslims. Our misguided brothers in Pakistan do not realise that if
Muslims in Pakistan can wage a war against Hindus in Kashmir why should
not Hindus, sooner or later, retaliate against Muslims in India.
376 sardar ratel’s correspondence

Does Pakistan seriously think that it could give us any help if such an
emergency arose or that we would deserve any help, thanks to its own follies?
It is incapable of providing room and livelihood to the 40 million Muslims of
India, should they migrate to Pakistan. Yet its policy and action, if not changed
soon, may well produce the result which it dreads.

We are convinced that India will never attack our interests. First of all, it
would be contrary to the spirit animating the political movement in this coun¬
try. Secondly, it would be opposed to the Constitution and to the sincere
leadership of the Prime Minister. Thirdly, India by committing such a folly
would be playing straight into the hands of Pakistan.

We wish we were equally convinced of the soundness of Pakistan’s policy.

So completely oblivious is it of our present problems and of our future that it is
willing to sell us into slavery—if only it can secure Kashmir.

It ignores the fact that Muslims in Kashmir may also have a point of view
of their own, that there is a democratic movement with a democratic leader¬
ship in the State, both inspired by the progress of a broadminded, secular, demo¬
cratic movement in India and both naturally being in sympathy with India.
Otherwise, the Muslim raiders should have been welcomed with open arms by
the Muslims of the State when the invasion took place in 1947.
Persistent propaganda about “jehad” is intended, among other things, to
inflame religious passions in this country. For it would, of course, be in
Pakistan’s interests to promote communal rioting in India to show to Kashmiri
Muslims how they can find security only in Pakistan. Such a policy, however,
can only bring untold misery and suffering to India and Pakistan generally and
to Indian Muslims particularly.
Pakistan never tires of asserting that it is determined to protect the inte¬
rests of Muslims in Kashmir and India. Why does not Pakistan express the
same concern for Pathans who are fighting for Pakhtoonistan, an independent
homeland of their own ? The freedom-loving Pathans under the leadership of
Khan Abdul Ghaflfar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib, both nurtured in the tradi¬
tions of democratic tolerance of the Indian National Congress, are being sub¬
jected to political repression of the worst possible kind by their Muslim brethren
in power in Pakistan and in the NWFP. Contradictory as Pakistan s policy
generally is, it is no surprise to us that while it insists on a fair and impartial
plebiscite in Kashmir, it denies a fair and impartial plebiscite to Pathans.
Pakistan’s policy in general and her attitude towards Kashmir in parti¬
cular thus tend to create conditions in this country which in the long run can
only bring to us Muslims widespread suffering and destruction. Its policy
prevents us from settling down, from being honourable citizens of a State, free
from the suspicion of our fellow-countrymen and adapting ourselves to chang¬
ing conditions to promote the interests and welfare of India. Its sabre-rattling
 appendices 377

interferes with its own economy and ours. It expects us to be loyal to it des¬
pite its impotence to give us any protection, believing at the same time that
we can still claim all the rights of citizenship in a secular democracy.

In the event of a war, it is extremely doubtful whether it will be able to

protect the Muslims of East Bengal who are completely cut off from Western
Pakistan. Are the Muslims of India and Eastern Pakistan to sacrifice themselves
completely to enable the 25 million Muslims in Western Pakistan to embark
upon mad, self-destructive adventures?

We should, therefore, like to impress upon you with all the emphasis at
our command that Pakistan’s policy towards Kashmir is fraught with the gra¬
vest peril to the 40 million Muslims of India. If the Security Council is really
interested in peace, human brotherhood, and international understanding, it
should heed this warning while there is still time.
Dr. Zakir Husain
(Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh University)

Sir Sultan Ahmed

(Former Member of Governor-General’s
Executive Council)

Sir Mohammed Ahmed Said Khan

(Nawab of Chhatari, former Acting Governor of United
Provinces and Prime Minister of Hyderabad)

Sir Mohammed Usman

(Former Member of Governor-General’s Executive
Council and Acting Governor of Madras and
Vice-Chancellor of Madras University)

Sir Iqbal Ahmed

(Former Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court)

Sir Fazal Rahimtoola

(Former Sheriff of Bombay)

Maulana Hafz-ur-Rehman, m.p.

(General-Secretary of Anjuman-i-Jamiat-ul-Ulema)

Colonel B. H. Zaidi, m.p.

(Former Prime Minister of Rampur State)

Nawab Zain Yar Jung

(Minister, Government of Hyderabad)

A. K. Kwaja
(Former President of Muslim Majlis)

T. M. Zarif
(General-Secretary, West Bengal Bohra

Community)
378 sardar patel’s correspondence

H. Quamar Faruqi
(President, Jamiat-ul-Uleraa, Hyderabad)

M. A. Kazimi, m.p.

(United Provinces)

Hashim Premji
(Former Sheriff of Bombay)

APPENDIX TWENTY-TWO

TEXT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1965

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General (S/6651) dated September

3 1965,
Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Concerned at the deteriorating situation along the cease-fire line in

Kashmir,
1 Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith
all steps for an immediate cease-fire.

2 Calls upon the two Governments to respect the cease-fire line and ha\e
all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its own side of the line.

3. Calls upon the two Governments to co-operate fully with the United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in its task of super¬
vising the observance of the cease-fire.
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three
days on the implementation of this resolution.

APPENDIX TWENTY-THREE

RESOLUTION 210 (1965) ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT

RESOLU TiUN s i23^ meeting> ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1965

The Security Council, . . .

*• T" »t ^
onn4,nsfPTehmTcrrST%5, [S/RES/209 (1965)] being document S/6661 dated 6

September 1965,
Noting With deep concern the extension of the fightmg w c
immeasurably to the seriousness of the situation,
 APPENDICES 379

1. Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict
immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the
positions held by them before 5 August 1965;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect

to this resolution and the resolution of 4 September 1965, to take all measures
possible to strengthen the UNMOGIP, and to keep the Council promptly and
currently informed on the implementation of the resolutions and on the
situation in the area;

3. Decides to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the
Council may determine what further steps may be necessary to secure peace and
security in the area.

APPENDIX TWENTY-FOUR

RESOLUTION 211 (1965) ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

AT ITS 1242ND MEETING ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1965

The Security Council,

Having considered the Reports of the Secretary-General on his consulta¬

tions with the Governments of India and Pakistan,

Commending the Secretary-General for his unrelenting efforts in fur-

therance of the objectives of the Security Council’s resolutions of 4 and 6
September,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease-fire as

set out in the Report of the Secretary-General (S/6683), but noting further with
concern that no cease-fire has yet come into being,

Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step

towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two
countries on Kashmir and other related matters,

1. Demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, 22 September,

1965, at 0700 hours GMT and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for
a cease-fire at the moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel
back to the positions held by them before 5 August, 1965;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure

supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;

3. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the
situation in the area;

d<rSa e COUSldcr aS Soon as °Perative paragraph 1 of the Council’s resolu-

ion .. o September has been implemented, what steps could be taken to
380 sardar patel’s correspondence

assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present con¬
flict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilise all peaceful
means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect

to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security
Council thereon.

APPENDIX TWENTY-FIVE

TASHKENT DECLARATI ON

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met
at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and
Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful rela¬
tions between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly rela¬
tions between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of
vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and
Pakistan.
I
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both
sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India
and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm
their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle
their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of
peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and,
indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by
the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this back¬
ground that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth

its respective position.

II
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later
than 25 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to J August, 1%j, an
both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.

III

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

IV
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against t e o e
 APPENDICES 381

country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of

friendly relations between the two countries.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner
of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning
of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments
shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse.

VI

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations,
communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan,
and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and
Pakistan.

VII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the
repatriation of the prisoners of war.

VIII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that
the two sides will continue the discussions of questions relating to the problems
of refugees and evictions/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides
will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agree
to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in
connection with the conflict.

IX

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels
on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognised
the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to ° their
Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their
feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union
the Soviet Government, and personally to the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers ot the USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble part in
bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory
results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan

hospitality.6'' for thdr overwhelming reception and generous

S.C.25
382 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to

witness this Declaration.

Prime Minister of India President of Pakistan

Lai Bahadur Shastri Mohammed Ayub Khan

Tashkent, 10 January 1966

 INDEX

AERONAUTICAL COMMUNICA¬ New Delhi, 231-32; his opinion

TION, 44 about Pakistan intrigue, 202;

Afridis, decide to attack Kashmir, 155 proceeds to New York, 148;

Agreement, arrived at between India suggests redraft to Sardar Patel,

Government & Sheikh Abdullah, 303-04; writes to Kashmir

274, 275 Maharaja about changes in the

Ahuja, 43, 44 existing constitutional & admini¬
Air services, 44 strative set-up, 108-11
Alexander, Horace, 102 Azad Kashmir, 184, 189; its govern¬
Ali Ghazanfar, 149 ment, 151, 244; its movement, 143;
All-India States Peoples’ Conference, its Radio, passage from—, 260-61
3, 6 Azad, Maulana, 9, 11, 20, 23
All-State Kashmiri Pandit Conference, Azim Hussain, 183, 184, 191, 193
2, 29
Amrit Kaur, Raj Kumari, 200; her
note, 50-51 BAJPAI, GIRJA SHANKAR, 283
Arbitral Tribunal, to give final deci¬ Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, 28, 126,
sion on points of disputes in Kash¬ 127, 134, 136, 142, 143, 147, 164,
mir, 102 188, 193, 194; invites Sardar
Arbitration, 312 Patel to National Conference,
Arms Act, its repeal, 179 300; keen on maintaining separate
Arms & equipment, supply of—in entity of Kashmir National Home
Kashmir, 121 Guards, 175-76; Sardar Patel gave
Arms, their supply to Home Guards, Rs. 50,000 to—for refugee relief,
143, 152 205
Army Minister, in Kashmir, 109 Bakshi Tek Chand, 61, 69
Army, should be open to all creeds Baldev Singh, Sardar, 37, 48, 93-95,
& communities, 132 153, 160, 189
Attlee, 283; his approach in regard Balramdas, Dr., 24
to possibility of Pakistan’s attack Batra, Deputy Prime Minister of
on Kashmir, 284
Jammu & Kashmir State, 40, 42,
Ayyangar, Gopalaswamy, 196, 199, 56, 58, 60, 61
200, 234, 264, 300-02, 318; con¬ Bazaz, Janki Nath, 2
demns Sheikh Abdullah’s inter¬ Bhargava, Dr. Gopichand, Punjab
view to Michael Davidson, 267- Premier, 172
68; expresses disapproval of Bhopal, Nawab of, advises Pandit
Sheikh Abdullah’s many state¬
Nehru to postpone departure to
ments in Press Conference in Kashmir, 8-10

383
384 sardar patel’s correspondence

Board of Judicial Advisers in Kash¬ Commonwealth Conference, 248

mir, 132, 139 Communal troubles, 3
British displomacy, 199 Communists, in Kashmir elections,
British Government, those who fought 26-27
with—are now placed in charge Congress Parliamentary Board, 28
of the Government of India, 16 Congress Working Committee, 5, 6,
Broadcasting, of India is necessary, 11, 19, 21-24; its resolution on
204 Kashmir, 23-24; resolves to send
a deputation to Kashmir, 23
Constituent Assembly, 32, 33, 117,
CABINET, for Kashmir, 175 132, 133, 141, 259, 263, 278, 295
Cabinet Mission, 23 Constitution Act, of Kashmir, 132
Calcutta, furnishes ghastly poten¬ Constitutional Impasse, in Kashmir,
tialities of lawlessness, 13 128-46
Cariappa, General, 226, 262, 283
Cease-fire line in Jammu & Kash¬
mir, 324-25 DALMIA JAIN AIRWAYS, 59, 61
Cease-fire order in Kashmir, 222 Deadlock, in Kashmir politics, 142
Chakravarty, S., Deputy Secretary, Defence Forces, must be loyal, 118
Ministry of Transport, 61 Defence Minister, of India, Ram-
Chaterji, R. C., Education Secre¬ chandra Kak writes to—, 44
tary, E. Punjab Government, 173 Defence Ministry, 38, 121, 211, 278
Ghaudhuri, P. C., Director-General, Delegation, to UNO, 148
A.I. Radio, 98, 193 Demilitarisation, 324
China, its Government states Kash¬ Dewan, 139, 140, 197, 198
mir’s question should be settled Dewan Chamanlal, his note for Sar¬
on basis of self-determination, dar Patel, 36-37
327; its principal enemy is U.S. Dewan Shiv Saran Lai, 50, 62
imperialism, 326; major shift in Dharmarth Council, thorough audit

its Kashmir policy, 327 into transactions of—, 287

Chinese Ambassador, asserts India Dharmarth Trust, 290, 292, 293

is a friend of China, 326 Dictatorship, virtual, in Kashmir,

Chopra, C. R., Governor of Jammu 118

Province, 85 Director General, of Civil Aviation,

Choudhri, Hamidullah Khan, his 43

adjournment motion in Kashmir Disturbances, in Kashmir, 13
Dixon, Sir Owen, his conclusions,
Assembly, 24
Chou En-lai, Chinese Prime Minister, 323-24
Draft Rules of Business, sent by
at a Press Conference, 325
Sardar Patel to Kashmir Maha¬
Code, use of special—is advisable tor
purpose of secrecy of certain im¬ raja, 194

portant administrative messages in

Dwarkanath, 16, 18, 21; General
Secretary, Jammu-Kashmir Rajya
New Delhi, 43
 INDEX 385

Hindu Sabha, 1, 175; his enclosure HARI SINGH, Kashmir Maharaja,

to Pandit Javvaharlal, 54-55 passim', complains rival army is
being created in Kashmir, 147;
describes military developments
EAST PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, & destruction in Kashmir in
122, 123, 124 October 1947 & after, 160-64;
East Punjab Militia, 176 expresses his full confidence in
Eastern Punjab Railways, 48, 49 Pandit Nehru & Sardar Patel,
Elections, for Kashmir State As¬ 157; feels he should withdraw
sembly, 23, 26, 117, 132, 139; in accession to Indian Union, 162;
Jammu, 26 his letter to Pandit Nehru, 225-
Electoral Rolls, of Kashmir, 23, 25 26; his letter to Sardar Patel,
Emergency Administration, 108, 269-71; his views on Kashmir’s
109 development, 115-18; insists
Mahajan as Dewan can preside
over Cabinet meetings, 133; is
FOODGRAINS, 235 prepared to take command of
Foreign Affairs Committee, 318 his & Indian forces, 162; main¬
Foreign Journalists’ Association, 154 tains Indian Dominion discharges
Franchise, 157 its duty on military side effec¬
Freighter service, 59, 60 tively & fully, 163, 164; pleads
no commitment should be made
to Security Council without con¬
GADGIL, N. V., Minister for sulting himself, 158; see also
Works, Mines & Power, 57 Kashmir Maharaja
Gandhiji, 6, 9, 20, 35, 221, 237, 240, Haskar, P. N., delegate to UNO,
286; suggests meeting should be 148
held to consider Kashmir ques¬ High Court, of Kashmir, 19, 129,
tion, 11 136, 139
Gangsterism, 13 Hindu & Sikh population, their
General Amnesty, 35, 42 future in Pakistan, 100, 104
Ghulam Mohammed, 110, 252 Hindu fanaticism, according to
Gill, Colonel, 11 Sheikh Abdullah, 228, 229, 231
Gopaldas, Rai Bahadur, 32, 34, 35 Hindu-Muslim question, 3
Government of India, 120, 176, Hindus, progressive, 1, 26; their
177; accommodating to Sheikh looting & murder, 51
Abdullah, 228; informs UNO of Home Guards, in Kashmir, 104,
Pakistan’s aggression on India, 193; are untrained, 161
i.e. Kashmir State, 125 Hyderabad affair, 201, 249
Government-Rajya Hindu Sabha,
their alliance in Kashmir, 27
Graham, Dr Frank, representative INDIA, as a great nation, 14; cele¬
of Security Council, 324, 325
bration of her independence, 220;
386 sardar patel’s correspondence

submitted a formal complaint in neighbourhood, 99; its zonal

against Pakistan to Security plebiscite, 262
Council, 323; though divided is Jammu & Kashmir, concessions &
completely free on 13-8-1947, 32 perquisites to be enjoyed by the
Indian Army, 177, 226, 276, 277; their Ruler of—, 288-89; its Army
morale is rapidly going down, Supply Service, 177, 193; its
160-61; was at the highest pitch Constitution Act, 109; its Govern¬
during Great War, 160 ment has no legislature, 320; its
Indian Dominion, 37, 100, 125, 126, legality is recognised by UNO
157, 182; accepted Kashmir ac¬ Commission, 324; its present
cession & advised His Highness to legislation is a mere fiat of the
form interim government under Government, 320; its Rajya
Sheikh Abdullah, 146; should Hindu Mahasabha resents Pan¬
concentrate some military forces dit Nehru’s misstatements on
near Kashmir, 48 Kashmir, 1; legality of its acces¬
Indian Independence Act, 66 sion to India is not questioned
Indian National Congress, 22, 33 either by Security Council or
Indian Parliament, 324 UNO Commission, 324; State
Indian States, massacres in, 149 Forces, 176-78
Indian troops, 100 Janak Singh, General, 37
Indian Union, 35, 46, 103, 276 Jarring, Dr Gunnar, 325
Indo-Pakistan war, 325 Jhelum Valley, 45, 102
Information Department, 153 Jinnah, 54, 71; note on a discussion
Instrument of Accession, of Kashmir, with—, 73-81
272 Joint Defence Council, 70, 125
Interim Government, in Kashmir, Joint Election Board, in Kashmir, 27
96, 109, 110, 118, 119, 137, 138, Joint Manifesto, 27
139, 140, 142; on model of My¬
sore with Sheikh Abdullah as
Prime Minister, 105 KAK, AMARNATH, Pandit, put in

Interim Ministry’, in Kashmir, 116, prison, 207, 208

Kak, Margaret, 12, 41; asserts that
132, 141
Pandit Ramchandra Kak is being
Ismay, Lord Hasting, 71
prosecuted on flimsiest evidence,
217

JAGIRDARS, 227 Kak Ministry, 26

Jagirs, 195, 235, 243; in Kashmir Kak, P. N., 207-08

Kak, Ramchandra, Pandit, ex-Pre-
are sought to be resumed with¬
mier, Kashmir, 130; his case
out any compensation, 182,
in short, 223-25; his letter to
183
Mahatma Gandhi, 146; is put
Jalali, Pandit Jiyalal Kaul, 3
in prison, 207, 208; on Congress
Jammu, 1, 49, 141, 196; in great
Working Committee resolution,
panic owing to Pakistan’s action
 INDEX
387

been definitely organised, 68;

24-25; Prime Minister ol Kash¬
neither Hindus nor Sikhs of
mir, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 35; suggests
loan of a Transmitter & a special like to go to Pakistan, 229; pro¬

officer for manning it, 44; thanks paganda for, 99, 204; propaganda

Sardar Patel for providing re¬ in, 204; proposal for, 100; re¬
nowned for its beauty throughout
quisite wireless, 43
Kamal Singh, Lt. A.D.C. to Kash¬ the world, 14; restrictions on

mir Maharaja, 194 movements of its residents should

Kanwal Singh, Assistant Private be removed, 168; should declare

Secretary of Kashmir Maharaja, adhesion to Indian Union, 46;

264 should have trade with India,

Karan Singh, Yuvraj of Kashmir, his 105; should remain within Indian

wedding, 298-99; with Sardar Patel Union, 103; threat to — is real,

in Dehra Dun, 281; see also 55

Kashmir Yuvraj & Yuvraj Kashmir Affairs, 5, 35, 249
Kashmir, passim', 1-17, 106; & Se¬ Kashmir Alienation of Land Act, 236
curity Council, note on —, 311- Kashmir Army, 196, 198; has lost
13; article in New York Times morale & discipline, 201; its
on—is most poisonous, 313-14; administration, 212; its compo¬
Constituent Assembly, 276; de¬ sition, 213, 214
militarisation in—, 325; Hindus Kashmir arrests, President of Praja
& Sikhs from—start leaving the Parishad protests against, 259-
State, 161; is cut off from India 60
during winter, 45; is of essential Kashmir civil administration, 118,
value to India, 104; its accession 119, 123
to Indian Union should be Kashmii elections, 16, 21, 24
expediated, 46, 47; its cease-fire Kashmir Forces, 37; should be con¬
agreement of Karachi is painful, trolled by Indian Army, 204
286; its civil administration is in Kashmir Government, 5, 39, 60,
hands of National Conference, 161; 123, 273; does not accept arbi¬
its constitution as applied with tration of any third party, 19;
regard to acceded subjects, 301; its indecisiveness, 56
its constitution would be deter¬ Kashmir Maharaja, passim; agrees to
mined by duly elected Constituent accept Sardar Patel’s suggestion,
Assembly, 272; its invasion, 125; 269; asserts his private property
its military authorities, 196; its should be protected against
military operations are in hands Sheikh Abdullah’s acts, 271;
of Indian Union, 161; its minori¬ complains that Sheikh Abdullah’s
ties, 46; its news in English Papers administration has completely ig¬
is false, 153; its past history, nored him even in most impor¬
2; its policy, 14-15; its political tant matters, 198; demands from
prisoners released, 56; its situation, Sardar Patel certain assurances,
4, 153; movement against —has 270-71; displays statesmanship in
388 sardar patel’s correspondence

granting responsible government that they wish to be connected

to his people, 185; does not like with them lor P & T arrange¬
the idea of a plebiscite, 103; has ments in Kashmir Stale, 36
implicit trust in Sardar Patel, Kashmir State Department, arrange¬
269; has not obstructed any ment of its properties, 291-92
popular reforms, 227, 230; his Kashmir Valley, 102, 235, 262, 317
abdication, 104, 270; his an¬ Kashmir Vuvraj, his safety should be
nouncement, 13-15; his landed the concern of Indian Dominion,
property, 321; his lands should 271; his visit to America, 127; see
not be covered by legislation, also Karan Singh & Vuvraj
but by separate negotiations, 320; Kashmiri Pandit Conference, 29-30
his reaction to proposed changes, Katoch, Kashmir Singh, Lt. Col.,
115-18; his stud farm for refu¬ 138, 144; loan of his services as
gees, 200; leaves negotiations Commander-in-Chief of Kashmir
with Pakistan in hands of Indian Forces, 37, 38; maintains ammuni¬
Union, 104; not in a position to tion has not reached, 58, 59; on
resist demands of popular minis¬ deputation to Jammu & Kashmir
try, 227, 229, 230; requests Sardar State, 38
Patel to find out a Dewan for Kaul, B. M., member of Delegation
him, 189-90; seems reconciled to UNO, 148
to Sardar Patel’s proposal, 208; Khan, Abdul Ghafiar Khan, 240
should co-operate with National Khan, Ayub, Pakistan’s President,
Conference, 45-46; signed the 325, 326, 327
Accession, 243; see also Hari Singh Khan, Liaquat Ali, 70-73, 102, 110,
Kashmir Mahasabha, 280 247, 248, 249, 250, 323; note of
Kashmir masses, in favour of Indian a talk with, 72-73; on participa¬
Union, 103 tion of Pakistan units in Kashmir,
Kashmir Military Adviser, 177-78 205
Kashmir Muslim military, & police Khan, Mohammed Feroze, 156
have misbehaved, 63 Khan, Zafrullah Khan, Sir Mohd.,
Kashmir National Conference, 21, 165,205; confessed three Pakistani

54, 237; is being harassed, 23; brigades had been in Kashmir

settlement with — should be territory, 323

brought about simultaneously Kher, B. G., Chief Minister of Bom¬

with accession to Union, 55 bay, 100

Kashmir Nationals, 167-68 Khwaja Shahabuddin, 251

Kashmir question, 200, 201; joint Kidwai, R. A., 47, 48-49, 60

statement by Chou En-lai & Cy- Kosygin, Soviet Prime Minister,

rankiewicz of Poland on —, 325; 327

should be settled peacefully, 325, Kripalani, Acharva, 28, 35, 256-57;

draws attention to a poem calling
326
Kashmir State, passim; raiders of —, Kashmir war a Jehad, 256

97; tells Indian P&T Department Kulwant Singh, Major-General, 152

 INDEX 389

Kunwar Sir Dalip Singh, Agent to interests, 139; their protection,

Government of India in Jammu 132; their representation, 132
& Kashmir, 85-89 Monopoly, of any particular com¬
munity, 62
Motor vehicles, 118, 119, 121, 123,
LADAKH, 278, 283, 284; its valley 150
is unapproachable in winter, 203 Mountbatten, Lady, 200
Lala Dina Nath Mahajan, 153 Mountbatten, Lord, 67-71, 110, 116,
Leh, 278, 279 150, 180; drops Kashmir celebra¬
tion attendance, 187; his letter
to Pandit Nehru, 219-22; opines
MAHAJAN MEHRCHAND, passim; disastrous consequences would
appointed as Prime Minister of come to India, if she declares war
Jammu & Kashmir, 40; his against Pakistan, 221; suggests to
enclosure, 91-96; his Press Note Pandit Nehru to take Kashmir
on Kashmir, 64-66; on Pakistan’s case to UNO, 220
attack near Jammu, 99-100; Mudaliar, Sir Ramaswami, 96, 248
points out Hitlerian method & Munshi, K. M., 10
its instances in Kashmir, 113-14; Muslim Conference, 26, 143; would
relieved by Kashmir Maharaja, not be asked to join Ministry,
171; solicits Sardar Patel to flow as it has supported Pakistan,
war equipment to Srinagar im¬ 117
mediately, 64 Muslim fanaticism, in Pakistan, 229
Matthai, John, 296; replies to Sar¬ Muslim League, 55; is involved in
dar Patel regarding privy purse Kashmir trouble, 68; of Punjab
to Kashmir Maharaja, 297 & NWFP are preparing to enter
Memorandum, submitted to Sardar Kashmir, 45; result of its Direct
Patel by G. L. Puri, 82-85; on Action Day, 13
recent Kashmir developments for Muslim majority, 4
U.K. & U.S. Governments, 283 Muslims, their atrocities on Kashmir
Menon, V. P., 118, 132, 133, 136, borders, 64; their conversion to
137, 146, 149, 154, 195, 196, 234, Sikhism, 51; their communalism,
291-92; shows Sardar Patel’s sug¬ 55
gestions for correcting Gopala- Mysore, 62, 97; constitution, 96;
swami’s draft about Kashmir to model, 69, 115, 116, 139; pattern,
Pandit Nehru, 274; writes to 108, 109; Proclamation of 24-9-
Yuvraj Karan Singhji Bahadur, 1947, 141
287-88
Meteorological observations, 44
Military equipment, 48
NARNAUL & Kohistan, predomi¬
Military farms, 235
nantly Hindu districts, 51
Minorities, of India, 3, 117, 251;
National Conference, 36, 45, 46, 129.
progressive elements in, 55; their 142, 317; its workers, 26, 273
390 SARDAR PATEL’S CORRESPONDENCE

National groups, in Kashmir elec¬ Neogy, K. C., 39

tions, 26 Non-Muslims, in Jammu & Kashmir
Nation-building departments, 62 would, in case of plebiscite, re¬
Nazi pattern, 57 sort to exodus to India, 317
Nehru, Brijlal, 87 Norman Cliff, 154
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, passim; N. W. F. Province, 50, 240, 244; refe¬
asserts Sheikh Abdullah is obsess¬ rendum in —, 230
ed with the idea of meeting
Pakistan challenge & of keeping
his own people away from it, ORDINANCE, 176
233; democratic by nature &
training, 4; does not like the idea
of splitting up Jammu & Kashmir, PAKISTAN, passim; agrees to accept

103-04; his report of visit to U.S. military aid, 324; as an ag¬

Kashmir, 1-17; Kashmir affairs gressor country, 125; attacks

largely handled by —, 323; on Gilgit etc. 100; builds armed

Hari Singh’s letter, 165; on Paki¬ strength with U.S. military hard¬

stan’s acceptance of U.S. military ware, 324, 326; has thrown its

aid, 324; opines in Kashmir as forces in Kashmir, 204; is gaining

in India, non-communal policy ground every day, 160; is more

alone would work, 105; opines organised than Indian Dominion,

State authorities have functioned 163; its raids on Kashmir, 161;

in an objectionable manner, on behalf of —, Zafrullah Khan

22; opines when winter isolates & Mohammad Ali go to UNO,

Kashmir, Pakistan will invade it, 150

Pakistan Areas, used as bases for con¬
46; prevented from proceeding to
centration ot invaders & rebels,
Srinagar, 7; refers to forming an
interim government in Kashmir, 110
Pakistan Army, 64, 69; commits ag¬
105; urges Sardar Patel to expedite
gression in Kashmir, 327; its
action in Kashmir, 46; withdraws
withdrawal is demanded, 324
statements, 2-3; writes to Kashmir
Pakistan authorities, actively en¬
Maharaja about Kashmir dis¬
courage rebels & raiders in
cussion between India & Pakistan
Kashmir, 110
Governments, 101-06; writes to
Pakistan Government, 51, 52, 57,
Sardar Patel about the military
101, 125, 126, 157, 251; propo¬
situation in Kashmir, 190-92,
sals made to — to stop fighting
writes to Sardar Patel from Paris,
in Kashmir, 81; refuses to recog¬
249; writes to Sardar Patel on
nise claim of Indian Post & I de-
Pakistan strategy to attack Kash¬
graph Department to control its
mir, 45-47; writes to Sheikh
work in Kashmir State, 36
Abdullah about conclusions
Pakistan ideology', 24
reached regarding Jammu &
Pakistan Radio, 44, 59, 204
Kashmir State, 276-77
 INDEX
391

Pakistan soldiers, cross cease-fire mir, 56; expresses his instinctive

line in civilian disguise & enter responsibility for ensuring safety

Kashmir, 326 & integrity of Kashmir State, 42;

Pakistan strategy, 45 expresses tension between Maha¬

Pakistan Times, 279 raja & Sheikh Abdullah in clear

Pakistan troops, concentrated in terms, 193; has no doubt that
Azad Kashmir, 283; would prove with proper discussion with
menace to Kashmir, 102 Kashmir Maharaja, amicable
Pant, Pandit, addresses a Press Con¬ settlement regarding lands is
ference, 325 possible, 320; his broadcast on
Paranjpe, Brigadier, 85, 86 Azad Kashmir Radio, 252; his
Parliamentary activities, 27 detailed reply of Sheikh’s letter
Parmeswaram, C., 4 of 7-10-1948, 241-45; his illness,
Parthasarthi G., delegate to UNO, 172, 174; his Jaipur speech re¬
149 ported well, 253; his long letter
Patel, H. M., 175, 176; might be to Maharaja, 272; his reasoned
given Kashmir work, 258 letter to Sheikh, 228-30; insists
Patel, Maniben, 182, 198, 281, 283 on Pandit Jawaharlal to pitch
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, passim’, Kashmir celebrations in as sober
advises Kashmir Maharaja that a key as possible, 186; insists
Kashmir’s interest lies in joining unless Maharaja agrees to Mysore
Indian Union & its Constituent model, then alone we can go
Assembly without any delay, 33; ahead, 107; opines inclusion of
advises Kashmir Maharaja to Sheikh in UNO delegation might
make friends with leaders of Free lead to some complications, 151;
India, 34; appointed by Congress opines there should be no ur¬
Working Committee to pursue gency in regard to private pro¬
Kashmir matter in association with perty of Maharaja, 320; ordered
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 12; landing of Indian troops in Sri¬
asserts question of Kashmir nagar, 69; persuades Sheikh not
Maharaja’s abdication does not to ventilate grievances in public,
arise, 272; assures Maharaja that 229; pleads Maharaja’s interests
he would expedite linking up of would be adversely affected to
the State with Indian Union by the extent of at least half the
means of roads, telegraphs etc., landed property, 321; replies
43; congratulates Brigadier Osman Pandit Nehru’s letter regarding
and his men for their courage & Kashmir situation, 192-94; re¬
valour, 167; disapproves of quests Maharaja to give him list
changes over original draft of of private estates, houses & other
the Constitution, 305; empha¬ property belonging to himself,
sises there is no difference between 273; suggests Mehrchand Maha-
Jawa'iarlal & himself on mat¬
jan to withhold proposed broad¬
ters • policy regarding Kash¬ cast, 93; suggests Mahajan to
392 sardar patel’s correspondence
make substantial gesture to
Poonch, reduction of its Raja’s al¬
Sheikh, 02; suggests Maharaja to lowance, 235, 242
be absent from State for some
Popular opinion, on Kashmir Gov¬
time & to make Yuvraj Regent, ernment, 56
268; suggests policy of India’s Postal strike, 8, 11, 20
Interim Government to be followed Praja Parishad, 279, 280
in Kashmir, 16; suggests question Praja Sabha, 14, 108, 117, 129, 139,
ol military assistance to Kashmir 142
must claim first attention of De- Private property, 320
lence Council, 57; suggests Privy Purse, for Kashmir Maharaja,
Ramchandra Kak some amicable 195-97, 294, 2%, 297, 298
settlement, 16; suggests Refugee Proclamation, by Kashmir Maharaja,
Relief & Rehabilitation Minister 177
to release planes to assist refugees Publicity arrangement, 44, 183
of Srinagar, 39; suggests Sheikh’s Public opinion, 320
difficulties should be solved round Punjab Relief Fund, 31
a table, 230; suggests Sheikh to
seek redress of any grievance
through States Ministry, 229; RADIO PROGRAMME, in Kashmiri
suggests when there is a serious from Delhi Station, 98
difference between Maharaja & Rajaji, Governor-General of India,
Sheikh, the matter may be referred 267
to himself, 194; tried to arrive at Rajya Hindu Sabha, 26
a friendly & honourable under¬ Rakhs, government land used as
standing on Kashmir question, common pasture, 235
22; tried to persuade Prime Ramadhar, secretary, A. I. Spinners’
Minister Kak to have different Association, 35; on conditions in
approach to Kashmir problem, Kashmir, 90-91
33; writes to John Matthai about Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 134,
Kashmir Maharaja’s Privy Purse, 135, 136, 137, 143, 152, 237, 280
296; writes to Maharaja in detail Rawat, Brigadier, 85
about future arrangement of Referendum, 240
Maharaja himself, 273; writes to Reforms, in Kashmir by Sheikh Ab¬
Yuvraj Karan Singh, 281-82 dullah, 229
Pathan tribesmen, their withdrawal Refugee problem, is difficult in
is demanded, 324 Kashmir, 188
Peshawar Radio, 99 Refugees, 239, 260; evacuating from
Philip Noel Baker, 70 Kashmir, 123; from Mirpur etc.,
Plebiscite, 88, 100, 103, 104, 141, 152; from VV. Punjab & local
157, 193, 204, 247, 249, 257, 259, villages, 85-86; in Jammu, 160,
268, 269, 286, 311, 312, 324, 325; 161; are 70,000 to 80.000, 200
in Kashmir is unreal, 317; under Relief work. 255, 256, 263, 264; con¬

UNO auspices, 110, 111 ducted on communal lines, 265

 INDEX 393

Responsible government, in combi¬ Prime Minister on Security

nation with constitutional mo¬ Council’s resolution on Kashmir,
narchy, 111, in Kashmir, 62 314-15; disregards Maharaja’s
suggestions, 229; does not agree to
the draft of Kashmir Constitution,
SAHAY, VISHNU, 278, 282, 283, 302; for Independent Kashmir,
301, 318 266-68; gave interview to Michael
Saksena Shibbanlal, 285; writes to Davidson on ‘Independent Kash¬
Sardar Patel saying that wc always mir’, 266-67; goes back on agree¬
go on yielding on Kashmir ques¬ ment he has reached with Pandit
tion, 286-87 Nehru in regard to provision relat¬
Scott, Major-General, 37 ing to Kashmir, 310; has been con¬
Security Council, 148, 157, 175, 201, victed, 15; has decided for Indian
202, 247, 248, 311, 312, 314, 323, Union, 54; his administration
324, 325, 326, 327; question of has adversely affected many in¬
accession is wholly foreign to, 162 terests, 264; his agitation supported
Separatist movement, 4 by Pandit Nehru, 1; his arrest,
Setalvad, M. C., included in UNO 18; his attack on Maharaja has no
Delegation sent to New York, 148 parallel in constitutional history,
Settlement, between Indian Govern¬ 228, 230; his demand to allocate
ment, Maharaja & Sheikh, 227 Kashmir’s some districts to H. H.
Shankar, V., 39, 59, 99, 171-72; his and leave the rest for a Muslim
talk to Kamal Singh, 292-94 republic like Pakistan, 128; his
Sharma, B. L., for publicity work letter to Maharaja, 130; his
in New York, 150, 151, 326 popularity dwindling in Kashmir,
Sharma, K. L., special correspon¬ 280; his Press Conference, 232-
dent of A. I. Radio, Jammu & 33; his release, 36; his vilification
Kashmir, 196, 198 of Maharaja, 270; in UNO
Shastri, Lai Bahadur, Indian Prime Delegation to New York, 148;
Minister, 327
intends to mobilize public opi¬
Sheikh, Abdullah, passim', agrees to nion in India, 231; invites Sardar
arrangement regarding State Patel for freedom celebration in
Property, 291-92; & Bakshi are Jammu & Kashmir, 184-85; is
virtual dictators, 147; & Na¬
anxious to keep out of Pakistan,
tional Conference leaders should 46; is given three years’ impri¬
be released, 45; assures of his sonment, 21; is ‘law unto him¬
opposition to Pakistan, 47; can¬
self, 216-46; Kashmir Maharaja
not convert Muslim Leaguers &
has a catalogue of grievances
the like, 103; charges Maharaja
against—, 136; refers to some
has strong friends in India or
people who believe in surrendering
he is in a position to buy friends,
Kashmir to Pakistan, 228, 229-
229, 231; conclusions ol Jammu
replies to Sardar Patel in detail,
& Kashmir Government with_as
233-41; seems to be acting in a
 394 sardar patel’s correspondence

dictatorial manner, 96; some Thimayya, General, 118, 264

instances of his administration, Transport, is monopolised in Kash¬
129; spoke out grievances against mir by military, 188
Maharaja, 227-28, 231, 241;
threatens to resign from Consti¬
tuent Assembly, 310; wants large UNO, 102, 125, 126, 148, 199, 221,
irrigated lands vacant for Mus¬ 222,268, 269, 286; its proceedings
lims, 266 cause perplexity to every Hindu
Sheikh, Abdullah, Begum, asserted & Sikh, 161; should condemn
Kashmir should permanently ac¬ Pakistan for sending their army
cede to India & any other course into Kashmir, 222
would be ruinous to that State, 232 UNO Charter, 323
Shelvankar, Dr K. S., for publicity UNO Kashmir Commission, 202,
work in New York, 150 233, 294, 311, 312; its proposal
Shiv Saran Lai, Dewan, his state¬ for arbitration in Kashmir, 283;
ment, 51-53 its resolution, 219; set up by
Sikhs, 11,51 Security Council, 323, 324
Sikh State, 51 UNO observers, posted in Jammu
Sino-Pakistan collusion, against India, & Kashmir, 324
326 Uri Front, report of military acti¬
Srinagar, 1-2, 19, 39, 49 vities on, 169-70
States Ministry, 38, 121, 122, 142, U Thant, visits India & Pakistan, 327
149, 225, 229, 234, 235, 238,
240, 243, 287; makes arrangement
to send Yuvraj Karan Singh to VAID, A. N., writes to Sardar Patel,
America, 100-01 26-27
States Peoples’ Conference, 4 Vellodi, M. K., included in UNO

Swaran Singh, Sardar, 123 delegation to New York, 149

TARA DEVI, Kashmir Maharani, WAVELL, LORD, 8, 21-22

182, 285; writes to Maniben Western Command, 226

Patel, 174; writes to Sardar Patel Wireless transmitter, at Jammu, 49

to arrange for marriage & other

expenses, 298-99
YUVRAJ, 197, 198, 273, 274, 275,
Tashkent Declaration, 327
279, 287, 291-92, 319; his thread
Tasscr, M. D., Publicity Officer in
ceremony, 277
Pakistan, 184
Telegraph strike, 11
Tenancy reforms, 235, 242
ZAMINDARI BILL, its abolition, 317
Terence Shore, Sir, 70
Zutshi, J. N., 129
Thakur Hamam Singh, 42
0

i
Continued from front flap

and Kashmir to India. hits «fc : curtain

on the high drama beim.u !'-e scenes
from the moment Pakistan launched its
attack on the State to th time when
Sheikh Abdulla! first aired tns preference
for an “independent Kashmir/’ The
letters to the SardaTMrom Jawaharlal
Nehru, Mountbatten, Maharaja Hari
Singh and Sheikh Abdullah, and his
replies to them also reveal the clash of
personalities and conflict of ideas on
Jammu and Kashmir, which is still free
India’s biggest problem of external policy
and security.
The State has been the cause of two
wars between India and Pakistan. A by¬
product of Partition, Pakistan has made
Jammu and Kashmir a focal point of
its unremitting hostility to India and of
its search for a national identity. Further,
it has provided the Super Powers with
a convenient and continuing excuse for
intervention in Indo-Pakistan relations.
To Pakistan, J & K is a symbol of its
theocratic basis which stands discredited
by the current democratic upsurge in
East Bengal—Bangla Desh. To India, it
is a symbol of the secular, multi-racial and
multi-religious concept of nationhood.
Sardar Patel’s
Correspondence 1945-50

V ol. 1 New Light on Kashmir

Vol. 2 Elections to Central & Provincial Legislatures -
Direction of Congress Campaign
Vol. 3 Guidance to Ministries - Constituent Assembly
Problems - Interim Government Deadlock -
Reforms in Indian States
Vol. 4 Transfer of Power - Communal Holocaust on
Partition - Administration and Stability
Vol. 5 Control over Congress Ministries -
Indian States’ accession
Vol. 6 Patel-Nehru Differences-Assassination of Gandhi -
Services Reorganised - Refugee Rehabilitation
Vol. 7 Integrating Indian States - Police Action in
Hyderabad
Vol. 8 Foreign Policy in Evolution - Constitution-making -
Political and Administrative Problems
Vol. 9 Political Controversies - Refugees from East Bengal
Territorial Integration of Princely States

Vol. 10 Acute Power Struggle- Triumph of Mutual

Accommodation - Warning against ( hina

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