Samson, Frances C.

December 7, 2019

1. EUSEBIO vs EUSEBIO 100 Phil. 593, December 28, 1956

FACTS:

The decedent Andres Eusebio is a Filipino who lived in Pampanga for 75 years. When
he got sick, he bought a house in Quezon City, where transferred his belongings and where
he eventually died. A deed of sale was executed prior by Andres was found to which he
referred himself as a resident of Pampanga.

After the death of Andres, his son, Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father,
Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952. Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente
and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate
children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and
praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly filed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Andres Eusebio is considered a resident of Quezon City or Pampanga.

He is a resident of Pampanga, thus, the case was improperly laid in Quezon City.

The Court held that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. If Andres Eusebio wanted to establish another domicile, it must have
been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to
stay therein permanently, however, such intent was not shown. The fact that he bought a
house in Quezon City and moved there were not enough to establish proof of his residence.

Thus, Andres being a resident of Pampanga, the Court of First Instance of Rizal had
no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue
having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants'
opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

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2. GARCIA-FULE vs CA G.R. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976

FACTS:

Amado Garcia died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places. Virginia Fule, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Laguna a petition for letters of administration and moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate of Garcia. The court granted her
petition.

Preciosa Garcia, the surviving spouse of Amado, filed a motion for reconsideration
arguing that the order appointing Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction.

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case Sp. Proc. No. 270-C before
Judge Malvar, Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City, she also testified that Amado Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months
before his death his residence was in Quezon City.

The motion was denied by the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari
and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

The Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge
Malvar, for lack of jurisdiction and appointed Preciosa Garcia as Administratix.

Virginia Fule elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the proceedings rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Laguna for lack of Jurisdiction.

HELD:

No.

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 Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate.

The word “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. It merely means the personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.

In this case, the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the
court. Amado Garcia was in Quezon City, and not in Calamba, Laguna based on his death
certificate. And a death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the
time of his death. Thus, the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna does not have the
jurisdiction to grant the petition for letters of administration over the estate of Amado Garcia.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Between the Eusebio case and Garcia-Fule case):

In the Eusebio case which was decided in the year 1956, the foregoing facts said that
the decedent died in Quezon City where he transferred for medical purposes, however the
Court had considered that domicile should be the basis for the venue of the proper
proceeding, since domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one’s
own health, it further held that where it is apparent, from the facts duly established, that the
domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over
seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence,
in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well settled that “a domicile once
acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained.”

However in the later case Garcia- Fule which was decided in the year 1976, the Court
has held the term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 on settlement of a decedent’s estate refers
to his actual residence as distinguished from his legal residence or domicile. Thus, in other
words, “resides,” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.

3. VENTURA vs VENTURA 160 SCRA 810, April 27, 1988

FACTS:
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 Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will in 1953 wherein he excluded
his legitimate children, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the institution of heirs, but
appointed his illegitimate child, Maria Ventura as the executrix of his will and administratrix of
his estate. The will was admitted to probate, but the testator died in 1955. The legitimate
children filed a motion to remove her as the executrix of the estate to which the Court of First
instance approved, hence, this appeal. However, aside from this special proceeding, the
estate of the deceased was involved in two other civil cases. After a joint hearing on both
cases, the court declared Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura to be the legitimate children of
Paulina Simpliciano and the testator, and as such are entitled to the annulment of the
institution of heirs made in the probated will of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix of the estate is legally justified.

HELD:
Yes.

Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious, and this results to intestacy. This
would then necessitate the appointment of another administrator under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. Said provision provides, among others, that administration is granted to the
surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if incompetent and willing to serve. The next of kin is defined as those persons
who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s property.

In this case, the surviving spouse of the deceased is Juana Cardona while his next of
kin are Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and, Maria and Miguel Ventura. Since the lower court
ruled that Mercedes and Gregoria are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, they are
given preference over the illegitimate children. Therefore, under Sec. 6, Rule 78, the persons
to be appointed as administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura as the nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura in the discretion of the Court in order to represent both interests.

4. VILLAMOR v CA G.R. No. L-41508, June 27, 1988

FACTS:

After the death of Bartolome Cortes, settlement of estate was instituted and Fr. D.
Camomot was named as administrator.
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 Between 1937-1938, Intestate proceedings was filed for the estate of the children of
Victor and Mana Cortes to the exclusion of Rufino, this is under Special Proceeding No. 262-
C. Atty Sato was appointed as administrator.

In 1938, Ireneo and Paula, all surnamed Villamor, alleged children of Rufino, filed a
petition for administration of their father’s estate, this was under Special Proceeding No. 343-
C. Moises Mendoza was appointed as administrator.

Mendoza made an inventory of Rufino’s estate, however, it was found to be the same
properties subject in Special Proceeding no. 262-C.

Being the successors of the estate, Sixta and Villamor siblings (Ireneo and Paula)
entered an agreement of Partition called “Project Partition”

Ireneo and Paula later sold the properties vested to them by virtue of “project
partition”.

Upon the death of Sixta Ceniza, Cristina Ceniza, the sister of the respondent in this
case, instituted Special Proceeding No. 364-R, for the administration of the estate of Sixta
and prayed for them, nephews and nieces of Sixta to be declared as sole and forced heir of
Sixta despite the presence of Fr. Nicanor.

RTC denied the petition of Cristina and declared Fr. Nicanor as the sole heir of Sixta.

Fr. Nicanor filed a petition to remove Escolastico Ceniza to be removed as the

Upon the death of Fr. Nicanor, Daniela Ceniza Urot was appointed as administrator of
the estate. It was her who filed a petition to recover the propertieds conveyed to the Villamor
siblings in the project partition on the ground of fraud.

Urot alleged that the Villamor siblings are just natural children of Rufino and that they
misrepresented themselves as legitimate children of Rufino, influenced Sixta who is blind and
already of old age to enter into project partition. Urot also alleged that the partition was made
without the knowledge of Fr. Nicanor.

Paula and Ireneo filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the court. They then
filed their answer and raised as a special affirmative defense that the court has no jurisdiction
over the case having intrinsic fraud as the basis of the complaint, that the complaint has no
valid cause of action and is barred by statute of limitations.

RTC ruled in favour of Urot, declared that Paula and Ireneo took advantage of Sixta
for the project partition.

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 Ireneo and Paula appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, hence
this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not project partition was valid despite the issue that Sixta was taken
advantaged of and that Fr. Nicanor has no knowledge of such partition.

2. Whether or not the appointment of an administrator who is a stranger despite the presence
of the nearest relatives valid.

HELD:

1. Yes.

The court ruled that just because a person is blind or of poor memory, it does not
follow that she is of unsound said. Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound
condition, neither old age, nor is health nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in
order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will.

Fr. Nicanor had known about the partition as evidenced in his letters to Dr. Felicisima
Veloso and Mrs. Gitgano. Assuming arguendo that there was fraud, Fr. Nicanor remained
silent and failed to assert his right. He even conveyed at least three lands which were among
those apportioned to Sixta Ceniza in the Project of Partition to several persons. Her
predecessor-in-interest, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, not having filed any action for reconveyance
within the prescriptive period provided by law, neither could private respondent do so now, for
her right cannot rise higher than its source.

2. Yes.

The court do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and
concurred in by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the
administrators appointed were complete strangers to the decedents. There is nothing
repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the courts.

Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as
executors and administrators. It provides that in case the persons who have the preferential
right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may be
granted to such other person as the court may appoint.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Between the Ventura case and Villamor case):

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 In the Ventura case which was decided in April 1988, the Court held that intestacy,
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: “When and to whom letters of administration
granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.”

Whereas in the case of Villamor which was decided in June 1988, where it was held
that in the appointment of administrator, complete strangers to the decedents may be proper.
As the court ruled that the administrators appointed were complete strangers to the
decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as
found by the courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who
can act as executors and administrators. It provides that in case the persons who have the
preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve, administration
may be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.