Evidence

SEC. 24 (e), Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.

The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as
to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by the Disclosure.

US v. NIXON

This case is assigned to explain that the demonstrated, specific need for the
documents/recordings needed and over the fundamental demands of due process of law
in the administration of criminal justice will overcome the privileged communication when
it is raised based on generalized interest in confidentiality, such as unsupported claim of
the need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. Further, there
is no unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial processes under all
circumstances. Hence, the generalized assertion of the privilege must yield to the
demonstrated need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.

BANCO FILIPINO v. MONETARY BOARD

This case is assigned to clarify that the privileged communication rule will not be
applicable when there is no public interest would suffer by the disclosure communication.
Further, it also stressed in this case that confidential communications are not necessarily
absolute and privileged. Furthermore, the privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended
not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Moreover,
the public officer who is asked to disclose certain documents relevant to the case has the
burden of proof to show that public interest will be adversely affected thereby.

PEOPLE v. ONG

This case is assigned to explain that the Governments has a privilege to withhold
from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with enforcement of that law.

The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest
in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials
and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.

However, the following are the compelling considerations why confidential

informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. The scope of the privilege is
limited by its purposes:
o One is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to
the police.
o Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of
revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known.
 All these considerations, however, have to be balanced with the right of an
accused to a fair trial. There is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an
informer. The case to be resolved based on a case to case basis and calls
for balancing the state interest in protecting people from crimes against the individuals’
right to prepare his defense.
The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among
others:

(1) the crime charged;

(2) the possible defenses;
(3) the possible significance of the informers testimony; and
(4) other relevant factors.

Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable, it should be disclosed.

Hence, when the disclosure of an informer’s identity is relevant and helpful to the defense
of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way.

Chavez v. PEA

This case is assign to elucidate the rule that there is a privileged against disclosure
on certain matters involving state secrets regarding the following:
- Military;
- Diplomatic;
- Other national security matters; and
- Information on investigation.

However, it does not extend to presidential conversations, correspondences, and

discussions in closed-door cabinet meetings.

It also cited Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to
information on matters of public concern: “…Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of
full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern.

Senate v Ermita

In this case, it explained the concept of executive privileged and its origin. The
privilege has been described as the power of the government to withhold information from
the public, courts, and the Congress.

The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, it allows the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefore. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Neri v. Senate

Under this case, the rule for the claim of executive privilege to be invoked, there
must be a formal claim of the privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control of the matter, and that a formal a proper claim of the privilege requires a “precise
and certain reason” for preserving confidentiality, but the Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel the
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of
respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.

In Re Myron Farber

This case is assigned to explain how Newsman’s privilege works since it is added
this privilege under the privileged communication.

Under Section 1 of R.A. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477.

Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher,
editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of
general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news--report or
information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds
that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State."

Newsmen cannot require appearing and testifying before state or federal grand
juries because it abridges freedom of speech.

Testimonial privileges which allow witnesses to withhold evidence seem to conflict

with Constitutional provision requiring the attendance of witnesses if summoned. The
Shield Law prevails over this statute. The legislative intent in adopting this statute in its
present form as seeking to protect the confidential sources of the press as well as
information so obtained by reporters and other news media representatives to the
greatest extent permitted by the Constitution.

The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on

a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
framework of the rules of evidence.

Air Philippines v. Pennswell

This case is assigned to be informed that trade secrets is now included in the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Further explain what and how trade secret doctrine works.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound

known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.
 It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor,
discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which
may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the
disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information “in confidence” or
through a “confidential relationship”.

In this case, the chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of

respondent’s special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. By
and large, the value of the information to respondent is very clear. The ingredients
constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business. No doubt, the
information is also valuable to the respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is
to cripple respondent’s business, and to place it to an undue disadvantage. The Court
finds that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the information
confidential and not available to the prying public. Furthermore, Rule 27 of the Rules of
Court sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not
be privileged. The documents must not be privileged against disclosure.

Admissions Against Interest

Rule 130, Sections 26 & 32

VIACRUCIS v. COURT OF APPEALS

This case is assigned to elaborate that evidence, through admission which is adverse to
his interest, may be used not only to a person who made such admission or his
successors in interest but also against 3rd persons.

The rule on declarations against interest (now Rule 130, Section 38), which must be
noted is an exception to the hearsay rule, and not an exception to the res inter alios
acta rule.

This particular exception to the hearsay rule can also be used to answer challenges that
one cannot be prejudiced by the declarations or admissions of another.

In this case it elaborate that the previous recognition by a party in physical possession
of the property in dispute of the ownership in another constitutes a declaration against the
interest of the former and be received in evidence not only against such party who made
the declaration or his successors in interest but also against 3rd persons. Hence,
Testimony and the public document constitute declarations of the Costelo’s adverse to
their interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to the rule on declarations against
interests.

EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD v. COB GROUP MARKETING, INC.

This case explicitly elucidate that the admissions of the president of a company
are binding on the company under the rule that admissions of liability by a party may be
given against it. In this case the admission of President is also supported by the
documentary evidence, therefore binding on the company.

PEOPLE v. ALEGRE
 This case is assigned to explain the jurisprudential exception of Admission by
silence SEC. 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. As a General Rule, An act
or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who
does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in
evidence against him.

However the aforementioned general rule is not applicable when an accused is

under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to
remain silent. Party’s silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silent would be illusory.

Further, the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" or “things done
between strangers ought not to injure those who are not parties to them” also explain
that said principle will not apply when an alleged co-conspirator has no independent
evidence of conspiracy. Furthermore, as a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of
an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative
value against his co--accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other
accused are concerned.

PEOPLE v. MEJIA

This case is assigned to emphasize that an offer of compromise done by 3rd party
to a suspect in a criminal proceeding cannot be deemed as implied admission of guilt on
the part of the accused when an accused has no consent or ratification thereto, under
Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Further explained in this case that an offer to reimburse hospitalization and medical
bills it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last
paragraph of the abovementioned rule, which provides “An offer to pay or the payment of
medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence
as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury”.

Compromises

El Varadero vs. Insular Lumber

The case is assigned because it discusses the exception of Rule 130, Section 28,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Rules of Court, which state that “In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against
the offeror”.

The offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence,
must be excluded, except that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain
sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, they are
relevant.

The exception of the said rule is when the compromise agreement is offered for
purposes other than proving admission of liability. As in this case, the compromise
agreement between the parties was not offered to prove that Insular Lumber admitted
liability but only to prove the amount of such liability.
 US v. TORRES

This case is assigned to explain the exception of offer of compromised by the

accused in criminal cases. As a General rule, such offer of compromised may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt, except, to those allowed by law to be
compromised.

In this case, it explained that a compromised has two (2) elements, to wit: (a) offer;
and (b) acceptance.
Ordinarily, it is the defendant who makes the offer and no presumption of guilt must be
raised against the maker if the law itself allows it. The offer may have been prompted
simply to avoid commencing or prosecuting suit. Further, the conviction of defendants it
is not necessary to consider and weigh this evidence, it could be considered as additional
or cumulative evidence.

Basis: Rule 130, Section 28, paragraph 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which states
that, “In criminal cases, except those involving quasi--offenses (criminal negligence) or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt”.

People v. Godoy

The case is included in the syllabus because it explained that an offer of marriage,
generally speaking, is an admission of guilt. However, in this case the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under the consciousness of guilt but merely
to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify
a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt
or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

People v De Guzman

Under this case it explained that when the accused was a party to the decision to
seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to
pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister--in--law.
A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In
relation to what the law provides in criminal cases, where an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt, except those
involving quasi--offense or those allowed by law to be compromised.

Since the circumstances here in this case is not within the bounds of exception of
law the plea of the accused’s parents given with accused’s knowledge and non-objection
can be introduced in evidence as proof of an implied admission of guilt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PARRAGUIRRE

This case is assigned to elucidate that an offer to compromise does not require
that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against
the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his
representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.

Week 6

People v Alegre

This case is assigned to explain the "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet
principle”. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-
accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.
Therefore, Extrajudicial confession of co-accused cannot be used as evidence and are
not competent proof against the other accused under the principle of "res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet".

People v Raquel

This case is assigned to be stressed the first branch of res alios acta rule, to wit,
the rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission,
particularly the extrajudicial declaration of another.

Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule

-Partner's/Agent's Admissions

Mahlandt v. Wild Canid

This case is assigned to elucidate how Admission by Agent, under Rule 130,
Section 30 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, will apply. It explain here that the statement
of agent is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is a statement by
his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship.

Further, under the aforementioned rule it is necessary that the agent is authorized
by the party to make a statement concerning the subject. When there is no indication that
the Agent was specially authorized to make a statement, the Court may rule that such
admission may not be taken against his principal.

Moreover, the degree of authority required by the rule must be clarified by

jurisprudence. As in this case, it may be argued however the Agent was especially
authorized as he doing his job (to take care the wolf) hence it is implicit that he is
authorized to make statements regarding the acts of the wolf.

People v Cabrera

This case is assigned because it explained that this decision is still applicable and have
same result to be achieved under the Revised Rules on Evidence. It further elucidates
that when the statement of accused, against his co-accused, was not made during the
existence of the alleged conspiracy between accused and co-accused, but after said
supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when the accused was already in the
hands of the authorities, it cannot be admitted as evidence against his co-accused.
One of requisites in the admissibility of admission of co-accused or co-partner is that the
declaration or act of the partner or co-accused must have been made or done during the
existence of the partnership or conspiracy.

People v. Yatco

This case is assigned because it gives details on how the rule on admission by a
co-conspirator works and be applied properly. The said rule refers to statements made
during the pendency and in furtherance of the unlawful act. Notwithstanding, the evidence
may be admitted in some other basis, such as a confession against the party who made
it. The same result would be achieved if the Revised rules on evidence are made to
apply in this case.

PEOPLE v. CHAW YAW SHUN

This case is assigned because it gives emphasize to the rule on admission by co-
conspirator and explain who such admission be binding to the other conspirator. Since
the admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must
relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a
confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Hence, when the statements were made during the investigation, when the conspiracy
had already ceased it is inadmissible as evidence against the co-conspirator.

Alpuerto v. Pastor

This case is assigned to elaborate who are privy in the case and what is the
meaning of “privies”. Based on Manresa, the word privy denotes the idea of succession,
not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by
singular title, derived from acts inter vivos and for special purposes, hence, an assignee
of a credit, and one subrogated to it, et., will be privies. In other words, he, who, by
succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation
and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal
rights and obligation, is privy.

Further, when the former owner of the property made the declaration after he
ceased to be the owner of the property, the rule on admission by privies does not apply,
under Sec. 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

CITY OF MANILA v. DEL ROSARIO

The case is assigned to explain that under Sec. 32, Rule 130 of Revised Rules on
Evidence, the act of a predecessor to a land is not binding on the successor if the
acts/declarations made by the predecessor acknowledging ownership or offering to
purchase the property from a third party were made before the predecessor held title to
the land.

People v. Compil
 This case is assigned to explain the limitation of rule on confession. Our
Constitution itself expressly provides that “No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself” akin to rule on confession, “the declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be
given in evidence against him.”

In this case, it elaborates that the confession obtained during custodial

interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed
in the presence of counsel are flawed under the Constitution and as such cannot be
admitted in Court. Further, even if counsel arrives prior to the actual signing of the
statement it does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract
incriminatory statements or the uncounseled confession from the accused.

The above rule explained that not the signing by the suspect of his supposed
extrajudicial confession is the issue, It is when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends
itself to eliciting incriminatory statements.

Moreover, under Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence (i.e. People v.
Rous) requires that before an extrajudicial confession may be admitted into evidence,
such must be read and fully explained toconfessant by counsel before it was signed. The
right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation.

PEOPLE v. WONG CHUEN MING

Under the Constitution particularly that of the Bill of Rights, the fact that even aliens
are given protection under the Constitution by not admitting as evidence, the extrajudicial
confessions that are made without the assistance of counsel. The signatures of accused
are tantamount to an uncounselled extra--judicial confession which needs the presence
of counsel and is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights.

Hence, all accused, both aliens and citizens, has the right under the Constitution
and does not preclude application of the exclusionary rule.

PEOPLE v. ALEGRE

This case is assigned to expound that silence of the accused does not necessarily
implicate him in the crime accused of. When an accused is in custody, his silence may
not be taken in evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when
in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would
be illusory. Thus silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements
by another implicating him in a crime; especially when such accused is neither asked to
comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of
acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny the statement would appear
incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination (Miranda v. Arizona).
 PEOPLE v. YIP WAI MING

This case is included in this course to explain that any confession including re-
enactment of the incident without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and
without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence.

PEOPLE v. MAQUEDA

This case is assigned to distinguish the difference of confession and admission. In

a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. On the other hand, the term admission
is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not
directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense charged.

Further, the rights of an accused are not confined to the period prior to the filing of
information but are available at that stage when a person is under investigation for the
commission of an offense. These rights are available to a person at any time before
arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense.

Parker v US

This case is assigned because the constitutional procedures require that it be in

writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or a valid waive, and in
the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
chosen by him. The violation of the right of confrontation has never been used to deny
the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions.

PEOPLE v. ENCIPIDO

This case is assigned to explain that Admissions made before the Mayor & Station
Commander during a conference that defendants were responsible for killing the victims
IS an admission. Also, a judicial admission by one accused is admissible against his co-
-accused, unlike in an extrajudicial confession, where it’s admission against the one
making it.

Again, though as a general rule extrajudicial confessions made by a person under

custodial investigation, to be admissible, shall be in writing and signed by such person in
the presence of his counsel or in latter’s absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
chosen by him, this rule applies only when the extrajudicial confession is made in a
custodial investigation. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply
to spontaneous statements, not elicited through questioning by authorities, but given in
an ordinary manner, whereby the accused admitted to having committed the crime.

PEOPLE v. Galgarin
 This case is included in our syllabus because it explain that a videotaped interview
showing the accused unburdening his guilt, willingly, openly and publicly in the presence
of newsmen does not for part of custodial investigation if it was not given to police officers
but media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. However,
it is prudent that the trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting confessions of such nature. Again, the constitutional procedures regarding
extrajudicial confessions apply only during custodial investigations.

PEOPLE v. ABULENCIA

Under this case it elaborated that a confession to a radio reporter is admissible

where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview
was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to
the killing out of fear.

PEOPLE v. MALNGAN y MAYO

This case is assigned because it gives example of the situation where an

extrajudicial confession or admission although made without counsel is admissible when
it is made to a private individual. Further, an uncounseled confession or admission given
by the accused to a private individual is not covered by Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution where there is no showing that said private individual was acting under police
authority.

PEOPLE v. LAUGA

An uncounseled extrajudicial confession taken by “Bantay Bayan,” who is charged

with the related function of peace-keeping, is inadmissible in evidence. Since peace-
keeping is essentially a state function, persons to whom such function is delegated are
likewise charged with the duty of observing the rights of person accused of a crime.