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608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 49852. October 19, 1989.

EMILIA TENGCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and BENJAMIN CIFRA, JR., respondents.

Remedial Law; Ejectment; Evidence; Question of whether or

not private respondent is the owner of the leased premises is one of
fact which is within the cognizance of the trial court whose
findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal barring any
material evidence to the contrary.—Indeed, the question of
whether or not private respondent is the owner of the leased
premises is one of fact which is within the cognizance of the trial
court whose findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the result of the case. And
since the petitioner has not presented sufficient proof that the
leased premises is not the same lot registered in the name of the
private respondent, the findings of the lower courts on the fact of
ownership of the leased premises will not be disturbed.

Same; Same; Same; Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 53

cannot be invoked to support the petitioner’s claim that private
respondent is not the owner of the leased premises or that
petitioner’s version of the facts of the case is more credible than
that of the private respondent.—As can be seen, the cited law can
be invoked only when there is a dispute between the owner of the
land and the lessee or tenant on share tenancy as to the terms of
an unwritten contract or where the contract is written in a
language not known to the lessee or tenant. In the instant case,
there is no dispute as to the terms of the contract of lease. Hence,
the cited law cannot be invoked to support the petitioner’s claim
that the private respondent is not the owner of the leased
premises or that the petitioner’s version of the facts of the case is
more credible than that of the private respondent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s contention that private

respondent is not the owner of the leased premises is inconsistent
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with her claim that she had tendered payment of the rentals to
private respondent.—Besides, the petitioner’s contention that the
private respondent is not the owner of the leased premises is
inconsistent with her claim that she had tendered payment of the
rentals for the month of January 1976 to the private respondent.

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Refusal to accept the proffered rentals is

not without justification.—Under the circumstances, the refusal to
accept the proffered rentals is not without justification. The
ownership of the property had been transferred to the private
respondent and the person to whom payment was offered had no
authority to accept payment. It should be noted that the contract
of lease between the petitioner and Lutgarda Cifra, the former
owner of the land, was not in writing and, hence, unrecorded. The
Court has held that a contract of lease executed by the vendor,
unless recorded, ceases to have effect when the property is sold, in
the absence of a contrary agreement. The petitioner cannot claim
ignorance of the transfer of ownerhip of the property because, by
her own account, Aurora Recto and the private respondent, at
various times, had informed her of their respective claims to
ownership of the property occupied by the petitioner. The
petitioner should have tendered payment of the rentals to the
private respondent and if that was not possible, she should have
consigned such rentals in court.

Same; Same; Same; No merit in petitioner’s contention that

private respondent is guilty of laches.—Finally, we find no merit
in the petitioner’s contention that the private respondent is guilty
of laches. As the Court of Appeals had stated, the demand for the
petitioner to vacate the premises and to pay arrears in rentals
was made on 23 August 1976 and the complaint seeking her
ejectment was filed a few days thereafter, or on 16 September
1976.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

of Appeals. Melencio-Herrera, J.:

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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     De Santos, Balgos & Perez for petitioner.
     Teofilo F. Manalo for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
**
Review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. NO. SP-08182, entitled: “Emilia
Tengco, petitioner, versus Court of First Instance of Rizal,
etc., et al, respondents,” which dismissed herein
petitioner’s “Appeal by Way of Certiorari” from the
judgment of the Court of First

_______________

** Penned by Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera and concurred in

by Justices Lorenzo Relova and Simeon M. Gopengco.

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Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. C-6625 which affirmed

the decision of the Municipal Court of Navotas, Metro
Manila, in Civil Case No. 2092, entitled: “Benjamin Cifra,
plaintiff, versus Emilia Tengco, defendant,” ordering the
herein petitioner (as defendant) to vacate the premises at
No. 164 Int., Gov. Pascual St., Navotas, Metro Manila, and
to pay the herein private respondent (as plaintiff) the
arrears in rentals and attorney’s fees; and the Resolution
denying the herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
of the said Court of Appeals decision.
The record of the case shows that on 16 September 1976,
the herein private respondent, Benjamin Cifra, Jr.,
claiming to be the owner of the premises at No. 164 Int.,
Gov. Pascual St., Navotas, Metro Manila, which he had
leased to the herein petitioner, Emilia Tengco, filed an
action for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Court of
Navotas, Metro Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
2092, to evict the petitioner, Emilia Tengco, from the said
premises for her alleged failure to comply with the terms
and conditions of the lease contract by failing and refusing
to pay the stipulated rentals despite repeated demands.
After trial, judgment was rendered against the petitioner.
The decretal portion of the decision reads, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the defendant and
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any and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the
premises occupied by her at No. 164 Int., Gov. Pascual Street, this
town and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff,
condemning the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (P376.00) PESOS, as rentals
in arrears and the sum of TWELVE PESOS (P12.00), a month
from October, 1976 until the premises is fully vacated. To pay the
plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS as and for
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.”

From this judgment, the herein petitioner appealed to the

Court of First Instance of Rizal where the appeal was
docketed as Civil Case No. C-6625. On 18 May 1978, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered judgment
affirming the decision of the municipal court, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

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Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered affirming in toto the judgment of the lower court dated
September 20, 1977 without pronouncement as to costs.”

Not satisfied, the herein petitioner filed with the

respondent Court of Appeals an “Appeal by Way of
Certiorari” which was docketed as CA-G.R. NO. SP-08182.
On 29 August 1978, the respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision, with the following disposition:

“WHEREFORE, finding that the Decision of the lower Court is

supported by substantial evidence and that its conclusions are not
clearly against the law and jurisprudence, the instant Petition is
hereby denied due course and is dismissed outright.”

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the

decision but her motion was denied on 16 January 1979.
Hence, the present recourse.
The petitioner contends that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in sustaining the decisions of the appellate
and trial courts which are allegedly contrary to the
evidence and applicable jurisprudence. The petitioner more
particularly claims that (1) the private respondent
Benjamin Cifra, Jr. is not the owner of the leased premises;
(2) the lessor was guilty of mora accipiendi; (3) the
petitioner’s version of the facts is more credible than
private respondent’s; (4) laches had deprived the lessor of
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the right to eject her; and (5) the private respondent failed
to establish a cause of action against the petitioner.
We find no merit in the petition. The reasons advanced
by the petitioner to support her petition are the same
reasons given by her to the Court of Appeals in support of
her “Appeal by Way of Certiorari” and we find no ground to
adopt a different course from that of the respondent
appellate court. In disposing of the petitioner’s contentions,
the Court of Appeals said:

“Petitioner claims that private respondent had failed to establish

his ownership of the lot in question for while the Certificate of
Title presented by him refers to a parcel of land situated at Bo.
Almacen, Navotas, the premises in question, on the other hand, is
situated in Bo. Sipak, Navotas; that it was not with private
respondent that she entered into the lease agreement but with his
mother; that her failure

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Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

to pay the rentals on the premises was due to the refusal of the
collector to accept her tender of payment; and that laches had
deprived private respondent of whatever right he had against her
considering that the Complaint was filed only in September, 1976
whereas his cause of action arose sometime in February, 1974
when she defaulted in the payment of rentals.
“We find this ‘appeal’ which We consider as a Petition for
Review, to be without merit.
“It should be noted that petitioner admits that she is a lessee
on the premises in question and that she had been in default in
the payment of the rentals thereon since February, 1974 allegedly
because of the refusal of the collector to accept her tender of
payment. However, she claims that the lease agreement was not
with private respondent, but with his mother. The question as to
who is the real lessor of the premises is one of fact and the
findings of the lower court that it was private respondent is
entitled to the highest respect by appellate Courts barring any
material evidence to the contrary. Neither can petitioner question
private respondent’s claim of ownership of the leased premises.
The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
“Petitioner’s excuse for her non-payment of the rentals on the
premises deserves scant consideration. If, indeed, her offer to
settle her obligation was refused by private respondent, she

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should have resorted to the judicial deposit of the amount due in

order to release her from responsibility.
“Petitioner’s claim that private respondent’s cause of action is
barred by laches is untenable. While it is true that petitioner’s
arrearages date back to February, 1974, however, a tenant’s mere
failure to pay rent does not ipso facto make unlawful his
possession of the leased premises. As held by respondent Court of
First Instance, it is the failure to pay rents after a demand
therefor is made that entitles the lessor to bring an action of
Unlawful Detainer. Moreover, the lessor has the privilege to
waive his right to bring an action against his tenant and give the
latter credit for the payment of the rents and allow him to
continue indefinitely in the possession of the premises. During
such period, the tenant would not be in illegal possession of the
premises and the landlord can not maintain an action until after
he has taken steps to convert the legal possession into an illegal
possession. Thus, in the case at bar, the demand on petitioner to
vacate the premises for failure to pay the rentals thereon was
made by private respondent only on August 23, 1976 and the
Complaint against petitioner was filed on September 16, 1976.

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Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

“Consequently, petitioner’s non-payment of the rentals on the

premises, notwithstanding demand made by private respondent,
and her failure to avail of the remedy provided for in Article 1256
of the Civil Code, entitles private respondent to eject her from the
premises.”

Indeed, the question of whether or not private respondent

is the owner of the leased premises is one of fact which is
within the cognizance of the trial court whose findings
thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a
showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of
the case. And since the petitioner has not presented
sufficient proof that the leased premises is not the same lot
registered in the name of the private respondent, the
findings of the lower courts on the fact of ownership of the
leased premises will not be disturbed.
The maps attached by the petitioner to her Reply to the
Comment of the private respondent which would tend to
show that Almacen and Sipac are two (2) different
barangays or sitios, cannot offset the findings of the trial
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court for lack of proper identifications; in fact, these maps

do not even indicate where the property at No. 164 Int.,
Gov. Pascual Street is located.
The petitioner’s contention that the provisions of Section
1, Commonwealth Act No. 53, should be applied in this case
in determining the credibility of witnesses, is untenable.
The said law provides:

“Sec. 1. Where a covenant or contract made between the owner of

land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof has not been reduced
to writing or has not been set forth in a document written in a
language known to the lessee or tenant, the testimony of such
lessee or tenant shall be accepted as prima facie evidence on the
terms of a covenant or contract.”

As can be seen, the cited law can be invoked only when

there is a dispute between the owner of the land and the
lessee or tenant on share tenancy as to the terms of an
unwritten contract or where the contract is written in a
language not known to the lessee or tenant. In the instant
case, there is no dispute as to the terms of the contract of
lease. Hence, the cited law cannot be invoked to support
the petitioner’s claim that the private

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Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

respondent is not the owner of the leased premises or that

the petitioner’s version of the facts of the case is more
credible than that of the private respondent.
Besides, the petitioner’s contention that the private
respondent is not the owner of the leased premises is
inconsistent with her claim that she had tendered payment
of the rentals
1
for the month of January 1976 to the private
respondent.
There is also no merit in the petitioner’s contention that
the lessor is guilty of mora accipiendi. The circumstances
surrounding the alleged refusal of the lessor (private
respondent) to accept the proffered rentals, according to
petitioner, are as follows:

“Sometime in 1942, petitioner entered into a verbal lease

agreement with Lutgarda Cifra over the premises in question
which belonged to the latter. Aside from the amount of rentals, no
other condition or term was agreed upon. The rentals were
collected from her residence by the lessor’s collector who went to

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her house to demand and collect payment from time to time, with
no fixed frequency (Cf., t.s.n. July 28, 1977, pp. 2-6).
“Sometime in 1974, the lessor’s collector stopped going to the
petitioner’s residence to collect her rentals, as she had done in the
past. The defendant-appellant waited for the collector to come but
the latter never showed up again in his neighborhood. Since no
demand for payment was made upon her, the petitioner decided to
keep the money until the collector comes again to demand and
collect payment.
“Sometime in May, 1976, petitioner received a letter (Exh. 1)
from Aurora C. Recto, sister of private respondent, informing the
former that the latter, was the owner of the property in question,
was offering the same for sale.
“Sometime later, or in August 1977, petitioner received another
letter, this time from the private respondent, demanding the
surrender of the possession of the premises in question, also
claiming to be the owner of the property.
“Upon receipt of this letter, petitioner forthwith went to the
residence of the collector, another sister of the private respondent
to whom she had been paying her rentals, and there tendered
payment but this 2
was refused without any justification (t.s.n. July
26, 1977, p. 7).”

_______________

1 Brief for the Respondent, p. 5.

2 Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2.

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Tengco vs. Court of Appeals

Under the circumstances, the refusal to accept the

proffered rentals is not without justification. The
ownership of the property had been transferred to the
private respondent and the person to whom payment was
offered had no authority to accept payment. It should be
noted that the contract of lease between the petitioner and
Lutgarda Cifra, the former owner of the land, was not in
writing and, hence, unrecorded. The Court has held that a
contract of lease executed by the vendor, unless recorded,
ceases to have effect when the property
3
is sold, in the
absence of a contrary agreement. The petitioner cannot
claim ignorance of the transfer of ownerhip of the property
because, by her own account, Aurora Recto and the private
respondent, at various times, had informed her of their
respective claims to ownership of the property occupied by
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the petitioner. The petitioner should have tendered

payment of the rentals to the private respondent and if
that was not possible, she should have consigned such
rentals in court.
Finally, we find no merit in the petitioner’s contention
that the private respondent is guilty of laches. As the Court
of Appeals had stated, the demand for the petitioner to
vacate the premises and to pay arrears in rentals was
made on 23 August 1976 and the complaint seeking her
ejectment was filed a few days thereafter, or on 16
September 1976.
For reasons aforestated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals appears to be in accord with the evidence and the
law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Without
pronouncement as to costs. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.

     Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

       Melencio-Herrera, J. (Chairman), No part. CA pp.
judgment penned by me.

Petition denied. Decision immediately executory.

Notes.—In ejectment cases, the tenant-defendants must

deposit in court the monthly rentals specified in the
dispositive

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3 Saul vs. Hawkins, 1 Phil. 275.

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Vda. de Carreon vs. Cartagena

portion of the court’s decision regardless of statement in

the body of the opinion or the contract of the parties on
giving documents of rental is paid on time. (Balagtas
Realty Corporation vs. Ramillo, Jr., 114 SCRA 318.)
Laches have been defined as the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it

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or declined to assert it. (Municipality of Carcar vs. CFI of

Cebu, Barile Branch, 119 SCRA 392.)

——o0o——

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