Facundo Lubiano vs.

Joel Gordolla
Adm. Case No. 2343
July 30, 1982

Facts:
Complainant Facundo Lubiano filed for the disbarment of Atty. Joel
Gordolla for the latter’s failure to observe the Code of Professional Ethics.
Respondent Gordolla, as counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No.
RB-IV-22635-78-T used insouciant language which are not merely trivial or
harmless on his statement.

Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s action is a ground for disbarment?

Held:
No. Use of insouciant language does not constitute sufficient cause for
disbarment. However, it should not be disregarded as the language of a
lawyer, oral or written, must be respectful and restrained, in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession. It is through a scrupulous preference for
respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance or
respect due to the courts and judicial officers, as mandated by Section 20(b)
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being
relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by
the mantle of absolute privileged communication; and that, as such, they
cannot be used as basis for any action, however false and malicious the
statements may be. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged communication
absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the
statements made in the pleadings. But like the member of the legislature
who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any
speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof, but
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature
for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains subject to this Court’s
supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty
as a member of the legal profession.
Atty. Joel G. Gordolla was ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, payable
to the Clerk of Court within ten (10) days from notice of decision, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is further warned that a
repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Henry Samonte vs. Gines Abellana
A.C. No. 3452
June 23, 2014

Facts:
Complainant Henry Samonte filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Gines Abellana, who represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and
Nelson Yu on the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City, citing the following as
serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana: falsification of
documents, dereliction of duty, gross negligence and tardiness, and
dishonesty.
Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,
clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June
14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had only given
P5,000.00 instead of the P10,000.00 they had agreed upon, and it was not
enough to cover the filing fees and other charges. He asserted that the charge
of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply and that it
was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the pre-trial. Anent his non-
attendance at the hearings, he explained that although he had informed the
RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having
attended the arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding
judge had opted not to await his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed
Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time,
pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of the
documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latter’s absence
from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest,
because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in
contravention of their agreement and that Samonte had not also demanded
any receipts for the fees.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent
be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful
practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits a
member of the bar. Albeit adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, the IBP Board of Governors suspended Atty. Abellana from
the practice of law for one year. Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration
but was denied by the IBP Board of Governors.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors committed an error in
suspending Atty. Abellana?
Held:
No. Every lawyer of the country is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy as embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath which they
took upon admission to the bar. By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer
enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every
lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of
law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 — A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request
for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity
and trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the
RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing
“0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already
filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June
14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that
Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his
inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by
June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his
falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever
reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and
integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law
Profession than his transactions with his client.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve
their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s
misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It
deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The Court AFFIRMS the IBP Board of Governors Resolution with
modification that Atty. Gines N. Abellana that the suspension shall be for six
months instead of one year, with the stern warning that any repetition of the
same or similar acts will be punished more severely.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Maria Celia Flores
AM No. P-07-2366
April 16, 2009

Facts:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charged respondent
Maria Celia A. Flores with dishonesty for failure to disclose in her Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) her suspension and dismissal from previous employment.
Flores applied for and was appointed as Court Legal Researcher II in the
RTC of Quezon City.
The OCA came across a labor case decision wherein respondent filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. She was
dismissed for engaging a fellow employee in a brawl and it also appeared
that she was disciplinary charged six times. On appeal, the NLRC declared
the dismissal valid. The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court
through a petition for certiorari. Pending the resolution of the petition, Flores
was appointed as Court Legal Researcher II. The validity of the dismissal
was eventually sustained by the Court on May 15, 1996.
Upon this finding, the OCA looked into the PDS of respondent which
was furnished by the CSC and found that she had not disclosed her previous
suspension, dismissal from the service, and the administrative charges
against her before the PPSTA.
Respondent maintained that she fully disclosed the fact of her
dismissal from PPSTA in the PDS when she cited the pendency of a petition
for certiorari in the Supreme Court. In invoking good faith, she reasoned that
her failure to indicate the suspension was due to an honest mistake
considering that the suspension happened more than seventeen (17) years
before she accomplished the PDS.
Respondent asked for the inhibition of then Court Administrator from
further conducting the investigation in light of his alleged partiality against
her. In his Comment, the former Court Administrator explained that the
charge against respondent for dishonesty was not brought about by any
desire to harass her but by his sense of duty. The OCA found respondent
guilty of dishonesty and recommended her dismissal from the service.

Issue/s:
 Whether or not the OCA committed an error in dismissing Flores on
the ground of dishonesty?
Held:
No. Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or
negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the
intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not
only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by
the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment.
As emphasized in Advincula v. Dicen, 458 SCRA 696 (2005),
the PDS is an official document required of a government employee and
official by the Civil Service Commission. It is the repository of all
information about any government employee and official regarding his
personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Since truthful completion
of the PDS is a requirement for employment in the judiciary, the importance
of answering the same with candor need not be gainsaid. Concealment of
any information in the PDS, therefore, warrants disciplinary action against
the erring employee.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in
the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must
live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and
diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is
impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest
standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law.
Respondent is found guilty of dishonesty and since this is her first
offense during employment in the judiciary, the Court deems it proper to
impose the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay, with a
stern warning that the commission of similar or graver offense in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
Julieta Narag vs. Dominador Narag
A.C. No. 3405
June 29, 1998

Facts:
Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of
having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for
Lawyers. On her complaint she stated how her husband maintained an illicit
relationship, known in various circles in the community, and lived with a 22-
year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level. The case
was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, complainant later seeked for the dismissal of the complaint
claiming that she had fabricated everything. Thus, the IBP dismissed the
complaint.
Complainant, along with her seven children, later filed another letter
appealing for the disbarment of respondent. Mrs. Narag explained that she
had earlier dropped the case because of continuous threats against her by the
respondent. Atty. Narag denied that he had threatened the complainant as
well as having a paramour, and instead described his wife as emotionally
disturbed.
In its Resolution, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating
commissioner’s recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the
respondent. Subsequently, the complainant sought the disbarment of her
husband. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and denied respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the IBP committed an error in the disbarment of Atty.
Narag?

Held:
No. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
“Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.”
 “CANON 7—A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03—A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.”
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol that, “as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.”
Respondent may have provided well for his family—they enjoyed a
comfortable life and his children finished their education. He may have also
established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But
these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to
continue being a member of the noble profession of law. We remind
respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties—e.g., to support,
educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well
as moral and spiritual guidance. As a husband, he is also obliged to live with
his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and
support.
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of
marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has
contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love
and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death. We reiterate our
ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova: “The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.” In Toledo vs. Toledo, the respondent was disbarred from the
practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child.
 In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa
vs. Cabanting, “a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.”
The Court ordered for the disbarment of Dominador M. Narag and
striked his name off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Patricia Figueroa vs. Simeon Barranco Jr.
SBC Case No. 519
July 31, 1997

Facts:
Complainant Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. She filed charges
of gross immorality against respondent because he bore an illegitimate child
with her as his sweetheart and did not fulfill his promise to marry her after
he passes the bar examinations; instead, respondent married another woman.
The Court denied respondent’s initial motions to dismiss the case but
later on resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath upon payment of the required fees.
Upon complainant’s opposition the Court, resolved to cancel
respondent’s scheduled oath-taking and referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP recommended the
dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath.

Issue/s:
Whether or not IBP erred in dismissing the case and allowing Mr.
Barranco Jr. to take his oath?

Held:
No. Respondent engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on
his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court
has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one
that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere
intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the
part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
 The petition is dismissed and Simeon Barranco, Jr. is allowed to take
his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
Torben Overgaard vs. Godwin Valdez
A.C. No. 7902
September 30, 2008

Facts:
Complainant Torben Overgaard seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin
R. Valdez from the practice of law for gross malpractice, immoral character,
dishonesty and deceitful conduct. The complainant alleges that despite
receipt of legal fees in compliance with a Retainer Agreement, the
respondent refused to perform any of his obligations under their contract for
legal services, ignored the complainant's requests for a report of the status of
the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected demands for return of the money
paid to him.
Despite continued efforts to contact the respondent to inquire on the
status of the cases, Overgaard was unable to reach him; his phone calls were
not answered and his electronic mails were ignored. The complainant had no
knowledge of the developments of the cases that the respondent was
handling for him. The complainant alleges that the respondent did not do a
single thing with respect to the cases covered under the Retainer Agreement.
Not only did the respondent fail to enter his appearance in the criminal cases
filed against the complainant, he also neglected to file an entry of
appearance in the civil case for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the
complainant filed. The respondent also did not file a Comment on the
complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms which was dismissed and under
review at the Department of Justice.
Due to the above lapses of the respondent, the complainant wrote the
respondent and demanded the return of the documents which were turned
over to him, as well as the payment in consideration of the cases he was
supposed to handle for the complainant. However, complainant was unable
to get any word from the respondent despite repeated and continuous efforts
to get in touch with him.
Hence, the complainant filed the administrative complaint against
Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the IBP. Respondent failed to submit an
Answer to the complaint against him and failed to attend the Mandatory
Conference despite being duly notified about it. The investigation proceeded
ex parte. IBP Investigating Commissioner Antonio S. Tria, to whom the
instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and
recommendation, found the respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of
Governors approved the recommendation of Commissioner Tria, and further
ordered the complainant to return the PhP900,000.00 to the complainant
within 60 days from receipt of the notice.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Valdez is guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

Held:
Yes. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client." Necessity and public interest enjoin
lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client. A lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. However, instead of devoting himself to the
client's cause, the respondent avoided the complainant, forgot about the
cases he was handling for him and ostensibly abandoned him. The client
reposed his trust in his lawyer with full faith that the lawyer would not
betray him or abscond from his responsibilities. By assuring the complainant
that he would take care of the cases included in the Retainer Agreement, and
even accepting fees, the respondent defrauded the complainant when he did
not do a single thing he was expected to do.
The Code of Professional Responsibility further provides that a
lawyer is required to keep the client informed of the status of his case and to
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. The
respondent did the opposite. Despite the complainant's efforts to consult him
and notwithstanding numerous attempts to contact him, simply to ask for an
update of the status of the cases, the respondent was able to avoid the
complainant and never bothered to reply.
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
provides that "a lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or
received for and from the client." The complainant paid $16,854.00 to the
respondent via telegraphic bank transfer. This was considered as complete
payment for the PhP900,000.00 that was stipulated as the consideration for
the legal services to be rendered. However, since the respondent did not
carry out any of the services he was engaged to perform, nor did he appear
in court or make any payment in connection with litigation, or give any
explanation as to how such a large sum of money was spent and allocated,
he must immediately return the money he received from the client upon
demand. However, he refused to return the money he received from the
complainant despite written demands, and was not even able to give a single
report regarding the status of the cases.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose - such as for filing fees - but not
used for failure to file the case, must immediately be returned to the client on
demand.
 In this case, the Court find that suspension for three years
recommended by the IBP is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable
acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts
and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him
as a member of the bar. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is disbarred and his name is
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Policarpio Catalan Jr. vs. Joselito Silvosa
A.C. No. 7360
July 24, 2012

Facts:
Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. filed a complaint against Atty. Joselito
M. Silvosa for three causes of action:
(1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case
for which he previously appeared as prosecutor;
(2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio
(Pros. Toribio) for P30,000; and
(3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No.
27776 for direct bribery.
IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis Funa held Atty. Silvosa
liable only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of
reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm.
Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he
resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case and his appearance was only
for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. He also denies any relationship
between himself and the accused. On the second, Atty. Silvosa dismisses
Pros. Toribio’s allegations as “self-serving” and “purposely dug by Atty.
Catalan and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.” On the third, while Atty.
Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under probation,
he asserts that “conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do not involve moral turpitude since the act involved
‘do not amount to a crime.’”

Issue/s:
Whether or not IBP erred in its findings and recommendation against
Atty. Silvosa?

Held:
No. Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer
shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in said service.” Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which
provides that “A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of
the defenseless or the oppressed” and on Canon 14 which provides that “A
lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.” We agree with Comm.
Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of facts.”
The Court however disagree in Comm. Fuma’s ruling that the findings
in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
Disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There
can be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper
authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are
incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the public
might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. x x
x The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed
attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.
Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls
under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the
crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension
because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His
excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public
officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his
character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved
himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
The Court then ordered that Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa be disbarred and
his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Pedro Linsangan vs. Nicomedes Tolentino
A.C. No. 6672
September 4, 2009

Facts:
Complainant Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services. He alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal
Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection
on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit
of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever
his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also
attached “respondent’s” calling card.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing
the printing and circulation of the said calling card.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. The CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.

Issue/s:
Whether of not the CBD erred in finding respondent liable for
unethical conduct?

Held:
No. Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere
to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: Canon 3 — A lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. Time and time again, lawyers are
reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence,
lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
which provides: Rule 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This
rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of
legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled
is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce
the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services. Again, the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s
“referrals.” Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.
Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only
exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter
that he is handling for the client.
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers.
Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.
For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a)
lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c)
address; (d) telephone number; and, (e) special branch of law practiced.
The Court then suspend respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino from
the practice of law for one year for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It also warned respondent that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Koppel, Inc. vs. Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Inc.
G.R. No. 198075
September 4, 2013

Facts:
Fedders Koppel, Incorporated (FKI), a manufacturer of air-
conditioning products, was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Km. 16, South Superhighway, Parañaque City. Within the subject land are
buildings and other improvements dedicated to the business of FKI.
In 1975, FKI bequeathed the subject land (exclusive of the
improvements) in favor of respondent Makati Rotary Club Foundation,
Incorporated by way of a conditional donation. The respondent accepted the
donation with all its conditions. FKI and the respondent executed a Deed of
Donation evidencing their consensus.
One of the conditions of the donation required the respondent to lease
the subject land back to FKI under terms specified in their Deed of
Donation. With the respondent’s acceptance of the donation, a lease
agreement between FKI and the respondent was, therefore, effectively
incorporated in the Deed of Donation.
From 2005 to 2008, FKI faithfully paid the rentals and “donations”
due it per the 2005 Lease Contract. But in June of 2008, FKI sold all its
rights and properties relative to its business in favor of herein petitioner
Koppel, Incorporated. FKI then, with conformity of respondent, assigned all
its interests and obligations in an Amended Deed of Donation and Lease
Contract. Thereafter, petitioner discontinued payment of the rent and
“donation”.
Petitioner refused to comply with the repeated demands of the
respondent and instead filed with the RTC of Parañaque City a complaint for
the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation against the respondent.
Respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner
before the MeTC of Parañaque City. The ejectment case was raffled to
Branch 77 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-307. The MeTC
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the case with
respect to the issues regarding the insufficiency of the respondent’s demand
and the nullity of the 2005 Lease Contract.
Respondent appealed to the RTC of Parañaque City, which reversed
the MeTC and ordered the eviction of the petitioner from the subject land.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue/s:
 Whether or not the dispute is subject to arbitration?

Held:
Yes. Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is
considered as independent of the main contract. Being a separate contract in
itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of the
possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract. Once again instructive is
Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further consequence of the
doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates the main
contract may invoke its arbitration clause.
The JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation,
conciliation or early neutral evaluation which entails the submission of a
dispute before a “JDR judge” who shall merely “facilitate settlement”
between the parties in conflict or make a “non-binding evaluation or
assessment of the chances of each party’s case.” Thus, in JDR, the JDR
judge lacks the authority to render a resolution of the dispute that is binding
upon the parties in conflict. In arbitration, on the other hand, the dispute is
submitted to an arbitrator/s — a neutral third person or a group of thereof —
who shall have the authority to render a resolution binding upon the parties.
It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful detainer action
should have been stayed; the petitioner and the respondent should have been
referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract. The MeTC, however, did not do so in violation of the law —
which violation was, in turn, affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals on
appeal.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon. Florentino Floro Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
March 31, 2006

Facts:
Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in both of his application for judgeship
took the required psychological evaluation, which exposed problems with
self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid
ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998
reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge. Because of his
impressive academic background, however, the JBC allowed Atty. Floro to
seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion
appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as RTC
Judge of Malabon City.
Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, filed administrative
complaint against Judge Floro to the Court upon the report of the findings of
the audit on respondent’s sala and recommended that the latter be subjected
to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator
Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive
suspension for the duration of the investigation against him. The Court
adopted the recommendations of the OCA.
The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to submit himself to the SC
Clinic for psychological or mental examination. Judge Floro sought
reconsideration with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo
psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental
institution. This was denied by the Court.
Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or
disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors and psychologist with a
manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses for
alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct. Justice Ramirez, with
the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be
sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply. The Court with the
report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to
psychological and mental examination; else, he shall be ordered arrested and
detained at the jail of the NBI.
Judge Floro complied with the directive. Still, he sought the services
of a private practitioner, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge
Floro. The report of the psychological examination suggested that Judge
Floro’s psychological impairment deem him unfit to be a judge. Upon the
findings on the psychological reports, Justice Ramirez recommended to
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that Judge Florentino Floro be removed
from office because he is unfit to perform the duties of an RTC Judge.
Issue/s:
 Whether or not the OCA erred in recommending the dismissal of
Judge Floro due to his psychological impairment?
Held:
Yes. Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the
contentment and happiness of the people. An honorable, competent and
independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the
stability of government, and the well-being of the people. Carrying much of
the weight in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners,
the judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted
the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will
only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly
honorable men, competent and independent.
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those
expected of other public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law
and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater
degree than legislators or executives.
As it has been said, judges administer justice judicially, i.e., not
according to some abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the
rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its
sanctions. The function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a
mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it
legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have
joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed
the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for
such major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his
application for judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and
interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his
scholastic achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations
given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by
the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted
by mental health professionals from the private sector and which were
favorable to him. Rule 6 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council thereof
states:
SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound
mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play a
critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task
of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall
submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the
Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or
psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
 It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely
on the evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by
the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological
evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme
Court Clinic.
The psychological and psychiatric reports of the SC Clinic, considered
as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro,
cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for
positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain
statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in
all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros
assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification
of work environment. While Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge
because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in
other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge
Floros current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his
making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for
now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice
not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly
due to a medically disabling condition. If Judge Floros mental impairment is
secondary to genetics and/or adverse environmental factors (and,
unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot
condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment factors
they have no control over.
Jorge Montecillo vs. Francisco Gica
G.R. No. L-36800
October 21, 1974

Facts:
Francisco M. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation and
a case for damages at the Cebu City Court against Jorge Montecillo as a
result of an alleged slander by the latter by calling Mr. Gica "stupid" or a
"fool'. Montecillo was acquitted in both cases as it was found that he did not
call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the
City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five
hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory
damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Gica filed an appeal to the CFI of Cebu which upheld the decision of
the City Court. The case was then elevated to the CA by petition for review
which, in turn, reversed the decision of the CFI. It ruled in favor of petitioner
Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner
Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the
negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's
lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its
decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred
pesos as damages.
Atty. Quirico del Mar, as counsel for Montecillo, moved for
reconsideration of the Appelate Court with a veiled threat by mentioning
provisions of the RPC and the innuendo that the CA allowed itself to be
deceived. The CA denied the motion and admonished Atty. del Mar to
remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of
justice to grant reconsideration. del Mar on his second motion for
reconsideration made another threat stating that citing the same provisions of
the RPC the next appeal will be to the President of the Philippines.
The Appellate Court ordered respondent del Mar to explain why he
should not be punished for contempt of court. del Mar made a written
explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened
and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of
the course of action he would follow. Respondent also sent two letters to the
Justices of the 4th Division of the CA: one, informing them that he sent a
letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and
requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter
during the hearing of the case; and another, wherein he reminded them of a
civil case he instituted against Justices of the SC for damages for a decision
rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not
like to do it again but would do so if provoked. CA found del Mar guilty of
contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended
from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. del Mar should be held liable in contempt of
court?

Held:
Yes. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the
court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which
he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil.
595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should
give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps
much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues
involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions,
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-
22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed
against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is
an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of
respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his
concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in
the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He
repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for
his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract
elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and
justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just
may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him
may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the
viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the
absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep
concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what
We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is
broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound
sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and
mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of
both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but
commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long
years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in
disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the
practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in
their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the
courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic
institutions.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the
Supreme Court is suspended from the practice of law until further orders of
the Court.
In re: Disbarment Proceedings against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez
A.M. No. L-363
July 31, 1962

Facts:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, a member of the Philippine Bar,
was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of
Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty
of death, which was later changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a
portion of the sentence, respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the
President.
The widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder
case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be
removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, stating
that: a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term
"moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. As used in disbarment statutes, it means
an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.
Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places
him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment?

Held:
No. The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but
conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does
not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a
full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with
rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States."
Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction
for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime
was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree
of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure
up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission
of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of
academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk
of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law
ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men
in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot
and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and
office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic.
Considering the nature of the crime for which he was convicted,
Respondent Diosdado Gutierrez is disbarred and his name is stricken from
the roll of lawyers.
Felicidad Oronce vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125766
October 19, 1998

Facts:
Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation,
the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,000 square meters,
obtained a four million peso-loan from China Banking Corporation. To
obtain said loan, respondent mortgaged said property and all its
improvements to the bank. Due to irregular payments, interests and penalties
accrued through the years.
Private respondent later executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage covering said property and all its improvements in favor of
petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad Oronce, in consideration of the
sum of P5,400,000.00. The petitioners, on the other hand bound themselves
to pay the repondents’ indebtedness with China Banking Corp.
Petitioners paid the indebtedness of private respondents’ with the
bank; however, private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver
possession of the premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year
period. Petitioners then registered the property under their name and paid the
real estate taxes on the property.
Petitioners then sent demand letters asking private respondents to
vacate the premises, all of which were left unclaimed on the QC Post Office.
Hence, petitioners filed before the MeTC of Quezon City a complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondent. In its answer to the complaint,
private respondent raised the issue of ownership over the property. It
impugned petitioners right to eject, alleging that petitioners had no cause of
action against it because it was merely a mortgagee of the property. The
MeTC decided the case in favor of petitioners. The counterclaim of private
respondents’ is dismissed for lack of merit.
Private respondent raised an appeal to the RTC of QC stressing that it
was not unlawfully withholding possession of the premises from petitioners
because the basis for evicting them was the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage that did not reflect the true intention of the parties to enter into
an equitable mortgage. RTC rendered the decision affirming in toto that of
the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners and RTC. The CA set aside the
decision of RTC and declared as null and void for want of jurisdiction the
decision of the MeTC. It made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining petitioners from implementing the decision of RTC, the writ of
execution and the notice to vacate.