Consuelo Vda V Palarca
Consuelo Vda V Palarca
Consuelo Vda V Palarca
DE QUIRINO, petitioner,
vs.
I. MAIN TOPIC:
CAN NEW AGREEMENT BAR A PERSON FROM EXERCISING HIS RIGHT GRANTED BY A
CONTRACT?
II. FACTS:
On October 4, 1947, said petitioner entered into a lease contract with the respondent
whereby the former leased to the latter a parcel of land known as Lot 30 of block 84 of the
Sulucan Subdivision, located at Sampaloc, Manila. In their written contract of lease it was
stipulated, inter alia, that the term thereof would be ten (10) years, from November 1, 1947
to November 1, 1957; that the monthly rental would be P250, payable in advance; that the
lessee could demolish the lessor's old building on the leased premises and construct thereon
any building and/or improvements suitable for school purposes, which new building and/or
improvements shall belong to the lessee; that within one (1) year after the expiration of the
lease, the lessee would have "the right and option to buy the leased premises" for P12,000;
that, should the lessee fail to exercise this option, said (new) building and/or improvements
shall be evaluated by a committee organized therefor, as set forth in the contract; that, after
such "valuation," the lessor shall "have the option to buy" said "building and/or
improvements within ... one (1) year, after the expiration of the contract"; and that, should
neither of the parties exercise their respective options, both "shall be free to look for a
buyer for his or her respective property."
By a letter, dated September 15, 1958, the lessee informed the lessor that the former
(lessee) was exercising "his right to buy the leased property for the agreed price of
P12,000," and inquired "when" the latter (lessor) would be "ready to execute the deed of
sale," so that the agreed price could be delivered to her. Soon thereafter, before the
expiration of the term of his option, or on October 6, 1958, the lessee wrote a follow-up
letter to the lessor, advising her that the former had in his "possession the amount of
P12,000 with which to purchase" the leased premises, and, asked her, once more, "when"
she would be ready to execute the corresponding deed of sale, in order that he (lessee)
could pay said price.
Through her counsel, the lessor replied, however, on October 10, 1958, that she "cannot
accede" to the lessee's requests "because the ... contract of October 4, 1947, has been
novated by another agreement, wherein the rent of P250 a month was reduced to P100.00."
Thereupon, that same month, the lessee instituted the present action to compel the lessor
to comply with her obligation to execute the corresponding deed of sale in his (lessee's)
favor, upon payment by him of said sum of P12,000.
The lessor filed her answer admitting some allegations of the complaint and denying other
allegations thereof, as well as alleging, as special defense, that the lease contract had been
"modified" by a subsequent agreement of the parties, which had been observed and carried
out by them, and that payment of the stipulated price had not been properly tendered or
validly consigned.
The lessor, likewise, set up a counterclaim for damages, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance rendered the decision
adverted to above, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari, in which the lessor maintains: (1) that the lessee's option to purchase
the leased premises was null and void for want of consideration; (2) that the lessee should
have been sentenced to pay rentals, during the pendency of this case; and (3) that the
lessee should have been sentenced, also, to pay damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
the suit.
III. ISSUE:
WON THE AGREEMENT TO LOWER THE RENT BAR THE LESSEE TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO
PURCHASE SAID LAND
IV. HELD:
The said contention is clearly without merit. The consideration for the lessor's obligation to
sell the leased premises to the lessee, should he choose to exercise his option to purchase
the same, is the obligation of the lessee to sell to the lessor the building and/or
improvements constructed and/or made by the former, if he fails to exercise his option to
buy said premises. Then, again, the amount of the rentals agreed upon in the contract of
October 4, 1947 — which amount turned out to be so burdensome upon the lessee, that the
lessor agreed, five (5) years later, to reduce it —1 as well as the building and/or
improvements contemplated to be constructed and/or introduced by the lessee, were,
undoubtedly, part of the consideration for his option to purchase the leased premises.
The supposed cancellation of the option was sought to be deduced from a novation made in
1952, when, upon the lessee's request, the lessor agreed to reduce the monthly rental from
P250 to P100. Neither defense was, however, sustained by said courts, and, we think,
correctly.
Indeed, not being inconsistent with the lessee's option to purchase the leased premises, said
agreement to reduce the rental did not necessarily cancel or extinguish the option. Although
the lessor would have the Court believe that she consented to said reduction, condition that
the option be cancelled, this claim had not been proven.
V. DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the lessor, petitioner-appellant Consuelo Vda. de Quirino.
VI. DOCTRINES/LAWS:
Art. 1350. In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party,
the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; in remuneratory ones, the
service or benefit which is remunerated; and in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere
liberality of the benefactor.