IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

49 SCRA 22

FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from
the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December
1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted
all comments on the proposed integration.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

RULING:
The Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority
over the Bar.
It was also held that the court may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law.”
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is “perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,” within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
 A.C. No. 8292

ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUELM.MARAMBAAND NASSER

FACTS:

The Court, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
resolves this matter of the election of the Executive Vice-President (EVP) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for the 2011-2013 term.

This administrative matter was triggered by the Petition for Intervention filed by petitioner-
intervenor IBP-Southern Luzon Region (IBP-Southern Luzon), seeking a declaration that the post
of EVP-IBP for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and that it is qualified to field a
candidate for the said position.

This matter comes at the heels of the controversies resolved by the Court in its December 4, 2012
Resolution regarding the application of the rotation rule in determining which chapter of the IBP-
Western Visayas region (IBP-Western Visayas) was qualified to field a candidate for the position
of governor. In the said resolution, the Court clarified that the rotation rule was one by exclusion.
Similar to this recently resolved controversy, the present dilemma calls for the application of the
rotation system at the national level.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rotation rule will be the rotation by pre-ordained sequence or rotation by
exclusion will apply after the first cycle.
RULING:
After an assiduous review of the facts, the issues and the arguments raised by the parties
involved, the Court finds wisdom in the position of the IBP-BOG, through retired Justice Santiago
M. Kapunan, that at the start of a new rotational cycle "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie
of the governorship for the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a
consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter
will have its turn in the rotation."

The Court finds merit in the contentions of both parties, and thus believes that the IBP-BOG
should be given its say on the matter pursuant to the dictates of due process.ÏWHEREFORE, the
Court hereby holds that in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, the rotation by exclusion shall be
adopted such that, initially, all chapters of the region shall have the equal opportunity to vie for
the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon.

Velez vs De Vera
496 SCRA 345 [ÀC No. 6697 July 25, 2006]

Facts:
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed
then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled
involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was
authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the
case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in
settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then
deposited to his personal account; The Hearing referee in the said administrative case
recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years; Atty. de
Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of
California. Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use
the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he “expected de Vera might
use the money for a few days. Petitioner claims that such information was concealed by the
respondent. Such and other circumstances which the IBP board deems that respondent is not fit
to be a member of the board, hence his removal was sought.

Issue:

Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign
jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be
sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction.

Held:

No. We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against
whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the
case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty.
de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to
practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial
evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is
successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B'
(of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining
to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.”

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen
vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law.
The definition of “practice of law” is the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law." The contention
of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been
offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent’s corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for
the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.

Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the
number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided
thecase will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar
advertisements were also published.An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to
the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for
1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he
admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it
was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public
isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule 2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes. The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service
and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary
interest. Advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines
the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people
otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether
proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.
Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that
purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine, etc., nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public
or the bar.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion |
A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

Facts:

The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of
the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-
Laws pertaining to the organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for
failure to pay the same.

Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence
of this, compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to
the IBP.

Held:

The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal. The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
 LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

Facts:

Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his IBP dues
from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he
worked at the Civil Service Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement. His
contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP
annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from
the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property
rights bereft of due process of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-
1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

Held:

No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary has
inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program
without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
 Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala
of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion
to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also
appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time
service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion.
So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a
grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the
legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions.
The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may
be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice.
The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.