International Politics, 2005, 42, (135–151)

r 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1384-5748/05 $30.00

www.palgrave-journals.com/ip

Interpreting September 11
Brian Frederking, Michael Artime and Max Sanchez Pagano
Political Science Department, McKendree College, Lebanon, IL 62254, USA.
E-mail: bfrederk@mckendree.edu

Whether to interpret September 11 as an act of war or a criminal act is embedded

within a larger dispute about the preferred nature of global security rules in the
post-cold war world. Interpreting September 11 as war is consistent with a
preference for Westphalian global security rules; interpreting September 11 as a
crime is consistent with a preference for global society rules. We present evidence of
a dramatic interpretive gulf between US and other leaders around the world in their
understanding and portrayal of September 11 and the ensuing ‘war on terrorism’.
Using a rule-oriented constructivist approach, we argue that this interpretive
dispute perpetuates two dominant post-cold war trends: attempts by many in the
international community to construct global collective security rules, and resistance
to that project from a hegemonic United States.
International Politics (2005) 42, 135–151. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800102

Keywords: September 11; constructivism; global collective security; rules of war

Introduction
We are still struggling to interpret September 11 and its influence on world
politics. Two competing metaphors for the acts of September 11 are ‘war’ and
‘crime’. Many argue that September 11 was an act of war against the United
States. The ensuing ‘war on terrorism,’ like previous systemic wars, is
fundamentally changing world politics. The post-cold war era is over and a
new era dominated by the new US grand strategy of pre-emption has begun
(Jervis, 2002). Others argue that September 11 has not fundamentally changed
world politics. The acts of September 11 were criminal acts violating the laws
of global society. Indeed, they were just another form of backlash against the
gradual emergence of global society (Hoffman, 2002; Ikenberry, 2002).
Interpreting September 11 as either a war or a crime has tremendous
theoretical, political and policy implications (Feldman, 2002; Howard, 2002).
We argue that this choice also illustrates the ongoing struggle between the
traditional rules of the Westphalia international system and slowly emerging
rules of global society. We take a rule-oriented constructivist approach to
world politics and posit the existence of overlapping social rules that both
constitute and regulate world politics. On our account, the war interpretation
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of September 11 is consistent with the traditional Westphalia rules of world

politics, and the crime interpretation of September 11 is consistent with global
society rules of world politics. Political agents who interpret September 11 as
either an act of war or a criminal act partially construct world politics by
invoking either Westphalia or global society rules. Conflicting interpretations
of September 11, then, reflect this larger struggle about whether the post-cold
war world will be constituted by traditional Westphalia rules or by newly
emerging global society rules.
The events of September 11 did not fundamentally change world politics.
Instead, they are consistent with three major (and contradictory) trends of the
post-cold war world: (1) the international community pursuing ‘global
governance’ through international organizations; (2) a hegemonic system with
the dominant United States at best ambivalent about ‘global governance’; and
(3) a backlash against both global governance and US hegemony by
traditional, fundamentalist, and/or poverty-stricken groups around the world.
The events of September 11 should be understood as part of the ongoing
tensions between the traditional Westphalia system, a slowly emerging global
society, and the marginalized forces of fragmentation and isolation around the
world. The terrorist attacks of September 11 are an example of the backlash
against global society and US hegemony (trend #3), and world politics since
September 11 has been dominated by whether the US should pursue a
unilateral ‘war on terrorism’ (trend #2) or whether a multilateral approach to
the violation of international law (trend #1) is more appropriate.
The global response to the events of September 11 has the potential to either
exacerbate or resolve this tension between the US preference for a hegemonic
Westphalia system and the international community’s preference for global
governance. The crux of this tension lies in whether to interpret September 11
as an act of war or a crime. A ‘war’ interpretation is consistent with the US
preference for a Westphalia system; a ‘crime’ interpretation is consistent with
the international community’s preference for global governance. In this paper,
we analyze statements of leaders around the world about September 11 and the
war on terrorism, including the debate about intervention in Iraq. Our results
show a striking difference in how US leaders and other leaders around the
world interpret September 11. Our analysis suggests that US leaders are more
likely to interpret it as an act of war, and global leaders are more likely to
interpret it as a crime. The tension in the global community about how to
proceed with the ‘war on terrorism’, we argue, stems from a larger tension
about which set of rules are appropriate for the post-cold war world.
We proceed in three steps. First, we use a rule-oriented constructivist
approach to differentiate a Westphalia from a global society interpretation of
September 11 and the appropriate global response. Second, we analyze 302
statements during the 18 months after September 11 and argue that the
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Westphalia interpretation dominates the statements of US leaders, while the

global governance interpretation dominates the statements of leaders around
the world. Finally, we discuss the argumentative challenge facing both the US
and the international community in this current Westphalia/global society
debate.

War, Crime, and the Rules of World Politics

Constructivist approaches to world politics use a social ontology and assert
that social structures constitute world politics. There are many ways to
categorize the variety of constructivist arguments within this proliferating
research program. The dominant distinction is between ‘conventional’
constructivists and ‘critical’ constructivists (Hopf, 1998). Conventional
constructivists embrace positivist epistemology and use mainstream methods
(Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 2001). Critical constructivists embrace a post-
positivist epistemology and use post-structuralist discourse analysis (Campbell,
1993). This distinction, however, obscures the rule-oriented approach of major
constructivists (Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf, 1989) who follow Wittgenstein and
study the pragmatic meaning of language-in-use, thus combining a post-
positivist epistemology with interpretive, but not relativist, empirical methods.
Rule-oriented constructivists argue that communicatively rational agents
perform speech acts that invoke the social rules that constitute the dominant
structure of world politics (Fierke and Jorgenson, 2001). As Onuf (1998)
argues, coherent sets of social rules are ‘social arrangements’ that both guide
action (they regulate or cause world politics) and make action possible (they
constitute world politics).
We combine a rule-oriented with a conventional constructivist approach in
this paper. Consistent with rule-oriented constructivism, we assert the
constitutive nature of social rules in world politics and analyze the pragmatic
aspect of speech acts. That is, we are dealing with the interpretations, or the
language-in-use, of political agents. Consistent with conventional constructi-
vism, however, we aggregate those interpretations and report them with
standard quantitative methods. Fierke (2002) argues that social science can
presume either that language is a picture that mirrors the logic of the world or
that language is analogous to making moves in a game. In this paper, we both
interpret individual speech acts as moves in a game — they help constitute the
rules of world politics — and provide a conventional analysis by presenting a
statistical ‘picture’ of world politics in which the United States and other global
leaders have differing interpretations of world politics since September 11.
Rule-oriented constructivists assert the existence of rules, or ‘social
arrangements’, that constitute world politics. No one social arrangement has
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dominated world politics since the end of the cold war. Instead, there are
multiple and conflicting social arrangements for agents to invoke to justify
their acts. We interpret the post-cold war world as a transitional period
between the (slowly outgoing) Westphalia system and a (slowly emerging)
global society governed by global institutions. This is not a necessary trend —
indeed, the US response to September 11 and the global interpretation of the
war on terrorism may reverse the trend.
Table 1 presents ideal-typical sets of rules that constitute four global security
social arrangements. The Westphalia rules can be divided into two coherent
social arrangements: Lockean rules of sovereign states existing in a ‘rivalry’
social arrangement and Hobbesian rules that apply when sovereign states are
in a ‘war’ social arrangement. Each social arrangement includes six rules
capturing an important aspect of world politics: identity, sovereignty, security,
deterrence, enforcement, and the use of force. In rivalries agents identify each
other as rivals (rule 1). They attempt to increase their security through joining
alliances (rule 3) and performing classic deterrence threats (rules 4 and 5).
Agents do recognize others’ right to sovereignty (rule 2), but the rivalry
constituting the system sometimes leads to violence to settle disputes (rule 6).
War is thus an accepted but limited practice to end an attempt by any state to
dominate world politics.
In war, agents identify each other as enemies, perhaps even an enemy that
threatens their existence (rule 1). Agents do not recognize the sovereign right of
territorial integrity or perhaps even the right of others to exist (rule 2). Survival
demands a military capability greater than one’s immediate enemies (rule 3)
because the military capabilities of others are interpreted as a threat to one’s
existence. The directive rule in war is to surrender (rule 4), supported by the
commitment to attack until the other does surrender (rule 5). Because others
are enemies with the military capability to threaten one’s existence, the use of
force is considered inevitable, necessary, and appropriate (rule 6).
The global society rules in Table 1 are also divided into two coherent social
arrangements: a Wilsonian collective security system and a Kantian security
community. In collective security arrangements, agents identify each other as
citizens (rule 1) who are obliged to uphold agreed-upon rules of behavior (rule
2) and act collectively to punish those who do not uphold those rules (rule 3).
In a collective security arrangement, there is no presumption that actors will
universally agree to the directive-rules (rule 4); an enforcement mechanism that
includes military force is thus needed to punish any transgressors of the rules
(rule 5). A collective security arrangement could be weak if the only agreed
upon community rule is state sovereignty, or it could be strong if actors agree
to collectively punish those who violate rules regarding weapons proliferation,
terrorism, human rights, etc. Enforcement distinguishes collective security
social arrangements from security communities: in the former, the use of force
International Politics 2005 42
 Table 1 Global security social arrangements

Westphalia rules Global society rules

War Rivalry Collective security Security community

Rule 1 — Identity We are enemies We are rivals We are fellow citizens We are friends

Rule 2 — Autonomy We do not recognize the We recognize the Autonomy is limited by Autonomy is limited by
autonomy of others autonomy of others obligations to follow and obligations to follow the
enforce the community’s rules community’s rules

Rule 3 — Security Survival is based Security is based on Security is based on a Security is based on political
on relative (alliance) relative (alliance) multilateral commitment to relationships
military capability military capability use military capability

Rule 4 — Deterrence You must surrender Do not attack me Do not break the rules of our Do not break the rules of our
community community

Rule 5 — Enforcement We will attack until you We will retaliate if you We will retaliate if you break We will resolve conflicts

Interpreting September 11
surrender violate our sovereignty the rules of our community peacefully

Brian Frederking et al.

International Politics 2005 42

Rule 6 — Use of force The use of force is The use of force is The use of force is sometimes The use of force is not
always necessary to sometimes necessary necessary acceptable
resolve conflicts

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is considered to be sometimes necessary and acceptable to enforce community

rules (rule 6).
In security communities agents identify each other as friends committed to
peaceful resolution of conflict (rule 1). Agents in security communities have a
strong consensus about the obligation to follow the rules of their community
(rule 2), and they engage in peaceful, multilateral decision-making to ensure
security through political relationships (rule 3). The directive rule to follow the
rules of community does exist in security communities (rule 4), but
enforcement does not include the possibility of force (rules 5 and 6). Given
the lower level of threat in these social arrangements, security often refers to
‘human security’ rather than state security. The military protection of
individual borders is often less important than systemic threats like
environmental degradation and economic collapse (Deutsch, 1957).
Note that the first three rules — assertion rules regarding the nature of
identity, sovereignty, and security in the world — are distinct across all four
social arrangements. These rules constitute the core differences between the
social arrangements. Agents can attempt to define their situation by conveying
the validity of these three rules. In war, agents are enemies who do not
recognize rights to sovereignty and must survive by acquiring greater relative
military capability. In security dilemmas agents are rivals who recognize rights
to sovereignty and ensure security by acquiring, unilaterally or through
alliances, greater relative military capability. In collective security arrange-
ments agents are citizens whose sovereignty is limited by obligations to follow
community rules and to use multilateral military force to ensure compliance
with those rules. In security communities agents are friends whose sovereignty
is limited by obligations to peacefully follow the rules of the community.
However, rules 4 and 6 — regarding deterrence, enforcement, and the use of
force — overlap across social arrangements, which can either lead to confusion
or conflict between agents over the applicable social arrangement. For
example, directive rule 4 is identical in collective security arrangements and
security communities (‘Do not break the rules of our community’).
Commitment rule 5 is similar — though not identical — in collective security
arrangements and security dilemmas. In security dilemmas the only agreed-
upon rule of the community is state sovereignty, and alliance mechanisms
enforce that rule. Collective security arrangements represent an alternative
mechanism to enforce agreed-upon rules that often extend beyond state
sovereignty to include human rights, etc. Also, assertion rule 6 justifies the use
of force in war, collective security arrangements and security dilemmas.
Globalization is driving the transition from Westphalia rules to global
society rules. The US in some ways perpetuates this transition, but in other
ways prefers the Westphalia rules. The conservative backlash against
globalization also prefers the Westphalia rules, while the liberal backlash
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against globalization prefers that those rules be more democratic, humane,

just, and sensitive to the environment. The three most important forces in
today’s world politics are invoking different combinations of these ideal-typical
social arrangements. And it is precisely these multiple and conflicting social
arrangements, we argue, that drive the current competing interpretations of
September 11. Interpreting September 11 as an act of war invokes the
Westphalia rules of world politics, and more specifically the Hobbesian rules of
war. We are not in a ‘normal’ Lockean social arrangement but instead in a
state of war. The appropriate response to an act of war is to declare a ‘war on
terrorism’ and, if necessary, act unilaterally to protect national interests.
Interpreting September 11 as a crime against humanity invokes the global
society rules of world politics, and more specifically the Wilsonian collective
security rules of world politics. We are not in a security community given the
initial and ensuing uses of force. The appropriate response to a crime against
humanity in a collective security arrangement is the multilateral capture, trial,
and punishment of the criminals.
Many distinctions between war and crime are consistent with the differences
between the Westphalia and global society rules of world politics. For example,
war violates or challenges state sovereignty, a fundamental rule of the
Westphalia social arrangement. Crime violates the laws of a state; to interpret
September 11 as a crime presumes the existence of international law and some
form of a global society necessary to enforce that law. Similarly, war is engaged
by those outside a state’s jurisdiction, and crime is committed by those who fall
within a state’s jurisdiction. International law recognizes the jurisdiction of US
courts to try those responsible for the events of September 11 as crimes under
the US criminal law and as a crime against humanity under international law.
Also, fighting a war requires military capability and thus is consistent with the
Westphalia rule that security is based on military capability; to interpret
September 11 as an act of war is consistent with the ‘old’ notion of national
security (MccGwire, 2002). Fighting crime requires multilateral cooperation
regarding intelligence, extradition, etc., consistent with the ‘new’ notion of
security based on political cooperation.
Terrorism, like other acts such as treason, rebellion, and, of course, war
crimes, is not easily demarcated as either war or crime. The blurred nature of
September 11 as a war/crime has led to some unsettling adjustments within the
US political system. The use of military tribunals, for example, includes
elements of both the war and crime interpretations. The Executive Order
establishing the military tribunals cite war as a justification for their creation,
but then proceeds to establish the criminal rules of procedure to legitimize a
judicial form of punishment (Feldman, 2002). Similarly, September 11 as a
war/crime blurs traditional institutional differences. No longer does the Justice
Department fight crime within the US and the military fight war outside the
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US. Amending the Posse Comitus Act enables the military to ‘wage war’
domestically by ‘apprehending’ suspects.
The distinction between war and crime also has functional implications for
how to carry out the ‘war on terrorism’. War requires the use of military force
in which the pursuit of the enemy most often results in death and sometimes
results in capture. Crime, however, requires the pursuit of the accused in such a
way that most often leads to capture and only sometimes results in death. Once
captured, however, the war/crime distinction has the opposite implication:
prisoners of war cannot be interrogated or punished, while criminals endure
both. The US war on terrorism illustrates this tension: while the US is
rhetorically at war and using military personnel for the purposes of capture,
the US is reluctant to designate anyone as a ‘prisoner of war’ to enable
interrogation, trial, and punishment. While the US has no intention of
exchanging prisoners after the war is over, indefinite detainment would violate
the Geneva Convention. Wars eventually end, while fighting crime never ends.
One simple part of September 11 does not easily fit into the war
interpretation: states make war and individuals commit crimes. This distinction
suggests that September 11 was a crime; to interpret it as war changes the legal
definition of who can engage in war. However, the overwhelming consensus
within the US is that the US is at war, and scholars are suggesting that
international law may have to change its definition of war to reflect this
interpretation (Greenwood, 2002).
It is thus plausible to interpret September 11 as either an act of war or a
crime. The actual events do not by definition or legal convention fall into either
category. It may be fruitless to debate the merits of this interpretive dispute. It
is both war and a crime, and in some ways it is neither. It is a war/crime. A
more fruitful debate, we suggest, would begin with the recognition that
emphasizing either the war or crime aspects of September 11 invoke very
different social rules currently competing to govern world politics. The debate
is ultimately whether we prefer a Westphalia or a global society system.

US and Global Interpretations of September 11

In this section, we analyze the extent to which elite interpretations of
September 11 invoke rules associated with a war social arrangement and/or
rules associated with a collective security social arrangement. We analyzed 302
speech acts by global political elites in the 18 months after September 11. We
generated 210 US speech acts and 92 speech acts from global leaders from the
New York Times as well as the White House, State Department and Defense
Department web sites. We engaged in a pragmatic analysis of the speech; that
is, each co-author independently interpreted the speech acts to be consistent
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with either war or collective security rules. We used a three-point scale: a

speech act was ‘war’ (one on a three-point scale) if all interpreted it to be
consistent with Westphalia rules; a speech act was ‘crime’ (three on a three-
point scale) if all interpreted it to be consistent with collective security rules;
and a speech act was ‘war/crime’ (two on a three-point scale) if the authors’
interpretations conflicted or if the authors interpreted elements of both war
and crime in the speech act.
Table 2 includes examples of common indicators we used to help us interpret
the speech acts. Pragmatic analysis assumes that the analyst has the same
communicative rationality posited to all agents in rule-oriented constructivist
ontology (Habermas, 1987). Communicatively rational agents perform speech
acts that convey implicit validity claims (truth, appropriateness, and sincerity)
and invoke intersubjective social rules (which also convey truth, appropriate-
ness, and sincerity claims). Communicatively rational agents also interpret
others’ speech acts and evaluate both the conveyed validity claims and the
invoked social rules. A speech act is valid within the context of mutually
recognized social rules. We interpreted the statements by asking: is this
statement valid within the context of Hobbesian war rules or within the context
of Wilsonian collective security rules?
The pragmatic analysis employed here is not the more familiar content
analysis where statements are coded into certain categories given the existence
of theoretically pre-determined words or phrases. We did not analyze the
statements by checking off how many times they included the indicators listed
in Table 3. Pragmatic analysis thus is not consistent with the ‘picture’ view of
language that language is meaningful to the extent that it accurately represents
the real world (Duffy et al., 1998). Its intent is to be consistent with
Wittgenstein’s (1968) argument that the meaning of language is connected to
context, or its use in speech, not whether it corresponds exactly to things in the
real world. Meaning resides in the everyday use of language as a ‘form of life’.
Intersubjectively held background knowledge is thus necessary to interpret
language, not merely observation of reality. Language not only represents the
world; it actively constitutes the world. Wittgenstein argues that learning a
language is like learning the rules of a game; they help you ‘go on’ by acting in
ways that make sense given the rules of the game. For example, the rules of
chess enable one to participate in or to interpret a chess game. This also applies
to the rules of world politics. Hollis and Smith (1991, 179) put Wittgenstein’s
position this way: ‘All social activities must have some constitutive rules
because actions have a meaning which behavior lacks. Social action can occur
only when there is a rule followed, thus identifying what is going on’ (our
emphasis).
Consider the following speech act by President Bush to a joint session of
Congress:
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Table 2 ‘War’ and ‘Crime’ indicators

(1) Identity rule
War: We are enemies
Bin Laden/al Qaeda/terrorists are ‘enemies’
The United States is at war
Those captured in Afghanistan are ‘prisoners of war’
Others are either ‘allies’ in our war or they are ‘enemies’ of the US

Collective security: we are citizens

Bin Laden/al Qaeda/terrorists are ‘criminals’
The United States is apprehending criminals
Those captured in Afghanistan are ‘detainees’
Others are cooperating in our effort to bring the criminals to justice

(2) Sovereignty rule

War: We do not recognize each other’s sovereign right to territorial integrity
Terrorists are ‘invading’ our country
The US will punish any state that ‘harbors’ terrorists

Collective security: Sovereignty is limited by obligations to follow/enforce the community’s rules

Other states are obligated to stop terrorism

(3) Security rule

War: Survival is based on relative military capability
The US will militarily defeat bin Laden/al Qaeda/terrorists
Increased military capability (borders, airports, etc.) will increase security

Collective security: Security is based on a relative military capability

Security requires multilateral efforts (intelligence, finances, etc.)

(4) Deterrence rule

War: Do not attack me
The United States will defend itself against terrorist attacks
The United States will defend its national interests

Collective security: Do not break the community’s rules

We will apprehend individuals in terrorist groups
We will uphold international law

(5) Enforcement rule

War: I will retaliate if you attack me
The United States will retaliate against terrorist groups

Collective security: We will retaliate if you break the rules of the community
We will prosecute all terrorist acts

(6) Use of force rule

War: The use of force is always necessary and acceptable to resolve conflicts
The use of force is the only way to defeat terrorism

Collective security: The use of force is sometimes necessary and acceptable to resolve conflicts
The use of force alone will not decrease terrorism

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Table 3 Aggregate results of the pragmatic analysis

US Global

(a) Overall results

War 28% 4%
Combination 48% 48%
Crime 24% 48%
Mean (1=war, 3=crime) 1.96 2.45
t-test: t= 5.498, P=0.000

(b) All speech acts About 9/11

War 24% 6%
Combination 50% 48%
Crime 26% 49%
Mean (1=war, 3=crime) 2.01 2.43
t-test: t= 3.272, P=0.001

(c) All speech acts about Iraq

War 52% 2%
Combination 37% 29%
Crime 11% 49%
Mean (1=war, 3=crime) 1.59 2.47
t-test: t= 5.924, P=0.000

(d) First 6 months

War 23% 5%
Combination 47% 52%
Crime 30% 43%
Mean (1=war, 3=crime) 2.07 2.38
t-test: t= 2.405, P=0.017

(e) Last 6 months

War 38% 3%
Combination 51% 43%
Crime 11% 54%
Mean (1=war, 3=crime) 1.73 2.51
t-test: t= 6.283, P=0.000

On September the 11th, the enemies of freedom committed an act of war

against our country. Americans have known wars — but for the past 136
years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.
Americans have known casualties of war — but not at the center of a great
city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks — but
never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us on a
single day — and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom
itself was under attack. (Bush, 2001a)
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Content analysis might code this statement as ‘war’ because it includes

phrases like ‘act of war’ and ‘under attack’. With this method, all we need to do
is observe reality (in this case, analyze the semantic content of words) because
these words reflect the real world (or at least, the real beliefs of George W.
Bush). Using pragmatic analysis, we interpret this speech act to invoke the war
social arrangement. It is more coherent within a context of mutually recognized
war rules (‘We are enemies,’ ‘I will retaliate if you attack me,’ ‘The use of force
is always necessary and acceptable to resolve conflicts,’ etc.) than within a
collective security social arrangement. The speech act simultaneously
constitutes the social world as governed by the rules of war and regulates
future acts to be consistent with the rules of war. Language is action.
Consider this contrasting speech act by Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov:
International terrorism has caused a blatant challenge to all civilized
humanity, to the civilized world. This reaffirms once again the urgent
necessity to join efforts of the entire international community in the fight
against new challenges and threats, including in the first place the threat of
international terrorism. Russia and the United States have agreed to closely
coordinate their actions in these areas. (US State Department, 2001)
We interpret this speech act to invoke collective security rules rather than
war rules. It is more coherent within a context of mutually recognized collective
security rules (‘We are fellow citizens,’ ‘Do not break the rules of our
community,’ ‘The use of force is sometimes necessary and acceptable to resolve
conflicts,’ etc.). This speech act simultaneously constitutes the social world as
governed by collective security rules and regulates future acts to be consistent
with collective security rules. Given this interpretation, US action invokes the
rules of war and Russian action invokes the rules of collective security.
We are asserting that world politics is constituted by four overlapping social
arrangements: war, rivalry, collective security, and security communities. In
some fundamental sense they exist ‘out there’ as potential rules to govern our
arrangements. All four are thus mutually recognizable by communicatively
rational agents. When US speech acts invoke war rules, others are able to
correctly interpret the validity claims of those speech acts and recognize that
the act invokes the rules of war. All communicatively rational agents are
capable of pragmatic analysis, and pragmatic analysis is only possible given
common background knowledge. Our own interpretive abilities presuppose the
existence of these social rules.
While all communicatively rational agents can correctly recognize these four
social arrangements, not all communicatively rational agents find them
mutually valid. Agents tend to interpret one set of rules as more valid (true,
appropriate and sincere) than the other three, and on this basis reject and/or
accept the validity claims of others’ speech acts. The struggle over which rules
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will govern our interaction is the stuff of politics. In the case of the two speech
acts above, the US interpretation of September 11 as an act of war and the
Russian interpretation of September 11 as a crime is more than a semantic
dispute over how to correctly interpret the real world. Instead, it is a pragmatic
dispute between agents advocating different social arrangements to govern
post-September 11 world politics.
The purpose of our paper is to gather evidence about the extent of this
pragmatic dispute between the US and the rest of the world. Given this
purpose we use simple quantitative methods to present the aggregate results of
our pragmatic analysis. We do not claim that this evidence in some
fundamental way reflects the social structure posited by constructivists as the
real world. Social arrangements are not reducible to aggregate characteriza-
tions of individual interpretations. Instead, this statistical evidence supports
our claim that an interpretive dispute exists between US and global leaders at
the level of intersubjective social structure.
Table 3 presents the aggregate results of our pragmatic analysis. The results
do support our claim that US and global leaders are interpreting world politics
differently since September 11. As shown in Table 3a, 28% of US speech acts
invoked the rules of war, while only 4% of global speech acts invoked war
rules. This is a statistically significant difference, suggesting an important
interpretive dispute between US and global interpretations of September 11.
These significant differences remain within subsets of the sample as well. For
example, US and global speech acts specifically about September 11 (but not
Iraq) are also significantly different. As shown in Table 3b, 24% of US speech
acts about September 11 and the ensuing campaign in Afghanistan were ‘war’
speech acts while only 6% of global speech acts were ‘war’ speech acts. Also,
the debate over Iraq between the US and global leaders are even more
disputed. As show in Table 3c, 52% of US speech acts about Iraq were ‘war’
speech acts, while only 2% of global speech acts were ‘war’ speech acts. Finally,
these significant differences in US and global interpretations of world politics
after September 11 are growing over time. US and global speech acts are
significantly different to a much greater degree during the last 6 months of the
sample than during the first 6 months (Table 3d and e).
This interpretive dispute includes all six rules associated with the war and
collective security social arrangements. US leaders are much more likely to
invoke war rules. For example, the US claimed the inherent right of self-
defense guaranteed in Article 51 of the UN Charter against an ‘armed attack’
against its territory. NATO also invoked the right of collective self-defense
after the ‘armed attack’ (Greenwood, 2002 309). A US letter to the Security
Council on October 7, 2001 stated that ‘self-defense’ might also require further
military actions against other organizations and states (UN document S/2001/
946). Consider the following speech acts from the analysis:
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George Bush: No threat will prevent freedom-loving people from defending

freedom. And make no mistake about it: this is good versus evil. These are
evildoers. They have no justification for their actions. There’s no religious
justification, there’s no political justification. The only motivation is evil.
(Bush, 2001b)
Colin Powell: It is an act of war. When you attack our homeland, when you
attack two places such as the World Trade Center buildings and the
Pentagon, that is an act of war against our sovereignty, against the security
of our people. When you kill thousands of civilians, there is no other way to
characterize it. (Powell, 2001)
George Bush: And I give you these commitments. The wound to (the
Pentagon) will not be forgotten, but it will be repaired. Brick by brick, we
will quickly rebuild the Pentagon. In the missions ahead for the military,
you will have everything you need, every resource, every weapon, every
means to assure full victory for the United States and the cause of freedom.
(Bush, 2001c)
George Bush: We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to
terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any
nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the
United States as a hostile regime. (Bush, 2001a)
These speech acts invoke all six rules we posit as fundamental to the war
social arrangement. Regarding the identity rule, they characterize the US as an
attacked nation-state with enemies that must be defeated. Note how Bush
(2001b) assertions about ‘evildoers’ provide an overwhelming enemy as the
‘other’. Regarding sovereignty, Powell (2001) characterize September 11 as an
attacked against US sovereignty, while Bush (2001a) does not recognize the
territorial integrity of states that harbor terrorists. Only the social arrangement
of war justifies a unilateral violation of others’ rights to territorial integrity.
Regarding security, Bush (2001c) claims the need for an adequate military
capability to win the war on terrorism. Regarding deterrence, enforcement, and
the use of force, all of the above speech acts are consistent with the use of
military force to retaliate for the attacks of September 11.
Global leaders were more likely to invoke collective security rules and
criticize a unilateral US war on terrorism. Consider the following:
German Chancellor Schroeder: Germany will not make itself available for an
adventure in Iraq. It would not be understood as an act of defense and could
destroy the international coalition against terror. (Erlanger, 2002a)
Iranian President Khatami: The events of September 11 were horrific, but the
American leaders misused them, too. (Al Qaeda) did it because they wanted
to create an atmosphere of violence and war in the world, but we know with
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certainty that in today’s world all our fates are linked. Those who plan to
launch this war shouldn’t think that the effects will be felt only where they
attack. To believe that you can make people submit by force is wrong. We
know that this approach only brings anger and destruction. (Burns, 2002)
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov: Any actions taken by the states and
international organizations against terrorists, including the use of force, should
be based on norms and principles of international lawy . No small number of
people suspect that by labeling Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an ‘axis of evil’
the United States seeks to prepare public opinion for possible strikes against
those countries under the banner of antiterrorism. (Erlanger, 2002b)
Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal: We’ve seen in the past what American attacks
have done in Iraqy.in our view the result of those attacks was merely to
bolster Saddam’s position in Iraq and make the people more supportive of
him. Not only that, it also gained him support in the Arab world, not
because he is Saddam Hussein and people admire him, but because they saw
the attacks as being aggression against Iraq. (Jehl, 2001)
These speech acts tend to criticize the US for invoking war rules rather than
collective security rules. Regarding the identity rule, they do not convey an ‘enemy’
identity but rather suggest the existence of an international society in which
nation-states are fellow citizens with obligations to collectively reign in terrorists.
Ivanov insists on following the appropriate decision-making process if force is to
be used; Faisal and Khatami argue that force is not necessary and most likely
counterproductive. None convey claims consistent with US claims that a state of
war exists. All are consistent with the crime interpretation of September 11.

Conclusions
The evidence from the pragmatic analysis of 302 speech acts presented in this paper
suggests that US and global leaders have a significantly different interpretation of
the war on terrorism. The events of September 11 seem to have exacerbated the
ongoing pragmatic dispute between the US and others around the world about
whether Westphalia or global society rules are more appropriate to govern post-
cold war world politics. The US was more likely to interpret both September 11
and Iraq in a way consistent with war rules, while global leaders were more likely
to interpret September 11 and Iraq in a way consistent with collective security rules.
The US was also more likely to interpret Iraq as ‘war’ more than other speech acts,
while there was no difference in how global leaders interpreted September 11 and
Iraq speech acts. Our sample of speech acts ends prior to the US invasion of Iraq.
However, the overwhelming negative global reaction to the US use of military
force in Iraq is clearly consistent with these results. If anything, the US invasion of
Iraq has led to an even larger interpretive gulf.
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This analysis thus suggests that the international coalition in the ‘war on
terrorism’ is inherently fragile. Habermas’ (1987) theory of communicative
action argues that agents can only coordinate action when they agree to the
validity claims mutually conveyed by their speech acts. If the international
community cannot agree to claims about the nature of the international
system, it is unlikely that they will be able to agree to specific policies
associated with the war on terrorism. US arguments about the need for pre-
emptive policies presuppose the existence and appropriateness of a war social
arrangement; global critics of US policy presuppose the existence and
appropriateness of a collective security social arrangement. These disputes
over the war on terrorism are embedded within a social structure that also
inform other disputes (the International Criminal Court, Kyoto, arms control,
etc.); the post-cold war world is dominated by the competing social
arrangements of a Westphalian world system and global governance.
This analysis also suggests two broad trajectories for future global security
rules. One possibility is that a ‘crime’ interpretation of September 11 will
prevail, collective security rules will ultimately govern world politics, and the
international community will continue the ‘war’ on terrorism through
cooperative multilateral action. The other possibility is that the United States
use of force in Iraq, together with other likely uses of force in its ‘war’ on
terrorism, will break down the post-cold war construction of collective security
rules and institutionalize some form of a war social arrangement. The
international community clearly prefers collective security rules over a
unilateral United States war on terrorism. The United States must consider
this underlying context in which it is fighting its war on terrorism; the US must
consider how others will interpret its use of force. Constantly declaring a ‘war’
on terrorism and using force in Iraq without Security Council authorization, at
least on the surface, does weaken collective security rules and invoke a war
social arrangement. Such actions may eventually convince others that global
security is indeed constituted by rules of war. Such a world would only
discourage many from cooperating with the United States in other areas of the
war on terrorism. The United States must seriously consider whether it is more
likely to be successful in its war on terrorism by embracing or ignoring
collective security norms and institutions.

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