Social and Economic Studies 61: 2 (2012): 51-72 ISSN: 0037-7651

The Informal Justice System in Garrison Constituencies

Christopher A.D. Charles and Orvllle Beckford

ABSTRACT

The informal justice system of "garrison constituencies" in inner-city

areas of Jamaica undermines the rule of law in the country.
This alternative justice system has not received much scholarly
attention. In this study, which attempts to fill the void of primary data on
"garrison law and order", participant observation, individual interviews
and focus groups revealed that the dons tried the "cases" reported and
"shooters" were used to mete out punishment in the informal justice
system. Police informers, renegade shooters and borrowers who refuse to
repay the dons were executed. Switching party allegiance led to expulsion
from the community. Since the demise of the West Kingston dons by law
enforcement, some residents have formally reported crimes. The state must
use this opportunity to support these residents, reassert its authority in the
other eleven garrison constituencies and outperform the dons with effective
public policies, thereby making them redundant.

INSIDE THE GARRISONS

Violent garrison constituencies in Jamaica have been deemed
counter societies (Charles 2002) that are a threat to democracy
(Daily Observer 2002) and a safe haven for criminals (Charles 2004;
Figueroa and Si ves 2003). As such, these electoral constituencies
have been blamed for the escalation in homicides (Harriott 2004),
and urban decay and incivility in lower St. Andrew and Kingston
(Johnson 2005; Johnson and Soeters 2008). The informal security
and welfare services provided by the dons who govern the
garrisons on behalf of the People's National Party (PNP) and the
Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) have been well documented. See, for
example, Charles (2004); Gray (2001); Price (2004); Sives (2002); and
Stone (1980). However, very little research has been done on the
informal justice systems which govern these constituencies and
undermine the rule of law. This article deals specifically with the
operation of the informal justice system in garrison constituencies.
An informal justice system is defined as an organised system of
52 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIO STUDIES

justice operating outside of the rule of law in a state that replicates

the activities of the legal system. This informal system does not
include extrajudicial killings by the police, or mediation, restitution
and restorative justice and so on offered by the state or legal private
authorities that complement the authority of the state (Charles 2002;
Johnson and Soeters 2008; Mason 2005; Strange 1988).
The article commences with an outline of the counter-society
framework and a discussion of the development of garrison consti-
tuencies within that framework, which explains the state functions
replicated by garrison constituencies, particularly the informal jus-
tice system. The informal justice systems in several other countries
are also discussed. This is followed by an outline of the method of
data collection used. Next is a discussion of the findings where we
use the counter-society framework to explain the informal justice
system and its perceived "benefits", as well as the problems asso-
ciated with the system. Finally, we suggest that the government
should make use of existing opportunities to dismantle the informal
justice system in garrison constituencies.

Counter societies
Human agencies, the forces of nature and the conflict between
competing authorities in a society all threaten human security. The
counter-society concept focuses on the conflict between competing
authorities because of a disagreement over the boundaries of their
authority. The conflict between competing authorities occurs
between the government and lesser authorities like trade unions,
gangs, religious groups, terrorist groups and so on. Conflict may
also arise between local and central governments. Peaceful
coexistence results when the formal and informal authorities agree
over the boundaries of their authority.
Counter societies are informal governance units, or lesser
authorities, in a society that competes with and challenges the
formal, higher authority of the state. Some examples of counter
societies are the favelas in Brazil, maroon communities, the drug
cartels in Colombia, garrison constituencies in Jamaica and the
Italian Mafia. The Kibbutzim and Maroon communities are unlike
the other counter societies because they do not participate in
criminal activities (Charles 2002; Johnson and Soeters 2008; Strange
1998).
 The Informai Justice System 53

Counter societies that are stable develop the capacity to

replicate some state functions within the domain of their authority
when there is a retreat of the state because society abhors a
governance vacuum. These counter societies develop their own
justice systems, make their own laws, employ sanctions and tax
their members. The informal governance units also create welfare
systems to take care of the poor; some even provide medical
services for the sick and care for the elderly.
Some counter societies develop transnational alliances with
other counter societies. The informal authorities do not necessarily
threaten national security or the economy, provided that there are
clear and agreed-on boundaries between the legitimate state
authority and the informal authority. This agreement leads to
peaceful coexistence.
Threats to security and violence occur when one authority
challenges the other and the challenge is accepted. The outcome of
the challenge is determined by the calculations made by the
challenger and the challenged about the cost of defending their
authority, and the possible gains or losses. The state can reassert its
authority and power over the lesser authority by reaffirming the
rule of law, reclaiming territory, reestablishing tax compliance and
other economic responsibilities and rights, and re-imposing
ideological values. The Jamaican state has failed to reassert its
authority in garrison constituencies that threaten national security
(Charles 2002; Johnson and Soeters 2008; Sti-ange 1998).

Garrison constituencies
The major political parties in Jamaica use pork barrel politics in
their mobilisation strategies. Grassroots supporters, who are often
uneducated, unemployed and unemployable, attach themselves to
the political parties to get first preference in the distribution of
scarce public resources. These supporters become dependent on
this political patronage for their daily survival because of their low
level of skills, little or no education, and the high level of unem-
ployment. Therefore, these grassroots supporters will kill anyone
who threatens the support base of their political party, because they
see it as a threat to their economic survival. General election
campaigns in the past led to violent clashes between rival party
supporters. There have been political murders during campaigns,
and there has been voter fraud and voter intimidation in some
 54 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

inner-city communities on Election Day. These poor communities

exist in urban garrison constituencies that are fiercely loyal to the
JLP and the PNP. The members of the criminal gangs who support
the PNP and the JLP do not allow political challenges and political
competition in these communities (Charles 2002,2004; Figueroa and
Sives 2002, 2003; Harriott 2000, 2004; Headley 1986; Stone 1980).
Garrison constituencies were created by politicians as part of
their mobilisation strategy, in which they distributed houses only to
their party supporters to develop a permanent power base. This
power base was then entrenched with the militarisation of these
communities by members of the informal party militias, who thwart
political competition and challenges with the use of guns and other
weapons. The gangs are rewarded for their service, and the
community for its support with the distribution of state patronage
(Charles 2002, 2004; Stone 1980). The first garrison community was
created in the 1960s when the JLP govemment bulldozed the houses
in the PNP-supported Back 'O Wall shanty settlement in Westem
Kingston. The modem houses in the new community of Tivoli
Gardens were given only to JLP supporters, thereby establishing a
permanent power base for the JLP in the electoral constituency of
Westem Kingston (Gunst 2003).
There are now 12 garrison electoral constituencies (each com-
prising several garrison communities), most located in the Kingston
Metropolitan Area (KMA). The garrison constituencies are Westem
St. Andrew, East Central St. Andrew, South Eastem St. Andrew,
Eastern Kingston, Central St. Catherine, South Central St.
Catherine, Central Clarendon, West Central St. Andrew, Southern
St. Andrew, South Western St. Andrew, Central Kingston, and
Western Kingston. The PNP controls most of the turf in the majority
of garrison constituencies (Figueroa and Sives 2002, 2003). New
research needs to be done on the three new constituencies created
(East Central St. Catherine, South East St. Catherine, and Central St.
James) that became operational for the 29 December 2011 General
Election (Luton 2010). This research should determine if these
constituencies are garrison constituencies. There also needs to be
research on other constituencies outside of Kingston where
garrison-like features might have emerged in some communities.
In the past, more votes were cast than registered electors in the
garrisons. However, there have been electoral reforms since 1997 in
which there are election reruns in polling divisions that experienced
 The Informal Justice System 55

voter fraud and voter intimidation. Despite the reforms, homo-

genous voting still occurs and political competition is absent in the
garrisons because heavily armed, politically affiliated gangs still
control these constituencies on behalf of their political party.
President Jimmy Carter of the United Sates, acting as an election
observer in the 2002 General Election, lamented the threat of
garrison constituencies to democracy in Jamaica. The members of
the informal party militias who threaten Jamaica's democracy are
also members of the criminal gangs who contribute to the high
homicide rate. The homicide rate is now 61.4 per 100,000 (Charles
2010; Daily Observer 2002; Figueroa and Sives 2002, 2003; Gunst
2003; Harriott 2004). The dons who run the garrison constituencies
are gang leaders aligned to the PNP and the JLP, who receive state
largesse as the highest-ranking party activists since they can deliver
the votes for fhe party on Election Day. The shooters in some of
these communities visit members of the electorate at home and tell
them which political party to vote for, and/or coerce them to vote
(Charles 2004).
Garrison constituencies are counter societies because they are
informal governance units or lesser authorities in Jamaican society
that compete with and challenge the state or higher authority.
Society abhors a governance vacuum, so informal actors will repli-
cate state functions (welfare, security, justice, etc.) when these
functions are either not provided, or inadequately provided by the
state. Structural adjustment policies in the 1980s and globalisation
and economic liberalisation in the '90s have shrunk public
expenditure and social programmes for the urban poor in Jamaica.
Therefore, the dons who control the gangs in the inner city have
replaced the Jamaican state, in general, and politicians, in
particular, as the main patrons in these garrisons through massive
wealth gained from the international drug trade, extortion, and gun
running (Branche and Beckford 2012; Charles 2002, 2004; Price 2004;
Rapley 2003; Sives 2002). See Henry-Lee (2005) for a detailed
discussion of the poverty in garrison constituencies exploited by the
dons.
The dons provide welfare systems that take care of the
economic needs of some residents, but they keep the lion's share of
the shrinking state patronage (government contracts) and the pro-
ceeds from fheir criminal enterprises for fhemselves. Some
residents support the gangs because the gangs ensure their daily
56 SOCIAL AND ECONOMiC STUDiES

economic survival in these very poor communities. Therefore,

whenever the police go after the gangs, they sometimes encounter
women and children who act as human shields for the gunmen,
who in turn, attack the police. Policing in garrison constituencies is
extremely difficult and dangerous (Branche and Beckford 2012;
Charles 2002; Harriot 2001; Virtue 2005; Wint 2002).
The governance structure of these informal societies includes
their own laws, a security structure, and an informal justice system.
The members of the line staff in the security structure are the
shooters under the control of the dons. The firearms used by the
shooters are imported illegally with proceeds from the drug trade
and other illegal activities. The dons in garrison constituencies use
the security structure to commit crimes, to defend the party turf
against gangs in rival political communities (and breakaway
factions within the community), and to attack the police and the
army when there is a clash of authority (Branche and Beckford 2012;
Charles 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009; Harriott 2004; Sives 2002).
The informal justice system is supported by the security
structure. The dons have also replicated the power of the Jamaican
state to adjudicate in interpersonal disputes, such as disputes
involving loans, cases of domestic violence, violation of community
rules like stealing within the community, disobeying the don, rape,
and murder. Depending on the offence committed within the
constituency, the shooters mete out punishments on the orders of
the dons. Some of the punishments include: the offender making an
apology, making restitution, receiving a beating, and imprisonment
for a specified period. For serious offences, the offender is expelled
from the community, shot in the foot, or executed.
While there are some perceived "benefits" to some of the
residents because the "community justice is swift", unlike the
official justice system which takes years to try some cases, the
informal system violates the laws of the Jamaican state and is open
to serious abuse of human rights and exploitation. Moreover, the
dons and their close associates violate the community rules without
sanction because they make the rules (Charles 2002, 2004, 2007,
2009; Harriott 2001; Rapley 2003).
The majority of residents in these garrison constituencies are
law-abiding citizens. However, poor citizen-police relations
(because of police abuse and the resultant distrust of the police by
the lawful majority) and the perceived weakness of the witness
 The Informal Justice System 57

protection programme are two of the main obstacles preventing

cooperation between the lawful majority in garrison constituencies
and the police. The police lack adequate resources and training to
deal with the heavily armed gangs that control the inner-city
communities. Therefore, the dons, their shooters, and the residents
who benefit from the don's welfare system (via state largesse and
crime) exploit the situation to their advantage by acting in concert
against the police (Charles 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010). For
more on the garrison phenomenon in Jamaica, see the growing
body of work by Figueroa and Sives 2002, 2003; Gray 2001, 2003a,
2003b; Harriott 2000, 2001, 2004; Hope 2006; Johnson 2005; Johnson
and Soeters 2008; Levy 1996; Price 2004; Rapley 2003; Robotham
2003; Ryan 1999; Sives 2002; Wint 2002).
The informal justice system in garrison constituencies is not
unique to Jamaica. In Colombia and Guatemala there is distrust of
the state security forces in some poor urban communities controlled
by gangs, drug cartels or paramilitaries. The "social cleansing" of
criminals is the norm because the police often do not respond to
crimes committed, such as rape and murder. As a result, perverse
organisations fill the law enforcement void in poor communities
(Mcllwaine and Moser 2001).
There are multiplicities of authorities in Columbia, some of
which have created identities and loyalties inimical to the interests
of the state. Citizens have been able to circumvent the legal system.
The Embreras have challenged the state's monopoly on legal rights
by attempting to force the government to put indigenous rights
over the sovereign prerogatives of the state. "Peace communities"
have also been exempt from complying with the police, the formal
justice system and national security because of a de facto acceptance
by the state (Mason 2005).
Drug traffickers in the Brazilian favelas exploit the state's
failure to provide public security. The drug gangs control these
communities through a patron-client relationship with residents
and the provision of security in return for the residents' silence
about the gangs' criminal activities (Penglase 2009). The breakdown
in the rule of law in Albania during the transition to a free market
economy influenced villagers to use the Kanun, a traditional ethical
and moral code to deal with crimes and blood feuds (Lawson and
Salthmarshe 2000).
58 SOCiAL AND ECONOMiC STUDiES

The purpose of this article is to understand the informal justice

system in Jamaica. The research question is: what are the reasons for
the operation of the informal justice system in garrison con-
stituencies and how does the system operate?

METHODOLOGY
Sample
A convenience sample of 60 persons was selected in Western
Kingston, Central Kingston, Southwest St. Andrew, West Central St.
Andrew and Eastern St. Andrew. These constituencies were
selected because one of the researchers lived in two of these
constituencies and engaged in a lot of social activities in the others.

Procedure
The researchers made contact with influential persons in five
electoral constituencies and explained the research to them. These
influential persons explained the research to residents in the
communities and asked the residents if they wanted to participate.
Residents who wanted to participate in the research were put in
touch with the researchers. The residents were irtformed of their
rights as participants and 10 personal interviews and five focus
group interviews were conducted. The participants in the personal
interviews were asked to talk about their personal experiences of
the informal justice system in terms of the reasons for the informal
system and how it operated. The focus group participants were
asked to explain the reasons for the informal justice system in their
community and also explain how the system operated. Participant
observations were also done in three of the five constituencies by a
researcher who lived in two of these constituencies and regularly
visited the other constituency. Secondary data on the disposal of
criminal cases in the formal justice system was also collected from
the Ministry of Justice.
The observations and experiences of the informal justice
system were recorded. The interviews were transcribed. The
transcripts and the participant observation notes were read
repeatedly to identify the reasons for the informal justice system
and how it operated. The counter-society framework was used to
organise the data in relation to the research question. The dates of
the interviews and the participant observations and the com-
 The Informai Justice System 59

munities in which they were done were not reported to ensure the
safety of the research participants and the researchers.

Results and discussion

The informal justice system
Table 1 shows several "cases" that were "disposed" of in the infor-
mal justice system in various garrison constituencies. Differences
among constituencies in the operation of the informal justice system
are not discussed since that is beyond the scope of this paper. The
discussion entails the electoral constituencies where the offence
occurred, the nature of the offence, the perpetrator and the victim,
and the punishment the perpetrator received.

Western Kingston
Some young men were playing football and the ball went over a
yard and dirtied recently washed clothing that a pregnant young
lady had hung on the clothesline to dry. The angry young woman
cursed the young man who came into the yard to retrieve the ball.
The young man felt disrespected and kicked the pregnant young
woman, who subsequently reported the incident to the don. The
don investigated the matter, and on completion of his investigation,
he gave the order for the young man to be shot in the leg. The young
man had breached the informal community rule against inter-
personal violence and was summarily punished.
Two young women—one obese, the other slim—had an
altercation. The obese woman physically attacked the other. The
slim woman pushed the obese woman to the ground and sat on her,
pummelling her with her fists. The fight was reported to the don by
the obese woman. The don spoke to both women and residents who
witnessed the fight. On hearing that the obese woman was the
aggressor and that the slim one got the better of her, the don
jokingly said, "Slim girl, yuh rough and tough." The don then told
the young woman that she should behave herself and he did not
want to hear that she was involved in any more fights in the future.
Another don in Western Kingston made loans readily
available to residents in need of money. Under this arrangement,
the borrower would tell the don when he or she would repay the
loan. The borrower could ask for more time to repay the loan, but a
borrower who failed or refused to repay the loan would be beaten
60 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

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 The informai Justice System 61

by the shooters and then executed. The counterpart don from the
rival garrison community did not make loans but would mediate
when there was tension between the borrower and the lender to
ensure that the loan was repaid. This don would ask the borrower
when he or she could repay the loan, and the borrower would be
given the agreed amount of time to repay the loan. Both dons in
Western Kingston would warn men whose spouses accused them of
domestic violence to desist. Men who are repeat offenders would
receive a beating from the shooters on the dons' orders.
A small business owner was told by a shooter to turn over his
business place. The resident reported the shooter's request to the
don. The don told the resident that no one could take his property
away, and the shooter was told to leave the resident alone. The
shooter disobeyed the don and continued to intimidate the resident.
On hearing this, the don told the resident to use a machete and chop
off the shooter's hand when he returned to the property. The don
also said to the resident, "Tell di [the] police a Central Police Station
say a me . . . tell you to chop off him [h]an[d]." The shooter con-
tinued to threaten the resident and the don ordered the execution of
the renegade shooter. The shooters abducted their wayward
colleague who was beaten with pick axe sticks and iron bars, and
then shot and killed. His body was dumped in Downtown
Kingston.
Eyewitnesses or the victims went to the don—the informal
authority—because the perpetrator violated the community rules,
which, in many instances, are identical to the laws of the Jamaican
state, the formal authority. These residents ignored the state
authority in favour of the lesser authority, and the residents,
including the perpetrators, accepted the punishment meted out by
the informal justice system. Although some residents accept the
verdicts because they are afraid of the dons, the majority of the
residents accept them because they see it as swift justice; they may
be pressured to conform, and there is also the influence of group
solidarity and communal identity. This preference for the informal
justice system is a challenge to the authority of the Jamaican state,
which has not responded because the ensuring violence would
create societal instability. Similar situations obtain in other garrison
constituencies.
62 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Southwest St. Andrew

One rule in garrison constituencies that is often ignored by
outsiders who lament the informal justice system is that of loyalty
to the party that controls the garrison. A powerful female activist
monitors the activities of residents in her community. Mere
suspicion that a resident has switched allegiance to the rival party
is deemed a treacherous breach of loyalty to party hegemony. The
female activist, buttressed by the shooters, gives the suspected
resident and their family two weeks to leave the community. The
families in question usually leave the community because failure to
comply would lead to their execution.
At first glance, the existence of the political loyalty rules
suggest that garrison constituencies are not counter societies that
compete with and challenge the Jamaican state, but, instead, are
parts of an intricate political system. Deeper reading of fhe situation
reveals that although the garrisons started out as loyal political
communities, they have evolved into relatively autonomous
political communities that are more loyal to the service-providing
criminal dons than the cash-strapped Jamaican state, which has
reduced public expenditure and social programmes for the poor.
The garrison counter societies maintain a symbiotic relationship
with the state and political parties that serve the electoral interests
of politicians, the interests of the dons, their criminal empires, and
the residents who support them. This relationship gives social
power to the urban poor (Gray 2003a, 2003b).
A young man physically assaulted a teenage boy during a
football game because of an alleged rough tackle. The physical
assault ended the game. The don was watching the football game,
and knew the teenage boy and his older brother who was well liked
and respected in the community. The don collared the young man
(who assaulted the teenager) off the field and slapped him in the
face several times. The don pulled his knife to stab the young man,
but he managed to escape. In this situation the don witnessed the
incident and acted immediately, by punishing the young man for
disrespecting him, breaking the community rules against fighting,
perpetrating interpersonal violence, and committing physical
assault. This don was acting in his capacity as the informal or lesser
authority where the informal laws are sacrosanct and violators face
serious sanctions. Similar to the "cases" in Western Kingston, none
 The Informai Justice System 63

of the residents who witnessed the two incidents in Southwest St.

Andrew voiced their disagreements by reporting the incidents to
the police, because they had greater respect for the rule of the don.

Eastern St. Andrew

Extortion of businesses carried out by the shooters is one of the
main sources of the dons' income. However, residents in garrison
constituencies who are entrepreneurs more often than not do not
pay extortion. One shooter in Eastern St. Andrew violated this
community norm. He targeted a prominent and respected member
of the commtmity, a shopkeeper who assisted many people in the
community. He refused to pay protection money to the shooter,
who became angry and killed him. Based on eyewitness accounts,
at the behest of the don (who operated the informal justice system),
members of the dominant gang in the community went in search of
the renegade shooter. They found the shooter, killed him and burnt
the premises of one of his relatives.
Renegade shooters have to be dealt with not only swiftly, but
also severely. Lesser action would signal that the don was "soft"
and that his informal authority could be successfully challenged.
The shooters, as the line staff in the security structure of the
garrison, have to be closely monitored and controlled, because they
have the fire power to oust the don.

Central Kingston
An American researcher doing research in downtown Kingston
reversed his car over the bike of a youth who had left it lying in the
street directly behind the car. The researcher got out of the car. The
youth became irate when he saw that one of the bike's wheels was
damaged. The youth started to curse the researcher and demanded
payment for his bike. Residents in the community gathered at the
scene and supported the youth in his bid to get "compensation".
The commotion came to the attention of the don, who went to the
scene immediately. The commotion ended abruptly with his arrival.
He listened to the youth and the researcher's versions of the
incident, and then made his decision. The don told the youth that he
was wrong to leave his bike lying in the street behind the car.
However, he told the researcher that the youth was a sufferer and
did not have the money to fix his bike, so the researcher should
64 SOCIAL AND ECONOMiC STUDiES

contribute to buying a new wheel. The researcher gave the youth

some money and left the community.
Silence at the arrival of the don revealed his power within the
domain of his authority. One way to view the don's decision was
that he "split justice". The youth was at fault but incapable of fixing
his bike, and the motorist committed no wrong but had the financial
means to contribute to repairing the bike. A counterview is that the
don buttressed his informal authority by articulating part payment
on behalf of a community resident and potential shooter in the
security structure who did not deserve payment. Garrison residents
expect the don to protect them at all times. The motorist knew that
it was dangerous to disobey the don because any challenge to the
don's authority would be met with violence.

West Central St. Andrew

The police are seen as the archenemy by many residents of garrison
constituencies because of their role as crime-fighting agents of the
formal authority. The police uphold the rule of law that threatens
the informal laws and justice system, and sometimes they phy-
sically abuse residents and engage in extrajudicial killings of
residents. Therefore, swift execution is the punishment for residents
who provide information to the police. Sometimes mere suspicion
of being a police informer is sufficient reason for the don to order
the execution of the "informer". :
Such was the case of a pregnant woman and her mother who
were the occupants of a yard in which a handgun was found by the
police. The gun was hidden in the yard under an old abandoned car
by the shooters without the women's knowledge. Guns are central
to the community's security structure and the don's power, so they
should never fall in the hands of the police. The police took the
women into custody because the illegal firearm was found on their
premises. Upon their release from the police station, both mother
and daughter were executed, because it had been reported in the
media that they were interrogated at the police station.^ These
executions reinforced the rule that police informers, real or
imagined, will be killed.

1 Immediately after the incident, the husband of the pregnant woman who was
murdered telephoned the first author who went to the home and removed the
rest of the family to a safe house in the constituency.
 The Informal Justice System 65

The pros and cons of the informal justice system

According to some residents, the informal justice system provides
certain benefits. It is quick—unlike the formal system with its
backlog of cases—with matters resolved within a few hours or days
after the crime. Moreover, the victim(s), perpetrator(s), and execu-
tioner(s) live in politically homogenous communities where
everyone knows each other, so detailed information about crimes
committed in the community circulates quickly among residents.
Preference for the relative swiftness of the informal system is
supported by the backlog of criminal cases in the formal justice
system that takes years to resolve. The backlog in the formal justice
system makes the informal justice system very attractive to many
inner-city residents. Table 1 shows the backlog of cases in fhe
resident magistrate's courts in the Kingston Metropolitan Area
which increased every year from 2000 to 2010. Some 59,971 cases
were disposed of in 2010, leaving a backlog of 228,140 cases (see
Table 2). Some residents argue that the informal justice system gives
them "a sense of security"; and they have a "crime-free"
community, where community problems are resolved internally.
The residents who support the informal system ignore the fact
that crimes have to be committed for the informal justice system to
work, so the community is not actually "crime free". Numerous
crimes such as kidnapping, physical assault, wounding with intent
and murder are committed in order to enforce the informal justice
system. The informal laws created by the don do not apply to the
dons themselves and elite shooters who are very close to the don.
Many prey on adolescent girls in the community and coerce them
sexually. Many mothers send their daughters to live with relatives
and friends elsewhere for safety, once these girls reach puberty. The
situation is worse for adolescenf girls in garrisons fhat are not
politically homogenous, but socially heterogeneous or fractious,
with contending comers and pockets of power, for example, in
South St. Andrew. The absence of a central unifying informal
authority means there are competing and clashing informal norms
and rules, compared to the political and socially homogenous
garrisons, for example. Western Kingston. Intra-community
violence sometimes results from the informal justice system when
one pole of power tries to flex its muscles and impose its rules on a
66 SOCiAL AND ECONOMIC STUDiES

contending pocket of power, especially when the contending pole

supports the rival political party.
Another problem is that those residents who use the state
functions replicated by the garrison communities become more
loyal to the informal system at the expense of the security of the
Jamaican state. These residents are willing to violently challenge the
Jamaican state on behalf of the dons and the garrison communities
that "protect" them when there is a clash of authority. Moreover, the
shooters who make up the security structure commit crimes in
other communities and attack the police and the army when there
is a clash of authority. Such was the case in Tivoli Gardens, Western
Kingston, in 2010. The Jamaica Defence Force led the security forces
in an assault against a barricaded and heavily armed Tivoli Gardens
to serve a warrant for the arrest and extradition of the don,
Christopher "Dudus" Coke, to the United States to answer charges
of distributing illegal drugs and gun-running. In a military assault
lasting about two days, 73 civilians and a soldier were killed. More
than 100 illegal guns were recovered by the army.^
Overall, the formal justice system is undermined by the
informal justice system because there is a breakdown in law and
order, which is reinforced by some police officers who liaise with
the dons in their police division in order to reduce crime.

Reassertion of state authority

The government should seize the opportunities that present
themselves in garrison constituencies to dismantle the informal
justice system. Since the sentencing of the Mathews Lane don,
Donald "Zeeks" Phipps, in 2006 to life in prison for murder, and the
extradition of Coke, several residents of Western Kingston have
reported crimes committed in the constituency to the police.^ These
2 Dudus employed shooters from other garrison constituencies to defend Tivoli
Cardens and prevent his arrest. Dudus escaped the military assault and dragnet,
but was captured a month later and extradited to the United States. He has since
been convicted and sentenced to 23 years in prison.
3 In addition to some victims of crime filing a report with the police, the members
of the hierarchy of the Spanglers Cang in Mathews Lane and the Presidential
Clique of Tivoli Cardens are afraid to assume the role of don. This fear arose from
the successful criminal case built against Zeeks, the don of Mathews Lane,
downtown Kingston, and the army's operation in Tivoli Cardens in 2010 to
extradite Dudus. The Jamaican state's reassertion of its authority in Western
Kingston, "the mother of all garrisons", sent shock waves throughout all garrison
 The Informal Justice System 67

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68 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDiES

residents have interacted with the higher authority of the state

despite the fact that the (weakened) informal justice system has
executed residents in Mathews Lane and Tivoli Gardens since the
demise of the dons. The residents of Western Kingston are divided
in their support for the informal justice system. Some residents have
decided to work with the formal justice system, while others
continue to support the informal justice system. The government
needs to exploit this divide and encourage and support the
residents who are now using the formal justice system.*
The government should also reassert its authority in the other
eleven garrison constituencies where the informal justice system is
still entrenched and undermining the rule of law. It is an oppor-
tunity to remove the dons by building successful criminal cases
against them in the courts. This reassertion would weaken the in-
formal system and encourage some residents to use the formal
system, as is occurring in Western Kingston. The informal services
provided in the garrisons (laws, justice, security, and welfare)
should be effectively provided by the state, thereby making the
dons redundant. The state has the authority, power and capability
to outperform the dons and improve the lives of inner-city residents
in partnership with civil society, international agencies and friendly
governments that have a vested interest in Jamaica's security, legal
system and democratic stability.
This article has contributed to the literature on garrison con-
stituencies by focusing on the role of the informal justice system in
these volatile constituencies, and by suggesting what should be
done by the Jamaican state to correct the problem. General pres-
criptive ideas, rather than specific policies, are presented. Despite

constituencies and fear among the leadership. Many de facto leaders of garrison
constituencies refuse to use the term don now, and they try to stay out of the
spotlight. This is the prime time for the state to reassert its authority in all
garrison constituencies.
There was an incident in Eastern Kingston where a shooter from one community
killed a resident from another community in the constituency. The informal
leadership of the two communities met with the support of a politician, an
academic and the Peace Management Initiative. The decision was that there
should be no retaliatory killing of the renegade shooter, but that he should turn
himself in to the police. The shooter went to the police and was arrested and
charged with murder. The state should formally replicate the East Kingston
model in other garrison constituencies and ensure that witnesses feel safe to
speak with the police and are protected by the state.
 Tine informai Justice Sysfem 69

these contributions, a major limitation of the paper is the convenient

selection of "cases" tried that are not representative of "cases"
disposed by the informal justice system in garrison constituencies.
Therefore, generalisations about the informal justice system should
not be made. Also, we only provided limited information about the
cases to protect the research participants and the researchers. The
ethical requirements to guarantee the corifidentiality and anony-
mity of the research participants reduced the amount of data that
we could provide.

CONCLUSION
A chance to intervene
Garrison constituencies have given electoral dominance to some
politicians, and have undermined democracy and the rule of law in
Jamaica. The informal justice system in garrison constituencies
challenges the integrity of the formal justice system. The Jamaican
state must reassert its authority in these materially deprived
communities by efficiently providing the services now being
offered by the dons. Counter societies will replicate state functions
where they are inadequate or non-existent. The use of the formal
jusfice system by some members of Western Kingston subsequent to
the incarceration of Donald "Zeeks" Phipps and the extradition of
Christopher "Dudus" Coke to the United States shows that these
residents respect the formal justice system and are willing to work
with the Jamaican state. The Jamaican state needs to show its
willingness to work with these residents, and to use the partnership
as a model to dismantle the informal justice sysfem in other
garrison constituencies.

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