Updates of Cases For Persons and Family Relations 2014 Prepared by Katherine Ababa & Angelo Garcia

UPDATES OF CASES FOR PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2014
Prepared by Katherine Ababa & Angelo Garcia

SALAS v. MATUSALEM
G.R. No. 180284
April 10, 2013
FACTS
Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas in the RTC.
Matusalem claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Salas. Narciso, 56 years old
at the time enticed her as she was only 24 years old making her believe that he was a widower.
Salas rented an apartment where Matusalem stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery
of their child.
However, when Matusalem refused the offer of Salas’ family to take the child from her, Salas
abandoner Matusalem and her child and left them. Matsalem alleged that she attempted suicide
due to depression but Salas refused to support her and their child.
Matsalem thus prayed for support pendent lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000
Salas filed his answer stating that Matusalem was a woman of loose morals, having borne her
first child out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. He alleged that Matusalem had
seduced a senior police officer and her charge of sexual abuse against the police officer was
withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges against Matusalem’s brother in law. It
was at that time when she introduced herself to Salas with whom she pleaded for charity as she
was pregnant with another child. Salas denied paternity of the child and was motivated by no
other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of
the child.
ISSUE
WON the Filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established pursuant to article 75 in relation to
article 172 of the family code and existing jurisprudence and therefore entitled to support from
Salas.
HELD
NO. Under Article 17 of the Family code of the Philippines, Illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way on the same evidence as legitimate children. According to Article
172 of the Family Code , filiation may be established either by: the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by the open an continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child or any other means allowed by the rules of court and special
laws.
Matusalem presented the certificate of live birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of
the petitioner appears as father but is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only Matusalem who
filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who
supplied the information she wrote therein.
Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 1
Submitted to Atty. M. Sta. Maria SY 2015-2016

The court has held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.
A baptismal certificate considered as public documents but only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not competent evidence of
the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
REPUBLIC v. NARCEDA
G.R. No. 182760
September 11, 2013
FACTS
Robert P. Narceda married Marina on July 22, 1987.
Sometime in 1994, Marina went to Singapore and never returned since. There was never any
communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Several years
later, one of their town mates came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw
his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, Robert filed with the a Petition for a Judicial
Declaration of the Presumptive Death and/or absence of Marina which was thereafter granted by
the RTC.
ISSUE
WON Robert failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead.
HELD
Hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding. Article
247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court
proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. Thus, by the express provision of law, the
judgment of the RTC is not appealable.


NMSMI v. MILITARY SHRINE
G.R. No. 187587
June 5, 2013
FACTS
In 1957, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, reserving parcels of land in Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Rizal, and Pasay City as a military reservation, more commonly known as
Fort Bonifacio.
Thereafter, President Ferdinand Marcos amended Proclamation No. 423 and reserved a portion
of Fort Bonifacio for a national shrine (now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani)
In 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423 by excluding certain barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
forming part of the military reservation.
At the bottom of Proclamation President Marcos made a handwritten addendum: “P.S.—This

includes Western Bicutan (SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos.”
That same year, Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette without the
addendum.
In 1999, members of Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a petition
with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) to convert the areas they were
occupying in Western Bicutan from public land to alienable land pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476. COSLAP granted the request, ruling that despite the lack of publication of the addendum,
the “intention of President Marcos could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of
others.”
ISSUE
WON Proclamation No. 2476 included any portion of Western Bicutan since the handwritten
notation by President Marcos on the said Proclamation was not published in the official gazette.
HELD
NO. The “Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.”
It was undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476
was published in the Official Gazette. The SC, however, noted that the issue of whether
President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan in Proclamation No. 2476 was not only
“irrelevant but speculative.” Courts cannot speculate on the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the words appearing in the law.
Citing Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, the SC also reiterated that requirement of publication is
indispensable in order to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The
phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen
days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette.


Nevertheless, this does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with -
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended . . . It is not correct to say that under
the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws
that are supposed to govern it.
The Court also cited those covered under the indispensible rule of publication – [a]ll statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers.
It is important to note that publication “must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.”


GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
FACTS
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.
The TPO was granted but Jesus failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, Rosalie filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when Jesus failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, Jesus no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “exercise in futility.”
Jesus filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said
law.
ISSUES
WON RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution.
WON RA 9262 does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social
institution.
HELD
NO. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a
valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men
as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.



SPOUSES HING v. CHOACHUY, SR.
G.R. No. 179736
June 26, 2013
FACTS
Spouses Hing filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the
Choachuys.
They alleged that they own a parcel of land in Cebu while the Choachuys are the owners of Aldo
Development & Resources, Inc., located at the lot adjacent to their property.
The Choachuys consturcted an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on the same
lot.
Subsequently, fence was constructed by the Spouses Hing, which, the Chouachuys alleged was
done without a valid permit. As the construction would destroy the wall of its building, the
Choachuys Hing filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO.
The case was denied for failure to substantiate their allegations.
In order to get evidence to support their case, the Choachuys illegally set-up and installed 2
video surveillance cameras on their building, facing the Spouses’ property. They also took
pictures of petitioner’s of the on-going construction through their employees and without the
consent of the Spouses Hing.
ISSUE
WON the Spouses Hing are entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground of the
violation of their constitutional and civil right to privacy.
HELD
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation
of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of an individual "to be free from
unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in
which the public is not necessarily concerned.”
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter. It protects an
individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed
against him by other individuals. It states that person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief.

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not
mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also
"similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. Thus, an individual’s
right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
Thus, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by
respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right
of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion
thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.


FUJIKI v. MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013
FACTS
Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in the Philippines. As Fujiki’s
parents opposed the marriage, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. They
eventually lost contact with each other.
Several years later, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara, and without the first marriage being
dissolved, the two were married in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse, so she
left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and reestablished their relationship.
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC of Quezon City, asking for the judicial recognition of the
judgment made in Japan.
ISSUES
WON the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages is applicable.
WON a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
WON the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD
YES. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, the
Court has held that the rule that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the judgment is consistent with

domestic public policy and other mandatory laws (Art 15 on lex nationalii). Thus, the
Philippines, may require recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, since Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they
are successfully proven under the rules of evidence (Art 26 of the Family Code). There is
therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. There is no doubt that the prior spouse
has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not
only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established,
there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil
registry.


GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
G.R. No. 201061
July 3, 2013
FACTS
Benjamin Bangayan filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration
of nullity before the RTC of Manila. He alleged that in 1973, he married Azucena in Caloocan
City and had 3 children. However, he developed a romantic relationship with Sally and the two
eventually lived together as husband and wife and had 2 children when Azucena left for the US.
Sally’s father was against the relationship and to appease him, Sally and Benjamin purportedly
signed a marriage contract. Benjamin claimed that Sally knew of his marital status and assured
him that the the contract would not be registered.
During their cohabitation, they also acquired several real properties which were mostly
registered in the names of Benjamin, married to Sally. The relationship ended in 1994 when
Sally left for Canada, bringing their children with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition
for declaration of a non-existent marriage / declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally and
for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
ISSUE
WON the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is void ab initio and non-existent.
HELD
YES. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena was duly established before the trial court, as evidenced
by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a
purported marriage, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void ab initio." In this case, The
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City testified that no marriage license was issued to them and their
marriage license number did not match the license numbers issued on the month of their
marriage.
Also, the marriage simulated as it was made in jest, at the instance of Sally, to cover her up from
social humiliation. Being fictitious, it was a non-existent marriage. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning.”
The marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and
void and for the second or subsequent marriage to have all the essential requisites for validity

except for the existence of a prior marriage. There being no evidence to the contrary, the
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed to be valid, However, as the second
marriage was void for lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. Benjamin and
Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code on
cohabitation. Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The
37 properties being claimed by Sally are excluded since they were given by Benjamin’s father to
his children as advance inheritance. As regards the remaining properties, only one property was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The rest were owned by the two
separately.


PEOPLE v. ODTUHAN
G.R. No. 191566
July 17, 2013
FACTS
Edgardo Odtuhan was married to Jasmin Modina on July 2, 1980.
On October 28, 1993, and without the first marriage being dissolved, he married Eleanor A.
Alagon (who died shortly after the complaint was filed).
Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The
petition was granted and the marriage was declared void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license.
Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of Odtuhan’s previous marriage with Modina and thus filed a
Complaint charging Odtuhan with Bigamy.
ISSUE
WON the court judgment declaring Odtuhan’s first marriage as void ab initio consequently
extinguished his criminal liability for bigamy.
HELD
NO. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.


GARCIA-QUIAZON v. BELEN
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
FACTS
Eliseo Quiazon died, leaving behind his wife, Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, two legitimate daughters,
Jenneth and Maria Jennifer Quiazon, his common-law wife, Maria Lourdes Belen, and their
daughter, Elise Quiazon.
After his death, Elise, represented by her mother, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the RTC.
She claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on her claim, she
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico
(Filipito). A marriage certificate issued by the Diocese of Tarlac was presented as proof of the
previous marriage.
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration
her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged
that Eliseo left her real and personal properties.
To preserve the estate of her father and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
ISSUE
WON Elise may impugn the ‘void marriage’ between Eliseo and Amelia Quiazon.
HELD
YES. The existence of the previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by the Certificate of Marriage. In the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage has taken place. Thus, it cannot be the source of
rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally and may be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father.


CCI v. QUINONES
G.R. No. 175822
October 23, 2013
FACTS
Shirley Quinones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific in Lapu-Lapu went inside the
Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinsons’ Department Store. She fitted four items:
2 jeans, a blouse and shorts. She then decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098. She paid
the cashier evidenced by receipt issued by the store.
While walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store, a Guess
employee approached her and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She insisted
that she paid however and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then
suggested to talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office where she worked.
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the
jeans. They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed
by another argument. Afterwards, Quinones went home.
On the same day, the Guess employees gave a letter to the director of Cebu Pacific narrating the
incident but was refused by the director as it did not concern the office and it occurred while
Quinones was off duty. However, the HR department received a copy of the letter and an
investigation was conducted for the purpose of cancelling her Robinson’s credit card.
ISSUE
WON the court erred in finding that the letter sent to the Cebu Pacific was made to subject herein
respondent to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury.
HELD
YES. Respondent’s complaint stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided in the civil
code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly
embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from
their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The
issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from the respondent if
she indeed purchased the jeans. This exercise however is not without limits. Any abuse in the
exercise of such right in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is
actionable in the civil code.
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoice leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to the respondent. When they made a
cash count, a deficit equal to the jeans was found. The question now is whether or not the duty
was performed in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against
them.


The court held that the petitioners violated article 19 of the civil code. Initially, there was nothing
wrong with petitioners asking Quinones whether she paid or not. The guess employees were able
to talk to her at the office. While the confrontation stated well, it turned sour when the started
raising voices at each other. It is evident from the circumstances that petitioners went overboard
and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding.


VENTURA v. SPOUSES PAULINO
G.R. No. 202932
October 23, 2013
FACTS
Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married on June 9, 1980.
• They never had any common children, but had children from prior marriages
• Esteban’s daughter: Evangeline Abuda
• Sorroco’s son: Father of Edilberto Ventura, the petitioner in this case
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas when she married
Esteban. The marriage was not annulled and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage
to Esteban.
Esteban’s prior marriage was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death. In 1964 Esteban purchased
property. The remaining portion of which was purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf on
1970.
On September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband Paulino. Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila, the mother of Edilberto discovered the
sale. Thus, Edilberto represented by Leonora filed a petition for annulment of deeds of sale
before the RTC.
She alleged that the sale of the property was forged. Respondents allege that because of
Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and Void.
Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any rights or interest over the properties purchased
by Esteban.
ISSUE
WON the properties were co-owned by Esteban and Socorro.
HELD
NO. In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based
on the actual contribution of the parties.
In Borromeo v. Descallar, it was held that it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply
Article 148 of the Family Code provides that in cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actually joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions… Applying the provisions, the Vitan and
Delpan properties can be considered common property if these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro and there is evidence that the properties were acquired
through the parties’ actual join contribution.

In the case at hand, the title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban Alone. The
phrase “married to Socorro Torres” is merely descriptive of his civil status and does not show
that Socorro co-owned the property.


REPUBLIC v. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 171557
February 12, 2014
FACTS
Rodolfo, then 21 years old, and Natividad, then 18, were forced to marry barely 3 months into
their courtship due to Natividad’s accidental pregnancy. The marriage produced 2 children.
Rodolfo had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero
sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the army, Natividad left their conjugal home
and sold their house without his consent.
Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez, and bore him a
child. After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage another man named
Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.
From the time Natividad abandoned them, Rodolfo was left to take care of their children. He
exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of
Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.
Thereafter, Rodolfo filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that
Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In response to Rodolfo’s claims, Natividad submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr.
Cheryl T. Zalsos. Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that
both parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable
behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct.”
Dr. Zalsos also observed that Natividad lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a
mother to her 2 daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband,
adding too that he sired a son with another woman. She also noted that the mental condition of
both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only
manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union was
bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage."
ISSUE
WON the marriage may be nullifed on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD
NO. "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and

fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. It must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence aand
incurability.
Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that
Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated
with psychological incapacity.
The psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how
Natividad’s condition could be characterized with gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Dr. Zalsos has not only failed to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered
on Natividad, but also failed to identify the root cause of Natividad's condition and show that it
existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's
behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently
described. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a
bare conclusion and even self-serving. Although expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the
courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.
In this case, there is no sufficient proof to make a declaration of nullity. Natividad's refusal to
live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Psychological incapacity refers only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too
with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family, the instant petition is hereby granted.


GRANDE v. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248
February 18, 2014
FACTS
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived together as husband and wife,
although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.
Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick. The children
were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry.
The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States
with her 2 children.
This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Appending the petition was a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the
children.
ISSUE
WON Antonio may compel the use of his surname for his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.
HELD
NO. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother (Art
176 of the Family Code). The exception provided is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such
a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
However, in the present case, although Antonio was able to sufficiently establish the paternity of
his children in a public document, he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, Antonio’s
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over
the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
As to the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. There is no legal basis for
the court to change the surname of the children. To do otherwise would be to contravene the
explicit and unequivocal provision of the law.


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UPDATES OF CASES FOR PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2014

Prepared by Katherine Ababa & Angelo Garcia

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 2

At the bottom of Proclamation President Marcos made a handwritten addendum: “P.S.—This

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 3

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 4

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 6

The case was denied for failure to substantiate their allegations.

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 8

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and reestablished their relationship.

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 10

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 12

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 13

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 14

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 15

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 16

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 18

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 20

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 21

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