The Communist Struggle for Power in Burma

Author(s): Brian Crozier

Source: The World Today, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Mar., 1964), pp. 105-112
Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40393589
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 The Communist struggle for power in
Burma

BRIAN CROZIER

Western observers tend perhaps to underestimate the difficulti

face General Ne Win's revolutionary regime in Burma, and in par
the scale and complexity of the communist challenge to his author
has been too readily assumed that the General and his revolutionar
are playing the communist game - a theory that has indeed seem
sistent with the abolition of parliamentary democracy, the prese
Marxists in the Administration, and the nationalization of the ban
of retail trade. The arrest of some 700 Communists after the brea
on 15 November last, of the Government's talks with the guerrillas
Burma Communist Party (BCP), however, forces a reassessment.
General Ne Win, who seized power for the second time in M
1962, inherited from U Nu (still under arrest with other politic
corrupt and ill-organized administrative machine, and an unsolve
lem of ethnic minorities ; and all this against a background of con
insurgency. There is little to choose between the long-term soci
economic policies of Ne Win and U Nu (though their political app
are antithetical). In effect, what General Ne Win is attempting is to
out the socialist measures which the parliamentary regime was too w
ineffectual to see through. In its social and economic aspects, th
gramme outlined by the revolutionary junta in April 1962, under th
The Burmese Way to Socialism, is not one with which U Nu and h
leagues would quarrel. Indeed, given the fundamental Burmese d
of the profit motive, it must be assumed that 'socialism' of one kind
other would be advocated by whatever party group found itself in
in Burma.
It is not the purpose of this article, however, to analyse Gene
Win's policies, but to consider the nature of the challenge he faces
the various groups of Communists within Burma and the degree
volvement of the two communist Great Powers - the Soviet Unio
China. What has been said in the first two paragraphs is enough t
that General Ne Win did not adopt a socialist programme to plea
Communists and that he has no compunction about having Comm

Mr Crozier recently resigned from The Economist to devote himself to wr

and broadcasting; author of The Rebels (Chatto & Windus, i960) and The M
After (Methuen, 1963), he is now writing a study of South East Asia for P
Books.

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 THE WORLD TODAY March 1964

arrested. It does not necessarily f

Burma safe for his own concept o

'Underground' and 'above-ground' Communists

Leaving aside the Trotskyist Red Flag insurgents, who are no longer a
serious threat, it is customary to divide Burma's Communists into two
groups, known as the 'underground' and 'above-ground* Communists.
The underground White Flag guerrillas are the militant arm of the
orthodox Burma Communist Party, which was not set up until 1939. The
above-ground United Workers' Party (UWP), led by U Chit Maung,
was formed in 1962 by a merger of the Burma Workers' Party and the
People's Comrade Party. At the time of the merger, the UWP had no
more than some 5,000 members. Its influence, however, is greater than
this figure suggests, for it has the support of the Burma Trade Union
Congress, with 40,000 members, and is the leading component of a wider
left-wing grouping, the National United Front (NUF), which claims up
to 100,000 members representing various groups.
Broadly speaking, the Soviet Union supports the UWP and China the
BCP, and this is hardly surprising, given the respective records and
policies of the two groups. Some of the evidence for this view is con-
sidered below, but assuming it to be correct, it is clear that the Chinese-
supported BCP, more by accident than by design, has gained the ad-
vantage over the Soviet-backed UWP as a result of the protracted and
finally abortive negotiations between the BCP and the revolutionary
Government. It will be recalled that the negotiations were made possible
by the offer of a general amnesty made on 1 April 1963, followed by an
offer on 11 June of unconditional peace talks with both political and
ethnic insurgents. The amnesty was originally due to expire on 30 June,
but was extended until 31 January this year. By keeping the talks going
until mid-November, the BCP guerrillas gained a long period of respite
in which to consolidate and regroup their forces; and when the talks
finally broke down, the immediate sufferer was the UWP, many of
whose members were arrested. Until then, there were grounds for be-
lieving that the UWP was likely, at any rate in the fairly near future, to
prove a greater threat to the revolutionary regime than the militant BCP.
Judged from the Soviet standpoint, however, the present setback is not
very serious, as the Soviet line is still being advocated by the ex-Com-
munist advisers in positions of influence within the Government.
The existence in Burma from the time of independence of legal and
illegal parties of communist persuasion was in itself bound to make that
country a major battlefield in the Sino- Soviet ideological dispute. The
BCP's White Flag guerrillas have been in dissidence since 1948. Though
their record, in terms of military effectiveness, has been dismal, their
dedication to violence accords well with Peking's view of the inevitable
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 BURMA

road to power. During 1962 there appeared to be disagreement within the

BCP as to whether it should support Peking or Moscow, but from state-
ments made by the BCP delegation in Rangoon in September 1963 it is
clear that the BCP is now unmistakably a Peking-orientated party. More-
over, the Chinese authorities made arrangements to fly to Rangoon
several exiled BCP leaders in Peking, in order to take part in the recent
negotiations with Ne Win.
The above-ground UWP, on the other hand, has been working its way
towards power by peaceful and more or less constitutional methods that
have Moscow's approval. To see the dispute between the BCP and the
UWP in its true perspective, however, it has to be placed in the context of
the Sino- Soviet ideological dispute, which itself cloaks a clash of interests
between the two communist Great Powers that amounts to what might
be termed a neo-imperialist struggle.
A key statement of Sino-Soviet differences, in the South East Asian
context, was made by President Liu Shao-ch'i in Hanoi on 15 May 1963.
He said, inter alia:

An acute struggle on world- wide scale is going on between the Marxist-

Leninists and the modern revisionists over a series of important prob-
lems of principle. The polemics are centred on whether the people of
the world should carry out revolutions or not, and whether the pro-
letarian parties should lead the world's people in revolutions or not. . .
The modern revisionists . . . are . . . repudiating the historic necessity
for proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship in the period of
transition from capitalism to communism, negating the leading role of
the proletarian party, substituting hypocritical bourgeois 'supra-
class' viewpoints for Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of class analysis,
and substituting bourgeois pragmatism for dialectical materialism.1
Though these bitter words were spoken before Peking and Moscow
had taken to 'naming names', it is clear enough that the term 'modern
revisionists' refers to Mr Khrushchev and the Soviet Communist Party,
and that the main target of President Liu's fire is the doctrine of 'national
democracy' first elaborated in the Declaration of the eighty-one Com-
munist Parties which met in Moscow at the end of i960. Since this doc-
trine is now a fundamental part of Soviet policy in the emergent countries,
it is no exaggeration to say that the Chinese President's statement is one
more pointer to the collapse of the tacit division of the world into com-
munist spheres of influence and to the development of a struggle between
the U.S.S.R. and China for influence in, and ultimate control of, the
uncommitted countries.
The i960 Declaration called on Communists the world over to form
'national-democratic fronts' with like-minded people and to work from
1 New China News Agency. Daily Bulletin No. 1938, 16 May 1963.
B 107

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 THE WORLD TODAY March 1964

within to make governments ado

reform; the elimination of 'rem
exclusion of foreign private comp
ment of cultural and economic rela
Countries that carried out such
'non-capitalist development', and t
Communist Parties were to be classified as 'national democratic States' -
an intermediate category standing roughly half-way between 'bourgeois'
States and 'people's democracies'.
Soviet theorists have presented the doctrine of 'national democracy'
as an important new contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory. It also
offers considerable practical advantages, however, in that it harmonizes
with the peaceful, friendly image cultivated by Mr Khrushchev's Govern-
ment. In this context, it provides an ideological justification for the Soviet
policy of maintaining friendly relations with the non-aligned countries of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while holding out the prospect that
these countries can develop naturally towards 'socialism' and ultimately
communism, without violence though not without some form of struggle.
In contrast, Maoism, or the Chinese pattern of revolution, calls for the
formation of an army of workers and peasants under Communist Party
direction, which is to engage the 'main enemy' (the Government) in
guerrilla war with the objective of setting up liberated areas. Within such
areas, a united front is to be formed with the aim of 'national liberation',
in which the bourgeoisie and 'middle peasants' are to be encouraged to
participate. When the liberated base has been consolidated and the
official armed forces exhausted, the final offensive can be launched, and
once the Communists are in power, certain elements within the united
front, having served their purpose, can be liquidated or emasculated. An
important difference between the Soviet and Chinese theories therefore
is the fact that the Soviet theorists are content to let a 'first-stage' revolu-
tion be carried out by non-Communists, with the second, or communist,
stage to follow, whereas the Chinese maintain, in theory at least, that the
Communist Party must remain in charge of the revolution throughout.
Another difference is that the Soviet theory allows local Communists to
maintain, as far as possible, 'friendly' relations with the Government in
power, while the Chinese theory involves the Communists in uncom-
promising hostility to the Government, whether foreign or indigenous.
During the early days of General Ne Win's regime, the Moscow-
orientated Communists in Burma seemed uncertain of the new Govern-
ment's political direction. The illegal BCP, which soon became distinctly
Peking-orientated, and its contacts in Rangoon University were the first
to complete their political assessment of the regime and to embark on a
course of action. They reaffirmed their faith in the armed struggle and
branded the revolutionary Government as a 'fascist military dictatorship'.
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 BURMA

There is evidence that this decision was reached 'dialectically' by BCP

students in Rangoon University within a few days of the coup d'état of
2 March 1962, and that it was confirmed to them in early May in a
directive from the BCP politbureau. In this directive, the National
United Front was stigmatized as a group of opportunists, revisionists,
and traitors to the people. If, said the BCP's directive, the NUF decided
to co-operate with the army (that is, with General Ne Win's junta), it
'could only add to the deception of the people*.
In contrast, the National United Front, under UWP leadership, is
clearly committed to establishing an 'independent national democracy'
in the form envisaged by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In
1962 it took the line that the 'national democratic revolution' in Burma
was a part of the international socialist revolution. The Union of Burma
must therefore be a 'national democratic republic' and the first steps
towards this goal must be the capture of the 'economic bases of the
imperialists' and the 'abolition of feudalism'. The country should there-
fore follow an independent and non-aligned foreign policy, but should
also establish closer economic and cultural ties with socialist countries.
The similarity of aims and wording between this programme and the
passages on 'national democracy' in the i960 Communist Declaration is
clearly more than coincidental. Moreover, a number of Soviet writers
and broadcasters have expressed approval of the direction taken by the
Burmese revolution (before the recent arrests of Communists) and, by
implication, of the tactics of the NUF. The most authoritative of these is
Professor Rotislav A. Ulyanovski, Deputy Director of the Institute of the
Peoples of Asia (a subsidiary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences). Pro-
fessor Ulyanovski visited Burma in February 1963 and on 15 March an
article under his name, entitled 'Burma on a New Road', appeared in
Pravda. The article makes it clear that Burma is regarded as a model of a
State developing towards 'national democracy' along the 'non-capitalist'
path. It is significant, however, that, despite approval on economic
grounds, Ulyanovski expressed reservations about the political character
of the Burmese regime, emphasizing that progress along the non-
capitalist road of development was possible only if the Revolutionary
Council rallied round it all progressive forces in the country and estab-
lished a united front with these.

Dilemma facing the Burmese Communists

Soviet theoreticians and Burmese above-ground Communists alike
face a dilemma implicit in the fact that the Revolutionary Council and its
Burma Socialist Programme Party, formed in July 1962, are not Com-
munist-controlled bodies though committed to measures that meet with
Communist approval. The 'philosophy' of the Socialist Programme
Party, adopted by the Revolutionary Council at its twenty-second meet-
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 THE WORLD TODAY March 1964

ing in March 1963, contained passa

instance, it placed equal emphasis
and condemned 'some so-called le
vulgar materialism'. The dilemma, t
ing with the Revolutionary Council
control of the revolution. In pract
lutionary Council's unwillingness to
munists, the question was whether
and join the Socialist Programme Par
within, or to stay outside and try to
lines from the Communist standpoi
In February 1963 the moderate, B
the Revolutionary Council. The UW
move as a defeat for the 'reactiona
were hoping to revive parliamentar
tee of the UWP met at this time a
country's situation, which was in so
the 'leftists' within the Revolution
from an ideological struggle with t
trying to jump straight into sociali
considered that the UWP must co-o
Party and press for the formation w
front as the best way of guiding a
Paradoxical as it may seem that the
into socialism (i.e. communism), th
tactics of 'national democracy'. Th
Revolutionary Council should alien
temporary alliance was required fo
front. In September 1962, the So
journal Kommunist had given warni
socialist (i.e. communist) aims.
The faction within the UWP that
favour of dissolving the party and
Socialist Programme Party from w
infiltration has not been overlooked
of the Union Bank of Burma and the Government's adviser in the
Ministry of Finance, was formerly a prominent member of the United
Workers' Party; he and others ostensibly broke with the Communists in
order to join the ruling Socialist Programme Party. Much attention has
also been given to those organs of government that translate government
policy into political action. The School of Political Science is one such
body into which 'defectors' from the Communist ranks have infiltrated.
Such 'defectors' are also to be found among the officers on special duty to
government departments and the private advisers to certain Ministers.
no

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 BURMA

Once in position, these people quietly press for 'national democratic*

policies and use their influence to bring Communists into the government
machine at lower levels.

Dangers for the Communists

The arrests last November revealed that the above-ground Com-
munists face certain dangers in their current strategy. Although the UWP
and other elements in the NU F officially accepted the need for 'national
democratic' tactics, some prominent members had reservations about
the extent to which they should collaborate with the Government.
Politbureau and central committee meetings of the UWP in May and
early June last year - just before the announcement of peace talks with
the underground Communists and various ethnic insurgents - brought
these differences to light, and a split might well have been imminent, had
not the announcement of peace talks provided a welcome breather. All
factions buried their differences to campaign for a successful conclusion
of the peace talks, and in consequence all were represented among those
arrested.
There are, however, other dangers that face the above-ground Com-
munists, besides the fear of a premature showdown. One is that the re-
gime, and in particular its left-wing group, may continue to move
rapidly forward on an ultra-leftist path, rejecting persuasion from the
Communists to slacken their tempo and introduce a form of democratic
procedure. Such extremism could destroy the popular base of the
Government and perhaps provoke a counter-revolution - or at least
render the Government less amenable to Communist manipulation.
A further danger is that the cynics among the Peking-orientated under-
ground Communists may be proved right, in that the above-ground
Communists will be unable to gain control of the Socialist Programme
Party or the executive arms of government, while the Government itself
captures much of their programme and appeal. This is clearly a funda-
mental weakness of the 'national democratic* tactic; in Indonesia, for in-
stance, President Soekarno has shown considerable skill in capturing the
programme and popular appeal of the Fartai Kommunis Indonesia.

Dangers for the Government

On its side, a genuinely nationalist Government, such as General Ne
Win's, faces both obvious and latent dangers when subjected to 'national
democratic* tactics. The most obvious is that of distinguishing between
friends and foes. Up to a point, the interests of genuine nationalists and of
Communists coincide, because the first stage of the communist revolu-
tion includes measures which the nationalists are eager to introduce.
The problem is to ensure that the Communists are not in a position to
topple the Government when the parting of the ways comes, as it in-
iii

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 THE WORLD TODAY March 1964

evitably must. It is, however, vita

Communists in Burma to ensure th
reins of political power to a civilian
so the party or front is under Com
A more subtle danger lies in the d
selves. The Government constant
one lot of Communists is more a
BCP is determined to continue on
In reality, however, from Gener
consolation to be derived from suc
between Peking and Moscow. All
the last analysis, pursuing identi
her independence. Moreover, ther
tures from a party under Soviet in
weight of China's massive presen
influence is bound to predominat
prevail, the Chinese Communists w
vene directly in Burma - a course
avoid. Failing direct intervention,
own choosing, decide to give the
logistic aid short of actual involve
Despite such dangerous possibilitie
General Ne Win's military regim
the Revolutionary Council is dete
from any quarter, however bewil
that politicians of the Right, Left,
the Government can manage to pre
ist Programme Party and further
organs of government, if it can r
democratic front', and, above all,
ing, and jealously controlling wide
able to capture the above-ground
Communists from the people.
These are, of course, formidable
be a mistake to suppose that the r
November arrests marks the final defeat of the 'national democratic'
strategy. The flexibility of the strategy is almost infinite. The Moscow-
line Communists need only to refrain from criticism of the Government
and quietly pursue their efforts to penetrate and seize the key points in
the power machine. This they may be expected to do with insidious
diligence during the months ahead.

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