G.R. No.

L-19299           November 28, 1964 The defendant Pampanga Sugar Mills is hereby absolved from the complaint.
Meanwhile, the third party defendant Jacobo Lampa is hereby ordered to pay the
FELIZA JOVEN DE JESUS, duly assisted by her husband GREGORIO B. DE defendant Philippine National Bank all sums of money, it was ordered to pay the
JESUS, plaintiffs-appellees,  plaintiff including legal interest, and costs. (Record on Appeal, pp. 127-128.)
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, DEL CARMEN BRANCH, and THE PAMPANGA Of this decision the parties furnished copies, through counsel, by registered mail.
SUGAR MILLS, defendants,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant. On March 16, 1961 defendant Philippine National Bank filed its notice of appeal and a
motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. On March 17, 1961, it filed its record
Felimon Cajator for plaintiffs-appellees. on appeal and appeal bond. However, its appeal was dismissed on that day by the court
R. B. de los Reyes and C. E. Medina for defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank. on plaintiff's motion as filed out of time because the registry return card showed receipt
Tañada & Teehankee for defendant Pampanga Sugar Mills. by defendant Philippine National Bank of its copy of the decision on February 13, 1961.

BENGZON, J.P., J.: Defendant bank filed on March 22, 1961 a "motion for reconsideration and relief from,
and/or to set aside the order of March 17, 1961." It alleged that movant's failure to appeal
This appeal presents a procedural question on the dismissal of in appeal as perfected on time was due to "accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence," as supported by
out of time. Specifically, it involves application of Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of affidavits annexed to the motion. The court denied the motion on May 18, 1961.
Court: Defendant bank has appealed from the orders of March 17, 1961 and May 18, 1961.

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal. — Where the The record will show that copy of the decision sent to appellant's counsel in its legal
notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of department was received on February 13, 1961. In its motion of March 22, 1961 filed
time herein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed. before the court a quo, appellant stated that the registered mail containing said copy was
received from the post office on February 13, 1961 by Eugenio Magpoc. Although the
Appellant invokes liberality in the interest of justice. Appellees cite among other things latter is postal mail and delivery clerk of appellant's cashier department, his affidavit
our statement in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 74 Phil. 235, 238: "we cannot fix a period states that "as such, one of my duties is to get and receive from the Post Office all
with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on reason, registered mail matters addressed to the Philippine National Bank, its personnel and
whim or fancy should play no part in its application." different departments" (Rec. on App., 151; emphasis supplied).

The controversy originated in Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1128 of the Court of First Defendant bank admitted having filed its notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal
Instance therein, entitled "Feliza Joven de Jesus vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.," bond beyond the 30-day period, but contended in its motion of March 22, 1961, that the
where judgment was rendered on February 6, 1961 as follows: delay was due to "accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence." In support of such
contention, it is alleged that on February 13, 1961 the registered letter was given by the
bank's postal mail clerk Eugenio Magpoc to Feliciano Jimenez, Jr., registered mail clerk
WHEREFORE, finding the averments of the complaint being supported by
of appellant's cashier department. Due to volume of work, Feliciano Jimenez, Jr.
preponderance of evidence, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
delivered it to the receiving clerk of appellant's legal department only on February 15,
plaintiff Feliza Joven de Jesus and against defendant Philippine National Bank,
1961 and failed to inform the latter that it was received two days before. Thereupon, it
Del Carmen Branch, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P3,274.98
was stamped by said receiving clerk as received on February 15, 1961. On the basis of
with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6% a year from September 15, 1956, the
this date, appellant's counsel computed the period to appeal.
date of the filing of the complaint, until the principal shall have been fully paid,
plus the other sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees of the said plaintiff, considering
that the defendant's action, in refusing to cancel the leasehold rights of Jacobo The lower court did not find excusable the negligence recited above. We see no
Lampa, was clearly unjustified, bordering bad faith, with costs. compelling reason to disturb this finding. Appellant's counsel carelessly took for granted
that the date of receipt stamped on the letter by the legal department's receiving clerk
was the date of receipt from the post office. It was known or at least should have been
known to him that letters addressed to appellant's legal department were taken from the A.C. No. 126           October 24, 1952
post office by Eugenio Magpoc and sorted out by Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. Thus, from
appellant's system of handling and receiving correspondence for its legal and all other In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero.
departments, it was clear that the date of receipt by the receiving clerks of its several
departments could not be relied upon as the very same date of receipt from the post Tranquilino Rovero in his own behalf.
office. Counsel for appellant could have easily found out the latter date had he inquired
from Eugenio Magpoc or Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. and in the circumstances, we find no
PARAS, C.J.:
excuse for his having failed to do so.
The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty.
It should also be stated here that important steps required of litigants by the Rules
Tranquilino Rovero, on the grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent Tranquilino
cannot be left for last minute action without assuming the risk of losing the right to take
Rovero, having been found in a final decision rendered by then Insular Collector of
such steps if, through the fault of the party concerned, the period for doing so is
Customs to have violated the customs law by fraudulently concealing a dutiable
miscalculated. Such fatal consequence has often resulted as what happened to
importation, was fined in an amount equal to three times the customs duty due on a
appellant's right to appeal in the case at bar. Hence, the attention and care needed on
piece of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which was subsequently found to be
periods provided by the Rules of Court can never be over emphasized.
concealed in his wallet", and that on October 28, 1948, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero
was convicted of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case
As we have stated in Bello vs. Fernando, L-16970, January 30, 1962: No. CA-G.R. No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent practice against customs revenue, as
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance defined and penalized by Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code." The
with the provisions of the law (Aguila v. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898; Santiago v. respondents admits the existence of the of the decision of the Collector of Customs, and
Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397). Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court requires that his conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient
the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the record on appeal be all filed in to disqualify him from the practice of law, especially because the acts of which he was
court, and served on the adverse party, within thirty days from notice of found guilty, while at most merely discreditable, had been committed by him as an
judgment. ...; and compliance with this period for appeal is considered absolutely individual and not in pursuance or in the exercise of his legal profession.
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business (Altavas Conlu v. C.A., L-14027, January Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar may be removed
29, 1960), so that if said period is not complied with, the judgment becomes final or suspended from his office as attorney for a conviction of a crime involving moral
and executory ... . (Layda v. Legaspi, 38 Phil. 83; Pampelina v. Suiza 12 Phil. 99; turpitude, and this ground is apart from any deceit, malpractice or other gross
Caisip v. Cabangon, L-14684, Aug. 26, 1960). misconduct in office as lawyer. Moral turpitude includes any act done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.)
While the above-stated rule may in special instances be relaxed "in the interest of
justice," this exception is at most discretionary for the Court to apply and can be invoked Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals certainly
only when there is "lawful justification" and as when circumstances of "fraud, accident, involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The ground invoked by
mistake or Excusable negligence," have intervened. (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 74 the Solicitor General is aggravated by the fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not
Phil. 235.) As already discussed, such circumstances do not exist in this case. We may merely a private person, but the Government.
also add that appellant, while invoking the interest of justice, has not shown how it would
stand to be prejudiced from the loss of its right to appeal. From the record no such
Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred from the practice of
prejudice can be gathered, especially because the judgment provided for reimbursement
law, and he is hereby directed to surrender to this Court his lawyer's certificate within 10
in appellant's favor by third-party defendant Jacobo Lampa and the latter has not
days after this resolution shall have become final.
appealed therefrom.
So ordered.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs.
[ AC. No. 126, Dec 29, 1980 ] Philippine National Red Cross to its Second Biennial National Convention held in Manila
on August 23 to 26, 1957.[8] He was president of the Quezon City Central Lions Club
IN RE: ATTY. TRANQUILINO ROVERO + which he helped organize,[9] and for a time, he was president of the Board of Trustees of
the Northwestern Visayan Colleges in Kalibo, Aklan.[10]
RESOLUTION Mr. Rovero has also held high positions of trust in commercial establishments.  He had
been elected the president of the Filipino Industrial Corporation; the vice-president of the
189 Phil. 604 Meteor Company, Inc., and the president of the Rural Bank of Hermosa (Bataan), a
position which he holds up to the present.[11]

CONCEPCION, JR., J.: Testimonials have been presented regarding the high esteem accorded him in the
community to which he belongs.[12] His good conduct is certified to by the president of the
Petition of respondent Tranquilino Rovero for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys.
Aklan Bar Association[13] and the parish priest of Christ the King Church who stated that
Mr. Rovero "is a devoted parishioner who always gets voluntarily involved in the various
The record shows that on October 24, 1952, the Court, upon a finding that the
charitable activities of the parish," and "is cooperative and responsible and gets along
respondent Tranquilino Rovero had been found guilty by a competent court of a violation
fine with his fellow parishioners."[14] His conduct has also merited the approval of the late
of Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, (Smuggling) and
Pres. Ramon Magsaysay who granted him an absolute and unconditional pardon for his
sentenced to pay a fine of P2,500.00, ordered his disbarment and the surrender of the
crime. [15]
lawyer's certificate issued to him.[1] Almost four (4) years thereafter, or on July 7, 1956,
the said respondent filed a petition for reinstatement, claiming, among others, that his
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
disbarment had caused him untold misery and mental anguish, and that he had been
resulting from the conviction.  In the case of In re Marcelino Lontok,[16] the Court, in
granted an absolute and unconditional pardon for his crime and restored to full civil and
dismissing the disbarment proceeding against the respondent therein, who had been
political rights, and pledged, "on bended knees", "not to commit the same or similar
convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, upon the ground that the
mistake in the future nor to involve himself further in any transaction which might tend to
respondent had been granted plenary pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a
drag down his name as lawyer and as an ordinary dignified citizen."[2] The Court,
person reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
however, denied his petition.[3]
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
Not one to be disheartened, on March 10, 1958, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero
never committed the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
again implored the Court to be readmitted to the practice of law,[4] but the Court turned a
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were,
deaf ear to his plea.[5]
a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity."
Once more, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero, "now in his twilight years (71 years old)"
Under the circumstances, and considering that more than 28 years had already passed
asks humbly and earnestly of the Court to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys "before
since he was disbarred, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero has been sufficiently
crossing the bar to the great beyond."[6]
punished and disciplined.[17]
To be reinstated to the practice of law, it is necessary that the respondent must, like any
WHEREFORE, the order of disbarment is lifted and Attorney Tranquilino Rovero is
other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
hereby reinstated in the legal profession and restored to the practice of law.  The Clerk of
moral character a fit and proper person to practice law.[7]
Court is directed to return to him his lawyer's diploma, his certificate of admission to the
Bar, and any other certificate issued to him relative to his admission to the Bar.
In the instant case, it appears that since his disbarment in 1952, the respondent
Tranquilino Rovero has honorably dealt with his fellow citizens.  He had demonstrated
his moral rehabilitation and reformation as to be fit, once more, to engage in the practice
of law.  Mr. Rovero has been active in several civic and educational organizations.  He
was appointed the secretary of the Provincial Board of Aklan when that province was
organized.  He had also been the duly accredited delegate of the Aklan Chapter of the
A.M. No. 227-RTJ October 13, 1986 cockpit carinderia to take a snack. Ponce followed him shouting, "Where is the Colonel,
walang Colonel Colonel sa akin, papatayin ko yan, babarilin ko yan." As Ponce was
GREGORIO R. ABAD, complainant,  approaching and holding a gun aimed at Abad, the latter grabbed a glass and hurled it at
vs. Ponce who was hit at the head, causing him to fall down in a sitting position. While thus
ILDEFONSO BLEZA, respondent. seated, Ponce's gun was taken by his bodyguard, Francisco Sabater. Jr. Abad was then
advised by a certain Captain Diaz to go home. Outside the cockpit gate, bodyguards of
A.M. No. R-561-RTJ October 13, 1986 Ponce approached Abad and engaged him in a fistfight. At this juncture, Francisco
Sabater, Jr., upon the order of Ponce, fired six (6) shots at Abad, the last one hitting him
on the chest, the slug exiting at the back of his right shoulder. Abad was rushed to the
CRISANTO P. CRUZ, complainant, 
Cavite Medical Center in Cavite City where he underwent an operation. On the 4th day
vs.
he was transferred to the V. Luna Hospital at Quezon City where he was again operated
HON. JUDGE ILDEFONSO M. BLEZA, RTC of Bacoor, Cavite, respondent.
on-to remove the slug imbedded in his back. He stayed in the hospital for 123 days.
A.M. No. 5249-RET October 13, 1986
Sabater and Ponce presented a contrary version of the incident.
Application for Disability Retirement.
Potenciano Ponce testified that on his way out of the cockpit, Abad uttered obscenities
against him which he answered in kind. However, common friends like Mayor Jamir of
Judge ILDEFONSO M. BLEZA, applicant. Imus, Barangay Captain Enrique Diaz, and Cavite City Fiscal Gabriel pacified them. After
cooling off, Ponce decided to go home but on his way out of the main gate of the cockpit,
R E S O L U T I O N  Abad, who was drinking beer at a carinderia, hurled invectives at him. Ponce then
approached Abad to ask for an explanation. Abad hit him on the forehead with a bottle of
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: beer causing him to fall down unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, he was
brought to the Cavite Medical Center. Ponce denied having aimed his gun at Abad,
Two administrative cases were filed against Judge Ildefonso Bleza of the Regional Trial insisting that his gun was never taken out of its holster. He also contradicted the
Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite, the first when he was contemplating optional testimony of Abad that his permit to carry his firearm outside of his residence was no
retirement due to poor health and the second, after he had filed his application. Bleza's longer valid on July 19, 1981, stressing that his permit expired on November 18, 1981.
entitlement to disability retirement benefits depends on the resolution of these cases.
Francisco Sabater, Jr. testified that he was at the cockpit that same afternoon as a bet
On October 15, 1984, Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio Abad of the Philippine Constabulary taker or casador. He declared that at about 5:30 in that afternoon, he heard Abad utter
charged Judge Bleza with rendering a decision with malice, ignorance of the law, grave the following words at Ponce: "Putang-ina mo, Pare pipilipitin ko ang leeg mo." Ponce
abuse of discretion, and misconduct as a judge. The complaint is docketed as Adm. reacted by approaching Abad who then took hold of a beer bottle from the table and
Case No. R-227-RTJ. hurled it at Ponce hitting him on the forehead. Ponce fell down. Thereupon, Francisco
Sabater, Jr., took the gun of Ponce and as Abad refused to be pacified, he went outside
After a cockfight held at the Imus, Cavite cockpit on July 19, 1981, complainant Abad the cockpit and fired the gun five (5) times upwards to call the attention of the authorities.
and one Potenciano Ponce had a verbal tussle which culminated in Abad's being shot in When Abad approached him, holding a broken bottle of beer and tried to stab him with it,
the chest by Francisco Sabater, Jr., an alleged bodyguard of Ponce. Sabater, was he was forced in self-defense to fire the gun at Abad who was hit on the chest.
charged with frustrated homicide and Potenciano Ponce with attempted homicide before
the Regional Trial Court where the respondent presides. On August 11, 1984, the respondent judge promulgated his decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
The prosecution alleged that during the aforementioned cockfight, Abad's gamecock lost
to the one owned by Ponce. A remark by Ponce that complainant's cock was weak and WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. B-82-119, entitled People v.
lacked more care (mahina, kulang sa alaga) led to a heated argument between the two Pontenciano Ponce y Dayacap, for Attempted Homicide, said accused is
but they were pacified by certain local officials Abad then went to the hereby ACQUITTED for insuffiency of evidence, with cost de oficio. The
 case bond posted in his favor is ordered reimbursed to him by the G.R. Adm. Matter No. 584-CJ, March 30, 1977; Lopez v. Corpuz, G.R.
Municipal Treasurer of Bacoor, Cavite. Adm. Matter No. 425-MJ, Aug. 31, 1977).

In Criminal Case No. B-82-57, entitled People v. Francisco Sabater, Jr. Indeed, assuming that Ponce really pulled out his gun and pointed it at
for Frustrated Homicide, said accused is hereby found guilty beyond Abad as he approached him, it would not be easy to fault respondent's
reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Homicide as defined and reasoning that Ponce had ample opportunity to fire the gun at the victim if
penalized under Art. 250 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating he had the intention to kill him. All what Ponce had to do was to press the
circumstances of voluntary surrender, incomplete self-defense and trigger while Abad was about to hurl the bottle, or glass at him. On this
without any intention to kill the victim, without any aggravating point, Justice Luis B. Reyes' Revised Penal Code (p. 100, 1981 ed) has
circumstances to offset the same and applying the Indeterminate this to say:
Sentence Law as amended, he is sentenced to suffer imprisonment
ranging from four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor, as To constitute attempted homicide the person using a firearm must fire the
minimum, and to indemnify the victim the sum of P9,750.00 for medical same, with intent to kill at the offended party, without however inflicting a
and hospital expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of mortal wound on the latter.
insolvency and to pay the cost.
On the matter of the non-imposition by respondent of subsidiary
It is this decision which forms the basis of Abad's complaint. On August 23, 1985, we imprisonment in case of insolvency, the decision did not mete out the
referred this case to Associate Justice Santiago Kapunan of the then Intermediate penalty of fine on Sabater. There being none, subsidiary imprisonment
Appellate Court for investigation and recommendation. The investigating Justice could not have been imposed, pursuant to Art. 39 of the Revised Penal
submitted the following recommendation: Code.

Coming to the question of respondent's culpability of the charges thus Respondent, however, was in error in appreciating as a mitigating
levelled against him on the basis of the facts, the arguments and the circumstance "lack of intention to kill the victim" in fixing the penalty
applicable provisions of law, it appears inescapable that respondent has imposed on Sabater.
not committed any wrongdoing to evoke disciplinary action in acquitting
Ponce of attempted homicide. The ground for acquittal was insufficiency xxx xxx xxx
of evidence due to inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which he specifically pointed out in the decision. In addition,
The kind of weapon used by Sabater which was a .38 revolver and the
respondent found that Ponce never pulled the gun tucked at his waist
location of the wound of Abad would undoubtedly give the presumption
during the incident, although prosecution witnesses testified otherwise. In
that Sabater had the intent to kill and which inevitably led respondent to
the face of conflicting evidence, it is difficult to impute dishonesty and
convict him of the crime of frustrated. For in attempted/frustrated
unfairness to respondent in arriving at his conclusion as to which side told
homicide the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there is no
the truth. And even if he made an error in his perception of the facts as
intent to kill on the part of the offender he is only liable for physical
he saw them, it cannot be justly presumed that he did it in bad faith or
injuries. Therefore, the fact alone that respondent found Sabater guilty of
with malicious intent. For not every error or mistake of a judge in the
the crime of frustrated homicide would prove that he had no doubt in his
performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge
mind that Sabater had the intent to kill Abad. Respondent's appreciation
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
as mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to kill in favor of Sabater is
renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
palpably out of place. Presumably, what respondent had in mind was to
harassment and would make his position unbearable. (Dizon v. De Borja,
consider the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
G.R. Adm. Case No. 163-J, Jan. 28, 1971; Gamo v. Cruz, G.R. Adm.
grave a wrong as that committed under Art. 13 of the Revised Penal
Matter No. 467-NJ, October 22, 1975; Rodrigo v. Quijano, G.R. Adm.
Code, which is different from lack of intention to kill.
Matter No. 731-MJ, Sept 9, 1977; Sec. of Justice v. Marcos, G.R. Adm.
Matter No, 207-J April 22, 1977). For no one called upon to try the facts
or interpret the law can be infallible in his judgment (Paulino v. Guevarra,
 It is believed that while respondent committed an error thus described, certain Ricardo F. Ortiz; that complainant Cruz persuaded Him to withdraw the complaint
the same was done without malice or deliberate intent to perpetrate an with a threat that if he would not withdraw the same, Cruz will cause his dismissal from
injustice. But in any case, there was negligence for which he should be the Fire and Rescue Division of the MIAA; that because he did not accede to Cruz'
reprimanded. demand, the latter filed against him an administrative case for inefficiency and serious
neglect of duty, insubordination, absenteeism, and habitual tardiness; that because of
ACCORDINGLY, the undersigned recommends that respondent be that baseless complaint, he has suffered embarrassment, mental shock, anxieties,
reprimanded, with warning that a similar transgression in the future will be sleepless nights, and loss of appetite. In his answer, Cruz denied knowledge of the
more severely dealt with. administrative case between Pacifico Ocampo and Ricardo Ortiz and averred that
Ocampo's inefficiency, absenteeism, and tardiness are substantiated by company
The recommendation is well taken although the reprimand may be dispensed with records.
considering the respondent's poor health and his impending retirement.
After trial, the respondent judge ruled in favor of Pacifico Ocampo. He ordered
As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of complainant Cruz to pay Ocampo the sum of P150,000.00 for moral damages,
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such P30,000.00 for examplary damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
acts are erroneous (Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619). However, while judges should
not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of The administrative complaint filed by Cruz alleged that the respondent judge disregarded
judgment, yet it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal the defendant's incontrovertible evidence and knowingly rendered a wrong judgment
principles (Ubongon v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30) They are called upon to exhibit more than against him.
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes (Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78) and to keep
themselves abreast of the latest laws, rulings and jurisprudence affecting their jurisdiction In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the decision, subject matter of this
(Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10). case, is pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. This allegation was not
refuted by the complainant. Thus, any action we can take in this case would be
In the case of Ajeno v. Inserto (71 SCRA 166, 172), this Court held that: ... Even in the premature. For only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a trial judge's
remaining years of his stay in the judiciary, he should keep abreast with the changes in alleged errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly
the law and with the latest decisions and precedents. Although a judge is nearing rendering an unjust decision be levelled against him. This is the pronouncement of this
retirement, he should not relax in his study of the law and court decisions. Service in the Court in several cases (See Garcia v. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria v. Ubay, 87
judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end... SCRA 179; and Gahol v. Riodique, 64 SCRA 494). In the meantime, the presumption is
that official duty was regularly performed.
The records fail to show malice, ill-will or even bias on the part of respondent judge. His
decision pointed out, one by one, the glaring inconsistencies in the prosecution's WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the administrative cases are hereby,
evidence which led to the exculpation of defendant Ponce. In Pabalan v. Guevarra (74 DISMISSED. The recommendation dated June 6, 1984 submitted by the Court
SCRA 53, 58), this Court held that ... Even on the assumption that the judicial officer has Administrator that the respondent judge be retired from office due to hypertensive heart
erred in the appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable disease and congestive heart failure with cardiomegally (enlarged left ventricle) under
for his judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts Permanent Total Disability, as endorsed by Dr. Antonio Valero of this Court, is hereby
done by him in the exercise of his judicial function however erroneous... APPROVED.

The second case docketed as Administrative Matter No. R561-RTJ was filed by Crisanto
P. Cruz on December 11, 1985, against Bleza for knowingly rendering a wrong
judgment. This case originated from the decision in an action for damages filed by one
Pacifico Ocampo against complainant Cruz.

Pacifico Ocampo alleged in the damage suit that on April 16, 1984, he filed with the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) an administrative complaint against a
 A.M. No. 1402-MJ September 14, 1979 document, he assured me that everything was alright. I did that because at the time I
was helpless without eyeglasses. 5
HERMOGENES ANGULUAN and ANGEL ANGULUAN, complainants, vs. HON.
HENRY C. TAGUBA, Respondent. On the alleged detention of the complainants for three days, the respondent said:

FERNANDEZ, J.: It is alleged in the Joint Affidavit of Hermogenes Anguluan and Angel Anguluan that they
were detained. May I ask if a Court after conducting the requisite preliminary
In a joint affidavit subscribed and sworn to at Tuguegarao. Cagayan on September 10, investigation prior to arrest is devoid of any power to issue a Warrant of Arrest. The new
1976, 1Hermogenes Anguluan and Angel Anguluan charged the respondent Municipal lawyer who instigated this case against me should study his law. The law is clear on the
Judge Henry C. Taguba of Rizal, Cagayan with (1) conniving with Mayor Venture matter that after a Judge has asked searching questions of the complainant and his
Baloran of Rizal, Cagayan in the filing of "an imaginary, fabricated, baseless and witnesses, a Warrant of Arrest could be issued there being findings of probable cause,
unfounded criminal case of Qualified Trespass" against the complainant Hermogenes which is present in the case. As to the allegation that when I subscribed their affidavit, I
Anguluan and other persons as a consequence of which the persons charged were did not explain to them what was then being subscribed, I know clearly my law on the
imprisoned for three (3) days at the municipal jail of Rizal on August 3, 4 and 5, 1976, matter and if there was mistake committed, I was probably laboring under the impression
and (2) advising the complainants and Aleco Anguluan, Diosdado Gundan and Jose de that everything was in order and since my Court and/or office was overcrowded doing
la Cruz, to sign an affidavit in the presence of Mayor Baloran on August 12, 1976 without plenty of work and forgot my eyeglasses then at home I mislooked and overlooked
allowing them to read the affidavit wherein the affiants admitted having entered upon "the important items that should at the first place given close scrutiny. But while I admit slight
area presently occupied and belonging to VENTURA B. BALORAN, a resident of Barrio oversight on minor matters, I deny vigorously that I connived with certain parties. I cannot
Cambabangan, Rizal, Cagayan."  sacrifice the immense prestige of a judge in a small municipality for the sake of
temporary friendship and narrow convenience. My oath as such has always served as
This affidavit-complaint was referred to the respondent for comment.  my guidepost for discipline, excellence and fairness. 6

In his comment filed on November 19, 1976, the respondent denied the alleged In a Resolution dated June 19, 1978, this Court referred the case to Executive Judge
connivance between himself and Mayor Ventura Baloran but admitted that Criminal Case Alberto Gampona of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan at Tuao, Cagayan for
No. 216 for Qualified Trespass was filed before him by Acting Chief of Police David G. investigation, report and recommendation. 7 Judge Gampona submitted his Report and
Duruin on June 18, 1974 and alleged that he (conducted the requisite preliminary Recommendation 8 to this Court on February 15, 1979.
investigation of the case on August 29, 1974 but issued the warrant of arrest only on
August 3, 1976; and that respondent's inability to promptly rule on the existence of During the investigation on September 14, 1978 conducted by Judge Gampona the
probable cause was due to his belief that the dispute was more or less civil in nature and complainant, Hermogenes Anguluan, appeared without counsel and manifested his
"there were sincere efforts on the part of both parties to settle the case."  library intention to withdraw his complaint against the respondent. 

On the charge that the respondent failed to read and explain to the affiants the On October 16, 1978, complainants' counsel appeared on the scheduled hearing without
averments of the affidavit, the respondent said: the complainants. Said counsel informed the investigating judge about his clients' desire
to withdraw the complaint. 
The Affidavit of Hermogenes Anguluan and Angel Anguluan was prepared by somebody
else. All what I could recall was the Municipal Secretary in the morning whom I trusted to On October 30, 1978, a motion to withdraw the complaint was filed by complainants'
serve as a bridge between the Mayor and accused approached me and asked lawyer, Atty. Nelson C. Villaflor To said motion was attached the affidavit of complainant,
accommodation to mediate the differences of the parties. Since this was the first time Hermogenes Anguluan, explaining the non-appearance of the other complainant, Angel
that a respectable and responsible person made a request which request could not be A. Anguluan, whose whereabouts are not known to him and alleging that the
turned down considering his stature, I acceded believing that it could terminate once and administrative matter was being withdrawn because the affidavit-complaint "does not in
for all their squabble. So that in the afternoon when the Mayor brought in the supposed any way substantiate a good cause of action" and the complainants' evidence on hand
affiants of the affidavit in question, I thought that was the work of the Secretary. I win not suffice our charge. ... " 
instructed my clerk to supervise the signing and unaware of the legal effects of the
Notwithstanding the above-stated motion to withdraw, Alberto Gampona examined the Revised Penal Code with the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00.
records of the case. He found that the respondent judge had committed gross negligence The act of entering a fenced estate is a light felony in view of the penalty
in the performance of his judicial functions in that the respondent gave due course to the imposed. 13 Light offenses prescribe in two months.  virtual law library
complaint for Qualified Trespass in Criminal Case No. 216 filed on June 18, 1974; that it
was clear from the complaint and the supporting affidavits that the crime charged therein It is alleged in the criminal complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police that the crime was
had already prescribed; that moreover, although the preliminary examination was committed on December 10, 1973. The criminal complaint was filed only on June 18,
conducted on August 29, 1974, the warrant of arrest was issued only on August 3, 1976, 1974. The respondent judge should have known immediately by simply reading the
after the lapse of more than two (2) years from date the complaint was filed; and that criminal complaint that the crime charged had prescribed. The respondent judge
finally, the respondent admitted that he failed to explain the contents of the affidavit displayed gross ignorance of the law in giving due course to the criminal complaint as a
which was subscribed and sworn to on August 12, 1976 before him by complainant result of which the persons accused were detained for three days. law library
Hermogenes Anguluan and four other persons, the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 216
being based on said affidavit. Although the preliminary examination was conducted on August 29, 1974, the warrant of
arrest was issued only on August 3, 1976. The failure of the respondent judge to issue
The findings of Judge Alberto Gampona are supported by the facts of record. the warrant of arrest within a reasonable time is suspicious. The respondent judge was
either ignorant of his duty or he was impelled by an ulterior motive. law library
The criminal complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police., David G. Duruin, in Criminal
Case No. 216 before the Municipal Court of Rizal, Cagayan, presided by the respondent And finally, the respondent judge admitted that he did not explain the affidavit to the
judge reads as follows: affiants before he administered the oath. His excuse that he could not read without his
eyeglasses asinine to say the least. law library
COMPLAINT 
Although the complainants have asked for the withdrawal of this complaint, the Court
The undersigned Acting Chief of Police, Rizal, Cagayan, under oath accuses cannot overlook the anomalous acts of the respondent judge. The actuations of the
HERMOGENES ANGULUAN, DIOSDADO GUNDAN, ALEJO ANGULUAN, ANGEL respondent judge seriously affected the public interest inasmuch as they involve the
ANGULUAN, JOSE DE LA CRUZ AND ERNESTO ANGULUAN, for the crime of administration of justice. It is for this reason that the motion to withdraw the complaint
'QUALIFIED TRESPASS' defined and penalized under Art. 280 in relation to Article 281 filed by the complainants will not justify the dismissal of this administrative case against
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, committed as follows, to wit:  the respondent. As stated by the Supreme Court in Vasquez versus Malvar, 15 " ...
Furthermore, to condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who
That on or about 10th day of December, 1973, in the Municipality of Rizal, Province of may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its
Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary."  law library
named accused without justifiable cause and has not secured the permission of the
owner entered the enclosed estate of one VENTURA B. BALORAN of plowing and Under the established facts and circumstances, the respondent judge should be imposed
planted corn versus the latter's will. a penalty of suspension from office without pay for three months. law library

Contrary to law. WHEREFORE, the respondent judge, Henry C. Taguba, is found guilty of serious
irregularities in the performance of his duties as a municipal judge and is hereby
Rizal, Cagayan, May 6, 1974. suspended from office for a period of three (3) months without pay effective from the
finality of this decision. law library
DAVID G. DURUIN 
SO ORDERED.
12
Actg. Chief of Police 

It is to be noted that although the crime is designated as qualified trespass, the