•

16

JCS 2366/92 19 May 1975

, COpy NO.

---

DisTRIBUTION D

Page I'

NOTE TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

_

THE RESCUE OF 'tHE "ss MAYAGUEZ" AND ITS CREW(U)

1. (U) The attached memorandum by the President for the

Secretary of Defense, 18 May 1975, subject as above, is

referred ,to J-3 for the actions required by the second para-

traph as a matter of urgency.

2. (U) Note the' suspense dates of 1200, 20 May 1975, and

1700, 23 May 1975.

Joint Secretariat

~
t\;;
.I ~
w
....
,
r-
...
~
"
cJ
(
~.
t-
~ DISTRIBUTION:

Gen Brown (C/JCS) (2)

Gen Weyand (CSA) (1)

Adm Holloway (CNO) (1)

Gen Jones (CSAF) (1)

Gen Cushman (CMC) (1)

~en Cowles (DC/5, P&O) (1) Adm Moorer (DCNO-P&P) (1)

Gen Huyser (DC/S, P&O) (1) Gen Beckington (DC/S, P&O, MC) (1)

Adm Train (D/JS) (1)

Gen St John (VD/JS) (1)

Gen Sitton (J-3) (2)

Gen Cooke (5/JCS) (1)

Col Jones (D5/JCS) (5)

orBBeMK'

JCS 2366/92

Classified by' The President. EXEMPT FRnM GEr;t.n~L DECLASSIFICATION SC!FDlj!J_ '~:C r:<c·::' . .'·'IV( ORDE~ 11652

[X[~Y1PTION ex! f::./;"y _ _:(~3::.!) _

Oli"LASSIFY ON yotifica Hon of Ot:iginator

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER RELEASE COVERED BY JCS MOP NO. 39

1

T 1-1 C V.Jl--l IT C f-; o USE

IN 1\ G H J i-.J G r o N

May i a, ] 'ns

MErAORANDUM FOR

TI--IE SECH.ETAHY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT:

The Rescue of the 5S Ma ya g uc z and its Crew

In the a Itc r rna th of the op c r-a t i ori to rescue the SS ]\'f.ayaguez and its

c r cw, I consider it c s s o n t.i.a I that we evaluate, a~-'a: 111CanS of insuring the rn o s t effective possible p e r Io r rnan cc in future crises, the manner in which th i s operation was planned and con du ct o d.

In order to fa ci l it.at c this eva Iua ti o n, I woul d like to r e c e iv e , on a priority basis, the following:

(a) A detailed and cornpr ch en s iv c chronological exposition of events and a ct i vi ti e s from the t irn.e of the seizure of the SS Ma yaguez. th r o ug h the cornpl c ti on of the eva cua ti on of Marines f r orn Koh Tang Island, foe LIS sed on the a c ti vi lies

.I of your Depn r trncrit:

(0) A copy of each order, verbal or written, wh i ch was issued eli r ecting rm Ii.ta r y p Ia n s and operations, from. the tirn e of the basic p Ia nrri ng decisions rna.d cut the National Se cu.r i ty Council rnc et.ing at 10:30 pv m. on May 13 th r ough th e

cva cua.ti on f r orn Koh Tang Island. Included sh oul d be all orders Ir orn you to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Er orn the Joint Chiefs of· Staff to th.e Commander. Pacific Cornrna.nd, ana from that Cornrriande r to s ub o r dinate C0111.mander s in the field.

(c) Any observations or sugg e s ti on s wh.ich you consider wo u.l d contribute to i rrrpr ov crn ent in the ability of the National

Se cu r ify Council machinery t~ deal effectively wi th c r i sis

si tua t.i.o n s.

; .

)

._._--- ._._----

/

'<,

Kii.: ,;')' r."4.' / y, c: Dh

, .--"-------- --~--.--

2

This ov a Iua ti on should 1)(; conrltlcF::d 011 a vcry cJ.Cf.;C hold b<uii~:. T!IL: rna tc r i a l j:1 (b) above S!10111d be su b.n ii ttc d by noun, 'J'u o s da y , .lvlay ~~()) and the r crnn in clc r by c Io s c of bu s i n c s s Frida")", I\lay 23. 1. ha v c

r c qu e steel s irn i Ia r subrrri s: si o ns I r orri th c: Secretary of St a t e , the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the Presiden!: for Nat.i ona l Sc cu r i t y Affair s .

,~.

r -'"~

I

r j I

..

•

j

I '~

")

,.I .

. . .

, '

THE RESCUE OF THE ·SS MAYAGUEZ· AND ITS CREW (U)

\", ';;:_<~.~" ~".:~"'cf""li··:'- /J'i-".r.o ... , l·c·

;.. , .. ' . /" ::~:~;,,::::::_'~:-'-~",'.-~;""1 ": "'-;~'--"'", . : I ,J-L ,"

~'~'\,:,i;~{~~"';:~,'ACtiOn O~".J~S, 236,6~92 'has bee,~ cOmpleted by the Office

/i~:~'.:jl~);A·~.:.:.·. Chairman, J~~n7 Ch~efs of S:#fo'

'. ,

of the

.. J:.

Joint Secretariat

/

{

,

t

"

.~ , .""

INTERNAL STAFF PAPE~ .

RELE/\SE COVERED BY JCS MOP NO. 39

1st NIH of JCS 2366/92

L ,'. ~t

.1

":.>

~ttKN ' 1,.'-"chmeJ~-4) 4-75

. . "." ... 11 v.'ir ,._._ ....

VI .-ICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF ,_FENSE WASH1NGTON. D.C. 20301

October 14, 1976

COMPTROL.L.EI'4

(Audit)

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)

SUBJECT: GAO ~/Final Report, dated May 11, 1976, "The Seizure of

the Mayaguez--A Case Study of Crisis Management" (OSD Case #42l8-A)

Pursuant to DoD ~irective 7650.2, it is' requested that arrangements be made for review and evaluation of the subject report.

Since the GAO makes no recommendations in this report, normally a simple letter of acknowledgement would be prepared. However, if this report contains misstatement of fact or unsupported conclusions without appropriatequalifYing language, or does not reflect adequately the comments of the Department, a detailed reply would be justified.

If only a simple letter of acknowledgement of receipt of the GAO report

is considered appropriate, it is requested that (1) it be prepared and sent to GAO without prior referral to this office, and (2) eleven copies of the signed, dated letter to GAO be provided to this office within two weeks. (October 28, 1976).

<.

If a simple acknowledgement letter is not considered to be appropriate, please provide this office -- Assistant for Audit Report, OASD(Comptroller), Room 3A 336, The Pentagon (Attn: Mr. Norwood), for OSD review and approval prior to uispatcL, with (1) six copies of the proposed reply to GAO and

(2) six copies of your transmittal memorandum to this office on or

before November 23, 1976.

In the event that it is not possible to propose a complete response, this office should be advised immediately by telephone, extension 74238, and provided with a proposed partial reply no later than the above date.

_./#~ Clifford A. Falkenau Assistant for Audit Reports

cc: SecArmy SecNavy SecAir Force ASD(I) ASD(LA) ASD(PA)

SpecAsst to SD/OOD

. -.~ •. " ;.. ."'. '.;!.~

- '- -" -- _; ~- ..:.,. :J

~v.:f5:.

Dir., J~,

DI'ACCS

Dir, DIA

Dir, DSAA AGC(FM)

DASn(p/B) AAO

Enclosure

I

orncr or T!r': SECRET t·.FI\' OF l)Hf.r'~::E WI\,SH!:"G'rO:~, D C i030l

I' !

/ !_J

: v t~

i :; I

7 August 1975

NOTE FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT UlIEFS OF STAFF

Reference your discussion with the Secretary on 6 August about whether we had fuTfllled all of the repor'ting requirements on the after action evaluation of the Mayaguez. Attached are copi~s of

the relevant documents. I, bel ieve that all requi remen t s have been

fulfilled. So does Scowcroft. t have so informed the Secr~t~ry.

At techmcnt s

JOHr~ r: H t CI(HAH, JR. Major [cneral, USA Military Assistant

, "

'., ..

::;, i. " ::l"

~ t:, _:: ~ I'" .

\:v

i

~\\ .

.", ,l'

I'

, "

\"

J

UPON f~U;:OVAL Or ATTt,CHMENTS THIS DOCUMEiH F~ECOrf.ES UNCLASSIF!ED

· Tep gESP~~ ~

SECDEF CONTR N9.

.,;~' ,., - .. -. '

~,;'.: :,:=: t

\,

TI IE ~.,f:C!~:F l'/\!,'Y or~ ()U F f'j',,!:".

\'it~~d{IIJ(.~~·ur.,j. I) r: ~.~~ to'

MErv.iDiU}.NDUNl FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:

Rc s cu e of the SS Mava g ue z and its C'r e w

In your rricrn o ra ridurn of May 18 you asked for rnat c r i a l

on which to base 'an 'evaluation of the rc s cu e of the

S5 Ma ya gu c z and its c r o w, In our discussion on Ma y 20 I

provided copies of rc~sponses on two of the fh r c e ca tc g o r i c s

of i nf o i-rn at i o n wh ic h you requested. In o r dor to p r ov id c yo u

a c ornplet e report, I arn enclosing w it.li this rn c rrio rarrdurrr

copics of responses to a l l tb r e c categories of. i nf o r rna t io n

reqnc s tc d ,

Enc Io s ur c S

I After Action Report ~-

Chronological Lis-ting of Events and Activitie s

II - Co m pi.Ia ti on of Verbal and Wr itt e n In s t r o c ti o ns Observations on'the

.~

...... _.

III-

•

Dc cis i on Process

') S!;C VEl·' C(lr;T~ 1',) ~

1 J" i~ -~ ,) l .,1.

X- _=::::::::',~.: ;~::

1-

; .

-"1"'"1 tv

..

Sou ])of Cout nr. x- 1 4 5 G

..... _ .... - ...... -r·:,: .. -_··-:·'IO. .....

'-- "--.,.,,.,~,---,., "'_~-7"---'-"":'----'---_"'" ._ .__ f . ,

,._--._ 1":-"

. '

i I'

!.

•

I

~":' '. . .. ,_ -:. - ;'_ ;;,. ':- .

[. .

!', ", .". __ .,,' ,,' .".

. '! r- '''-- - ~,

r'- "

["'" ,,- ":", --: - ,.'- - - ,

,.c-,- ..

~ • -:-> .. ,_ •• ',.

r -::-

r ':

,':;'-"

-' ,

I'

"

. ~ . -.~ -', .. - .

'." ,,' _. , . _'-

n,_" : .'

. .'" ~.~..'.,

t: l

"- '-:'

.,. -

"

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON.D.C.20301

In reply refer to: 1-20600/76

INTEANATIOI'(IU.

KCURITY,."AIRS

',16 Har 1976

Hr. J. Kenneth Fasick

Director, International Division US General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Fasick:

The GAO draft report of 2 February 1976, liThe Seizure of the Mayaguez-A Case Study of Crisis Management" (OSO Case #4218-A), has been reviewed by the Department, of Defense.

Comments on the major findings and recommendations of the report affecting the Department of Defense are contained in the attachment. The Department of Defense has worked with the Department of State on the comments and general agreement has been reached.

The Department of Defense interposes no objection to the declassification of this document. However, the Department defers to the judgement of other agencies concerning the classification of material under their purview.

In accordance with 000 Directive 5200.1, you are authorized to distribute the final report to appropriate Congressional Committees, individual members of Congress, and executive agencies.

It is requested that this reply be published in the Appendix to the final report.

Auachment

S'nce~ely,

'"J. '~_h ep

~~ ,~?

HARRY El BERG I 0 ACTING ASSlSTANT SECRETARY

... '. .: ~.t I

,

. ~ i : i ',. I _" ..

",' ,:r,' lft i FJ i, t f.' F, rr~

~., ')0-, ! .. ~ • .:,.

"r I

t:;j 1"" Ii

~ o ..... t:I c+

til

.. -~"

~ H]

.,' "~"""""'7' _._- .-..........,... ...

·_

.- ..

_''I, ••

"artment of Defense Comnent s h .he GAO Draft Report, "The Seizure of the Mayaquez A Case Study of Cr i sis Management"

There are a few areas in the report which' contain speculative conclusions on the part of the GAO which are based upon a too-rigid interpretation of the facts. For example, throughout. the GAO report appears

to blithely assume that the Cambodians' failure to attempt certain actions proves that preemptive measures by US Forces were unnecessary. Similiarly, a number of conclusions were based on an extensive after-the-fact analysis which was not available to decision-makers during the short period of the crisis. The Department of Defense believes that some general comments are appropriate, in order to put these events and conclusions into better perspective and to make the report more accurate and helpful. There are four substantive areas which deserve attention and general comments.

First, the report insists that the whereabouts of the crew could and should have'be~n more accurately ascertained. This criticism must be viewed in the context of the crisis. The implication that the US intelligence community can or should be able to reach into every remote corner of the world on a moment's notice, ignores the physical and fiscal facts of life. The information desired here was not general but very detailed and concerned specific people who were being moved almost constantly. Air observation and photographs may be helpful in such a case but certainly offer nO guar~ntee

to provide this type of data. The time to conduct extensive examination of photography and detailed debriefings of aircrews. as was c6nducted by the GAO, was simply not available to decision-makers. It must be recalled that approximately 16 hours elapsed from planning to execution of the Koh Tang operation. Actually the US was aware that some of the crew had probably reached the mainland. To ask for more, stretches credibility. Moreover, even the GAO post-action analysis does not indicate that definitive knowledge regarding the locat·ion of the crew was among the available data. Also, there

Is no evidence that an additional wait would have further clarified the situation. It remains for us to insist that the assessments made were as good as could be expected in the light of information then available and the other co~iderations which constrained planners and decision-makers.

Second, the report Charges that the timing of the operation was unnecessarily hurried, requiring commanders to act with inadequate force and intelligence. Again this criticism must be viewed in the context of the time and the events. / The'United States was attempting to secure the release of the Mayaguez crew before anything happened to them or they were transferred to the less accessible interior of the maint'and.

From a military standpoint, it is a well known and proven principle that to move first and earliest yields a commander great advantage over an opponent by denying him the time or the opportunity to improve his position.

In this case moving rapidly to cordon off the island and to attack the local garrison was not unr easonab l e . In fact, the·crew was not on Koh Tang. This does not discredit the timing or the t~ctics used as much as it illustrates again the uncertainties which plague military operations and"intelligence gathering (discussed above). Certainly, delay would have made it possible

"-_, .. ---'---'-~---

. - _;

-,

. --,

'y ..

. 2

to bring more force to bear but this decision would have given the Cambodians more time to act. As with all military operations. it was necessary to balance competing and incompatible demands and in the context of the crisis surprise was. gauged to be more imp6rtant than overwhelming force. Therefore, we believe that the tactical judgments that were made. based on information available at the time. were both reasonable and justified. from a military point of view.

Third, the report:chal1enges the underlying purposes for attacking mainland targets. The intent of the mainland airstrikes was to deny Cambodia the capability to interfere either by sea or by air. The fact that in retrospect ~he specific bombing strikes had little influence on the Cambodians' decision to release the Mayaguez crew is not disputed. However, the presence of US combat aircraft on the scent prior to the airstrikes and before the release of the Mayaguez crew as indicated in Captain Miller's testimony, did weigh heavily in the Cambodian decision. Additionally •. the fact that the Cambodians did not reinforce or interfere with our operation on Koh Tang from the mainland cannot be disputed.

This lack of reinforcement or interference can be attributed, in part at least, to the successful mainland airstrikes. The facilities were approved military targets and, in light of the infonnation at the time,

were appropriate, based on the limited objectives for which the airstrikes were designed.

Fourth, the report states that available intelligence on Cambodian' opposition on Koh Tang was not fully coordinated and was not made available to the assault force com~ander. This criticism is only partially true. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) did agree on the nature of the probable opposition. and in retrospect their force estimates appear to be quite accurate. Although these estimates were given wide distribution, by an unusual set of circumstances they did not reach the ground assault commander. The Commander in Chief. Pacific (CINCPAC) has subsequently established a feedback system which is designed to ensure acknowledgement of critical intelligence~by all commands directly concerned in an operation of this sort. It. should be recognized that time and geographical distances

were both critical factors in the operation which inhibited extensive cros s+check l ng and feedback,

In addition to these general comments, the following specific observation~ are deemed appropriate.

1. Page iii, lines 10-15:

GAO Statement: A significant time elapsed before reconnaissance

ai rcraft were launched to Iocat e the Mayaguez GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense review procedu~es and safeguards to ins~re prompt launching of reconnaissance aircraft.

-

"'-

.,

:~ ." '"

.. ,.' ~

3

DoD Comment: In his testimony before the House Subcommittee On International Political and Military Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements acknowledged that the process of initiating reconnaissance can be improved upon. At the same time, Secretary Clements reminded the members of the subcommittee of the many restraints placed

on US forces prior to the collapse of both Cambodia and South Vietnam

and stressed the inhibiting effect of those prohibitions upon some commanders, causing them to be extremely cautious about initiating actions In that part of the world other than under normal circumstances.

I

Page iiil. lines 16-17:

2.

GAO Statement: All available information relating to the possible location of the frew .did not reach decision-makers.

,

000 Statement: The information passed to decision-makers was not inaccurate or intentionally altered. It was passed as received, together with the uncertainties of identification and location in a. fast moving tactical situation. Undoubtedly, in transmission, SOme details were either omitted or inadvertently altered. This is inevitable. Interestingly enough, even post-action reconstruction, as indicated in the report. was vague, which suggests the difficulties associated with eyewitnesses reporting. More~ver, it is not clear that the reporting to Washington of every single detail _witnessed on the, scene would have altered 'the dec l s lon-make rs ' assessment of the situation or final decisions.

--:

3. Page iii. lines 19-24:

GAO Statement: Marine assault forces planned and carried out the assault on Koh Tang with inaccurate estimates of Cambodian strength on that island. GAO was unable to determine why the available, more accurate estimates of DIA or IPAC did not reach the Task Group and assault force corrrnanders.

DoD Comment: Intelligence estimates on the enemy strength on Koh Tang

by OIA and I~AC were accurate and given wide distribution but did not reach the ground assault commander. CINCPAC has subsequently establ ished an improved feedback system which should now ensure acknowledgement of critical intelligence by commander-s directly concerned. (See general comnents above .• )

4. Page iv, .lines 4-9:

..

GAO Statement: Were all US military actions necessary in securing the

releas~ of the crew? In retrospect, the final marine ass~ult and the bombing of the Cambodian mainland did not influence the Cambodians' decision to release the crew.

t

I

I I

I

I

DoO'Comment: The marine assault on Koh Tang was deemed necessary in view of the assessment ·that SOme members of the Hayaguez crew were being held on the island. Given the information avallable at the time, the

decision to assault Koh Tang was reasonable and logical. (See general comments above.) The mainland airstrikes were iQtended to deny the Cambodian

military the capability to interfere either by sea or air. Clearly the

-v:

Cambodians had (he capability to do 50. Their ILdlitary intentions were not clearly known. The fact tha~ US operations on Koh Tang were completed without interference or reinforcement from the Cambodian mainland can be aq.ri.buted in part to. the successful mainland strikes .

. 5. Page v, lines ~-7:

GAO Statement: Why was a 15,000 lb. bomb the l ar qe s t non-nuclear

weapon in the US arsenal -- dropped On Koh Tang? The bomb. was dropped without the specific request of the Task Group and assault force commanders.

DoD Comment: The BLU-82 waS expended in the southern end of Koh Tang. The enemy was observed Shifting troops from one area to another and it was surmised that the purpose might be to bring overwhelming force to bear on

the small group of Marines isolated from the main body. After the weapon . was expended, no additional enemy troops were observed moving their positions. The weapon was expended under the control of tlfe forward air controller;'who was aware of the tactical situation on Koh.Tang.

6. Page 2, lines 21-23:

GAO Statement: Our review was hampered by an inability to"get access to certain executive branch records and by extensive delays in getting access to other records and to personnel.

000 Comment:· DoD responded to GAO requests in a timely fashion in all instances where data requested fell under the sole purview of the 000.

7. Pages 24, 56,99. 112; various lines:

GAO Statement: Throughout the report there is mention of "75 USAF Security Police from Nakhon-Phanom, Tha l l and ;!'

DoD Comment: The 13th AOVON was tasked by USSAG to assemble 125 USAF Security Police from within Thailand at U-Tapao Air Base. The breakdown by location was 50 from Nakhon Phanom, 25 from Udorn, 25 from Korat and 25 from U-Ta~ao.

3. Page 25, lines 20-23:

GAO Statement: .The question ar i sesvas . to why almost 5 hours elapsed before this elementary action was undertaken.

000 Comment: S "f· t 1 b

.ee s~eci Ie commen ,a ove.

9. Page 27. line 18:

GAO Statement: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense review procedures and safeguards to insure promp~ launching of aircraft for reconnaissance when similar future needs arise.

---- ... -.-.........._:.~

-r- .

..... t:

DoD COrnr.1ent: [ ,acknowledges a two-fold respc "b i l i ty in instances similar to the Mayaguez which may arise in the tuture. The first requirement is to be able to quickly verify ihe facts of a distress call. The second requirement involves the launching of reconnaissance aircraft within the limitation of us military assets available. Within the limitations of available assets, 000 will respond to reconnaissance requirements. It must be emphasized~ however, that these assets are not inexhaustible and occasions'may arise where the demand exceeds the immediate availability for such aircraft. Likewise, it should be recognized that there are vast areas of ' the world not with~n the normal range of US military r~connaissance forces.

I

10. Page 36, lines 23-25:

GAO Statement: In re~rospect. the information collected by pilots under difficult circumstances appears to have been accurate but incompletely or incorrectly passed 'to decision-makers.

000 Comment: The allegation that the detailed observations of the pilots attempting to identify those individuals on the fishing boat never reached Washington is incorrect. This information was passed

over the secure conference line to Washington through Hawaii in a timely fashion. The only information that can be pinpointed as not having been passed to Washington concerned the fact that the individuals wore brightly colored clothing, In any event. considering the facts at handJ it was, recognized by all concerned that it was not possible to make a positive identification as to whether these individuals were in fact Caucasians.

It was only established that they could be Caucasians. Moreover, no reliable information was available as to how many Caucasians had been transferred. Lack lnq this. it was impossible to conclude that some of

the crew was not on Koh Tang. Again. the substance of the situation was accurately conveyed to Washington and there is no evidence that further' inconclusive details would have altered the fundamental assessment or the final decisions.

11. Page 37. lines 3-7:

GAO Statement~ Despite the availability of various assets and the apparent uncertainty· concerning the location of the Mayaguez crewJ little attempt appears to have been made to verify reports or obtain additional information'through the use of photography or other means.

000 Comment: Throughout the entire operation. every reasonable effort was made ,to verify reports and to secure the maximum amount of infor-

ma t ion t hroug h photog raphy and ot he r. mean S on, a II a spec t s of the inc i den t. Statements made by the GAO concerning the discovery of a. fishing vessel

wi th approx imate 1"y 29 persons on deck near Kompong Som harbor do not explore some relevant considerations:

The GAO had the benefit of photos of the fishing vessel taken when the Mayaguez crew was recovered. photos which were not available when the reconnaissance film was being reviewed.

· ....

,.

-

-I ·~I 0

r-o_.o .• ro".;'; ~.,~"~ •• '. I -. ~.,io"~_ l~'

·1

The GAO· was not under the same time constraint that commanders and photo interpreters were' in revi-ewing the reconnaissance film. The GAO spent many days reviewing debriefings of the

'Hayaguez crew as well as other documents and testimony which assisted in pinpointing are~~ of search and reconci ling discrepancies in accounts. Hi litary commanders and analysts do not have tha~ luxury in a crisis.

l2. Pages 1,5-46. lines 22-25. 1:

GAO Statement: GiVen the inability of jet aircraft pilots tO'positively identify the occupants on the deck of the fishing vessel, a slower aircraft flying at reasonably low altitudes might have been able to obtain better intelligence -- both visual and photographic.

000 Corrvnent: The fact that the fishing vessel was not firing at the fixed wing jets gave no assurance that hostile fire would not be directed against a slower, lower flying aircraft such as a P-3. It sh6uld be poi~ted out that a P-3 aircraft was fired upon and hit on 12 May while performins low altitude reconnaissance for a similar surface vessel.

13. Page 1,8, lines 19-22:

GAU Statement: Using the helicopter to obtain more positive identification of 'the suspected Caucasians was not considered, in ~art because the helicopter was not believed to have been in the vicinity at that time. Defense has stressed the risks involved in using a helicopter in this manner.

000 Comment: The suggestion that helicopters should have been used for reconnaissance near Kompong Som with jet fighter escorts ignores the fact tha~ search and rescue helicopters were being used for search and rescue and armed helicopters were not availabe. Even when armed, the advisability of using slow flying and vulnerable helicopters to recon armed ~nemy vessels is a highly questionable tactic.

14. Page 55. lines 10-11:

,.

GAO Statement: The Holt was accompanied by the USS Vega, a refrigerator cargo ship.

'000 Comment: Both the USS Holt and the USS Vega were in an operating' a~ea off Subic when they were directed to the Koh Tang area. Because-

of the diff~rences their speeds. the units ~id noia~company each

other. The Vega fo l l owed in trai 1 of Holt and was approximately 75 . miles astern during the transit.

'5. Page 57:

GAO report provides a chart depicting approximate locations-of US forces on 12 May 1975.

.. ",'" .... 'O:"_O __ -,;t" ""_~ ... ',' -,.. • '. ~.- "' ',":,"'_~"'O

.~~.-~ ..... : .. ;;~.:- .. -~:::: ~-s;_:';~ ::~~: .. ~: .. :. .~'

.

~O_O __ 0 .~,-O~:

.... "

,'_ 0,-_0-,

~O 'l';~'.o":~~_ ....... o~""""-oo::: ''''_L0t- o·';o~."~·!o_" '.~~'.'"_ ,~

. - _. 7 -'.--.------

·000 Corrrnent: Disposition of forces as\depicted does not reflect actual positions on 12 May 1975. The chart should be titled with date and time of presentation of force disposition, 12 May 1975. This would reflect that (l}'USS Okinawa was east of Taiwan, approximately 150 miles, (2) USS Holt was southwest of Manila, approximately 150 miles, (3) 'USS Wilson was inport r.aohsiung. Taiwan, (-4) USS Hancock was inport Subic Bay and (5) USS Coral Sea and escorts were on the Indian Ocean side of Lombok Strait •

. 16. Page 60, 1 ines 23-26:

GAO Statement: These photos revealed the existence of a possible antiaircraft site near the eastern landing zone (C, 'illustration on page 68). The commander of the Marine Task Group requested that it be destroyed prior to the insertion of the assault force. However, it was not destroyed prior to the assault.

000 Comment:. We are unable to verify either in ~ashington or in Hawaii any request from the Marine Task Group Commander to destroy a possible anti-aircraft site. Any such. request, however, would have been weighed against the potential risk pre-assault strikes would have had for the Hayaguez crew believed to have been held on the island.

17. Page 61, lines 22-25:

GAO Statement: The Marines recommended a simultaneous landing on the Hayaguez and Koh Tang. CINCPAC directed that Marines be put aboard the Holt and the Holt be brought alongside the Mayaguez. As a result; the landings on the ship and the island were not simultaneous.

000 Comment: CINCPAC directed that the Marines be put aboard ~he USS Holt and that the USS Holt be brought alongside the Mayaguez because

it was unknown if any Cambodians were on fhe Mayaguez. It was si~pler. with fewer risks. to .board the Mayaguez from the USS Holt than from helicopters.

t

13. Page 73, line 13:

GAO Staterr~nt: An Amphibious Ready Group, a configuration of ships primarily designed to support a Marine amphibious assault. was scheduled to set sai 1 for the area of the seizure' at 6:00 a.m., 15 May ..

DoD Cooment: The above statement-provid'es only part of the' information regarding the' use of the Amphibious Ready Group. Recorrrnend the s t a t e> ment·be modified to read as follows: IIAn Amphibious Ready Group, a configuration of ships primarily designed to support a Marine amphibious assault, was scheduled to sail from Subic Bay for the area of operations at 6:00 a.m., 15 May. but utilizing a 20 knot speed of approach, would not have reached the Koh Tang area unti I 12:30 p.m't 17 Hay.1I

......

L'~' ••

'.,,'

. I

19. Page 80, lines 7-10:

GAO Statement: Thirteen of those killed were aboard one of the helicopters shot down (1 Air Force, 2 Navy', 10 Marines). One Marine was killed on Koh Tang and three were reported missing on the island.

DoD Comment: The above statement describes only I~ KIAs. An additional sentence should be added between the first and second sentences: "A USAF sergeant drowned when his helicopter was also sh~t down off Koh Tang.11

20. Page 85, lines 12-15:

GAO Statement: At the same time all available means were not used to obtain better evidence on the location of the crew while plans were being developed to assault Koh Tang Island.

DoD Conrnen t : ·Given the limited availability of resources, with the i.nherent limitations of each, the rapid tactical situation, the uncertainties existing at the time,and the limited information o~ Cambodian intentions, it is difficult to see what more could have been done under the circumstances. (See general corrvnents.)

21. Page 109. lines 17-19:

GAO Statement: A mariner's warning to US shipping to avoid the area where the Mayaguez was seized was broadcast by the US hydrographic system.

DoD Com~ent: The mariner's warning was disseminated through the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center.

22. Page 114, lines 27-29:

GAO Statement: Nineteen were Air Force security police being transported from norther~ Thailand to U-Tapao.

DoD Comment: Recommend the statement be changed to read: "Eighteen security po l l cernen were killed On ·the helicopter." This tracks with facts stated th~oughout. the repo~t.

".-. . ~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D C, 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Seizure of U.S. Merchant Ship MAYAGUEZ

r

,. .; '~~' .~

Early on the morning of 12 May (Washington Time),: the U.S. 1

I

merchant ship ~~YAGUEZ was seized in the Gulf of Thailand in international waters by a Cambodian boarding 'party. The MAYAGUEZ has a u.S. crew, and her cargo consists of general

commercial cargo destined for Singapore and military exchange

store and other general supplies for Sattahip, Thailand. The

ship is a container carrier owned by Sea Land Corporation, and

was en route Hong Kong to Sattahip. Although initially uncon-

firmed reports had the ship headed for the port of Kompong Som, P-3 reconnaissance at 122116 EDT revealed the ~~YAGUEZ was dead-

in-the-water in-company with two Cambodian gunboats near

Paulo \,lai Island. The ship then started to move towards por t.r

however, more recent reports confirmed that the ship appeared

to be dead-in-the-~'ater 25 miles off Kompong Som in the vicinity

of Kas Tang Island.

In order to', provide, a 'capability for u.s .: milH:a:r;~ response to counter this belligerent act, certain actions have been

, t~ken \0' iricr~a~e the 'readiness: of 'selected."combatant und t s,

Aerial reconnaissance has been underway since the 'incident

." ': '". ~ .' . .... ". . .'. ". ~. .... .:' .. '. ~ .'. . . . ._ , ... ' . . . ". . . " .. ,':", ;'

and now that positive identification of the M.Z\.YAGUEZ has been

CORTl.L 'SEA and its acccmpany Inq 'escorts' have been, or'de r ed. to

proceed to the area and their arrival time is estimdt~d

to be about 0300 EDT on 15 May. Aircraft could be launched

for missions up to 17 hours earlier. A destroyer escort, the

, ,

USS HOLT, directed to proceed from the Subic Bay area, will I

I

arrive about 0530 EDT on 14 May. Orders have also been issued to

!

prepare the carrier USS HANCOCK to sail from Subic Bay and

CINCPAC was directed to constitute a Marine Amphibious Ready

Group at Subic Bay as soon as possible. Initial elements will be

ready to sail by noon Tuesday Washington time. A Marine BLT has

been alerted for movement to Utapao and could be in Utapao by

first light 14 May.

Based on the available forces, several military courses of

action also have been developed to give a range of options for

your consideration. These options' are presented in the first

a t tiacnmerrt ,

As long as the ~ffiYAGUEZ remains outside the harbors of

Kompong Som or Ream, our primary option should be to recover

the ship and crew by eliminating unfriendly escorts and boarding .>:;:-,>,;>

her when the USS HOLT arrives in the area about ~ EDT on

14 May. An additional option is now being planned to put forces abo'arC! the MAYAGUE'Z by he Li.copt.er s from Thailand,usi~g tactical

aircraft .. for,. suppressive. fire as, necessary .. and. rio,t control .' ....

+_ • .." .' I •• • . -. • .'. •• ••••••.• • ". ..; > , • ,.::

...... ' .. ',' "~. agent's' (RCA')· to··miriimi~·e·casual·ties .• '. Shotildthis' 'option- not'·"· , " :":' : . ,

.. -' .. "

.: " '_","';' .,;~h:·~.,~~.~ .. ,.,~O~T,.: .. ~~r,i:v,~.~ ... 0.~::_.,~~~: .. l?T.e,~~.~: .. \~,~er~., ... a..~:!~.: ~~~:~ .. :~,.~~~n~ . t.~~.:~':, ~~~. ', .:

cre\\!.may have been moved ~o Kas Tang. In ~his event, a BLT s,ize helo

. , .. :.4. : •.. :."_':: •.... ,.' " , ~:." '., ," :- ". ~ "_ :", .. _ .: , :: ~ -, ' .. ' .. _ o_ ', •••••

Landi.nq ot Harines '~'n Kas' Ta~g "~o~id 'be 'made.

2

".;' •• L

-, _ _..' .... ",.,t? ,.

If the ship is .moved into'Kompong Som harbor, recovery of

the MAYAGUEZ and crew from the principal Cambodian port of Kompong Som could require up to an amphibious task force with 5,000 Marine combat troops supported by a carrilr task group.

I

I

Enemy oppostion in the vicinity is estimated to'be approxi-

mately 1,500-2,000 Khmer combat troops. The operation could

begin in about 5 1/2 days. A blockade of the Cambodian coast,

another option, could begin initially with arrival of the

USS HOLT in about 24 hours. This option could be 'exercised

separately or in conjunction with mining of the port of Kompong

Som and Ream. Mines could be air delivered. The mines could

be set for self-destruct at various time intervals with the

earliest period ranging from 10 to'17 days and longest up to

180 days.

A further option' is seizure or sinking of Cambodian naval

and merchant craft. Cambodian naval combatants consist of

•

only some 21 small patrol craft, like those used against the

MAYAGUEZ, and the merchant ships number only 3 or 4 small

coasters. Again, however, this option could. commence with the

arrival of the USS ·HOLT .

.. , . '. ; Tne .Las c . op t.Lon, d i.scuased I .. like .. that imrnedia tely .. above , .Ls ..

'a' rebUiatdry' one' bu td.nvo.l.ve s .. ·the· "island of "Penilo Wai 'near" ,', .... >.,

~. " r ~.

"'," ", ', : •••• ._ •• ,:. ,,: ••• :.: ""':_., ~' e , '."' •• ": •• ~ .. ~~ ."> .':~.".";: '.' , •. ~.:: •• ~:.: : = .• ;. ", ': ~.: ; . <,'>: •• :.~ •. :. -.: <~,' •• .' .: ; •••• = : _..,

'where our ship was' seized'. This island and the Hori 'Panjang

.. " .: ... ·I.s.IB:n~s., ~O ;miles., t:q. th~' southea~.t,. ~r.e, espe~~ally impor.,~a~t., ' .: :.':. __ : .. ;

" ',.:':": ... ~ . :·-:;L.·· .:.-~.~:- .: ~;. ';" .. ." +' ••• :~ .~.: ••• ~~ •• : ••• ~·.·.·· ••• <r· . ~ ... ~ .. :.:~. : .: _ .. , ... :. '::~:.'.'.: '~'.; ... : -. : .. : ..... _.. . '.: , ~~ r . . ~ .

to the Cambodians for potential oil exploration, and sensitive

. . . . . .

because the Vietnamese claims to both areas. A communications

3

.. ' C :L . " -:'~:- ~~~.~. ~~ .. _~-" :'.=:';;;-:":;

,.,. :i ,~~:>i !}~~:, fi~wY f; a tt~ W -

intercept on 8 May revealed Khmer communist intent to take

I

the Hon Panjang Islands and interest in Poulo Wai: "Concerning

I

the island which we were to go take control of, we hare not

,

yet gone and taken them because we have not (garbled)iKoh

Ponlo Wai and another 100 kilometers southeast of Koh Poulo

Wai. Therefore, as long as the situation is favorable, we

. must go seize it before they do' because that island has

petroleum on it. The organization has decided that we should

go seize that island but do it quickly or else they will get

there before we do.n Other intercepts confirm intense Khmer

interest in these islands and a desire to seize control before

the Vietnamese do so. The proximity of the MAYAGUEZ to Paulo

Wai could well have been the reason for its seizure.

For military action against Paulo Wai Island, there appear to

be adequate forces at Subic Bay to isolate the island by surface

combatants or secure the island with a relatively small Marine

force. It has been xepor ced that about 60 GKR marines were

stationed on the island but number of.personnel and their current

orientation are unkncwn. There are some defenses on the island •.

Exact timing and force sizing will depend upon reconnaissance

of the area.whiGn

. ", . . :., .... ~ ":' . '. ' .. :' -". .. .' ..

-.: exp'ected shortly ~

.. '. . ~.

has. been condu~ted' a~d . detaile.d rep·~r·ts. are

', ",:. . ;.-',. .:;, ~ ' ... '.... . :._. -. .. :'~ _... .,'.: ';. . :. ,,' ' .... :' :+ . ",',. . - .

...

The distance from the· mainland would make .it .

.. -'. . ...•. 7'

. easily defendable against any Cambodian attempt to dislodge ol:lr

." ;-', ;' I'~ .' •. :." ", ,":_.: _.' •.• __ " •.• , : ...••.. :. ;':' ,'_"" ~ ',:.' •. - :_ -: :'_ ',' •• : ••...••.•

.... : .: ,: .. ,:: . forc'es-~ ", "The '-Hon Pcl'njan'g"!sl:arids -wou I'd: ':be': 19ft:'. to' ·exploitation s , ' ••••• '. : ...... -.

:by Vi~tnamese 'to: Lncr ea se pressure on' the Khmer' ~td negotiate 'on'

4

. " .. , .... . ~.~ ~ •. ' I~·.

-'. _.

',-

terms favorable to the U.S.

The USS HOLT and USS VEGA could be

used to interdict Cambodian efforts to send forces to the Hon

Panjang Islands until the arrival of the CORAL SEA and ships

from Subic.

-', .

.: ....

" :.

'", ~ :. " J ','

.::.',", s-> "

....

,: .

•• '. J ._:

"".'

: .. ,'.: ..

..... "

. ~".

. ~, . .:. . ...

. .

.' >

" .'" ;. .' .: .' ,:': • ~~.:. ,1 ••• .-·.-

. . . _'.".. '.;" _ .

. ", . :>: ..... .;. . :.'

. .' -: .' (: .....

',' ." " .... .'

", :-::

Should any of the military options be selected for execution

it is recommended that consultations with the Copgress be

,

initiated promptly to inform them of the planned~course of

j

action and to enlist support. Without such support any mili-

I I

tary action could be terminated by the Congress under the

provisions of the War Powers Act. Moreover, any unilateral

action which generates too much congressional and public

antipathy could create the notion that we as a government

\

are unable to act forcefully to protect our interests •

. . . ~

. .

: ~ ..

.,' .

", :' •• +

, "

. :."

f . ~ .'

....

. ....

~ ._.: :. -'~.' .'.

. ' ~ .'

' ..

'.~. :

... ' ..

.: .: ", : " :' . . ',- .'~ ' ..... .:

. +: .'

+ ", < .. :-'_".' .. " ..... ~, .~'. ~.:~ .. : ~ ':'," ..

',,,,,:' .:."' • ~:. ", 1 • r' ~ • • .... • • -.' ',' • .."

•••• " .' ~ '. • j" • .: "

. ",: .. ' .:.: ~"~ ; ...

L,.: :

.....

.• '1',

Description of Poulo Wai Island

Poluo Wai Island is located approximately 55 miles southwest of Kompong Som, Cambodia. Island consists of 2 wooden islets separated by a channel about 3/4 mile wide. Depth

of channel approximately 40 ft. The west island is 299

ft high at its southeast end. The east island is 200 ft high and is rock fringed.

Info - naval infar.try company (GKR) of about 100 men reported on island as of mid Aoril. Current numbers and whether friendly of not unknoWn.

Description of Eon Panjang Island (Paulo Panjang)

Han Panjang island is located approximately 100 miles south of Kompong Som, Cambodia. The island's dimensions are

about 2 1/2 miles long and 1 mile wide. It is flat topped approximately 548 feet high. A cove on the west side affords a good anchorage in depths of over 30 feet. Reportedly some ARVN on island as of mid April. '

Description of Kas Tang Island

Kas Tang Island is a small island located approximately 25 miles southeast of Cambodia. It is 440 ft high at its north end, is wooded, inhabited, and rock fringed •

.. ' ~

•. • t'

: ,.

".'

• • •

"r~.i~" 'OC't$li.l.l:1l":: ..... •

•

•

•

•

•

tJoOlirlOt'1 e""'.~Q.""'"

+10:0'

• • • • • •

QUA'" D

• • •

• • • •

•

••

G U L F

•

T H A I L A·

'1

o

07

Republ1c 0' Vle'lIOlII C~"'l Bulfe. %0". flvlI ... 1011111'." 12.7 NMI of Vl.'"olll 010"0 Ihll boret." hodlo o!lel "" UOIIMI'lIn IS." B," Hili 'I .... ' II'IlIIch 1II1!'t. Ih. II". 01 etlll'lorco'lo" "twll.JII ,,,,, Republic of Vletotal'll.

OPTION

FORCES

TIMING

" i J /-',J". I~." " " . '/ ~. .j"

(...f-C ... ·r- -::.., ...... : I ...

I.

PROS & CONS

Recover ship and crew from Kroner at sea.

- Close with ship and Khmer gunboats. Take vessel by force if necessary.

II.

Recover ship and crew from Khmer in por t.

- Carrier Task Group for air superiority and TACAIR support

- Marines Amphibious Brigade from Subie and Okinawa

in amphibious task

force for assault

1 Destroyer minimum

Carrier Task Group with TACAIR if required.

Amphibious Task Force (Approx 5000 Marine Combat Troops)

1 Carrier Task Group

w'

24 Hours

5 days (min)

TACAIR support can launch in 34 hours)

PROS

-=-Would demonstrate US resolve and ability to protect US shipping worldwide

- Involves minimum use of force

- Minimize question of legality depending on how far off-shore recovery took place.

CONS

-=-Some risk of casualties

Khmer could retaliate against ship crew during recovery.

PROS

-=-Would demonstrate US willingness and ability to protect US shipping worldwide.

- Khmer unable to· successfully oppose.

CONS

-=-Could cause unfavorable reaction from Congress and US public.

- Some questions of legality under laws prohibiting combat on, ove~. or off the shores of Cambodia.

- Could result in sinking of US ship MAYAGUEZ by Khmer and execution

of crew.

- rts casualties likely.

f -

.I

. .,

OPTION

FORCES

PROS

~voids direct military confrontation

III.

Naval Blockade of Cambodian Coast

- Surface Task Group would assume positions to intercept and turn back shipping destined for Cambodia.

USS HOLT and USS VEGA together with P-3s could begin.

IV.

Mining the ports of Kompong Som and Ream

Seal the port using destructors to prevent entry or exit of all merchant and naval vessels. Destructors can be set to self destruct for various periods of 10 to

17 days (earliest) up to a maximum of 180 days.

Carrier based aircraft or Guam based B-52s can lay destructors.

- ..

TIMING

24 Hours

Approx 36 Hours

2

... - ... _.,.-

PROS & CONS

CONS

-=-May have little immediate effect due to paucity of shipping into Cambodia

- Involves third countries in di teo

- Legality would depend upon position of force imposing quarantine.

- Involves large surveillance forces

- Problem in effecting closure of Hekong.

- Blockade is extreme measure which has unfavorabl~ international implica tions.

PROS

~an be accomplished with little or no military risk.

CONS

-==--Mining is extreme measure whicl. .. s unfavorable international implications.

Seals MAYAGUEZ in Kompong Som (if ship is in Kompong Som).

. ,

/

~SEcnET

OPTION

FORCES

TIMING

PROS & CONS

Seize or Destroy Khmer Naval and Merchant Vessels

- Khmer have 21 swift boats operating in coastal area.

- There are up to three small merchant vessels normally in area.

VI.

Seize Offshore Island of Poulo Wai and block Cambodian access to Hon Panjang

a. Secure island using naval surface combatant and deny use to Khmer.

b. Secure island with Marines.

USS HOLT and USS VEGA supported by P-3s initially on scene followed by other Seventhflt units.

USS HOLT and USS VEGA initially

Use Marines from Subic

or Okinawa aboard .suitable vessels. Surface or helicopter landing.

v'

24 Hours

24 Hours

Awaiting reconnaissance

3

,..

PROS

-=-Appropriate response for actions of Khmer

- Can be accomplished with little military risk.

CONS

- Value of Khmer vessel not comparable to US flag vessel seized.

- Would be necessary to sink or tow to Guam.

Could result in Khmer destroying MAYAGUEZ.

- Islands are sensitive real estate because of possible oil discovery.

- Blocking Cambodian access to Hor Panjang will allow Vietnamese u: contested access at an inopportune time for Cambodia.

- Few if any inhabitants.

CONS

-.

- Possibility of territorial claim

by Vietnam.

,

.. ' _ __.

SEQUENCE OF EVEt~TS

~ECON - ON GOING

::' ::: : • '-: - -. p __ ~ '_*--: .... __ .. _T_: : _. ~ :':~: ~: -:

: : :

JSS CORAL SEA CVA-43

K.

CAN LAUNCH MINING IRECON AIC

**: --

• FIRST LIGHT

ON 14TH I:)'

:'_ 1

ETAOH KOMPONG SOM

ISS HAROLD E. HOLT DE- 1074

ISS OKINAWA LPH-3

...

£TA OFF KOMPONG SOM

.: 4.:. ': . __ . :: '1J NOTE: SPEED LIMITED TO 10KT SOA-BOILER CASUALTY

H A SUSIC

UNDTMD

ISS WILSON DOG-7

":'~:_ :.: .: ; . ::DI . :w~_:]

--------------~---------------------- ....

(fA OFF

KOMPONG SOM

JSS VEGA AF-59 -

USS HANCOCK CVA-19

[? ~: ·t· • :':_: -~ i -'I

ET A KS. J SHAFTS

['--- -_- ::-: ~'

.... ....

HO SUBIC ON J SHAFTS IS KTS

__ ~I~_S~LN~~~_'~ __ O __ ~~ __ -+ ~~ ~ ~ __ --~ -+ __

130600 131200 131800 132400

140600

141200

141800

142400

150600

151900

112400 i~o~

All TIMES EDT

---- 13 MAY -----~·I-, ---- 14 MAY -----,+-1---- 15 MAY ---(-----_.-1+t-11-

~. - .

\

1

~TOP SIGRH

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFf WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301

SM-259-75 13 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, J-3

Subject: Words To Be Included in Operation Order (U)

(TS) Your operation order should include words saying that the helicopter with bullhorn should appear overhead coincidentally

with the force intended to take Kas Tang (Koh Tang). The message

from the helicopter should say words to this effect: "Produce all

the Americans immediately or we will harm you."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

----{£r2L

G) 1. COOKE

Brigadier General, USAF Secretary

Classified by Secretary, JCS SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1985

- TOP S.£eRET

,.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF Sf AFF WASHINGTON, D.C. ::10301

SM-625-75

5 November 1975

. , ~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO~~NDANT, AIR WAR COLLEG~

; .

Attent1on: Lieutenant Colonel~~~~E. Smith, USAF

Subject: Request for Information, S5 ~mYAGUEZ

~ ~. ·"-;l J

1. Referenc~ your message 22130bz October 1975, which requests data concerning the IJ'!\YAGUEZ, opera tion •.

!

I j

j

1

,{

2. Operational messages related to this incident number in exoes s of 500. The a t t actied basic after action report, submitted to the President by'the Secretary of Defense, represents a summar y of the incident gleaned from the many r epoz t s , 'This and other documents which have been se Le'ot.ed and identified

be Low should provide adequate information' 'from wh i.ch appropriate presentations =v= studies may be, derived •..

.

a. sections 1, 2 and 3, USSAG/7AF 141730Z, May 1975 (TOP SECRET).

j •

b. CINCPAC message 142112Z May 1975 (SECRET).

c. JCS Afte~ Action Report, US Military Operations, SS MAYAGUEZ/ Kaoh Tang Island, 12-15 Hay 1975 (SECRET).

d. USS HENRY B. l'JILSON message 161420Z May 75 (SECRET).

e. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4, USS HENRY B. WILSON message 212307Z May 75 (CONFIDENTIAL).

f. USS HAROLD E. HOLT message 180553Z May.75 (SECRET).

g. Lessons Learned - SS MAYAGUEZ!Kaoh Tang Island Operations 12-15 May 75 (SEC~T).

h. CINCPACAF, Assault on Kaoh Tang Island (SECRET) •.

\tElin I!~T :::;:;1~/~!.5 DECLl~.S~~f~;j': (~;Ir

1985

---- ... _--------

..

ltlP SIGR£T. ,

, .'~. ~~ --.;,~~- --" ... --- .... -~ ~- _.

~

._ ...... " ._ .. ;.:::..) ..... " ,- .. ., ...

~ •

... ' .... ~...-- '--~ _.,.

(

3. Further coordination of informat:ion on this incident may be _obtained by contacting Colonel Paul A. Seymour, Chief, Southeast Asia Branch, Pacific Division, J-3, OJCS. '

4. Without attachments, this memorandum is regraded UNCLASSIFIED •

. (

_.'

0t

Attachments

. a/s

G. E. COOKE

Brigadier General, USAF Secretary, JCS

, .

. "" \

.:

, .,

"

_".,.

2

lOP SECRET

--

.............

~ - u.,_p . .----.,. __ ___,...... < _ •••• _. _ _"__._.,,

-_I--

I

"

e. .-

SEIZURE OF THE MA Y Al;UEZ

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITAUY AFFAIRS.

OF THE

CO~[MITTEE ON INTERNATIONA.L RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PART III

JULY 31 AND SEPTE~IBER 12, 1975

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

63-071

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1976

I.

..

\

, , f

~

....

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1

THOMAS E. MORGAN, P(!llnSYITanln, Ohairman

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin WILLIAlI S. BROOMFIELD, lIIleblgun

WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio EDW ARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois

L. n. FOUNTAIN. ~orth Carolina PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois

DANTE B. FASCELL. Florida JOHN H. BUCHANAN, In., Ala.bama

CHARLES C. DIGGS, In., M1chtgan J. HERBERT BURKE. Florida

ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania PIERRE S. DU PONT. Delaware

DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR" OhIo

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York EDWARD G. BIESTER, JR., PeDnsylo:an!a

I,EE H. HAMILTON, Indiana LAURY WINN, JR., Kansas

LESTER L. WOLFF, New York BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York TENNYSON GUYER, OhIo

GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California

ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carollna

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts

LEO J. RYAN, California

CHARLES WILSON, Te~as

DONALD W. RIEGLE, In., Michigan

CARDISS COLLINS. Illinois

STEPHEN J. SOLA HZ, New York

HELEN S. 1I1EYNER, New Jers~y

DON BONKER. Washington

MARIAN A. CZARN&CKI, OMef oJ Staff

SUl3COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AwADIS

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Ohairman

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina CHARLES WILSON. Texas

DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., MIchigan

R. MICIU.E1L FINLEY, Subcom.mittee StaJ! Oomtultanf JON D. HOLSTINE,Minority Subcom.mittee Staff Consultant JOAn C. SULLIVAN, Staff .i8818tant

CAIIOL A. BARIIY. Staff AssiBtant

LARRY WINN. Ja., Kansas

JOHN n. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama

(U).

• ceQ ii),r ~ •• CO.II.

• C c. ell O. C oet' .cc •• ~ •• coet. el U •• 'f

•• C C'.'·~I •• L (I .,.'rc_

•• C (,.Ct •• c C~ .·e< •• C CI.I)\~ •• C C _,e.c •• G o • .,-1

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

Thursday, July 31, 1975: page

Ingersoll, Han. Robert S., Acting Secretary of State; _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 256

Miller, Robert H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia

and Pacific Affairs - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 266

Friday, September 12, 1975:

Abramowitz, Morton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, East

Asia, and Pacific Affairs , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 295

Atkinson, Brig. Gen. A. W., U.S. Air Force, Assistant Director of Operations for Command and Control, Joint Chiefs of Staff______ 303 Clements, Hon. William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense______ 289 Dambrauskus, Col. Vincent, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Communications-

Electronic" Directorate , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 308

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

List of Members of Congress who were notified by the executive branch

at the beginning of the ltfayaguez seizure ~ _

Response received by the Department of State from the United Nations

Secretary Gen eral , " _

Department of Stu tc answer on Geneva Protocol of 1925 _

Sighting of fishing vessel with possible Caucasians aboard _

Detailed sequence of United States early reconnaissance efforts in attempt-

ing diversion of Cambodian gun boats reaching the mainland with the

crew members of the M ayaguez _

Department of Defense estimates depicting Cambodian strategy with crew

of Mayaguez after captivity and arriving on the mainland (REAM) _

Clarifying statement on executive determination of exact whereabouts of

crew members of the Mayaguez upon arriving on mainland _

Clarifying statement submitted by Defense Department on cable com-

munication received, and by whom, during seizure of the .Mayaguez _

Clarifying statement submitted by Defense Department on precise times PACOM, CINCPAC, and the Pentagon were notified on the seizure of

the ltfayaguez _

Department of Defense procedures in processing of reconnaissance photog-

raphy _

Statement clarifying exact location Df ltfayaguez at the time of the seizure

by the Cambodians _

Clarifying statement by Defense Department of sequence of U.S. helicopters strikes on the Cambodian crew during seizure of the lIfayag1lez __

APPENDIX

Letter from Assistant Secretary of State McCloskey to Han. Thomas E.

Morgan, chairman of the Committee on International Relations responding to resolutions introduced in the House opposing the seizure of the

ltfayaguez - ~___________ 321

Message from the Department of State to the United Nations Secretary General regarding releaseof the Mayaguez and its crew______________ 324 Message from the President to the Cambodian officials dated May 12

demanding release of the members of the crew of the Mayaguez________ 325-

(III)

263
274
287 I
299 f
301
301
302
303
304
306
312
312 --qa. .. o..d

--Rf)1I1)"

- ... v- _ trlit

J

J

----- .------- ....

SEIZURE. OF THE MAYAGUEZ

~RURSDAY, JULy 31, 1975

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COM~nTTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

SUBCOMl\HTTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

POLITiCAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, lVa8hington, D.O. 1.11e subcommittee met at 10 a.m, in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. F ASCELL. The subcomittee will come to order.

This morning the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs continues its inquiry into events surrounding the seizure of the 1II ayaguez and subsequent U.S. Government efforts to secure release of the vessel and its crew.

The purpose of our hearings is to establish the facts and to evaluate the effectiveness of the crisis management operations of our Government in order to assure that future crises are handled in a way that

minimizes risks to peace and to the lives of our citizens. .

Since the seizure of the lIlayaguez, the subcommittee and the full committee have held fixe hearings on various aspects of the crisis. Testimony has been received from representatives of the Defense and State Departments, Members of Congress and Charles Miller, Captain of the M ayaguez. After today's hearing the subcommittee will resume our inquiry in September with testimony from the Deputy Secretary

of Defense. -

Now, I would like to ask our ranking- minority member, Mr. 'Ylnn, for such comments as he cares to make.

Mr. ·WIXN. Thank you, Mr, Chairman.

I, too, would just like to add my welcome and thanks to vou, Mr. Secretary, for appearing before us this morning. 'Ve know that you understand and share our interest. in completing OUl' investigation of the M ayaguez, action, and in creating' a solid public record which leaves no doubts as to the handling of that situation.

We are also appreciative of the many people from the ndminist.ration who have already testified before us and other subcommittees, and we know that you wi1l be every bit as helpful as they have been, as you always are. There are a few areas about which we have some questions and which we hope yon can help us clarify.

Thank you, )[1', Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. Mr. Winn.

Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have you here this morning. I appreciate the efforts that 'have been made 'by the Executive to make you available to make this public record. As Mr. Winn says; and as

(255)

256

you know, we are operating under a resolution of inquiry and that makes it doubly necessary lor us to get at the facts.

Our witness this mornmg is the Acting Secretary of· State, Robert

S. Ingersoll, who is accompanied by Robert H. Miller! Deputy Assist'and Secretary for East ASIa and Pacific Affairs; Mr. Robert Demling, Executive Assistant to Mr. Ingersoll; Mr.· Monroe Leigh, Legal Ad-

viser to the Department of State, and Ambassador Robert McCloskey, Assistant Secreta.ry of State for Congressional Relations.

Mr. Secretary .

• c c c e« •• C U.f~ .C C •• t. O. C L).lC! • C C •• f. •• C(J •. 4~ • l U •• t.

STATEMENT OF RON. ROBERT S. INGERSOLL, ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Robert Stephen' Ingersoll, of Winnetka, Illinois, was sworn in July 10, 1974 as Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Ingersoll had served sInce January 8, 1974, as As· sistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Atrairs, and from April 3, 1972 until last January as U.S. Ambassador to Japan .

Born in Galesburg, Illinois, on January 28, 1914. Mr. Ingersoll graduated from Phlttlps Academy and from the Sheffield Science School of Yale Unlveralty, where he received a RS degree in 1937.

Before hIs service in Japan, Mr. Ingersoll had spent some thirty·five years In industry, the last thirty-three with the Borg-Warner Corporation in Chicago. He was Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive officer of Borg-Warner at the time of his appointment to Japan. Prior to joining Borg- Warner, lIfr. Ingersoll

served with ArIllco Steel Corporation from 1937 to 1939. .

He has been active in a number of civic and professional organizations.

Forrnertv a director of the First National Bank of Chicago, Atlantic Richfield, Burlington Northern, Marcor Corp. and a member of the Board of Directors ot the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, he has also been a Director of the Chicago Assoclarton of Commerce and Industry and a member of the Business Council. In addition. he has been an active member of several International business committees: and eouncils. including the Advisory Council on Japan-It.S, F"conomic Relations. and the Emergency Committee for American Trade.

With a deep interest in education. Mr. Ingersoll holds trusteeships with the UniYerRlty of Chicago, the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, and the California Inst.itute of Technology. He was formerly President of the Board of 'Education of Winnetka, Ill.

Other associations involved him in Civic activities such as hoard memberships with Evanston, (Ill.) Hospital, Chicago Symphony Orchestra. Leadership Council for ;\fl'tropolitan Open Communities, and the Mayor's Committee for Arts and Cnl tnre (Chical!;o).

With a long interest in the Western part of the U.S., I1Ir. Ingersoll vacations in the Colorado Rockies where he participates in hiking, horseback riding, back packine, fishing. and skiing with his family.

lIIr. Ingersoll is married to the former Coralyn Eleanor Reid, and they have four daughters.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your inviting me to appear before you as a Department of State witness to testify concerninz the Iff ayaguez crisis.

Allow me to review brieflv what has already been provided. This subcommittee has received Department of State testimony on the jl[ auaoue» from Deputy Assistant Secretary Miller. A detailed chronology concerning the Mayaquez crisis was submitted in connection with that testimony. In addition, Assistant Secretary Mc010skey sent letters to Chairman Morgan, providing answers to questions stated in the proposed resolution of inquiry that had been introduced in the

257

House, and to you; Mr. Chairman, providing -f~rther inf~~ation

subsequent to Mr. Miller's testimony.' '

'With respect to the legal aspects of the M ayaguez affair, the Department's Legal Adviser, Mr. Leigh, appeared before Chairman Zablocki's Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific' Affairs. '

It is my understanding that you have now asked me to appear before yo~ because of my participation in the National Security Council deliberations concerning diplomatic and ultimately military action which resultedin the release of the ship and its crew.

I attended nio~t. meetings of the National Security Council during the M ayaguez CrIS1S as the Representative of the Department of State. I can outline for you some of the primary factors influencing the policy decisions which arose from those meetings but I do not believe it would be appropriate to provide a detailed account of internal

executive branch discussions. ' " ,

First, the President was primarily concerned with obtaining the safe release of the ship and its crew. As soon as it was clear that the ship had been taken to Koh Tang Island and not to the mainland, the National Security Council was faced with 'developing a course of action to prevent the crew from being moved to the mainland, where their rescue would have been more difficult and where the risk of long-term internment and the jeopardy to their lives would have

increased. "

In view of the Khmer authorities' hostility toward the United States, the probable conduct of t.he Cambodianstoward the captured

Americans was unpredictable. '

In the President's letter to the Speaker of the House and to, the President pro tempore of the Senate; andin Mr. Mil1er's testimony, you received an account of the actions by aircraft to prevent the movement of the crew and to keep track of such movement. as could be detected from the' air. All of these actions were directed toward minimizing the risks to the crew and toward securing their early safe return,

A second factor influencing National Security Council deliberations was the lack of response to our diplomatic efforts.

The President did not make the decision to proceed with military measures to recover the ship and crew until he had come to the reluctant conclusion that diplomatic efforts had not been successful in securing

the crew's and the ship's early release. ...

Mr. Miller's statement and our answer to the first question m Assistant Secretary McCloskey's letter to Chairman Morgan provide a detailed account of the essential elements of our diplomatic initiatives.

Third, the President was concerned for the principles undermined by the Cambodian action. He believed it was necessary to make clear that the safety of U.S. citizens and 'the freedom of the seas for U.S., vessels were matters of great concern to the American Government

and people. , . ,

Resrardless of the motives the Cambodian Government may have had i~ seizing the ship, the seizure occurred without any prior warning and without any conceivable basis in international III w. ~he Cambodlan _/

, See appendix, p. 821.

258

authorities, to our knowledge, made no prompt effort to notify us that the ship had been seized or whether .and how it might be released. It was important to make clear that this illegal act of force and interference with freedom of navigation by the Cambodian authorities

could not be considered an acceptable precedent, . ..

Military action to recover the ship and its crew was finally taken on 'Ve~nesday evening, May 14, because we believed that further delay, in the absence of any constructive response to our diplomatic initiatives from any source, would risk removal of the entire crew to the mainland where their rescue would be more difficult and their

safety placed in further jeopardy. :.. . .

It was not until our military actions to recover the ship and crew were already underway, that we received in Washington a report of a domestic broadcast in the Cambodian language which did not state that the vessel and crew would be released but only that the vessel would be released. The broadcast did not say when the vessel would be released. Moreover, the broadcast was not directed to the United States. After learning of this message, we announced that as' soon as the Cambodian authorities would issue a statement that they were prepared to release the crew members unconditionally and immediately, we would promptly cease milita.ry operations.

The Cambodian authorities did not issue any such statement. 'Ve were not certain that the Cambodians had, in fact, released the entire crew until some 3 hours after receiving the domestic broadcast.

It is reasonable to assume that the Cambodian authorities were concerned that our initial efforts to prevent movement of the crew presaged a determined effort to rescue them; we further assume that such concern influenced their decision to release the crew and that our military actions to recover the crew removed any Cambodian doubts about that decision.

We deeply regret the Iives lost during this operation. However, even in retrospect, there is no clear reason to believe that a course of action other than that taken would have secured the safe release of the ship and its crew.

I shall be glad to answer any questions, sir.

Mr. F"\SCELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. For whatever reasons, the Executive's conclusions are as good as any, the fact is that the ship and crew were released.

'Ve have a quorum call over there and I guess we might as well take

an informal recess and we will get right back. rA. short recess was taken.]

Mr. F ASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, would you please discuss the State Department's contribution to the NSC meetings during the Mayagu.ez crisis in terms of personnel involved. the information that was provided and options, if any, that were identifiable, that were presented.

Mr. INGERSOLL. As far as the attendance of State Department representatives, I attended the first day on the 12th. I attended the NSC meeting on the 12th which was held at noon. Mr. Sisco attended a meeting on Tuesday morning at about 10 :30 and I attended a meeting that evening at 10 :40. I attended again at a meeting on the 14th about 4 o'clock and then a followup meeting was held on Thursday at about 4 o'clock.

,

!

·CGOQOQ •• co ... ~O!. .cc.eoG ... {).Q. C)~a)4

ecc.eoe e.coe.~~( .CO •• O,EJ

•• C o e e-c •• C o •• €.14 •• 0 (,.Cr:C .ecc •• IG.~ •• e· o. fJ\f! • ec c. eell •• G ().~(5

259

)

As far as documents Or advice to the NSC is concerned, Mr. Chairman, I believe my statement has already indicated. that I think these are privileged and it would not be proper to disclose them in open session, sir .

Mr. F ASCELL. I was not asking for any documents, just trying to get clear in my mind what was State's input, if any. I mean, were you just an observer at the meetings you attended.j

Mr, INGERSOLL. As far as I was concerned, I was an observer/ the Department, itself, provided whatever information we had, first, from the commercial channels that announced the seizure of the ship which came to us somewhere after 5 o'clock on Monday morning. I do not believe there was any other communication with the ship after that.

It continued for a short time but then was shut off when the Cambodians shut down the radio transmission from the ship.

I think that the bulk of the communications probably came from the military after that in their effort to locate the ship and determine

what was happening to it. .

'Ve had access to those communications but they came to the NSC from the military.

:Mr. FASCELL. 'Yel] , if I understood this--

:Mr. IXGEHSOLL. Excuse me, Mr. Miller reminds me we did make diplomatic representations, first, in the Department to the Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China on Monday afternoon. 'Vhen he refused to accept the message, we transmitted the message to our liaison office in Peking which, in turn, delivered the messaze to the Foreign Office of the People's Republic and to the Cambodian Government in Peking.

Mr. FASCELI,. 'Yell, as I had understood from prior testimony, Mr.

Secretary, when an event like this occurs, there are two management centers that ~o into operation. One is in State and I do not know what its name is-I guess it is crisis room. 'What is the name ~

)11'. INGERSOLL. 'Ve had a task force in the operations center where

all messages come into the Department.

)Ir. FASCELL. Are you talking about the State Department nowj )Ir. Ixneasor.r., The State Department.

)£r. FASCEI,L. It had a task force?

Mr. IXGERSOLT,. Whenever there is a crisis of this nature a task force is set up specifically for this particular event and one was established so that we could monitor on a 24-hour basis any messages that might be received,

Mr. FASCELL. Now that is called operations center in the State Department ~

)fr. IXGFJ{soLL. Yes. sir.

Mr, F ASCEI,L. The Defense Department operates one, too, as I under-

stand it. from the testimony. .

:Mr. INGERSOT,T,. Yes, sir .

)fr. FASCF.I,L. And nt the two onerntions centers, if that is what they called it in Defense. Do you know ~

i

1 'TilP following n'mplltylng statement subsequently 8ubmtttPd by IIIr. Ingersoll:

"While the trnnscrfpt Is correct In recording what I satd, I wish to provide this ampttfyln.:; statement hCCBl1Ae I rntsunderstnod the mennlug of the chairman's question .

"I attended the NSC meetIngs DS the representative of the Department of State, nnd therefore was <>f course 9. participant rather than an observer In the proceedings. Bowever, other participants took a more active part In the discussions than J did."

63-971-76-2

~60

Mr. INGF.RSOLL. National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. That, like our operations center, is always in existence 24 hours

a day 7 days a week. . ...' . ' ..

Mr. F ASCELL. There is some kind of communication that takes place between the two centers and I was never quite clear how they did it.

Mr. INGERSOLL. 'Ve received the message of the seizure from the National Command Center in the Pentagon, that is, the State Depart-

ment did, to our operations center. .'

Mr. FASOELL. 'VeIl, State sets up a task force. Is that automatic or does some special action have to take place once the crisis is identified 1 Mr. INGERSOLl,. That is true. lVe only set it up when the crisis is identified and a determination is made that it warrants a special task force.

Mr. FASCELL. 1Vho makes that determination ~

Mr. INGERSOLL. Usually the regional desk recommends it to the

Deputy Secretary.

Mr. FASCF;T,L. 'Vas that done in this case? Mr. INGERSOLl,. Yes,sir.

Mr. FASCELL. "Vhat did the task force consist of,.1n terms of State personnel for the ilI aya,quez?

:i\fr. INGERSOl,L. 'VeIl, the operations center is as I pointed out, in existence all the time, but to a ugment the operations center and to 11a ve something concentrating- on this, one or two officers were assigned from East Asian Bureau, which is responsible for Cambodia, to the operations center to form the task force.

There was not a great deal or volume for them to handle but at least they were monitoring it on a 24-honr basis.

, Mr. FASCELL. I do not quite understand. '''hat were they monitoring in this case? They ha ve no traffic from anybody.

Mr_ IXGERSOLL. 'Yell, we had some traffic, diplomatic traffic and we had considerable traffic with the military.

Mr. FASCELL. That is different. The' only traffic yon had was your

diplomatic effort going to the Government of China.

Mr. INOERsor,L. And the Cambodian Government. - l\fr. FASCELL. And the Cambodian Government,

Mr. INGERSOLl,. And to Thai Government, to our Embassy in Thailand and later to the United Nations.

Mr. FAscELr,. Basically, having done that as far as the minute-to- . minute operations were concerned, that came out or the National Military Command Center made available both to the operations center in State and to the National Security Council]

Mr. Ixcensor.r., Right. .

Mr. F ASCELL. That is direct communications in some fashion. I do not know how that works yet, but I guess we will find out.

Mr. INGERSOLl .. It, is electronic communication directly with each center and that exists all of the time. I mean that is not something that just started up.

Mr. FASCFlLL. You mean the 1\'\'0 centers are hooked up by computers or telephone or whatever. I am not sure I understand.

Mr. INGERSOLL. 'Ve 11, it is a message communication.

Mr. FASCELL. 'I'eletyperadio, I mean that is all I am trying to find out-what is it?

•• c···o.c •. c...~---'.~ ••. 0·,,0.'

.ce, •• ' •• e.O •• • ".c., •• l •• ,0 ••

I

;

261

Mr. INGERSOLL. They repeat the cable traffic and messages by teletype, yes. I do not know whether' that is the term-they. are in telephone communication all of the time, but there is transmittal of mes-

sages automatically to each of those centers, .

Mr. F ASCELL, I want to be sure I am clear on this and the record has JlO inference otherwise with respect to at '.least Secretary Ingersoll's participation in the three meetings on the 12th, 14th, and l~th of .May 1975, on the ill ayaguez incident. I am left with It distinct impression that JOU did not say anything, do anything, or offer anything and that you were merely an observer representing the Department of State:

Mr. INGJmSoLL. I think you left out the meeting I was attending on the 13th. I attended one on the evening of the 13th.

Mr. FASCELL. Right. I did leave that out. I am sorry, That is on the list.

~II·. I~WEI!SOLL. Of course, Dr. Kissinger attended all of these meetings but. us the adviser to the President for National Security Affairs, Mr. FASCl'LL. The only trouble is we do not know which hat he was

wearing when he was talking.

1\f,', Ixcznsor.r; I believe he was talking this way. i) Ir. F ASCEU., As both ~

~h. INGERSOLL. No. I believe as the adviser to the President, because I wus representing State Department. I did make some comments during the deliberations, but I say I think it is not. proper for me to disclose the discussions that went on during the NSC meeting.

Mr. FASCELL. Axe you saying that on advice of Mr. Leigh or are you j list saying it?

UI'. Ixm;RSOLr .. "VeIl, on his advice and my own understanding of the pri vileged nature of NSC meetings.

Mr. FASCELL. "VeIl, yon are really not in a position to claim oxecutive privilege, Mr. Secretary, but I think we need to clear up on the record why you make the statement, if at all, because I cannot, think of anything I ha ve asked yet that could not be answered, But, let us get it straight 011 the record. I mean, you are claiming executive privilege or attempting to; is that correct?

Mr. I xmmSOLT •. I believe the President is the only one that can claim executive privilege.

Mr, FASCELL. I think he is, too.

Then the question arises, whether or not even the President can delegate that right or claim to anybody else and, if he does, how does he do it, arid since he has not given you any letter in writing or any instructions to claim it, I do not see how you could claim it except gl·atnitously. I do not even know why you claim it, frankly, but that is your business, not mine.

Mr. Ixoxnsor.r •. You were asking me what I said during the meetings. Mr. FASCELL, You said you did not say anything, so why would you

claim executive privilege if you did not say anything? .

Mr. INGERSOLL. I had said I made a few comments, but they were

minor to the major discussions, .

MI'. FASC};LL. Yes. Well, I must confess I certainly would not be interested in any minor comments in a major discussion.

Could we have some idea, if ,Yon do not violate whatever it. is vou arc hanging onto in terms of pr: vilcge, what the range of options was

/

262

that might be considered? I mean I could draw my own scenario but 1 do not know why I would want to do that.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think the first effort was diplomatic contact with fhe Cambodian Government and with the People's Republic of China, the only outside government that had any contact with ,the Cambodian Government at that time.

Mr. FASCELL. That was the United States first effort to try diplo-

mati cally to get the release of the vessel and the crew. '

Mr. IXGERsOLL. Yes, sir.

That was the first effort we made on Monday afternoon. , 1\11'. F ASCELJ.. Then the decision was made on that date, l\fay 14. as I

understood you to say, on the night of May 14. that dinlornatic efforts having failed, the decision was made to go ahead with some kind of military action.

Mr. INGERSOLL. .Yes, sir.

Mr. FAscELr~. Is that correct ? I am not trring to trap you or put words in your mouth, but trying to get it straight.

Mr. IXGERSOLL. No. that is true and I think this was disclosed to a group of conzressionnl leaders about 6 :30 that eveni ng. the evening of the 14th. There was about an hour's meeting in the "lnlite House at which the subject was discussed.

)fr. FASCELL. ]\TOW, we get into the time differential problem and I am not sureexactly what the time differential is with respect to that; but the allegation has been made that, at the time the meeting took place to which you refar, when congressional lenders for the first time were called to the "Thite House, the military action was already underway.

Mr. I~mEllsoLI,. It had not taken place at Koh Tang Island.

The heJicopters were underway but could have been recalled. I might mention, if you thought this was the first contact with Congress, there was a previous contact by telephone on Monday afternoon; the 12th.

)[r. FASCELL. I think we have that. in the record, Mr. Secretary. that somebody in the 'White House-I did not. get the gentleman's namecalled the Sneaker on the telephone. The Speaker could not remember his name, either, bv the way.

Mr. I~GERsoLL. They called about 21 Members at that time, not just tho SpNlker.

)11'. F_\SC'E!,L. lYell, I am glad to have that information for the recOJ·d. Do you ha pnen to know who the 21 Members were ~

"There were they called from q

Mr. IXGERsou~:From the lVhite House, but they can give you the names for the record.

Mr. FASCELI~. I think that would be useful to do that.

Mr. IXGERSOLL. I emphasize that even on ·Wednesday. when the conzressional leaders were brought into discussion on this snbiect at tlw 1Yhite Honse. that the operation could have been recalled if there J1PCI heon reason to do so.

)fr. FASCELL. But. the fact is that. it really was underway.

Mr. IXGEnsOLT .. The order bad been gIven to move, because it was a severn l-hour flil!ht by helicopter from the Thai base to the island. )fr. RTEGLE.1Vill the chairman yield for an inquiry!

Mr. F ASCELL. Sure.

. -

Jlq*\~>!,<.,.",. I ,~ .. ~,~ ~Sl.:!,.! "

,

! j

/

· )fr.RIEGLE. You have several people here with you from the State Department and I would like to know who the 21 people are HOW. Can somebody go to the phone and find out so we do not have to wait.

Mr. F ASCELL. 'Why don't we make the record complete while doing it because there were several phone calls made later 011, as I recall, befOl'e the first meetinz at the 'White House on May 14 with the leadership group aiu] this 1ms already been spread on some other record so you might as well do it here. But there were phone contacts at least twice as I recall. I agree with the gentleman that we might as well get it in

tho record now. .

[The following information was submitted for the reeord i]

Scnator8.-)Iil,e Mansfield; John Stennis: Clifl'ord Case; John Sparkman; Strom Thurmond; John lIcClellan; James Eastland; Hugh Scott; Robel·t 1'.

Griffin; Robert C. Byrd; and lIIilton R. Young.

RcpreaentutivcII.--Cnrl Alberr.: TlIomas P. o-xem, Jr.; John :lIcFaU; Jolin Rhodes; Robert H. :lIlchel ; George Mahon; Thomas E. Morgan; William Broorufield; Melvin Price; }<;]ford A. Cederberg; aurl Bob Wil~Oll ..

Mr.F ASCEU>; .Mr. 1Yinll. Mr. 1VIXX. Thank you.

There has been question, Mr. Ambassador; that possibly because of the lack of communications perhaps the Cambodian Government did not get our message . As I understand the information that was sent back to the committee by Mr. McCloskey-and I want to be sure that is who signed this--yes. That the Chinese Government was one of the first notified and that at the time there were two stories, that they refused to pass that message on.

~Ir. INGERSOLT>. That was the message we attempted to pass to them

here in Washington; yes, sir.

:!III'. 1VINN. Not throne in Peking.

Mr. IXG};Rsou,. 1VelI, in Peking they returned the message. Mr. 1Vrxx. By regular mail?

:i\fr. I:~WERSOLl>. Yes,later--

:\11'. 1Y1:."x . And rho other attempt to communicate 0111' feelings to the Cambodian Govornment was through--

~fr. Ixoznsor.r, [continuing], The Cambodian Government 1I1

Peking.

Mr. 1VIXX. Throusrh the Cambodian Government where I )fr. INGJ':nsoLI •. In Peking.

)£1'. "'lXX. In Peking, do you know the time difference on that or was there a time diffHcnce?

)[r. Txonnsot.r., Thev were delivered at about the same time to the Cambodian Government and to the Peking Government, I think: in addition to the diplomatic communications, there were public statements hy the President that we demanded that the ship and crew be

released. '

)[1'. 'Vrxx. I am "me of that but maybe the Cambodians do not rend the New York Timos.

)Ir. Ixcxnsor.r., I do not think it was just the New York Times hut was over worldwide communications.

)JI'. ","n\"x. That. is whnt I want to find out, what methods do we use to communicate our feelings or our demands or our time schedules to a government like the Cambodian Government who obviously has

been displaying an animosity toward the United States. .

11 7~

_c

---_ .. _ .. - ... _ ...

264

Mr. I1'WERSOLf,. As far as the direct communications; I have described how we did that. As far" as general communication that was done by the public press media--

j\h. 'VINX. But. we have no idea of whether the Cambodian Government in Phnom Penh ever got access to that through whatever method they' used to pick up news.

:\Ir. INGERSOLL. 'Ye never had any response from them, but the one communication we had from them was a public broadcast in Cambod in that they intended to release the ship.

Mr. 'YINN. That was several days later. :Mr. INGERSOLT~. Yes.

Mr. 'YINX. According to the records we have, that is the only response they made to our Government at all and it was not really to our

Government but to their people. .

Mr. INGERSOLL. No. It was just a public broadcast.

Mr. WINN. Public? Why did we wait so long to notify the U;N.? 1Yhy didn't we notify them at the same time?

Mr. INGERSOLL. 'VeIl, I believe the UJIL was aware of it through the public pronouncements that had been made.

1\[1'. 'YINN. 'Yell, I am sure they were.

Mr. INGERSOLL. But the intention was to get a response directly from the parties involved, particularly the party involved, the Cambodian 'Goyernment. If we received a response from them, saying they were releasing the ship and the crew, there would be no need for the U.N. to take action.

'Yhen it was apparent they had returned our message, -that is

when we contacted the U.N. '

Mr. 'VIXN. 'Yell, I suppose I could be a Monday-morning quarterback but according to the letter here that we have from "Ambassador McCloskey, it says: Mr. 1Yaldheim, at our request, 2 days later, got directly in touch with the Cambodian Government. We had not been able to get in touch with them. If we had. they were completely ignor-

ing 11S which, of course, is obviously a possibility. ,.

Mr. IXGERsoLT,. They got no response at the U.N. immediately. It was several days later they got a response.

?lfr. WINN. That is right.

The Cambodinn Government did not answer Waldhcirri's request for a peaceful settlement between the two parties involved.

~[r. IXGF:RSOLI,. Right.

Mr. 'VIKN. In theearlier hearings we had on this, some of us were of the opinion that the Cambodians purposely seized this ship, because it was an American ship and I think that philosophy sort of prevailed for tho first 2 or 3 days when 1\Ir.1\{iller came up and appeared up here. Although nobody actually made the statement, I think many of us felt that. was the issue. That was part of the problem.

Captain Miller said that they were not flying an American flag and ·other than the printing of the name in 18 inch letters on both sides of the ship, there would be no way for them to know that that was fin American ship. So it looks like-I am strictly speculating=-the Cam· bodinn gunboat, in an effort to either protect that island, and I do not

have t.he name of the island, the first one where it was seized before it was taken around behind--

-.Jb&l3&aiHdb%_ ••

j

I I

t .'

• C Cl'e._ •• c en.

• c C\.I... c·ett.

• C C'.14 •• C Gt ...

.l C!l.!_

265

Mr. INGERSOLL. Poulo Wai. Mr. WINN. Right.

And the fact they seized a Korean ship and a Panamanian ship, and they took one of the two ships earlier, either in the same week or within 2 weeks prior to that, into the mainland, to investigate its cargo and still there are, according to Captain Miller, 10, 11, or 12 ships a day that use that same sealane which is approximately 5V2 miles off the island, I asked Captain Miller if it did not turn out that he was just sort of at the wrong place at the wrong time, and I forget his exact response, but that is about what it boiled down to. They just happened to.get ~>ne time aKorean ship, one time a Panamanian shiJ? and the third time was the charm, they got us. They got one of our ships. So, It did not look like it was intentional, I mean intentionally challenging

an American ship. . . . ..

Mr. IXGERSOLL. But I do not believe anybody knew that at the time. M.r. 'Ynm. No, obviously. I think most of us thought it probably was done intentionally at the time.

:Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. \YINN. As a matter of fact, I carried that in my mind until Captain Miller explained how many ships go up and down those

navigational lanes. .

Congressman Riegle has asked for the list of the 21 members and that brings a question to my mind. Do YOU believe that Congress can play any role during a crisis such as the Jlayaguez seizure ~ As I understand it, and I may be wrong, but as I understand it, mainly, the first couple of days; the 12th, the 18th, arid the 14th, even though we were having hearings up here which Ambassador McCloskey refersto all the way through his letter in answering our questions, Members of Congress were informed all the time, informed, 'and my question is, maybe :Members of Congress, the 21 leaders or 10 leadors=-whatever.is feasible in a crisis matter like thnt=-should be included in and "sitting down with the State Department and the executive branch and the Department of Defense, even if they sit there as observers oradd small talk as you said you did in some cases. What is your feeling .on. that,

Mr. Secretary? "" . . ",'. .

Mr. IXGEHsoLL. I think it is difficult to generalize in this sort of an issue. I believe that Congress should be involved in discussions of this type and the opinions of Congress certainly should be taken into account in nn ongoing event and decisions that are made with respect to that. I think eventually the President has to make the decision after he has consulted with both his own staff and the Congress. I think that the Chief Executive officer has to take that responsibility.

Mr. 'YINN. 'Yell, I think most of us would agree with that, that someone has to take the main responsibility and obviously that the top mnn, is the President of the United States. But he calls the National Semi: ' rity Council in for advice, to give him advice and he calls the Department of State in and I just am wondering if, in your opinion, you think he should not. have staff. because I would like to have clarification of this-I can nowhere through here find out if the President or the Secretary of State personally talked to anyone of om leadership in Congress, either the Speaker Or Mr. O'Neill or Mr. Rhodes or anyone personally, or if it was all done via the staff which is what your letter says.

266

Mr. IXGERSOLL. W''ell: on the meeting on the 14th and lflth, the meetmg on the 14th, the President personally discussed this subject with

the leaders that were present. . .

Mr. 1Ve,N. That was when the leaders of Congress went down to

the White House? .

Mr. IXGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. WINN. Of both parties]

Mr. INGERSOLL. I have forgotten the composition but I believe both parties were represented.

Mr. 'VINN. Well, if it is what was considered the normal leadership of Congress, it involved both parties.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I remember members of Loth parties being there hut

100 not know the entire complement.

Mr, ,"VINN. You were at the meeting I Mr. INGERSOJ,L. No. sir.

Mr. 'VINN. You Welt', not there I Mr. INGERSOJ,J,. No, sir.

Mr. 'VINN. 'Vas the Secretary there ~ Mr. IXGERSOLl,. I believe he was.

:'\fr. 'VIXN. Do you want to change that] ~[r. IXGERSOJ"L: He was there.

Mr. 'VINN. He was there and the President was there 1

Mr. IXGERSOLL. Yes. .

Mr, 1VINN. There is a timelag involved in some of the notification and we have hit :Mr. Miller pretty hard on this, I think, when he first came on the Hill, what was it, the 12th or 13th-I do not remember the day, it was pretty early.

Mr. I NOERSOLL. The 13th.

Mr. 'VINN. The 13th. 'Ve had another gentleman the day before that, didn't we, )[1'. Chairman !

)f 1'. F ARC};LT,. ",Veil, we had a desk officer.

:Mr. 'VTXK. 'Ve had the man that first got the notice in the early morning hours.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. MILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRE-

TARY OF STATE, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

:.l[r. MU,I,ER. Mr. Rives, Lloyd Rives.

Mr. FASCEI.T,. All he said was he got the message from then on. Mr. 'VIXN. To Mr. MilIcI', he gotJll touch with you 1

:Mr.l\{u,LER. Yes. .

Mr. 'VINN. I think the committee is trying to work out, and Mr.

Riegle is honestly trying to find out why and what the circumstances were that involved the loss of 41 men to, directly and indirectly, save 3D men which is obviously subject to criticism.

At the same time I think we are all wondering if the communications system which we feel involves Congress, is as good a system as we can develop.

'Ve have already found Rome biz discrepancies which probably do not come under your jurisdiction, and that is in the advance warning system by the ships. In other words, the Korean and Panamanian ships were seized and Captain Miller, who W!lS going right throuzh the suuie IUIlCS, was not aware of this under any circumstances. Even

)

f

•• c·o.~c • l.. ~~.'.'Ci •• o.o.eel •• ce·.,.e; •• C.O.C7- • • • c-c .• ·.C· •• CO • .,..

267

the truckers on our highways know where the speed traps are better than that and that is only going to cost them a ticket probably.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that is true.

Mr. 1VINN. That concerns us. He had a tendency to blame the Korean Government and Panamanian Government for not making rep'orts, but I blame our Coast Guard. Somewhere a captain that is sailing toward an island where trouble has been brewinz and where gunboats have been seizing ships from other countries and we have an American ship going into those waters, that captain should know what is facing him.

I suppose that he can change his course, or at least he is well aware of the possibilities. This is one of the biggest weaknesses that came out, I think.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think you are right, and that procedure has been changed to be sure that ships are alerted in the future for any similar event.

Mr. WINN. Yes; but 41 guys lost their lives as a part of the overall

deal because of a lousy communications system. .

Mr. INGERSOLL. Unfortunately, we find these things out after the event many times.

Mr. 'Vn .. N. It seems so simple to me, I mean they tell them the weather, they know what other craft are coming toward them, and I have not seen the reports, but they get out a full manual of that. So, somewhere there ought to be some type of emergency crisis communications that trouble is brewing up around a certain island and that other ships have been seized and searched.

'Ve were still at the tail end of a war there, and you do not have to use your imagination, with gunboats running around and the Cambodians trying to figure out where their men are and which islands they can seize and which ones are valuable.

I do not think anybody has to be too smart to figure that is going to happen certainly for a while at the tail end of the war.

Some of those islands we find out now were controlled partly by Cambodians, the Khmer Houge and so on. You are going to b'y to flush those Cambodians out, and some of those islands are coshared with the Thai Government.

Mr. !XGEUSOLL. The Vietnamese, sir. :Mr. 'VINN. "That 1

:Mr. INGERSOLl,. lVith the Vietnamese Government.

Mr. 'VrxN. 1Yith the Vietnamese, but some of the northern islands are shared with the Thai Government,

Mr. hWERSOLL. This particular island was in dispute between Vietnam and Cambodia. I think the fact there were so many ships going by there daily, it did not appear to be likely they were going to take all of the ships. 1 certainly agree with you that there should have been some warning going out, and we have a procedure now which will make sure the warnings do go out. The Korean ship was not seized but fired upon, but it got away. I understand that the Korean Government did issue a warning to its ships, but no other nation picked up that warning .

Mr. 1VINN. That is kind of hard to understand . Mr, bWERSOLL. Yes .

63-971-;6-3

I

268

Mr. F.\SCELL. 'Will YOIl yield at that point? Mr. WINN. I will be ghtd to.

JIr, F',\SCELL. As a matter of fact, it is a well-known secret, is it not, ~Ir, Secretary, that the incident involving the Korean ship was picked up in the foreign broadcast information service, which is published and made available and public to everybody, The President did not find out about it until after the AJayaguez incident was all over, and he was, to say the least, slightly disturbed about it.

~fr, 'VINN. I have no more questions, Mr. FASCELI>, Sure; I am sorry,

Mr, WrxN. No; I would like to yield.

Mr. HrEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. 'Yinn for the gracious comment he made earlier.

I understand, Mr. Ingersoll, that you were really not It direct PlIl'-

ticipant in the decision process in the Security Council? l\f r, INGERSOI.T>. Yes.

Mr. Hn:.GLE, 'Vho were the direct participants?

Mr. Ixosnsota, Ml'. Leigh tells me only the President is involved in the decisionmaking process. He is the one who makes the decisions, Mr. HIF.GLE. "Tell, as I look at the meetings here, and there were five of them, I believe, I think there was one that the President was not able to attend.

Mr. INGERSOLL. If that were true, it was the one I did not attend, I do not know whether he was not at that meeting, but he attended c\'ery meeting I attended.

Mr. HIEGLE. I think there is one that you missed and that he missed, but I assume that is the reason he has other people-I mean he does Bot go to the meeting by himself but has other people with him, and from what you told us, they talked a lot and you did Bot talk very much, and presumably the President solicited advice, and he was discussing it and options were presented and people were advocnting points of view, and out of it came a collective judgment.

Mr. INGERSOLL, No; I do not think it is n, collective judgment, but I think it is the President who makes the decision. This has been my experience in other meetings. In fact, ill some meetings no decision is mude,

Mr. HIEGr,E. 'Vern recommendations prcscnted l Mr. I XOl-:RSOI.f.. Y es,

i\fl'. HIEGu,. By whom?

M r, INGERSOLL. By attendees at. the meeting. Mr. HIEGLE. ,Yho are you l'efclTillg to?

1It-. IXGF:nsor.J.. At the various meetings there were representatives from the Defense Department. Seeretary Schlesinger, I believe, wus at most of the meetings I attended. Assistant to the President for Xationnl Security Affairs Dr, Kissinger WlIS there. CIA Diredot' Colin' was there, awl the Chairman of the -Ioint Chiefs. It varierl : it was George Brown at times, and then I thi Ilk Da ve .Iones was there another timc-I hu ve forgotten at which meeting.

),[1'. Hn:nuc. 1Yho present cd the rccommendutions]

i\[r. IXGERsou .. The operation of the NSC, the meeting structurcvis thut the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs usun lIy summarizes the options and recommcudutions.

~fl'. HIEGr.E. Dr. Kissinger?

. _ ... _ -- -- - _, . ...

l

269

::\11'. INGERSOLL. Yes; and the other members discuss what has been presented.

Mr. RIEGLE. Now, when he makes those summary presentations, is it based on an earlier mooting that has taken place with him and other members in the absence of the President?

In other words, how does the summary get pulled together that he then prepares, or does he just do that himself 1

Mr. INGERSOLL. In normal circumstunces, where there is time for preparation in advance, there is another meeting held at which the President is not present, and Dr. Kissinger usua Ily presides. It depends upon the issue, but after the 'Vashington Special Group or the Senior Review Group meet, though the NSC stair provides the briefing for

Dr. Kissinger. .

Mr. RIEGLE. In this instance, then, Dr. Kissinger made the recommendations ~

Mr. INGERSOLL. He presents options. Seldom docs he make recommendations.

::\fr. RlF.GU;. So, arc you saying that several options were presented for It Presidential decision?

Mr. IXGERSoLL. 'Yell, the matter of diplomatic initiative, a matter of various militar-y actions that might take place nml--

.:\11'. HU:Gr,I'~, Let us take the militarv actions because that is the sort of thing where we should know if 1ll01~e than one option was presented. )11'. Ixm:RsoLI,. 'Yell, there were 11 considerable number discussed, yes.

Mr. Rn:ou:. "'as one recommended over the rest 1

1\:[1'. IXGEJ:SOLL. 'Yell, there were several, fOI' instance, the marines were moved from Okinawa to back up those that had come from other areas.

The various ways of reaching: the island were discussed because we did not have any assets around the island at the time, naval vessels, aircraft, the Marine helicopters, these were all discussed.

Mr. 1{IEGu:. Those are sort of tactical questions that would presumably fall under It general heading of "military action," if you decide to take mi Iitary action, then how do YOII do it 1

l\II·. INGERSOLL, How yon cnrr'y it out, that is right.

Mr. RIEGLE. So there was sonic tactical discussion that went OIl? 1\11'. INOImsoLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUGuc. I see, and within the area, were there options other than military ones considered, as you got. to the end of the decision process] Mr. IXGlmsoLI .. At various times durlng the meeting, yes; diplomatic efforts were discussed.

)Ir. H.IEGU:. After yon hied the diplomatic effort and that did not work, what ha ppened]

)Ir. !xmmsoLL. Again there was another diplomatic approach on 'Vednesday through the Unite(l Nations which was before the orders were in fact given to IIIOYC militarily.

)Ir. HIEGLE. And have we established why we waited so long to go to the United Nations? It nuikes it sound like it was an afterthought. If we are going to move in with the military we should at least muke an initiative through the United Nations. I think that kind of suspicion urises when you get the timelng,

270

Mr. IXGF:nsOLI •. Mr. ",Vinn asked me that and I said I think the desire was to 'get a response directly from the parties concerned that had been contacted through private diplomatic channels before we went to a general request to the United Nations.

Mr. Ru::au,:. Dr. Kissinger basically .made a recommendation' for

some kind of military action and then it was discussed,

Mr. IXGERSOLL. No; I did not say that. I said he presented options. Mr. HlEGLE. How many options were there?

Mr. Ixounsor.r •. 1,Vell, diplomatic and military I would say is about all there is.

Mr. RlEGLE. Aud after the diplomatic initiatives that you made did not produce anything, then that option fell on the side and you were then talking about military possibilities.

",Vithin the military side of it was there more than one option presented or just one option presented ~ .

~Ir. Txosnsor.r .. Well, there were several, you mi~ht say, means of rescuing the ship and tho crew that were suggested, yes.

j\Ir. l~n;GLE. Can YOIl describe those for us?

Mr. I~GJmsoLI •. I think it is not £01' me to talk about what other people said .

Mr. TIl£GLE. You sec, I ngree with yon that we have a problem there and the problem is we CHlUlOt get the people here who were the heavy hitters at the meeting. I mean, no disrespect to you but the problem is that when we ask for witnesses that were directly involved in this decision process we are not able to get them to testify and they ask you to come instead. You come because we cannot get them and it is like It "Catch 22" situation where all we want is an opportunity for direct conversation but never seem to be able to establish it. So as long as you have been selected as the intermediary, it seems to be your responsibility as someone who was there to tell us what happened.

Mr. IXGEnSOI.L. I am reluctant to do so.

Mr. Rn:m.F.. No, I understand; I realize that is the problem, but our job is to find out what took place and I do not think anybody here wants to subpena you 01' put witnesses under oath or anything of that

kind. '

Now, if you cannot tell us because you nrc reluctant to say what someone else said, then we are going to have to get somebody else in here.

M!'. IXGETISOI.L. I think so.

1\ll'.llIEGL]~. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1\[1'. FASCELL. Mr. Buchanan.

1\11'. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am in sympathy with t.he purpose of these hearings as described by the chairman and I quote, "To evaluate the effectiveness of the crisis management operations of our Government in order to assure that future crises are handled in a way that minimizes risks to pence and the lives of our citizens," I think that is a very meritorious purpose.

I am glad to hear you say that we have done something about this warning system because it does seem to me this is one thing that we need to do.

Mr. I:-;GERsoLL. I agree.

271

Mr. BUCHANAN. A second area I wanted to discuss with the Defense Department when the Deputy Secretary of Defense is here is the time lag between our notification that the ship had been taken captive and the sending out of a reconnaissance aircraft simply to find out what the status was. It seems like there was too long a timelag and I would like to explore it with them.

With respect to the lives lost in this operation, I am constrained to say that playing numbers games with the lives and rights of American citizens is just almost beyond belief to me. I would hate to live in a society in which the firemen would say, "Hey, there is a gny on top of that apartment, it is burning up and we might lose three firemen if we rescue him, one life against three, goodby buddy."

I would hate to live in a society in which the police would say, "There is a gangster holed up with a captive and he has It virtual arsenal and we might lose three or four policemen if we try to rescue him," and therefore, bid the captive goodby, rather than losing more Ii yes than we gave.

I would hate to see a situation where the marines would be unwilling to do what they did and take the risk they took and in some cases make the sacrifices they made because in t1l(~ process we might lose more marines than the American citizens whose lives they acted to try to save.

Now, as I understand it, the reason for the loss of life was primarily because they made the military.decision that providing the normal air coyer would run the risk of endangering the lives of the people they were actually trying to rescue and, therefore, they decided not to do that find that this is one of the bases for the amonnt or loss of

lives that occurred. .

If you , .. ish, I will bring it up with the Defense Department, but is that your understanding of the case?

~[r. Lxmcusor.t •. I think that is true. I think for Mr. Winn's benefit, we should g-et the record clear that the numbers he cited were not the result of military action, the 41 he referred to. A mechanical failure of a. helicopter in noncombat operation happens many times around the world, not only in our forces but others and I think it is unfair to include the lives that were lost in the transfer of personnel within Thailand to be included in combat losses of the marines on Koh Tang Island. And these figures arc cited by the press and I think by this subcommittee as being part of the combat operation,

Mr. RIEGLE. ·Would you yield on that pomt so we can establish that figure once and for all and I appreciate the gentleman doing so. I do not think anyone on this committee suggested they were lost in combat and I am sure the record would show that is not the case.

I think the assertion had been made, and I made it, was that. the loss of those troops occurred in this whole military effort and, if we had decided not to take this set of military steps, of which this was one backup step, then that particular movement of troops would not hnve taken place.

Mr. Ixonnsor,r., There is another thing, it could have happened to any helicopter.

1\11'. RmGLE. Yon can say what you "Want to, but the fact of the matte]' is it was related to this operation.

i

272

Ml', IXGEHSOLI" I did not say it was not, Ml'. HlEOLE. I did not think you did,

The fact is it was related to the operation and if you want to leave the numbers off you can do so . .I am troubled about the fact the administration did not even reveal that information until several days after the incident took place and it left the impression correctlv 01' incorrectly that facts were being hidden. It jacked up the numbers and that took some of the luster oft' the operation. The fact, is, it was related to the whole change of military events,

Mr, Lxosnsor.r., I agree with you, sir, but I say that it is not directly l'~latetl to the combat operation which is the implication that has been

gln'Jl, .

Mr. BGGIl,\XAX. It would appeal' to me that a defective helicopter would probably have fallen wherever it was flying and really it is not fun- to urttibutc that to some mistaken decision on the pa I't of the United States. Aside from that, I want to reiterate the point I started to make, I want to repeat us forcibly as I can, I believe it would be immoral und cowardly of the President of the United States to say:

If I act ill def('II~e of these America 11 cit lzens i II protection of thei r rights. t hel r llves and their freedom, it mav cost IIII' more I>eopie thun I can hope to rescue, t1H'refol't~ I will not net and I will let them go hang,

I think that would be inunoral, scandalously immoral, and cowardly us a basis for decision. I just wanted to register that as strongly as I can make it.

)1 r,lx(1EHBoLL. I agree with yon.

Mr, llL;c]I.\x.\x. 1 alii glad that WHS not the case, I think, however, we examine it, and whatever kind of color we try to paint it from un American point. of view, there was It need for decisi vencss and there was a ru-ed for action and it went. well beyond the 1.1[ ayaguez IIntI the crew and the Humber of marines involved. The world needed to understand we woulrlnct to defend a Ill' interests and OUl' citizens. I think for ~L gn'at runny of us in the United States, it. is quite enough to know that ·at a time of crisis we came up with decisi ve action in defense of OUI' people and 0111' I'ightfi.

As to whether 01' not this was a deliberate taking of an American '"('SHe I , vou havo indicated it is It It iatte I' of 0111' information that a number' of ships had passed all this sallie scalunc, yet of the three ships thnt were involvedin this, aile was one of OUl' 'allies in the COIlflic; in Southeast Asia which was fired upon and ours was the one which was ill fact seized and the crew taken capt ive.

Huvo we COIIIC to the conclusion that the fact that they "'CI'C Americans had nothing to (10 with the way they were handled? Arc we uc('('pting tho tlwor,Y this W:IS just a game of chance and they happened to be the ones taken, it might just as well have been somebody else?

~fr, Ixmm.soLl .. 1 had notheard this until Mr, "~illn mentioned it this morning,

I was not hem whon Captain )Iillel' madc his testimony .

:.'Ifl-, BFCIL\X.\X. You know, I urn a lousy fisherman but when] go lishing I somcf.imcs get, a twig and I sometimes get very little fish and I lll,ly be t-ishing for bass but catch all sorts of things ill the process of tryillg' to get the big bass and I am S1lggcsting it is not necessarily so that they were not after an Aruei-ican ship just because, well, I Hili

• (" C 0 ilj4 •• C O.IC] .CC •• ,l4 O. CO .IC: .c C •• n •• CLJ.i& .l U •• '~4

•• <!:o·.~ •• L~".'. •• C.O.'

• • C4C'.'. •• c o e •• c.c .•.• •• CO.I

273

just wondering if our Govcrnlllcnt has come to some conclusion, now, about that but It has not to your knowledge 1

.Mr. IXGEflsoLL . .I\' ot that .I know of.

MI'. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

Mr . .FASCEI>L. Mr. Secretary, the diplomatic effort was to have notes sent to the Cambodian Government and deli vered in Peking, right?

Mr" INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. j1'ASCELL. The note sent to the Cambodian Government was delivered in Peking and that was returned several days later. The morning of the 14th, 011 the moming of the NSC meeting, that was the morning that NbC got definite information that that particular effort had failed and that is when the order went forward to go ahead with the military action?

l\fr.INGERSOLL. In the afternoon. Mr. FASCELL. In the afternoon.

III the meantime, I believe we had sent the diplomatic note to tne U.N'. ?

Mr. INGERSOLL. That is tight.

MI". FASCELL. 'Vhat was the tenor of the note to the U.N., was it simply to then ask the U.N. to get involved in the matter or what did we ask the U.N. to do?

Mr. INGERSOLL. To make efforts to get release of the ship and the crew.

Mr. FASCELL. I sec. Did the U.S. Governmont ever get a response from the U.N. '?

Mr. INm:RsoLL. 'Ve had word that they had made an effort to comnnuricate with the Cambodian Government. There had been no response.

~rr. F.\SCELL. The Secretary Genera 1 advised us he made an effort

to communicate with the Cambodian Government and got no response?

Mr. Lxcznsor.r., That is right, he had not had any response. 1\11'. FASC}:LL. I am not sure of the time.

)II'. INGERSOLL. The time was about noon of that day. Mr. F.\SCELL That is on the 14th.

Mr. IKGEBSOLL. The 14th.

)11'. FASCELL. "rell, ut ;):;,)0 or ± o'clock in the afternoon, the orders went out on military action at 5 ~

~It .. INGEI~SOLL. 5 :15 .

. Mr. F.\SCJ~LL" And then )Iembers of Congress were brought into the 'Vhite House. Now. did we or did we Hot know at the State Department what the response from the U.N. was? That is all I am t,"yillg to find out, 'Vas it a public statement made by the Secretary Genernl ? I mean how did we determine what his response was and when was his response and what was his response.

~k INGEIISOLL. I fruukly do not know, Mr. Chairman. But I can get that for you,

- Mr. WHO •. Maybe I can help, I happened to find it here. It says the Secretary Genorul's original statement went out. the a ftcrnoon of J1u'y 14 and the second to last sentence from Ambassador :lIeCloskey to the Secretary General's letter elicited llO response from the Camhodinns until some days after rescue of the ship and the crew. I believe that is what Ambassador Ingersoll said to me (t little while ago ill answering another question.

274

Mr. FASCELIJ. You were reading the State Department's response to the Resolution of Inquiry.

Mr. WINN. Right.

Mr. F ASCELL. I listened to that, but I am not sure it registered.

Do I understand that State's position is that we got no response from the U.N. 1

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think I will have to check on that, Mr. Chairman, and give you a message because I do not know.

[The information subsequently provided by Department of State follows:]

We received a response from the U.N. Secretary General but he did not release it. At 7:00 p.m. on May 14 his spokesman read the following statement to the press.

"The Secretary General Is making all possible efforts to achieve a solution to the problem of the United States merchant vessel Mayagucz by peaceful means. For this purpose, the Secretary General has communicated with the Governments of Cambodia and of the United States and has offered his good offices to the parties. He has also appealed to them to refrain from further acts of force in order to facilitate the process of peaceful settlement."

}\fr. FASCELL. ·Well, that is fine with me. I mean, I think that would be very useful for the record. On May 14, sometime in the early forenoon, a message went to the U.N. asking for U.N. intercession. The United States then went ahead with its military preparations and, as far as we know, we got no response from the U.N. or anybody they contacted until several days after the whole event was over.

That means that the United States, once having asked U.N. intercession did not wait-for whatever reason-and just went right ahead with whatever plans were then about to be put into effect.

Can we -know what the message to the U.N. wns specifically; can we ,get a copy of it? "\Vhat did we ask them to do?

Mr. ~fILLER. Mr. Chairman, I think we supplied a copy of the message that we sent to Secretary General "\Yaldheim. I believe we supplied it, for the record after my testimony .

.MI .. F,\SCELL. I see. OK. So, in our transcript somewhere we have a copy of the State Department message that went to the U.N.? 1

!\II .. :MILLER. I am quite certain of that.

Mr. FASCELL. Ole. I just confirmed it and Mr. Finley of the staff confirmed we do have it.

Did the message to the U.N. have any time frame like "'Ve need to know as quickly as possible," or "Please get back to us in 3 days," 01' anything?

1\1r. INGERSOLl,. lYe will have to check. I do not know. Mr. FASCELI,. Yes. I could not remember myself.

,Yell, the message will speak for itself. The answer to my question is already in the record. OK. So, I will go look it up, myself.

Now to get back to the other message.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, excuse me, I hare a copy of this message before me. It says, "As you no doubt arc aware, my Government has already initiated certain steps through channels insisting on immediate release of the vessel and crew. 'Ve also request you to take any steps within your ability to contribute to this objective." Then it goes on to say, "J)fy Government reserves the right to take such measures

1 See appendlx, p. 324.

·.co •. • C .. (j'.'. •• c.o ••

•• e·c·.,. •• co •. •• cc. •.• •• c o e s

275

as necessary to' protect the lives of American citizens and propert; inc!lI~iJ% appro~riRt~ measures of self-defense un~er article 5.1 0 the U.N. Charter.' So It does not specifically put a time frame m terms of the request of the Secretary General.

Mr. FASCELL. The way I read that, now that you refresh my memory, basically is what you call a legalistic notice to advise the U.N. that we are about to take action. I am not quarreling with it but that is the way I interpret it. In other words, filing notice that we are about to do something while asking them to use their offices to do whatever it is that they want to do. Unless the message is a lot more detailed titan that, that is the way I read that.

Mr. "YINN. Will you YIeld ~ Mr. F ASC}:LL. Sure.

J\Ir. 'VINN. I agree with your assumption there because I have a report from the GAO who has been lookmg into the time schedule and it says that at 1 p.m.-this is just prior to the fourth meet.ing of the National Security Council which was held 3 :52 p.m. Wednesday, May 14-that the UN. was asked for assistance. I gather that is the first letter, the first communication by the U.N. ?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. 'YINX. And at the same time out of that National Security Council meeting came orders for the U.S. Marines to board the lit a.ya.guez and U.S. Marines to land on Koh Tang for rescue purposes and for aircraft from the Coral Sea to attack military facilities on the mainland, so your assumption on second-guessing is right on the nose.

Mr. IXGF.RSOLL. 'VeIl, it had been delivered earlier than that, Mr.

'Vinn. .

Mr. 'YINN. One o'clock and the meeting was 3 :52 p.m, and I guess that is the starting time of the meeting.

1\'11'. INGERSOLL. Starting time of the meeting and the order went out at approximately 5 :15 p.m,

Mr. 'VINN. Let's say sometime during the meeting or at the tail end of the meeting.

Mr. IXGEHsoLL. Right.

Mr. 'VINX. About four or five when vou called the U.N. and asked them for help and the military orders ,vere issued. I wanted to clarify it as far as the time schedule.

Mr. FASCELL. I think we can make another assumption that is justified on the record and that is: Orders having gone out late that afternoon of the 14th with respect to some military operational plan, that the plan had to be ready long before that time, and as I recall the testimony on the record, the individual responsible for the plan, that is in concept and its implementation was the Commander in Chief, Pacific, who has the sole responsibility ~

1\11'. INGERSOLL. Right .

1\11'. FASCELL. By the way, :'111'. Secretary, as Mr. Winn has pointed out and as you know, the subcommittee has asked GAO to look into this whole question in terms of facts find to make such recommendations as might seem appropriate with respect to structure, method, and improvement for the future. I just want to be sure now that GAO and the subcommittee and the Congress is going to receive full cooperation of the Department.

G:l-!l71-76-4

276

As fur as I know right now, there huve not been uny problems bitt am I correct there is no problem now and that GAO is going to be permitted to finish this job for Conaress l

Mr. I:-;"OERSOLI,. I understand, eitiler by letter or telephone communication with GAO, that we are now in the process of providing them with the information that they are seeking .

Mr. F,\SCELL. ·Well, I certainly would appreciate it. I think it can be worked out. It depends on the question of will, and I hope there is 110 difficulty in turning loose whatever the documents are the GAO needs to review or in gi\'ing access to any other material that GAO needs to curry ont its responsibility at the request of the Congress . All we ha ve asked them to do is quite simple, quite c leur: "~e just want to examine the facts in terms of the timeframc and the actions that took place because we already have begun to have a certain amount of apparent discrepancy which may be minor but must be corrected, if possible, 01' at least explained away, if possible, and the other is to look at the whole method and see whether 01' not we can have some improvements. Whutever you are doing now in terms of State and Defense, the ·White House and XSC in cooperating with GAO: we very much npprcciutc it and hope it will continue.

'Ye were talking about the note sent to the Cambodians to Peking. "rhat was the genera I nature of that message?

Mr. ] NGEHSOLL. The general gist was that the net of seizure of the ship WlIS a matter of piracy and that we demanded the ship and crow be released immediately. That WlIS the essence of the message.

Mr. FASCEI,L. So the timefrume was immediate release, It was not some time in the future.

:'Ifr. ] :-;"(H:I(SOLI,. Yes; that is right,

Mr. FASGELL. 'Had they chosen to accept the message they would ha ve known right then and there?

Mr. Ixonusor.r., I do not think there is any question but that they knew what the message wns,

)[1'. FASG}jLL. ])0 .You think it was opened or they knew any way through other sources ?

111'. Lxoicusor.r .. I am not really sure but I am sure they knew what was in the message.

MI'. FM;CELL. Yes.

'Veil, YOIl obviously base it on some kind of knowledge we do not have, It would be kind of crazy to have a message delivered and think it was sent back and nobodv read it.

M]'. Ixcxusor.r., I quite agree.

:'Ifr. FASCELI,. I guess that is what you mean. 1fr. Winn.

111'. "rIXN• Along that Same line, that lnings up a question. Do yon have the exact wording- of the messag-e that was sent to the Cambodians? Yon keep l'cfei'l'ing to the gencral gist that they release our ship and 0111' crew. Doe>: the actual wording say "Ship and crew':?

Mr. I'xonusor.r., I don't have tho message hero, )[1'_ 'Vinn. but it was basically what. the President 01' the 1Vhite House released in its stntomcnt ni. about noon 01' 1 o'clock 011 the 12t.h .

Mr. Fxscsr.r.. :'Ill'. Finley says he believes we have that message.' :'Ifr. Ixm;HsOI.I .. So, it was essentially whut was publicly stated .

• C C OlQ •• COt.,.

.e C' •.• O. C (D .• t.

.e C •• ·• •• C (;1".1. • (_ C!\.~.

•• C·O' •• •• (""Cr.'. ••. O~O ••

•• Cte=·.'. •• eo •• •• c.c .•.• •• CO ••

•• c o.;~ • C (, .·eft

•• CO.(] •• C C.;.II •• CO • .: •• C C·.,.oj •• CO.t:

277

illr. 'VIXX, I am being a little technical on that but I am also leading into the question whcreLrcfer to the ship and the crew, because I am wonderin ... why did the State Department interpret the Cambodian message an couple of days later that it would "oreler the ill ayaguez to withdraw from Cambodian Territorial Waters" and then the State Department took it, and I suppose the whole X ational Security Council took it, that they did not refer to the crew. They only referred to

the ship, _

N ow, I wonder, going back to the first message that was sent to

them, did we refer to the crew? . ,i\lr, IXOlmSQJ,r,. Yes,

)[r, WIXX. No doubt about it?

)[1'. J XGEl!SOLL, There is no question in my mind but maybe,

Mr. WIXX. It is a small technical point but I would like it clear in my own mind,

.Mr. IXGlmsoLL, I will check it for t.he record but I am certain.'

)h. 'VIXX, YOII see what. I menn=-wheu thev answered \IS one of our excuses fOI' the militurv was the fact they OIi\v referred to the ship, not to the crew, so we had no assurance that. they were going to n~lease our crew and then after talking to Captain ?dil1er, hc said that they were only going to rt'I[~llse six men of the crew. They were scpnratillg the crew. They were trvuur to hold some back which of course we did not know at the time. 'Ve did not. know where the crew was,

Jfr. Fxounsor.r., That, was the problem. "'c did not know where the crew was. 'Vc had suspicions part of the crew might have been taken to thc mainland. but we did not know whether the total crew wus sti 11 on Koh Tan::~ IsI:md,

)ft·. 'VIXX. After hClll'ing the experiences of the crew, T can unclel'stand why the State Department. the military, nor anyone else knew where the crew was because they were flitting around hom island to island and to different. docks and the coast of the mainlund, hut. not. on the mainland and T can understnud why your observation teams could not find them, That was one thing' I wanted to ask. Tho other is a. rumor, and I don't pnv mur-h attention to rumors hut. this kind of bothers me, the rumor that. the Korean Govcrument did talk to OUl' Government about the fact. that t.hcir ship was seized. yos. shot at on May 3 or 4 and that the Korean Govcrmncnt supposedly consulted with our Government on the fact. that they were fired 011 by an m-med Communist gunboat.

)[1'. IXGEI!sOI.L, T do not think there is any question but that. we had 'that information in this Govcmment, I do 1I0t think that has ever been denied.

)fr. "TIXX. And we sat on thnt in good shape, is that. righH

Mr, TXGlmsOI.L. As YOII pointed out earlier. this was at. the COJlelusion of It \\':11' that had just previously ended and nobody really kuew what, was ~!omg on, Nobody knew whether these people were pirates 0" part of It government,

)f1', 'VJXN. OK. 'Ve goofCfl that lip in my oninion. Is there an ndministrntion review. von tcst.ificd on it. and T ilclip\'e von said them was hut. J want. to fret. that strnight. is there an administration ,'cyicw underway of the U.S, system of wnrninsr our ilia tincrs of pol it icu I or mi litary navigational hnzards ! b

'Inform.ntl(>." subsequently Jlrn\'l<lct! h~' n,'[lnl·tmP.llt of StMe nltlrrns the e.s. messnge to Cnmhotha dhl rt~f~~r to t he crew,

278

)11', Ixm:nSOLT., Yes, and action has been tlllwn to prevent the brenkdown that apparently took place at the tillle of the Korean ship being shot at 'and the Panamanian ship being seized.

IHr. 'VIXS. 1Yhat action? 'Vhat action has been taken?

Mr. b:-GERSOLJ •• 'Yell, the National Command Center receives messages of this type and they are now instructed to notify our, I do not know-s-well, it notifies, of course through the operations center and then they in turn arc in touch with our economic and business bureau which has 'a section of maritime affairs which notifies the shippers of such an action,

Mr. 'VrYN. Now, how do they notify thorn, because Captain Miller had a printed deal after the whole thing was all over, a printed warning put out by the Coast Guard, He had a copy of it and read the paragraph "Notice to Mariners" PHt out by the Coast Guard; but printed 4 or 5 or cven=-wcll. several days after the complete incident was over.

I hope your new improved system involves a quicker wayof communication than by putting it in print. and mailing i,t to the captains; because tha.t is not going to work. Is it telegraphed in?

Mr. IXGlmsoLL. If goes out h)' radio and you say a printout of it.

That was it.

Mr. l'hu,En. It was issued on Mnv 12.

Mr. 'Vrxx. Rnt the captain of the' ship did not get it until 2 or 3 days nfterwardsj

~Ir. IXOf:nsoLL. He was not listening. His radio was shut down. He was seized.

Mr. 'YIYX. The message yon are talking about is the message that he was seized, sure. he knows he was seized .

.l\Ir. IXGF:RSOLT,. But the ot.hCl" message about the Panamanian and the Koman ships did not go out, that'was the problem.

!\[I'. 1Yrxx. I know, lmG it was put in print and he was on his way and it was mailed to him.

Mr. IXGF.RSOLL. Rut it had ,!rone to the other ship bv rnrlio hut he was not in contact by radio at that time. He may not have even been on the ship. I do not know when he was taken off.

1\11'. 'Yrxx. He was taken off the 12th: the first day, shortly after

they boarded the ship. .

Let me ask YOU this: 'Yhnt ideas can von offer personallv, and this. is along" the line of ,tllc questioning of the chairman, on the qnalitv of the U.S. Government crisis mnnazement that. we have been Hounding away about.? 'Ve hit Mr. Millerpretty hard on this, and the possible means of improving this process. Have you personally gi"en any testimony because YOIl were involved and yon know t.he step-by-stun prorerlllre which to us is still kind of ra,!!IIC, and I do not know if it is ,t.hat had or it is just yon cannot clarify it to us hnt personally, Imvo yon gotten [PH' ideas on how we can improve that crisis managemcnt as we call it. ~

~[r. IXGF.HsoLL. Everv crisis is different. and that is why it is rlifficult to try to nnticipntewhat may arise. 'Ye hare nroccdures of establishinz first notification and then a task force if them is to he ·a cont.inuinrr process, 'Ve have the responsihility to provide advice to the President and I think we have procedures for this. I ren.llv cannot suggest anything more than what we have done in the notification to

I

279

mariners in this particular case. You try to anticipate :whl1:t may happen but you do not know the circumstances under which It may happen and therefore it is difficult to suggest any change.

Mr. 'YINN. In retrospect, would you go to the U.N. faster since obviously Mr. Wnldheim did not Seem to ~mve any troubl.c gettmg it rnessaze to Cambodians although they did not answer It. I mean,

I:> •

would you 1 I think I would.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Perhaps so. This raises the question if he really got throuzh to the Cambodians immediately. He did eventually and I do not know the channels he used. It may have been the representation in the United Nations, who in turn had to get in touch with his government. I think you are right, that perhaps we should.

Mr. ,VINN. I think we would go to the United Nations. You do not have the Cambodians involved bnt you have the support and if other hearings are factual and I imagine they are, that cost of the support of the Cambodian, theKhmer government, came from the Peking government not the Russian Communists ~ .

Mr. INGERSOLL. That is right. That is why we went to Peking.

Mr. ,VINN. Through that you have another way to communicate with the Cambodians and give your message, direct, indirect, or however we can get through to them.

~fr. INOImsoLI,. I think you are right, Mr. Winn, It probably would have been desirable if we had gone earlier, because, as it turned out, the island was in dispute between Vietnam and Cambodia also.

::\11'. ,v IXX. Thank you and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. F ASCELL. 1\Ir. Riegle.

Ml·. RIEGLE. 'Thank you.

I want to run through as many things as I can one after the other, and I do not want to dwell on any one over any length of time.

Coming back to the NSC meeting because we sort of did not finish that, I believe I understood you to say in the end this thing played itself over several days the final decision to take the military actions that were taken, presented in the form of a recommendation by Dr •. Kissing-er and presumably the President?

Mr. INOlmso~.L. No, I did not say that. I sai.d that options were pre-

sented but I did not say that a recommendation was made.

Mr. RIF.ou:. So, a recommendation was not made? Mr. INomsoLJ,. I did not say that.

Mr. RIEGLE; So, in other words, ;'"e ~lave to guess as to whether a recommendation was made or not 1 You Just do not feel you can tell us?

Mr. Iz.wERsoLL. No, I am not sure I remember, frankly, but I really do not.

Mr. RIEGLE. ",Vho would knew] There must be minutes of the'

meeting. . .

Mr. IXmmSQI,L. I do not understand there are any minutes taken of

NSC meetings. .

1\[1'. RnWLIi]. There are no minutes?

Mr. Ixusnsor.r., I do not know that, I do not know that there are. :Mr. UIEGLE. I would assume there are, but I have no way of knowing

for a fact.

Mr. INGERSQJ,L. I have never seen a transcript.

Mr. RIEGJ,E. In any event, a decision was made? 'Vere you in the room when the decision was made?

.280

Mr. I:s-oERSOLL. Yes, sir.

:Mr. Rn:GLE. And the President makes the decision? ~Ir. IXGERsol,L. Yes, sir.

Mr. HU:GL]-:. But yOl~ ?Hl1110t tell us anything more about the process

that led up to that decision] .

Mr. I:S-GlmsoLL. No, sir .

Mr. RlEGLl~. Are! you familiar with Captain ~Iiller~s testimony before our committee within the last week or so ?

Mr.I:S-GERSOLL. Only what I heard this morning.

Mr. Hn:GL};, Let me urge you to read it because I think you will find it interesting. A couple of things that came up along that line und one relates to something that Mr. Winn was saying a minute ago, that was the question: "'hen the Cambodians sent out this message by rndio picked up in Bangkok-to the.eflect they were going to release the slu(>, but no mention was made of the crew, My understandin~ is

. that, after the ship was taken, the crew was removed and they shut off all of the power so that it set dead in the water, and I do not know of any way that the ship could have left unless the crew was on it to make it operational.

I do not know how else the ship could leave.

Mr. I:-;GERSOl,L. It could leave with their own people. It could leave

with noncrew Americans.

1\11'. RIEGLE. 'Vhm'e would they come from] Mr,I:S-GERsoLL. From the helicopters.

Mr. HIEGLE. I guess you are saying maybe the assumption in the State Department was at that time, within the administration, the thoughts that they would release the ship, did not necessarily mean the crew would be rclensed with the ship ~

Mr. ISGImSOLL, Very definitely not.

Mr. RIEGLE. Captain Miller also said to us that the night of the l:-3th~ before the day of the action, he worked out an arrangement with the Cambodians, and this is my recollection of the testimony and we [ia ve it here so we can refer to it if there is any question about it, but my recollection of his testimony was he worked out an arrangement where the Cambodians were going to allow him to go by boat from where he and the crew were being held, back out to the ship with enough people to POWel' the ship up and get on the radio and to send ont a JIleSsll&,e that the Cambodians were willing to release, my understanding is both the ship and the crew, if the Americans would call off the air activity that was in the ail' over the Cambodian area at

that time. .

Mr. IXGlmsoJ,L. The entire crew? 'Vere they going to release the entire crew? Mr. 'Yinn gave me. the impression they were going to release six members.

Mr. RIEGLE. To power up the ship. Now, I mean my understanding was and have to check the transcript, but my understanding was that the deal was if we called off all military activity in the sky, that everybody was going to be able to pack up and go .

. Mr. INGERSOLJ,. I see .

Mr. RIEGLE. But in terms of how the message was going to be delivered, no, that was not the arrangement .

First, I think either six or seven crew members were going to do it and Captain Miller negotiated it up to nine, I think, and then he had

• {" C 0 ~'I •• CO •• .C C •• ~I o. C O.~IJ .C C •• rc •• C U.lC .{ O •• !4

•• c C,··.·«•• L (1.'.'14 •• Co.e •• C C .:.14 •• CO.I) •• c C ..... •• GO.IJ

• c C O'.~I •• CO.'. .c C .,.~4

oee a.le • c C .,.rt

•• ClJ.l~ .l -(] _ .• 'C

•• co.-~ • L C,·.'.'4 •• co.e

•• eel.'." •• GO.I:

•• C C ...... t4 •• co.c;

281

It decision to make as to whether 01' not, this is in the eveninz, apparently getting dark on the night of the 13th. and Captain Miller was trying to decide whether he would go out with this skeleton crew and

power up the ship to do this. ' .

As I recall his testimony, he said there were two reasons he decided not to do that. No.1, he was aJm.id to do it because he knew at the time that apparently foul' Cambodian gunboats had been blown out of the water by American aircraft and he did not want to be on the gunboat at dark and have the same thing happen to him by a pilot not knowing he was on the ship ..

Second, he had reservations about separating the crew, In other words, if he kept everybody together, he felt better about it than the idea of going back out. In any case it was a key decision because had he gone out to the ship and had he arrived and had he powered up and had the message, or the deal he worked out at that point been transmitted, we might. have saved ourselves all of that grief. It turned out it did not happen and obviously this falls into the area of a reconstruction and it is awkward for us because we are Monday morning quarterbacks and that is why we are being asked to do this) we are being asked to try to reconstruct what happened, Another fact he revealed to us that is significant and I think you should know as well, t hat is after this ship, our ship, I say "our ship," it was not an American Government. ship but a pri\'ate ship: but after the ship was taken, it. was not flying the American flag and when he was taken by the Cambodian Cl'CW: them was nobody on either ship for a period of nhout 2 days that spoke any common language. In other words, nobody could talk to anybody, There was not anybody on the Americanowned ship who could speak Cambodian or any other third country lan~'1lUge or vice versa and it took about 2 days before the Cambodians were able to communicate with somebody who could speak French and then there was a crew member who, while he could not speak French, apparently knew Cajun French hom Louisiana and somehow or other they managed some kind of minimal dialog and I for one would like that crewmember here because he W[lS really the key COBtact. point to the extent we had one.

But my concern is this: I can See in reconstructing this thing, how there was quite u long period of time when there wns nobody, in terms of the principals ill the middle of the incident, who really could talk to one another and find out what was going on. Then finally, some young fellow came along who spoke English who was n Cambodian and then the dialog got started and the negotiation process with the captain of the ship got started which finally led to the tentative deal on the night of the 13th which aborted for the reasons I described and then the events of the next morninp.

Now, one of the things I want to pin down and it may take GAO to pin it down because 'we get conflicting information about what the time differential is between action hem, using eastern standard time nl'SUS the time out. there .

Mr. I NGEnsOLr~ About 12 hours difference .

Mr, RIEGLE, 'Ye were also told 15 hours. Captain Miller told us 15 hours .

Mr. Ixonnsor.r., I think there are really 13 hours, Mr. Rn:oLE. You see, nobody seems to-know .

•• C C •• ~t'it •• L (_J •• 'E •• C O.C~f •• C C .J.te •• C 0.1)'1 •• c c .• t •• e •• G 0.1;""

282

Mr. INGET'.sOLL. In Vietnam, it is 12 hours and Cambodia it is 13 hours.

:Mr. RIEGLE. I asked Captain Miller that question three times and I do not know if he has any more basis than you have to know but he was very precise, 15 hours. So, I do not know what it is, and it is the -one thing we have to establish.

Mr. INGERSOLL. It was roughly half a day away from here. You can say that.

'Ur. RIEGLE. But this becomes crucial because the whole question of whether or not the response was necessary or could have been halted midstream is a very relevant question' and there is a lot of skepticism about it and not just by people who are native adversaries of this administration. There is a real question as to whether, because of sloppy internal procedures and processes and in message delivery, we ended up missing an opportunity to settle this thing peacefully,

. This was not a cheap operation by any means, whether you figure it in loss of life or in terms of dollars.

But, in any event, what still is not clear to me is in terms of the time the captain then was released with the crew and t.hey got on the fishing boat and started to go back out and then the whole sequence of military actions that was taking place coincident with that, either just before, some apparently before, some at, some after and then the whole question of when-well, it was verified that the crew was released and how long it took to get the messages back to the 'Vhite House and how long to get the message back out to shut this down and to the extent to which the incident was allowed to mushroom because of impotence, sloppiness, 01' deliberately mushrooming into something bigger than it had to be. There are some real suspicions about that and we still do not have answers and I am not suggesting you can provide all the answers, but I want to state clearly now for the record in your presence that some of these questions remain and are unanswered.

I want to comment, too, on 1\11'. Buchanan's comments and I respect the gentleman from Alabama a great deal personally, although I do not fully agree with the way he put his arguments but that is an honest difference of opinion.

But I do want to talk for a second about this psychology and high. light it because I think it is important how this kind of event takes on [L meaning that goes far beyond the specifics of the cast of characters that are caught in a situation where we want to try to resolve the issue as quickly and with the least damage and loss of life as possible.

Unfortunately, we were not able to get away with that and it became It very costly operation.

Senator Goldwater is quoted in the 'Vashington Star, on Saturday, May 17, 1D75, and it says:

Tlle Cambodian incident drew comments from guests during the evening, Senator Goldwater said, of the j[uyuguez incident: It was wonderful. It ShO'TS we st.ll! got some balls in this country .

I cite that because I am very disturbed by that kind of quote and I

, am disturbed by that kind of psychology and because I think that is the kind of thing that, in a fit of passion and excitement and all, can become sort of a natural consequence of a line of reasoning that says that, if an incident takes place and you are not satisfied with the prog-

• r Cf"tG •• c-o« .cc;. (J .·C~(Di. .C~~. •• C.a.(;J .... • (_ ·e~.

•• e-~01 •• c, "<J". •• 0.0" •• etC·. •• .ec

•• e.c". •• COI

e 283 _

ress of events, that therefore you know you take wha.tever action you feel justified in taking.

If you happen to be the tougher guy and if you happen to have more to work with, then that is to your advantage and to the disadvantage of the other person.

'Yell, I do not think that can really be a basis of American foreign policy. I do not think it is, in terms of the career people in the State Department that I have known over the years I have been in the Congress and I do not think that is reflected for most of the people who are serious for foreign policy officers in this Government.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think you are right.

Mr. RIEGLE. But I think it is possible, if we are not careful about the procedures we use and that is one of the reasons I wanted to reconstruct exactly how the decision process evolved in the Security Council. All the work' of all the diplomatic people in the country can be wiped off the board very quickly, not just in terms of citizen attitudes but by observers around the world, if international situations arise and veer off in a direction of brute strength. I ask is this really the messag-e of what the American statement is to other nations ~

'Vell, obviously, that is not our ultimate statement and I think, in fact, it's just the reverse; that after 200 years of struggling with the ideals and values of this system of ours we are really trying to make a different statement to the world which essentially says that we are not bullish and we want to avoid the use of force and the loss of life.

I do not know how many Cambodians were killed in the operation.

I am sure in my own mind the figure was several times higher than the number of Americans lost.

'Ve sunk at least four boats on that occasion and bombed the mainland and with the combat activity on Koh Tang, so I have to assume . that there were a lot, of Cambodians killed as well.

For the most part it seems to me everybody, at least the victims, were innocent bystanders. There were people who got caught up in this, whether it is the Thailander who happened to be sitting drinking beer in a barroom Or those in the boats, because of an operation being underway and they had to be there for backup and so the helicopter goes there and they are not around. The guys in Koh Tang took a bullet head on and are not around any more.

I think even now in the Congress among many people who want to try to understand what happened, there is a feeling of uneasiness about this situation in retrospect. At the time there was a great burst of feeling, it happened quickly, and it was corning in the aftermath of Vietnam and in ,mflIlY respects it was kind of-well, it released a lot of energies and passions that people had. But that has gone by now and as we try to look at this thine; m retrospect and try to figure out what happened, I do not think it IS a happy chapter and I am not sure we really proved a great deal in terms of what the applicable lessons are for the future.

It may be the Cambodians will be reluctant to grab one of our ships in the future but at the same time I think we will be a little more careful about straying into those waters and we already made that decision, but of course it does not bring anybody back that got wiped out in the operation .

&3-971-76-5

\

~ 284 4It

So I guess I want to conclude by saying I appreciate, I think, the dilemma you are in as a person who sat in those meetings and docs not feel free to relate to us fully what took place but I would hope, I would hope that the people of long service in this Government like yourself and you have been through several administrations and you have been through a long period of service of this country, to try to do things in the foreign policy arena that makes sense and that are just and that are fair and would use all of the influence you can just as we must do here in the Congress and on this subcommittee and the full committee to see to it that the American way does not become the kind of sort of clenched-fist approach to international relations that leads to the kind of inflamed comments in this case as Senator Goldwater's was, but there were others who said equivalent things in my party, to my regret, because I just think. if we let ourselves sort of drift down that road, then I think probably coincident with that we will lose some friends and of our influence in the world because I don't think many people are ~oing to be impressed by that around the world been use they should not be. fIl any event, that is all for me at this point, Mr. Chairman.

~[r. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, the testimony on the record is very interesting in many aspects, One, that is particularly interesting is precisely what information was available to the U.S. Government with respect to the location of the crew at any given point. Now, as I recall it, reconnaissance was ordered in the first meetmg of the NSC, am I correct?

~[r. Ixm:RSOLI,. I am not sure but what it may have been ordered before that. Certainly they wanted to make sure there was reconnaissauce but I think there may have been planes out before then.

Mr. FASCET.L. Or at least it was continued. :Mr. IXGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. F ASCEI.L. My recollection was that the order went out to locate the ship.

1fr.IxGERSOLL. That is right.

Mr. F ASCELI,. ",Ye got the word that it had been seized but nobody knew exactly where it was so the order went out "Let's find the ship," so reconnaissance went out at least that is the way I reconstruct it, but. again the record can speak for itself on that subject.

The interesting point Mr. Secretary, is this: The Secretary of State is alleged to have said that the crew was believed to be in three possible locations at any given time. Those were: on the ship, on one island or the other, or on the mainland. ",Ye have been told in testimony so far, and we will go into more detail on this with the Defense Department, that one of the objectives of the military operation was to keep the crew somewhere near the ship or on the island in order to keep the crew from being taken to the mainland, because there we had visions of another problem-it would certainly seem to have made it more difficult once they got to the mainland, so the order went out to intercept anyone going to the mainland and, as part of that order, the Cambodian boats were identified and sunk.

Mr. INGERSOLL. The effort was made initially to try to have them stop. In other words, there were shots across the bow rather than at the ships .

Mr. F ASCELL. I understand.

Mr. INGERSOLL. They were not trying to sink the ships.

• CeQ CUCl~f •• C Lt .I~"'C:: .c c •• ~e4,C oec C'.!C~ • C C •• '<B'C •• CCJ ••• e .l o •• '01«

•• co.·~c • ( 'Ci ... ·.!€,1

•• C,O •• C •• C ,c·.l.e

•• c. 0 .~·f •• c-c .•.• .e •• C. O.c..~4

• c c e~fi •• C 0'.'1 • C C,.,.

tt. C CDI.11 • (.: C;.'. •• C o ... ,.

• (_ ·e'.; .•

•• (t 0'.1 • t... "<;j1'.'. •• C-O.'

•• etC·.' • •• c. 0.1 •• c.c. •.• •• CO.I

.285

. }Ir. F ASCELL. I was not being critical: The captain of the M a.yaguez said when he was on the gunboat going to the mainland with the erswthat our guys in the airplanes came by, down both sides of that boat, first and then across the bow in an effort to stop it and they .started out at 200 yards and then they moved in closer and closer and he said they could thread the eye of a needle at 1,000 paces with those cannons because they brought the cannon fire to within 10 feet of the boat. They knew what they were doing. Don't let anybody ten you those boys could not shoot because they could have blown that boat out of the water .

Mr. INGERSOLL. Right.

. Mr. F ASCELL. But the point is they did not .

)fr. INGERSOLL. That particular one. .

Mr. FASCELL. That particular one, exactly right, was not blown out -of the water .

Now, 'you know, you do not have to be a Chinese scholar to figure -out the fact that the guys who were shooting knew that the. crew was on that boat.

Mr. IKGERSOLL. They knew there were white people on that boat, 'Caucasians, but did not know how many nor whether it was the total

'Crew Or not. '

Mr. F ASCELL. Agreed, but they did not sink the boat. They tried to :turn it around.

Mr. J:.WERSOLL. No. They knew there were Caucasians on the boat. 3fr. F ASCELL. They did not want to take a chance. Again I am not critical but it is obvious based on the record .

. Mr. IXGERSOLL. Yes.

~Ir. F ASCELL. On the other boat, however, they were able to determme that there were no Caucasians and they did not make any 'mistakes.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Fortunately.

3fr. F ASCELL. Right. So that means our reconnaissance is not only very good, it is great.

Mr. IXGERsoLL. But we did not know that the whole crew was on.

.that ship. .

Mr. F ASCELL. I. did not say that you did, Mr. Secretary. Let us not make any allegatlOns about that at all. All I am saym~ IS our reconnarssance was so good that we were able to tell even If the guy was not wearing a flag On his T-shirt. They knew he was Caucasian because ·the guy in the airplane shootirur the cannon did not blow the boat out of the water. That is all I k~ow, not any more. I am just saying that and that is a conclusion on my part.

:Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. But obviously that information was available to the National Security Council, one way or another. They had to know that information or could not have made the decisions they made.

I find that a very interestinrr point in terms of the whole discussion and again-well, let the recor:i speak for itself about what happened, why it happened, and whatnot.

Was any of that information available to you or did you hear any thing II bout it ~

Mr. IXGERsoLL. Yes .

., - .. _- . - . - - - ...,.--

286

Mr. FASCELL. You saw the tapes or the photographs or whatever. Mr. INGERSOLL. "Well, it was conversation.

Mr. F ASCELL. Yes; in other words, part of the general discussion.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes. .

Mr. FASCELL. All I am trying to establish is, did you, personally,

at an NSC meeting see the tapes of the photographs?

Mr. ING1<:RSOLL. Only conversations,

Mr. F ASCELL. That is all I wanted to get .

Mr. RIEGLE. Could I inquire about that because I think we ought

to get the photographs .

Mr. FASCELL. Yes .

Ur. RIEGLE. If they exist, I don't understand why we can't get them • Mr. INGERSOLL. Of the ship, the Cambodian boat 1

Mr. FASCELL. He means reconnaissance photographs.

Mr. RIEGLE. Yes; because I think the point the chairman makes, and the question we didn't ask the captain, as to whether the crew was on deck, must be resolved.

Mr. FASCELL. He did testify about that. Mr. RIEGLE. What did he say?

Mr .. FASCELL. The record will speak for itself and I do not want to misquote him and I am not sure I remember. I am not playing

games with you, but he did give testimony about that. .

lUI'. RIEGLE. ",Vell, may I request the photographs for the record so that we can take a look at them? 1

Mr. FASCELL. Well, Defense is coming up the first week in Scptom her as soon as we get back.

Mr. INGERSOLL. They would be in the hands of the Defense Department .

. 1\[1". FASCELl,. Thev will be able to answer that for us.

Again, I am not 'being critical. I think it is gn~at. I am glad we can find out and that we can flv over a boat and tell who is on it and fly over an island and tell ,vho is on it, assuming you can look through the trees .

But at none of the meetings you personally attended was any visual review made of reconnaissance. It was all verbal reports that came up from whoever was supposed to bring them, that is what I want to establish .

. . Mr. INGERSOLL. There were photographs of the island but as I recall it, they were photographs taken at a previous time .

Mr, F ASCELL. That is from the standard normal reconnaissance or ongoing reconnaissance .

.Mr. !NGERSOLL. I think so but I saw no photographs of the Cambodian gunboat you referred to, Mr. Riegle.

Mr. RIEGLE. Right. Would they be able to establish who the pilot was who saw the ship with the Caucasians on it and who made the report?

lUI'. INGERSOLL. I am sure the Defense Department can.

Mr. FASCELL. 'Vo will probably get a report on every aircraft. Mr. INGERSOLl,. Yes; they would know.

Mr. F ASCEf..L. Yes. .

Mr. Secretary, before we go and we have to conclude this because we have another vote on the floor now on this matter, let me ask you

.c C OQI~$G •• C U."~G" • L C ••• e"cm ".l: C).c·m • (: c • eiCB'JG •• C ().ti¢j • l U •• 1.8q€

1 Photogrllphs of reeonnatsaance to be printed by the General Accounting Olllce u part ot GAO study Inveatlgatlng the MOlloguez incident.

287

about this-the captain testified that at one point in order to stop the Thai. fishing boat from getting to the mainland after the use of

artille ry failed. .' .

Mr. INGERSOLJ~. You mean the Cambodian boat ~ You said Thai. Mr. F ASCELL. No; it was a Thai fishing boat that took the crew to the mainland.

Mr. INGEltSor,L. I see.

Mr. FASCFLL. After the efforts to gun it and turn it around or stop it or make it do something else, failed, the boat was "gassed" and the ea ptain testified that he assumed the purpose of that was that in the ensuing confusion the crew would rise up, the American crew would rise up, take over the boat, overpower the Cambodian armed guards and in some way manage to make its escape. He said he assumed that was the purpose of it. He told his crew immediately "Don't do it, don't try it, sit tight" because it is not going to work. He used words to that effect. He did not want to expose his men to possibly being killed by Cambodian guards so they covered up the best they could. Question; Does the use of that gas contravene the Geneva protocol, which we recently ratified, in any way as far as we are concerned ~

Mr. INGEnsor~L. I really do not know but we will submit a statement

to you, Mr. Chairman. .

tThe following information was subsequently submitted by the Department of State:]

The United States has ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925, but in our view that Protocol does not extend to the use of riot control agents.

In ratifyIng the Geneva Protocol, the President announced that the United States would, as a matter of national policy. renounce the first use in war of riot control agents except their use, upon approval of the President, in defensive military modes to save lives, such as their use in rescue uitsstons in remotely isolated areas.

The use of riot control agents in the Mayagucz incident was specifically authorized by the President, and was deemed necessary to facilitate the rescue of the Mayageuz crew in an area which at that moment was remotely isolated from U.S. forces. Accordingly, the action was consistent with U.S. policy on the use in war of rIot control agents.

Mr. FASCEIL. 'Ve would like your opinion on that. Also we wish to have your assessment, Mr. Secretary, on whether or not that partieular event, in your judgment, impacts on the efforts which are ongoing right now, I hope worldwide, to eliminate the use of such weapons as gas and if you could find (;llit for us, or we will ask Defense or anybody else, just exactly what lund of gas that was because I am not sure and I do not believe it is on the record anywhere.

Mr. INGEItSOJ~. I am not sure but I think Defense can probably tell you because it came from their aircraft,

Mr. FASCEUh OK. ·Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Leigh, and Mr. Miller. 'Ve appreciate your making yourselves available.

This record, of course, is still ongoing. 'Ve do not know what we may need 01' desire from you or from State and we appreciate your cooperation thus far very much. I think, as you can see, we arc beginning to make a factual record which, hopefully will eliminate some of the confusion and not add to it.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Very good.

Mr. F ASCEU~. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

This subcommittee stands adjourned subject to the call of the Chair. [At 12 :20 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of

the Chair.] .

SEIZURE OF THE ~IAYAGUEZ

FRIDAY. SEPTEMBER 12. 1975

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

'CmUrI'ITE£ ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SUBCOMlIIlTTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND j\fILITARY AFFAIRS.

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Mr, FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs continues its inquiry into events surrounding seizure of the vessel Al ayaguez by Cambodia, and subsequent diplomatic and military efforts made by the United States to secure the safe return of the ship and its crew.

The purpose of these hearings is to review the operations of our Government's crisis management system in this particular instance in order to insure that in any future situation our Government operates with maximum efficiency and with minimum risks to the welfare of U.S. civilians and military personne1. .

Since the seizure of the Mayaguez on May 12, the committee and this subcommittee have held a total of six hearings on the seizure and our Government's response. We have heard testimony from Members of Congress, officials of the Defense and State Departments, and the ca ptain of the M ayaguez.

Today we are pleased to have with us Hon. William P. Clements.T r., Deputy' Secretary of Defense. Secretary Clements is accompanied by Mr. Morton Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, East Asia and Pacific; and B rigadier General Atkinson, U.S. Air Force. Assistant Director of Operations for Command and Control, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Secretary, I want to thank vou for coming today. We appreciate the cooperative spirit shown to this subcommittee by your Department during this inquiry. I regret that the Department of State and the National Security Council' have not yet demonstrated similar cooperation although I remain hopeful that they will yet be forthcoming.

Mr. Secretary, you have a prepared statement, so please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM: P. CLE~ENTS, lR., D~PUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. CLEl\IENTS. I have a short statement and I would like to read it, and then answer any of your questions.

(289)

290

I am pleased to appear before you today to testify for the Department of Defense on the Mayaguez incident. You have received considerable testimony previously from both State and Defense witnesses. The basic elements of the incident and the chronology of events' are well known to the committee. I would like here to comment briefly on some of the significant aspects of the incident and then try to answer whatever questions you have.

First, the question of intelligence. It has been frequently asserted that there was an intelligence failure or that intelligence was faulty. I do not believe this charge is an accurate one, although in such situations it would be a blessing to have the gift of prophecy.

The main elements of the intelligence problem were: were initial reports of seizure accurate; where was the ship; what was the nature of the opposition of the Cambodian forces on the island; and where was the crew of the M ayaguez.

We had very little time to determine answers to those questions. But we proceeded to do everything in our power to gain as full and complete a picture as possible.

In order to put the Mayaguez in perspective, I should point out that in the course of a normal day the Defense Department receives hundreds of messages and, in turn, a number of reports of incidents throughout the world-some true, some false, some insignificant, some minor.

The initial tasks were to confirm that the J[ ayaguez was in the area, and to verify the report of seizure. These first steps were achieved in the early hours of May 13. Then the, wheels were set in motion to find the Mayaguez and to determine the actual and updated situation. Once located, we commenced continuous aerial surveillance of the M ayaguez and photographed the island and the area constantly.

In the case of the Cambodian forces on the island, our intelligence estimated-and I want to emphasize estimated-that there were 150 to 200 troops with a variety of machineguns, recoilless rifles, and other well pons. These estimates proved to be essentially accurate. We did not know, nor did photography permit us to tell, the readiness or determination of the Khmer Communist forces stationed on the 'island.

In the case of the crew, surveillance indicated that at least some of the men had been taken off the M aya,Quez and removed to Koh Tang Island. On the evening of May 13, Washington time, our aircraft identified a fishing boat as possibly carrying some members of the crew. The craft was headed toward t.he mainland. Our planes made efforts to turn back the vessel and divert it, but were unsuccessful. Because there was possibility of some part of the crew being abroad

the vessel, we allowed it to proceed into Kompong Som. .

From this point on, military planning for the rescue of the crew had to consider the possibility that some of the crew could be on the Afa?/aguez, some on Koh Tang Island, and some on the Cambodian mainland.

It is difficult. to see what more c0111d have been done in terms of gathering intelligence given the specific situation. I would add, however. that based upon a review of this incident. some improvement in intelligence procedures might be recommended.

The second mat.ter relates to the view of some that the military action taken was premature, overreactive, and unnecessary. Proponents

/

291

of this view generally contend that the effort to resolve the situation by diplomatic means was inadequate. It would be appropriate to recap the situation as it existed at 1652 e.d.t., May 14. In fact, I believe it is always important in reviewing events such as this to make a conscious effort to understand and appreciate the atmosphere in which the decisions were made. Only by doing this can matters be kept in the -proper perspective.

At that time some 51 ,hours 'had elapsed since the ship had been seized. The Khmer Communists had not given the slightest acknowledgment or explanation for the seizure. Even the most elementary statement about the condition of the crew had not been 'heard.

Diplomatic efforts through the People'S Republic of China had been turned down. A direct approach to the Khmer Communist government in Peking under Sihanouk was similarly unproductive. The situation was beset with many uncertainties regarding the ship and crew, and whether the government in Phnom Penh was actually in control of the situation. I think this is kev,

It should also not be forgotten that the new Khmer government was host-ile 0 us, Given these conditions, the order to take military action to recover the ship and its crew was issued on 'Wednesday at 1652, May 14, e.d.t, To have delayed any further would have allowed the Khmer Communists greater opportunity to remove the entire crew to the interior of Cambodia where rescue would have been very difficult at best.

In general, it is my belief that the direct and resolute actions taken were an essential aspect of the safe recovery of the ilfaya!lWJz and its crew. This judgment is shared by Captain Miller. Before this committee last month, Captain Miller stated his belief that the willingness of the Khmer Communists to release the ship and crew was directly related to our military threat such as posed by our aircraft.

The final subject I would like to discuss is casualty reporting. As YOIl know, we have reported 15 killed, 3 missing, and 50 wounded. There was a delay in tallying and compiling these figures. I regret this but it is simply not easy in an operation of this sort to get instant, accurate casualty reporting.

As vou can well appreciate, due to the sensitive nature of this subject, especially notificntion of next of kin, it is essential that all reports be thoroughly checked and cross-checked before we make a final determination of the status of an indi vidual,

In this particular sitnation, the muster of the forces associated with the opera~ion was complicated by-the :fact that all personnel extracted from the Island were not moved to the same location. Personnel ended up on the Ooral Sea, the two destroyers and in Thailand, and some of those in Thailand were then on their WRV back to Okinawa in a few hours. Thus, it took several days before ~all reports were consolidated, confirmed, and proper notification procedures were completed.

That ends my statement, I will try to answer your questions.

Mr, FASCEJ,I" Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I believe that yon have addressed yourself to all of the major issues that have been raised so far in the hearings. I appreciate your presenting your testi-

monv in that fashion. .

Mr. Secretary, yon attended some of the NSC meetings: am I correcti

•• C 0-.:'-: •• L (/.'.'4 •• CO.Cl •• C, C .4 •. •• CO • .: •• c c.e,ell •• CO ••

,e

292

~rr. CLE)[ENTS. I attended all of them. . Mr. FASCELL. 'Would you set the atmosphere and the tone for us. 1 never have attended an NSC meeting and I am sure Mr. Buchanan .has not. We would like to get an idea of what goes on, particularly in .terrns of this kind of incident.

Mr. CLE)ffil-.""TS. First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that in my judgment the NSC structure provides an excellent forum for this Government and this country to handle crises of this nature.

The President is the Chairman of this body. He makes the decisions.

This is the way it should be. This is by law, and these people who are there at his invitation consult, discuss, suggest, recommend, and consider all the options. A forum of this type for circumstances of these kinds certainly brings together the greatest amount of information that, in my judgment, could be concentrated for a decisionmaking process.

I would suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that in crisis management; which you have already referred to, that this is e .. xactly the kind of forum that is needed and required and should be used. I think the President should be complimented for utilizing this resource.

Mr. F ASCELL. How about intelligence that comes in from all channels? I am talking about the entire intelligence community. How does that become available to NSC in an ongoing operation? That is important since, in the examination of options, you might want to change your mind every hour on the hour depending on what the situation is?

Mr. CLEMENTS. ]\[r. Chairman, there is no breakdown of any kind in regard to the flow of intelligence to this body. In the first instance, 1: am sure you already know, Mr. Colby is present at these NSC meet:ings .

As you also know, he is the Director of Central Intelligence, which 'by law has certain responsibilities. Mr. Colby heads up what is .callod the intelligence community of this Government, He is con.stuntly in touch with his people and he provides to the President the .interfnce with the intelligence community in these meetings.

In addition to this, the NSC staff has certain responsibilities within its structure to handle intelligence through the normal day-to-day flow a nd the Department of Defense has similar structures, as does the State Department.

In the Department of Defense the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Dr. Hall, and General Graham, who heads up the DIA, normalIy report through me within the Department of Defense.

The people that were there are fully informed on the most current intelligence and if there are changes they are immediately informed.

Mr. FASCEU,. "Vho orchestrates the requirements for intelligence as yon are sitting in an NSC meeting ! For example, location of the vessel or the crew. it seems, would be a DOD intelligence requirement 'because they are the only ones capable of carrying it out. State could not do it .

-, Mr. CumENTR. That was the way it was handled, and the requirement .to locate the 111 ayaguez took place immediately when we knew there was a crisis.

Mr. FASCF..LL. In other words, at the first meeting, it became an obvious issue. We had to find the vessel 1

e 2U3 e

Mr. CLElIIENTS. Even before the first meeting was officially called that effort was underway.

1Vhen we lmew there was a problem, we immediately started searching for the vessel and trying. to find it. Some time was required to ready the crews and get them in the air and so forth. But the need and the requirement which you mention was immediately recognized, and the process was started.

Mr. FAscELL. Mr. Buchanan ~

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think this is mostly a positive thing. So far as the decision to take the military action, I assume that was made by the Commander in Chief ultimately-the President, that is-and I think that was acting decisively in a crisis. And it turned out well.

I think the military operation was primarily a success, but the purpose of this subcommittee as the chairman stated is to take a look at the system for responding to crises.

We had a similar incident once before in the Pueblo crisis that did not turn out well. We had that situation arise.

The use of the word "immediately" intrigues me and concerns me and concerns me a bit. Mr. Neil's report was received at 3 :19 a.m., the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta informed 'Vashington at 5 :02 a.m., almost 2 hours later.

At 7 :30 a.m., 21;2 hours later, you ordered CINCPAC 1 to send recon-

naissance aircraft to find the ship.

Mr. Cr.F.lIlEXTS. '¥hat time did vou say~

Mr. BUCHANAN. 7:30 a.m., that is ,~hat our information is. ~Ir. CLmrExTs. On what date '?

Mr. BUCHANAN. May 12.

Mr. CJ.F,lIfENTS. My time is 7 :03. I don't want to be nicaynnish, but I have certain information that comes from the logbook. And I would want the record to reflect what our record indicates.

Mr. BUCIJAXAX. I am glad to ha.ve the correction, because our records were 7 ::)0. That is 7 :03, just 2 hours after Washington was informed of t.he incident, that the reconnaissance was ordered. Our records show 9:57 a.m., which according to your records would be almost 3 hours later the aircraft were actually dispatched according to our records.

Do you show something different from that ~

Mr. CLEIIO~XTS. Yes, sir, our records indicate that in some 4 hoursnow that would conform to what you said-but in some 4 hours we launched a P-3 to start the search. This has to be put into the context that we don't maintain an aircraft, of this type on strip alert in Thailand from where it was launched. The aircraft had to be readied, the crew briefed, the mission planned, and an other of these pretakeoff activities completed.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I appreciate your opinion of that subject, but I just wonder-the first word came in at 3 :18 a.m., and this was a situation in which two other ships had previously been disturbed in these waters. This is 6 hours and 40 minutes from "the time of the first word that the aircraft was dispatched.

Maybe from the point 'of view of our Military Establishment that is immediate action. From the point of view of a layman it seems like a long time to get reconnaissance started when there has been some

1 Commander In Chief, Pacific.

e·

294

existence of the possibility of such thing because of the other ships that have been disturbed and given the general situation when we had the Pueblo incident.

Perhaps it is my lack of knowledge of military affairs, which is very great, but from a layman's point of view, it would make me wonder if the system is all that excellent, if it takes this kind of time to begin surveillance.

It would seem to me as a layman that there might be a system under which surveillance would be an automatic thing that would be triggered without all these hours of delay, particularly when you consider the fact once they get to the mainland, like the Pueblo, they may be gone forever and you might have a mean crisis on your hands.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I appreciate your position, hut I want to point out there is a great difference between the lJIayaguez and the Pueblo. In the first instance, the jJJaya.guez is not a U.S. Navy ship, and it was not on an official military mission. The Pueblo was. That is a great difference as far as we are concerned.

In addition, the M ayaguez seizure had a cloud over it. These other incidents had apparently gone on, evaluation was required as to what really took place. 'Ve did not know what the true facts were in this regard.

As a matter of fact, it took us many days to sort out whether those other two incidents, that you were talking about, whether those ships were actuall;y seized or not and we finally determined that one of them had a shot fired across its bow, and it escaped. In the other instance, the ship was boarded and let go. It was not seized at all.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I understand all that.

1\1r. CLEMENTS. So, the information flow was not all that one would have wished for.

I have a log here of the events in sequence of time of exactly when

these things took place. I will be happy to put this in the record. 1 Mr. BUCHANAN. I would appreciate that. .

Mr, FASCELL. Without objection.

Mr. BUCHANAN. ""Ve have such a log, but yours is apparently dif-

ferent. ' .

Mr. Secretary, I would be an absolute hypocrite if I did not convey my substantial concern. ""Vould you similarly defend the Pueblo crisis as bcing immediate 1

Mr. CLEMENTS. No, sir, I would not.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It just seems to me that this-it is true of many entities and enterprises-but we have a very great bureaucracy in the Pentagon. You have quite a military bureacuracy getting from the

point of decision to the point of implementation. .

It seems to me there ought to be some way to make very elementary steps like sending out reconnaissance to see what in fact is happening, that there ought to be some way to speed up their process.

From your response, it would appear to me, you feel your response was perfect already so there is no room for improvement.

Mr. CLEMENTS. If I left that impression, I would like to correct it.

And if you would prefer, I would withdraw the term "immediate." . I certainly think that the process could be improved.

1 The Information was subsequently provided and retained In the eommtttee tiles not printed tor public record due to claSSification.

I

• C C QQ •• I •• C Lt.'~Cl .C C •• l(ill U.CO.lC~~ • C C .,.,m'l •• C lJ.i.,.e .l o .,.l~

295

I don't want to leave any other impression with you. If JOU have the impression that I was saying it was satisfactory, even, it was not.

I think that we can do better .

Mr. BUCHANAN. I want to repeat, I think overall the military operation was a fine success-the actual recapture of the ship and the end result of the mission, but it seems to me there may really be a way to improve the system to initiate particularly the reconnaissance.

Mr. CLEUENTS. I accept that, and I agree with you . Mr. F ASCELL. Mr. Secretary, let's backtrack a minute . When did you first learn of the seizure?

STATEMENT OF MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, EAST ASIA, AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. ABRA1tIOWITZ. In 'Vashington at 5 :12 in the morning. That is when we learned about it from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta.

Some 4 hours after that time, the P-3 was launched. I would point out that P-3's are located in the Philippines and in Thailand. Only the P-3 in the Philippines is on strip alert.

Mr. F ASCELL. 'Vhy doesn't somebody tell us why it was a P-3 and not something closer or faster or bigger or whatever?

Mr. CLEMENTS. You mean--

Mr. FASCELL. You had to bring in a P-3 to do the job? You did not have something else closer? You did not have a carrier closer? You did not have a plane that could do the job closer? There was nothing else to send except that particular plane? Why? Is it equipped to do the job? Was it the only one there?

I am throwing the football as hard as I can.

Mr. CLBIENTS. The P-3 is uniquely equipped to do this pnrt icular type of reconnaissance and surveillance, It was the pt'oper asset to assign t.o this particular mission,

Mr. FASCELL. You see the problem Mr. Buchanan and I have, and I am afraid other laymen have. ",Vc hnve the idea that yon pick up the red telephone and you say "Hey, CINCPAC, Send an aircraft out. Go find that boat."

Now, what is wrong with our thinking i I think that is what he is asking.

Mr. OLE~mNTs. There is not a thing wrong with that kind of thinking. As a matter of fact, it works in that fashion, but we are tn lking about finding out something here at 5 :12 and having something happen at7 :03.

Now, if you are specifically saying that that 2·hol1l' differential is too Iong--

Mr. FASCELL, No, sir, I am not saying that.

I am just saying you said that yOll sent a P-3 from the Philippines.

All I said is "Fine, why r' You tell me; I don't know.

Them were not any other reconnaissance flights going on in the area]

Mr. CLE~rENTS. There were not, and furthermore, you know we just can't cover the world in this manner.

.c c c e o e» •• CO.I3O'J~ .C C •• 0e;1 G.e a.e·am • f':: C •• o·eli •• C LI • Ii e:1Q • l (J •• 01<t)J

•• c c, •.. •• L (i .'.'6'< •• (, (). ",,0,

•• c. C .1 •• " •• C ( •• lltS' •• c c ... ,c.c •• r. o • .,..G

296

:Mr. FASCEJ,L. 'Ye laymen don't have that kind of knowledge. "'e think you are cove ring the world.

:Mr. CT.T·:;\m:\Ts. If you consider OIlI' budget, that is perhaps It reaSOil able thought on yOUI' part. But the truth of the matter is, we just don't.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, you did not have F ~ reconnaissance

flights in the area that could give YOll the intelligence you wanted!

l\It-. CLE"IEXTS. X at at that pnrticulnr time. ..

Mr'. F,\S(JELr .. Then: how did you veri fy the seizure?'

Mr, CU;"IEXTS. Through the usc of 1'-3 aircraft and through their surveillance and photography and continued reconnaissance. 'Ye not only found the ship, we kept it under observation,

Mr, F.\SG1~LL •• John, are you still ha ving trouble with this? I am a little bit. but. go ahead.

Mr. BUCHAN.\N. I have another reluted quostion to raise, but. I think my problem is that if there is not a way to develop It system where reconnaissunce can begin soonel'- maybe there is not, but it seems to me that Illight he possible. "Then JOu consider the kinds of problems we ha,·e with the Pueblo and we fortunately averted in this case it seems to me if a system could be developed where just reconnaissunce, going' to 1;(':1: could be launched It little more automatically-maybe that. is not, possible, but thnt is the problem.

I have a rclnted question. That is, the captain of the fll ayagllez testified that. there were commercial vessels in the area which responded to his mayday and which indicated they were notifying the authorities, specifically, the tug Bianca. The tug Bianca indicated it had notified the nuthorit.ies ill Manila and they had sent it on to Subie Bay.

This is separate from the whole story we have of it being picked up by our people in .J akarta and being relayed to ", ashington, Do you have evidence of thnt? 'Ve had the testimony the captain of the Jll ayaguez had response from this commercial vessel, which said they hnrl reluved this informatiou.

Mr. C~,TDfEXTS, '" e do not.

1\[1'. BUCIl,\:-',\X. Yon do not ha ve this information? 1[r. Cu,,,rEXTI'. No, sir, we do not.

]\[1'. }'.\RCELL. How was the JJI aya,quez first located?

Mr. CU:M CX'l'S. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I thought I had made that clear', It was located through the aeriul reconnaissance efforts of the 1'-:3.

Mr. I~,\f;cELL. 'Vas that eyesight 01: electronic ?

1\1r. CLEMEXTf;. I really don't know that specifically, I would assume by cyesiglJting~ but I can~t positively say that.

Mr. F.\SCELL. I thought I heard you say in your testimony that we had continuous mode film going fr-om hour one to hour zero.

Mr. CLE:llEXTS. Once the ship was located we had continuous sur-

vcillanco of the ship .

?III'. FM;CELL. Once the ship was located, butMr. CU;:lrE:\'['R. 'Vc could 1I0t. have continuous->-

Mr. j<',\i:\CI';U,. Tn other words, the ship was located as a result of tho reconnnissunco flight of the P-;3 coming from the Philippines?

~h. CLE"I EXTf;. K 0 sir, it carne from Thn ilund .

l\It-. }<'.\:;CIo:I,L. Thailnrld, but we don't know if this was visual sighting of the ship?

!

• (" CO Qat" •• C o • I.:-"'~ • cc •• e",c o • co. C'J(l~ .C C •• '(8l( •• eLI. &ole; • l U •• ',aIC

•• C' o.'C'. •• f- c . .'.-<: •• C O.C.

•• ( e.'.1( •• L 0.1)' •• c: c ._,.-c

•• L o.~.,

297

Mr. CLlmF.XTS, I thought you meant did the pilot find it in the sense of first sighting it either by radar or by signals, or what, Certainly, in duo COurse he got down and identified it with his eyes, that is exact-

ly right, _

1\11', FASCELJ" In other words, visual vcrification i )fr. CU::1IIJo:X'fS, Visual verification .

Mr. FASCF.LL. By the pilot of the reconnaissance aircraft ? Ml'. CLE:lfEXTS, Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCt:U •. And that was immediately transmitted by radio from

tho airplane back to home base and then tni"nsmitted back to Defense? lIfr. CLE)U:XTS, Yes, sir .

)1r. FASCELI., That is just a question, I don't know, Mr, CLE)IEXl'S, Yes) sir,

Mr. FASGI':LI •• Sometimes it is difficult to go back and recall it exactly but one of the recurrent questions that arose all through this testimony was the capauility of Out' surveillance to make any determination as to the location of the crew ami exactly what information was U vailable to r-;- SC for them to make decisions,

This is a very crucial point because, whatever the range or options you had before you at the time, it all centered on one q uestion : "'here was the crew? Otherwise, your range of options did not mean anything.

I am taking your ca vent into account, I agree with you that you Ita ve to rebuild the atmosphere of what was ~olllg on at the time in order to have some perspective.

Fifty-one hours have brone by, That is a long time, 'Ve have not heard anything and tho crucial issue is: "'hem is the crew? I am at an NSC meeting and I ask that question and I keep asking that question: 'Vhcro is the crcw l ",Vho tells me that ~ 'Vho gives me the answer to that? Do you? You arc DOD, You arc flying the airplanes so I look you in the eye, lIh. Secretary, and I say, where is the crew? "'here is it?

:Mr, CLE:1IIEXTS, )11', Chairman, the information about what had been happening with respect to operations, the movement of the Cambodian gunboats and CIfOIt to turn the gunboats around, and the fact that our pilots who were flying right alongside the particulur boat that had what were termed to be "Cuucasians~~-and that wns the term that came in from tho pilot--

Ml', FASCt:LL, "Appeared to 1Je~"

1\[1'. CI,}~)mNTS, '(Appeared to be Caucasians on board." All these reports were thoroughly mussuged by the intelligence community and tho l\TSC staff's and the principals. ",Ve all had the same informut.ion. It was Hot U case of somebody looking me in the eye and saying: ",Yhat can you serve up?"

Mr. FASCELI., You mean we all sat there and looked at the Iihus ? 1\11'. CI,E)(t;XTS. X 0, sir, I am talking in terms of the reports that came from the pi lots themselves.

Mr. FASC~:LI., I hear JOII. SO basically we acted 011 a report that came in 0\'01' the wire that a pilot said Caucasians?

Mr. CI.Jo:lrt:X'l'S. Absolutely, This is the way it cnme in, and us it comes into DOD it goes to State and CIA and DIA,

Mr. FASCt:LI" I assume you are n very curious man, Mr. Secretary, 1\!t" Cr.E;'IIEXTS, Your perception is well taken,

•• c:'O'.4 .<.."0'.'. •• ·C.O.j

•• cte-.'. •• eo e •• .e,c .... •• CO.I

.e

298

Mr. FASCELY,. I wonder if you went back and looked at the films that the pilot took at that time?

Mr. CLElI[ENTS. My recollection is that there were no pictures taken,

but I am not sure of that. .

Mr. F ASCELL. That hurts me, Mr. Secretary. Here again I am acting like a layman. I thought DOD is so thorough they would take pictures even if it was coal black dark and that the film would hare a time indicator on it that would say 11 :01, 11 :02,11 :03 et cetera so that, when it cot to the game room atthe Pentagon, the guy could take a deep bre~th and say: "Here is my roll. Look at it, baby." It was black and white or dark red, but there it is, with the time.

1\[1', CLElIIENTS. My associate, Mr. Abramowitz, tells me I was wl'?ng.

There WCI'C pictures taken. I have not scen them and I am not as curious as you thought J was. The reports that came in from the pilot were carefully gone over. These were visual. He was flying over this gunboat at very, very close l'unge and his reports cominrr back in were carefully and thoroughly gone over. I did this personally as did other

people. .

From the standpoint of our use at this particular time and with the time sequence which Mr. Buchanan was talking about, I am satisfied that we acted promptly, based on those reports as opposed to waiting for the photographs. I would not have wanted to do that. The photographs were not available at that time,

Mr. FAscELL. I understand.

Mr. CLElI[EXTS. 'Vo had to act on the information we had.

Mr. FASCF.LL. I think GAO is trying to find out-and the Chair is tI-yingto find out-if they are available at this time.

Mr. CLF .. MEXTS. I am sure they arc.

:Mr. FASCF..J.L. I am just curious, I am not. assuming that anything is wrong here. It is critical because the whole operation hangs on the pilot saying- it. looks like there arc Caucasians on that boat.

Captain Miller told us they arc the greatest guys in this worldall those pilots. Not just this pilot but all the pilots, He said that gllY came so close to that boat when they were trying to turn him arounrl that they were shooting and firing rounds right up to within 10 feet of the bow. He thought they were pretty good.

Mr. Cu::m;NTs. Our information was thut the pilots flew extremely close to the boat. And under these circumstunces I considered that their visual evaluation under the crisis management situation to which you referred was the best information we had available at the time,

Mr. FASCELL. I would not argue that even thonzh it is as difficult as it is to fly over 100 miles an hour and try to decide anvthinsr at all.

. 'Vhich series of sightings was this? Where was this ':('sscl,the fishmg vessel, when the pilot said-which was the first identificntionthat Caucasians might be on board? Do YOIl have that handy?

l\fr. (_JLEl'IIEXTS. No, sir, but "'0 can get it for you, and we can trace from hIS log when he picked up this boat. I call tell you in mv reeolIection t.hat. his picking th~ boat up, his trailing it, liis tJ·yin£to stop It-and It did stop for a while and he had it more or less--

[Tho information referred to follows;]

!

•• c C)·.'tl(J • c. ( •• '.'(i;l •• ( o.e.a •• c. C ,.I.C·I •• G O.CJ'( •• C C~ ••• .ci •• c, 0.11'4:1

299

SIGHTI:>'G OJ!' FISHING VESSEL 'WITH POSSmLE CAUCASIANS ABOARD

At 2103 EDT an aircraft reported sighting a fishing boat with possible caucaslans huddled in the bow at 10 degrees 23 minutes North and 103 degrees 18 minutes East, This location is approximately 9~ nautical miles East North East of Koh Tang Island, From 2103 EDT until the boat docked at Kompong 80m, approximately 2315 EDT, this boat was under constant surveillance. During this period numerous attempts were made to stop or divert this boat, but these attempts were unsuccessful.

:Mr. F ASCELL. I can't remember whether that was between Paulo 'Ylti and Tang or between Tang and the mainland.

]\fr. CLE~fENTS. It was between Tang and the mainland. And I want to add here, Mr. Chairman, that our judgment was, that based on this information, there were Caucasians on board. But-and I want to make a big "but" 11e1'0-\\e did not know for sure how many and that is the key.

~lr, FASC"~UJ' I understnnd that. Yon covered that in your testimony very well. In the range of options which you had to consider in NSC you had to assume that there could have been in one place or in three places or in nine places?

Mr. CLE;)IEXTS. That is right. .

Mr. F ASCELL. But the boat was picked up. I am tt'ying to recall Captain Miller's testimony, It seemed to me his testimony verified the fad that the crew was Oil that boat at that particular time. Am I cor-

rect.? Do any of you gentlemen recall? .

Mr. CLEUEXTS. That is right.

:Mr. FASCFLI,. So, in other words, we have subsequent testimony which verifies the pilot's information at that .time, which was essential to dccisionmnking in the NSC. NSC had indications that Caucasians were being moved, and you had reason to believe they were members of ,the crew, but you did 110t know how many or where they were gOlllg.

Mr. CLE:IIEXTS. That is right.

Mr. F ASCELL. I keep thinking of this film rolling with the time indicators in the side sprockets-when was that exactly?

:.'\rr. CLEJ\IJo:XTS .• Just a. moment. Let me look at my records.

Mr. Chairman, that was 2152-that is, f) :52 eastern daylight timeon the 13th,. The fishing boac with possible Caucasians abroad was spotted movlllg toward the mainland northeast of Koh Tang Island, Mr. FASCELL. I would assume it is dark?

Mr. CLE::IIEXTS. No, sir. That is 12 hours later around the clock in Cambodia. So that is morning,

Mr. FASCELL, So the time yon gayc me, 2152, is our time?

:Jrr. CLF;:UENTS, Yes. That is eastern daylight time. So you have to 1II0ve that--

Mr. FASCELL. I thought I heard you, but I wanted to be sure the record did .

}\fr. CL1DmNTs [continuing]. You have to move our time forward l2ltonrs .

Ml'. FASCELL. 1Vhich puts me on their time. at what time on what

day? '

i

f

300

~[r. CLE:'IEXTS. Eleven hours ahead on the 14th, the morning of the

14th.

~Ir. FASCELL. So the morning of the 14th, at what time?' l\f I'. CLEMEXTS. At R :52.

:'III': FASCELL. So it is broad daylight. And it is in the morning, Now, we picked lip that boat?

)11'. CLE:\IEXTS, ~Ir. Chairman, I want to make sure the record shows this because there has been confusion about the time. The reason it is not 12holll's ahead is because we am on daylight saving time anrl they are not. Normally, it would be 12 hours,

Jfr'. FASCELL. "~e picked upt he boat at 8 ;!)2 in the morning of the 13th?

:u I'. CLE::In:xTs. Cambodinn time.

)fl'. FASCELL, The time is OIl(} of the problems with this whole thing so we have to be very careful.

Mr. CU;JmXTs. "!e have a log here that we would be happy to give you,

MI'. FASCELL. I thought we harl nlready put, that in ,t he record, 1.'011 said in response to )11'. Bnehnnan that you would do that, and I appreciate that because that is obviously a fuller, more complete. Ing than what we have, which was too general and may hn.ve had some inco rreet t.imes in it, too.

:.'III'. Secretary, I assume hom the timc we picked lip the boat. we new]' turned it loose. right? 'Ve followed it with our reconunissnnce ? ~[r. Cu::m:xTs. No, sir. I don't think thab is right. At a point, that boat went on into the harbor,

Mr. FAscEI,r,. I know, but our reconnaissance followed it all the

way, didn't it? '

Mr. CLDIEXTR. In the spir-it you are using reconnaissance, the answer is probably yes, "~e know where the boat generally was.

:.'Ilr. F,u:;n;LI .. 'Vhnt does that mean? I have an idea of a guy flying an airplane with 11 camera that would pick thc fly specks out of the paper at 90,000 feet, 'Ve find the boat aIHI we think the guys are on thcrc-s-ancl I am assuming when that happened an order went out and said, "OK. yon fnllow that haby no matter where i·t goes." Is that what happened 01' did something else happen 1

~rl'. Cr,I-:JfEXTS. No, si r, I dou't think that is what happened. Certainly, in the sense of us keeping constant surveillance without any interruptions and knowing full time, all the time, where that boat was and where the CI'C\\' was, that is not true. 1Ye did not know that.

Mr. FASCELL. You better tell us what happened now because I nm feel iug a little flat.

Mr. CU;:lfEXTS. "'cll, for a sequence detailed, I am going to hare to lean on some of my associates here to make sure it is correct. May I (10 that?

Mr. FAscELr,. Absolutely.

Mr. CL}:Jn:XTs. Mr, Chairman, we are going to have to develop for the record the exact, details of how fa!' in that boat was find when we lost it-e-becnuse of the proximity to the mainland-or because nig-ht came on and similar details. I just. don't han! that, But we will provide for the record to the extent that we have an nccounting of that com' plete sequence.

:Mr. FASCF.LL. That would be vcrv. useful because it would close some gaps and also answer some questions.

,.

/

•• C o.·c" •• c. (,.,.·C •• C o.e. •• c c·.·.< •• c. o.c:' •• c c·.~ • .(

•• GO.C)i

301

~Ir. CLE;\IEXTS. That "ill be fine. We will be happy to do it. [The information follows i]

D~;TAII.ED SEQm::-;CE OP U,S, E,\IlI.Y RECOXXAISSA:,\ce EFFOIlTS

A field report transmitted at 2226 EDT on 13 :'lIlly Indicnted that one 30 foot craft with approximately 40 people ubonrrl depnrted Koll Tallg Islnud ut 1S30 f;OT )3 :\Ias, The identity of the personnel nhon rd the craft was Hot dlscerulble. Earlier reports had indicated thut the crew of tile JIUgtIYIIU;; hntl been transferred from the vessel to Koh 'I'ung.

At 2103 l<JDT 011 13 :\lay It pilot observed a fislling hOllt with "posslble CUlIcuslons huddted in the how" at. ]0 del-:"rees 23 minutes Xnrt h, 103 degree~ 1H mlnutcs I';u~t, Attempts were mnrle to divert the hoa t IJ)' strafing', From 2103 EDT to 22;i5 EDT, when reports ludlcure rnut riot control agents were dropped 011 the :Joat, numerous attempts were nia de to stop the bont or dh'ert it from Its course, However, nil attempts to dlvert thifJ boat from Its bnse course toward tile mainInnrl were unsuccessful. .

Tile hout, WIlS observed to r~>ach the mniulund at npin'[JxiulIItelr 2;{1;; hours EDT, Sun-eillallce was; discontlnued oil tllis pn rticulu r hoat «nee it urrtverl ill tile IJort of KOInjJollg Som,

Mr. FASCEU,. As I rcmember Captain :Miller's testimony, thcv went into the mainland and wound lip 011 :III island somewhere just off the rua iniund. Am I correct? Til order to get on the mu inlund itself, they had to cross R bunch of bamboo bridges, or something likc that. Does that ring a bell?

Mr. Cr,t;:m,;x'1's, He went to the mninland first-that. is the informu-

tioll-und thcn under' the CO\'CI' of night they WCI'C moved to un island. :Mr. F,\SCI';U .. I believe thut is whnt his testimonv disclosed.

Mr. Cu:)[t;x'J's,l think that, is correct. ~

}fl'. Fxscm.r., 'Yell, we will doublecheck.

)h', CI,I,)fEXTS. ,Ve will muke an effort to sec what "'C call run down from OHr records.

f.Thc information follows i]

J)F.I'ARTllI'XT m' DI~n;;O;St; ESTrlf,\TI>S OF CAlfBOIJI,.\:,\ STILHEfOY

A review of the tef<tiflwlIY prnvlrled IJ~' Captain ;\Iiller to the SuiJcoJrllllittee on Inrernutlunul Political n nd :lIilitar.l' Affairs 011 2;', .Jul.l' If)7;) estahli:<hes the following: CIJrUllOlog:r of the crew of tlw J/lfuu!lrlCz uftCI' di\'ersioll urtempr« of U,H. aircraft fllUed und the crew arri\'ed Oil the CUIIlIJn<liau nmf nln nrl. TiulPs nf tllpse e\:en!s were lint pr()rilled lIy Captaiu ),[iller, hut nre estimated by DOD.

Arrl ved in Iteam:

Were under sllrYeillHne(!!lr V,S, aircraft,

Tjt'd up lit fIshing pie!' (GOO IIl!rSOIlS were watching),

After %-% of an hour, CHlltOI'S were told to 1/l<)\'C hy Ilel'!;ouuel from another g-ulluoat,

g"timnted time of arrtval hy DOD sources ~1Hi hours EDT (IO};'i hours local),

).IO\:e<l down the harbor about 1 % miles nnd anchored off tile beach nhout r:;() ~'artls :

A military eompoinul nnd pr'lsnn were Incatf'd Oil the heach,

About 00 or 70 urrcrnft were over KOlllpung ::lOIn IIl1d Ream during this per lorl.

Crew had lunch aboard uont,

The crew and their captors were again ordered to move to Isln nd of R()n~ Sa UJ Loem :

Houses were built oyer the water Oil stilts .

TIle Second ~[i1itary Commuud Post of the KOlUP[)Ug Sorn are:! wns ha sed there,

The crew was met. at the dock hy the comniunder nurl IlU Interpreter lJy the name of Sum Knl.

E>;timates urrtvul time of mkl-afternoon.

After an Interrogutron they were fp~l (prior to a nullo cuntuct :II. 0700 Iwurlol EDT (IS00 hours Iocul ) with KompolJg ;';0111),

302

Mr. FASGELL. ",Ve need to get the record straight on that. If we lost the boat somewhere, we lost it. It just happens. That can happen to anybody.

1\[1'. CLE:!IIE~TS. 1\11'. Chairman, we knew-when I say we knew, we did not positively know-we felt it was our judgment that if they got to the mainland, it was going to compound our difficulties immeasurably.

Mr. FASGELL. I would certainly arrive at the same conclusion, Mr.

Secretary. I would not argue about that.

1\1r. CLEME:-'TS. 'Ve strongly felt that our feeling was correct in this regard, and we just lost track of the boat.

Mr. FASCEU,. No argument. As I recall the testimony, the men of the crew said they were moved from the mainland to this island in broad daylight. It was not dark, but the record will disclose that.

But there is another scenario which reads like this: Some guys made it to the mainland. "TO don't know how many. So we know now the parameters of our problem. ",Ye have two islands where we might have some people, and we know positively or we lire pretty certain that we have guys on the mainland. They arc there. It does not make nny difference whether they are 65 feet in or 500 miles in. They are

ili~ I

The problem is the same no matter how far from the shoreline they are. That is a possible scenario, By hindsight, you can't extend the gift of prophecy to the guys who were involved in tho operations, Yon can't in this scenario, say they should have known because it was broad daylight that the crew was moved from the mainland to the island, and tho Cambodians did not have any idea of holding them hostage. You can't arrive logically at that kind of reasoning. That would be totally illogical.

~Ir. CU;::I£EXTS. w« agree.

Mr. FASCF.LL. But the point is still valid. If a conscious decision "as made, Mr. Sccretary=-and this is what you are going to have to put in the record for us-if a conscious decision was made saying they are on the mainland, that is it. Now we go back to the drawing board and see what we do about it, and that conclusion would have stopped your reconnaissance.

Mr. Cr,E::I[EXTS. No, sir, that is not true, and I will expand upon that for the record.

[The information follows i]

DETER~II~ATIO~ OF "'HEREABOUT OF CREW MEMBERS Urox ARRIVING ON lIIAINLA:-;D

In answering this question the following factors should he considered. First, despite reports to the effect that there was R possihility t.hat some of the crew were on R fishing boat, at no time were aerial observers able to clearly identify the crewmen nor determine how many personnel were aboard. Second. according to previous reports, some or all of the crew had heen transferred from the M(l1Ja{ltlcz to Koh Tung Island. Once the fishing boat docked at Kompong 80m. it was believed that any further action woukl he unproductive in light of more pressing requirements at Kob Tang where the majority of crewmen were thought to be. Although continued reconnaissance of the aren WIIS directed. the fishing boat was not designed as [I target of significant interest. The lnst known report made identifying the fishing craft at Kompong Som was 2315 EDT on 13 Jofay.

·C 0 Q'G'i1 •• C C •• '. .c c ..... ~

Q .'C C'.l.

ee C .'.'1 •• c LI.i.

• (_ o _,."

•• c oee •• C (j'.~.~4 •• CO.Cl •• ( C,.I.14

•• CO.t; •• c C ... ~.,t •• co.c:;

303

Mr. FASCELL. I could seethat as a logical sequence. And you would say, "Well, yes, but we will still continue reconnaissance over the two islands."

Mr. CLEMENTS. 'We had the coverage and the reconnaissance to the maximum extent possible, in our judgment, not only on the islands but also on the mainland, but you have to remember there was hostile action on the mainland, too. 'Ye just did not have completely free passage in there to do whatever we wanted and--

Mr. FASOELL. Are you talking aboutair or water i

Mr. CLE~IENTS. I am talkinz about air and not only there. The pilot plane that you were so complimentary about, was taking hostile fire when he was doing his job .

Mr. F ASOELL. Small arms fire from the boat or antiaircraft from the mainland?

Mr. CLEJrF.NTS. No; from the boat.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to get 'back to CINCPAC and to the initiation of reconnaissance in the first place. You indicate that you have no information of any report by the tug Bianca to the authorities in Manila or Subic Bay of this. 'Vould you get somebody to send a cable out to CINCPAC and see if they ever received such a message, and supply it for the record?

Mr. CLE:\[E}j"TS. I will he glad to. I have no recollection of it, but ',"0 will check and make sure. 'Ve will provide the cable you ask for. [The information follows:]

CABLE COMMUNICATION RECEIVED BY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

.We have queried CINCPAC and they stated that they did not receive any communication from the tug Bianca. However, they did receive a message from our attache office in Singapore which reported that the tug Bannock: had received a distress call from a vessel identifying itself as nn American flag ship named Marlborough. The report Indicated the transmission was not clear. OINCPAC states that this report WIIS received at CINCPAC after they had received the report from our Embassy in Jaknrta Intlonosln. A copy of the classified message received by CINCPAC and retransmlttcrl at our request was provided.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Jakarta notified at. 5 :02 a.m., 'Vashington. As a part of the system, or is it a part of tho system that there would be any notification of CINCPAO at that point that maybe the Cambodians have made off with an American vessel ~ 'Vouid that be part of the system or would it not ~

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. A. W. ATKINSON, U.S. AIR FORCE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General ATKIXSOX. I am not sure I understand your question, sir. Mr. BUCHANAN. There is a report that someone had seized an American vessel within the area of responsibility of CINCPAC and this report was now coming through official U.S. channels. The embassy at Jakarta has notified 'Yashington, D.C. At what point, given the system, would CINCPAC be notified, "Hoy, you may have a pro'blem there, there has been a reporting of the seizure of a vessel in your area of responsibility" ~

• c C '-1 'iil() •• co • .."

• C C •• lCli G.e O.C)

• c c •• ~(!! •• CLI •• ,ij

.l o •• l~

•• C C, .'t:'~1 • L c. .~.tC •• C (t.erl •• CC .:.'C •• C. (,. "'1 •• c C ••• .c •• G C •• 1l"'4

304

General ATKIX::;OX. Normally the first thing that would be done would be to call CINCPAC al{d ask them if they had additional information.

Mr. B0CIlAXAX. 'Vas this done?

General A'rxrxsox. I can't answer that, sir.

Mr. BI;CIIAXAX. 'ViII you provide that 'for the record? General ATKIXSOX. Yes, sir.

[The information follows r]

PltECISE Tn!ES OF XOTIFICATIO:O; OF SEIZURE

l'ACO)f first became aware of the Mayaglt6z seizure nt 0514 hours Eastern Dil~'1ight 'I'ime (1<;0'1') on 12 ;\lay 19i:" uppruxtmu telv the same time the messagu was receivell in 'Vn~hington. Records indicate that extensive discusslous occurred between the l'entilgoll and CINOI' At}; ut 0534 hours EIYI', 0620 hours ED'l', Oi();? hours }~DT, and at Oi30 hours EDT. Additionally, other consultu- , tiou>I took J111ll~e by telephone and message th roughnut the dny of 12 May,

1\11'. CLE:\lEX'l'S. 1\11'. Abramowitz has a comment.

Mr. AnHA:\IOwITZ. I cun't verify this, but 1 would assume that the American Embassy in sending that message to "\Vashington sent it immediately to CINCPAC.

Mr. BI,cIrAXAx. I would think, if that is not part of the system, it should he made so.

Mr. ABI:.DWWITZ. I would assume so, but I can't verify that at this moment.

1\[1'. BGCII,\x.\x. I [lin not any high-powered admiral in the Navy.

I was once an enlisted man in thc Navy. lIIaybe that created certain prejudices 011 Illy part. But, if I were a high-powered admiral in the Kay)' and I received a report. at [) :02 a.IlI.-I dOI1~t know what time that is, 4- o'clock in the morning=-whcnever it is-the time he was OPCI'atin!!, if Lroccivcd a report, I believe the very first thing I might do is starr making contingency plans for reconnaissnnce in the area. no von think that would be an appropriate thing for' a high-powered admirn l to do?

:\11'. CLOIEXTS, Or not even high-powered. Mr.lk(;IL\xAx. No contingency plan, nothing- at all?

Mr. CLIDIEXTS. I feel here YOli have to put this in the context of our normal business, and I mentioned enrl ier that we l2:et daily from all oyer lumdrcds of reports of incidents or potentially important developments-c--c-

l\[1'.lkclI,\XAN. Everv dnv ?

1\[1', CU:JmXTS r continuing]. And some arc valid and some arc not valid, As an cxumple=-and I won't, mention the name-but It ,'eI'Y, verv prominent, powerful person in the Middle East was rumored to have been the victim of all assussinnt ion attempt. 'Yell, it turned out the report was completely erroneous. but nevertheless it flowed through the system and could have caused a real flap if we had renctcd violently like you are talking about.

1\11'. B0CIL\XAN. K O. I am not tn lkilll-',' about rencting violently. Yon mean you get Oil a daily basis 1)00 items comparable to the seizure of an American vessel? Do YOll mean you real ly get that kind of traffic] Mr. C'LE:\lEXTS. No. of course not.

Mr. BUCIL\X.\X. l\nd false reports 01' questionable reports?

Mr. CU::\IEX'I'S. Bnt at the same time we have to take into considerat ion thnt-as 1 have already pointed out-thnt we did have in exactly the same area two other erroneous reports which were to the

.eGO" •• CO.l ecc •• ct. GO •. • c o •• •• CO •• .co ••

•• oc,.€' •• CG~. eft •• OC).E •• C C •• if •• CO.CJ •• cc .... •• o c •• e

305

_)

effect that two of the other vessels had been seized. In fact, neither one was seized-one was shot at and one was boarded and released.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Isn't that a warning in itself that somebody was out there bothering somebody?

Mr. CLElIIEXTS. But we did not have that at that time .

Mr. BUCIIAXAN. They were not OUI' responsibility. These were not American vessels in the first place. I must say it strains my credibility a bit to believe that the Pentagon or GIN OP AC would receive on 11 regular basis numerous reports of this type that might be subject to question, so it would be inappropriate to shut doing some thinking about how you are going to handle it if it turns out to be true.

To describe that as a violent reaction-if that is violent for the military-we have a very pacifist military.

Mr. (_,1..DIEXTS. I think that what we are reull,)' talking about here is a relatively small amount of time. If we had Just jumped through the hoop and done everythin¥ that possibly we could have done, we are onl,)' talking about an additional hour or so saved in getting the P~:3 off the ground, Is that what you nrc talkinl:? about? You hu vc to

narrow it down to specify what we are trying to do. .

If you are suying=-und I thought I had already agreed with youif you arc saying that we could improve the system, the answer is certainly yes, we can improve the system. Now, how much we could squeeze of that 4 hOUl'S, I don't really know.

Mr. BUGIL\XAX. In the first place, according to my recollection, from 5 :02 to !) :57 is very close to 5 hOUl'S, not 4:, but maybe there is something wrong wit-h Illy arithmetic in that instance. But where you 11<\,"e a ship that has in fact been seized and is being towed to a hostile shore, although it is not a military vessel-c-civiliuns, not military 1'C1'sonucl 011 bonrd-c-nevertheless you have a situation which might become l"Oughly comparable and certainly so far as the American people arc concerned, ,"cry comparnble to the Pueblo incident, where you have that contingency and that possibility having had this one bad experionce just a few years ago, I still fail to see why it would not huve been it reasonable pmt of the system for CINCPAC to have some kind of cont.ingency plan to take O\'Cl", at least to have somebody standing by for possible immedinte depmture.

1\[1'. Cu::m:NTs. The point is well taken and we will tl'y to improve the system.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, let me get back to where we were. I need to know specifically, in my own mind for judgmental reasons, whether 01' not we have continuous film and whether it is from one source or several sources, meaning one aircraft 01' several aircraft, I also need to know, Mr. Secretary, how fast that film was reviewed in "'ashillgton, what the procedure is, how it gets here, what the timclng is, \Y hat YOU do with it. And, again, I want. to say I am 110t being critical because 1 have no way of being critical yet. I am just struggling with the procedures .

"'c uow know there was a photogrnp]: of the fishing vessel leaving Kompong Sour Harbor with Caucasians 011 board. 'Vc know that now from our own Iihn. And they went to Ream Islund but obviously yon did not know it at the time. Question. Is that perfectly logical ~ "'as that because tllC·gllY that shot the film in that uirplnnc had to get it to ·Washington and it had to be analyzed by somebody-and I am re-

~.

306

constructing this scenario, I don't know whether it actually happened or not-but by the time it was processed the incident was over. Or was it over 1

'Was it because somebody in interpretations missed that particular photograph, which is entirely possible if you arc looking at 10,000 feet of film? You can't see everything. "We need to know that. Did that really happen? What is the timelag here? That brings HS back to your statement in which yon say there are obviously improvements that can be made in our intelligence system, and that comes back to just what did you have in mind?

I appreciate Y0ul' saying that. I think it is it very fair statement. I don't think it impinges on your operation one way or the other, but what did you have in mind in the way of improvement?

[The information follows i]

.CCOQot( •• CO.~~ .CC •• Gf,~ ... oo • C:~ • CO .•• <814 •• (~O •• H¢ .C. O •• ~lJ

I'1l0CESSrxo OF RECO::>NAISSAXCE PnOTOGIlAI'HY

The following information concerning the sequence of haudllng reconnnissauce pllOtogruphy from the flying of a photo reconuatssanee mission to the ntilization of processed photography by policy makers 111 Washlngton is suhmitted.

The normal sequence of events are as follows: (a) Picture of target is taken,

(Ii) Aircraft returns to its operating location (time depends on distance

from target to operating-location (OL».

(c) Aircraft is downloaded and film brought to ]"lhoto lab (up to 1 nour ) . (a) l!'ilm is processed in labor [seeuntydeletion).'

(e) Photo interpreter (1'1) readout begins and frames are selected for electronic trunsmission.

(f) Duplicates (length of time vartes) are produced for shipment to

Washington, D.C.

(V) Chi,lS (selected prjnts) are prepared for electronic trnnsmlsslon. (h) Chips are sent to transmission terminal [security duletion}.'

(i) ChillS are transmitted to CIXCPAC and Washington, D.C. [Scetlrit~· deletlcn.]

(j) Initial Photographic Interpretntfon Reports are produced (time varies from inullediatelr after receipt of film by the PIs to 12 hours later). This

report is called an IrIll. .

In effect, upon arrival of the reconnaissance aircraft at its operating location (Udorn in MavagllCz Incident) the film is downloaded and immedIately processed. As soon as the material is processed the photo interpreters begin the readout. Depending upon the urgency of the readout it will be done on either the original negutlve or It duplicate positlve (which takes longer to obtain but Is more suitable for interpretation).

1'he basic intellig-cnce produced from the readout hy photo interpreters is provided in the IPIR, 'l'heHc reports are usually completed within ]2 hours of the receipt of the film. Secure telephones were available to puss the highest, Vl'iodty information wit.hin the tlioater.

There are two methods available for the transmlssion of pliotog raphy in 9. crisis srtnatlon. (n) The use of dedicated aircraft to move tile jlllOtograpllr from the field to Washington and [security deletion). In the case of tbe Mayaguez Incident both methods were employed. Dedicated aircraft moved reconnaissance film from Udorn AB, Thailand to Wn!'hingtoJ}, D.O. Yin Clark AFB, Philippines and San Fraucisco, California, Selected photographic frames were flown from Udorn An to NKP, 1'hailand and transmitted electronlcnllv to Washington. D.C. It should he mentioned that 110 film exposer] dUl'illg" the time of the incident reached the Washington, D.O. area until after the Mavauucz was released,

Transmission time of imagery from the field to Washington on each mission cannot be precisely determined. XO logs were matntalued ; therefore, there is

1 Classified portions are retaIned In the committee files.

\

•• c c •• £·j4 •• C O •• '€: •• C('.C;4 •• c c ••• c •• C ... C). IllC •• cc •• at: •• C (,. C)"(

·W

307

no information readily available on specific events. [Security deletion.] As soon as infurmation in the form of IPIR or chips is received, the informution is disseminated to appropriate decision makers by the offices recelving the information. As indicated above, no photos/rolls reached ·'Vashington before the ship was released. 'l'he imagery was availuble, however, to theater commund elements for appropriate application in tactical decisions relative to the J1layauu6z operations. The imagery was made available by use of the electronic transmission and air courier srstems,

Mr. CLEMENTS. I knew you were going to ask that question and when I read my statement I did not read tfia.t sentence in it.

Mr. F ASCELL. Do you want to take it out ~ That is all right. I don't want to hold you to the specifics right at this point, if you are just making that as a broad, general proposition that anything can he improved. Everything can be improved.

Mr. CLEIIIEXTS. No, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to comment On it without getting too specific.

First of all, let me acknowledge again to Mr. Buchanan that I certainly do agree with him that we can improve that time sequence. ·We can improve the discipline of the distribution of those messages and the alertness of the individuals invol ved, and so forth. 'Ve can do those things and we can start squeezing that 4 hours-plus and get it down to pet'ha1,'s half that time.

There IS some reasonable minimum that we can work in order to put aloft a crew and an airplane with a mission and instructions and so forth. But for me to say that we could get it on almost an instantaneous basis, I question that. Or that we will have constant surveillance around the world. I know we will not because we don't have those kinds of resources. But we can certainly squeeze the time and improve the

, reaction, to a situation of this kind.

So that is an improvement. 'Ve can also improve significantly-and I mean this now-our command and control communications system. 'Ve refer to this as W,VMCCS, Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems. We have a Director of WWMCCS in the Department of Defense, Mr. Tom Reid.

This is a department within itself. He has the same position as an Assistant Secretary of Defense. I am chairman of the 'V'Y~ICCS council and we are working hard to improve that system.

I want to quickly add, however, that this is a multi-billion-dollar effort over a lO-yeal' period, at least before we can get to where we want to go. It is not going to take place overnight. These are the kinds of things that I really had reference to when I was talking about improvements.

Mr. It'ASOELL. Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt you there. Explain to me what the difference is between WWMCCS and DCA (Defense Communications Agenc),) .

Mr. CLEMENTS. Well, there is a significant difference. Now, I will get back to ,VWMCCS in a moment because I know of nothing that is more important to crises management than 'V'V:MCCS, and so I can

speak to it in that spirit. '

Now, DCA-we have a representative of DCA here from the Joint Chiefs, Colonel Dambrauskas. I specifically asked him to come in order to explain to you DCA's role. He will talk about DCA and I will talk about WWMCCS, if I may.

.CC'Q~Ot •• co • ..,c .cc •• a:j(J • 'C '0 • 1:)'(1 .CC •• cal •• C o •• ~~ .{ 0 •• 01

•• C (J eic;i •• co •• -c •• C (t.e_~ •• c c •• ;c •• C (,. CJ' •• c c •• ,( •• G ( •• 0

308

STATEMENT OF COL. VINCENT DAMBRAUSKAS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS AGENCY

Colonel DAlIIBRAUSK.\S. The Defense Communications Agency is the agency of the Defense Department charged with the management of the defense communications system. The defense communications system includes all nontncticnl communications of the Defense Department.

Mr. FASGBLL. So you are land-based?

Colonel D,UIlIHAUSIL-\S. Yes, sir, essentially, and satellites.

Mr. FASCELL. That has nothing to do with operational command communication functions!

Colonel D,uIBI!AUSIL'S. However, the command and control circuits and the ,,\V1VMCCS circuits that Ml'. Secretary mentioned traverses the system. This system provides the carrier that takes those circuits as fur as it can go.

Mr. FAS<;ELL. You pick them up and shoot them out. You are a

conduit?

Colonel DAIImnAUSKAs. Yes, sir.

lir. FASCELL. But you lin "6 no operational function? Colonel D.Dmru\Usl{As. Not in this sense.

Mr. FASCELL. Let's get back to 1VW.MCCS.

1\r r. CLJ"In:XTS. In this "\Vorldwide Militnt·v Command and Control System-,,\V,Yl\lCCS-wc use these ussets=-you used the word "conduit." It really is fur more than that. They service these systems and design them,

Mr. FASCf:LL. I meant he is a conduit for your operational requirement. That is all I meant.

~fl·. Cu::m:xTs. Yes. Now, as to improving these systems they come huck through the National Command Authority, which means the NBC-and the President and the body that we originally talked about; these systems fire what enable us to flow information up and down and through the .r oi nt Chiefs, the Chairman, and the unified commands.

Mr. F,\sc],r.r .. l\Ir. Secretary, excuse me, I have to ask this 'nt this point.

I was under the impression from prior testimony many years ago that DOD had three world wide channels of communication, onc of which is completely cOYCJ'ed, and the other two of which are avnilnble. One is' operational command and the other is in conj unction with State and CIA .

Now as I understand your testimony-or maybe I misunderstand the whole thing-e-we don't have that capability yet. ,,\Vo nrc still in the process of building it to bring it back through national command . ~h, CU:::IrEXTS. No, sir, I am afraid yon read something into this that, Ir!'all_y did not mean to say .

Mr. FASGELL. I just don't have enough information. That 1S the problem .

)fl'. CLE::If.EXTS. 'Yhat I am trying; to COll\'CY to YOH is that. ,YC are taking: the systems that we now have und we are building on them other systems to improve and refine a II systems to cnhunco t he. CO]~Imaud and control features that would cnuhle us to do a better Job JIl crisis munngomcnt,

• (" C ~.Q •• c 0.'1 .cc •.• ... C·O.ll

.C C.'. •• C O.l.'l • l CJ .;.

•• co~. •• L ·~i'·.'4 •• C·O. •• C ·C·.1C •• eo. •• cc ••.• •• co.

309

Mr. FASC~~LL. All for that, but what that tclls JIlt'. is you did not. hu ve two-way communication to start with at a central command.

Mr. CU:lImNTs. X 0, sir. You nre rending again in something I did not say. As a matter of fact, in this particular instance we certainly did have tWO-WilY communications and those communications \\'CI'O good as a matter of fact,

. lUI'. FASCELL. So you n re just improving thc system you have gOL?

)11'. CU:]'IENTS. \Ye certaiuly arc, but you asked me what recommendations that I had in this respect. Certainly one of the things that we can do, and I mean significantly do, is to improve our couununica-

tions. That is not to say they arc bad, .

Mr. Fxscsr.r., And there was no lapsc 01' breakdown or problem with

respect to this particular issue which is the Jl!ayayuez? .Mr. CU;:UEXTS, No, sir; there was not.

MI', FASCE[,r., That is the whole point.

The next question is: 'Vhat docs that ha ve to do with the Llfayqgucz? Mr, C[,~:lIENTS. It has exactly the same thing to do with the llla.ya-

guez that this P-;3 ~etting aloft. docs. 'Ve can make that. system work better and serve 0111' purposes better just like we can improve the takeoff time on that airplane,

)[1'. FASCJo:[,L. You can't send those films over that wire, can vou ! Mr. CU:lIENTS. In.an executive session I will talk to vou nUOlit those

films. "

)[1', FASCE.I,L. Fine, because you know I am a finn believer in thc fact we huve t.hc capability to count the number of cells in a ti.(s eye at DO,OOO feet or better.

~Il'. CU:lH;Xl'S. X 0 comment.

)11', BUCH,\N,\X. Talking about the improvement of systems, how milch power and function people below the 'Vashingtoll level now hu ve in responding to an ulert, or It maydny they recei vc from outside sources. Is there any system which would involve action at that level, ill response to a mayday ? 01' docs th:tt Ita vc to come to "'llshill!:,'tOIl for clca ranee to go see what the matter IS?

General ATKINSON. They would respond with whatever they have, but if YOIl are talking about ail' rescues it depends on where we have those units located. Normally maydays are ussociuted with that but they recci \'8 everyone's attention. The local commander will take action

on that. .

Mr. BUCHANAN. Hut the Ma;ljaguez was first It mnydny.

General AT1\.IN80X. Yes, it was, but the local commander probably did not get that one,

?Ill'. BUClIAXAN, If CIXCPAC got it-we stiJl don't have absolute testimony on that-e-but if he got. it would it not be a pnrt of the system that he might tnke some action in response to a mnyduv ?

Gcncrnl Arxixsox. I would say C1SCPAC would huve been authorizer! to do surveillance but no other action in this case.

)[1', BUCIUN,\N, Now we are right back to square one. I stn rted my whole interrogation on the question of why there was not immediato action with ullyour survcilluncc, and JOU described t.hat at one point in .\"0111' testimony as a violent response .

If volt have a lllHyda\' and he learns about. it nn<! he is authorized to go usfur us surveillance, then I am back at why that did not happen.

.c COQO<t~ •• CO.I3G"tG .c C •• o e; (J. c·o. C~·Q.IG .c C •• o e» •• C_LI. CI etel .l U •• ore$t

1: ._.

• • co. (:'iC'Ql • c, c. •• C'C" • • C' r, • ()t(!;jc; •• C C •• 0'8)' • • C o • (;'6·"& •• c r •• e.e.aC

• • G () • C~~~(§

310

General ATKlXSON. He would not be authorized to do surveillance over a foreign country or something of this nature, but he would be in international waters.

Mr. CLE)IEXTS. That was not in internal waters. The mayday came from what we considered international waters .

I want to remind vou in retrospect these things are a lot easier to evaluate now than they were under the circumstances of the time, which I tried to touch upon in my opening statement. You must remember that we had just gone through a very traumatic experience in this part of the world. These commanders with whom we are finding some fault for lack of response all were very sensiti ve to the feelings of Congress and the public and everyone with respect to what do you do in Cambodia, what do you do in Laos, what do you in South Vietnam, I am afraid that we may have had a situation here in an area where the past circumstances and environment restrained and made us more cautious than we normally would have been.

Mr. BUClU .. NAN. I think that response docs make a good deal of sense, Mr. Secretary. I understand. 1Ve had passed many restrictions ngainst any kind of military presence activity in this part of the world hero in Congress and I do understand this would put this in a special categolJ'.

Is it your judgment that, had this same incident occurred under other circumstances, you might have had a more normal mayday response from the field ~

Mi. CLDIEXTS. Mr. Buchanan, I was involved in all this, I can assure you, speaking for myself, that I was very sensitive to this area, to the concerns of the whole situation. I would like to think-it is purely speculative, of course-I would like to think our response would have been quicker in another part of the world or under other circumstances.

Thk BUCII.\XAX. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

:\h. F"\SCELl, . .Mr. Secretary, was there concern in Defense with determining the intentions of the Cambodians in seizing the vessel or was this something that Defense figured was a State problem? .

Mr. CLE:\n:xTS. K 0, sir; we "'Cl'C concerned and we did discuss this both among ourselves and with State. "'Yhy did these people do this] What is their purpose i" And, frankly, we were mystified. 'Ve did not really know.

Mr. F ASGELL. As I recall, the Foreign Ministry of Cambodia has commented on the seizure in newscasts and in the statement they issued they claim that they issued no order and that there was difficulty with command and communication and control with Cambodian forces. Am I correct in that? Have you been made aware of those news reports ~

Mr. CLE:lIEXTS. Yes, sir; I have read something to this effect and, whether it is true or not, I don't know. They are trying to give off the sort of noises that would make this out to be an act of pirates as opposed to an official act of the Cambodian Government,

Mr. FASCELL. You had no way of knowing that at the time?

Mr. CLE:\IEXTS. No, sir. - .

Mr. F,\SCELL. You had to assume they had a government and that somebody , v as running it?

Mr. CLEMEXTS. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. And that is the assumption you finally made?

.c OOO(ltO •• CO.C3~ .CC •• eA,C (J • CO. C~l<I~ .C C •• f.!lC •• C CI • ~i.t!A • (_ 0 •• ~1(l

• • C C) .~«"rc • L (_ J .'.'Ct' •• Co c,.e,.

•• cc .~.lC •• G () • .,'. •• c c ••• -c •• G o .11'4

311

Mr ... GL~MEXTS. Yes, sir; and those were the kinds of diplornatrc negotiations that we tried to put forward on an official government-togovernment basis.

Mr. F ASCELL. I am not making any final conclusions one way or the other on this matter, but it seems to me that that conclusion or assumption by NSC was corroborated in the testimony of Captain Miller when' he said .that he bezan negotiating with his captors on Ream Island and that they had ~erican radio communication sets and that. they obviously communicated with some central authority and a decision was reached in that manner on when the crew would be released and under what conditions, if any. So they obviously, notwithstandin~ any current news reports, had some communication with the central reason for all of that negotiation taking place and there would have been no reason for the communication system being set up.

I find it difficult. to follow the line of reasoning that they were really just It bunch of guys running around over there that did not know what they were domg.

Mr. CJ.E~fENTS. That was our impression, and it was further brought forcibly to our attention when' the marines started going on that island. They did not act like a bunch of pirates. That resistance wassevere,

Mr. FASCELL. That raises another question that keeps cropping up in these hearings. That is: Why did we hit Tang Island if we thought part of the crew was there? I ha ve not ever been clear on that. Our military assumption was that the crew could be any number of places; part of them could still be on the boat; part of them could still be on Paulo Wai; part of them could be 'on Tang; part could be on the mainland. So we lowered the boom on Tang. 1Vhy was that ~

Mr. CLE~IENTS. No, sir; we really felt that there were three places that the crew could be. We felt that there was a number on Tang Island. And we also felt that island was sort of the seat of the situation because that is where the ship was; and where the activity had been.

There had been severaI- .

Mr. F ASCELL. The ship had been moved there and the fishing boat was seen leaving there.

Mr. CLE1<IENTS. Not only the fiishing boat but there had been other gun boats and patrol boats in and around there, so we felt that this was the proper thing to do. It was a military judgment and, in our judgment, it was a correct one.

Mr. FASCELL. 'Wen, I am not going to try to second-guess that but I am going to ask this question: Assuming we had some of our people on that island did we say: "OK, one of our options is to leave them there or go get them. If we go for them we may kill them. 'Ve better make the effort to go get them notwithstanding." Is that what we did '?

Mr. CLEMENTS. In a manner of speaking, that is what we did. But you also have to remember that, as our people were delegated to this mission, they were also charged with how to go about it, and it was as tightly controlled as we know how to do in order to try to protect these peonle if they were there .

Mr. F ASCEJ.L. The scenario staggers me a little bit. It may be just because I don't have enough military comprehension but that. is like running a pregnant woman in front of a soldier and saying: "Be sure she floes not get killed."

'Vere there simultaneous strikes--or was the first, strike on Tang~ Mr. AnRA:\fQWITZ. Two operations=-one for the boat and one for thu islands-conducted virtually simultaneously.

/

312·

Mr. CLEMENTS. Not exactly simultaneously but they were coordinated and they could well have been simultaneously but the timing fell

off where they were not. .

Mr. F ASQElL. The boat was then anchored.. .

Ur. CLF:UENTS. My recollection is that it was less than a mile from

~ore .

Mr. FASCEU>, One of the things I don't recall being in the record i~

the exact location of that vessel--· . . ~~! .

)[r, CLE::I£ENTS. \Ve will supply that for the record. .

[The information follows:]

Ex~CT L~ATION OF ·!I!AYA.GU~ ;'T TIME OF SEI~URE

The Mayagucz was located east of the northern tip of Koh Tang Island . .According to a report from the USS Holt, the location of the Maya(Jucz just prior to being boarded by marines was, quote, three thousand yards oil' the east side of the island, unquote.

~i:r. FASCEr,L [continuing]. And where the marines landing took

place. .

)[r. CLE::IIENTS. 'Ve will supply that for the record.

~[r. FASCELL. I am not familiar at all with the topography of that island or what the military assumptions were when we went in there. But if we had two separate forces going-one for the boat and one for the beach Iancling-.-

. }[r. CLB::IIEX'l'S. Of course the boat was taken hy the Holt and that was a surface ship operation, whereas the other was by air with helicopters.

~[r. FASCELL. Now, were the strikes on the mainland simultaneously or shortly thereafter ¥

Mr. CLE::IIENTS. Yes, sir, and we will give you the sequence of those

events also. .

[The information follows r]

• CeQ (i.) 0 Ojf •• CO.4130« .CC •• CQ~~

CI. '. . - •• ' 0) tII1! '(j: 'L) ,..;' "Q'

• c c •• o en •• co.ec~ .( C •• O~l~

•• c o .. e •• c O •• €'~ •• o o • (),(!Jd

•• CC •• CIG •• c o e ()tSYf •• c \' •• ·c.c •• G('.C\~f

SF::QUF:::<;CE OF U.S. HF::LICOPTER STRIKES In strict sequential order, the events took place as follows:

1714EDT, 14 !lIay-First flight of assault helicopters depart U-Tapao. ls::iSl'iDT, 14 Mar-Three helicopters arrive U.S.S. Holt to Offload :lfariuc>I. In09EDT. 14 May-First AF helicopter received small arms fire at Land ing

Zone on island.

202ilEDT, 14 !IIay-:lfarine hoard Jl[a!logucz.

2045EDT, 14 May-Programed time on target for flrsf wave of Coral Sea a ircraft.

2205EDT, 14 !lIlly-Second wnve of Coral se« aircraft attack Ream Ail'fi('lfl,

Ur. FASCELL. That was Kompong Som Harbor. 'Vhat was that

again? . .

General ATKIXSON. The airfield at Ream, sir, the.naval facility . ?\II'. FASCEJ,L. Is that. airfield on the island or the mainland? Genernl Arnrxsox. The mainland .

~Ir. FASCEU>. So it is on the mainland opposite the Island of Ream? General ATKIXSON. Ream is on the mainland also .

)Ir. FASm~J,L. 'Ve have a language difficulty here. 'When you say

Ream is on the mainland: you are talking about a city?

General ATKINSON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FASC)'J,L. And the Ream Airfield is on the mainland? General ATKINSOX. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELI,. There is also a Ream Island?

General ATKINSON. I am not familiar; with the island, sir ..

.C COQOClfG •• cO.I3Ci¢1 • CC •• Cf.t.Q ".GO.C·Ca.l • c c •• OGtel •• c o •• jCl~ e(_ U •• O@lO

. ~~

•• C o (I C; •• L (_ I •• C:'CJC: • • C (' • (;rtZ.(t1 •• c. C •• 'CiClICl • • C o • 1)'6'(1' •• cc •• cae.( •• G (, • £"G'.'

313

:Mr. FASCELL. I am not, either. What is the name of thatisland they

were on ? Do we know? Is that in the record?

General ATKINSON. Thereis a Ream Island just oft' the mainland. :Hr. ABRA:lIOWITZ. Rong Sam Loem. .

Mr. FASCI-:Lr,. We hit the airfield, and what else did we hit ~

General ATKINSON. I will get that for you ..

)[r. CLF.:lrEXTS. Some oil storage tanks, some dock areas j we hit some

warehouses, some barracks; they were all military tal·~ets. . .

Mr, FASCF.LI,.· ·What did we say was the time differential between

that and the landing? .. .

)1r. CJ,I'.o~IEXTS. I am looking for that now, Mr. Chairman. It will bein this log that we have for the record.

General ATKINSON. 8 :45, sir, that evening.

Mr. FASCELL. GeneraH Excuse me; I am sorry. You said 8.:45 that evening but I did not know what you had reference to.

General Arxrxsox. On the 14th, sir, which was the same time as the

recovery of the ship. . .

Mr. F ASCELL. SO it was set simultaneously! Genera I,:\, TKixsON. That was what was directed.

1\1r. F ASCELL. That makes sense to me .. Is that what actually ..

happened? .

General ATKIXSOX. Yes, sir; it did happen very close to the time that the ship was recovered.

Mr. CLE)IEC\"TS. I am looking at this log, trying to run this down. ·Ur. Chairman, at 1909 eastern daylight .time on the 14th the first mnrines were on the island. That is 1D09 on the 14th.

)!I'. Chairman, I will have to run that down and make sure about

it hut it v,as upproximatelyI hour later. . . .

Mr. F ASCELL. As I understood the general, he said it was ordered for the same time, simultaueously, for S :·15. I thought he said.at night.

General ATI\.INSON. That was our time, sir, ·We still are having a

time problem. . .

)fr. FASCEU., The time you ga ve was- .

)fr. CLImEYTs. Eastern daylight time. on the 14th, 1909. )[r. Fxscer,r, General. that does not read "8 :45" to me .

Gcncral A'ncrxsox. No, sir; I said the order was given to strike the

mainlnnd at about 8 :41). . .

)[1'. FASCET.L. That clarifies that. ,

Mr. Cr.L~[EXTS. 'Ve had difficulty, the reason we did not have absolute coordination where these took place simultaneously was because of the movement of the Coral Sea-the winds, .the launch time, and so forth. 'Ye just missed that coordination by some. 'Ve would have

hoped to have had simultaneous coordination.. .

Mr. F,\SCELL. Am I correct, Mr. Secretary, that the assumption in NSC at that time was that the crew, some of the crew, was on that island or could be Oil that island 1

)h·. CLID[EXTS. Yes; we were really thinking in terms that they

could be any one of three places. .

)[r. FASCELT,. And if they were there it was just a calculated risk hut you did everything, as I understand your testimony, to protect the crew from either injury or death if they were actua.lly on Ta.ng Islnnd !

)[1'. CLE:I[E~TS. Yes, sir.

I

314

I nrn ·being reminded that the helicopter assault was a part of this consideration .. ",Ve tried to carefully pick out two places for the hel icopters to go In and they were selected because of the circumstnnces, It was all very much, :Mr. Chairman, a judgmental process.

~fr. FASCET,L. A judgment was made tha:t there were onlv three

places that the crew could be, is that correct? v

Mr. CLE~rE~<Ts. That was our judgment at the time. W1ICl1 We! say "mainland" we !~re not being' definitive in that regard.

Mr. FASCET,L. I understand that. You were not snre where they were because you were then, (IS I recall your testimony, totally unaware of where the men were, although you are going to go back and take a look at all those photographs and whatnot to see ~

Mr. CLE~[ENTS. That. is correct.

Mr. F ASCEU,. ",Vhilf> you are doing that I won Id appreciate it. i f you would be kind enough to hear in mind the problem I han' with respect to what happens to those films and how fast, they ,!ret back and who gets them, when thev internret them, what happens to that informatiorr nnd partienlarlv-c-withrespect to this photog-mph of the fishing 'boat with the crew on it. leaving Kompong Som Harbor and t!Oing to that other island. There mil!ht be lapsesthat come to light after the fact which might, give us some due as to how to improve 0111' capability in terms of informnt·ion necessary to make crucinl decisions.

The operation, }\fr. Secretary, has been criticized by some as being extrernely costly in men and eouipmcnt lrivcn the small Sb~9 of the def ... nsive force on the island. 'What is vour comment. on that!

Mr. CLE~IENTS. I ,'!l1ess I don't have but one and that is that certninlv I was surprised. and I think some other people were: nt, the intensity of the resistance. Mnvbe that is not tlie answer YOU 31'e

looking for. ' .

Mr. FASCEU" No. In vour opening statement, yon said our intelli~ence indicated that. thr'r(' were 100 or 11)0 people on that island and thev were armed with whatever yon said they were armed with.

)1r. CLE1'>rE"TS. ",Ye haveestimated they were armed with machine,!runs. recoilless rifles, small arms, grenades, small mortars, this type of eoninment.

Mr. FASCELL. Does that intelligence assessment. square with the kind of military response you got ~

Mr. CI,E:lrEXTS. Yes, sir; surprisingly good as a matter of fact.

Mr. F ASCELL. But vet the resistance or the extent or the vehemence of the resistance surprised you 1

Mr. CU::UENTS_ I think it. W(lS better organized, and it was more intense than certainly I anticipnted .

Mr. FASCET,L. But it had nothing to do with the estimate of the number of people who were on the island 1

Mr. CLE:I[EXTS. No, sir ; because the intelligence community, and principally DIA and the tactical intelligence group had como up, with the figure of l!'iO to 200. I still think that. WaS accurate .

Mr. FAscmu,. And there were no surprises in the estimate of the kinds of weapons they had ~

. Mr. CLE:lrENTS. No: sir ~ there was not.

Mr. F ASCI-;LL. SO the fei'ocity-Mr. CLE:\IENTS, The intensity.

•• co. • • ( t I •• '€'C-f4 • • r : (). O,G4. •• ( C· •• 0 ....

• • c. ( •• Cl'S'C,I

•• <"( •• ~

•• (, (·.~.CJ

•• C o .'«"1 •• L (I ••• "C •• c C).C. •• C (' .,.1(

•• L O.t;, •• C C .~.~C •• GO.c:.'

315

Mr. FASCELL. The intensity of the response was based, from a mili-

tary man's point of view, on good organization, decision capability-. - Mr. CLE1I1ENTS. Perhaps we better get the ~eneral to comment.

Mr. FASCELL [continuing]. Command, training]

General ATKINSON. And a will to fight ; they were determined to

resist the assault.

Mr. FASCELL. Did our military operation, in effect, take the island 1 General ATKINSON. No, sir, it did not.

Mr. FASCELL. At a certain point the order was given to leave the

island?

General ATKINSON. As soon as we confirmed the-Mr. F AS CELL. Release of the crew 1

General ATIUNSOX. The release of the crew and that they were all safe. 'Ye had the vessel. It became harder to withdraw than we anticipated. 'Ve had to insert some more marines in order to get out.

Mr. CLElIIEN'I'S. This reminds you, J\Ir. Chairman, of having the bear by the tail. Yon can't turn him loose.

Mr. FASCEr,L. So as soon as it was verified that the vessel was under tow or taken and all of the crew was released and safe, the order was g-iycn to get oft' the island but you could not immediately execute that order because it was impossible to withdraw the original group of people who were still there?

General Arrcrxsox. That is correct, sir. The commander asked for reinforcements in order to withdraw. Of course, we still had 22 people across the island that the main body was not able to join up with, so our first efforts were to try to get those people ant, feeling they would 1111\'e a difficult time, if not impossible, surviving the night, isolated from the main bodv,

Mr. F.\SCEU,. The initial attack 011 the island was at two different points ~

General ATKISSON. It was at two different points. The first helicopters used t.he primary landing zone and they were al l shot down. That is how 2:2 pea ple became isolated on one side of the island. The secondary Illuding zone was on the west side and that is where the main body went. in, the other five helicopters.

Mr. FASCELL. 'Vhere was the main bodv of resistance, General ~ In the primary helicopter zone? You said they were all shot down. I would assume the primary resistance was your first target.

General ATIUXSON. That is correct, sir; because the intensity of fire on the east landing zone was heavier than it was on the west, all five hel icopters got into the west zone.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not familiar wit.h the topography of that island.

Is it dam i na ted by one particula I' hill?

General ATIONSOX. No, sir; I think it is hilly an over. There are wide beaches .

Mr. FAscEr,L. That ridge runs right down the middle of the island? General ATKINSOX. I believe that is correct hilt I can supply the exact tonography if you like.

Mr. F ASCELL. I am just trying to get a picture in my mind of the Innding zones, One was east; one was west. And were they both on the beaches ?,

General ATKINRON. Yes, sir .

Mr. FASCF.r,L. Both of them were on the beaches ~ General ATKIXSON. Yes, sir.

316

'Mr. CLEMENTS. ",Ve will supply you a picture of the island for"'ihe

record.' '

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Buchanan.

~fr. BUCIIAXAN. General, you 'went onto this island to attempt to rescue people; you have indicated' that, therefore you had special instructions and special restrictions. Now, a good deal has been madeI think 'rather unfairly-about there being more Iives lost than sa ved in this operation. Is it true that if you just set up to take an island, you would follow different procedures, procedures that might make it more safe for the marines , ... ho are going onto the island?

'General ATliI~SO~ • Yes; the typical assault on an island of this type would require softening up with fighter-bombers or naval gunfire. Under coyer of suppressive fire is normally the way we do it. 'Ve did not suppress the fire from the air until we had determined that all of the crow had been located elsewhere,

Mr. BUCHANAN. So that, of course, there was one accident-an accident can happen in any circumstances-and I personally think you 'would have to rule those lost lives out to get a fair picture of the cost anyway-but so far as the lives that were lost, had you not been following procedures in which you were trying to protect the lives of the civilians you were seeking to rescue do you think it is fair to say that the chance of the loss of life of the service personnel would have been less g-reat? Is that a part of the reason for the loss of the military people-the special procedure you would have to follow to try to protect the people you were trying to rescue?

General ATKI::-;-SON. lYe would expect that our normal procedures result in less loss of life, yes, sir.

~Ir. BUCIL\XAX. I am under the strong impression that this a nrument which has been raised about the loss of life and the cost of this operation and portraying it as something- that cost more lives than it saved is not a fail' argument, and that. if marines had just set ontto take that island and not worry about who might be on it, if it were 9. military conquest situation rather than a rescue of people situation, that the chances seemed rather great the price tag might have been lower than, rather than higher in terms of American lives.'

General A1'IUNSO);', That. would be out' judgment, Of course .. the executive order contained the instructions to withdraw as soon as the mission had been accomplished, which was to recover primarily the crew, then the ship. There was no intent to go any 'further than neces-

sary to accomplish that mission. "

Mr. BUCHA~AN. In military matters-I don't know whether you can say with certainly whether it was true in this instance-but it mig-ht be more dnngerous to try to withdraw from this kind of operation and discontinue and remove your people than to proceed to take the island. That is at least militarily It possible thing is it. not 1

I don't know how big the forces were, how tough it would be or whatever .

General .ATKINSON. It certainly 1S possible but I don't think you could jump to that conclusion, sir. It would 'have taken more people and more time.

Mr. BUCHANAN. More lives, probably.

•• (t·O·. ·c..~.'4 •• ·C .. O.

•• ete'.'4 •• eo. •• C.C •••• •• CO.'

1 The photograph referred to was retained In the commtttea files.

,/

•

•• c o •• C (/.1.'(& •• c o .e,t •• C (~.:etC •• Co (,. CI'e •• c c •.• ,cl •• G Ct .CJ'G

·317

General ATKINSON. Yes.sir.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you. ' , '

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know who is supposed to answer this butT

will ask the guy in. uniform to start with. . .'

General, on the mainland targets, am I correct m assummg that two of the targets were chosen for tactical reasons and the others were for strategic reasons, in terms of supporting our forces on the island and knocking out the oil simply so tliey would not go too long

without having to do something ~ ,

General ATKINSON. I had not thought of it that way, sir. Mr. F ASCELL. How did you think of it ~

General ATKINSON. The oil tanks were probably not immediately involved in direct support of enemy operations. However, the length of time would be engaged 'vas not known at the time.

Mr. F ASCELL. I understand that. I put, that in the strategic cate-

gory. I don't know if that is right or not.

Mr. CLEME~'TS. These are oil tanks, not an oil field. Mr. FASCELL. I understand.

In other words, what you are saying is the decision to hit them could be classed as tactical ~

General ATKINSON. 'Ve were thinking in terms of that. Keeping the enemy busy and causing confusion, preventing reinforcement of the island.

Mr. F ASCELT .. But that is a secondary benefit.

Mr. CLEMENTS. And these are also fuel depots which would service their ships and airplanes and so forth.

Mr. F ASCELL. I understand. I am just trying to find out whether the decision to strike the targets on the mainland was tactical-yes or no~

General ATKINSON . Yes, it was ta etica 1.

Mr. F ASCELL. If I used the wrong language from a military point of view, just correct it for me. I am not sensitive.

General ATKINSON. It was entirely tactical.

Mr. FASCEI.L. It had to do with the operation on Tang Island,

didn't it ~ ,

General ATKINSON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. The reason I asked the question is because some people have been very critical about the operation on the mainland, as being totally unnecessary and t.hat it was punitive in nature. '

General ATKINSON. It was not punitive in nature.

Mr. F ASCELL. 'Vas that the way the NSC felt about it, Mr. Clements, because the issue goes to your motive and you were there and yon are the only guy who can say what your motive was, so hurry up and'

tell us and put your critics to sleep? '

Mr. CLEMENTS. I had earlier said, Mr. Chairman, that these were military targets. You have refined that to mean tactical military

targets and that is exactly right. .

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, let me to try to further clarlfymy

line of questioning. '

Here is the thing. Some criticisms have been leveled and when you start counting lives and that sort of thing I think we have to keep very clear the nature of the mission. Your mission was not to go out and take an island. Militarily your mission was to rescue people.

•

• ceo" 0 at,Uj •• c O.1301W

.CC •• OO~Cl G. C C). e·Gl.J

• c C •• 0 etCl •• co •• elm]

.l U •• OG}Cl

•• C04ilC1Cf4 • C(; •• €'C •• c (). e ... mlf •• c c: •• -GIS •• C C). el'S'« •• C l •• .e-e • • G o • CJ"@-I

- .

318

General ATKIXSOX. That is correct.

Mr. CLE?lrEXTS. That is correct. Absolutely. That was our only mission .

Mr. BUCli,\xAN. So if you have It building on fire and two firemen die rescuing one little old lady you don't say, "You never should have entered that fire. You lost two firemen in saving that one life and therefore it was a foolish thing to do." That would not be a very good way to approach the kind of situation in which your mission is to rescue somebody.

Mr. F ASCELL. I would like to catch that football, Mr. Secretarv. It certainly would not be if that poor little old woman was my mother.

lUI'. Secretary, I want to thank you for your cooperation and the Department's cooperation with the General Accounting Office in carrying out their function in cooperation with Congress. There was .some question in the Department about whether or not GAO would I have the right to get out to the field representatives and ask questions, Is there any problem with that, or can we tell them that is all solved?

Mr. CLE::I£EXTS. No, sir, not in my judgment. It is not all solved, because I think GAO has the idea, perhaps, that all these people are going to he at one airfield in Thailand or one airfield in the Philippines.

:i\fr. F ASCELL. That is their problem.

Mr. CLDIEXTS. And that is not true. These people arc scattered all over the world.

Mr. FASCELL. But that is their problem, isn't, it?

Mr. CLEJI:ENTS. Frankly, I don't really understand why they need to go out there and talk to ail' crews, If they could tell ItS what It IS they want we can supply them with anything that we have. There is no effort on our part to withhold information. And I would think that our group here this morning has made that abundantly clear. ",Ve want to share with you whatever' it is you need to support the inquiry. ",Ve will be happy to look into this further.

Mr. FASCELL. Your response leaves me hanging out there pretty goood. Actually. you just raised more questions than you answered, Mr. Secretary. I am sure you did not mean to do that.

Mr. Cr.El\£ENTS. No, sir; I did not. If I had my preference I would urge that these people not run 'all around the world talking to these aircrews and so forth .

Mr. FASCELL. I hear yon but they are our agents, so now what you 'are telling me is, Fascell, if you want to know anything just ask-me . Don't go ask that pilot or ship's captain. And I understand theprob • "lern. I am not too excited about some guy in the middle of a war springirur a microphone in a soldier's face and saying, "'Yell, buddy, how did vou feel when you killed your first woman?"

Mr. Cr.El\fF:X'I'S. I am satisfied that if in vour judzrrnent you want 'the GAO to go out there and talk to those pilots. they are going to go talk to them.

- Mr. FASCEU,. I hear you; If you had your choice you would just

-ns soon they din not.

•

• C COlO •• C 01.lt .ee •.• CJ. U C".~. ecc.,.

•• C GI •• ,. el o •.• 1

•• CO' •• •• L'G·.'.' •• C.O •• •• c -c •• I • •• CO •• •• oc .•.• ' •• co ••

319

lIr. Secretary, I appreciate your saying you will take a look at it and see how you can accommodate us. Another procedural issue is: normally the photographs or the prints are just destroyed or put away . Some of the prints have been destroyed but fortunately the negatives and tapes are still around. I would gather everybody is sufficiently alerted at this point that none of the tapes will disappear, inadvertently be destroyed or otherwise sent to Alaska; am I correct 1

Mr. CLE:MENTS. Yes, sir.

Mr. F AS CELL. Let the record indicate everybody nodded ill the affirmative .

Mr, CLEMENTS. To my knowledge, all of this information is available.

Mr. FASCELL. I am just being supercautious because this has hap-

pened in the past. ,

Mr. CLEME~TS. You have even excited my curiosity. I may look at

some of these things, too. . ,

Mr. FASCELL. I just wanted to be sure that inadvertently we did not lose something because then it looks bad because all of a sudden the tapes are gone. Ordinarily you bum the things anyway.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and gentlemen, General Atkinson, ,Mr. Abramowitz, all of you. Thank you for your patience and for being so candid in making this record for us.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12 :30 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]