What Is Risk Management?: U.S. Treasury Derivatives Options Futures
What Is Risk Management?: U.S. Treasury Derivatives Options Futures
What Is Risk Management?: U.S. Treasury Derivatives Options Futures
For example, during a 15-year period from August 1, 1992, to July 31, 2007,
the average annualized total return of the S&P 500 was 10.7%. This number
reveals what happened for the whole period, but it does not say what
happened along the way. The average standard deviation of the S&P 500 for
that same period was 13.5%. This is the difference between the average
return and the real return at most given points throughout the 15-year period.
When applying the bell curve model, any given outcome should fall within one
standard deviation of the mean about 67% of the time and within two standard
deviations about 95% of the time. Thus, an S&P 500 investor could expect the
return, at any given point during this period, to be 10.7% plus or minus the
standard deviation of 13.5% about 67% of the time; he may also assume a
27% (two standard deviations) increase or decrease 95% of the time. If he can
afford the loss, he invests.
Often, what investors really want to know is not just how much an asset
deviates from its expected outcome, but how bad things look way down on the
left-hand tail of the distribution curve. Value at risk (VAR) attempts to provide
an answer to this question. The idea behind VAR is to quantify how large a
loss on investment could be with a given level of confidence over a defined
period. For example, the following statement would be an example of VAR:
"With about a 95% level of confidence, the most you stand to lose on this
$1,000 investment over a two-year time horizon is $200." The confidence level
is a probability statement based on the statistical characteristics of the
investment and the shape of its distribution curve.
Of course, even a measure like VAR doesn't guarantee that 5% of the time will
be much worse. Spectacular debacles like the one that hit the hedge
fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 remind us that so-called "outlier
events" may occur. In the case of LTCM, the outlier event was the Russian
government's default on its outstanding sovereign debt obligations, an event
that threatened to bankrupt the hedge fund, which had
highly leveraged positions worth over $1 trillion; if it had gone under, it could
have collapsed the global financial system. The U.S. government created a
$3.65-billion loan fund to cover LTCM's losses, which enabled the firm to
survive the market volatility and liquidate in an orderly manner in early 2000.
For example, in addition to wanting to know whether a mutual fund beat the
S&P 500, we also want to know how comparatively risky it was. One measure
for this is beta (known as "market risk"), based on the statistical property
of covariance. A beta greater than 1 indicates more risk than the market and
vice versa.
Active managers are on the hunt for an alpha, the measure of excess return.
In our diagram example above, alpha is the amount of portfolio return not
explained by beta, represented as the distance between the intersection of the
x and y-axes and the y-axis intercept, which can be positive or negative. In
their quest for excess returns, active managers expose investors to alpha risk,
the risk that the result of their bets will prove negative rather than positive. For
example, a fund manager may think that the energy sector will outperform the
S&P 500 and increase her portfolio's weighting in this sector. If unexpected
economic developments cause energy stocks to sharply decline, the manager
will likely underperform the benchmark, an example of alpha risk.