Muktibahini Wins Victory - Maj Gen ATM Abdul Wahab 365p

Pak Military Oligarchy Divides
Pakistan in 1971
Abdul Wahab
MUKTI BAHINI WINS VICTORY
Pak Military Oligarchy Divides
Pakistan in 1971
Major General ATM Abdul Wahab, retd

Mukti Bahini
Wins Victory
Pak Military Oligarchy Divides Pakistan in 1971
Columbia Prokashani
4
Columbia Prokashani
WAK
Copy Rights
Author
Phone : 88-02-9887070
E-mail: wabab@bijoy.net
First Published
December 2004
Publisher
Lt Col (Retd) SIM Noor-Un-Nabi Khan Bir Bikram
Columbia Prokashani
Abas-Nibas, 494/1, Sheora Para, Mirpur,
Dhaka-1216, Bangladesh
Phone: 8055366
Cover Design, Graphics & Makup

M. Ziaul Haque
Printing
City Art Press
173 Fakira Pool, Dhaka-1000
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Tk. 400.00
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ISBN : 984-713-044-2
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Contents
Chapter 1 Political Background : Failure of National
Integration in Pakistan
• l.l Birth of Pakistan 17
i 1.2 Discrimination against the Bengalis 25
*
1.3 Rule of oligarchy in Pakistan 27
: 1.4 In search of Constitution 44
-
1.5 Agartala Conspiracy Case 63
1.6 Cyclone of 12 November 1970 67
Chapter 2 March 1971 : Pakistani Military Agression and

Genocide
2.1 Karachi on March 1971 73
2.2 Dhaka Airport on 04 March 1971 74
2.3 Historic 7lh March 75
2.4 Dhaka Cantonment on March 1971 85
2.5 Pakistan Military in East Pakistan 87
2.6 Jessore Cantonment on March 1971 91
2.7 President on the air on 26 March 93
2.8 Senior Tiger out of the cage 96
Chapter 3 Beginning of Armed Resistance

3.1 Crackdown in Dhaka on 25 March 10
3.2 Operation Searchlight 511
3.3 Armed Crackdown and Proclamation of Independence 0
11
3.4 Armed Resistance Boiled Down 812
3.5 Battle of Kushtia 112
3.6 Bengal Military in East Pakistan 8
13
i 1
Chapter 4 Bangladesh Government in Exile and Organization of
Mukti Bahini
i
t 4.1 Crossing to Indian soil 141
\i- 4.2 Bangladesh Government-in-Exile 143
%
\ 4.3 Birth of Mukti Bahini 150
\*» 4.4 Mukti Bahini at Kallyani 160
: 4.5 Mujib Bahini 164
:
j
!
8
Chapter 5 Guerilla Warfare of Freedom Fighters
5.1 Barrackpur 171

5.2 Base Camp at Banpur 172
5.3 Raid on Darsana Enemy stronghold 177
5.4 Akbar Bahini 179
5.5 Guzadanga Base camp 182
5.6 Raid on Baikhari 185
5.7 BBC in Liberated Area 188
5.8 Gono Bahini camp at Satkhira 190
5.9 Eagle Company, a heroic Legend 190
Chapter 6 Marine Warfare and Operation Jackpot

6.1 Naval Force 203
6.2 The Great Ordeal of Submariner 204
6.3 Operation Jackpot 205
6.4 Operation on Chittagong Port 206
6.5 Operation on Mongla Port 208
6.6 Chandpur Operation 210
6.7 Operation at Narayangonj River Port 211
6.8 Operation at Daudkandi Ferryhead 212
Chapter 7 Conventional Warfare and Bangladesh Brigade

7.1 „Z‟ Force
Battle of Kamalpur Battle of 215
Nakshi Bahadurabad Ghat 218
Opertion Battle of Chotokhel 222 -
225
Battle of Dhalai Battle of
Chargram „K‟ Force 230
232
Battle of Saldhanadi Battle
7.2 of Kasba Battle of Belunia
Bulge „S‟ Force 234
236
Battle of Mukundapur
237
7.3
241
l
9
Chapter 8 Diplomatic Warfare and Role of UNO

8.1 The Role of Diplomats in Foreign Mission 245
8.2 US Senator on Bangladesh 248
8.3 Geopolitics-Polarization in the context of Bangladesh crisis 250
8.4 Diplomatic moves in U N 252
8.5 Gunboat Diplomacy 254
Chaptr 9 Failure of Pakistan and Birth of Bangladesh

9.1 Final Offensive 261
Pakistani Strategy 262
9.2 Allied Forces Strategy 263
Southwestern Sector 264
Northwestern Sector 272
Eastern Sector 274
Central Sector 276
9.3 War Casualty 280
9.4 Epilogue 280
Appendices
i Bangladesh Forces 285
ii Pakiatan Forces in East Pakistan 303
iii Indian Forces in Eastern Command in 1971 309
iv Indo-Soviet Treaty 319
V Interview of General Sam Manekshaw 324
vi Article by Jack Anderson 1972 327
vii Appeal to India for Recognition of Bangladesh 330
ix Recognition of Bangladesh by India 1971 332
X Suhrawardy‟s Statement 1947 335
xi Sanad for ATM Abdul Wahab 343
xii Battle of Plassey 344
xiii Appenl to Indian Brethren for Arms 348
Bibliography 350
Preface 11
PREFACE
I personally consider it a solemn responsibility as a freedom fighter to
record the eyewitness accounts of liberation war to encourage the people
to remember the sacrifices of the millions and to raise their conscience.
My heart bleeds like others when I watch that after thirty-three years of
independence the values of liberation war are disappearing. It is a great
disappointment that supreme sacrifices of millions of martyrs had been
buried in an avalanche of legends. Rampant corruption and appalling act
of terrorism have engulfed the entire society. I participated in the war of
liberation betting my life for freedom. My roles as a freedom fighter
were various as I led troops in battle, went behind enemy lines a risky,
dangerous and courageous mission to carry out sabotage, raids and
ambushes on enemy and provided battle intelligence to Allied Forces for
ultimate victory. I have undertaken a humble endeavour to write about
the events leading to war, some important battles, encounters with
Pakistan Army and ultimately the final offensive culminating in the birth
of Bangladesh.
The people of the region that is now Bangladesh went through a
long period of colonial exploitation and fought against the colonizers.
Indian sub-continent was under the British colonial rule for 190 years.
Several attempts were made by the Indians to liberate India from British
subjugation. Some of the great leaders are Nawab Mir Qasim, Titumir,
Rani of Jhansi, Surja Sen, Tipu Sultan, Subash Bose and Indian sepoys
especially the Bengal Army in 1857. The British foiled all attempts with
their collaborators in India.
The Bengalees were the worst sufferers as they took leading roles
in every endeavour, particularly in the Indian liberation war of 1857 that
had failed. At that time there were Bengal regular units, like Bengal
Native infantry, Bengal Cavalry and Bengal Artillery. The British
colonial rulers expanded their Empire by intrigue and manipulation; and
they employed Bengal Army for expedition to different regions of India.
As Bengal Army took part in armed revolution in 1857, this was
disbanded. Madras and Bombay Army sided with the British rulers.
Organized political movements started to overthrow the British when
political parties were formed. Indian
12 Mukti Bahini Wins Victory
National Congress was established in 1885. Muslim League was born in

1906 at Dhaka. Indian National Congress became the political platform
to implement the hopes and aspirations of the people. Freedom
movements under the leadership of Indian national Congress geared up
in the beginning of the nineteenth century
Muslim renaissance movement was initiated by Sir Syed Ahmed
Khan to safeguard the religious, cultural and political rights of the
Muslims of India. He speculated that the Hindus and the Muslim would
not be able to sit on the same throne; one had to throw the other. Quaid-
e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as one of the leaders of the Indian
National Congress visualized that the Hindus having brute majority in
India, democracy in united India would mean a perpetual permanent
Hindu raj. He contributed towards uniting Muslims under the banner of
Muslim League to create a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims.
Pakistan was created on the basis of the two- nation theory - Hindu
nation and Muslim nation. After the independence of Pakistan on 14
August 1947 cultural and economic conflicts between the Bengali
Muslims and Punjabi Muslims, particularly on language issue
(recognition of Bangla as state language) and economic exploitation of
East Pakistan by the so called elites of Pakistan, put the seeds of poison
and bitterness in the minds of the Bengali Muslims.
President Ayub Khan fabricated the Agartala Conspiracy Case to
defame and humiliate the Bengalees. He considered the East Pakistanis-
as second-class citizens of Pakistan and pointed his finger to the
Bengalis as secessionists. His attitude and policies made it obvious that
the Bengalis needed freedom from the Punjabi domination. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman because of his uncompromising attitude against the
Punjabi domination became the undisputed leader of 75 million
Bengalees.
President Yahya Khan implemented the universal adult franchise,
that is, one-man one vote for the first time in united Pakistan. President
Yahya framed the Legal Framework Order (LFO) with the assistance of
his Information Minister Dr G W Chaudhury, a Bengali political
scientist who incorporated adult franchise and other constitutional
matters to be decided by single majority. Dr G W Chaudhury was
credited by many political analysts as the architect of an electoral
mechanism that had ultimately led to the birth of Bangladesh. He
artfully incorporated adult franchise clause, that is, one-man one vote
against parity in LFO approved by President
Preface 13
Yahya Khan against the wishes of his inner cabinet colleagues especially
General Abdul Hamid Khan and Air Marshal Noor Khan. President
Yahya who was in favour of adult franchise could not conceive that
Awami League would achieve a landslide victory in the 1970 National
Assembly election. Awami League won absolute majority in the
National Assembly election of 1970. Awami League‟s election
manifesto was based on the famous „six points‟, raised by the party on
the basis of which movements were going on. Awami League‟s „six
points‟ envisaged the provisions to stop the flight of capital from East to
West Pakistan and exploitation of its resources by the West Pakistanis.
This was not designed as really the instrument for a secession
movement. In fact the crackdown of Pakistan Army on the unarmed
population of East Pakistan on 25 March, 1971 left no way open for the
people of East Pakistan but to engage for the sake of freedom in the
liberation war leading to the disintegration of Pakistan and birth of
Bangladesh. However secession movement had its root, deep into the
soil of Bangladesh because of the colonial attitude of the West
Pakistanis and exploitation of the Bengalis in general.
I had been contemplating to record the events leading to the
disintegration of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh since 1980. In
the structure of the book I have tried to include an intensely felt personal
memoirs and personal accounts of the events of constitutional crisis,
autocratic rule of Pakistan, political movements that crystallized into
armed resistance, its momentum and maturity, political moves in the UN
Security Council supported by Soviet Union and final offensive by the
combined forces of Indian Army and Mukti Bahini leading to the
disintegration of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh.
The main agenda of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was to
stop the exploitation of the resources of East Pakistan in the framework
of six points, not the complete disintegration of Pakistan. President
Yahya frustrated the hopes and aspirations of Pakistan by not allowing
the National Assembly to sit and frame the constitution and run the
country by constitutional means. Rather he adopted the means of
weapons and violence to remain himself in the seat of power. He
disbanded Awami League as political party and branded Bangabandhu
as traitor and enemy of Pakistan. President Yahya claimed that he was
the descendant of Nadir Shah who started his career as the leader of a
band of robbers.
Three political leaders Bangabandhu, Bhutto and Yahya truly held

the fate of Pakistan in their hands. Each one of them was under
enormous pressure from onrushing events, their constituencies and
from their own sense of personal duty and responsibility. It is
unambiguous in asserting who was the first one to break down under
the pressure and precipitate Pakistan towards disaster and East Pakistan
towards independence - the uncouth soldier, greedy Sindhi landlord
who turned to be a politician or the nationalist politician from the soil
of Bengal. It was the uncouth soldier who let loose the Army hyenas to
commit genocide in Bengal. He committed a colossal error of judgment
by striking innocent unarmed civilian and moves to disarm and
eliminate the Bengali elements of the Army.
I would like to express my deep gratitude and thanks to my
college classmate Mia Abdul Awal, a Former civil servant and an MP
for kindly taking keen interest to go through the script and accord
valuable suggestions to improve the quality of the book without whose
contributions the book could not be given the present excellent shape. I
am immensely indebted to him for the care, pain and interest he has
undertaken for correcting the manuscript. I am grateful to Dr Naseem
Akhter Hussain, Professor, Department of Government and Politics,
Jahangir Nagar University for final editting. I am thankful to my PA
Sergeant Md Kamal Hossain for typing the first draft of the manuscript.
My sons ATM Ashraful Arifin and ATM Manzurul Arifin extended
assistance when I faced problems with composing and printing in the
computer. My wife Afroza Shahani extended full support and
cooperation. I also express my deep gratitude and appreciation to my
comrade-in-arms in liberation war, a most valiant freedom fighter
Lieutenant Colonel SIM Noor-Un-Nabi Khan Bir Bikram for
undertaking the responsibility for publishing my book. I am thankful to
the writers mentioned in the bibliography whose books helped me in
enriching my ideas and analyses.

Political Packground 15
Chapter 1
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND
FAILURE OF NATIONAL
INTEGRATION IN PAKISTAN
Birth of Pakistan
Pakistan - comprising of East Bengal, West Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan
and North West Frontier Province - was curved out of Indian
subcontinent and established as an Independent sovereign Muslim state
on 14 August 1947 when the British left India after a prolonged reign of
190 years commencing from June 23, 1757. Although Pakistan had
neither common language and uniform culture, nor an integrated
geographical entity and a unified economic unit, nevertheless Pakistan
was created with East Bengal as one of its provinces. Sir Allahma
Muhammad Iqbal, the poet and philosopher for the first time made a
reference to the need for a „North-West Indian Muslim State‟ in his
presidential address at the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in
1930. But it did not contain any proposal for inclusion of Bengal as a
part of that newly conceived state.
Chaudhury Rahmat Ali may be regarded as the proponent of the
idea of „Pakistan‟. He demanded a separate national entity for the Indian
Muslims in 1935, coined its name as „Pakistan‟ taking the first alphabets
from the Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sindh and last portion of
Baluchistan. At that time also he did not visualize the Muslim majority
province of Bengal. Pakistan was the culmination of the Muslim
renaissance movement initiated by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to safeguard
the religious, cultural and political rights of the Muslim of the entire
sub-continent during the later part of the nineteenth century. He had
observed the Hindu- Muslim cultural conflicts in 1867 when he was
posted as a Judge in Benares, a city on the bank of Ganges with great
religious significance for the Hindus. As early as in 1888 Sir Syed
Ahmed had speculated on a possible struggle for power in the event of a
transfer of sovereignty to the Indians. The Mohammedans and the
Hindus - being two separate nations, most certainly would not be able to
sit on the same throne peacefully and remain equal in power. It would
be necessary.that one of them should conquer the other and thrust the
other down if they continue to remain in the same statecraft after the
British left this sub continent. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah
also predicted that the Hindus having brute majority in India, democracy
in united India would mean a perpetual permanent Hindu raj.
I
18 Mulcti Bahini Wins Victory
In Quranic doctrine, Muslims are those who have entered the

services of Allah perusing His path revealed through Prophet, Hazrat
Muhammad(SM). Obedience to Allah is the supreme duty of mankind.
Again as per revelation of the holy Quran, Muslims must compose of
one Miliat, one nation; Prophet Abraham (AS) is the father of that
nation. But in reality Muslims did not and could not stick to the
direction of Allah and in consequence there are a number of Muslim
states now in the world. Allah wanted unity of the Muslims in one
Miliat. The word „Pakistan‟ has another popular connotation in Persian
meaning- „land of the pure‟. In the naming of this proposed state of
Pakistan, letter „B‟ to represent the word Bengal was missing, whereas
letter 'K' intended for Kashmir is outside the frontier of Pakistan.
Founder of Pakistan
Here it will be imperative to give a brief life-sketch of the founder of
Pakistan—Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was born on 25 December 1976
in a Shiite Muslim family of mercantile community. His father was
Jinnahbhai Poonja and mother was Mitibai. His ancestors fled Persian
persecution and settled in Western India around sixteenth centuries.
Khoja or Khwaja, like other mercantile communities the world over,
traveled extensively, were quick to assimilate new ideas and adjusted
with relative ease to strange environments. They developed linguistic
skills and sharp intelligence, often acquiring wealth. Jinnah Poonja after
his marriage with Mitibai moved to Karachi from Rajkot, Gujrat around
1870. At that time Karachi enjoyed its first modern boom as British
India‟s close port to Britain after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.
Jinnah Poonja had seven children from Mitibai. Jinnah Poonja‟s
business had prospered by the early 1880‟s. Jinnahbhai handled all sorts
of agricultural produce such as cotton, wool, hides, oil-seeds and grain
for export and piece goods, metals and refined sugar for import through
the busy port of Karachi. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was approximately six
when his father engaged a private tutor to start his student career
through learning the alphabets and mathematics.
Early in 1887, Jinnahbhai‟s only sister, Manbhai, who had married
an even more successful Khwaja named Peerbhai and lived
in metropolitan Bombay, came to visit. Jinnah loved Auntie‟s witty,

vivacious, cosmopolitan good humour, and she in turn adored her bright,
handsome young nephew. She lured Jinnah back to Bombay with her
that year, introducing him to the great city that was to become his
chosen home most of his adult life.
He was enrolled in Muslim Anjuman-i-Islam at Bombay and later
on in Gokul Das Tej Primary School. He was in Bombay little more
than six months. He returned to Karachi and got admitted in Sind
Madrasa in December 23, 1887. He would rarely attend the classes. He
enjoyed riding his father‟s Arabian horses in Karachi‟s sandy beach
more than doing arithmetic for his class. He liked reading poetry, too,
but at his own pace and leisure not harnessed to any Karachi
pedagogue‟s lesson plan. He was an indomitable child, could never be
intimidated by authority. He was sent to Christian Mission High School
on Lawrence Road, Karachi, a more congenial stimulus for his restless
minds, but had shown little interest there.
Jinnahbhai Poonja‟s firm was closely associated with the leading
British managing company in Karachi, Douglas Graham and Company.
Sir Frederick Leigh Croft was the general manager of Graham who
recommended Jinnah for an apprenticeship to his home office in London
in 1892. That single letter to London lifted young Jinnah into the orbit
of British imperial prominence. His mother objected to this journey as
her son may be lured by English girl and would be a tragedy for the
Poonja family. On completion of marriage he was permitted to leave for
England. Before he proceeded to England he married a fourteen-year-
old girl- Emibhai at the age of sixteen.
In January 1893 Jinnah left for England and arrived there in
February 1893. At Graham he sat at a small desk surrounded by stocks
of accounting books as he was expected to copy and make balance. His
father deposited enough money to his account in a British bank to allow
Jinnah to live in London for three years. Mr. M A Jinnah did not take
long time to abandon the drudgery of his Graham‟s apprenticeship. On
25 April 1893 without procrastinating he applied to Lincoln‟s Inn to sit
for a test and was granted permission for Preliminary Examination with
the exemption of Latin portion of the syllabus. He appeared for the
examination on 25 May
20 Mukti Baliini Wins Victory
1893 and was duly qualified. On 25 June 1893, he embarked upon 's
stud in law at Lincoln‟s Inn. Jinnah admitted to his private
y
v u K'hnrshid that he did not appear for the Entrance
1
secretary K n tvnuom \ . . . , ....
Examination. Jinnah passed the final examination with brilliant result.
He spent much of his time in the reading room of British Museum. On
Sunday he would go to Hyde Park comer at the Marble Arch to listen
to the open-air oratory. Thus he improved his professional knowledge
and debating skill. He had shown his outstanding maturity at teen age.
He was probably the youngest to become Bar-at-Law from Lincoln‟s
Inn.
On 11 May, 1896, Mohammad Ali Jinnah Esquire, a Barrister
petitioned to the benchers of Lincoln‟s Inn for a certificate attesting
his Admission Call to the Bar and of his deportment. With that
talisman he would be welcome to join the Bar of any court in British
India. Throughout his stay in England, he was not a flirtation type and
no girl could break through his reserve. He had not wasted a single
penny his father deposited in his account in London bank. He was
meticulous in financial matters. He was perfectly suited to display
London‟s first fashions. Jinnah remained a model of sartorial elegance
for the rest of his life.
In London he signed a contract with a theatre company and
informed his parents craving for their blessings. His father in a reply
strongly disapproved the project and told, “Do not be a traitor to the
family.” The same letter informed him of his mother‟s death and wife
s as well-- full of dread news, shock and reprimand. Half a century
later, addressing Karachi‟s bar he recalled, “I joined Lincoln s Inn
because there, on the main entrance, the name of the Prophet was
included in the list of the Great Law Givers of the world. But no such
inscription exists over the main or any other entrance. May be that
was shown by the Divine power to lure him to Lincoln s Inn. It is a
rare honour for Jinnah, founder of Pakistan that two marble bursts of
Lord Macnaghten and Sir Francis Henry Goldsmith flank M A
Jinnah‟s portrait, like horseguards over the entrance of Great Hall and
Library of Lincoln‟s Inn, hallowed wall of British Jurisprudence.
Mr. Jinnah was enrolled as a barrister in Bombay‟s high court on
24 August 1896. He hardly had any professional promise till 1900,
Political Packg round 21
when Bombay‟s acting Advocate General; John Molesworth

MacPherson invited him to work in his office. Through this office he
learnt about the vacancies of magistrates and went to the office of Sir
Charles Ollivant. Sir Charles was then the Judicial Member of the
Provincial Government of Bombay who hired Mr. M A Jinnah to serve
as a temporary third magistrate. When Sir Charles offered him a
permanent place on the bench, at the perfectly respectable starting salary
of 1,500 rupees a month in 1901, Jinnah declined, replying, “ I will soon
be able to earn that much in a single day.” And soon he did prove his
claim.
Jinnah‟s first active move toward politics took place during the
1906 session of the Indian National Congress in Calcutta in the wake of
the Hindu community‟s adverse reaction to the partition of Bengal in
1905. He became the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity for the
realization of „Swaraj‟ (Self-Rule). He came across Dadabhai Naoraji,
Sir Pherozeshah Metha and Gopal Krisna Gokhle; they were his political
mentor and heroes. First two belonged to Bombay‟s Parsi community
and Gokhle was a secular Hindu.
Jinnah‟s ascent to political influence began with an important piece
of legislation passed by British Parliament in 1909, the Indian Council
Act, expanding the Viceroy‟s Executive Council into the Imperial
Legislative Council by the addition of 35 nominated members and 25
elected members with special representation of Muslims and
Landowners. Jinnah became one of the elected members of the council
from Bombay. Although he had earlier association with the Muslim
League, Jinnah joined the Party formally in 1913.
In December 1915, Congress was to hold its annual session in
Bombay. Jinnah for Hindu-Muslim unity, fatemization, understanding
and co-operation persuaded the Muslim leaders of India to hold Muslim
League‟s annual session at the same venue and time. In the autumn of
1916 he was elected once again to the Imperial Legislative Council. In
December 1916, he succeeded to hold the annual session of Congress
and League in the same place and at the same time in Lucknow. The
Legislative center of India‟s Government, first in Calcutta and Simla,
latter in Delhi became one of Jinnah‟s most important and powerful
stages.
22 Mukti Bah ini Wins Victory
The Rowlatt Act was passed in March 1919 to give the

Government of India summary powers to curb sedition activities, and
Jinnah in protest resigned from the Imperial Legislation Council.
Jinnah‟s ingenious legal mind convinced Congress President A.C
Mazumdar at Calcutta to accept Lucknow Pact 1916 formula. The key
to the Lucknow Pact lay in agreement on percentages of guaranteed “
Muslim Members” for each of the Legislative Councils, one-third at the
center and in Bombay, one-half in the Punjab, 40 percent in Bengal, 30
percent in the United Provinces, 25 percent in Bihar and Orissa and 15
percent in the Central Provinces and in Madras. The promises made by
Congress in Lucknow Pact were never honoured and rift between the
two communities continued to widen.
Jinnah married Ratanbhai, also called Ruttie on Friday, April 19,
1918, at his house, Malabar Hill in Bombay against the consent of her
father Sir Dinshaw Manockjee Petit, the wealthiest Parsi and textile
magnet. She was precociously bright, talented, gifted in every art and
beautiful in every way and seemed like a “fairy princes”. At that time
Jinnah was forty and Ruttie was eighteen only.
After the Calcutta session and before the Congress session at
Nagpur in December 1920, Gandhi moved to neutralize Jinnah‟s
political influence, which was still a power to be reckoned with as the
President of the Home Rule League Bombay. Gandhi hurriedly called a
special meeting of the Home League attended by an insignificant
presence of 60 (1%) out of 6000 eligible members to change its name
and constitution to be held on 03 October 1920. Instead of Home Rule
within British Commonwealth, and by constitutional method, Gandhi
brought the new creed „Purna Swaraj‟ - complete independence. Gandhi
cleverly orchestrated the stage to pass the resolution. The change was
not acceptable to Jinnah and his colleagues.
Central India‟s Nagpur hosted both regular session of the Muslim
League and the Congress after Christmas 1920. Gandhi first moved his
credo resolution at a meeting of the subject committee on 28 December
1920, proposing, the „Puma Swaraj‟. Jinnah objected to the resolution
on ideological ground. Next day Gandhi placed his new creed before
14,582 delegates who flocked to Nagpur. Gandhi‟s
resolution was greeted with deafening, prolonged cheers and applause,

seconded by Lala Lajpat Rai with further raucous acclamation.
Jinnah in a democratic mood opposed the change of the creed. He
was howled down with the cries of „shame, shame and „political
imposter‟. He referred to “Mr. Gandhi‟s resolution”, but the irate
audience yelled “No. Mahatma Gandhi”. Jinnah refused to be coerced. “
At the moment the destinies of the country are in the hands of two
men,” Jinnah argued, “and one of them is Gandhi, who commands the
majority in the assembly, I appeal to him to pause, to cry halt before it is
too late”. Jinnah‟s appeal was unanswered by Gandhi, however, as the
boos, hisses and catcalls of the audience finally drove the author of the
Lucknow Pact and ex-President of the Home Rule, Bombay Conference,
Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity and Apostle of United India from
that Nagpur platform.
Jinnah was shocked, humiliated and hurt and left not only the
session but also the Congress. He told Durga Das, “I will have nothing
to do with this pseudo-religious approach to politics. I part company
with the Congress and Gandhi. I do not believe in working up mob
hysteria. Politics is a gentleman‟s game.” Gandhi who dressed like
Hindu, ate like Hindu, talked like Hindu, behaved like Hindu, thought
like Hindu, was the total incarnation of Hinduism. He was the greatest
Hindu leader and politician in guise of a saint. British called him half
naked Fakir. Whereas Jinnah who dressed like Englishman, spoke in
English, ate in western style, lived in a palace like home at Malabar Hill
was a complete secular man, Apostle of United India. Husyen Shaheed
Suhrawardy when visited Malabar Hill House called it a dream house.
Gandhi made Congress a one-man party. Subash Chandra Bose was
elected President of the Congress twice in 1938 and 1939 as popular
leader against the very stiff opposition from Gandhi and ultimately he
was forced to resign the office in April 1939.
The decade of twenty‟s was a time of series of frustration for
Jinnah. In 1931 he decided to settle down in London and abandon
Indian politics. Jinnah started practicing in the Privy Council Bar.
Jinnah was persuaded back to carry the mantle of Muslim League
as its President in 1934. The election under the India Act 1935 held in
1937 proved shocking for the 100 million Muslims -
except Bengal Muslim League was defeated in all the provinces.

Congress formed the Government and steamed rolled the Muslim
community. Muslim minds were poisoned during the short interlude of
Congress rule. When Field Marshal Sir Lord Archibald Wavell raised
the necessity of Hindu-Muslim harmony to Gandhi on 15 December
1945, Gandhi replied that harmony had been frustrared by the British
policy of divide and rule. Viceroy replied, “I say this is nonsense, we
tried our best to bring them together. The increase in communal fleeling
was mainly due to the action of Congress Ministries in 1937-39 which
had made Muslims feel that they would not get a square deal from
Congress and this had caused the rise of the Muslim League and the
idea of Pakistan. We are bound to have some suspicion that the
objectives of Congress are to secure control of the center, entirely
eliminate British influence, and to deal with the Muslims and princely
States with a high hands.” It was the acid test for the future of Hindu-
Muslim living together as a single nation, which miserably failed. In
1938, Jinnah founded in Delhi an English newspaper ‟Dawn‟ primarily
to fight the propaganda of the Hindus. By 1940, Jinnah started speaking
of „two nations‟ and adopted „Pakistan Resolution‟ moved by the Chief
Minister of Bengal A K Fazlul Huq. On 19 November 1946, Jinnah
begged Lord Wavel “ Give us our own bit of country, let it be as small
as British raj liked, but it must be our own, and we would live on one
meal a day with honour and dignity.”
To resolve the power sharing battle between Hindus and Muslims,
The Cripps Mission 1942, Wavell Plan of Simla Conference June 1945,
The Cabinet Mission Plan 1946 were undertaken by British raj, but all
failed due to uncompromising attitude of the Congress. The main
features of above plans were full Dominion Status for Indian Union
representing all parties in Cripps Mission; Parity between Caste Hindu-
Muslim and Council to function as the Interim Government in Wavell
Plan; and Federal union of Government, forming three groups, Group A
would consist of Hindu majority provinces of Madras, Bombay, UP,
CP, Bihar and Orissa, Group B would consist of such Muslim majority
provinces as the Punjab, NWFP and Sindh, Group C would comprise
such Muslim majority provinces as Bengal and Assam in Cabinet
Mission Plan.
On 28 July 1946 Muslim League at its Council meeting at Bombay

withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission proposals and declared
DIRECT ACTION to force the cause of Pakistan and protest Viceroy
Lord Wavell‟s invitation to Congress to form an interim Government at
the center. The Direct Action Day on 16 August 1946 set off the great
Calcutta killing annihilating no less than 4000 Muslims and Hindus.
The last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten arrived at Delhi on 22 March 1947
to preside over the partition of India. On 07 August 1947 Jinnah flew
from Delhi to Karachi to be sworn in as the first Governor General of
maimed, mutilated, moth- eaten Pakistan with only „the husk‟ on 14
August 1947. It was the „moth-eaten‟ Pakistan that the Qaid-i-Azam
had scored; purchased at the price of vivisecting the two historic
Muslim dominions of Bengal and the Punjab, spaced thousands miles
apart. It was unethical on the part of British raj to partition Muslim
majority Bengal and the Punjab whereas Hindu majority provinces
were kept intact. Even Muslim majority Kashmir state occupied by
India by the military operations orchestrated, planed and conducted by
shred guidance of Mountbatten.
Discrimination against the Bengalis
Issue of Language
In 1947 when I was a kid, I had shouted the slogan of Larkelenga
Pakistan, a popular jargon adopted by the Muslims of the sub continent
in general that meant, “We would fight to achieve Pakistan”; playfully on
the streets of Bombay with the national flag of Pakistan in my hand. May
be I was the only courageous soul on the street of Bombay with the flag
of Pakistan proclaiming the birth of Pakistan. Thus the slogan imprinted
a feeling of Muslim patriotism in my infant heart as much as my
realization for a separate homeland for the Muslims. After the creation of
Pakistan, Quiad-e- Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Father of the nation
and the first Governor General of Pakistan while addressing a historic
meeting at Ramna Race Course on 21 March 1948 and again at a
convocation ceremony at Curzon Hall on 24 March 1948 in Dacca
declared that Urdu and Urdu alone would be the state language for
Pakistan. Ironically enough he made the declaration in English, not in
Uidu.
The protests against this declaration were instantaneous and Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman, present there, vehemently opposed it among others.
How can the Bengalis forget their mother tongue and speak a foreign
language! Thus were sown the first seeds of disintegration by a person
considered as the founder of Pakistan and at that time the highest living
leader of the Muslims of the sub-continent. Jinnah was the greatest
politician of the sub-continent, but unfortunately he had not the
experience of an administrator. He should have told that English should
be the official language of Pakistan that we practiced during the 23 years
of Pakistan and Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi and Postu should have been the
state language of Pakistan. Then there would have not been any
misunderstanding. He made other mistakes not foreseeing the fates of
the Muslims in the areas of Assam, Hyderabad and Kashmir; minority
Muslims of rest of India and accepting the partition of Bengal and
Punjab. The ruler of Hyderabad, Nizam was a Muslim but it was
occupied by India and Muslim majority Kashmir ruled by Hindu King
Hari Singh was also occupied by India. His leadership failed to include
Hyderabad as well as Kashmir in Pakistan. When Urdu was made the
state language of Pakistan, the Bengalis were disillusioned and they
started the language movement, the objectives of which were to get for
the Bengalis the right of mother tongue and to get the recognition of
Bangla spoken by the majority of the people of Pakistan, the status of
one of the state languages. The movement reached its climax on 21
February 1952, when police fired on a procession in front of Dhaka
Medical College and a number of Bengalees embraced martyrdom. In
1952 during the days of Bengali language movement, I was a minor boy
but the occurances are still vivid in my memory.
I still remember various events of the language movement and the
processions in which I had taken part riding on the shoulder of the
elders. The slogans chanted in that procession are still alive in my
memory: Rcistro Vhasha Bangla Chai -Bangla must be a state language,
Nural Aminer Rakto Chai- we want blood of Nurul Amin, (then Chief
Minister of East Bengal), Nazimuddin Ghadhi Charo- Nazimuddin to
leave the post (then Governor General of the country)
etc. At that time my maternal uncle Kazi Abul Bashar was a student of
Dhaka University. During the vacation, he came to our village home
wearing a black badge and recited some songs of language movement.
As I recollect now, the meaning of one of those songs was, "How can we
forget 21st February, the streets of Dhaka were stained with the blood of
my brothers Barkat, Salam and Rafiq".
1954 Election
In the 1954 Parliamentary election, the United Front (Zukto Front), a
political alliance against ruling Muslim League won the election in East
Pakistan securing 228 seats out of 237 Muslim seats. On 03 April 1954,
Sher-e-Bangla Abul Kashem Fazlul Huq formed the provincial
Government in East Pakistan and he became the Chief Minister of East
Bengal. After a short period of only two months on 29 May 1954,
section 92-A, of the interim constitution of Pakistan was invoked by
Governor General Ghulam Muhammad who after the end of British
colonial rule had been enjoying all the prerogatives of the Indian Act,
1935 enforced as the interim constitution of independent Pakistan.
Article 92A of the Act, 1935 authorized the Governor General to impose
the central Government‟s rule over the province through its appointed
Governor and to suspend the elected provincial parliamentary
institution.
Thus the Governor General of Pakistan, a bureaucrat up to the hilt,
Ghulam Muhmmad, a former member of the Audit and Accounts
Services of India in the name of „integrity and solidarity of Pakistan‟
frustrated the administration of a duly elected Government without
himself having much of constitutional legitimacy to act as the head of
the state. The Governor General by the interpretation of Indian Act,
1935 at his will used as a tool to rule the country as an autocratic
dictator assuming the power of British crown whereas Independence
Act, 1947, curtailed the power of crown to a mere constitutional
figurehead. Defense Secretary of Pakistan Iskendar Mirza became the
Governor of East Bengal on 30 May 1954. The Provincial Government
of East Pakistan headed by A K Fazlul Haq was dismissed on the pretext
of a riot at Adamjee Jute Mills instigated by the centre. At that time
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy was the Opposition Leader at the centre.
For a very
short period in 1956 he became the Prime Minister of Pakistan with the
support of the Republican Party. When Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy
turned his eyes for the welfare of East Pakistan, the President of
Pakistan Iskender Mirza removed him, although he was the proponent
of one unit in West Pakistan and accepted the parity in representation
between two wings, that is, 50:50, not on population basis, one-man one
vote. The smaller provinces of West Pakistan Baluchistan, Sindh and
North West Frontier province opposed the creation of one unit in West
Pakistan. The interest of the biggest province Punjab was only
safeguarded with the formation of one unit in West Pakistan.
Coup d‟etat
In 1958 Iskender Mirza with the support of General Ayub Khan
promulgated Martial law and abrogated the constitution. He dissolved
the Parliament and thus captured state power for a short time. In his
second move he hatched up a conspiracy to remove General Ayub
Khan, the commander-in-chief of Pakistan, which came to his
knowledge, and Iskender Mirza was arrested and exiled to Britain. He
died on 13 November 1969 at the age of seventy in obscurity while he
was in service there as the Public Relation Officer of the Indian hotel,
Veerswami. What a disgraceful end for a former President of Pakistan.
He could not be buried in Pakistan, as President Yahya refused it. He
was buried in Tehran with state honour in the initiative of the Shah of
Iran.
General Ayub captured the absolute state power and ruled the
country for long ten years. The driving forces behind the creation of
Pakistan were Muslim brotherhood and democracy. Soon after the birth
of Pakistan, the democratic process was destroyed- firstly under an
imperfect parliamentary system and then under an autocratic military
regime. The death of the democratic process and rise of an authoritarian
system under Ayub and total domination of the West Pakistanis along
with negligence for the Muslims of East Bengal were the beginnings of
the end of United Pakistan. Authority of Pakistan Government, whoever
in state power, never thought of national integration, whereas the
Bengalis to preserve and protect national solidarity, accepted parity of
representation and the formation of „one unit‟ in West Pakistan. From
this changed position
of one unit system the Bengalis could derive no advantage, rather had to
accommodate West Pakistan leaders like Liakot Ali Khan, Sarder Abdur
Rab Nister and Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Osmani in the seats of the
Constituent Assembly from the share of East Pakistan. The power of the
Governor General or any Governor to act in his discretion or to exercise
his individual judgment lapsed on 15 August 1947 under section 8(c) of
the Indian Independence Act of1947. The Governor General was
expected to act on the advice of his cabinet. But in reality the Governor
General continued to enjoy wide and absolute power of the statecraft
hoodwinking Indian Independence Act, 1947. In a democratic state, the
minority section is usually constrained and has to fight for preservation
of their legitimate rights, such as regional autonomy, quota reservation
in the civil and military services, guarantee of the economic
development of their region and for upholding their cultural heritage.
But on the contrary the majority section of Pakistan, the Bengalis had to
fight for such safeguards from the day of Independence in 1947 till the
disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.
These political crises accumulated one after another and ultimately
culminated into a national movement for the creation of a separate state
for the people of the Eastern wing through segregation from Pakistan
and from its Western wing.
Rule of Oligarchy in Pakistan

Pakistan as an independent state began its political journey under a
parliamentary system modeled on Westminster style and under a federal
constitution. But to the utter dismay of its people the ruling clique
grasped power under the cover of constitution and in the name of
democracy. There was no general election on the basis of adult
franchise till 1970. The failure of parliamentary democracy created all-
powerful and irresponsible executives, aided and supported mostly by a
powerful West Pakistani civil and military bureaucracy. None of them
was an East- Pakistani. The ruling elite had the tacit support of the army
from behind the screen uptol958; thereafter the involvement of the army
was direct and open. The political order in Pakistan in the mere
existence of cabinet and a parliament could be called an iron law of
oligarchy, rule by a small group from the army.
The iron ruling elite composed of West Pakistani civil and military
oligarchy, continued to dominate in every vital decision-making process
irrespective of the subjects being related to political, defense, economic
or diplomatic issues.
Among all the provinces the situation of East Pakistan was rather
the worst. The West Pakistanis had direct access to the central ruling
clique and they held all the key posts in the administration.
Consequently they would invariably sabotage the development projects
in East Pakistan. To cite one example, I would like to mention that once
I was traveling from Jessore to Khulna along with an Additional Chief
Engineer of Roads and Highways Department the road had too many
bends. I enquired from him why the roads had so many curves and not
straight as a high way should have been. In reply he said that all the
high officials in the decision making process were from West Pakistan.
They always cause inordinate delay in the acquisition of land for the
road; as a result money allotted to the projects would lapse. While this
continued, Mr. Sobur Khan, central communication Minister from East
Pakistan helplessly had to order the Roads and Highways Department
to construct the roads over the existing unplanned district board roads.
The country theoretically had a federal constitution, but in practice,
centre would impose authority in every sphere of activities of the
provincial government, particularly in financial and administrative
matters. As regards economic and financial matters, even a small
project such as road link between two districts had to be finalized by
Planning Commission sitting thousands of miles away and dominated
by the non- Bengali bureaucrats. Pakistan during its 24 years of united
existence never had a single Bengali Finance Minister or a Bengali
chief in its Planning Commission.
Election on Pakistan Issue

Pakistan was created on the Two Nation Theory- Muslim nation and
Hindu nation. Islam was the only unifying factor for East and West
Pakistan. Except religion; - languages, costumes, customs and even
dietary habits were different for the East and the West Pakistanis.
Bengali Muslim leaders who extended leadership in the movement of
Pakistan, particularly A.K. Fazlul Huq and Huseyn Shaheed
Suhrawardy remained undecided just at the time of partition of India or

creation of Pakistan. The uphill task of creating spring boat for Muslim
League in the sub-continent was built by A.K. Fazlul Huq and Huseyn
Shaheed Suhrawardy. In 1946 elections were held on the Pakistan issue.
The onerous responsibility to organize the general election in Bengal
had fallen on Suhrawardy. He boldly accepted the challenge, toured the
remotest parts of the country and mobilized the masses so that when the
fateful election came, the Bengal Provincial Muslim League captured
114 of the 119 Muslim seats of the Provincial Assembly. The general
election fought on the issue of Pakistan resulted in complete victory. It
saved the Muslim League from an impending disaster and the demand
for Pakistan from becoming ineffectual. The three other overwhelmingly
Muslim majority provinces—the Punjab, Sind and the NWFP - had
voted against Pakistan that put Jinnah in a very awkward position. The
Muslim minority provinces solidly voted for Pakistan. It was Jinnah who
brought Pakistan into being, but it was Suhrawardy, without question,
who supplied him the weapons and ammunition to fight for Pakistan.
Had Suhrawardy not won the general election in 1946, in the light of
total failure of the Muslim League in all the other Muslim majority
provinces, there would have been no Pakistan. It is history that the
Muslim League victory in Bengal in 1946 made all the difference for the
creation of Pakistan. In case of defeat of the Muslim League in Bengal,
the British would have left the destiny of India in the hands of the
Congress. But the central Muslim League leadership could not tolerate
their dominating leadership. A.K Fazlul Huq became the first casualty in
September 1941 as he was thrown out from Muslim League leadership,
though he was the Chief Minister of Bengal. Huseyn Shaheed
Suhrawardy was excluded from the Muslim League Central Working
Committee. The central leadership both of Congress and Muslim League
had great advantage of being located at Delhi, the capital of India where
they had frequent interaction with the Viceroy and other British high
officials, and thus could influence the course of political decision at the
ciucial time of the partition of India.
Founder of Muslim
League in 1906 at
Shahbagh, Dhaka
Prime Minister of Bengal

(146-47).
Co-Founder of Pakistan.
Founder of Pakistan
Awami Ligue.
Prime Minister of
Pakistan (1956-57).
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy
Prime Minister of Bengal

(193743)
Architect of Pakistan
(Lahore) Resolution 1940
Home Minister of
Pakistan (1955)
Governor of East Pakistan
(1956-58)
Sher-e-Bangla A. K. Fazlul Haque

United Bengal
In the last week of May 1947, an agreement was reached between
Muslim League leader Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and Congress
leader Sarat Chandra Bose for a United Sovereign Bengal. The draft
agreement was sent to high commands before the announcement of the
03 June partition plan. The agreement was subject to the approval of the
high commands of the two parties. Hindu leaders like Gandhi, Nehru
and Patel from northwest opposed the idea. They would know the
political and intellectual superiority of the Bengalis and hence were
scared that should Bengal remains united Bengalis ultimately would
dominate the rest of India. The leaders of Hindus and Muslims in
Bengal agreed to live together as United Bengal, but the outsiders
imposed partition in Bengal. Three parties - Congress, Muslim League
and the Government of Britain agreed that Hindu majority provinces
would form India and Muslim majority provinces would form Pakistan.
Even in that formula Bengal should have remained united. But the
historical Muslim majority Bengal and Punjab were partitioned. British
did not play the neutral and impartial role. Britain wanted to accord
independence to united India. Great Calcutta killing became a tool for
Jinnah to plead for surgical operation of India to avoid bloodshed and
violence. The Moslem of India, Jinnah insisted, were a nation with a
„distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and
architecture, laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and
traditions. For Jinnah, the division he proposed was the natural course.
That division, however, would have to produce a viable state and that,
Jinnah argued, meant two of India‟s great provinces, the Punjab and
Bengal, would have to go into his Pakistan, despite the fact that each
contained enormous Hindu populations. Failed to keep united India
against the logical argument of Jinnah, Mountbatten was bent upon to
divide the Punjab and Bengal as part of the bargain or there would no
Pakistan. „Ah‟ Jinnah would counter, „Your Excellency doesn‟t
understand. A man is a Punjabi or a Bengali before he is Hindu or
Moslem. They share a common history, language, culture and economy.
You must not divide them. You will cause endless
34 Mukli Bahini Wins Victory
bloodshed and trouble.‟Jinnah was correct. Millions of Muslims,

Hindus and Sikhs were massacred and uprooted from their ancestral
home at the time of partition. Indepedence brought freedom to India and
Pakistan with endlessd human sufferings.
Mountbatten had inserted in the partion plan a clause which would
allow an Indian province to become independent if a majority of its
communities wished to. That clause was intended to provide that the
sixty-five million Hindus and Muslims of Bengal could join into one
viable country with the great seaport of Calcutta as their capital. The
idea had been placed before Mountbatten by Husyen shaheed
Suhrawardy, agreed and signed by both the communities of Bengal. The
Viceroy liked it. To his surprise, he had discovered Bengal‟s Congress
Hindu leaders intrigued by the project. He had quietly encouraged their
interest. He had even discovered Jinnah would not oppose the idea. He
had not, however, exposed it to Nehru and Patel and it was his oversight
that disturbed him later on. A sudden inspiration struck him.
Determined to follow his instinct, Mountbatten called the members of
his staff to his study and explained his idea to them. They were
horrified. To show the plan to Nehru without exposing it to Jinnah
would be a complete breach of faith with the Moslem leader, they
pointed out.
„I‟m sorry,‟ he finally announced. „Your arguments are absolutely
sound. But I have a hunch that I must show it to Nehru, and I‟m going
to follow my hunch.‟ That night, Mountbatten invited Nehru to his
study for a glass of port. Casually, he passed the Congress leader a copy
of the plan as it had been amended by London, asking him to take it to
his bedroom and read it. Then, perhaps, Nehru might let him know
informally what reception it was likely to get from Congress. Flattered
and happy, Nehru agreed.
A few hours later, while Mountbatten devoted himself to his
regular evening relaxation, construcking his family‟s genealogical table,
Jawarharlal Nehru began to scrutinize the text designed to chart his
country‟s future. The plan was designed to divide India into three parts,
India, Pakistan and Bengal, even several parts. Nehru saw India
deprived of its lungs, the port of Calcutta along with its mills, factories,
steel works; Kashmir, an independent state ruled by
a despot he despised; Hyderabad become an enormous, indigestible

Moslem body planted in the belly of India; half a dozen other princely
states clamouring to go off on their own.
Mountbatten got first intimation of his friend‟s violent reaction in a
letter early the following morning. For the confident Viceroy, it was „a
bombshell‟. The Congress party bitterly disliked it. The plan the British
Cabinet was discussing that very day. Congress had the veto power. No
plan would be accepted without the consent of the Congress.
Mountbatten was not the man to brood over setbacks. He favoured
friendship to future prime Minister of India, Nehru than to do justice to
Bengal, Kashmir and Hyderabad. At Mountbatten‟s behest, Nehru
agreed to stay on another night to give him time to draft a revised plan,
which might be acceptable to Congress. It would be at the desire of
Nehru who was distressed. The plan would offer India‟s provinces and
princes‟ only one choice - India or Pakistan.
The dream of an independent Bengal was gone. Mountbatten
betrayed the aspirations of the people of Bengal in order to satisfy the
desire and maintain friendship with Nehru. Mountbatten entrusted V. P
Menon to re-draft the plan. Menon finished his task in accordance with
Mountbatten‟s instruction in barely six hours on an office porch looking
out on the Himalayas, a plan which was going to re-order the sub-
continent and the map of the world.
In the Lahore Resolution of Muslim league moved by AK Fazlul
Haque, Pakistan was proposed to be constituted of „Independent States‟.
Bengal should have remained a single entity for its economic viability
and national prosperity. If Netaji Subash Chandra Bose would survive
and could play his role in politics the political geography of Bengal
could have been different. It was a failure of the leadership of Fazlul
Huq and Suhrawady that they could not implement the idea of creation
of Pakistan as proposed in the Lahore Resolution that is creation of
more than one state, not one unified Pakistan.
A.K. Fazlul Haque had a bitter relation with Jinnah. He was the
Chief Minister of Bengal. Jinnah asked him to resign on the question of
membership in the National Defense Council constituted by the
Viceroy. In a defiance letter of resignation, he attributed his ouster to the
pressure created by the Muslim leaders of the minority provinces and
vowed: ‟I will never allow the interest of the thirty-
three million Muslims of Bengal to be put under the domination of any

outside authority, however eminent it may be.‟ Initially A.K Fazlul
Haque was hesitant, but ultimately he decided to resign from Chief
Ministership and from the Muslim League as well.
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy was in an illusion to create united
Bengal. While these two leaders, Haque - Suhrwardhy were in the
central politics of Pakistan, their moral foundation was weak. In
undivided India, they fought for the genuine cause of Muslim Bengal
while in Pakistan they had to concentrate in an altogether different task
for which they were not mentally prepared. Practicaly they had to
sacrifice the interest of Muslim Bengal to the West Pakistanis. Fellow
feeling and brotherhood could only grow through participation in state
activities on common interest. Even in a football match, one grows
friendship and brotherhood. But West Pakistani iron ruling elite never
allowed effective participation of the Bengalis in national affairs.
Muslim nationalism could not continue to flourish in an atmosphere of
neglect and exploitation. Rather another form of two-nation theory
emerged- theory of cultural nationalism based on Bengali culture and
West Pakistani or Punjabi culture. The changed attitude of the Bengalis
as to their nationalism resulted in several movements. In 1964 when I
was a student of BUET, I participated in one such democratic
movement for the establishment of rule of law in Pakistan against the
autocratic rule of Muhammad Ayub Khan. I participated in a student
procession when the rally was attacked by tear gas shelling by the
police in front of Central Saheed Miner.
Muslim League and Pakistan Resolution

In 1965 when Pakistan was attacked by India, I had undergone military
training with the high spirit of fighting for the motherland under the
arrangement of BUET. I joined Pakistan army in 1968 with the noble
aim of serving and protecting my beloved motherland Pakistan.
Democratic movement spearheaded by Muslim League created
Pakistan. The first partition of Bengal ignited Muslim political
consciousness throughout the subcontinent. Dhaka provided the cradle
of Muslim renaissance for the birth of Muslim League on 30 December
1906. Muslim League was established to protect the
life, property, honour and faith against the majority rule of Hindus when
British rule would cease to exist in India. Two thousands Muslim
delegates from all over India assembled at Shahbagh, Dhaka at the cost
of Nawab Sir Khawaja Salimullah who spent six lac rupees to meet the
expenses of the meeting. In less than four decades Muslim League
became the leading party for Pakistan movement. On 23 March 1940, in
the twenty-seventh session of the All-India Muslim League, A.K Fazlul
Huq drafted and moved the Lahore Resolution in Lahore. He delivered
his speech in English. The audience requested him to explain in Urdu, he
repeated the same in fluent Urdu roaring like a lion. The people of
Punjab at the same public meeting gave him the title Sher-e-Bangla
means “Lion of Bengal”. The Lahore Resolution envisaged: “The
establishment of completely Independent States formed by
demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions which
should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be
necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a
majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India,
should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the
constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign”. The
interpretation of Lahore Resolution remained a subject of controversy
regarding the wording of „Independent States , and „autonomous and
sovereign‟.
It was understood from the Lahore Resolution that Pakistan would
be created with five provinces and the status of the provinces would be
that of federating states which would ensure guarantee for equal
opportunities for the people of all the provinces free from exploitation of
one by the other.
Betrayal
Islam was the only unifying factor used to gain the support of the
Muslims of India for the creation of Pakistan. Except for religion there
was nothing common between the two wings. For a true Muslim Islamic
faith is much more important than any other consideration, but the few
selfish Punjabi coteries wanted to subdue
the religious Bengalis in the name of Islam. The capital was established
at Karachi, later on at Islamabad in West Pakistan and all the decisions
were taken from the capital. The decision-making elite failed to fulfill
the hopes and aspirations of the Bengalis.
The fate of the nation continued to be decided from Karachi and
subsequently from Islamabad. The head of the state was always from
West Pakistan during the entire period of united Pakistan. How a house
can be set right when the head of the family is absent from the home?
East Pakistan was thrown out from the harmony created by Islamic
brotherhood in 1947 by the centrifugal forces generated by the selfish
political leaders of West Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan had
enormous contribution to the creation of Pakistan. It is an irony of fate
that state power went into the hands of the West Pakistanis alone.
The Bengalis played pioneering role in Sepoy War in 1857. At that
time Bengal Army consisted of 34 Regiments of Cavalry, 119
Regiments of Infantry, 32 Companies of Artillery and 6 Companies of
Engineers. The strength of Madras Army and Bombay Army combined
was one third of Bengal Army who remained loyal to British raj. The
total strength of Native Troops was 232,224. Bengalis were never
trusted by British after that mutiny and were not taken in the armed
forces, whereas the Punjabis, Gurkhas and Sikhs actively collaborated
with the British. "Had they joined Sepoy War India would have been
liberated in 1857. Delhi could not have been taken without Sikhs and
Gurkhas; the whole of the country North of Calcutta prevented losing,
should the men of the Punjab remain true to their cause". This is quoted
from the book „An eye witness account of the Indian Mutiny‟ written by
Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar Commander-in-Chief of
British Indian Army. Politically Bengalis are very wise and farsighted.
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel commented "what Bengal thinks today rest of
India thinks tomorrow". After the Independence of Pakistan, East
Pakistan had only two companies of paramilitary force. All the regular
troops comprised of the Punjabis and the Pathans. After the birth of
Pakistan in 1947 when Pakistan Army was organized, it consisted 90%
Punjabis and Pathan troops and officers; and only the rest was Bengalis.
Military top brasses were all from Punjab. Even the civil bureaucrats
who migrated from India settled in West Pakistan.
him Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army. The Governor General

•]t j in faVour of West Pakistan from the very birth rf
dismissed Nazimuddin when he made an effort to curtail the power of
IhSnJn late 50s military power became the main source of t to run the
Governor General; Ayub had provided the tacit support to the Governor
affairs of the state in the third world countries Political leadership was at
General Gholum Muhammad. Nazimuddin called Ayub unfaithful dog for
the mercy of military and civil bureaucrats. West Pakistani leadership
outright betrayal. Ayub also betrayed Iskander Mirza, exiled him to London
grabbed the power of the state by virtue of their military strength.
overthrowing him as President of Pakistan. Ayub tenure ended as
Commander-in-Chief on January 1955 and got four years extention through
Ayub Khan
the efforts of Iskander Mirza, then the Secretary of Defense. Many
Military dictator Field Martial Mohammad Ayub Khan did maximum commented that Ayub was devoid of moral ethics and loyalty. He wanted to
damage for the dismemberment of Pakistan after he took state power by ;| I 1
sell East Pakistan to Nehru only for two crore rupees, even wanted to swap
a military coup. It will be relevant to give a brief background of Ayub Kashmir in exchange of East Pakistan.
1:I t
Khan who was born in Rehana, a remote village in North-West Frontier Democracy is the safety valve for ventilating grievances, injustice and
Province on 14 May 1907, and who had an uneventful childhood. His eruption of dissatisfaction. From 1958 to 1969, Ayub destroyed democratic
father, who had retired as a junior commissioned officer in the Indian norms and political institutions for his personal interest. Mass uprising in 1969
Army, had a large family, four sons and three daughters and a small put an end to the Ayub dynasty. Muslim majority areas comprised Pakistan.
income from his army pension. His father lived in a house in Rawalpindi Pakistan was a Repu ic and the state principle was such that people s
abandoned by a Sikh. His father with the assistance of his British officer representatives s rule it. Pakistan was an independent sovereign countiy. f was n0
could manage to send him to Aligarh Muslim University. General Skeen,
more the colony of any foreign power. I cherished this 1 ea. u when I was
Adjutant General of the Indian Army looking for suitable soldierly
posted in West Pakistan I felt as if West Pa istanis w the rulers and East
qualities spotted him for enrolment in the army for his tall and well-built
Pakistanis were their subjects. They were ma and we were slaves. General Gul
physique. He was of fair complexion and appropriate mould.
Hasan former comman er 1 of Pakistan Army admitted in his book Memoirs t
comrrT^ -Sent t0 ândburst as a military cadet and he was a Ahmed as chief secretary of East Pakistan consi eie o
A~
m thS rmy in 1928 Durin
i , ' § Second World War‟ natives as British used to. Sir Z a f n j l l a h b u t he never minister of
m Army headc uart Pakistan for seven years from 194/ to IJJ > ,t
later moved l ers in Delhi and
B a n a c k p u r visited East Pakistan. Although he was the mem er ° which he Assembly from the
in-Command of t h e Reglment
Âs - He was Second
'
Burma. Ayub was a R • * and watched fighting in constituences of East Pakl^tan‟ ^ Pakistan or its oould not become a Minister, he
partition of India anri ^ ier m tke Indian Army just before General Rees in did not cate or , t0 gast
n
People. This is a glaring testimony of neglect by in i »
1947 attacked t0 the boundary force under Muslims who were tran e,nilSera^^
Pakistan! . ,„hirh
âded to protect the lives of Azam wanted to court mTr nv massacred *n East foi nda 1 OI
The concept of Islamic brotherhood was the ' ' e Jy°ranny 0f
akistan was
Punjab. Quid-i- Khwaja Nazimuddin intend A™ ^ b*S âdures and misdeeds, a en
created. This principle was s T was serving
but of East Pakistan. When Kh ”^ ^ saved îm and made him GOC General
discriminatory rule. Under such prevailing atmosp ^ forcgd Fieid >n Pakistan
of Pakistan he DOJÂ azimuddin became the Governor Rawalpindi and later
army. The great movement of the unformnately he Marshal Mohammed Ayub I
on 17 ! yUb aS AdJutant General to GHQ,
JanUar Khan to step down. B
y 1951 Khwaja Nazimuddin made
•]t j in faVour of West Pakistan from the very birth rf him Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army. The Governor General
IhSnJn late 50s military power became the main source of t to run the dismissed Nazimuddin when he made an effort to curtail the power of
affairs of the state in the third world countries Political leadership was at Governor General; Ayub had provided the tacit support to the Governor
the mercy of military and civil bureaucrats. West Pakistani leadership General Gholum Muhammad. Nazimuddin called Ayub unfaithful dog for
grabbed the power of the state by virtue of their military strength. outright betrayal. Ayub also betrayed Iskander Mirza, exiled him to London
overthrowing him as President of Pakistan. Ayub tenure ended as
Ayub Khan Commander-in-Chief on January 1955 and got four years extention through
Military dictator Field Martial Mohammad Ayub Khan did maximum the efforts of Iskander Mirza, then the Secretary of Defense. Many
damage for the dismemberment of Pakistan after he took state power by commented that Ayub was devoid of moral ethics and loyalty. He wanted to
a military coup. It will be relevant to give a brief background of Ayub sell East Pakistan to Nehru only for two crore rupees, even wanted to swap ;| I 1
1:I t
Khan who was born in Rehana, a remote village in North-West Frontier Kashmir in exchange of East Pakistan.
Province on 14 May 1907, and who had an uneventful childhood. His Democracy is the safety valve for ventilating grievances, injustice and
father, who had retired as a junior commissioned officer in the Indian eruption of dissatisfaction. From 1958 to 1969, Ayub destroyed democratic
Army, had a large family, four sons and three daughters and a small norms and political institutions for his personal interest. Mass uprising in 1969
income from his army pension. His father lived in a house in Rawalpindi put an end to the Ayub dynasty. Muslim majority areas comprised Pakistan.
abandoned by a Sikh. His father with the assistance of his British officer Pakistan was a Repu ic and the state principle was such that people s
could manage to send him to Aligarh Muslim University. General Skeen, representatives s rule it. Pakistan was an independent sovereign countiy. f was n0
Adjutant General of the Indian Army looking for suitable soldierly more the colony of any foreign power. I cherished this 1 ea. u when I was
qualities spotted him for enrolment in the army for his tall and well-built posted in West Pakistan I felt as if West Pa istanis w the rulers and East
physique. He was of fair complexion and appropriate mould. Pakistanis were their subjects. They were ma and we were slaves. General Gul
comrrT^ -Sent t0 ândburst as a military cadet and he was Hasan former comman er 1 of Pakistan Army admitted in his book Memoirs t
a Ahmed as chief secretary of East Pakistan consi eie o
~ m thSirmy in ,1928' Durin§ Second World War‟
A
m Army headc uart natives as British used to. Sir Z a f n j l l a h b u t he never minister of
later moved l ers in Delhi and Pakistan for seven years from 194/ to IJJ > ,t
B a n a c k p u r
in-Command of t h e Reglment
Âs - He was Second
' visited East Pakistan. Although he was the mem er ° which he Assembly from the
Burma. Ayub was a R • * and watched fighting in constituences of East Pakl^tan‟ ^ Pakistan or its oould not become a Minister, he
partition of India anri ^ ier m tke Indian Army just before General Rees in did not cate or , t0 gast
1947 attacked t0 the boundary force under Muslims who were tran e,nilSera^^ People. This is a glaring testimony of neglect by in i »n
âded to protect the lives of Azam wanted to court mTr nv massacred *n East Pakistan! . ,„hirh
Punjab. Quid-i- Khwaja Nazimuddin intend A™ ^ b*S âdures and misdeeds, The concept of Islamic brotherhood was the foi nda 1 OI
' ' e Jy°ranny 0f
akistan was
but of East Pakistan. When Kh ”^ ^ saved îm and made him GOC General created. This principle was s a en
T was serving
of Pakistan he DOJÂ azimuddin became the Governor Rawalpindi and later discriminatory rule. Under such prevailing atmosp ^ forcgd Fieid >n Pakistan
on 17 ! yUb aS AdJutant General to GHQ, army. The great movement of the unformnately he Marshal Mohammed Ayub I
JanUar
y 1951 Khwaja Nazimuddin made Khan to step down. B
had handed over power to another Army autocrat General Mohammed

Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan‟s rise to the post of commander-in-chief
was done through the patronage of General Ayub. General Ayub paid
General Yahya back for his help rendered to General Ayub‟s taking
over as President of Pakistan.
Yahya Khan
When in 1958 General Ayub took over as President of Pakistan,
Karachi was the capital of Pakistan. Brigadier Yahya was the head of
intelligence at Karachi. Brigadier Yahya intercepted the telephone
conversation of President Iskender Mirza and Syed Amjad Khan,
Finance Minister of Pakistan. The President wanted to sort out
General Ayub. General Ayub entrusted brigadier Yahya with the
detail staff work in connection with the coup, which brought General
Ayub to power. He had ever since remained close to Ayub. When
General Muhammad Musa retired in 1966, General Yahya was made
the Commander-in-Chief superceding fourteen senior Generals and it
was no surprise. In 1969 when law and order deteriorated in Pakistan,
General Ayub asked General Yahya to impose martial law, instead
General Yahya in private asked Ayub to leave to make room for
General Yahya to take over as President of Pakistan. General Yahya
Khan promised to hold General Election in Pakistan on the basis of
„one man one vote‟. It was the number one point of Sheikh Mujib‟s
six points. Among total population in Pakistan East Pakistan
population was of 56 percent while West Pakistan was only 44
percent. General Election was held on 07 December 1970. Out of
169 seats East Pakistan Awami League secured 167 seats. Total
number of seats in Pakistan National Assembly was 313. Thus
Awami League obtained the absolute majority to form the
Government in Pakistan.
Initially Yahya had the good intention to summon the
Parliament. He had frank discussion with Bangabandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman at Dhaka. Bangabandhu proposed to General
Yahva to continue as the President of Pakistan after the calling of
‟ innal Assembly and the formation of government. Bangabandhu
chpikh Mujibur Rahman also promised to praise General Yahya for
f! r
S holding general election in >' “°here -H
upholding democracy in Pakistan in his inaugural speech in the National

Assembly.
General Yahya returned to Karachi with happy mood as he was
assured of his post. But Zulfikar Ali Bhutto played the dirtiest game. He
invited General Yahya and General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff
of Pakistan army at his hometown at Larkana. Bhutto family had the
previous experience of sponsoring and hatching the coup d'etat of 1958
by Iskander Mirza in their house in Larkana. President Bhutto claimed
the planning of 1958 coup at their house Larkana while interviewed by
London Observer on 02 January 1972. It was a natural gesture to the
host by Iskander Mirza to award a cabinet position for the son of Sir
Shanaz Bhutto. Sir Shanawz Bhutto landlord of Larkana was the father
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. At the crucial time of 1947 he was the Dewan of
Junagadh. Sir Mahabatkhan Rasulkhanji was the ruler of Junagadh who
singed the instruments of accession to accede to Pakistan. But later on
Shanawaz Bhutto invited the Indian administration and army to take
over the control of the state. Even then Pakistan claimed Junagadh as
part of Pakistan. Sir Shanawaz Bhutto had four wives. He married one
Baizi (professional singer and dancer) named Rani converted to Muslim
and took the name of Khursheed to whom Bhutto was born. General
Yahya was not a Punjabi. His grandfather migrated from Iran and
settled in Peshwar, Pakistan. By religion he was Shiite Muslim. His
father and grandfather served as ranker in British-Indian Army with
loyality. For generations his forefathers polished the shoes of British
like Ayub's forefather and also Tikka and Niazi who themselves rose
from the rank of sepoy. In recognition Yahya and others were granted
commition in the British-Indian Army. He had no firm backing in
Pakistan, whereas General Hamid a Punjabi had firm root in Punjab,
which is known to be the power base of Pakistan. A heinous conspiracy
was hatched up at the house of greedy Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It was
decided that the power would not be handed over to Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and if need be armed forces would be deployed to crush the
Bengalis. Blue print of genocide in East Pakistan was prepared by
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Hamid, and was approved by the
stooge General Yahya while he was under the influence of heavy dose
of alcohol. Virtually
General Yahya became rubber stamp in the hands of the Punjabi

Generals. General Yahya should not have accepted the personal
invitation by a politician that was beyond the dignity of the President of
Pakistan. As president he should have maintained complete neutral role.
At that time I was attending a course at Quetta that was due to
terminate on 27 February 1971. In the meantime General Yahya
summoned National Assembly to sit at Dhaka on 03 March 1971. In the
middle of February 1971 I could sense that power would not be handed
over to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Suddenly college authority got the
message to assemble all the training equipment like guns, tanks etc. and
to be kept ready for despatch to the field units. I had cast my vote for
two candidates- one for National Assembly and another for Provincial
Assembly of the constituency of Magura through postal ballot from
Quetta to exercise my right of franchise as citizen of Pakistan. Like
others I was eager to show respect for democracy, as I understood it to
be the true binding factor for United Pakistan. Democracy only could
keep Pakistan united, as India had been kept united besides cultural
diversities of its provinces.
As the heat of politics was raising a Baluch friend promised to put
every effort to smuggle me out of West Pakistan to East Pakistan. On 26
February 1971 I started for Karachi from Quetta. My Baluch friend
came to the railway station and wished me a free and sovereign
Bangladesh. He requested me to pray so that Baluchistan might also
become free from Punjabi domination.
In search of constitution
We can define constitution and constitutional law for easy
understanding of the democratic rule of Pakistan. Constitution is the
supreme law of the country governing the nation. The constitutional
law encompasses the set of rules that define the fundamental rights of
the people and outlines the distribution of the power of the legislature,
executive and judiciary of the state. Let us see whether these rules
were so framed and applied in the politics of Pakistan.
The Bengalis supported Muslim League and Quad-e-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah for the creation of Pakistan. Their sole aim
was to have a separate land for the Muslims of Indian sub-continent.
Birth of Pakistan brought overwhelming joy for the Muslim of
Bengal. They never thought that their Muslim brothers would impose
another colonial rule on the Bengalis. As per the sermon of our great
Prophet Muhammad(SM) one Muslim is the brother of another Muslim.
This was in the mind of Bengali Muslims. This conviction was
frustrated by the selfish action of Punjabi ruling elites. People of East
Pakistan wanted that the country should be run by the rules of the
constitution whereas Punjabi ruling elites wanted to reign the country by
brute oligarchy of bureaucratic and military forces.
Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 provided that the
government of India Act of 1935 with amendments and adaptation
would be the working constitution of Pakistan during the interim period.
Under the Indian Independence Act, 1947 the constituent Assembly was
vested with two distinct functions: to prepare a constitution and to act as
a federal legislative Assembly or parliament until the constitution came
into effect. The powers and functions of the central legislature under the
government of India Act 1935 were conferred on the Constituent
Assembly. Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the President of the
Constituent Assembly. It was a sincere initiative on the part of the first
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan that had constituted several
committees and sub-committees to carry out its task of framing the
constitution. The Basic Principal Committee was the most important
among them. The Basic Principal Committee set up three sub-
committees namely: a) Sub- committee on federal and provincial
constitution b) Sub-committee on franchise
c) Sub-committee on Judiciary.
The interim report of the committee was adopted by the
Constituent Assembly in 1950 and the final report in 1954. The
government of India Act, 1935 envisaged the establishment of
autonomous provinces as the constituent units of this Indian federation.
Provincial autonomy was its basic idea. Thus „Federation of Pakistan‟
was established by the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) order, 1947.
The powers of the Governor General were the main obstacle created
against the framing of the constitution of Pakistan. Under the original
Act, 1935 the Governor General was vested with final political
authority, entire executive power as the representative of the British
crown. Under section 8(c) of the 1947 Act, the power of the Governor
General to act in his discretion
lapsed on 15 August 1947.The Governor General was presumed to act

on the advice of the ministers. But in spite of that under the government
of India Act, 1935, as adopted in Pakistan, the Governor General
continued to enjoy the wide and substantial powers. He was the
executive head of the federation of Pakistan. Under 1947 Act, the entire
field of government activity was brought under the control of the
cabinet that was responsible to the Constituent Assembly, which
became the real authority. The Governor General would exercise
powers on the advice of the cabinet. It was unfortunate that Quid-e-
Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liakot Ali Khan died before the
framing of the constitution.
After the death of Quid-e- Azam on 11 September 1948 Khawaja
Nazimuddin became the second Governor General of Pakistan. Liakot
Ali Khan chose to remain the Prime Minister, which meant that cabinet
form of government was to become effective. The position of the
Governor General during this time was like that of a constitutional
figurehead while the Prime Minister and the cabinet exercised real
power. This arrangement continued until the assassination of Liakot Ali
Khan on 16 October 1951. Khawaja Nazimuddin took additional charge
as the Prime Minister after the death of Liakot Ali Khan and on 24
October 1951 he assumed the full responsibility of Prime Minister
leaving the post of Governor General for Ghulam Muhammad who was
then the finance minister.
When Ghulam Muhammad became the third Governor General in
1951, it was expected that he would be content to be a constitutional
figurehead. But Ghulam Muhammad had no respect for, or training in
parliamentary procedures and its tradition or convention. The position
and powers of the Governor General in Pakistan depended on the
quality and the personality of the holder of the post. Prime Minister
Khawaja Nazimuddin proved to be a weak leader, consequently political
factions developed in the cabinet. Prime Minister and the cabinet failed
to exercise real power. On one occasion Prime Minister Khawaja
Nazimuddin challenged the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad
saying that while Liakot Ali Khan was the Prime Minister and he
(Khawaja Nazimuddn) was the Governor General, Liakot Ali Khan
wielded the real power. In reply Ghulam Muhammad pointed out that
Khawaja Nazimuddin was not
Political Paekground 47
Liakot Ali Khan and he (Ghulam Muhammad) was also not Khawaja
Nazimuddin. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor
General had the power to dismiss his council of ministers. When the
draft constitution was adopted by the first Constituent Assembly in
1954, the expression- that „the Prime Minister shall hold office during
the pleasure of Governor General‟ was omitted and it was laid down that
the cabinet should be collectively responsible to the federal legislature.
Due to this significant change, the Governor General Ghulam
Muhammad seized the initiative and opportunity under the Act, 1935
and dismissed Khawaja Nazimuddin on 17 April 1953 from the office of
Prime Minister.
Muhammad Ali Bogra the ambassador of Pakistan to Washington
was brought back and was assigned with the office of the Prime
Minister. When Muhammad Ali Bogra tried to exert the real power, the
tussle ensued. The first Constituent Assembly, growing impatient with
the way in which Ghulam Muhammad began to exercise his powers,
sought to control him. On 21 September 1954, a Bill was passed
hurriedly by the Constituent Assembly amending sections, 9, 10,10A,
10B of the Government of India Act, 1935 as adopted for Pakistan. The
net result of the amendment was to divest the powers of the Governor
General to dismiss his council of ministers. The Governor General
Ghulam Muhammad retaliated by dissolving the first Constituent
Assembly on 24 October 1954 when the Prime Minister failed to take a
strong line, as some of the cabinet members were in league with the
Governor General.
Maulavi Tamizuddin Khan challenged the Proclamation and
dismissal as „unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, without jurisdiction,
inoperative and void‟ and asked for a writ mandamus to refrain the
government from interfering with the exercise of his function as
President (speaker) of the Constituent Assembly and for a quo
warrantor with a view to determining the validity of certain
appointments to the Governor General‟s council of ministers. A full
bench of Sind High Court headed by the Chief Justice of Sindh, Sir
George Constantine delivered verdict unanimously in favour of Maulavi
Tamizuddin Khan, and termed that the dissolution of Assembly was
„anullity in law‟. It further clarified that the
)
48 Mukti Bcihini Wins Victory
Governor General and Prime Ministers of Pakistan from 1947 to 1958

Governor General had no power of any kind to dissolve the Constituent

Assembly. It was a sovereign body created for a special purpose and it
was to function till that purpose was complete, unless it were dissolved
by a majority of tô-third of its members.
An appeal to the Federal Court by the government was made
against the verdict of the Sind High Court. The Federal Court accepted
the appeal of the government and rejected Moulavi Tamizuddin Khan‟s
claim. The Federal Court did not go to see whether the Constituent
Assembly was rightly dissolved. The Federal Court set the judgment of
Sind High Court aside on technical ground that the section 223A of the
Government of India Act, 1935, as adopted in Pakistan, by virtue of
which the Sind court issued the writs in favour of Tamizuddin Khan, *
was not yet a law‟ because it had not received the assent of the
Governor General. In reply to an argument of Advocate General, the
Chief Justice Mr. Munir remarked, “I do not know whether the
Constituent Assembly dissolved legally or not but so far it does exist in
law.”
The country was faced with legal vacuum after Federal Court‟s
decision. To prevent the breakdown of constitutional machinery the
Governor General promulgated the Emergency powers Ordnance IX of
1955. The Federal Court rejected the Governor General‟s emergency
powers. The Governor General immediately summoned a „Constituent
Convention‟ to meet on 10 May. But the Federal Court pointed out that
„Convention‟ might be challenged as an illegal body. The Federal Court
also foiled another attempt of Ghulam Muhammad to frame
Constitution by executive decrees with the help of so called “Cabinet of
Talents”. The Federal Court unanimously declared that the task of
framing a constitution had to be performed by a Constituent Assembly.
After the verdict the Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad, by
proclamation summoned a sixty member „Constituent Convention‟ to
meet on 10 May 1955. The Convention was to be elected from the
existing Provincial Assemblies and its function would be to replace the
first Constituent Assembly. The Governor General by another
amendment raised the member of the Constituent Convention to eighty.
The composition of the Convention was based on the principle of
parity between East and
West Pakistan, forty from East and forty from West Pakistan. In East
Pakistan, the leader of the United Front, Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq, was
threatening to boycott the Constitution Convention on the ground that it
did not give East Pakistan the majority of seats on population basis.
Subsequently as a result of a deal with the Prime Minister, Mohammad
Ali Bogra under which parliamentary institutions suspended sincel954
were restored in East Pakistan, the United Front agreed to accept parity of
representation. The Awami League under Law Minister Huseyn Shaheed
Suhrawardhy accepted it as West Pakistan was not prepared to accept
majority seats for East Pakistan and there was a threat of military rule and
some other considerations might have worked in this acceptance of parity.
Suhrawardy had the aspiration in the back of his mind to become the
Prime Minister. Assurance for the same by the West Pakistani leaders
prompted him to compromise on the issue of parity of representation. The
background and origin of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardhy might have
influenced himself to accept the parity of representation. His forefather
migrated from Iran to West Punjab, then to Midnapur in Bengal. His
father was Justice Sir Zahid Suhrawardhy, Judge of Calcutta High Court.
He was the leader of Muslim Bengal. His rise to political stature was by
the support of the Muslim Bengali voters. He could not speak Bengali,
although at a later stage he tried to learn Bengali. He was the Chief
Minister of undivided Bengal during 1943-1945, Law Minister in
Muhammad Ali Bogra‟s cabinet in Federal Government in Pakistan
during 1954- 1955. He was the Prime Minister of Pakistan for thirteen
months during 1956-1957.
On 10 May 1955 the Federal Court authenticated the Constituent
Convention as Constituent Assembly and confirmed that the Governor
General had the power to summon new Assembly. Chaudhury
Mohmmad Ali became the Prime Minister in August 1955 with the
support of the United Front led by A K Fazlul Huq. The framing of a
constitution already in progress by the cabinet of Mohammd Ali Bogra
continued by the coalition government of Chaudhury Mohammed Ali.
Sher-e-Bangla A K Fazlul Haque, leader
of the United Front and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardhy, leader of the

opposition, assisted the Prime Minister, Chaudhury Mohammad Ali.
On 07 July 1955, the sitting of the inaugural session of the second
Constituent Assembly opened at Murree a summer hill resort 50 km
from Rawalpindhi. Only after a few days this venue was shifted to
Karachi. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy envisaged the idea of the
unification of West Pakistan comprising Punjab, Sind, NWFP and
Baluchistan to One Unit and the Constituent Assembly passed the Bill
on 30 September 1955. The Bill was hailed as a measure of
administrative rationalization and placed East and West Pakistan on
equal footing. As Bengal accepted the parity of representation, there was
little hurdle to pass One Unit Bill of West Pakistan. Ultimately this issue
of One Unit led to the downfall of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy‟s
cabinet.
The second Constituent Assembly in a record time of seven months,
on 08 January 1956 presented a draft constitution to the nation and it was
adopted on 29 February 1956. It was implemented on 23 March 1956
proclaiming Pakistan as Islamic Republic. The constitution of 1956
consisted of thirteen parts, covering 234 articles and six schedules. The
unicameral legislature called National Assembly consisted of three
hundred members to be elected on the basis of parity between East and
West Pakistan. The constitution provided for strong centre with
maximum autonomy to the provinces ensuring national integrity and
solidarity.
Awami League in East Pakistan voiced for outright condemnation
of the draft and demanded that it should be scraped. The election
manifesto of the United Front in 1954 proposed to confer three subjects
to the centre: defense, currency and foreign affairs. The chief of Awami
League in East Pakistan Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, in a
public meeting threatened for secession as the constitution so framed
became the tools for exploitation of the resources of East Pakistan. The
second Constituent Assembly utilized the base work of the first
Constituent Assembly. The constitution finally emerged as a poor
product based on multiple compromises and much of expediency rather
than sound principles. There was parity in representation between East
and West Pakistan,
52 Mukti Bahini Wins Victory’
but there was no pronouncement to guarantee parity in appointments,

jobs, defense service, business, trade, economic development, military
and bureaucratic executive powers, political influence and of no fair
shares for the East Pakistanis in any field.
The major sources of income under 1956 constitution were
assigned to the centre. The centre was given power to levy custom
duties, export duties, excise duties, corporation tax, taxes on income,
succession duties, taxes on capital values of assets, taxes on goods or
passengers and taxes on mineral oil and gas. The principal source of
income for the provinces was taxes on agricultural income and from
land revenue. The provinces particularly East Pakistan, was left without
adequate source for their income generation.
The executive authority of the federation in the 1956 constitution
was completely vested in the President. The President could summon,
prorogue and dissolve the National Assembly on the advice of Jhe Prime
Minister. The constitution of 1956 also dealt with Judiciary and
Fundamental Rights.
Sher-e-Bangla A K Fazlul Huq, a genius in the field of politics and
parliamentary affairs who took leading role in the constitution making of
1956 predicted “you can no more expect the representation of institution
to flourish in their proper form in India that you can expect hot-house
flowers to blossom in the icy cold of the north.” The politicians in
Pakistan should have taken the note of the sayings of British statesman
Lord Arthur James Balfour that Westminster type of parliamentary
institution was the most difficult institution in the world to manage
properly. The spirit of parliamentary system is based on tolerance,
understanding, justice and so forth. The constitution of 1956 had
provided Federal form of government, but it was federal only in theory.
In practice centre controlled and dominated provincial politics, finance
and administration.
Iskander Mirza became the President of Pakistan in March 1956
at the promulgation of the constitution. The President Iskender Mirza
also alike Governor General Ghulam Mohammad was a despot, not
content as a mere constitutional figurehead as in Westminster type of
democracy. He exercised his rule through intrigues and maneuvering.
During 30 months of Iskander Mirza‟s tenure as President four Prime
Ministers: Chaudhury Mohammad Ali, Huseyn Shaheed
Suhrawardhy, I I Chundigar and Malik Feroz Khan Noon
fell like pins. Iskander Mirza knew that in the event of general election,
scheduled to be held in the spring of 1959, party positions in the next
parliament would change in a manner through which he could not be re-
elected as President. Noon - Suhrawardy coalition would win in the
general election. Noon would have become the President and
Suhrawardy would become the Prime Minister. Pakistan would emerge
like a solid rock united homeland for the Muslims of Indian
Subcontinent. He, therefore, in collusion with Ayub decided to abrogate
the constitution, dissolve cabinets and National Assembly, abolish
political parties and impose martial law. This was done on the evening
of 07 October 1958 when General Mohammad Ayub Khan became the
Prime Minister.
Chaudhury Mohammad Ali former Prime Minister during 1955- 56
and the architect of 1956 constitution during his interview with the
Constitution Commission stated that Iskander Mirza deliberately
orchestrated political environment to abrogate constitution to establish
life long dictatorship and at a suitable time even a kingship whereas he
was oath bound to protect and defend the constitution. In February 1958,
F M Khan the Chief Election Commissioner, a friend of Iskander Mirza,
during conversation at a private function denigrated the election as „this
farce of counting sheep and goats‟. Prime Minister Feroz khan Noon
being reported by intelligent bureau drew the attention of the President
Iskander Mirza to such derogatory remarks; on that issue the silence of
the President indicated patronization of such un-constitutional
behaviour. Iskander Mirza was commissioned in British Indian army in
1920. On his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel he joined
Indian Political Service and he had the arrogance and temperament of
the member of that service.
He was popularly known as the descendent of Mir Zafar Ali Khan
Commander-in-Chief of Bengal army, who had betrayed the last
independent ruler of Bengal Nawab Siraj-ud-Dawla in the battle of
Plassey on 23 June 1757. Next day Clive met Mir Zafar on 24 June 1757
mornings at Daudpur and saluted him as Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Bihar
and Orissa. Mir Zafar took possession of capital on 25 June 1757. Clive
entered the city on 29 June 1757 to witness the installation of Mir Zafar
as Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Bihar and
Orissa. He was later to remark about Murshidabad, “ as extensive,

populous and rich as the city of London”. At his installation Mir Zafar
hesitated at the foot of the dais, Clive promptly took him by arms and
led him up to the throne. Forced by the British, Mir Zafar abdicated in
favour of Mir Qasim on 22 October 1760. Mir Qasim, new Nawab
Nazim of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, when tried to wield power, shake
up administration and Army in order to lessen the British influence, Mir
Zafar again joined hands with British and accepted the post of Nawab
Nazim of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa on 04 July, 1763. Mir Qasim was
defeated by the combined forces of Mir Zafar and Clive and fled to
Oudh. En route Mir Qasim killed Seth brothers and English prisoners in
Patna. Mir Zafar was once again invested as Nawab Nazim of Bengal,
Bihar and Orissa on 24 March 1763. Mir Qasim with the support of the
ruler of Oudh and Shah Alam, Emperor of India planned in an effort to
drive out the British. British forces of 900 European, 5000 sepoys and
900 Indian cavalry faced 40,000 Indian forces, with some European
officers and artillery at Buxer on October 25, 1764. That was an
extremely bloody battle, which went on all day, ended in the defeat of
the Indian Army.
By 1765, Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa lost all control
over the military and the treasury except judiciary. British never
believed in treaties but the force. British made several treaties with
Nawab and all were broken at will. Englishmen are the most
treacherous people in the World; they extended their empire by intrigue
and treachery in India and in other parts of the world. As per the Divine
principle, treacherous race becomes extinct from the earth may be the
actions of some good Englishmen protected the race. By treaty Nawab
allowed annual stipend of rupees 54 lakhs, subsequently it was reduced
to rupees 16 lakhs, 19 gun salutes and Royal title His Highness. Syed
Mansur Ali Khan at the age 8, on 19 December 1838 was installed as
last Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa who was the last entitled
19 gun salutes and Royal title His highness. 19 gun salutes and Royal
title His Highness was stripped off by British when his illegitimate son
Ali Kader Hasan bom to Abyssinian girl Hasina was installed as Nawab
Bahadur instead of Nawab Nazim. Abyssinian eunuch used to guard the
harem and Abyssinian girl used to serve as maidservant in Royal court.

Syed Munsur Ali Khan‟s sexual appetite was Herculean by any standard.
He was a sexual athlete. He had four wives including two Europeans and
number of concubines had hundred children, but most of them died at
infant. Legitimate son Khurshid Kader was deprived of the post of
Nawab Nazim. Syed Fateh Ali Mirza son of Khurshid Kader Mirza
married Dilshad Begum; a Persian girl who lived at Bombay. Dilshad
Begum while staying at Bombay with her parents gave birth to Iskander
Mirza on 13 November 1899. Fateh Ali Mirza fell into the ways of his
grand father. The Nawab Mirza was enticed back to Murshidabad by the
Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad. Dilshad with her son Iskander Mirza
was exiled to Bombay to avoid unhealthy environment of Murshidabad.
Iskander Mirza obtained his undergraduate degree from Elphinstone
College Bombay in 1918 and was the first Indian to graduate from the
Sandhurst military college at Camberly, England in 1920 with a kings
Commission. Iskander Mirza was posted to the Second Battalion Scottish
Rifles, but ultimately the authority cancelled the posting order for fear of
insubordination by British soldiers in the Army. After careful
deliberation by British authority he was attached to Scottish Rifles for
one year as part of training. After successfully completing his year‟s
sojourn with a British regiment, he joined his own regiment: The 17
Poona Horse (Queen Victoria‟s own) at Jhashi. On 24 November 1922,
Iskander Mirza married Rifaat Shiraz, daughter of Mirza Muhammad,
whose wealthy family had vast real estate holdings in Shiraz, Iran. The
family had shipping company at Bombay named Mughal Lines having
15 ships. Iskander Mirza had six children from Rifaat Begum. Having
reached the rank of Colonel, he resigned his commission in August 1926,
and joined the Indian Political Service (drawn half from the Indian civil
service and half from the Indian Army). From 1930 to 1945, Iskandar
Mirza served with the Englishmen in various capacities: Assistant
Commissioner, Bannu, and Nowshera (1930 to 1933), Deputy
Commissioner, Hazra (1933 to 1936), Political agent, Khyber (1938 to
1940), Deputy Commissioner, Peshwar and Political agent, Mohmands
(1940 to 1945). In May 1945 Iskander Mirza was posted as first political
agent at Orissa. In April 1946, Iskander Mirza was posted as joint
secretary in the Ministry of Defense in Delhi. Sir
Ambrose Dundas, the secretary of defense, sent Iskander Mirza to set

up a new ministry of defense in Karachi. Iskander Mirza was true to one
wife, in the accepted sense, for over thirty years. But he was destined to
follow the path of his ancestors. In 1953, he married Nahid Afkhamy, the
wife of Iran‟s military attache at their embassy at Karachi. He became
the Governor of East Pakistan on 30 May 1954 till he joined as cabinet
minister as Minister of Interior, states a- nd Frontier Regions on 24
October 1954. He became Governor Gieneral of Pakistan on 06 October
1955. The inauguration of Uikander Mirza as President of Pakistan took
place on 28 March. 1956.
Iskander Mirza was the decendent of Mir Zafar. So some
commented that his betrayal to the cause of a democratic Pakistan was
imbedded genetically in his blood for generation. Through his acts
democracy was finally uprooted from the soil of Pakistan.
On 08 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza while presiding
over a meeting attended by General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Chief
Justice Mohammad Munir, Air Marshal Mohammad Asgar Khan and
the members of General Mohammad Ayub Khan‟s cabinet, the Chief
Justice Mohammad Munir was asked by General Mohammad Ayub
Khan as to how he should go about getting a new constitution approved
by the people. Justice Munir‟s reply was both original and astonishing.
He proposed that it was a simple matter. In olden times in the Greek
states, he said, constitution was approved by „public acclaim‟ and this
should be done in Pakistan as well. General Ayub asked as to what was
meant by „public acclaim‟ to which Justice Munir replied that a draft of
the constitution, when prepared, should be published in national
newspapers. This was to be followed by General Mohammad Ayub
Khan addressing public meetings at Nishtar Park in Karachi, Paltan
Maidan in Dhaka, Mochi Gate in Lahore and Chowk Yadgar in
Peshawar at which the draft of the constitution that had been published
in the newspapers a few days earlier would be presented for seeking
public‟s approval. The answer of the people, the Chief Justice said,
would definitely be in the affirmative. This was according to him
approval by „public acclaim‟. Justice Mohammad Munir was so much
frustrated by the
t
abrogation of 1956 constitution framed by nine years of hard labour;

and conduct of civil-military bureaucracy that he had no choice but to
advice on the parody of constitution.
On 17 February 1960 President Mohammad Ayub Khan appointed
a Constitution Commission headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice
Mohammad Shahabuddin as its chairman to examine the causes of
failure of parliamentary government in Pakistan. The Commission
pointed out that as Head of State it was the supreme duty on the part of
Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza to be faithful and loyal to the
constitution, but they seemed to have failed in discharging their highest
obligation in impartial manner as expected from a constitutional Head
in a parliamentary system. It further pointed out that Ghulam
Mohammad and Iskander Mirza actively contributed to the breaking up
of the solidarity in parties - a course that was undignified and
unbecoming of any Head of the State in a parliamentary system. It was
mentioned by Air Marshal Mohammad Asgar Khan in his book
„General in Politics‟ that Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza, in
all their actions, had the tacit support of General Mohammad Ayub
Khan, Commander-in- Chief of Pakistan army since 1951.
President Field Marshal General Mohammad Ayub Khan ruled
Pakistan since the imposition of martial law on 27 October 1958 to
01 March 1960 without any constitution. Ayub like Iskander Mirza

used to consider the illiterate people of Pakistan as sheep and goats to
justify the introduction of Basic Democracy. Minister for External
Affairs, Manzur Quadir, an eminent lawyer from Lahore and the
chairman of the Committee, drafted the constitution of 1962 known as
Basic Democracy. The constitution of 1962 a form of „controlled
democracy‟ was authenticated by a presidential decree on 01 March
1962 and was announced in a broadcast by the President himself on
the same day. It was in the same ancient Greek line as Chief Justice
Mohammad Munir advised General Ayub just after the abrogation of
1956 constitution in a conference. The public rejection of the
constitution was instantaneous and unanimous. It was seen as an
elaborate desjgn to perpetuate one-man rule in the country. The
I lj
.*
4j
*
58 Mukti Bahini Wins Victor)’
constitution of 1962 contained 250 Articles divided into twelve parts

and three schedules. Its main features were the Presidential form of
government, President to be elected by Electoral College formed by
the members of electoral units of 80,000 basic democrats equally
distributed between the two provinces.
The constitutional plan of General Ayub was discussed and
adopted at the Governor‟s conference in Karachi on 01 May 1959. A
detailed programe of action to members of Electoral College, to create
“Basic Democracies” (BDs) was approved by the Governor‟s
conference in Nathiagali on 12-13 June 1959. 80,000 BDs equally
shared between East and West Pakistan would be elected on the basis
of universal adult franchise and would act as an electoral college for
the presidential election and the election to the parliament. The
election of the Basic Democrats was held in January 1960.
General Ayub wanted to obtain a vote of confidence from the
newly- elected BDs, who formed the Electoral College for a mandate
but only with the Question of „yes‟ vote. Manzur Quadir formulated a
question: “Do you have confidence in the President Field Marshal
Muhammad Ayub Khan, Hilal-i-Pakistan, and Hilal-i- Jurat?”
This Question was finally put to the members of the Electoral College
on 15 February 1960 as a referendum and 75,283 of them,
representing 95.6 per cent of BDs, gave their verdict in affirmation.
Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan was sworn in as the first
elected President of Pakistan on 17 February 1960. At a later date
members of National Assembly were elected by BDs on restricted
franchise for 150 seats, 75 from each province. Six seats were reserved
for women, three for East and three for West Pakistan. The
constitution of 1962 enacted by Field Marshal Ayub rejecting the
suggestion of Constitution Commission provided a constitutional
dictatorship of the President for Pakistan.
Ayub‟s tenure as President was due to expire on 25 March 1965
and that of BDs in January 1965. The election of Basic Democrats
were held and ended on 19 November 1964 with both parties-
combined opposition party (COP) and Muslim League supporters of
Ayub claiming overwhelming victory. Miss Fatema Jinnah, sister of
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the Presidential candidate
of COP. The charisma of Miss Jinnah had demolished the ruling
party. The train in which Miss Jinnah traveled in East Pakistan was
named as Freedom Train. Ayub lacked the charisma of Miss Jinnah and
he had no experience of public speaking. The public opinion was in
favour of Miss Jinnah. It was rumored that Ayub was packing his bags
for leaving the country. The polling took place on 02 January 1965 in
peaceful environment. It was easy to control 80,000 BDs. The
government set out to buy as many of elected BDs as possible, while
blaming the COP for disturbing peace. The election result showed that
out of 80,000 members of the Electoral College 49,951 voted for Ayub
and 28,691 for Miss Jinnah. Though Ayub had won the election but he
was completely shaken as he had come close to defeat and his
constitutional reforms had been so comprehensively rejected by the
people in general. The National Assembly elections by BDs for 150
seats were held on 21 March 1965. Ayub was sworn in as President of
Pakistan for a five-year term on 23 March 1965.
The destiny of the people of East Pakistan under restricted
franchise by the West Pakistani ruling elite could not be allowed to
perpetuate indefinitely. Under Ayub‟s perpetual rule the famous 22
families emerged, all belonging to West Pakistan controlling 90 percent
of banking, insurance and industries and 70 percent of the total
industrial wealth of the country. All money transactions in East Pakistan
could move in a matter of seconds to West Pakistan. In 1949-50 per
capita income in West Pakistan was 18 per cent higher than that of East
Pakistan; it was 31 per cent higher in 1959-60, and 75 per cent higher in
1967-68. The income gap quadrupled in percentage terms during 20
years of autocratic rule of Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55), Iskader
Mirza (1955-58) and Ayub (1958- 69). During Ayub‟s autocratic rule
over ten years from 1958-69, the annual rate of growth of income in
West Pakistan was 6.2 per cent, while it was only 4.2 per cent in East
Pakistan. In 1949-50 the GDP of East Pakistan was Rsl23.60 billions
against Rs 121.06 billions for West Pakistan, while in 1967-68 GDP for
East Pakistan was Rs202.35 billions against Rs 286.52 billions for West
Pakistan. The economic disparity widened many times in absolute terms
under perpetual autocratic rule.
Under these circumstances Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appeared in
the scene with his six points programme to challenge the perpetual
exploitation of the resources of East by the West. This six-point

formula created violent impact in the minds of the ruling elite and
shattered the politics of Pakistan. On 23 March 1966, Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman placed his six-point formula before the Lahore Conference
attended by leaders of various political parties. It was a bombshell to
Pakistan ruling elite. The six points formula presented in Lahore
Conference were:
Pointl : The Constitution should provide for a Federation of
Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of Lahore Resolution and
parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of legislature
directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. The
representation in the Federal legislature shall be on the basis of
population.
Point 2 : Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects,
viz: Defense and foreign affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall
be vested in the Federating States.
Point 3 : Either of the two following measures should be adopted
with regard to currency:
A. Two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two
wings may be introduced, or
B. One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this
case, effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop
flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking
Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy
to be adopted for East Pakistan.
Point 4 : Power of taxation and revenue collection shall be
vested in the federating units and the Federal Centre shall have no such
power. The Federation shall have a share in the state taxes for meeting
their required expenditure. The consolidated Federal fund shall come
out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes.
Point 5 :
There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange
earning of two wings;
(1) Earning of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East
Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the
control of West Pakistan Government;
(2) Foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government
shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be
fixed;
(3) Indigenous products shall move free of duty between two
wings;
(4) The Constitution shall empower the unit Governments to
establish trade and commercial relation and to set up trade
missions in and enter into agreements with foreign countries.
Point 6 : A militia or Para-military force shall be set up for East
Pakistan.
The charges of secession of East Pakistan in Agartala Conspiracy
case against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman including other 34 accused
persons were framed and trial under a special tribunal started on 19 June
1968 at Dhaka Cantonment to humiliate and crush initiators of six point
formula. But it bounced back. Agartala Conspiracy case made Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman the unparallel leader and the hero of the 75 millions
Bengalis. It would be seen in subsequent years that elements like
autonomy, election on universal adult franchise on population basis;
fiscal and monetary policies of six point formula set the minds of
Pakistani ruling elite to undo the injustice to East Pakistan while
framing the Legal Framework Order (L.F.O). Pakistani ruling elite,
particularly President Yahya realized the extent of injustice to Bengalis
through the interpretation of six points.
Political upheaval in the winter of 1969-70 brought down the
popularity of Ayub to the lowest ebb. He was compelled to withdraw the
infamous Agartala conspiracy case. He called for a Round Table
Conference (RTC) of leaders of all political parties at Rawalpindi to
reach a workable solution to run the country. Ayub arranged secret deal
with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman through Haroon brothers, member of 22
industrialist families of Pakistan to share power. In the deal Ayub
proposed to remain the President and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was to be
made the Prime Minister in a parliamentary system, six
points were assured to be suitably accommodated in Ayub‟s 1962

constitution.
Major General Peerzada leaked out the secrecy of the proposal of
the President to Bhutto. Ayub sacked Peerzada and Bhutto in 1966 and
during the next years they formed good partnership. Bhutto and
Peerzada with the General in GHQ foiled this attempt of President
Ayub. President Ayub called the conference of the Generals of GHQ and
requested to impose martial law to sail the government administration.
General Yahya took President Ayub to a separate room for intimate
parleys where Yahya offered Ayub some preconditions such as to
impose martial law etc. The most serious amongst his proposals was the
abrogation of 1962 constitution. This would actually mean that General
Yahya would exercise absolute power. President Ayub realizing that
earth under his feet had gone quietly asked General Yahya to take over.
General Yahya took over as President of Pakistan on 25 March 1969,
and imposed Martial Law, abrogated 1962 constitution and dissolved
parliaments both national and provincial.
President Yahya pledged to transfer power to the elected
representatives of the people.
He had held several parleys with the leaders of all political parties
and worked out a plan known as Legal Framework Order (L.F.O). L.F.O
had five fundamental principles of the constitution. L.F.O was not the
constitution, but just a modus operandi for electing a National
Assembly- the first task of which would be to frame a constitution of
Pakistan. L.F.O embodied two very important issues: firstly, the
question of „one unit‟ in West Pakistan, secondly, the issue of „one man,
one vote‟ versus parity. The third issue was regarding the relationship
between the centre and the federating provinces to be decided by the
newly elected National Assembly. President Yahya conceded to all the
demands put forward by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman including
constitutional matters to be decided by single majority. Lieutenant
General Abdul Hamid Khan and Air Marshal Noor Khan of the „inner
cabinet‟ of President Yahya vehemently opposed this particular point of
single majority. They wanted two-third or 60 percent vote for resolving
any constitutional issue. The provision of „60 percent clause‟ was raised
at the last moment. At the eleventh hour in the cabinet meeting; by most
skilful
maneuvering, President Yahya dropped the clause from the plan. It was
the real concession to Bengalis. President Yahya showed great
magnanimity towards Bengalis while making the L.F.O. The L.F.O was
published on 31 March 1970. The elections of National Assembly and
Provincial Assembly were held on 07 December 1970.
Awami League obtained absolute majority in National Assembly.
Bhutto and military Junta frustrated the hopes and aspiration of the
people of both East and West Pakistan by not allowing the National
Assembly to sit and frame the constitution of Pakistan. This act
ultimately reduced the country to the truncated Pakistan that our
forefathers established through unending struggle and blood bath of
about two hundred years.
Agartala Conspiracy Case

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was put behind the bar for 13 years out of
23 years of united Pakistan. Ayub Khan also imprisoned Husyen
Shaheed Suhrawardy co-founder of Pakistan, as he was the
mouthpiece and champion of democracy and wanted to preserve the
integrity of Pakistan. First Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liakot Ali
Khan was assassinated in Rawalpindi. Even father of the nation
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was slow poisoned. While he
was recuperating in Ziarat, a hill station forty miles away and several
thousands feet above Quetta, Liakot Ali Khan visited him just to see
him how long he would survive. Jinnah told this to his sister Miss
Fatima Jinnah. Jinnah traveled from Ziarat by a big Humber car to
Quetta accompanied by his sister Miss Fatima, Lieutenant Colonel j
Ilahi Bakhsh, AMC and a nurse. He stayed in Quetta from 28
October to 11 September. He was flown from Quetta to Mauripur
airport; Karachi on 11 September at 2 p.m. The ambulance that
carried him broke down near a crowded refugee settlement as they
waited for another ambulance. Every minute was an eternity of
agony. Sixty minutes had passed before another ambulance arrived.
There was no breeze and the humid heat was oppressive and scorching
sunray was falling on his face. To add to his discomfort, scores of flies
buzzed around his face and he did not have the strength to brush them
away.
Sister Dunhum found a piece of cardboard and fanned Jinnah s

face to keep the flies away and protect him from the sun. There was
none to receive him at Mauripur airport and Sister Dunhum was still
protecting him from sun by cardboard and no high official visited him
till his death. The ambulance took him to Government House where he
breathed his last at 10.20 p.m on September 11, 1948. Pakistanis never
knew how to respect their national heroes. They behaved like hungry
beggars and their thirst could never be fulfilled. Autocratic
Government during the entire period of united Pakistan did not do
anything to consolidate national unity and national solidarity. The
comments and forecast of Husyen Shaheed Suhrawardy can be cited
regarding a possible mass upheaval in East Pakistan, as an outcome of
the gross injustice done to the Bengalis.
“Public political life to day is at a standstill in Pakistan. There is
apprehension of mass upheaval in East Pakistan. By all accounts there
is general political stagnation and the question remains how it can be
ended. The general theory is that when constitutional avenues are
blocked, people find a way to adopt un-constitutional measures- in
short, a revolution. Whether such a revolution is possible in view of
the tremendous disparity between the armed forces and the people is
doubtful. One contingency which we were probably approaching was
the mass upheaval in East Pakistan against West Pakistan which would
have included the army, the West Pakistani industrialist and even the
non-Bengali refugee element. This would have led to bloody riots and
murders and would have been based on sheer hatred. I have succeeded
in stemming this, but we have yet to see if it is entirely extinguished. If
not, desperation may once light the smouldering fires and destroy me
in the process as well.”
In 1962 political change started to evolve among conscious
nationalist Bengalis for the prevailing situation. Ordinary citizens had no
voting right. Only 80 thousand Basic Democrats had voting rights.
Therefore the rights of Bengalis could not be achieved through
democratic means. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy was their hope. He was
placed under the bar in Karachi jail. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was
seeking alternative means for achieving the rights of Bengalis. He had a
conviction that Military regime could not be uprooted through
democratic means. So he adopted the footprint of
Netaji Subash Chandra Bose. He started to incline towards armed

revolution. In 1962, he established Bengal Liberation Force under the
leadership of Lieutenant Commander Moazzem Hossain with some army
officers and soldiers, airmen and seamen. He needed foreign assistance
and foothold in foreign soil. So he established contact with India. Ruhul
Quddus csp, Ahmed Fazlur Rahman csp and Moazzem Hussein
Choudhury owner of tea estate in Sylhet were associated with this secret
plan. They established contact with Indian Embassy in Dhaka. On
receiving green signal from Indian High Commission, Sheikh Mujib
would proceed to Agartala to be received there by Moazzem Hussein.
Ruhul Quddus gave the green signal. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman boarded
the Sylhet bound train at Tongi Railway Station. He got down at
Kulawara railway Station and reached Agartala on foot. But Mozzam
Hussein could not establish proper negotiation. Agartala Mission was not
successful. Indian Authority did not permit to continue movement from
the soil of India.
Sree Shachindra Lai Singh Former Chief Minister of Tripura gave
the following written statement to writer Md. Mofidul Haq in 1996 at
Delhi.
“In 1963, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with 10 persons accompanied by
my brother Sree Umesh Lai Singh entered Tripura through Khoye
subdivision of Palan District of Tripura and reached my Banglow at
midnight. After preliminary discussion Sheikh Shaheb stayed in the
house of my sister Hemangani Debi at a distance of one and half mile
from my residence. Then as per the proposal of Mujib Bhai, 1 went to
see Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Sree Sree Ramdy, chief
secretary accompanied me, who waited in the room of Foreign Secretary
Sree Vandaria and I met the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Pandit
Nehru did not agree with the proposal of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as he
did not like to take the risk after the invasion of India by China in 1962.
After stay of 15 days Mujib Bhai left Agartala. All assistance was
ensured to Sheikh Mujibr Rahman when time will be ripe.”
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned from the unsuccessful trip.
Sheikh Mujib entered his 32 Dhanmondi house from the back door;, he
was socked in rain, while police entered from the front door. He
took the fresh bath with hot water and then encountered the police.
Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Bangabandhu, disclosed this to me (author).
This trip to Agartala by Bangabadhu and his associates was the first
and the last. One positive outcame of his visit was that he knocked the
Indian door, sounded the Indian Leaders, and got positive assurance for
future favourable response. Later Indira Gandhi, daughter of Pundit
Jawaharlal Nehru won the election in 11 March 1971, who would
subsequently render all out assistance to the Bengalis. Later on Bengali
Officers, Leaders, Seamen and Airmen had several meetings in Karachi
for secession of East Pakistan. Lieutenant Commander Moazzem
Hossain contracted Indian High Commissioner at Dhaka without any
tangible result. Pakistan Secret Service, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI)
fabricated Agartala conspiracy case without sufficient evidence. Coining
Karachi conspiracy case or Pindi conspiracy case would have been more
appropriate, instead of Agartala Conspiracy. The name of Agartala
conspiracy case was given to defame and humiliate Bangabandhu and
his associates in the eyes of Pakistanis. Pakistanis considered India as
their enemy and whoever is aligned with India is considered to be a
traitor. Pakistanis used India xenophobia to humiliate Bengalis.
The conspiracy was in the nascent stage and could be called
drawing room talks and there was no seriousness in it. There was no
preparation for staging armed attack. Bangladesh Liberation Force had
no organization, manpower, arms, weapons, ammunition, and money for
implementing their plan. As Ayub‟s popularity in both the wings of
Pakistan particularly after the signing of Tashkent declaration was
falling, Ayub needed some booster to regain his popularity. Blaming
East Pakistanis would be Ayub‟s best weapon to hoodwink West
Pakistanis to regain his image. During the entire period of conspiracy
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was in custody in the prison.
Initially Lieutenant Commander Moazzem Hussein was the number one
accused. At the last stage Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was implicated as
number one accused to implement Ayub‟s heinous objective.
On 21 April 1968, by virtue of President Criminal Law Amendment

(Special Tribunal) 1968 (ordinance number 5-1968), trial of Accused of
Agartala conspiracy case was arranged under Special Tribunal. The court
was constituted under the leadership of retired justice S A Rahman of
Pakistan Supreme Court with Justice Mujibur Rahman Khan, and Justice
Maksudul Hakim. The trial of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other accused
started at Kurmitala Cantonment on 20 June 1968 and ended on 30
November 1968. There was political agitation all over Pakistan. Ayub
was compelled to withdraw Agartala Conspiracy Case on 21 February
1969. The popularity of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman skyrocketed and
became undisputed leader of East Pakistan that helped him to win 1970
National Assembly Election-a big bargaining stake.
Cyclone of 12 November 1970

The most colossal and devastating tidal wave accompanied by cyclone
storm that caused the highest casualty in the history of Bengal on 12
November 1970. Barguna, Khepupara, Patuakhali, Chittagong, Char
Burhanuddin, Char Tamizuddin, Maijdi, Haringhata were devastated. It
caused heavy loss of lives and damage to crops, livestock, marine crafts,
houses and property. Death toll was more than a million. The height of
the tidal wave was 10.6 meter equivalent to three-storied building and the
speed of the hurricane was 222 km/hr.
I was at Quetta at that time. In subsequent days I heard the news.
The West Pakistanis were unmoved by hearing the deadly calamity. They
commented that flood and cyclone were the daily affairs of East Pakistan.
East Pakistan means flood and cyclone. They expressed no sympathy.
That very night Yahya Khan was in Beijing having dinner, whisky
and merry making in the house of ambassador, Mr. K. M Kaiser. Next
morning on 13 Novemberl970, Pakistan Foreign Secretary Mr. Sultan
Mahummud Khan received the news of devastating cyclone of East
Pakistan. Foreign Secretary Mr. Sultan Mahummud Khan donning a
costly Kashmiri woolen overcoat approached Yahya Khan who along
with his entourage was sitting in winter sun on the lawn of state
guesthouse. Yahya Khan drawing the
attention of his entourages told that this Sultan was looking like pansy
in brown colour overcoat. Mr. Sultan Mahammud Khan told the
President, “ Sir, very bad news. Thousands of people have been killed
by Cyclone in East Pakistan.”
“ Ho, Is it?” Yahya Khan replied.
Yahya Khan kept silent for a moment and laughed loudly and told,
“ You know, just now I was telling them that you are looking like
pansy in over coat.”
Again laughter. Bengali First Secretary Khurshid Hamid was the
witness to Yahya‟s devilish laughter.
It was the shameful moment in the history of the country. It was
ever great naked expression of neglect to the cyclone affected millions
countrymen. It was an unpardonable insult to the memories of millions
who were carried away with the forces of tidal wave. That was a natural
calamity, no fault of million victims.
Mr. Farruq Ahmed Chowdhury, a Bengali diplomat of Presidential
entourage listened the conversation of two Pakistani journalists.
First journalist: What did President do in case of such calamity in
West Pakistan? To day he would rush to his country.
Second journalist: This type of cyclone does not take place in West
Pakistan.
PIA plane touched down at Dhaka airport on 16 November 1970.
At the plane doorstep, Mr. Farruq Ahmed Chowdhury met Mr.
Anisuzzaman, Relief Commissioner of East Pakistan.
“Tell me the situation,” asked grieved Mr. Farruq Ahmed
Chowdhury to Mr. Anisuzzaman. . .
“ It seems it was a doom‟s day. I have flown over the cyclone
affected areas several times. Only dead, floating dead, piled up dead,
complete doom‟s day,” replied Mr. Anisuzzaman.
Mr. Anisuzzaman also described there is no helicopter, no food, no
drinking water, no clothing, and no medicine. Everyone expected that
President would take all appropriate measures on arrival at Dhaka.
Bureaucrats in the VVIP room encircled President. Governor of East
Pakistan Admiral Ahshan, Chief Secretary Mr. Shafiul Azam and a
great number of generals were present there. Mr. Farruq Ahmed
Chowdhury along with others was waiting for the outcome
of the decision whether President would stay back in Dhaka or proceed

to Karachi.
The door of the VVIP room was opened. One military officer in
uniform came out and declared an unbelievable declaration. President
would continue his journey to Karachi. President had lot of important
jobs waiting there for him. It remained as written history.
There was one helicopter in East Pakistan for the movement of
VVIP. No helicopter was dispatched from West Pakistan. Instead 8
helicopters were dispatched from Pope Air Force Base in North
Carolina, USA, half the glove from East Pakistan covering a distance of
13000 miles whereas West Pakistan could not sent helicopter from a
distance 1000 miles. The US helicopters were dismantled, put in two C-
41s and flown to Dhaka where they were assembled and flown to their
operating bases in affected areas. The press, both in Dhaka and
Washington, were asking why helicopters could not be brought in from
the places around East Pakistan, as was Senator Edward Kennedy.
On 22 November 1970 US Consulate at Dhaka sent a message
slugged “Helicopter Roundup”. Following helicopters were sent to East
Pakistan for relief operation in the calamity areas after two weeks of
devastation.
a. Ten US helicopters with crews started arriving on 23
November 1970.
b. Ten UK helicopters with crews arrived by 24 November 1970.
c. Five German helicopters with crews due on 23 November
1970.
d. Three French helicopters with crews expected to arrive on 23
November 1970.
e. No helicopter from West Pakistan.
The total numbers of helicopters that became available for disaster
relief reached thirty-eight big and small, which included later arrival
from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Soviet Union.
The British had airlifted from Singapore forty troops, one dozen
land rovers and two Sioux helicopters to be used in reconnaissance
of the disaster struck areas. The eight large UK helicopters also brought
one company of Royal Engineers, one company of Marines and
equipment such as bulldozers. US and UK troops carried out extensive
relief work. Even UK marines buried the dead whereas West Pakistani
troops failed to extend their help.
On 24 November 1970 eleven political leaders from East Pakistan
sent protest note to President for endless neglect, callousness and
suppressing the news. They included Mowlana Abdul Hamid Khan
Bhasani, Ataur Rahman Khan, Professor Muzaffor Ahmed,' Khawja
Khairuddin, Mr. Gulam Azam, Khan Sobur, ASM Solaiman, Mowlana
Siddique Ahmed, Pir Mosleuddin and Garib Newaz. No central
Minister visited East Pakistan. President arrived Dhaka on 26
November 1970 for face saving visit for a lapse of 15 days since
cyclone hit the coastal belt of East Pakistan. Pakistan High
Commissioner in Britain told blatant lies that 58 helicopters were in the
calamity areas and situation was under complete control, which was
senseless and baseless statement. Helicopters arrived only after the cry
of politicians and press reporting, which moved the conscience of the
world community.
March 1971 71
Chapter 2
MARCH 1971
PAKISTAN MILITARY AGRESSION AND
BENGALI RESISTANCE
March 1971 73
Karachi in March 1971

On 27 February 1971 I reached Karachi by train from Quetta and rested
in the house of my cousin Mr. Shamsul Islam who was serving in
central Government. On 28 February I bought a PIA ticket for Dhaka
and I was scheduled to fly on 02 March 1971. In Karachi the
atmosphere was very tense. The life and property of Bengalis were
unsafe. At Karachi I was invited to a dinner by Major Fazal Ahmed a
Punjabi officer who was my officer commanding at Sialkot. At that time
he was posted at Naval Headquarters at Karachi. At dinner he told me
that President Yahya had been remaining drunk most of the time and not
serious rather callous about the affairs of the state.
On 02 March 1971 I reported to Karachi airport along with my
relatives and friends. I was not allowed to board the aircraft and was
asked to report next day. The reasons I found were that troops of 16
Division of Pakistan Army were being ferried to East Pakistan by
passenger aircraft to crush the people who voted for the establishment
of democracy and rights of the people. I could sense that the clear
mandate Sheikh Mujib‟s Awami League won in general election was to
be frustrated under the heel of the military jackboot to perpetuate the
exploitation of the wealth of East Pakistan. The situation created by the
manifestation of their misdeeds was to be corrected by the ruthless
military force. Troops were carrying rifle and pouch ammunition only.
MV Swat and other merchant ships transported heavy equipment and
ammunition from Karachi seaport to Chittagong seaport. The use of
civil passenger aircraft or any means of transport by military is illegal as
per international law. But Pakistani rulers did not care for such law
when all of their moves aimed at perpetuating the military rule and
clinging to power by the military Junta.
The PIA authority once again asked me to report next day. Tension
was mounting in Karachi. At one stage I even thought that it was wise
to report to some army unit at Karachi for my personal safety. However,
on 04 March 1971 I was allowed to check in. Unfortunately I had some
excess luggage that I was not allowed to carry although I wanted to pay
for it. I was told that aircraft would fly via Colombo because India
banned flying of Pakistani aircraft
over her territory and as such the aircraft would carry extra fuel load for
its long journey. India did this as a reaction to the blowing up of her
aircraft at Lahore airport that was hijacked there. The plane was blown
up at the instigation of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. So I threw my excess load
at Karachi airport and boarded the aircraft with only 44 pounds. I was
the last passenger to board the aircraft.
Dhaka Airport on 04 March 1971

The PIA aircraft carrying me landed at Dhaka Airport in the afternoon
of 04 March 1971.1 was surprised and shocked to see the massive
security arrangement at Dhaka airport. I saw big sandbag bunkers with
pointed machine guns and a battery of fortified antiaircraft guns
deployed all around the runway. I also found sandbag bunkers on the
terminal building guarded by soldiers with machine guns and other
automatic weapons. Troops were guarding the airport in full battle
dress. The whole situation gave an impression that war had already
started in East Pakistan. Some panic engulfed West Pakistani soldiers
and their families were waiting to catch the next available flight to
return to West Pakistan.
Some foreigners who accompanied me from Karachi asked me
about the situation of such war like preparations. I told them that
Punjabis are a very coward race. They are afraid of the brave sons of
Bengal. They were making mouse holes to hide themselves. In 1857
during patriotic Sepoy War in India when Bengal native infantry,
Bengal cavalry and Bengal artillery were fighting in Mirrat, Barrackpur,
Bahrampur and Delhi against British to wipe them out, Punjabis, Sikhs
and Gurkhas were helping the British to continue their rule in India. In
those days there was not a single regular Punjabi and Sikh army unit in
British Indian army. Delhi and rest of India were kept liberated for six
months. British diverted their ships carrying troops, which were bound
to go to Indo China. British rulers brought more troops from the Middle
East. Patriotic Sepoy War in 1857 ended with the treachery of the
Punjabis and the Sikhs. Victoria Park later named as Bahadur Shah Park
at Dhaka Sadarghat still bears the testimony of supreme sacrifices of
unknown valiant sons of Bengal who embraced martyrdom. Bengal
troops were executed by hanging on mango trees in the present Bahadur
Shah Park. Delhi could never rule Bengal effectively even during the
Mogul empire.
March 1971 75
Here I want to mention the bravery of a son of Bengal. His name was
Issa Khan. He belonged to Bikrampur of Dhaka. The great Mogul
emperor Akbar sent his Commander-in-Chief Man Singh a Rajput
belonging to a martial race to crush Issa Khan who displayed his
complete disregard to Mogul rule. The army of Issa khan and Man Singh
were face to face for confrontation. Issa Khan sent proposal for dual
fight with Man Singh. Brave Man Singh accepted the challenge. During
the fight sword of Man Singh was broken. Immediately brave Issa Khan
offered his sword to Man Singh. Issa Khan never wanted to kill an
unarmed soldier. Man Singh embraced Issa Khan and they became
friends. The news reached Delhi. Emperor Akbar was pleased to grant
more Parganas to Issa Khan. I told the foreigner that we are that martial
race; they cannot subdue Bengalis hiding in the mouse holes and
showing us the barrels of cannon. I found Punjabi army officers in the
terminal building who were on police duty there. Army had taken
complete control of the airport. After I received my luggage, I hired a
taxi and started for Shantinagar through the airport road. I found troops
on rooftops of buildings and sand bag bunkers at different places along
the road.
Historic 7th March

I was on leave from 28 February to 11 March 1971. Instead of going to
my home village at Jessore, I was observing the development of
situation at Dhaka. After the postponement of National Assembly on 03
March 1971, all Bengalis were desperate to do something as they were
charged with the flame of anger, for the treachery of Yahya Khan,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Junta of Pakistan army. It was apprehended that
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would outline his future course
of action at a mass rally on 07 March and might declare independence of
Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman sought the support of American
Government for secession of East Pakistan, but got negative response. In
anticipation of 07 March address by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, President
Yahya addressed the nation on 06 March in an attempt to warn Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman about the consequence of unilateral declaration of
independence. Yahya in his speech warned that he would use his
absolute authority
as head of Armed Forces and head of state to ensure complete and

absolute integrity of Pakistan without any doubt or mistake.
This time well-recognized method of carrot and stick used by the
rulers would not function to acquiesce the people of Bengal. Civil
administration of East Pakistan completely collapsed. Government
offices, courts, banks etc. were functioning by the directives issued by
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Raman virtually became the ruler of
East Pakistan. While I was on leave I was fortunate to be present on the
historic 07 March 1971 at the Ramna Race Course to hear the historic
speech delivered by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. For the
first time I saw the national flag of Bangladesh hoisted on the stage.
This was a clear-cut defiance of the authority of Government of
Pakistan. The Race Course gave the look of sea of human beings. There
were more than a million people on that day in the Race Course. Many
people came with bamboo sticks in their hands shouting "Joi Bangla
and Joi Bangabandhu" slogans.
On that day I saw hundreds of foreign journalists in the race
cource. People were waiting for the arrival of Bangabandhu. Whole
crowd burst into applause when Bangabandhu appeared on the stage.
Bangabandhu climbed the wooden stair to reach the top of the stage at a
height of 15 feet. It was a great moment in the history of the people of
Bengal. The fate of Bengal would be decided on that day. It was the
bravery and leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that
would decide the destiny of the nation. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman proved himself as the bravest son of Bengal in its ever-
recorded history.
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was more than six feet tall.
He looked elegant and impressive in white pajama, Punjabi and black
sleeveless prince coat. On earth no body could match the personality of
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He had been looking as the
king of Bengal. Almighty Allah especially created him with the grace,
beauties and qualities of a leader for the oppressed Bengali race. He
was a gift from Almighty Allah for the Bengali race.
March 1971 77
I heard from a Punjabi Colonel who had interrogated Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman that he had so much of personality that no body could
dare to physically assault him during custody in connection with
Agartala conspiracy case. But unfortunately one Bengali Major (later on
Lieutenant Colonel) Mustafizur Rahman during interrogation slapped
and kicked Bangabandhu. Late on this incident was cofirmed by Dr
Kamal Hossain. After the repatriation of the said officer from Pakistan,
Bangabandhu took no revenge against him. It again showed the
magnanimity of a great man. It is an irony of fate that Mustafizur
Rahman became Minister twice in Independent Bangladesh in Gen Zia
and Begum Zia's cabinet.
When Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stood on the rostrum,
he gave the look of a towering personality and started his historic speech
with the roar of a lion. He set four preconditions before the seating of
the national assembly. These conditions were complete lifting of martial
law, return of Pakistani troops to barrack, handing of power to people's
representatives and setting up of judicial enquiry for the killing of
Bengali people. The English version of his deliberation before the
million Bengalis assembled in the Race Course on that day is
reproduced below:
My dear brothers and sisters,

I have come before you with a very heavy heart full of sorrows.
All of you know how hard we have tried our best to show our
restraint, but it is a matter of great sadness that the streets of Dhaka,
Chittagong, Khulna, Rangpur and Jessore are to day being spattered
with the blood of my brothers and the cry we hear from Bengali people
is a cry for freedom, a cry for survival, a cry for our rights.
What is our fault? People of Bengal voted for Awami League and
me in the election. The hope was that the elected representative of the
people, sitting in the national assembly, would frame constitution that
would assure the people of their economic, political and cultural
emancipation.
But it has turned out to be a sad story. To-day I tell you with pain
the painful story of past 23 years history of tyranny, history of bloodbath
of the people of Bengal, history of heart rendering cry of dying people,
history of Bengal is the history of blood stained street shed by Bengali
people.
!
‟s Historic 7
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March 1971 79
We spilled our blood in 1952, we won a mandate in 1954, but we

were still not allowed to take up the reins of this country. In 1958 Ayub
Khan clamped martial law and enslaved us for next 10 years. In 1966,
during the Six-Point movement of masses, bullets killed my sons of
Bengal.
After the downfall of Ayub, Yahya Khan took over state power
with the promise that he would restore constitutional rule and restore
democracy and return power to the people.
We accepted that. After crossing lot of hurdles, election was held. I
have met President Yahya Khan. As not only the leader of Bengal, but
also the leader of majority party in the national assembly, I requested
him to set February 15 as the day of its opening session. He did not
listen to my request. He listened to Mr. Bhutto and announced that the
assembly would be convened on the 3rd of March.
We accepted that, agreed to join the deliberations. I even went to
the extent of saying that we, despite our majority would still listen to
any sound ideas from the minority, even if it were a lone voice. I
committed myself to the support of anything to bolster the restoration of
a constitutional government.
Mr. Bhutto came to Dhaka and had a discussion with me. He left
Dhaka saying that doors for negotiation were still open. Maulana
Noorani and Maulana Mufti Mohammad were among those West
Pakistani parliamentarians who visited Dhaka and discussed with me. I
said, come, let us sit down, discuss and frame the constitution of the
country.
I made it clear that I could not agree to any deviation from the Six
Points. This is the property of the people.
But Mr. Bhutto threatened and cautioned that if any West Pakistani
Member of Parliament were to come to Dhaka, the assembly would be
turned into a slaughterhouse and he who joins would be slaughtered. He
added that if anybody were to participate in such a session, countrywide
agitation would be launched from Peshawar to Karachi and that every
business would be shut down on protest.
I said that the assembly would be convened despite the dire threats.
But suddenly, on March 1 the session was cancelled.
Mr. Yahya Khan convened the assembly as President. I said that I
would attend the session, but Mr. Bhutto said he would not attend the
session. 34 members from West Pakistan came to Dhaka to attend the
session but in spite of that session were cancelled.
Blame was put on the people of Bengal, and blame was put on me.
On the postponement of National Assembly, people made
instantaneous protest. I called for a hartal as a peaceful means of
protest. I asked my people to close mills and factories. The masses
readily took to the streets in response. They were pledge bound to
continue the struggle in peaceful means.
What have we received? We purchased arms with our own money
to protect the country against any threat by the external enemies. Today
the same weapons are being used against my poor, distressed and
unarmed people of Bengal. They are being shot at. We are the
numerically larger segment of Pakistan's population. Whenever we
Bengalis tried to go to power, they sprung on us.
I talked to Mr. Yahya over telephone. I told him, Mr. Yahya Khan,
you are the President of Pakistan, come and see, how bullets are being
fired on my poor people - people of Bengal. How the mother's lap is
being emptied, how the people are being killed, you Mr. Yahya come,
see and do justice.
He told me that I should agree to a Round Table Conference on the
10th. What is RTC? With whom I sit? Should I sit with them who have
taken the blood of my men?
On 3rd of March at Paltan, I called for non-cooperation movement
and closure of offices, courts and revenue collection. You gave me the
full support.
Then suddenly, without consulting me he met one individual for
five hours and then made a speech in which he turned all the blame on
me, laid all the faults upon the people of Bengal.
Bhutto created the deadlock, yet the Bengalis are the ones facing
the bullets! We face their guns, yet it's our fault. We are the ones being
hit by their bullets and it's still our fault!
March 1971 81
My dear brothers,
Mr. Yahya has summoned the assembly to meet on 25 March.
Bloodstains have not been dried out. I have told that Mujibur Rahman
cannot attend RTC walking over the blood of martyrs. You (Yahya)
have to accept my demands before convening the assembly. Martial law
must be withdrawn. The soldiers must return to barracks. Judicial
inquiry for the killing of my people has to be carried out. State power
has to be handed over to the people's representatives.
Only after that we can consider whether we can sit in the assembly
or otherwise. Before that we cannot sit in the assembly. Masses have not
given me that mandate.
My dear brothers,
Do you have faith on me?
Million masses raised hands and shouted yes.
I do not want to become the Prime Minister. I want the rights of the
people. Alluring the Prime Ministership before me, they failed to buy
me.
You have freed me from the so-called conspiracy case by spilling
your blood. That day right here at this racecourse, I had pledged to you
that I would pay for this blood debt with my own blood.
Do you remember?
Today I am ready to pay debt with my blood.
I want to tell in clear words that all offices, courts, criminal courts
and educational institutions in Bangladesh will remain closed for
indefinite period. No official will go to office. That is my instruction to
you.
Some systems will not observe hartal to avoid the suffering of my
poor people. Rickshaws, horse cart, train and launch will operate as
usual. The trains will operate but will not carry army troops. If the army
does not respect this, I shall not be responsible for the consequences.
The secretariat, Supreme Court, high court, judge courts and
government, semi - government offices shall remain closed.
Workers! Collect your wages on the 28th. If the salaries are

stopped, if a single bullet is fired upon us henceforth, if the murder of
my people does not cease, I call upon you to turn every home into a
fortress against their onslaught!
Use whatever you can put your hands on to counter this enemy. To
save lives every road must be blocked in case I failed to issue orders. We
will starve them to death by refusing food. We will cause them to die of
thirst by denying water.
Troops! You are my brothers, you go back to barracks, and no body
will show any hostility towards you. Just do not attempt to aim any
bullet at our hearts.
You cannot suppress seven crore people. The Bengali people have
learned how to die for a cause and you will not be able to bring them
under your yoke of tyranny!
To assist families of the martyrs and the injured, to the best of our
ability, we on behalf of Awami League will try to help. Those who can
afford, please donate some amount of money to my relief committee
fund.
Also owners of industries must give full pay to the workers who
participated in the seven days hartal or were not able to work because of
curfews.
To all my government employees what I say must be obeyed.
No taxes will be paid till my country attains freedom. No one will
pay taxes. Leave everything to me; I know how to organize a
movement.
Listen and remember that enemy has infiltrated in our ranks. They
will create civil strife and resort to looting. Hindu - Muslim, Bengali -
non-Bengali whoever is residing in Bengal is our brother. It is our
sacred duty to ensure their safety. We must not earn bad name.
Remember! Radio, television workers, no Bengali will go to radio
and television stations, if media do not report news about our
movement.
Banks may remain open for two hours daily for business
transactions but no money shall be allowed to move from East Bengal
to West Pakistan.
March 1971 83
Telegraph and telephone communication will be continued within

Bangladesh and journalists may send dispatches to the outside world.
But if there is a plan to eliminate the people of this country, Bengalis
will be cautious in their future course of action.
Set up movement committee in every neighborhood under the
leadership of Awami League. You must prepare yourselves what little
you have for struggle ahead.
Remember! We have shed blood if need be we will give more
blood, Insa Allah! People of this country shall be set free!
The fight, this time, is for freedom! The struggle, this time, is for
independence!
Be ready, we cannot afford to lose our momentum. Carry on
movement and agitation. If the movement dies down, they will ascend
upon us.
Be disciplined. No nation's movement can be victorious without
discipline. Joy Bangla (Victory to Bengal!)
Bangabandhu‟s voice of 07 March 1971 was not the ordinary one;
it was as if the Divine voice. If the Bengali nation is the name of a
dream, of a hope, of a struggle and of a success, then Sheikh Mujib is the
architect of it. Bangabandhu established cultural and political dream of
Bengalis by the establishment of Bangladesh. Bengali nationalism was a
force that was propelled by Bangabandhu and he utilized it to throw the
colonial force from the soil of Basngladesh. Yahya Junta could not
visualize the strength of Bengali nationalism.
Indirectly Bangabandhu declared independence and openly he
called upon the people to fight back the Pakistan army and liberate
Bangladesh from the clutches of enemies - the Pakistan occupation
Army. National flag of Bangladesh was hoisted on the dais of the
meeting venue. It was a clear-cut defiance of Pakistan authority, and
symbol of the birth of Bangladesh. Bangabandhu had the political
acumen that if he had openly declared independence, Yahya would get
the plea to take military action. As a matter of fact machine guns were
placed on the high rise buildings around Race Course and artillery in the
Dhaka cantonment were in firing mode and Race Course- the meeting
venue was registered for artillery bombardment. Military Junta‟s
reaction to the declaration of independence would have caused large-
scale murders and would surpass the massacre of Jalianwala Bagh.
The speech of Bangabandhu was to be broadcast on Radio Pakistan

as directed by Bangabandhu; otherwise Bengalis working in Radio
Pakistan would stop the functioning of Radio Pakistan. Pakistan
authority did not allow the speech of Bangabandhu to be broadcast on
Radio Pakistan. Radio Pakistan remained silent as the workers of radio
refused to work unless speech of Bangabandhu was broadcast. Pakistan
government was forced to broadcast the speech of Bangabandhu on the
morning program on 08 March 1971. This radio speech ignited the
flame of liberation war across East Pakistan. Men, children and women
were catapulted with the fire of the revenge and got ready to fight the
occupation army. Military Junta could not understand the meaning and
implication of the speech. It was the strategic declaration of
independence. The coining of the word „Mukti‟ meaning freedom
instead of „Shadhinata‟ meaning independence toned downed the
declaration of independence. Although in true sense it was a covert
declaration of complete independence, it was done to confuse and
hoodwink the military Junta.
Bangabandhu in his speech gave the war plan where he asked his
people to take up arms, to fight the enemy and to cut all sorts of
supplies to enemy. Major Zia, senior most officer of 8 E Bengal at
Chittagong, Major Safiullah senior most officer of 2 E Bengal at
Joydebpur, Major Khalid Musharraf senior most officer of 4 E Bengal
at Comilla, Captain Hafiz of 1 E Bengal at Jessore, Captain Ashraf of 3
E Bengal at Rangpur, Major Abu Osman of EPR at Chuadanga, police
at Rajarbagh and EPR at Pilkhana and all other Bengali fighting
elements received the message of declaration of independence and
mentally got ready at the call of Bangabandhu, to hit back only when
struck by the enemy. The declaration of independence was given at the
end of the speech so that the enemy could have no reaction time to
retaliate on the massive gathering. Virtually Bangabandhu called to start
struggle for independence. Bangabandhu called upon his people to take
up arms and fight the enemy till the ultimate victory. Bangabandhu‟s
call was conditional, that pre-emptive strike to be launched by the
enemy, so that Bengalis
March 1971 85
are not blamed as secessionists. Bangabandhu kept last hope to save the
destiny of United Pakistan within the framework of constitution.
Dhaka Cantonmemt on March 1971

Before my formal reporting to my unit 59 EME Battalion I went to
Dhaka Cantonment to see the atmosphere there. At the MP check post at
the third gate, barricade was placed, and I was stopped. On query, I was
allowed to enter the cantonment. I went to my battalion headquarters,
where I met Major Hakim, 2IC of the Battalion, Captain Rafiqul Islam
Bhuiyan adjutant, Major M Golam Mowla, Captain Ikramullah. All of
them were Bengali officers. Commanding officer of the unit was a
Punjabi who had an accident on Dhaka - Chittagong road and was
admitted in Dhaka CMH. I told them I would report the unit on 12
March 1971. In the Cantonment I went to see Major Abdul Baset an
officer of Baluch Regiment, whom I know since 1968 from Sialkot. His
wife told me that she was so much inspired and inflamed by the 07
March speech that although as a woman she had extra difficulties, she
felt like going to the battlefield to fight the foreign army.
I reported my unit at Dhaka on 12 March 1971. On the same day I
saw a farewell message sent by Lieutenant General Yakub Khan Corps
Commander, Eastern Command. In the message he sent good wishes for
all the members of Eastern Command. It was a hopeless message from a
frustrated General who wanted the political solution of the crisis through
dialogue, negotiation and understanding rather than use of military force.
On the same day I heard that Lieutenant General Tikka Khan would
address the officers of Dhaka garrison at the auditorium. I went to hear
his address. There I saw new officers who were flown from West
Pakistan. Lieutenant General Tikka Khan read out a written speech. His
pronunciation was so poor that hardly anybody present there could
understand him.
May be in his criminal mind he had been preaching for the unity of
Pakistan as he repeated the phrase "Islam is in danger" like Ayub Khan,
who also hopelessly failed. In the name of Islam the vested interest
group in West Pakistan always exploited the wealth of Bengal by
hoodwinking the pious Bengali Muslims. The traders of religion from
Bengal always joined hands with them. I was staying in Signal Officers
Mess and shared a room with a Bengali Captain
Abdul Malek Bhuiyan, an A SC officer. In the dining hall I met some

senior officers who had been flown from West Pakistan recently. I
asked them why they had come. Before they could reply one young
Bengali Lieutenant replied that this time Bengali would give them
unclean bamboo. After the liberation war I knew that this Lieutenant
was picked up and killed by the Pakistani officers.
Subedar Abdul Wahed, a radar JCO of EME crops who served
with me in Sialkot and visited me on several occasions in Quatta came
to see me in the Officers Mess at Dhaka. He brought my camp kit from
Quetta to Dhaka by ship. He went to Dhaka airport to receive me,
unfortunately due to the rescheduling of flights; he could not see me at
the airport. He briefed me about the activities of Pakistan army in
Dhaka. One day he came to tell me that a train loaded with arms and
ammunition was going to north Bengal from Dhaka. He requested me
to plan and lay ambush on that train. He was a highly patriotic Bengali.
Subeder Abdul Wahed was also lifted and killed in the month of
March. Whereas his Bengali Officer Commanding Major M G Mowla
safely reached West Pakistan and later on got his posting in safe heaven
in Saudi Arabia during liberation war and in independent Bangladesh
was promoted from Major to Major General. What a shame for
Bangladesh!
Here a few words about Lieutenant General Tikka Khan are worth
mentioning. He was a sepoy in an Artillery Regiment. He was a good
boxer. His commanding officer wanted to award him commission.
Accordingly Tikka applied for selection for commission. He was
rejected by ISSB. Tikka's commanding officer arranged the boxing
competition and in that event the chairman of ISSB was made the chief
guest.
Seeing Tikka‟s boxing chairman of ISSB was impressed.
Commanding officer of Tikka requested the chairman of ISSB to re-
consider Tikka‟s case. That is how Tikka was selected for commission
in the army. I heard this story from my commanding officer Lieutenant
Colonel Afzal Khan Raja at Sialkot. Tikka was commissioned for his
muscle and not on his intellectual merit. That is why Tikka wanted to
win over the Bengalis by force and not by love of heart.
Tikka Khan was assigned with the task to bringing Mujib to heel.
Tikka Khan was notorious as a butcher. He would not hesitate to use
March 1971 87
military force against unarmed civilians, even to any extent of brutality

to uphold the authority of the military Junta. He lacked human qualities.
He earned the name of a butcher when he employed brutal force against
a tribal rebellion in Baluchistan with success. Lieutenant General
Sahebzada Yakub Khan, an intellectual was removed who had refused to
use force to suppress the aspirations of Bengalis. He wanted a political
solution of the crisis through dialogue between the President of Pakistan
General Yahya khan and Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. On his
return to Karachi, he was demoted to the rank of Major General and
ultimately sacked from the services of Pakistan army. Afterwards, on
appeal his rank was restored and was allowed all pensioner benefits of
army. Subsequently he was twice made the Foreign Minister of Pakistan.
When Lieutenant General AAK Niazi was dismissed, he never got back
pensioner benefits and honor of his rank. Similarly Tikka was disgraced
and imprisoned with his political boss Bhutto. Bhutto only at the age of
45 was hanged disgracefully for murdering his political opponent. Nixon
the President of USA supporter of Yehya s genocide in Bangladesh had
to quit the White House disgracefully. Henry Kissenger friend of Yahya,
the then Secretary of State of the USA, and winner of Nobel Peace prize
has become the loughing stock worldwide when the crime was unearthed
and there is a demand for trial of Henry Kissenger for manslaughter in
Bangladesh.
Pakistan Military in East Pakistan

Lieutenant General Tikka Khan arrived in Dhaka on 07 March 1971. He
took over charges from Lieutenant General Yakub on the same evening.
He took over charges of three appointments: those of Governor, Martial
Law administrator and Commander of Eastern Command. Mr. Justice
BA Siddique, Chief Justice of the East Pakistan High court, refused to
administer the oath to swear Tikka as the Governor of East Pakistan.
Eventually the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan had to
rush to Dhaka to administer Tikka‟s oath. This was a clear defiance of
Military regime‟s authority by the Bengali intellectuals. After swearing
in, Tikka Khan as Governor of East Pakistan asked Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman to see him but Sheikh Mujibur Rahman agreed to see him only
if he came to his
88 Mukri Bahini Wins Victory
house. Unable to stomach this personal insult, Tikka reacted violently

against ostensible defiance on the part of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
On reporting to my duty at Dhaka Cantonment I found Eastern
Command having the following compositions:
Eastern Command
Corps Commander - Lieutenant General Tikka who replaced
Lieutenant General Sahabzada Yakub Khan Corps Headquarters
located at Dhaka.
HQ 14 Division located at Dhaka.
GOC : Major General Kadim Hossain
Raja HQ located at Dhaka.
57 Brigade located at Dhaka

Brigade Commander - Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab Khan
Units under command:
18 Punjab 32
Punjab 22 Baluch
13 Frontier Force
31 Field Regiment
13 L A A Regiment
2 East Bengal
10 East Bengal (Newly raised)
107 Brigade located at Jessore.

Brigade Commander - Brigadier Rahim Durranni
Units under command
25 Baluch
27 Baluch
22 Frontier Force
1 East Bengal
55 Field Regiment
24 Field Regiment (Bty)
140 Infantry Workshop Company EME( Author‟s location)
March 1971 89
23 Brigade located at Rangpur

Brigade Commander : Brigadier Abdullah Khan Malik
Units under command 29 cavalry 26 frontiers Force
3 East Bengal 25 Punjab
23 Field Regiment Artillery
53 Brigade located at Comilla

Brigade Commander: Brigadier Iqbal Shafi Units under
command.
4 East Bengal
3 Commando Battalion
24 Frontier Force 20 Baluch
8 East Bengal 53 Field Regiment
Squadron of Air force was located at Dhaka, and Naval base at

Chittagong.
War criminals involved in the planning and execution of operation
GENOCIDE in BANGLADESH included the following:
General Muhammad Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan arrived
East Pakistan on 15 March 1971 for overall planning and execution.
Lt General Abdul Hamid Khan Chief of Staff, Pakistan Army
accompanied President.
Major General S G M Peerzada, HQ CMLA, Rawal Pindi.
Lieutenant General Tikka Khan
Governor and Martial Law Administrator, East Pakistan & Corps
Commander Eastern Command.
Major General Khadim Hussain Raja GOC 14 Division Major

General Rao Farman Ali, Adviser to Governor Major General Iftikar
Janjua and Major General A.U. Mitha to assist the operation Genocide.
When Pakistan Army failed to consolidate their position in East

Pakistan and suffered heavy casualties Tikka was exposed to the world as
a butcher. The high command in Rawalpindi despatched Lieutenant
General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi who assumed the command of
Eastern Command on 11 April 1971 whom I met as my GOC (8
Division) in Sialkot in 1968.
After the electoral victory of Awami League in East Pakistan in
1970, General Headquarters at Rawalpindi conceived a military
operational plan to despatch additional 3 to 4 divisions of soldiers to East
Pakistan. Movement of troops started in February 1971. General
Headquarters despatched the following Generals:
Major General Rahim Khan, new GOC 14 Division
Major General Shaukat Raza GOC 9 Division Major
General Nazar Hossain Shah, GOC 16 Division.
9 Division and 16 Division were flown from Karachi and Quetta by
PIA in the month of February and March 1971 while Yahya was
continuing dialogue with Bangabandhu to buy time for final crackdown.
It is clearly evident that Bhutto, Yahya and their associates were fully
responsible for the break up of Pakistan; although Pakistani writers and
press tried to blame Bangabandhu who wanted united Pakistan along
with the legitimate rights for Bengalis. Military leadership in Pakistan
was upset after 07 December 1970 general elections and planned how to
suppress the aspiration of the people of East Pakistan. Planning for
movement of troops from West Pakistan took place in the month of
January 1971. Movement of troops started in the month of February
1971. It is clear that military leadership of Pakistan is wholly responsible
for division of Pakistan. It is an irony of fate that while Sheikh Mujib
was actively working for the creation of Pakistan, Yahya was protecting
the British Raj and Tikka was polishing the shoes of British masters as
their batman.
In the month of February and March 1971 additional 20 Infantry
battalions were despatched by PIA from West Pakistan to crush the
Bengali race. 1 was an eyewitness of such despatch of troops at
Karachi airport. It was the irony of fate that the arms, ammunition and
defense equipment were purchased by the foreign exchange
March 1971 91
earned by East Pakistan which were used to kill the people of Bengal.
The only crime of Bengalis was that they voted for democracy and
wanted to establish their legitimate rights.
Jessore Cantonment on March 1971

I was fortunate that I was posted out from Headquarters 59 EME
Battalion at Dhaka to 140 Infantry Workshop Company EME at Jessore.
Battalion Headquarters issued me the posting order on 17 March 1971
with a few days joining time. I went to my village home at Magura on
18 March 1971. My parents and relatives were delighted to see me after
about two years stay in West Pakistan. My father had a dream at that
time in which he found himself running carrying a national flag having
red patches of color. He was exhausted and reached a Hindu house. He
requested for water to drink. They brought water, but my father refused
to drink as he would not eat or drink in Hindu house. Hindus showed
that water bottle had the shadow of our Prophet Muhammad(SM). He
drank the water with satisfaction. It had the indication that during the
fight for freedom the real help would come from Allah through the
Hindus.
I recollect an important incident, which took place during my stay
at my village home. There was a secret meeting of local people at Sripur
about how to organize armed resistance in case of crack down by
Pakistan army. Mr. Akbar Hussein Mia, Chairman of our Union Council
and a local leader Mr. Nobuat Ali Mullah invited me in that meeting. I
instructed them to remain prepared to resist army action and organize
training for young people. I was moved to see enthusiasm among retired
EPR, police and Ansar personnel. On 23 March 1971 that was the
national day of Pakistan my younger brothers went to Sripur police
station and saw the national flag of Bangladesh to be hoisted in the
premises of Sripur School ceremonially instead of Pakistani Flag.
People declared independence of Bangladesh and sang national anthem
of Bangladesh “Sonar Bangla I love you” instead of national anthem of
Pakistan. People were determined not to allow the Pakistan army to go
unchallenged.
92 Mukti Bahini Wins Victory »
On 23 March 1971 I started from my village home for Jessore to

join my duty. During my journey in the bus I heard on the Calcutta
Radio that there was a clash between the 2 East Bengal Regiment
located at Jaydebpur and the West Pakistan troops. As a disciplined
soldier I could not think of remaining absent without leave. At Jessore I
got down at cross roads from where a road leads towards Jessore airport
through the Cantonment. People there particularly the rickshaw pullers
cautioned me not to enter cantonment and told me that West Pakistani
members of the army had slaughtered the Bengali members of the army.
Keeping faith in Almighty Allah, I gathered courage and proceeded
towards Cantonment. At the entrance of the Cantonment near the
railway crossing I was stopped by a soldier who from a sand bunker at a
distance of fifty yards shouted at me to stop and challenged me.
Rickshaw puller stopped and I got down from rickshaw. Some soldiers
pointed rifles at me from sand bunkers while others approached towards
me and asked my identity. I produced my identity card. The soldiers
saluted me and took me to nearby building, which was the office of
Martial Law Headquarters. After liberation of the country the building
has been converted to Cantonment College. My luggage was also
brought to that office. I contacted my new unit 140 Infantry Workshop
Company EME over telephone. My commander sent me a jeep. I
boarded that jeep and reached the office of my officer commanding
Major Syed Ahmed Loan. He cordially received me. My
accommodation was arranged in the Brigade Officer's Mess, which is
now the Station Officer's Mess No. 1.1 went to the mess and occupied
Room no 9. There I met three Bengali officers namely Captain
Nuruzzaman AEC, Lieutenant Rezaul Karim of 22 FF, Lieutenant
Monzur of corps of Engineer and some West Pakistan officers. There 1
learnt that most of the units had gone out to quell the agitation and
uprising created by the treachery of military Junta. 22 FF had gone to
Khulna leaving Bengali Lieutenant Rezaul Karim in the rear. 27 Baluch
had gone to Kushtia. 1 East Bengal was sent on exercise to Chaugacha
and 50% soldiers of 1 East Bengal were sent on two months leave.
Bengali Sepoys of my unit brought a charpoy for me who told me that
West Pakistanis had hatched conspiracy to eliminate Bengali members
of the army. The situation in the cantonment was very tense. The night
of 25
March 1971 93
March passed away, but we in Jessore could not sense that Pakistan
army had cracked down brutally with tanks, artillery, machine guns and
other automatic weapons on the unarmed civilian people in Dhaka.
The President on Air on 26 March

The Jessore Cantonment was isolated from the town and the
countryside. Food supplies to the cantonment were stopped. In the
officer‟s mess during lunch I could find only chapatti and dal. There
was announcement that President of Pakistan General Aga Mohammad
Yahya Khan would address the nation over radio and television in the
evening of 26 March. There was a radio set in the room of a Punjabi
officer, the officer commanding of Field Intelligent Unit. We gathered
in his room to listen to the Presidential speech. As usual there was
national anthem before the speech.
All officers stood up in silence to honor the national anthem. It was
an unusual demonstration of respect for national anthem. In his address
General Yahya Khan praised the role of the army for the excellent job
they have accomplished on the night of 25 March in Dhaka and branded
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as a traitor of Pakistan. He completely banned
Awami League as a political party although it had received people‟s
mandate. He also banned all political activities in Pakistan. The text of
Yahya's speech is reproduced below:
“On the 6th of this month I announced the 25th of March as the
new date for the inaugural session of the National Assembly hoping that
conditions would permit the holding of the session on the scheduled
date. Events have, however, not justified that hope. The nation
continued to face a grave crisis.
In East Pakistan the Awami League launched a non-co-operation
and disobedience movement and matters took a very serious turn.
Events were moving very fast and it became absolutely imperative that
the situation was brought under control as soon as possible. With this
aim in view, I had a series of discussions with political leaders in West
Pakistan and subsequently on the 15th of March I went to Dhaka.
As you are aware I had a number of meetings with Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman in order to resolve the political impasse. Having
consulted West Pakistan leaders it was necessary for me to do the same

over there so that areas of agreement could be identified and an
amicable settlement arrived at.
As has been reported in the press and other news media from time
to time, my talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman showed some progress.
Having reached a certain stage in my negotiations with Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman I considered it necessary to have another round of talks with
West Pakistani leaders in Dhaka. Mr. Z.A Bhutto reached there on 21st
March and I had a number of meetings with him.
As you are aware the leader of the Awami League had asked for
the withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power. The West
Pakistanis are living in a state of panic, and a very large number had to
leave that Wing out of fear for their lives.
The Armed Forces, located in East Pakistan, have been subjected
to taunts and insults of all kinds; 1 wish to complement them on the
tremendous restraint that they have shown in the face of grave
provocation. Their sense of discipline is indeed praiseworthy. I am
proud of them.
I should have taken action against Mujibur Rahman and his
collaborators weeks ago but I had to try my utmost to handle the
situation in such a manner as not to jeopardize my plan of peaceful
transfer of power. In my keenness to achieve this aim F kept on
tolerating one illegal act after another. At the same time I explored
every possible avenue for arriving at some reasonable solution. I have
already mentioned the efforts made by me and by various political
leaders in bringing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to see reason. We have left
no stone unturned. But he has failed to respond in any constructive
manner. On the other hand, he and his followers kept on flouting the
authority of the Government even during my presence in Dhaka. The
proclamation that he proposed was nothing but a trap. He knew that it
would not be wise to create a vacuum by lifting Martial Law. He could
have done anything with impunity. His obstinacy, obduracy and
absolute refusal to talk can lead to but one conclusion that the man and
his party are enemies of Pakistan and they want East Pakistan to break
away completely from the country. He has attacked the solidarity and
integrity of this country. This crime will not go unpunished.
March 1971 95
We will not allow some power hungry and unpatriotic people to

destroy this country and play with the destiny of 120 million people.
In my address to the nation on 6th March I had told you that it is
the duty of the Pakistan Armed Forces to ensure the integrity, solidarity
and security of Pakistan. I have ordered them to do their duty and fully
restore the authority of the Government.
In view of the grave situation that exists in the country today I have
decided to ban all political activities throughout the country, as for the
Awami League it is completely banned as a political party. I have also
decided to impose complete press censorship. Martial Law regulations
will very shortly be issued in pursuance of these decisions.
The political leaders were also very much perturbed over Sheikh
Mujib's idea of dividing the National Assembly into two parts right from
the start. Such a move, they felt, would be totally against the interest of
Pakistan's integrity.
The Chairman of the Pakistan People‟s Party, during the meeting
with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and myself had also expressed similar
views to Mujib.
On the evening of the 23rd of March the political leaders, who had
gone to talk to Mujib on this issue, called on me and informed me that
he was not agreeable to any changes in his scheme. All he really wanted
was for me to make a proclamation whereby, I should withdraw Martial
Law and transfer power.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's action of starting his non-co-operation
movement is an act of treason. His political party has defied the lawful
authority for over three weeks. They have insulted Pakistan‟s flag and
defiled the photograph of the Father of the Nation. They have tried to
run a parallel Government. They have created turmoil, terror and
insecurity.
In the end let me assure you that my main aim remains the same,
namely transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. As
soon as situation permits I will take fresh steps towards the achievement
of this objective.
It is my hope that the law and order situation will soon return to
normalcy in East Pakistan and we can again move forward towards our
cherished goal.
I appeal to my countrymen to appreciate the gravity of the situation

for which the blame rests entirely on the anti Pakistan and secessionist
elements and to act as reasonable citizens of the country because therein
lies the security and salvation of Pakistan.
God be with you God bless you.

Pakistan Zindabad.”
Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Chairman of Pakistan People's Party

after reaching Karachi on 26 March from Dhaka relieved a sigh of relief
and declared that Pakistan had been saved.
Senior Tiger out of the Cage

After the speech I came out of the room completely frustrated and
foresaw the death of Pakistan. Lieutenant Rezaul Karim of 22 FF
Regiment who was also listening over the radio repented that he obtained
very good grading in tactics in Infantry School and could not be of any
help to his fellow brethren during the crucial time of Bangladesh. He
made a forecast that Bengal would once again been put under the tyranny
of slavery for another two hundred years. The Cantonment was quiet. The
date trees were standing as leafy sentinels all around Jessore Cantonment
as if no wind had been blowing. I could sense that the nature was
weeping. My mind went back to the time, when Clive defeated Nawab
Siraj-u-Dawla in the battle of Plassey and the subsequent sufferings that
had come down on the people of Bengal. I took my dinner and turned
over the pages of the books pertaining to guerilla warfare written by Che
Guevera and Mao Tse Tung. Mental planning cropped up for future
course of action. Then I went to prayer. I prayed to Almighty Allah for
my protection and for the freedom of Bangladesh.
Next morning I went to my office and took a jeep to see around
the cantonment for my orientation. When I reached the office of my
OC, one FIU officer who was following me entered and asked me why
I went for the trip. I replied that as workshop officer I went to test the
vehicle. My OC Major Syeed Ahmed Loan took me to a nearby supply
unit for lunch. There I saw some West Pakistani civil servants who
took shelter in the cantonment. We had the lunch
March 1971 97
together. Cows and goats were forcibly brought from the neighbouring
villages and slaughtered for feeding the troops. I received a telephone
message that 'Namaze Janaza' would be held for a NCO who had been
killed by Bengalee armed elements when a column of 22 FF were
advancing towards Khulna and all officers of the garrison were asked to
attend the ‟Janaza‟. Deliberately I did not attend the ‟Janaza‟ as I could
sense a hostile attitude of the West Pakistani troops and officers towards
the Bengalis.
After office hour I came to my room when I could feel that I
committed the biggest blunder by joining my unit. I was cursing myself.
I devoted in prayer five times and emphatically sought Divine help.
There was a radio set in the Officers Mess where I heard the news and
met the son of Brigadier Durrani, the Brigade Commander of 107
Brigade. At the entrance of the Officers Mess armed sentries saluted me.
1 switched on the radio to Calcutta radio station. Radio Calcutta
announced that Lieutenant General Tikka Khan had been shot dead and
the „Mukti Bahini‟ had liberated Jessore Cantonment. I was happy to
hear the first news, but I laughed at the second news. The son of
Brigadier Durrani almost broke down when he heard that Lieutenant
General Tikka Khan had been killed. I returned to my room and went to
prayer.
Army detachment was sent to capture the Awami League leaders
from Jessore town. After returning from the operation the Punjabi
officers had been describing why they could not catch the leaders. There
were barricades all along the roads and so their journey was not easy.
However they could get hold of Mr. Mosiur Rahman former minister
and a renowned politician of Awami League. Later he was tortured to
death. On 28 March Captain Nuruzzaman in his Volkswagen car took
me to the residence of Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai, CO 7 Field
Ambulance. There I met Lieutenant Colonel Sobur of CMH, Jessore
Cantonment. Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai told us that one Major Ziaur
Rahman announced the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from Chittagong radio and had
given a call to fight back the enemy. Captain Shubid Ali Bhuiyan and
Captain Rafiqul Islam also were with him. Armed people were asked to
report at Laldhighi. Lieutenant Colonel Abdus Sobur whom I met in the
residence of
Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai gave me the frequency of the clandestine

radio station of Bangladesh Government. I tried to tune the station but
could not get it. On 29th March in the evening I went to garrison cinema
hall to see a movie where I met a driver of 1 East Bengal who told me
that they returned from the exercise on that day.
I had no mood to see the movie and so I returned to my room. On 30
March as I was going to my office, I saw some civil jeeps in the
Bungalows of officers. On the way I met a Bengali armourer NCO of 22
Frontier Force. He warned me that all Bengalee troops would be killed
that day. Brigadier Durranni entered our unit while I was standing in
front of my OC's office. I could read the evil design from the expression
of his crude smiling face. He just entered our unit and left immediately.
Few packets of ammunition of 7 Field Ambulance was brought by
the Punjabi JCO of that unit to be kept in our unit. My OC asked me to
assemble all the troops in the recreation room. He went to attend a
conference in martial law office. I addressed the troops of my unit and
said, "We all belong to the same Islamic faith. We are brothers as
Muslims and comrades in arms. United we stand and divided we fall.
Pakistan was conceived and shaped by the Muslim leaders of this sub-
continent as a homeland of the Muslims. Armed conflict among armed
forces would destroy the existence of Pakistan. Bengalis, Punjabis,
Pathans, Baluchis and Sindhis are all brothers and must live like
brothers."
I asked every one to go to the respective sections and to work as
usual. I went to my office in the workshop hanger. Again I found
.Brigadier Durranni entering the workshop hanger and searching for me
when I approached towards him, he drove away. He thought that the
workshop officer was a Punjabi. One Bengali sepoy told me that one
Punjabi sepoy had slapped Bengali sepoy in my workshop hanger. He
also told me that one Bengali naked woman was brought to the
Cantonment on the point of bayonet. One NCO of my unit came and told
me that kotes of 1 East Bengal were locked up and keys of the kote were
taken away by Brigadier Durranni from the commanding officer of 1
East Bengal Lieutenant Colonel Rezaul Jalil.
March 1971 99
I foresaw the immediate danger. A disarmed soldier is as helpless

as a naked prostitute on the street. My unit consisted of heterogeneous
elements and the Bengalis were minority there. The West Pakistani
soldiers guarded our unit quarter guard. Finding no other means for
survival I sent two of my Bengali NCOs to 1 East Bengal to request the
troops of 1 East Bengal to break open the kote and to take arms and
ammunition and fight back the aggressors. After a few moments I heard
the sound of machine gun and other automatic weapons fire. It became
clear to me that the West Pakistani soldiers had started planned attack
on the disarmed soldiers of 1 East Bengal. 1 East Bengal was caught in
dire surprise. Disorganized, confused and perplexed soldiers of 1 East
Bengal under the leadership of Captain Hafizuddin broke open the kote
and took whatever arms and ammunition they could get and challenged
the cowardice attack of Godless enemy. 1 East Bengal known as the
senior tigers of Bengal Regiment extricated from Jessore cantonment.
About fifty brave sons of 1 East Bengal Regiment embraced
martyrdom on that fateful day. Lieutenant Anwar who embraced
martyrdom was buried near Nazrul Islam College on the Jessore
Jhenidah highway. Whenever I pass by the grave, I remember him. With
solemn prayer I beg to Almighty for the salvation of his departed soul
and for other heroes of the liberation war. Later on at Indian BOP Betai
I found the blood stained web belt of Lieutenant Anwar with Captain
Hafiz. Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai whom 1 met only the previous
night was shot dead in his office along with other Bengali officers.
Broken windows of Jessore CMH still bear the testimony of that
massacre. During my meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai, he
advised me not to talk to any Bengali. He warned me that some Bengalis
were working as the agents of the Punjabis. Some Bengali agents
informed the Punjabis that Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai had passed
some valuable information to Awami League during the period of non-
cooperation movements. I met the brave lady, the wife of Lieutenant
Colonel Abdul Hai at his residence. She told us that there was no
alternative to crushing the West Pakistan Army to save our nation. But
that was not materialized before for want of bold leadership. My OC
Major S A Loan although a Punjabi, was a nice gentleman. Those
unfortunate
Bengalis who could not extricate were taken into custody and many of
them were killed. Major S A Loan went to every unit and requested not
to kill the unarmed Bengalis. Almighty Allah always saves the honour
of saintly man. In the month of November Major S A Loan was posted
to West Pakistan and thus he was saved from the humiliation of
surrender and a disgraceful and humiliating time in POW camp in India.
When I was confirmed by the sounds of fire of automatic weapons
that we were under attack, I decided to rush to 1 East Bengal and join
them. I shouted and called all the Bengali troops present in the workshop
hanger and asked them to rush to 1 East Bengal.
I got the strength of thousand men. It was a miracle. I got the
Divine power to fight back the enemy. Most of Bengali troops resisted
me, as we would fall in the crossfire. Then I got hold of a jeep and
decided to leave the Cantonment. Again Bengalee Subedar Irtazul of my
unit stopped me and told me that we would be gunned down by machine
gun at Suntala Cantonment exit. The last option was to leave the
cantonment on foot through the cross-country. Subedar Irtazul decided
to stay back as his family was in the cantonment. We left the
cantonment towards the countryside through the open field. We were
fired upon from different machine gun posts.
I heard the sound of machine gun bullets passing hissing my ear. The
Divine power protected all of us and we safely reached a nearby village
Churumankati. I must admit that Almighty Allah listened to my sincere
prayer and thus helped me to join the right side, - the Liberation Force of
Bangladesh.
Most of the Bengali officers and troops could not escape from
Jessore Cantonment and were taken in custody. They were either killed
or kept in the prison cell to undergo inhuman torture and sufferings.
Punjabi military leadership wanted to eliminate Bengali troops in
totality. Their only fault was that they were Bengalis. It is amply proved
that Punjabi leadership was wholly and solely responsible for the
disintegration of Pakistan and for the sufferings of the common people
of both the wings of Pakistan. Pakistan would remain intact if
March 1971 101
Pak army could take Bengali officers and troops in confidence and
could avoid killing Bengali troops. It was Bengali officers and troops
who organized the Mukti Bahini and ultimately became the hard core of
the liberation war. I was an eyewitness of the massacre of 1 E Bengal
and other Bengali troops. 1 E Bengal troops were disarmed; all the
weapons and ammunition were locked up in the kote. Brigadier
Durrani, commander of the garrison, took the keys of the kotes away.
Then 1 E Bengal was encircled by West Pakistani troops and unarmed
troops were machine gunned and killed. Bengali troops of supporting
and service arms were arrested and killed. What a heinous design!
Beginning of A rmed Resistance 103
Chapter 3
BEGINNING OF ARMED RESISTANCE
Beginning of Armed Resistance 105
Crackdown in Dhaka on 25th March

Let us delve into what happened in Dhaka on the night of 25 March. The
beginning of the end of united Pakistan started on 25 March. Sheikh
Mujibar Rahman became the crownless king of East Pakistan, won the
hearts and minds of all Bengalis. All Bengali Hindu, Muslim, Christian
and Buddhist stood like a solid rock beside Bangabandhu. March may be
considered a fortunate month for Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, for 17 March
was his birth anniversary. In this month he initiated non- co-operation
movement. All the offices, banks, courts and industries followed the
directives of Bangabandhu. Bangabandhu in all issued 31 directives to
run the country during the non-cooperation movement and those were
faithfully followed all over East Pakistan.
President A M Yahya Khan reached Dhaka on 15 March. He met
Sheikh Mujibar Rahman on 17 March in the President House and held a
full dress talk. It was a tough and tense session. The people of East
Pakistan were in a nerve-breaking situation about the outcome, of the
dialogue. They sincerely expected a political solution of the crisis and
not the complete separation of East and West Pakistan. But the majority
of West Pakistani leadership was arrogant and they wanted complete
domination and exploitation of the resources of East Pakistan. The
decision to use force was already taken and therefore negotiations and
talks were only eye wash show as its failure was planned to legalize the
use of force. Bhutto and Yahya were all the time on heavy doses of
alcohol and military Junta was under the domination of General Hamid,
General Peerzada, General Gul Hasan, General Umer and General Tikka
who were hard liners.
After the show of drama with Bangabandhu, Yahya gave final order
to General Tikka to get ready for the assault. But in reality they were
getting ready from the beginning for armed attack immediately after the
victory of Awami League in the General Election of 1970. In turn
General Tikka asked his field commander Major General Khadim
Hussein Raja, G 0 C 14 Division to go ahead to subjugate the Bengalis
by using brute military force and silence the aspirations of Bengalis.
On 18 March Major General Khadim Hussein Raja, G O C 14

Division and Major General Rao Forman Ali, in charge of civil affairs
in martial law headquarters sat in G O C‟s office to draft the operational
plan. The aim of the plan was to overthrow Sheikh Mujibar Rahman‟s
de facto rule and re-establish Pakistan Government‟s authority by
applying brute military force. The nickname of the operation was
“Operation SEARCHLIGHT”. The main features of the “ operation
SEARCHLIGHT‟ was to disarm all Bengali troops, including regular
East Bengal Battalions, arresting all provincial Awami League leaders
while in conference with the President, and allocation of tasks and areas
of responsibilities to various formation and units. It was like pelting
stone on hornet‟s nests. The operation „SEARCHLIGHT‟ and
subsequent violent military actions of Pakistan Muslim Army on the
Bengali Muslims was a blot on the escutcheon of Islamic Faith. What a
cowardice plan! Coward and immoral Generals can only plan this.
These cowardice traits were displayed on 16 December when Pakistan
army surrendered en mass and that too to Hindus whom they treat as
cowards as worshipers of idols. If they were a real martial race and true
believers of Islam they should have waited to see victory or elimination
fighting in the battlefield.
Punjabis never rured Punjab except for short period of 25 years by
an one eyed Sikh ruler ranajit Singh Kana. He had 22 wives most of
them were Punjabi Muslims. Punjabi Muslim cowardice traits were
displayed at the time of partition in 1947 when they in illogical frenzy
initiated massacre of unarmed Hindus and Sikhs in Lahore. In
retaliation Punjabi Hindu and Sikh in Amritsar killed Muslim Punjabis
and there was orgy of rape of Muslim women. Millions were killed and
uprooted from their home in both the regions of Punjab. Subsequently,
Hindu-Muslim riot spread all over India, fortunately Hindu-Muslim of
Bengal restrained their passion and tolerance. Suhrawardy took pledge
from Muslim leaders not to kill any Hindu in Bengal in return Gandhi
calmed the Hindus in Calcutta. Unlike looting each other properties in
Punjab, Hindu-Muslim in Bengal exchanged their properties. Hindu-
Muslim in both the Bengals are living in peuce and harmony. Bengalis
have human
qualities unlike Punjabis. Hindu-Muslim in Bengal wanted to live as

independent nation, but Nehru destroyed that dream. But we Bengalis
took oath that we might be destroyed, but would not be defeated,
corresponding to ancient oath in Bengali „Sangsaptak‟ meaning an
army fighting to the last with the determination to do or die.
On the other hand Awami League had conceived no plan to
encounter or attack Pakistan army. Awami League was expecting a
political solution, not an armed conflict. Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed and other
Awami League leaders claimed that there was no breakdown in
negotiations and the army action was an act of treachery that forced
Awami League Leaders to go into exile, resist the Pakistan army, and
declare independence. Awami league volunteers only raised some road
barricades to avert surprise attack.
Last minute attempt was undertaken by Awami League to avert
unpleasant catastrophe. The Yahya - Mujib parleys agreed on Awami
League proposal that martial law be lifted immediately and power be
transferred to elected bodies of the five provinces, and in the central
Government Yahya Khan to continue as President. Two committees
would be formed to draft the constitution. Each committee shall
comprise of MNAs from the East and the West wings. The committees,
meeting in Islamabad and Dhaka, would prepare separate reports within
a given period. The National Assembly would meet to discuss these
reports and arrive at a compromise formula between the two. President
was happy about this proposal as because his position was kept
unaffected. President assured Mujib that the scheme would be accepted
if Bhutto did not raise any objection to it. So Bhutto was asked once
again to come to Dhaka. The President conveyed the salient features of
the Awami League‟s scheme for transfer of power to Bhutto, saying that
it awaited his approval for implementation. Bhutto vehemently opposed
the proposal with an uncompromising rigid stand. Thus the window for
a peaceful political settlement through dialogue and negotiation had
been closed in a very unfortunate and unexpected manner.
To deceive Awami league nay the Bengalis, the President drove to

Dhaka cantonment in the afternoon of 25th March before the sunset. The
President‟s Motorcade returned to the President house with the usual
protocol having — the pilot jeep, outriders, the Presidents‟ car with
four-star plate and national flag. But the President was not in the car.
The President left Dhaka for Karachi by air in the evening. As a matter
of fact Bhutto floated the idea of separate constitutions for East and
West Pakistan with Sheikh as Prime Minister of the East and Bhutto as
Prime Minister of the West keeping Yahya as President at the centre.
Arnold Zeitlin, the associated press correspondent in Pakistan conveyed
this to Sheikh. Initially Sheikh agreed to this proposal, but subsequently
asked Zeitlin to kill the story.
Top army hierarchy was over enthusiastic for an armed offensive to
settle the issue of East - West Pakistan. General Yahya was buying time
on the pretext of dialogue and negotiation and at the same time staying
in Dhaka playing the war game with his general for effective and
successful operation plan and final crackdown on Bengalis. All
preparation for crackdown was completed by the 19 March and only the
timing for the assault was kept secret. The timing or H-hour was set at
0100 hours - 1 a.m. of 26 March. Bengali Captain A T Salahuddin, 21C
of field intelligent unit sensing the impending attack on Dhaka city,
rushed to Dhaka University halls and residences of Awami league
leaders to alert them. Major General Khadim Hussein Raza obtained the
official order at 11 a.m. on 25 March from Lieutenant General Tikka
and passed the same to his staff for implementation. Army leaders were
so impatient that the troops moved at 10 a. m. before the official order
was received at their end. Full text of “Operation SEARCHLIGHT” is
reproduced below for a clear understanding of operation genocide.
Quid-e-Azam Muhammed Ali Jinah

Founder of Pakistan
Some of the War Criminals Commited Genocide

in Bangldesh in 1971
0'*-
A. M. Yahya Khan
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Abdul Hamid Khan

V
S.G.M. Peerzada
lr
Gul Hasan Khan Rao Farman Ali
wh-
:
k v Mim
Khadim Hussain Raja
110 Mukii Bahini Wins Victory
Operation Searchlight
Basis for Planning
1. A.L. [Awami League] action and reactions to be treated as
rebellion and those who support or defy M.L. [martial Law] action be
dealt with as hostile elements.
2. As A.L. has widespread support even amongst the E.P. [East
Pakistan] elements in the Army the operation has to be launched with
great cunningness, surprise, deception and combined with shock
action.
Basic Requirments for Success

1. The operation to be launched all over the Province
simultaneously.
2. Maximum number of political and student leaders and
extremists from amongst teaching staffs, cultural organizations to be
arrested. In the initial phase top political leaders and top student-
leaders must be arrested.
3. Operation must achieve a hundred per cent success in Dhaka
and for that Dhaka University will have to be occupied and searched.
4. Security of cantonments must be ensured. Greater and freer
use of fire against those who dare attack the cantonment.
5. All means of internal and international communications to be
cut off. Telephone exchanges, radio, TV, Teleprinter services,
transmitters with foreign consulates to be closed down.
6. EP troops to be disarmed and neutralized by controlling and
guarding the kotes and ammunition by WP [West Pakistani] troops.
Same arrangement shall have to be made for the P.A.F. and the
E.P.R
Surprise and Deception

7. From the army hierarchy it was advised that the President
may pretend to continue the dialogue with the intention of deceiving
Mujib that even if Mr. Bhutto does not agree he will make an
announcement on 25th march conceding to the demands of A.L. etc.
10. At Tactical Level

(a) As secrecy is of paramount importance, preliminary
operations given below should be carried out by troops already located
in the city:
i. Breaking into Mujib‟s house and arresting all present. The
house is well guarded and well defended.
ii. SuiTOunding the important halls of the Universities
— Iqbal Hall DU [Dhaka University], Liaqat Hall, Engineering
University.
iii. Switching off telephone exchange.
iv. Isolating known houses where weapons etc. have been
collected.
(b) No activity by troops in the cantonment area till

telephone exchange has been switched off.
(c) Nobody should be allowed to go out of the cantonment
after 2200 hrs on the night of operation.
(d) On the excuse or the other troops in the city should be
reinforced in the Presidents House, Governor House, MNA Hostel,
Radio, TV and Telephone exchange premises.
(e) Civilian cars may have to be used for operation against
Mujib‟s house.
Sequence of Actions
1 1 . ( z ) E Hr-0100 hrs.
(b) Timing/or Move Out
i. Commando [one Platoon] - Mujib‟s house - 0100 hrs.
ii. Telephone exchange switched off - 2455 hrs.
iii. Tps earmarked for cordon University - 0105 hrs.
iv. Tps from the city to Rajarbagh police HQ and other
PS [Police Station] nearby — 0105 hrs.
v. Following places surrounded — 0105 hrs.
Mrs. Anwara Begum‟s House, Rd No. 29 &
House No. 148 Rd No.29
vi. Curfew imposed — 0110 hrs by Siren (arrange) by

Loudspeakers. Duration 30 hrs initially. No passes for
the initial phase. Due considerations were given only to
the cases of delivery and serious heart attack etc. Evac
by Army on request. Also announce that there will be
no newspapers brought out till further orders.
vii. Tps move out to respective sectors with specific
missions — 0110 hrs. (For tp alert a drill to be
evolved). Halls occupied and searched.
viii. Tps move to the University area — 0500 hrs.
ix. Rd blocks and riverine block estb — 0200 hrs.
c. Operation During the Day Time

i. House to house search of all suspected houses of
Dhanmondi, also Hindu houses in old city (intelligent
organs-to collect data).
ii. All printing presses to be closed down. All cyclostyling
machines in the University, Colleges (T&T) and
Physical Training Institute and Technical Institute to be
confiscated.
iii. Curfew imposed with severity.
iv. Other leaders to be arrested.
12. Allotment of tps to Tasks: Details to be worked out by Brigade

Commander but the following must be done:
a) Kotes of EP units taken over, including Signals and other
administrative units. Arms to be given only to the WP personnel.
b) Explanation: We did not embarrass the EP tps and did not
want to be used in tasks that may not be pleasant to them.
b) Police station to be disarmed.
c) DG [Director General] EPR [East Pakistan Rifles] to
ensure security of his kotes.
13. Info required
a) Whereabouts of the following:

i) Mujib ii) Nazrul Islam
iii) Tajuddin vi) Osmany
v) Sirajul Alam vi) Mannan
vii) Ataur Rahman viii) Professor Muzaffar
ix) Oli Ahad x) Mrs Motia Chaudhry
xi) Barrister Maudud xii) Faizul Haq
xiii) Tofail xiv) N.A. Siddiqi
xv) Rauf xvi) Makhan
And other student leaders.
b) Location of all police stations and of Rifles.
c) Location of strong points and arsenal houses in the city.
d) Location of Cultural Centers that are being used for imparting
military trg.
e) Location of training areas and campus.
f) Names of ex-service officers who are actively helping
insurrectional movement.
14. Comd and Control — two commands be established:

a) Dhaka area
Comd — Major General Farman Staff
— Eastern Comd staff/or HQ ML Tps
— Located in Dhaka
b) The rest of the province

Comd — Major General K H Raja
Staff — HQ 14 Div
Tps — Less those in Dhaka.
15. Security of the Cantonment

Phase I De-escalate. All arms including PAF deposited.
16. Communication
a) Security.
b) Layout.
Allotment of Troops to Tasks

Dhaka
Command and Control: Maj. Gen. Farman with HQ MLA (Zone-B)
Troops:
HQ 57 Brigade with troops in Dhaka, i.e. 18 Punjab, 32 Punjab
(C.O. to be replaced by [Lt. Col.] Taj, GSO I (int), 22 Baluch, 13
Frontier force, 31 Field Regt, 13 Light Ack-Ack Regt., company of 3
Commando (from Comilla).
Tasks:
1. Neutralize by disarming 2 and 10 East Bengal, H.Q. East
Pakistan Rifles (2500), Reserve Police at Rajarbagh (2000)
2. Exchange and Transmitters, Radio, TV, State Bank.
3. Arrest Awami League leaders — detailed lists and
addresses
4. University halls, Iqbal, Jagan Nath, Liaqat (Engeering
University)
5. Seal off town including road, rail and river. Patrol River.
6. Protect factories at Gazipur and ammo Depot at
Rajandrapur.
Reminder: under Maj. Gen. K H Raja and HQ 14 Div.
Jessore
Troops:
H.Q. 107 Brigade, 25 Baluch, 27 Baluch, elements of 24 Field
Regt., 55 Field Regt.
Task:
1. Disarm 1 East Bengal and Sector H.Q. East Pakistan rifles
and reserve Police inch Ansar weapons.
2. Secure Jessore town and arrest Awami League and student
leaders.
3. Exchange and telephone communication.
Beginning of A rrned Resistance 115
4. Zone of security round cantonment, Jessore town and

Jessore - Khulna road, airfield.
5. Exchange at Kushtia to be made inoperative.
6. Reinforce Khulna if required.
Khulna
Troops:
22 FF Task:
1. Security in town.
2. Exchange and Radio Station.
3. Wing H.Q. East Pakistan Rifles, Reserve Companies and
Reserve Police to be disarmed
4. Arrest Awami League students and communist leaders.
Rangpur - Saidpur
Troops:
H.Q. 23 Brigade, 29 Cavalry, 26 Frontier Force, 23 Field Regt.
Task:
1. Security of Rangpur - Saidpur.
2. Disarm 3 East Bengal at Saidpur.
3. If possible disarm Sector H.Q. and Reserve Company at
Dinajpur or neutralize by dispersal Reserve Company by
reinforcing border outposts.
4. Radio Station and telephone exchange at Rangpur.
5. Awami League and student leaders at Rangpur.
6. Ammo dumps at Bogra.
Rajshahi
Troops:
25 Punjab Tasks:
1. Dispatch C.O. - Shafqat Baluch.
2. Exchange and Radio Station Rajshahi.
3. Disarm Reserve Police and Sector H.Q. East Pakistan
Rifles.
116 MuktiBahini Wins Victory
4. Rajshahi University and in particular Medical College.

5. Awami League and student leaders.
Comilla
Troops:
53 Field Regiments, IV2 Mortar Batteries, Station troops, 3
Commando Battalion (less Company)
Tasks:
1. Disarm 4 East Bengal, Wing H.Q. East Pakistan Rifles,
Reserve District Police.
2. Secure town and arrest Awami League leaders and students.
3. Exchange.
Sylhet
Troops:
31 Punjab less company Tasks:
1. Radio Station, Exchange.
2. Koeno Bridge over Surma.
3. Airfield.
4. Awami League and student leaders.
5. Disarm Sector H.Q. East Pakistan Rifles and Reserve
Police.
Liaise with Sikandar.
Chittagong
Troops:
20 Baluch, less advanced party; company 31 Punjab present ex
Sylhet; Iqbal Shafi to lead a mobile column from Comilla by road and
reinforce S.T. 0100 hrs (H hrs) on D-Day.
Mobile Column: Brig. Iqbal Shafi with Tac H.Q. and
Communications; 24 Frontier Force; Troops Heavy Motors; Field
Company Engineers; Company in advance to Feni on evening D- Day.
Tasks:
1. Disarm E.B.R.C., 8 East Bengal, Sector H.Q. East
Pakistan Rifles, Reserve Police.
2. Seize Central Police Armoury (Twenty thousand)
3. Radio Station and Exchange.
4. Liaise with Pakistan navy (Commodore Mumtaz)
5. Liaise with Shaigri and Janjua (C.O. 8 East Bengal) who
have been instructed to take orders from you till arrival of
Iqbal Shafi.
6. If Shigri and Janjua feel sure about their outfits then do
not disarm. In that case merely put in a roadblock to town
from Cantonment by placing a company in defensive
position so that later E.B.R.C. and 8 East Bengal is
blocked should they change their loyalties?
7. I am taking Brig. Mozumdar with me. Arrest Chaudhury
(C.I.E.B.R.C.) on D-Day night.
8. Arrest of Awami League and student leaders after above
accomplished.
Army crackdown and Proclamation of Independence

Pakistan Army planned to neutralize the places of resistance and they
identified targets which were East Pakistan Rifles at Pilkhana
numbering about 5000 jawans, Razarbagh police line number about
1000 police, and University campus. 22 Baluch, 32 Punjab moved to
attack Pilkhana and Razarbagh respectably. 18 Punjab attacked
university area.
A squadron of M-24 tanks moved according to plan and fired to
create shock action on the population. This column was heavily
equipped to engage in any offensive should there be a strong resistance.
There was minor resistance from East Pakistan Rifles and police that
lasted not more than an hour. Army column destroyed and killed
whatever and whoever they found on their way. The Army attacked old
Dhaka city where Hindus were living. When the first shot had been
fired, the pre -recorded voice of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman came in the
air broadcast over EPR radio and that was further transmitted and
relayed from river and sea ships and many people listened on their
radio. Bangabandhu proclaimed the independence of Bangladesh. East
Pakistan was buried under the jackboot of military crackdown. The full
text of proclamation is reproduced. “This may be my last message.
From today Bangladesh is independent. I call upon the people of
Bangladesh, wherever you are and whatever you have, to resist the
army of occupation to the last. Your fight must go on until the last
soldier of the Pakistan occupation army is expelled from the soil of
Bangladesh and the final victory is achieved.” The same
proclamation of independence came as the banner headlines of both the
Times and Guardian of London dated March 27, 1971. During the
fateful night of 25,h March Pakistan army killed several hundred
thousand people and burnt and destroyed hundred of houses.
The magnitude of the reign of terror by the Pakistan military was
so horrified that American Consulate General office at Dhaka on 28
March despatched a telegram to American Embassy at Islamabad and
State Department at Washington captioned “Selective Genocide”. On
06 April “Dangerous Dissent” cable was prepared by American
Consulate General staffs at Dhaka and signed by twenty officers and
despatched to American Embassy at Islamabad and State Department
Beginning of A nned Resistance 119
at Washington. The dissent cable, on its arrival at the State Department,

was signed as a show of protest by a further nine senior officers in the
South Asian Division. It was the most public and most strongly worded
demarche from State Department servants to the State Department that
had ever been recorded. Bengali nation will ever salute the brave
twenty-nine Americans for their courageous action in the crucial period
of Bengali race. Main features of the Dissent cable contained that USG
failed to denounce the suppression of democracy, atrocities and
displayed moral bankruptcy. Archer K Blood American consulate
general at Dhaka was withdrawn for his correct reporting and dissent
cable, and was dumped first at Washington, state department and later
on to army War College at Pennsylvania as he was Secretary Kissinger‟s
doghouse because of his Dhaka action. On 24 June 1971 fortunately
Archer K Blood was awarded The Herter Award for extraordinary
accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage and
creative dissent. The winners of the Herter are selected by committee
made up of senators and distinguished private citizens. The Herter
Award was formally handed over to Archer K Blood by secretary of
state Roger and Mrs. Herter. What a divine consolation! Archer K Blood
was posted at New Delhi as Deputy Chief of mission when Carter took
over as President and exit of Kissinger had occurred. Most of the time
during his tenure at Delhi Archer continued as the Charge D Affairs of
US embassy.
As soon as Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973, he
downgraded all those who had signed the genocide protest in 1971. The
attitude of Kissinger towards Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was extremely
acrimonious. In 1974 in Washington Kissinger boycotted the fifteen
minutes meeting that President Ford allowed for Sheikh Mujib. He also
opposed Mujib‟s main request, which was for emergency United States
grain shipment, and some help with debt relief, in order to recuperate the
country so ravaged by Kissinger‟s friend and ally. To cite Kissinger‟s
aide Roger Morris again: “In Kissinger‟s view there was very much a
distance hand-off attitude towards them. Since they had the audacity to
become independent of one of my client states, they will damn well float
on their own for a while.”
“In November 1973, on brief face saving tour of the region,

Kissinger made an eight hour stop over in Bangladesh. Within a few
weeks of his departure, a faction at US embassy in Dhaka began
covertly meeting with a group of Bangladeshi officers who were
planning a coup against Mujib. Dhaka CIA station chief Philip Cherry
was operating a back channel without the knowledge of the US
Ambassador in Dhaka, David Eugene Booster. Here the defeated force
in 1971 war used the concept of “Two Track” policy. There were junior
officers ready to mutiny and there was a senior officer- the future
dictator General who was ready but hesitant. In fact, the senior
Bangladeshi officer had dated meetings between Mustaque and the
mutineers more than six months before Mujib‟s overthrow”. -
Christopher Hitchens.
Christopher Hitchens through his book „The Trial of Henry
Kissinger‟ takes the floor of prosecuting council against the tyrant and
mass murderer Kissinger. He investigated, in turn, Kissinger‟s
involment in war in Indochina, mass murder in Bangladesh, planned
assassination in Santiago, Nicosia, Bangladesh and Washington DC, and
genocide in East Timor. Christopher Hitchens took bold step in his
investigation to find a genuine candidate for the dock. He is Ex-
Secretary of States and National Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger
whose record of war crimes bears comparison with the worst dictators
of the recent history. Kissinger‟s ambition and ruthlessness have
directly resulted in both widespread, indiscriminate slaughter in Bengal
and murder of Sheikh Mujib. With full backing of Kissinger, for
negotiating the pink-pong diplomacy between Washington and Peking
through Pakistan embassy in Peking, Yahya had the audacity to commit
genocide in Bangladesh- for the elimination of entire Bangladeshi race.
There was one motive for realpolitik for the shame that Nixon and
Kissinger were to visit Peking for its complicity in the extermination of
Bengalis. Yahya‟s Information Minister and close associate G W
Chaudhury later wrote, “If Nixon and Kissinger had not given him false
hope and understanding that he would be protected by Washington and
Peking, he had been more realistic.” Most of Kissinger‟s partners in
crime have been punished. “His own lonely impunity is rank; it smells
to heaven. If it is to persist then we shall shamefully vindicate the
ancient philosopher Anacharsis, who maintained that laws were
i
like cobwebs; strong enough to detain only the weak, and too weak to
hold the strong. In the name of innumerable victims known and
unknown, it is time for justice to take a hand”. - Christopher Hitchens.
Almost all the foreign journalists stationed at Dhaka were rounded
up on the night of 25 March and despatched out of Dhaka so that
evidences of mass massacre would go unnoticed. Simon Dring, then a
27 year old reporter for the London Daily Telegram, evaded the roundup
by hiding on the roof of the Intercontinental Hotel and later on went
around the city to see firsthand the results of army‟s repression. He flew
out to Bangkok via Karachi two days later with his notes intact (hidden
in his socks) despite having twice stripped and searched. Michael
Laurent, an Associated Press photographer and Arnold Zeitlin, the
Associated Press correspondent, eluded army and flew out of Dhaka.
Bakery man at Inter Continental Hotel cooked bread where the films
were concealed for smuggling out to out side world. Dring and Zeitlin‟s
reports were the first to show the outside world the extent of fury of
military crackdown. Grateful nation on the anniversary of silver jubilee
of Independence Day invited both of them including all foreign
dignitaries who supported the cause of Bangladesh.
Armed Resistance Boiled Down

It was Pakistan army that declared war against unarmed population by
attacking them. Yahya and his military Junta triggered the civil war.
Awami League and the Bengalis had no preparation to engage in an
armed conflict with the powerful and well-organized Pakistan army. The
Pakistan army officers from the western wing antagonized Bengali
troops in the army by their contemptuous misbehaviour. East Pakistan
Rifles and police forces were also their target for killing on the fateful
night of March 25. Pakistan army by their action invited Bengal army,
EPR and police to fight them back. In Jessore Cantonment we fought
back the attacking army and made the way out of the Cantonment. Thus
the preparation for resistance and organized armed resistance started in
the South Western part of the then East Pakistan.
Now the question before me was what should I do after the miracle
of getting this new life through my escape from the valley of death?
The only option left to me was to form the resistance movement and I
thought that it could be better organized from my own hometown
Magura. Army personnel who escaped with me from the cantonment
requested me to allow them to go to their home to see their near and
dear ones and promised to report me back at Magura town. I gave them
some money but they had never reported back.
On the way I talked with the people, I was encouraged to see that
most of the people irrespective of cast, creed and religion expressed
their willingness to support the liberation war. I needed some trained
men and weapons. I reached Simakhali - a village bazaar on the eastern
bank of river Chittra on Jessore - Magura highway. There I found a
group of armed people headed by Havilder Aktar belonging to an
artillery regiment. Mr. Shorab Hussein MP of Awami League who was
my cousin sent them. I took the command of the group. They were only
about fifty. Most of them belonged to irregular Ansar force. They
carried 303 rifles with only few rounds of ammunition. In the evening
we got hold of a vintage bus and proceeded towards Jessore town. We
stopped at Khezura Bazaar. I myself with few armed persons went to
the local police station. I asked the officer-in-charge of police station to
handover all the rifles and ammunition to us. After some altercation he
handed over all rifles and ammunition boxes to us. Then we proceeded
further towards Jessore town and stopped near a school and spent the
night there. I had a stomach upset as I had to take food here and there.
Next morning we again started towards Jessore. On the way I found
exodus of frightened people running from town towards the countryside
for fear of life. We halted at Hasimpur Bazaar about three miles from
Jessore town to find out the enemy activities in the town. Hundreds of
local people gathered there to help us. They gave us food and water.
They brought some Biharis and asked my permission for execution. On
enquiry I found them innocent and ordered them to join other Biharis in
town and remain neutral. I told them that Biharis had undergone
immense sufferings at the time of partition of India and above all they
were our Muslim brothers.
We gathered that Jessore town was under the control of East

Pakistan Rifle and the enemy was confined in the Jessore cantonment.
Again we started for Jessore town and reached Jessore new market.
From there I sent a detachment towards Cantonment and took position
on the eastern bank of river Bhairab covering the bridge over the river. I
myself along with the rest entered the town. When I reached near Jessore
central jail, I heard that prisoners in the jails had been freed. Bengali
jailor freed the prisoners on the condition that they would fight for the
liberation of motherland. But later their activities proved that they had
gone back to their past criminal lines. These criminals engaged
themselves in looting Hindu houses and robbing the Hindus fleeing to
India to escape the onslaught of Pakistan army. Some captured Razakers
during the liberation period confessed to Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chaudhury,
who was SDO of Meherpur before the start of war that those with good
family background joined liberation war and only the bastards
collaborated with the occupation army.
I went to BDR lines in front of circuit house. There I met Subedar
Abdul Malek who was courageously conducting the resistance against
the occupation army. He told me that Pakistan soldiers who were
guarding the important installations like telephone exchanges had been
eliminated. He further told me that the bulk of the BDR troops had been
deployed at Chasra and I could hear the machine gun fire of BDR at
Chasra. I found two 6-pounder guns at BDR Headquarters. Subeder
Malek told me that Bengali officer Captain Awlad and Captain
Hasmutullah deserted them and surrendered to Pakistan Army. After the
liberation these two officers lost their job for collaboration with the
Pakistan army. They lay down in front of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman's car and begged for re-employment. Bangabandhu was kind to
employ Captain Awlad in Trading Corporation of Bangladesh and
Captain Hasmatullah in police service. Both of them were ill reputed for
corruption in their new assignments.
In the mean time I managed a jeep, but there was no fuel. I went to
the deserted petrol pump and managed to get some fuel-after lot of
efforts. I had a round of the town. All the houses and shops were locked
and the town was giving a ghostly look. I came back to
Subedar Abdul Malek and asked him to leave the place and join the
forces at Chasra and extricate towards Bangaon in case of withdrawal. I
could see PIA aircraft over our head at Jessore town coming from
Dhaka and landing at Jessore airport. PIA aircraft must have been
carrying troops to reinforce Jessore cantonment. We fired at the
aircraft, but that went too high beyond the range of small arms fire.
District judge of Jessore was entrapped in his house. His men
requested me to rescue him from his house that was close to the
cantonment. He requested me for a lift. I sent my jeep to rescue him
and his family. He left with my jeep and never returned the jeep. I
would never forgive that ungrateful judge. I felt that it was unwise to
stay there and get killed. I lost confidence in the irregular forces most
of whom deserted me. So I decided to go to my hometown Magura and
to organize resistance movement from there.
On the evening of 03 April 1971 I reached Magura by Jessore-
Khazuria-Magura road. I came to Magura on foot, rickshaw and auto
rickshaw covering a distance of 25 miles and had to cross river twice by
boat. The people were delighted to receive an army officer who could
render military leadership to liberate the country. People of Magura
cordially received me. I went to meet Mr. Waliur Rahman, SDO
Magura at Ansar camp at Nomani Maidan. I felt very bad when I
entered the office of SDO as I was wearing a dirty lungi and a vest. I
had no shoe on. Mr. Waliur Rahman showed complete allegiance to the
People‟s Republic of Bangladesh and organized the resistance
movement at Magura. He told me that some Pak soldiers escaped from
Kushtia and took shelter in a cater caused by uprooting banyan tree
somewhere between Jhenidah and Magura. Thousands of people from
the surrounding areas attacked the position by whatever arms they
could manage. The enemy would show the steel helmet by pushing
with the bayonet of the rifle. Seeing the helmet our forces fired
indiscriminately. Mr. Waliur Rahman managed some homemade
bombs and those were sent to eliminate them. One brave man crawled
up to the position and killed one Pak soldier with a boomerang. The
Pakistani soldiers were only about ten in number. But he embraced
martyrdom. One night the enemy found a gap and
'

!
escaped to Jessore cantonment with the help of locals who were forced
to guide them on gunpoint.
At Magura I bought one shirt, a trouser and a pair of shoe. I stayed
at Magura for that night. My village home was about seven miles from
Magura. My younger brother Anawar a medical student was at Magura
who told me that there was rumour that I was killed at Jessore
cantonment. I asked my brother to tell my parents to pray for me. Next
morning I went to Nomani Maidan where I met Mr. Asaduzzaman
MPA. Mr. Asaduzzaman and the SDO asked me to stop the advance of
Pakistan Army at Alamkhali. I started by a Toyota jeep from Magura. I
could not use the main highway as roadblocks were placed all along the
road. The local people made Roadblocks spontaneously by placing big
trees that were cut from the roadside. Thousands of people particularly
the small children wished me with the slogan "Joy Bangla". The slogan
were piercing in my heart and reminding me that I must fight for these
children so that posterity can live in freedom. When I reached Alamkhali
I found thousands of people to fight back the Pakistan Army.
There I found one section of solid EPR soldiers who could be relied
upon. The Nabaganga River crossed Jhenidah - Magura high way at
Alamkhali. The width of the river was 100 feet. There was about 15 feet
water in the month of March-April. The bank of the river was flushed
with the ground. There were trees on both sides of the river, which
obstructed the line of sight. I immediately reconnoitered to take
defensive position on the eastern bank of the Nabaganga. The road
ahead of bridge over the Nabaganga had been cut off by the local people
so that no mechanized column could cross the Nabaganga and go
towards Magura. A telephone link was established at Alamkhali behind
the defensive position. 1 talked to the SDO of Magura. Several times I
talked to Mr. Mahbubuddin Ahmed, SDPO, Jhenidah over telephone
who organized the armed resistance at Jhenidah. My telephone operator
Pankas located a Bengali Major named Major Abu Osman Chowdhury. I
could hear his faint voice on telephone. Major Abu Osman Chowdhury
told me that he was at Chaudanga EPR headquarters and only Captain
Azam Chowdhury was with him who was fighting at Kushtia. Rumour
spread that Pak army was advancing towards Alamkhali and within no
time all people including Army soldiers and Air force airmen
except the East Pakistan rifle soldiers were vanished. EPR soldiers
promised that they would fight till death and would not leave me alone.
We stayed in defensive position to receive the enemy, but the enemy
never came. Instead two dead bodies of 27 Baluch regiment were
brought from Jhenidah. I had sent them to Magura for display. A
company of 27 Baluch regiment numbering about 150 took position in
Kushtia town on 25 March to impose the authority of Yahya Khan. On
29 March Bangladesh liberation forces comprising of East Pakistan
rifles, Police, Ansars, students and general people attacked Pakistani
position at Police Line of Kushtia under the command of Captain Azam
Chowdhury, valiant fighter of liberation force. Liberation force used
outdated weapons like 303 rifles and few machine guns.
It was the moral stength of Bengali fighters that defeated the
Pakistan army. Kushtia was liberated from the occupation of Pakistan
Army. Surviving troops of 27 Baluch Regiment escaped from Kushtia
and was heading towards Jessore garrison. Mr. Mahbubuddin Ahmed
SDPO put a trap at Jhenidah by cutting the metal road and camouflaging
it. The liberation force laid ambush on that site. The first jeep of the
convoy of the escaping troop fell in the ditch. Rifle fires came from all
sides and most of them were killed. Only few could escape and went in
hiding in the countryside. Some of them survived a few days by eating
raw vegetables. One soldier took shelter in the house of a Bengali and
this remained secret for sometime. When the public knew it, the house
was encircled. The host refused to hand over the soldier. The host was
all out to save the life of his guest. But the people were desperate. They
killed the Bengali host before killing the Pakistani soldier.
At night I stayed in the house of my school mate Viku who later on
became a freedom fighter. I stayed at Alamkhali for two days. In the
mean time Captain AT Salahuddin and Captain Mustafizur Rahman
came from Dhaka. They were provided with a jeep by Mr. Sorab
Hussein MP to join me. They told me that they had been instructed by
Major Khalid Mushrraf to contact Indian authority to get military help.
EPR troops whom I was commanding for few days were boarded in a
truck and I instructed them to join their
headquarters at Chuadanga. I offered myself to join the two Captains.

We embarked a motor truck and started for Jhenidah. At Jhenidah we
met a young courageous boy named Mussaddeq with a 303 rifle in his
arm. In the later part of war, he was with me as wireless operator. I met
him in Barrackpur while he was undergoing training as wireless
operator. He told us that they had given some heroic resistance to
Pakistan army. Jhenidah town gave a deserted look. When we were in
front of WAPDA office, a Sabre (F-86) aircraft flew over strafed
Jhenidah. We were narrowly escaped. From Jhenidah we again started
for Chaudanga.
At Chuadanga we halted for a while and heard that EPR Forces had
joined liberation war under the leadership of Major Abu Osmam
Chowdhury. Again we started our journey for Meherpur. At Meherpur
we stayed in the residence of Mr. Matiur Rahman brother of Captain
Mustafizur Rahman. He was a magistrate in the SDO's court. In his
office I met a young brave man who was not shattered by barbaric action
of Pakistan Army. At first sight I took him as a revolutionary student
leader from his talking, posture and age. I inquired about that smart
young man from Mr. Matiur Rahman. He told me that he was SDO of
Meherpur. His name was Mr. Tawfiq-e- Elahi Chowdhury.
At Meherpur I met Major Abu Osman Chowdhury, Captain K.N
Huda. The SDO of Chaudanga was Mr. Iqbal, a West Pakistani officer.
He shifted to Meherpur with his wife and was staying in the residence of
Mr.Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury. Mr. Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury again
shifted Mr. Iqbal and his wife to Meherpur jail for safe custody. There
were about thirty-five West Pakistanis including West Pakistani EPR
jawans in the jail custody. Mr. Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury took them to
India to hand them over to Indian BSF. The Sector commander of BSF
refused to accept them, as he had not received any instruction from
Indian Government in that regard. They were returned back to Meherpur
jail. Later on when Mr. Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury was away on some
operational duty, they were taken out from the jail and killed by the
instruction of an influential lady at that time. Unfortunately Mr. Iqbal
was the brother- in-law of Awami league leader Dr Kamal Hussein who
was arrested by Pakistan army and imprisoned in Haripur jail in
Pakistan. Later
on Mr. Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury wept for this sad incident and

wanted to have an enquiry after liberation. But nature took its own
revenge. The lady was killed by troops in a coup in 1975 in her Gulshan
residence.
Battle of Kushtia
Pakistan army suffered the initial major defeat in Kushtia in their
indiscriminate shoot out and display of their military might in March
1971. Pakistan army‟s Sher Dil Jawans (lion hearted troops) as Yahya
called them on 26 March 1971 in a nationwide address was deployed in
Kushtia and was completely annihilated by Mukti Bahani.
Kushtia is a district town. It is an important communication center
as a number of roads and railway line converged to Kushtia town.
Kushtia town is connected with Jhenidah, Jessore, Chaudanga and
Bheramara by road. River Gorai passed on the eastern side of Kushtia
town.
As per the operation plan „Operation Search Light‟, Delta Company
of 27 Baluch regiment was deployed at Kushtia on the night of 25
March 1971. They started indiscriminate killing of civilians and
terrorized the civil population. Delta Company of 27 Baluch took
position in Kushtia Zilla School, Police Line and Wireless Station.
Major Shoaib with Captain Samad established headquarters at Kushtia
Zilla School with 90 soldiers. Captain Sakil took the possession of
Police Line with 45 soldiers. Lieutenant. Ataullah Shah established the
Signal Centre at Wireless Station with 15 soldiers. They were in the
process of consolidating their defense position in order to establish the
authority of the Government of Pakistan.
Bengalis were not ready to accept the illegal authority of the
Regime of Pakistan. The illegal authority must be flouted at any cost.
Major Abu Osman Chaudhury and Captain AR Azam Chaudhury in
consultation with political leaders and civil officials and in
consideration of the grave political situation and Pakistan army s
crackdown on civil population, decided to attack enemy position in
Kushtia town. The overall responsibility for the operation of Kushtia
town occupied by enemy was vested on Captain AR Azam
r” Battle of Kustia
1.
Chaudhury. The date and time of the attack was fixed on 29 March at
0400 hours.
It was planned to attack three enemy positions simultaneously so
that one post could not reinforce the other. Accordingly tasks were
allotted to task force commanders. Captain AR Azam Chaudhury would
attack and capture Kushtia Zilla School from southwest corner of the
circuit house. Subedar Muzaffar Ahmed would attack and capture Police
Line from Jagati side. Naib-Subedar Moniruzzaman (Shaheed) would
attack Wireless Station.
Besides steps were taken to block enemy reinforcement from
Jessore Cantonment. A blocking position was established at Garagonj 12
miles east of Jhenidah on Jhenidah -Kushtia road by a platoon of 4
Wings EPR to stop the escape of retreating Pakistan Army from
Kushtia. One platoon of EPR was placed in defensive position at
Bisaikhali on Jhenidah - Jessore road to stop any reinforcement from
Jessore Cantonment. About two-mixed platoon of EPR, police and
Ansar were kept as reserve at Jhenidah under SDPO Mahbubuddin
Ahmed to meet any eventuality.
Subedar Muzaffar Ahmed with his Company from Pragpur in the
police station of Daulatpur was to join the battle. He needed more time
to collect all EPR solders from different BOPs and sought more time to
organize and consolidate with the approval of Major Osman. Time was
shifted to 30 March 1971 at 0400 hours.
Captain AR Azam Chaudhury moved on 28 March 1971 at 0900
hours from Chaudanga to Kushtia on foot following Chaudanga-
Alamdanga - Poradah- Kushtia non-metal road covering a distance of 20
miles and reached Poradah in the evening. They stayed the night of 28
/29 March and the whole day of 29 March 1971 at Poradah at a distance
of 8 miles from Kushtia town. Delay of one day afforded two benefits.
Troops got complete rest and food, and gathered enemy information
regarding strength, deposition for planning of attack. Both the
Companies reached the target area much before H hour. Captain AR
Azam took position in Hospital area and Subeder Muzaffer took position
in Jagati area.
Mortar detachment commander Subedar PK Ibrahim started firing
mortar on Zilla School and Police Line 15 minutes before H hour as per
the plan. As soon as Captain AR Azam‟s Company reached Hospital
area, enemy fired from recoilless rifles, machine
guns and all automatic weapons. Under the cover of walls and building
Mukti Bahini started firing with rocked launcher, machine guns and
automatic weapons. Captain Azam changed his position and took
position behind one storied building adjacent to the boundary wall of
Kushtia Zilla Schools at a distance of 75 yard from the Pakistan army
position. Subedar Mazaffar and Naib Subedar Moniruzzaman also
simultaneously launched attack. It was a hell for the Pakistan Army.
They were completely taken by surprise. They never thought that rice
eaten gentle, polite and sophisticated Bengalis could be so ferocious.
Major Shoaib sent SOS messages to Jessore Cantonment, but no
assistance arrived. By 1400 hours Pakistan army suffered, 25 were
killed and a large number were injured. Captain Azam sent a section
near to SP Bungalow to engage fleeing Pakistani troops from Police
Line and Wireless Station towards Zilla School. At that time Subedar
Muzaffar‟s group was firing from three-storied building of a local
Judge adjacent to the Police Line and killed a good number of Pakistani
soldiers. In the evening Pakistani troops vacated the Police Line and
Wireless Station and concentrated in Zilla School. At about 2300 hours
on 30 march 1971, about 50 troops of 27 Baluch quietly left the Zilla
school, walked 1000 yards on Kushtia-Jhenidah road and boarded the
vehicles and started for Jessore Cantonment. Huge quantities of arms,
ammunition and vehicles were captured.
At about 1000 hours on 31 March 1971, Pakistan Sabre Jet (F- 86)
straffed Kushtia town, again on 01 August 1971 at 0900 hours F- 86
strafed Kushtia town.
Retreating Pakistan army led by Major Shoaib were ambushed at
Garagonj and most of them were killed. During the entire Kushtia
operation 150 Pakistan Army men including Major Shoaib, Captain
Sakil and Captain Samad were killed. Lieutenant Ataullah Shah was
captured and taken as POW. Thus the Delta Company of 27 Baluch
Regiment ceased to exist in the official battle list of the Pakistan Army.
A reinforcement company supported by artillery from Jessore
Cantonment was ambushed at Bisaikhali and 60 Pakistani troops were
killed.
Bengal Military in East Pakistan

Bengali Forces of Pakistan Army posted in East Pakistan on 25 March
1971 :
1 East Bengal at Jessore Cantonment.
2 East Bengal at Joydebpur Cantonment.
3 East Bengal at Rangpur Cantonment.
4 East Bengal at Comilla Cantonment.
8 East Bengal at Chittagong Cantonment.
East Bengal Regimental Center at Chittagong.
Total number of East Bengal troops was about five thousand. Other
arms and Services units like Armour, Artillery, Signal, Engineers, Army
Service Corps, Ordnance, Medical Corps, Electrical & Mechanical
Engineering Corps etc constituted 20% Bengalis of the total forces of
Pakistan army stationed in East Pakistan numbering about seven
thousand. A few hundred officers and troops who were on leave also
joined the liberation war. Besides military, paramilitary forces like EPR,
Ansars and Police also joined Mukti Bahini.
East Pakistan Rifles numbered about twenty thousands.
Police Force were about hundred thousands.
Ansars were several hundred thousands.
Most effective force composed of students and youths who were
several hundred thousands.
1 East Bengal stationed at Jessore was sent to Chaughacha on
exercise duty to keep them in darkness as to the intention and planning
of Pakistan army. Should there be any action on the Bengali soldiers this
unit did not have any scope to react. Half of the troops of the regiment
were sent on leave to reduce its operational strength. The unit had four
Bengali officers Lieutenant Colonel Rezaul Jalil, Commanding Officer,
Captain Hafizuddin, Lieutenant Anwar and Lieutenant Khawja Shafi
Wasiuddin. The I E Bengal was ordered to fall back to Jessore
Cantonment on the evening of 29 March 1971. Brigadier Rahim Durani
Brigade commander 107 Brigade asked the Commanding Officer of the
regiment to deposit arms and ammunition to kote and it had to be done
when he took away the
keys of the kote. On 30 March 1971, 25 Baluch regiment supported by

artillery attacked the disarmed 1 East Bengal Regiment. Troops of 1
East Bengal under the command of Capt. Hufizuddin broke open the
kote and repulsed the attack and extricated from Jessore Cantonment. In
the fighting about fifty soldiers including Lieutenant Anwar embraced
martyrdom on 30 March 1971. Lieutenant Colonel Reazul Jalil and
Lieutenant Khawja Wasiuddin did not leave the Pakistan Army.
Lieutenant Khawja Shafi Wasiuddin was the son of Lieutenant General
Khawja Wasiuddin.
1 East Bengal Regiment turned as one of the hard cores of
fighting forces of the Liberation War.
2 East Bengal Regiment was stationed at Joydebpur 30 km north of
Dhaka. The Battalion was housed in the Rajbari of Joydebpur. In the past
the Rajbari was the official residence of the Bhawal Ra). This Battalion
was lucky because the Bengali Officers in the regiment out numbered the
Pakistanis. Lieutenant Colonel Masudur Rahman Khan, Commanding
Officer of the regiment, Major K M Safiullah, 2nd in command, Major
Nurul Islam, Major Mainul Hussein Chowdhury, Capt. ASM Nasim,
Captain Azizur Rahman, Captain GM Helal Morshed and Second
Lieutenant Ibrahim were the officers of 2 East Bengal Regiment. Brigade
Headquarters were located at Dhaka and its Brigade Commander was
Brigadier Arbab. The morale and the fighting force of the Battalion were
weakened by the ill motives of the higher authority. The companies of the
battalion were separated and despatched to different locations to weaken
the operational effectiveness of the battalion. One company of the
regiment was sent to Mymensingh under the command of Major Nurul
Islam and another company was sent to Tangail, Major Kazem Kamal as
its commander. One platoon was retained at Ordnance Factories at
Gazipur and another platoon was sent to Rajendrapur.
Brigade commander Brigadier Arbab along with 75 officers and
other ranks with full teeth arms landed at the Rajbari of Joydebpur on
19 March 1971. Clearing the road barricade from Tongi to Joydebpur
Chourasta, he indiscriminately used arms and killed several civilians.
He forced the local civilians to clear the road barricades. Brigadier
Arbab asked the 2 East Bengal over wireless to
reach the Chourasta and instructed to use maximum force if needed.

Brigade commander‟s aim was to disarm the battalion. The 2 East
Bengal was fully armed to face any situation whatsoever. Seeing the
state of readiness of the 2nd Bengal, Pakistani Brigade Commander was
alarmed and did not dare to take attempt to disarm the regiment.
There was a road barricade at Joydebpur Railway crossing where
about fifty thousand people assembled. Under the order of Brigadier
Arbab opening fire dispersed the crowd and some civilians were killed
on the spot.
Lieutenant Colonel AFM Abdur Raquib, a Bengali officer, replaced
Commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Masudur Rahman Khan. He
was an officer of Baluch Regiment. He was in Command of 32 Punjab
Regiment in Dhaka in 1971. His battalion on March 1, 1971 had staged
a crackdown on Awami League supporters and brutally killed quite a
number of innocent Bengalis in Dhaka. On 27 March 1971, Major K M
Safiullah and other Bengali officers asked the new commanding officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Raquib to take some action but he was reluctant.
Major KM Safiullah decided to concentrate the Battalion at
Mymensingh for future plan of action. 2 East Bengal left Joydebpur on
28 March 1971 and reached Tangail and joined its Alpha Company. By
the evening of 29 March 1971 the battalion completed its concentration
at Mymensingh.
3 East Bengal Regiment was located at Saidpur, a small garrison 20
km West of Rangpur. Lieutenant Colonel Fazal Karim, a West Pakistani
officer was the commanding officer. This battalion had a few Bengali
officers amongst whom were Major Nizamuddin, Captain Ashraf,
Lieutenant Mukles, Lieutenant Anwar, Lieutenant Rafiq Sarker and
Lieutenant Sirajul Islam. The battalion fought gallantly against the
numerically superior enemy and inflicted heavy causalty on them.
Lieutenant Rafiq Sarkar and Lieutenant Sirajul Islam embraced
Martyrdom. After successive battles thereafter this battalion assembled
at Hilli.
4 East Bengal Regiment was located at Comilla Cantonment.
Lieutenant Colonel Khizir Hyat was the Commanding officer of the
battalion. Major Khaled Mosharrof was the brigade Major of 57
Brigade located at Dhaka. West Pakistani Army authority could not

trust Major Khaled Mosharrof. He was posted to 4 East Bengal, as it‟s
2nd-in-Command.
Pakistani Army command at Comilla Cantonment thought it wise
to send 4 East Bengal out of the Cantonment to carry out coldblooded
massacre of other Bengali troops. 4 East Bengal was split up and sent to
different places. Charlie and Delta companies were sent to
Brahmanbaria. Alpha company was sent to Shamshemagore, Sylhet
under command of Major Khaled Mosharraf. At one stage
Commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Khizir Hyat was arrested.
Major Khaled Musharrof took over as the Commanding officer. Other
Bengali officers who joined Major Khaled Mosharrof are Major Shafaat
Jamil, Captain Ainuddin, Lieutenant Gaffar and Captain Abdul Matin.
Major Sultan, the Pakistani Brigade Major of 53 Brigade
committed cold-blooded murder of the Bengalis. He rounded up the
Bengali troops everywhere at the playground and military barracks and
killed them indiscriminately. All Bengali troops numbering about
hundred including Major Ayub Bern and Lieutenant Salahuddin of 135
Infantry Workshop EME were taken to a room and locked from outside.
At dead of night, all of them were killed. Sepoy Deen Muhammad was
unhurt and pretended as if he had also been killed. When the Pakistanis
left after the killing, Sepoy Deen Muhammad tried to escape. He found
a ventilator near the roof, but it was too high for him. He piled up the
dead bodies in different positions, some parallel and others crosswise
and thus could touch the ventilator. Every time the dead bodies had
been rolling down and the ventilator escaped his hands. After repeated
efforts he could some how get hold of it and escaped from the death
trap and participated in the liberation war. After liberation he was my
driver when I was commanding Base Workshop EME in 1972.
Captain Haider of 3-Commando battalion at Comilla cantonment
consulted Major Mannan to join liberation war. In reply Major Mannan
warned Captain Haider that he would report about his intention to
Pakistani authority if insisted on the same issue. After liberation Major
Mannan became Minister of Bangladesh
Government. Captain Haider (Later on Lieutenant Colonel) was killed on

07 November 1975 along with Major General Khalid Mussarraf, Bir
Uttam and Colonel K N Huda, Bir Bikram.
There was another survivor Lieutenant Imamuzzaman from Comilla
Cantonment. He along with another Captain half Bengali offspring of
Bengali and Bihari was locked up in a room. He was shot by a Subeder
of Pakistan Army. The office room where Lieutenant Imamuzzaman was
locked up was on the top of a hill. Subeder took him as dead and left the
room. Luckily Lieutenant Imamuzzaman was not hit, but he pretended to
be dead after he received only minor injury. At an opportune moment in
the same night, he opened the window of the room and jumped through
the window, somersaulted, ran, crawled, hided in rice field, again ran and
escaped the death trap and got new lease of life to fight the enemy. The
Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police of Comilla
district were locked up in a near by room and Lieutenant Imamuzzaman
heard the firing shots which killed both of them.
8 East Bengal Regiment was located at Chittagong Halishahor to be
despatched to West Pakistan. Lieutenant Colonel Rashid Janjua was the
commanding officer of the regiment. Major Ziaur Rahman was the
second in command of the regiment. Other officers of the regiment were
Major Mir Shawkot Ali, Captain Oli Ahmed, Captain Khaliquzzaman,
Captain Sadeq Hussein, Lieutenant Mafuzur Rahman and Lieutenant
Shamser Mobin Chowdhury. Major Ziaur Rahman was despatched to
Chittagong Port by his commanding officer with the intention of getting
him killed at the port. On the way Captain Khaliquzzaman came rushing
to Major Ziaur Rahman and informed him the ill motive of his CO.
Major Ziaur Rahman disarmed the West Pakistani troops accompanying
him and revolted. When the plan of CO was uncovered and Bengali
troops became furious and killed Lieutenant Colonel Janjua CO of the
regiment. Its reprisals started in Chittagong, Comilla and other
Cantnments by Pakistan Army. 8 East Bengal was fifty percent of its
strength at that time. 8 East Bengal moved towards Kalurghat and fought
the enemy at different places. At the Kalurghat Bridge Lieutenant
Shamser Mobin Chowdhury while engaged in fighting against the enemy
was seriously injured and captured by the enemy. Captain Harun Ahmed
Chaudhury was also injured. During the initial period Major Ziaur
Rahman had the unique and rare opportunity to announce the

independence of Bangladesh over high-powered radio at Khalurghat
first at his own and second time on behalf of Bangbandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman. In history he was at the right place and right time
when the destiny beckoned for him twice once on 27 March 1971 and
07 November 1975. By the time of his sixteen years commissioned
service career in 1971 Major Zia had achieved two background
qualities and experiences-skill of oratory and courage to do the job of
announcement. He was instructor at military academy at Kakul and he
commanded a company of 1 East Bengal in 65 Indo- Pak war at
Bedian-Kasur Sector along BRB canal in Lahore front where 1 E
Bengal repulsed 17 Indian divisional attacks under continuous air
support and destroyed most of the Indian main battle tanks (Centurian)
and saved Lahore from being captured by Indian army. I East Bengal
Regiment obtained 17 gallantry awards and its Bengali commanding
officer Lieutenant Colonel A T K Huq was decorated with second
highest gallantry award Sitara-i-Jurat. Nisan- i-Haider the highest
gallantry award generally kept reserved for the martyrs. 1 East Bengal
obtained maximum number of gallantry awards in 1965 Indo-Pak war
among all Pakistan units. It was the rare honour for the Bengal Tigers.
In Chittagong another important battle was fought in Kumira on 28
March 1971. A Pakistani column composed of 24 Frontier Force
Regiment and 88 Mortar battery under the command of Brigadier Iqbal
Shafi, commander 53 Brigade of Comilla proceeding towards
Chittagong was ambushed by 100 men of East Pakistan Rifles and
some police at 7.30 PM. Lieutenant Colonel Shahpur Khan with 152
other ranks was killed. There was a hot rumour that Shahpur was shot
and killed on the very first day of the crack down by Brigade major
Sultan, as he did not approve of the Pakistan Army action and was
opposed to the killing of Bengali officers and troops in Comilla
Cantonment. Mukti Bahini captured two truckloads of ammunition. 14
gallant soldiers of Mukti Bahini embraced martyrdom. On 29 March
1971, 2 Commando battalion was asked to link up 24 FF was also
ambushed by Mukti Bahini. Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman, CO of 2
Commando Battalion, Captain Sikander and 19 ORs were killed in the
same site.
Major General Mitha Khan, QMG of Pakistan Army was moved to

Dhaka on 07 March 1971 along with Tikka from GHQ, Rawalpindi
arrived by a helicopter on 29 March 1971 to Chittagong to motivate the
demoralized troops. Artillery and gunboats from the sea were brought in
to support 24 FF. Leaderless Mukti Bahini fought courageously and
extricated.
The troops of 9 Division from Kharian Cantonment already brought
in, in the month of February 1971 and stationed at Dhaka airlifted to
Chittagong. PNS JAHANGIR sailed from Karachi on 02 March 1971
arrived at Chittagong port on 27 March 1971 with two infantry battalions
and two squadrons of tanks. The massive reinforcement forced the Mukti
Bahini to leave the City stronghold.
East Bengal Regiment Centre was located at Chittagong. The
Commandant of the Regimental Centre was Brigadier Muzamdar, a
Bengali Officer. Another Bengali officer Lieutenant Colonel M R
Chowdhury was the Chief Instructor. There were a few thousand of
Bengali recruits and instructors in the East Bengal Regimental Centre.
Just before the crackdown Brigadier Muzunder was attached to Division
headquarters in Dhaka. Lieutenant Colonel M R Chowdhury was killed.
Most of the Bengali officers, troops and recruits while in sleep at dead of
night were killed. Commanding officer of CMH, Lieutenant Colonel
Badiul Alam Chowdhury; Officer Commanding station workshop,
Captain Mohammad Akhand were also killed brutally by Pakistan army.
Bangladesh Government 139
Chapter 4
BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND
ORGANIZATION OF MUKTI BAHINI.
Crossing to Indian Soil

I crossed the Indian border to see the attitude of the people of India
towards our cause. I went to Bahrampur, Krisnanagore and Calcutta
while at times I traveled by bus and sometimes by train. The people of
India were very sympathetic to our cause. The Indian press and
electronic media published the brutal atrocities committed by Pak army
on the innocent Bengalis. Even the international print and electronic
media had given wide publicity about Pakistan army‟s atrocities. I
bought a Newsweek, issue of 06 April 1971, its cover page bearing
caption civil war in Pakistan with the photograph of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman. Newsweek‟s Loren Jenkins filed a report entitled Pakistan
plunges into civil war where he described Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as
poet of politics who is eloquent in three languages of Pakistan in Urdu,
Bengali and English. The challenges by Yahya and counter challenges
by Sheikh Mujib were in the preamble of the article that is quoted below:
„The man and his party are enemies of Pakistan. The crime will
not go unpunished. We will not allow some power hungry and
unpatriotic people to destroy this country and play with the destiny
of 120 million people.‟
-President Mohammed
Yahya Khan
„Come out of your houses with whatever weapons you have.

Resist the enemy forces at any cost...until the last enemy soldier is
vanquished, and save the country from the ruthless dictatorship of
West Pakistan.‟
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
In Calcutta I spent my night in a police station. They treated us as

guests from Joy Bangla. The government of India was also in our favour
but till then not decided to extend us any military help. Being a separate
nation India could not and should not have interfered in the internal
affairs of another sovereign country without any valid reason that
affected their interest and sovereignty as well. India cared for world
opinion. India could at that stage at best support the legitimate stand of
the people of East Pakistan by imparting military
training to the young men who could reach there by supplying arms,
ammunition and weapons as a matter of political support. After all a
country needs very reasonable grounds to attack another country only
when their own interest is in jeopardy.
I returned back to Meherpur on 15 April 1971 and met Captain
Mustafizur Rahman. He asked me to take a convoy to Indian BOP at
Betai. The convoy consisted of about hundred jeeps, trucks and buses
loaded with arms, ammunition, POL, rice etc including another three
trucks filled carrying 6 crore taka. There was a river passing beside
Meherpur town. The river was almost dry. A very thin stream of water
was flowing through its narrow channel in the centre. A temporary
Bridge made with local expedients existed over the river. One of
Bangladesh Rifles truck partially went off the bridge with its front left
wheel and fell partially into the river. It created a roadblock. We tried
to take the truck on the other side of the river, but all our efforts failed.
In the mean time we had the message that Pak Army was about to
reach Meherpur. I brought a road roller and with the help of local
people pushed down the stranded truck into the river and thus whole
convoy could cross the river.
At night there was rainfall. The non-metal road ahead of us was
absolutely muddy and not motorable. Able leadership, bravery and
initiative of Captain Salahuddin and untiring hardship of EPR troops
helped us to reach Indian BOP at Betei. We had to push the vehicles
through mud as their engines failed to pull. It was really a hard task.
We found a BSF Captain at the Betai BOP who allowed us to stay
there. But we were without any food. However the BDR troops
cooked khechuri- a mixture of rice and pulses with oil, onion, chilli
and turmeric, which was our lunch for that day. At Betai I met Captain
AR Azam Chowdhury who offered me a plate of khechuri. In the
evening all Bangladesh Rifles troops assembled and Major Osman
Chowdhury addressed the troops and motivated the troops so that they
could fight back the Pakistan army for the freedom of our motherland.
The officers present on that occasion included Capt AT Salauddin,
Capt Muztafizur Rahman, Tawfiq-e- Chowdhury, SDO Meherpur,
Mahabubuddin Ahmed, SDPO Jhenidah and Safiqullah, lecturer of
Jhenidah Cadet College. It was so unfortunate that Major Osman
Chowdhury's contribution to liberation war went unnoticed.
He was not awarded any gallantry award. All the sector commanders
were awarded Bir Uttam for holding the post irrespective of their
performances and gallant action. Major Osman and Major Jalil were
exceptions amongst them.
Bangladesh Government in Exile
On 16 April 1971, a foreign journalist was trying to take a snap of BDR
troops along with the national flag of India that was flying at a BOP. I
got hold of the journalist and removed the film and asked him if he had
the courage to go inside Bangladesh and make a film on the genocide
taking place over there. On the morning of 17 April 1971,1 learnt that
formal declaration of provisional Government of Bangladesh in exile
would take place at Plassey. The place was a mango groove in East
Pakistan territory under Meherpur subdivision.
On 17 April 1971, we started for Baidaynathtala a small village near
Indian border in Meherpur later known as Mujibnagore to attend the
installation ceremony of Bangladesh Government. I carried my
submachine gun. On the way I had been stopping my jeep at places to
enquire about the location of the place of the ceremony. At one place, I
came to know that the name of the place was Plassey. The shock wave of
excitement went through my veins. My mind went back to the time of
Nawab Sirajuddawla, the last independent ruler of Bengal who was
defeated by the treachery of his commander-in-chief Zafar Ali Khan who
had a conspiracy with British officer Lord Clive of East India Company.
Nawab Sirajudawla was captured by the information given by his own
subject and executed by Mohammad Ali Beg Miran, a butcher, by order
from Zafar Ali Khan‟s son hired by the English.
On the middle of the ceremony we reached Mujibnagore. Major
Abu Osman chowdhury, Captain Salahuddin, Captain Mustafizur
Rahman, Captain A R Azam Chowdhury Captain KN Huda, Tawfiq- e-
Elahi Chowdhury, and Mahbubuddin Ahmed attended the historic
ceremony. Mr. Syed Nazrul Islam who was made the Acting president of
the provisional government of Bangladesh was addressing the huge
gathering. Hundreds of foreign journalists from all over the world were
present there. Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam delivered his
historic speech. The gist of the speech is produced below:
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

President (in Pakistan Lastly)
Syed Nazrul Islam Jajuddin Ahmed

Acty President Prime Minister
M. Munsur Ali M. Quamruzzaman

Finance Minister Relief & Rehabilitation Minister
Khandakar Mustaq Ahmed

Forign & Law Minister (New Version of Mirzafar)
Cabinet Ministers of Bangladesh Government in Exile 1971

Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister of Bangladesh Government in exile at Mujibnagar on 17 April
1971 after the swearing in ceremony giving interview to foreign journalists. Author with stengun seen in
the picture marked 'W' who had also given interview to BBC and French journalists.
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Mukti Bahini Guerrillas engaged in killing Pakistani hyenas in 1971
Members of Mukti Bahini Loading ammunition truck for transportation to operational area in 1971
Moments of henious creminal Design by Yahya under the cover of

dialogue with Bangabandhu 16-24 March 1971
Acting Presedent Syed Nazrul Islam speaking at Mujib Nagar after

the swearing in ceremoney on 17 April 1971. Author was present in
the swearing in ceremoney
“To-day a new nation is born in this mango garden. The people of

Bengal wanted to move forward with their own culture, tradition, hopes
and aspiration during the last few years. But vested interest group in
Pakistan never allowed materializing these aspirations. They launched
armed attack on us. We wanted to move democratically, but were not
allowed. They initiated barbarous attack on our unarmed people. That is
why we have chosen the path of fighting. In this fighting, ultimate
victory will be ours. We will drive out the Pakistani aggressors. We
want peaceful co-existence with all countries of the world. We want to
see the victory of humanity, democracy and freedom.
Bangabandhu continued movement against the exploitation and
autocratic rule of Pakistan during the last 23 years. He wanted to
establish political, economic and cultural rights of the Bengalis. We
have received his dynamic leadership at times of our crisis. Newborn
state of Bangladesh will remain forever on the world map. No power on
earth can erase it. In every step during the last 23 years Pakistani
opportunist, industrialist, capitalist, army and civil groups continued to
suppress the Bengali movement. We wanted to get our rights
implemented through peaceful means. It is a matter of shame and
sorrow that West Pakistanis termed Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq as traitor
and put Husyen Shaheed Suhrawardy in jail. We cannot compromise
with them. We cannot forgive them. President Bangabandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman the great popular leader symbol of unity for the
oppressed people of Bangladesh fought for political, economic and
cultural rights of the people of Bengal who is also put behind the bar.
Freedom movement will be achieved under his leadership.”
Mr. Syed Nazrul Islam announced the name of Colonel
Muhammad Ataual Ghani Osmany, psc as the Commander-in-Chief of
Bangladesh Armed Forces. Colonel Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmany
was known as a brilliant and talented officer in Pakistan Army who
possessed splendid soldierly qualities. But Ayub Khan deprived him of
his due promotion and many junior officers superceded him. He had 28
years of glorious commissioned service
at his disposal. He fought in World War II in Burma and held important

appointments in Pakistan Army. His service arms from Army Supply
Corps to infantry regiment were changed by the recommendation of
British instructor for his outstanding performance in Staff College. We
proudly observed that under his leadership, Bangladesh Armed Forces
were organized only in seven month. It was an outstanding feat and has
no parallel in history. He was aware of his position as Commander-in-
Chief of Bangladesh Armed Forces. He maintained his dignity and pride
as Commander- in-Chief. He would always maintain that his country
needed help, not alms. He was very conscious of his position. On one
occasion he had to reach an operational area by helicopter but he
instructed his pilot to circle in the sky until commander of Indian army
landed to receive him. Indian commander was with the rank of Major
General and Osmany was with the rank of Colonel. But Osmany was
Commander-in-Chief of Bangladesh Armed Forces. It was
organizational leadership of Colonel Osmany that in a very short time
Bangladesh Armed Forces launched an all out offensive against the
Pakistan Army.
Professor M Yusuf Ali read out the proclamation of Independence
order of Bangladesh. The context of the proclamation of
Independence order of Bangladesh is reproduced below:
“Whereas free elections were held in Bangladesh on December 07,
1970 -to elect representatives for the purpose of framing a constitution,
and
Whereas in these elections out of 169 the people of Bangladesh
elected 167 representatives from the Awami League, and
Whereas General. Yahya Khan summoned the National Assembly
of the elected representative of the people to meet on March 03, 1971,
for the purpose of framing a constitution, and
Whereas instead of fulfilling their promises and while still
conferring with the representatives of the people of Bangladesh, the
Pakistan authorities declared an unjust and treacherous war, and
Whereas in the facts and circumstances of such treacherous conduct
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed
leader of 75 million people of Bangladesh, in order to establish the

legitimate right of self- determination of the people of Bangladesh, duly
made a declaration of independence at Dhaka on March 26, 1971, and
urged the people of Bangladesh to resist the occupation army, and
Whereas in the conduct of a ruthless and savage war the Pakistani
authorities thrusted upon the people of Bangladesh and are still
committing numerous acts of genocide and unprecedented tortures,
amongst others on her civilian and unarmed people, and Whereas the
Pakistan Government by initiating an unjust war and committing
genocide and by other repressive measures made it impossible for the
elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh to meet and frame a
constitution for the country and form a Government of their own, and
Whereas the people of Bangladesh by their heroism, bravery and
revolutionary fervour have established effective control over the
territories of Bangladesh,
We, the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh, as
duty-bound by the mandate given to us by the people of Bangladesh
whose will is supreme, have duly constituted ourselves into a
Constituent Assembly, and
Having held mutual consultations, and in order to ensure for the
people of Bangladesh equality, human dignity and social justice,
Declare and constitute Bangladesh to be a Sovereign People's Republic
and thereby confirm the declaration of independence already made by
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and
Do hereby, confirm and resolve that till such time as a constitution
is framed. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shall be the President
and that Syed Nazrul Islam shall be the Vice- President of the Republic,
and
That the President shall be the Supreme Commander of the armed
forces of the Republic,
Shall exercise all the executive and legislative powers of the
Republic including the power to grant pardon,
And to appoint a Prime Minister as and when he considers it
necessary shall have the power to levy taxes and expend monies,
Shall have the power to summon and adjourn the Constituent

Assembly, and, do all other things that may be necessary to give to
the people of Bangladesh an orderly and just Government.
We the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh, do
further resolve that in the event of there being no President or the
President being unable to enter upon his office or being unable to
exercise his powers and perform his duties due to any reason
whatsoever, the Vice-President shall have all the authorities to
exercise all the powers, duties and responsibilities herein conferred
on the President.
We further resolve that we undertake to observe and give effect
to all duties and obligations devolved upon us as a member of the
family of nations and by the Charter of the United Nations.
We further resolve that to give effect to this resolution, we
authorize and appoint Prof. M Yusuf Ali our duly constituted
potentiary to give to the President and Vice- President the oaths of
office.
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was appointed as the
President of the Republic. Professor M. Yusuf Ali conducted the
oath of office of vice-President, Prime Minister, and other ministers.
Following were the ministers of cabinet of the Provisional
government of Bangladesh:
Vice-President Syed Nazrul Islam (Acting
President)
Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed
Finance Minister M. Mansur Ali M
Home, Relief and Quamruzzaman
Rehabilitation of Minister
Foreign and Law Minister Khandakar Mustaq Ahmed.
A contingent of smartly turned out BDR troops led by Major Abu
Osman Chowdhury presented a guard of honour to Mr. Syed Nazrul
Islam, Honourable Acting President of Bangladesh. I was in civvies with
a Chinese SMG. I had given my interview to a BBC reporter and a
French journalist. BBC reporter told me that it was very difficult to get
independence, as young people were not fighting. They are running
away from the country and taking shelter in India or hiding in the
countryside. I did not agree with his
arguments and convinced him that young Bengalis had been fighting
against Pak Army. By showing my SMG I told him “Look I am young
and I am a freedom fighter”. At Mujibnagore I met Colonel Ataul Ghani
Osmani and other political personalities. I found my cousin Mr. Shorab
Hossain who was Member of Parliament. Later on he became a minister
in Bangabandhu's cabinet. I met a French journalist who was in Dhaka
on the night of 25 March 1971. He had observed the atrocity of the Pak
Army in Dhaka and made the film on the attack on Bengalis by Pakistan
Army. He put the films in his underwear for smuggling it to outside
world but he was checked at Dhaka airport and those films were ceased.
From Karachi he had flown to Calcutta to attend the installation
ceremony of Bangladesh government.
The formation of Bangladesh Government in exile bestowed the
Lucas standi of its cabinet to negotiate with Indian Government and the
outside world. Conduct of war under an authoritative leadership aided
vitality and momentum in our struggle for achieving complete freedom
from the clutches of Pakistani colonial rule.
Birth of Mukti Bahini

The formation of Bangladesh Government in exile under united single
leadership was a major step forward to continue the fight against the
Pakistani occupation army. The installation ceremony of Bangladesh
Government was over. We returned to Betai where Mukti Bahini was
temporarily camped. Our forces were instructed to assemble at Bangaon
for re-organization and for planning and to conduct operation.
On the night of 19 April 1971 we started our journey for Bangaon
via Krisnanagore and Ranaghat. It was raining that night. Captain
Salahuddin, Captain Mustafizur Rahman and I were traveling in the
same jeep. The jeep had been proceeding in rains on very slippery road
and on the way we averted a serious accident and miraculously got a
new lease of life. The jeep went out of the metal road, stopped to earth
shoulder of the road. We decided to travel by three different transports
to avert the probability of all officers getting killed in one go. The
transport in which I was traveling had a leaked canopy through which
water was pouring. From Krisnanagore
some of our transports loaded with crores of rupees by mistake

proceeded towards Calcutta. Captain Salahuddin rushed and got those
transports back to join the convoy.
We reached Bangaon in torrential rains. At night I stayed there in
the house of a custom superintendent. By that time 1 East Bengal
Regiment concentrated in the custom colony at Bangoan. Colonel
Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmany, our Commander-in-Chief visited 1
East Bengal Regiment next morning. 1 East Bengal commanded by
Captain Hafizuddin presented guard of honour to Colonel Ataul Ghani
Osmani. The strength of 1 East Bengal was only about 165. He
addressed 1 East Bengal to infuse fighting spirit in them, and then he
went to East Pakistan Custom Office for a meeting with Bangladesh
military officers. At the custom office he described how he survived on
the fateful night of 25 March 1971 and how he escaped from Dhaka city.
He was staying in Banani residential area of Dhaka on that night. When
he heard sound of the fire of weapons, he left his house and stayed near
the Banani Lake and when the situation was normal, he returned to his
house and found bloodstain on the floor of his house. He trimmed his
big moustache and left Dhaka city with his private car. First thing he
managed was a map of Bangladesh. In his initiating move he visited
Bangaon to gather information about the conditions of Bengal army and
EPR for subsequent planning.
Next morning Captain Mustafizur Rahman and me were going to
watch the defensive position of Mukti Bahini mainly composed of EPR
troops at Bangaon. Before we could reach the defense position, we heard
the burst of MG and other automatic weapons. We took up position
behind a banyan tree. A battalion of Pakistan Army dressed in EPR
uniform launched a dawn attack on Mukti Bahini defensive position.
Our forces opened up their weapons, when Pak soldiers came in front of
their bunkers they could be recognized only from their appearance.
Mukti Bahini was caught in surprise. There were heavy casualties at our
side. The brave Havilder Mujibur Rahman who was promoted to the
rank of Naib Subeder by Sector Commander inflicted heavy causalities
to enemy and embraced martyrdom. He was gunned down when his
ammunition got exhausted and he had been rushing to another MG post.
The defeat
152 Mukti Dahini Wins Victory
of our troops at Bangaon had a demoralizing effect on our troops. Later

on posthumously Naib Subeder Mujibur Rahman was awarded gallantry
award.
At noon I met Major General Jacobs Eastern command of Indian
army at Bangaon check post on the Indian side. I introduced myself to
General Jacobs. He was very nice to me. We became friendly in no time.
Soldiers have respect for each other by instinct and General Jacob had
this in him. I inquired about their infantry rifle. He showed me a SLR.
For the first time I saw a SLR. He asked his ADC to give me a SLR to
have an idea of its operation. While I was cocking the rifle other officers
accompanying the general were alerted. General told them not to worry
and told them that I was a defected officer of Pak army and hence I
know how to handle such weapons.
At the check post on the Indian side Mr. Tawfiq-e-Elahi
Chowdhury, Mr. Mahbubuddin Ahmed and another gentleman were
sitting on a bench in a small shelter of the custom department. I went
there and sat near the gentleman. As he was an unknown face I wanted
to know his identity. He remained silent. He could learn about me as I
was in friendly company of an Indian general. Later I found out that this
gentleman was our Honourable Prime Minister Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed.
General Jacob requested me for a military map of Bangladesh. I
searched for one but could not manage it and regretted the request of
General Jacob. In the afternoon Mr. Tawfiq- e-Elahi Chowdhury
brought a plate of rice and requested me to share with them as we were
without food for the whole day.
In the same afternoon a member of British Parliament Mr. John
Stone House came to Bangladesh custom office. Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed
briefed the member of the British Parliament about the killing and
atrocities in Bangladesh. Later on Captain Salahuddin also in his lucid
language briefed the massacre of Pak army in Dhaka and other places in
Bangladesh.
Just after the departure of our Prime Minister and the British MP
Mr. John Stone House, Pak Army launched an attack on our custom
office position. We were not prepared for such an attack to a position so
close to international border. BSF replied the fire. There was rumour
that Pak army captured Major Abu Osman Chowdhury. The wife of
Major Abu Osman was very anxious and she asked me about
Sector Map of Bangladesh War of Liberation
Map-3 Graphics : M. Ziaul Hague

the fate of Major Abu Osman. I consoled her that Major Abu Osman
was safe. We left our territory and retreated to the Indian side.
Bangladesh Armed Forces were organized under the C-in-Cship of
Colonel Ataul Ghani Osmany, MP. BDF‟s HQ was located at 8, Theatre
road, Calcutta, officially called Mugibnagore. The overall responsibility
of the HQ was command, control, and administration of Mukti Bahini
and planning of operation. Colonel Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmany,
MP was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of Bangladesh Armed
Forces. Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rab, MP was appointed as Chief of
Army Staff responsible for Eastern Area; Group Captain A K
Khandaker was appointed as Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Air
Staff. Besides other staffs, Lieutenant Sheikh Kamal was appointed as
ADC to C-in-C.
Bangladesh Army and Para-military‟s defected troops composed of
mainly Army and BDR were grouped into sectors and companies.
In all ten sectors were organized, they were 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, .6, .7, .8,
.9 and 11 sectors. The brief description of the sectors are given below:
HQ 1 Sector was located at Horina; the area of responsibility was
the district of Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tract extending up to East
bank of River Mohuri. Sector Commander was Major Ziaur Rahman.
When Major Ziaur Rahman took over the command of „Z‟ Force in the
month of July, Major Rafiqul Islam was made Sector Commander.
HQ 2 Sector was located at Meghalaya. Its area of operation
included the districts of Noakhali, Comilla, Dhaka city and a portion of
Faridpur district and the Sector Commander was Major Khaled
Musarraf.
HQ 3 Sector was located at Mantola (Sylhet), its area of command
consisted of a portion of the districts of Comilla and Sylhet; Kishorgonj
sub-division and northern area of Dhaka district. Sector Commander
was Major K M Shafiullah.
HQ 4 Sector was located at Khoyi the area of responsibility was
part of the district of Sylhet. Sector Commander was Major Chitra
Ranjan Dutta.
HQ 5 Sector was located at Shillong the area of responsibility was

a portion of Sylhet, Ameerigoj and western area of Lakhai. Sector
Commander was Major Mir Shawkat Ali.
HQ 6 Sector was located at Patgram (Rangpur) the area of
responsibility was the districts of Rangpur, Dinajpur and subdivision of
Takurgoan. Sector Commander was Wing Commander M K Bashar.
HQ 7 Sector was located at Tarangpur. Its command area
encompassed the districts of Rajshahi, Pabna and Bogra. Sector
Commander was Major Nazmul Huq. Major Qazi Nuruzzaman became
sector commander after Major Nazmul Huq was killed in a tragic road
accident.
HQ 8 Sector was located at Kallayani the area of responsibility was
the district of Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur and Khulna. Sector
Commander was Major Abu Osman Chaudhury and from August Major
Abul Manzur.
HQ 9 Sector was located at Hasanabad. The area of responsibility
was the district of Barisal, Patuakhali. Sector Commander was Major M
A Jalil.
HQ 11 Sector was located at Mohendragonj. The area of
responsibility was the district of Tangail and Mymenshing. Sector
Commander was Major Abu Taher.
The sector under which I fought was named as 8 Sector. Following
companies were raised under 8 Sector.
„AT Company was located at Itenda opposite of Satkhira, Company
Commander was Captain AT Salahuddin. Later on Captain
Mahboboddra Ahmed, a police officer, commanded the company. I also
cosmsEexkd She company for a month in the month of August.
'B' Company was located at Banpur opposite to Darsana. Its
QxrcsG?y Commander was Captain Mustafizur Rahman and I also
commanded Tne(company for a month in the month of July,
“C Company was located at Betai opposite to Meherpur and its
Company Commaadar was Captain A R Azam Chowdhury and I also
commanded -this .company.
*D Company was located at Boyra opposite to Chaugacha. Its
Company Commander was Captain Khandker Nuzmul Huda.
■
„E‟ Company was at Hakimpur opposite to Satkhira. Its Company

Commander was Professor Shafiqullah.
„F Company was located at Shikarpur opposite to Pragpur. Its
Company Commander was Lieutenant Jahangir. Later on Captain
Tawfiq-i-Chowdhury took over as company commander.
S
H' Company was located at Petrapole opposite to Bangaon. Its
Company Commander was Captain Tawfiq-E-Elahi Chowdhury
Besides there was a sub-sector commander Captain Giasuddin
Chowdhury. His headquarters was located at Lalgola opposite to
Rajshahi. Sector Headquarters 8 Sector was located at Kallayani and I
was company commander at sector headquarters. Major Abu Osman
Chowdhury was Sector Commander and in August Major Manzur
replaced him. Tactical headquarters was located at Ranaghat. Areas of
responsibilities of 8 Sector were districts of Jessore, Khulna, Kushtia,
Faridpur, Rajshahi and Pabna.
One night Captain M Nurul Huda from 9 Sector came to me at
Bangaon with a slip from Major Abu Osman Chowdhury for issuance of
32 Light machine guns, 500 automatic rifles and- sufficient ammunition.
Those were issued to Captain M Nural Huda. Major MA Jalil was sector
commander of 9 Sector. Pak army ambushed the motor launch while
going towards Barisal with these arms; he abandoned the motor launch
and returned to his Sector Headquarters at Taki in the district of Basirhat.
At this Colonel Osmani was very much annoyed with him and showed
his serious indignation.
Colonel Osmany accompanied by Mr. Tofael Ahmed and Major
Shafat Jamil visited our headquarters at Bangaon once again. On that
occasion Major M A Jalil was also present. Major M A Jalil requested
for fresh supply of arms and ammunition from our sector. Colonel
Osmany turned down the request. Major Osman pleaded for Major Jalil.
Colonel Osmany insulted Major Jalil in whatever language he could and
shouted at him in presence of many officers and politicians, which was
humiliating on the part of a Commander.
Colonel Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmany, C-in-C informed us that
he proposed four types of gallantry awards in recognition of brilliant and
brave performances in war field. He read out the written
contents of the awards. These gallantry awards were Bir Sheresto, Bir
Uttam, Bir Bikram and Bir Pratik.
Bir Sheresto- gallantry of highest order in the face of enormous
odds entailing the peril of certain death, in which but for the individuals
gallant deed the enemy would have succeeded in inflicting grave loss
on our forces. Alternately, the individual‟s gallant deed caused the
destruction to the enemy of a magnitude, having vital influence on the
course of operations. Essential- three witnesses, Award- TK 10,000.00.
Bir Uttam- gallantry of high order. As above but of a lesser degree.
Essential- Two witnesses. Award TK 5,000.00.
Bir Bikram- gallantry of commendable order. As above but of a
still lesser degree, Essential - One witness. Award - TK 2,000.00.
Bir Pratik- gallantry certificate. Of a degree not coming up to any
of the above standard but of a positive nature warranting recognition.
Captain SIM Noor- Un- Nabi Khan and Captain Shariful Hoque
Dalim accompanied Commander-in-Chief as his staff officer. Captain
Noor-Un-Nabi Khan after attending a course at Quetta landed at Dhaka
on 28 March 1971. His father-in-law who was civil surgeon at Dinajpur
was brutally killed. He observed the atrocities and brutalities of Pak
army on innocent civilians in Dhaka. He decided to leave Pak Army
and joined the liberation war.
Captain Nurul Afsar my classmate in BUET who attended the
course on tactics with Captain Noor-Un-Nabi Khan and returned to
Dhaka by the same flight wanted to join the liberation war. But his
brothers resisted on the ground that if he would join liberation war, his
family members would be massacred and so he reported his unit 31
Cavalry at Rangpur Cantonment. On the last week of March he was
taken in custody and killed later on.
Captain Dalim also after completion of junior tactics course at
Quetta along with Lieutenant Matiur Rahman and Lieutenant Noor
escaped from Pakistan during the joining time. Later on these Captain
Dalim and Lieutenant Noor along with other officers killed
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. Both these officers
were retired from service under Bangladesh Army Act (BAA-16)
without trial. It was true that they were bad elements; they should
have been court-martialed and awarded more severe punishment.

Punishment is awarded for maintenance of discipline in the army and
acts as deterrent. Once the criminal escapes the punishment, next time
he will commit bigger crime. Exactly that had happened in case of
Dalim and Noor who subsequently committed heinous crime. They took
the revenge by killing Bangabandhu. BAA-16 is bad law where one-
sided verdict is given, accused has no scope to defend his case. He
cannot go to civil court to redress his grievances. The constitution of the
country does not give any shelter to army soldiers. Army officers are
being retired from service by the authority of BAA-16 at the wish of the
government in power. Some mechanism may be worked out to check
this trend. Army persons are issued weapons to use for authorized duty,
but dealt severely when this power is misused. This is most justified.
The weapon of BAA- 16 was made by the imperial army to deal with
the native troops. It is time that it needs revision in an independent
democratic country. India has already revised Manual of Indian Military
Law (MIML) and lifted the imperial restriction and opened the legal
doors to the civil courts for the officers and soldiers to redress their
grievances.
Lieutenant Matiur Rahman killed Major General Ziaur Rahman in
1981. It is irony of fate that a group of freedom fighters killed the father
of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and another group
killed the great freedom fighter Major General Ziaur Rahman. In 1971
all were comrade-in-arms. Lieutenant Matiur Rahman (later on
Lieutenant Colonel) was not selected for a Staff College course in
America. Lieutenant Colonel Matiur Rahman was from public school of
Lower Topa in Pakistan and a regular officer and held important
appointments in Bangladesh Army. A short service Lieutenant Colonel
who did not participate in liberation war was selected for the same
foreign course. It might be an injustice to Lieutenant Colonel Matiur
Rahman. This insignificant incident ignited the anger of Lieutenant
Colonel Matiur Rahman against Ziaur Rahman. And he took leading
role in the killing of Ziaur Rahman that should not have ever occurred.
Captain Dalim recorded the personal history of all the army officers
located at Bangaon at the instruction of Colonel Osmany. This was
required for planning of organized war.
l5s MuktiBahini Wins Victory
Mjnions of people from Bangladesh who were targets of killing

Pakistan army rushed to India. Hundreds of refugee camps were et up
along the border. The living and sanitary condition of the refugee
camps were simply horrible and miserable. Youth camps were also
established where they were imparted physical and military training.
Some time in the last week of May 1971, Prime Minister of India,
Sreemoti Indira Ghandi passed our camp while visiting refugee
camps. At that moment Colonel Osmany was with us. We were
instructed to remain hidden so that accompanying pressmen could not
see us. But I was eagerly waiting to have a glimpse of the Honourable
Prime Minister of India. This great leader of India had been doing
everything to help us to liberate Bangladesh and had given us arms,
shelter, food, medicine, sanctuary for the freedom fighters of
Bangladesh. I saw her from a distance. She was dignified and
graceful.
Captain Abdul Halim arrived at Bangaon in the last week of May
1971. He reached Bangaon with a lungi and vest. I helped him to
procure dress like pant and shirt. Mr. Waliur Rahman and Mr.
Kamaluddin Siddique both member of Pakistan Civil Service and other
officers visited our camp. Mr. Waliur Rahman told us that we were the
only hope and he could see the ray of freedom through us. If we betray,
the country would never be liberated. Mr. Kamaluddin Siddique
expressed his wish to Commander-in-Chief to participate in battles.
Later on he joined 'A' Company under command of Captain Salahuddin
at Guzadanga opposite to Satkhira and participated in a battle. He could
not sustain the physical and mental pressure of the battle. His patriotic
emotion subsided and he left the Mukti Bahini camp as his taste of battle
was met. He understood that life could be sacrificed at any moment. He
returned to his armchair job. Mr. Kamaluddin Siddique was SDO of
Narail before Pakistan Army crackdown. He described that after
crackdown in the absence of law he could identify good and evil men. A
number of looting and raping incidents took place in the absence of law
enforcing agencies.
In the mean time I received a message that my younger brother
Anwar-uz-zaman, final year MBBS student, reached Calcutta. He was
staying there in the house of a Hindu gentleman who migrated from my
village in 1947.1 heard that police warrant against me was sent to my
village home under instruction from the army. I also heard
that my parents had deserted our home and were staying in the house of
our relative. Occasionally Pak army used to go to my village. Once I
visited my cousin Mr. Shorab Hussein MP at Bangaon. One Indian
gentleman allowed him to stay in his house. There were some other
political leaders of Bangladesh with him. They were totally demoralized
and left the hope of achieving freedom.
To infuse courage and remove frustration from the minds of these
political leaders I told them that we had been fighting for our existence
and survival. The whole nation was fighting against the occupation
army. The days of colonization had gone. We the freedom fighters were
fighting for freedom and Pakistan army was fighting for subjugation. We
were fighting for a genuine cause and Pakistan army was obeying orders
of Yahya. Pakistan army thought that they would face unarmed civilian
and then they were facing ■armed freedom fighters. They thought the
Bengalis are non-martial and coward and then they were caught in
surprise and got killed in thousands by the Bengalis. Pakistan army was
told that they would be killing only Hindus but in reality they were
killing their Muslim brethren. The cause for fighting by Pakistan army
was based on falsehood and personal ambition of Bhutto and Yahya. We
would be crowned with Victory. I expressed my firm belief, faith and
conviction that the country must be liberated. Political leaders present
there after my spirited arguments understood that Bengal had many
courageous people who had strong conviction for liberating Bangladesh
from the illegal occupation of military regime of Pakistan.
1 East Bengal Regiment was located separately at Bangaon but was
not placed under our Sector Commander. Captain Hafizuddin was the
acting commanding officer of the unit. He was the only officer of the
unit. 1 East Bengal was not included in sector troops. Captain
Hafizuddin was allowed to operate independently by Commander-in-
Chief. He had the mind to re-organize 1 E Bengal. He did not like that E
Bengal to be commanded by an ASC officer. Lieutenant Colonel Megh
Singh was the sector commander of BSF at Bangaon. He was all out to
help us. He even criticized the Indian government as Banius for not
issuing order to attack the occupation army in Bangladesh. When he met
Lt General Aurora, he offered his
resignation and wanted to join Mukti Bahini. Once his forces even
chased the soldiers of Pak army into Bangladesh. In the process the
occupation army captured two of his sepoys. Later on they were shown
on Pakistan television. During the war, Lieutenant Colonel Megh Singh
fought in the western front and I learnt that his forces went 70 miles
inside West Pakistan territory. Major Megh Singh, sector commander of
BSF used to infuse fighting spirit among the freedom fighters of
Bangladesh.
Mr. Shoban who was a magistrate in Meherpur SDO‟S court
counted the Pakistan currency we brought from Bangladesh. The
amount of money was about 6 crore which was handed over to the
government of Bangladesh in Calcutta. In the mean time government of
India started issuing us free ration and fresh supplies. We were given
tents, jungle boots, mosquito nets etc. The government of India at this
stage started making regular payment of salary to Bangladesh freedom
fighters. Sector commanders were paid Rupees 500.00 per month. All
other officers in the army were paid Rupees 400.00 per month. JCOS
and NCOS were paid Rupees 100.00 and Rupees 70 per month
respectively. Food was free for all officers and troops. All were paid in
Indian currencies. Civil officers were paid Rupees
500.0 per month. The members of parliament were paid Rupees
150.0 per month.
Mukti Bahini at Kallyani

It was decided to establish Headquarters of 8 Sector at Kallyani. In the
third week of May 1971, I moved to Kallayani from Bangoan along
with the headquarters elements and established the sector headquarters
at Kallayani. Kallayani is a modern beautiful satellite town 40 km east
of Calcutta and 30 km from Bangladesh border in the district of 24
Parganas. Residential houses there can be compared with the houses of
Gulshan in Dhaka and Gulbarg in Lahore. Subedar Abdul Malek along
with some members of Mukti Bahini and myself started for Kallayni
with a convoy. I was instructed to reach Nehru Hospital where the
members of the Indian army would receive us. When I reached
Kallayani I was shown a newly built six storied U-shaped hostel of
Nehru hospital complex with three wings
and asked to make our accommodation in that building. I was

accommodated in a room in the second floor in a wing. My office was
set up in the first room of the ground floor. Office of sector commander
was set in the 1st floor. One wing was used for ration, weapons and
ammunition and the third wing was used for accommodation of regular
troops and fresh trained Mukti Bahini.
The tactical headquarters of 8 Sector were established at Ranaghat.
Sector Commander with his staff was stationed at tactical headquarters.
My job at Kallayani was to receive arms, ammunition, ration, medicine
and other war materials from the Indian army and to maintain liaison
with the Mitra Bahini. My assignment also included receiving trained
guerillas who used to get training in different training centres in India
and to dispose them to different companies/sub sectors for further
induction in occupied Bangladesh territory. One-day one boy died of
cholera in Nehru Hospital located in front of our headquarters and his
mother cried piercing the sky. Major Sankor Roy Chowdhury, Brigade
Major of Indian Charlie Sector hearing the heart-rending cry commented
that this was the reason why we should fight back the barbarous army to
stop the repetition of such unfortunate death. Charlie Sector was raised
at Barrackpur by Indian army to organize and render logistic support to
Mukti Bahini. In some instances Indian army had given suicidal plan to
Mukti Bahini, but we could reject the attack plans in some pretext. But
„Z‟ Force was committed to their attack plan and was massacred in
Kamalpur and Nakshi. Major Sankor Roy Chowdhury was a talented
and matured officer having human qualities and I could see in him bright
future. My assessment was correct; later he was made not only the
general but became the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army
Once I was delivering motivation speeches at Kallayani to a group
of guerillas trained from training centres in India, I told them that their
task would be to carry out attack, raid and ambush etc. They lodged
complain to Major Sankor Roy Chaudhury, Brigade Major, Charlie
Sector that they did not have the proper training to go for frontal attack.
They had only 21 days training which is not enough. Major Sankor Roy
motivated them to enter inside Bangladesh and remain there with the
possession of arms and
ition and not to loose them. His advice had far reaching *j mmer
meaning and implication. If these freedom fighters could sustain
themselves in enemy occupied territory, they could gain courage,
confidence and moral strength for subsequent fighting.
During our liberation war almost every one had conjunctivitis an
eye disease having eye turned to red. I received a letter from sector
commander that the same eye disease had attacked him. The Indians
pamed the disease as “ Joy Bangla” I had the same eye trouble. One day
when I was busy in my office at Kallayani, Major Zia who was
fortunate to announce the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from Kalurghat Radio landed at
my office. I saw him depressed and was not hopeful about the
liberation of Bangladesh as four more divisions of soldiers were flown
from West Pakistan and five Army divisions were operating in
Bangladesh against our irregular fighters. I expressed different views
that victory would be ours as we had been fighting for the cause of our
liberation and we would obtain the assistance of Allah who is always
with the oppressed. Allah never rejects the prayers of three types of
persons as mentioned in holy Quran, - prayers of parents for their
children, prayers of Musafirs (Travelers) and prayers of oppressed. It is
difficult to predict how Allah‟s help will be bestowed. India was all out
to help us liberate Bangladesh. More over all actions of Government of
Pakistan was wrong which could not be sustained. We had been
fighting for life and death. It was a rainy day. Major Zia had lunch with
me. Before his departure I requested him to say a few words to the first
batch of cadets who were selected for commission in the army. These
selected cadets were with me for medical check up and final dispatch to
military academy at Murti a temporary military academy. Major Zia
delivered a good speech with commanding voice for the boys and
departed for Calcutta. I took the cadets to a Field Ambulance of Indian
army at Kasrapara for medical examination. Few days later Sheikh
Kamal, son of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other two
cadets reported to me at Kallayani. Other two cadets were Abdul
Quiyum and Alok Das Gupta. Sheikh Kamal stayed with me for a few
days. There was rumour that Bangabandhu, Sheikh Kamal and other
members of the family were killed on the fateful night of the 25
March 1971. Sheikh Kamal described his ordeal of escape from Dhaka.
He took shelter in the embassy of Poland. Later he escaped from Dhaka,
went to Faridpur and then to India. At Calcutta he stayed with Aminul
Huq Badsha. I wanted to offer Kamal some money from my pay. Sheikh
Kamal declined to receive and told me that Badsha gave his minimum
requirements, a shirt and a pant. With Sheikh Kamal and other cadets
while returning from Kashrapara after medical examination, our jeep
was stopped as its fuel got exhausted. The jeep had no hood cover. We
were waiting as the driver went to bring petrol from a nearby petrol
station. Suddenly it started to rain. A group of young boys recognized us
as freedom fighters of Joy Bangla and requested us to take shelter in a
tea stall. They were eager to know about the fate of Bangabandhu and
Sheikh Kamal. They could not know that Sheikh Kamal was with them.
They were blaming that Colonel Osmany hired a modem house at
Kallayni for his wife and children, whereas millions of Hindu refugees
remained under the open sky or trees. Thank God that Colonel Osmany
was bachelor and he had hardly any vice, otherwise it was difficult to
refute this blame.
One evening Mrs. Sultana Zaman, wife of Major Nuruzzaman
commander 7 Sector accompanied by her daughters, Miss Nyla Zaman
and Miss Lubna Zaman visited my office at Kallayani. I realized that
families of freedom fighter officers had no shelter to have comfortable
living in India. I requested Brigadier Shalek commander Charlie Sector
of Indian army to allot some houses for families of our officers. 14
houses were requisitioned by Indian army and handed over by Indian
MES to me for the families of our officers. The houses were allotted to
Group Captain A K Khandkar, Major Khalid Musarraf, Major Kazi
Nuruzzaman, Major Abu Osman Chaudhury, Captain Azam Chaudhury,
Major KM Shafiullah, Major Abul Manzur and some other officers.
Flight Lieutenant Jamaluddin Choudhury MPA was posted at 8
Sector Headquarters as staff officer. His job was more or less political.
He was very clever and ambitious like his younger brother Abdul Rouf
Choudhury. When Major Abu Osman Chaudhury was
laced by Major Abul Manzoor, he headed a delegation comprising

of Mr. Rawsan Ali MP from Jessore and Mr. Salahuddin MP from
Faridpur to meet Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam at Calcutta. He
entered the office of the President along with the delegation and
threatened the President showing his red eyes. He proposed the
President to post back Major Abu Osman Chaudhury to 8 Sector as
Sector Commander. President said to them, "Don't show your red eyes.
Remember I am the President of Bangladesh. Go and talk with Mr.
Tajuddin on this issue. Get out from my office." After being bullied by
the President, they went to the Prime Minister's office and met Mr.
Tajuddin. On flimsy ground Colonel Osmany used to offer his
resignation. Flight Lieutenant Jamaluddin proposed to Prime Minister
to accept the resignation of the C-in-C and himself wanted to become
the commander-in-chief as he was the member of Provincial Assembly
with defense background.
Mujib Bahini
Mr. Rawsan Ali MP was attached with 8 sector headquarters as
political adviser. Flight Lieutenant Jamaluddin was so crook that one
day he sent Mr. Rawsan Ali to Boyra with an official letter to be
handed over to Captain K N Huda, company commander of 'D'
company. The letter could be sent by a normal runner, but he sent a
Member of Parliament.
There was the regular Bangladesh Army vis-a-vis emerged a
parallel liberation force named "Mujib Bahini". Mujib Bahini had four
central leaders namely Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, Tofael Ahmed, Abdur
Razzak and Sirajul Alam Khan. Mujib Bahini was organized and
financed under the leadership of Indian General Oban. About 25 trained
youths of Mujib Bahini were brought to our sector headquarters for
interrogation. This task was assigned to Mr. Rawsan Ali MP, Flight
Lieutenant Jamaluddin MPA and me to find out the ideology and
intention of the formation of Mujib Bahini. Extempore speech by each
of them was arranged. It was found out that the ultimate motive of
Mujib Bahini was to grasp state power after the
liberation war was over. Mujib Bahini had no serious intention to fight
Pakistan army. Mujib Bahini did not come under unified command of
our Prime Minister, Mr. Tajuddin. I was shocked to learn the motives of
Mujib Bahini. We were fighting liberation war under two separate
commands! Mujib Bahini used to get money, arms and ammunition
from their four central leaders who used to get the same from General
Oban.
While preparing for the war against Pakistan, Indian Government
side by side prepared a plan so that independent Bangladesh remains
under the sphere of Indian influence. Research and Analytical Wing
(RAW) of Indian Government was assigned to work out a plan to
implement the desire of the Indian Government. While whole Bengali
nation and valiant Mukti Bahini were desperately fighting against
Pakistan Army under the leadership of Bangladesh Government in exile,
RAW was organizing Mujib Bahini at Tanduar near Deradun without
the knowledge of Bangladesh Government in exile.
Indian Government constituted three committees for war
preparation, to maintain contact with Bangladesh Government and to
render assistance to Mukti Bahini. One is political and the other two are
war related. Political committee worked as bridge between Indian
Government and Bangladesh Government. Mr. D P Dhar, Chairman,
planning commission, Ministry of Foreign affairs was made the head of
this committee. General Manekshaw Chief of Army Staff was the leader
of the war council related to the preparation of war. Mr. DP Dhar was
also included in war council. General Manekshaw formed another
committee headed by Deputy Chief of Army. This joint intelligence
committee was constituted in co-ordination with the intelligence
branches of three defense forces. General Manekshaw included RAW in
this committee. Though Deputy Chief of Army Staff was made the
Chairman of this committee the full authority remained with General
Sham Manekshaw. Joint Intelligent
Committee in addition to its normal function of preparation for the war,

planned to organize a special force with the freedom loving youths of
Bangladesh. RAW was given the task to implement this plan. General
Sham Manekshaw took its direct responsibility. Major General Oban an
expert to organize special force was given the responsibility to form this
force. He got down to business with utmost keenness. This task became
easy for him because the said four student leaders heading the Mujib
Bahini did not happily accept Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed as Prime Minister
of the Government of Bangladesh in Bangladesh. Major General Oban
took this opportunity to organize Mujib Bahini with the assistance and
cooperation of these senior student leaders. Bengalis are over
ambitious. They do not have the patience to wait for their turn.
Major General Oban was directly responsible to General Sham
Manekshaw. That is why; Mujib Bahini was sometimes called sons of
Sham Manekshaw. He was also responsible to Mr. RN Kaw, Director
of RAW. As Major General Oban was responsible to two bosses, he
took this advantage and started on his own arrangement inducting
trained Mujib Bahini boys inside Bangladesh without the knowledge of
Lieutenant General Aurora, Commander, Eastern Command. It created
dual command in Eastern region and naturally it was not acceptable to
Lieutenant General Aurora. He created pressure on the Army
headquarters to bring Mujib Bahini under his command. But Army
Headquarters consoled him that Mujib Bahini had some far-reaching
special purpose. When Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister of
Bangladesh Government came to learn the existence of Mujib Bahini,
he requested General Sham Manekshaw to leave Mujib Bahini under
the command of Bangladesh Government. General Sham Manekshaw
replied in the same tune as was given to Lieutenant General Aurora. Mr.
Chitra Ranjan Sutar, Member of provincial assembly of East Pakistan
assembly in 1970 on Awami League ticket, went to India during non
co-operation
movement in 1971. He was stationed at 21 Rajendra Road, Calcutta and

he acted as the contact man between Major General Oban and the four
student leaders. Mr. Chitra Ranjan Sutar cunningly united four-student
leaders encashing political rivalry against Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed who
became Prime Minister of Government of Bangladesh in exile against
the desire of these four student leaders.
The student leaders claimed that neither the political leaders nor the
people of the country but these student leaders had given the people a
dream for the liberation of the Eastern Wing of Pakistan and
psychologically made them ready to start an armed struggle for the
independence of Bangladesh. These young student leaders thought that
they had the maximum contribution to the creation of war like situation
through violent agitation and sacrifice of lives of their student
supporters. Therefore in the leadership of the Government in exile and
in the leadership of the liberation war, they must enjoy an authority.
Instigated by Mr. Chitra Ranjan Sutar and under the umbrella of
protection from Major General Oban having the support of RAW from
the background four student leaders proposed to form War Council
challenging the Premiership of Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed. War Council
would conduct liberation war as proposed by student leaders who would
enjoy significant authority and control in war matters. Actualy they
wanted to have a parallel government side by side that was sworn in at
Mujibnagar of Meherpur, but the Bangladesh Government in exile
turned down their proposal. In order to materialize their plans the said
four student leaders with the material assistance and secret arrangement
of the RAW started to organize a parallel force named Mujib Bahini
under their command.
First group of Mujib Bahini reported for their military training at
the hilly town of Tunduar two kilometers away from Deradun where
Indian Military Academy is located. After the expiry of a fortnight,
Major General Oban and four student leaders met at 21 Rajendro Road.
Training started on 29 May 1971. Major General Oban was the main
planner and director of Tunduar Training Camp. In all ten
thousand Mujib Bahini youths including the top notches were trained in
Tunduar. Their training ended on 20 November 1971.
Four student leaders divided Bangladesh into four zones to conduct
Mujib Bahini operation. Northern region sector comprised of Rangpur,
Rajshahi, Pabna and Dinajpur. Sirajul Alam Khan was the sector
commander for this area. His second-in-command was Monirul Islam.
Southern region sector included Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur,
Barisal and Patualkhally. Its leader was Tofael Ahmed and Kazi Arif
Ahmed was his second-in-command. Eastern region sector was
constituted with Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Comilla, Noakhali,
Sylhet and some portion of Dhaka. Sheikh Fazlul Hoq Moni was the
leader of this sector. ASM Abdur Rob and Abdul Quddus Makkon were
jointly second-in-command. Central sector was comprised of
Mymenshing, Tangail and some portion of Dhaka. The leader of this
sector was Abdur Razzak. Sayeed Ahmed was his second-in-command.
Thus the seed of difference in the war for liberation was sown in at the
very birth of a nation that brought several catastrophes for years to come
after the independence of Bangladesh and they are still continuing.
i
Guerilla Warfare of Freedom Fighters 169
Chapter 5
GUERILLA WARFARE OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS
i
Barrackpur
Barrackpur, a few km from Calcutta is the oldest cantonment in Indian
sub-continent. Here in 1857 Bengali sepoys took up arms against the
British colonial rule. The British called this war as sepoy mutiny and we
call it patriotic Sepoy War. In 1971 Pakistanis called us miscreant and
rebel; but the World at large named us „Freedom Fighter‟ and in the
country people would call us in love as „Mukti Bahini‟ or Liberation
Army.
During my stay at Kallayani once I went to Barrackpur cantonment
to sign documents for collection of arms and ammunition. There at lunch
in their officer‟s mess I met Brigadier Shalek, Major Sankor Roy
Chaudhury, Major Chatterjee and other officers of Charlie Sector. The
food was served with delicious tinned fish. They told me that the fish
was imported from Russia. At the dining table Brigadier Shalek wanted
to know when I was going to get married. I told him that there was no
earth under my feet and I was in a foreign soil and thinking about
marriage in such a situation was beyond my imagination. At one point
Major Sanker came to my rescue.
Brigadier Shaleq was hinting to our patriotic zeal. He hinted at
Captain Dalim who eloped with the daughter of a second secretary of
Bangladesh Embassy at Calcutta and married her without the consent of
her father. Her father complained to Colonel Osmany. Colonel Osmany
showed his indignation in front of her father and promised to take action
against Captain Dalim. At the same moment Captain Dalim and his wife
were hiding in the same room under a cot. Captain Dalim and daughter
of the said second secretary afterwards came out from the hiding and
touched the feet of Colonel Osmany. Colonel Osmany took no action.
After liberation they went to Bangabandhu‟s house to touch his feet.
Bangabandhu blessed the newly married couple that came in the
newspaper next day. Touching of feet for showing respect is very
dangerous, as it can melt the heart of the persons whose feet are touched.
Afterwards he can derive many benefits and even cause serious damage.
Dalim caused fatal damage to Bangabandhu‟s life on 15 August 1975.
David Frost a renowned British journalist commented that Sheikh
Mujib should have amputated his legs if he would want to live.

Touching of feet in Islam is prohibited. It is a Hindu custom and cultural
practice. Muslims of India adopted this habit from Hindus.
At the Charlie Sector headquarters I found some of our freedom
fighters who were undergoing training on signal communication
equipment. They were taught cipher and Morse code. EME personnel of
Bangladesh armed forces were repairing mechanical transports and small
arms belonging to Bangladesh Armed Forces. I was shown a big go
down having weapons like rifles, LMG and MGs. I saw some cargo
plane in the sky of Barrackpur and learnt that vintage type weapons were
imported from other countries for Mukti Bahini and those were carried
to Barrackpur by cargo planes. After I had signed vouchers for arms and
ammunition those were dispatched to our headquarters at Kallayani.
I moved freely in Barrackpur Cantonment and was received in
many offices in Barrackpur. Everywhere I was shown warm hospitality.
I moved in a jeep with Bangladesh national flag. In West Bengal nay in
India there was no security check and harassment of Mukti Bahini.
Mukti Bahini was highly respected by the Indian people for their
patriotic spirit and zeal. I carried an identity card but never got checked.
I requested Brigadier Shaleq for a book on guerilla warfare and later on
he sent me the same.
Base Camp at Banpur

I was posted at Banpur to relieve Captain Mustafizur Rahman and take
over the command of 'B' company of 8 Sector in the month of June. I
procured a preci on different operations of war and minor tactics like
raid, ambush etc and refreshed my memories before I went to take
command of the company. Captain Abdul Halim was asked to take over
S
D* company at Boyra. Boyra is a place in India opposite to
Chaughacha in the district of Jessore. I dropped Captain Abdul Halim at
Boyra and I started for Banpur. Banpur is a place in India opposite to
Darsona.
In June 1971, I reported my arrival at the company located at
Banpur. The base camp inside India was a few hundred yards from
Bangladesh border. While I was entering the base camp I came across
the commanding officer 14 Punjab of Indian army who was leaving the
camp. He stopped my jeep and enquired about me. On
my introduction he threw a challenge mentioning that the freedom

fighters were not effective fighters. His intention was to inject anger and
fighting spirit in me so that I would engage in pitched battle with the
enemy. He further mentioned that he gave an operation plan to freedom
fighter Captain Dalim and that the same plan was found in the street of
Calcutta. There was information that at Darsana Pak army officers had
brought women in the bunkers and were torturing them in heavily drunk
condition. Captain Dalim assured the Commanding Officer 14 Punjab
that he would capture the officers and bring them to the camp. Later on
the commanding officer told me that he was furious on Captain Dalim
whom he had given a plan to attack Darsana enemy position.
Operational plan with a sketch given to Captain Dalim was suicidal, but
he promised to go for the operation. But instead he went to Calcutta and
reported the matter to Colonel Osmany.
Commanding officer 14 Punjab wanted me to do the same task. I
met commander of the camp Captain Mustafizur Rahman. The members
of the Mukti Bahini were accommodated in tents. Captain Mustafizur
Rahman and I myself were put up in a separate tent and we were given
charpoys and toilet facilities. Arms and ammunition were kept dug in
bunker covered with tent. This kote was protected by barbed wire and
guarded by sentry. POW cage was constructed by timber, bamboo and
barbed wire. The Commanding officer of 14 Punjab saw few prisoners
in the POW cage. He instructed me to dispose of the prisoners meaning
to kill them. It was not ethical to eliminate them, so I set them free with
warning not to assist Pakistan army. Regular weapons training were
carried out in the camp. Dummy target made of hessian cloth was placed
in the training area and bayonet fighting was practiced to infuse
aggressiveness among the freedom fighters.
From my childhood I heard everyone to call me a lucky man. My
comrades in arms in my unit also said that I brought luck to the
company as because the next morning our fighting patrol party brought
a dead body of a Pakistani soldier. In the previous night our fighting
patrol was sent to Sarabari in Darsana commanded by Naik Tabibur
Rahman. They fell in the ambush of the enemy. Enemy got hold of
Sepoy Hafizur Rahman. Naik Tabibur Rahman received a blow on his
face and asked to remove magazine of his weapons.
Sepoy Taramia took position on the ground and started firing with his
LMG. Other members of Mukti Bahini also opened fire. Enemies also
returned fire. Our boys had won the battle. Enemy suffered 4 dead and 8
of them were injured. We got it confirmed later on. Our side suffered
one minor injury. As a testimony of our victory the dead body of one
Pakistan soldier with full uniform was brought to display to Indian army
and shown to the press. The next day the photograph of Pakistani
soldier killed by Mukti Bahini was published in the Indian Statesman.
Surviving and retreating Pakistan soldiers killed innocent farmers and
fishermen. Pakistani dead soldier was buried in accordance with Islamic
solemnity. A letter and few money receipts were discovered from the
dead body. From the letter, it was revealed that his near ones in Pakistan
was worried about his life while the receipts showed that money sent by
money order was beyond his means of income. I felt extremely sorry for
the poor soldier. The architect of killing a Punjabi Muslim by the
Bengali Muslim and vice versa was Zulfiker Ali Bhutto, President
Yahya and his military Junta.
The fate must have relation with time and space. In 1947 my
parents, my younger brother and myself were rushing from Bombay to
newly created East Pakistan by train in a first class compartment locked
from inside. We were destined to come via Calcutta. There was Hindu-
Muslim riot in Calcutta. A Hindu gentleman advised my father to avoid
Calcutta, so by passing Calcutta he changed route via Ranaghat-Banpur
to Darsana. My father was relieved of anxieties when we reached
Darsana on 14 August 1947. In 1947 our life was in danger in India and
in 1971 it was in East Pakistan. I was fighting in the same crossroad for
life and death for the creation of Bangladesh. In 1947 fight was between
the Hindus- the Muslims and inl971 fight was between Bengali
Muslims and Punjabi Muslim while Bengali Muslims were receiving
shelter and food from Bengali Hindus for their existence. Indian soil
became the spring boat for Bengali fighters for organizing and
launching fight for liberation of Bangladesh. Bengali Hindus in 1971
became the most trusted and tested friend of Bengali Muslims as if they
were the twins of one mother having separate faiths.
The area of operational responsibility of 'B' company at Banpur
was in the district of Jessore, Kushtia and Faridpur. The company
had two types of fighters "Nyomita Bahini" or regular troops and "Gono
Bahini" or citizen forces. Nyomita Bahini kept the Pakistan army
engaged in border area while Gono Bahini forces were sent deep into the
Bangladesh territory. Gono Bahini forces carried out minor operations
like raids, ambush, killing of collaborators, making propaganda amongst
the people for gaining public sympathy, boosting the morale of the
people, sending battle intelligence and enemy information to sector
headquarters and allied forces, organizing local resistance forces etc. I
went to see the enemy position at Jibannagore. From a distance I was
trying to locate the enemy position at Jibanagore with the help of
binocular. Before I could locate the enemy, the enemy located me and
opened machine gun fire on me. They missed me narrowly. Some other
night I tested few old light machine guns on that enemy position. Later
on an attack was launched on this position and few of our freedom
fighters embraced martyrdom. Finally an attack was launched on the
same enemy position commanded by Captain Mustafizur Rahman. The
position was captured; unfortunately Captain Mustafizur Rahman was
seriously injured and evacuated to Barrackpur Hospital.
I was in command of the company for about a month. Captain
Mustafizur Rahman was carrying out mine warfare in his area of
operation. The sector commander thought it wise to post me to B'
company at Banpur. It would be easy to continue mine warfare for me.
Soon after my arrival I established contact with Indian army officers at
Ranaghat. I got a preci on mine warfare from an Indian officer and went
through it. I asked Havildar Ali Akbar of Engineers corps to give
demonstration about the functioning of TNT slab, cord, detonator, fuse,
anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mine. Thus I acquired the required
knowledge to conduct mine warfare. Initially we used antitank mines
along the railway track Darsona- Jessore and Darsona-Chuadanga. Anti-
tank mines destroyed number of railway engines and bogies. Enemy as
precaution took safety measures. They started to put two empty wagons
in front of the engine. These created new problem for us, before the
engine / bogy could come over the mine, mine would explode earlier by
the pressure exerted by rails and slippers which would receive
transmitted pressure from the load of the bogy placed in front of the
train. The intended damage to the enemy could not be materialized. So
we also changed our tactics. We
adopted a technique to explode antitank mines by remote control

electric switch instead of pressure switch. This technique was excellent
and success was cent percent. The success was better than previous
method. Virtually the movement of enemy by train was completely
stopped. Initially we used to dig metal road and put antitank mines.
After initial damage, enemy became very cautious. Enemy could detect
the mines by careful observation of the road. Later on mines were
camouflaged by cow dung, tree leaves and painting with liquid bitumen.
Regular activity of the company was to dominate the areas of
Chuadanga, Darsona and Jiban Nagore by sending fighting patrol.
Once I went to Krisnanagore where there was only one infantry
battalion (14 Punjab). This battalion had been camping temporarily at
Kisnanagore. I stayed one night in the officer‟s mess of that battalion. I
met the commanding officer of the Battalion. The commanding officer
told me that he was very much impressed by the conduct and
personality of Colonel Osmany. A separate guerilla camp was set up at
Ranaghat for the youths trained afresh. I visited the camp along with the
CO of 14 Punjab. He wanted to test the freedom fighters whether they
could identify the electric pylon. Freedom fighters were taken near to a
pylon and shown the pylon. These guerillas were the first batch of
trained freedom fighters that had undergone 21 days military training in
Chakulia in the district of Bihar. They were waiting for induction inside
Bangladesh territory.
I collected pay of freedom fighters of my company from
Krisnanagore. While I was returning by train one of my Hindu village
mate who took refuge in India met me in the train and could sense that I
was.carrying some amount of money. Next day he visited me in the
camp with his land documents and requested me to give him some
money in exchange of his document. I have no desire for any property
except the liberation of the country. I entertained him in the camp, but
refused to accept his offer.
Wherever I would find a youth camp, I used to step in and used to
ask about their condition and welfare. Youth camps were set up to
accommodate the young persons coming from Bangladesh and waiting
for dispatch to training centre. These camps were temporary shelters for
them and usually political leaders of Bangladesh managed them. Most
of the youths in the youth camps were suffering
Guerilla Warfare of Freedom Fighters ill
from skin diseases. Generally I used to carry dettol and would distribute
the same among the affected persons. Once I stepped in a camp but that
was a police camp. Their condition was miserable. They were without
money and food. I sent them some food items from my company. I
informed the matter to Mr. Mahbubuddin Ahmed, a police officer who
was SDPO of Jhenidah. Mr. Mahbubuddin Ahmed with the assistance
of Mr. Abdul Khaleque IGP of the government in exile took care of the
police personnel who took refuse in India.
Raids on Darsana
Darsana a border town of Kushtia district was one of the strongholds of
enemy in my area of operation. I considered it important to launch an
attack on Darsana enemy position to destroy them. The operation was
planned with the assistance of Mitra Bahini commanding officer of 14
Punjab. The enemy strength was one company of 18 Punjab of Pakistan
army commanded by Captain MS Hannan. Besides regular troops,
enemy had paramilitary forces like Rangers and Razakars. The enemy
was in fortified dug in position. The enemy prepared 50 feet wide and 7
feet deep tank obstacle along their defense line to protect Darsana from
the threat of attacks by tank.
The attack was to be launched by two platoons of Mukti Bahini
supported by Mitra Bahini artillery. The aim of the attack was to kill,
harass and break the morale of the enemy. Mukti Bahini assembled at
Gedey railway station in the evening of 28 July 1971. The final
operational order was briefed by the commanding officer of 14 Punjab.
The enemy position was to be bombarded by artillery fire from 290430
hrs to 290500 hrs. Immediately after the lifting of artillery fire, enemy
position was to be physically assaulted by two platoons of Mukti Bahini
to cause maximum damage to the enemy and then to withdraw to our
base. Two freedom fighters were sent to Darsana earlier with wireless
set that secured their position on a big tree who directed the observed
artillery fire.
At 0100 hours on 29 July 1971 I myself along with the two
platoons of Muktibahini started our Journey for the operation from
Gedey railway station. We walked a distance of about 3 miles and
kept on waiting near the bank of Naragangni River. The entire route was
muddy. The enemy position was another three hundred yards from the
river. There I found some indiscipline. Some of our boys started
smoking and I prevented them from doing so. I was perturbed by the
rattling sound produced by the collision of helmets in the darkness that
could detect our move. My wristwatch had stopped and I had to find out
the time from some one else. We swam across the river and then found
the tank obstacles made by the enemy. We negotiated the tank obstacle
without any opposition and then through the sugarcane field reached the
target. A barrage of artillery shelling fired form a battery of 105 mm
guns bombarded enemy strongholds. Then we launched attack on the
enemy bunkers. The enemy was prompt to react and had returned our
fire. We carried out our operation for about 30 minutes and the enemy
position was overrun by us. We found dead bodies of enemies lying here
and there. A Pakistani flag was flying there, which was removed and
brought by us. We retreated from Darsana and reached a safe zone.
I myself fired only nine rounds of ammunition from my sten gun.
One of our Mukti Bahini boys was injured. A medical assistant Naik
Faizur Rahman who accompanied us gave him first aid. Commanding
officer of 14 Punjab was anxiously waiting for us. He was happy when
he heard my debriefing. Enemy suffered 34 killed. The successful
operation at Darsana infused a great deal of confidence in Mukti Bahini
boys and kindled enthusiasm for further operation. When I reached our
base camp, I found Captain Muztafizur Rahman who was away from the
camp for other duties. I was so tired and so I went to sleep. When
Captain Mustafizur Rahman arrived, he took over the command of the
company. I debriefed Captain Mustafizur Rahman about our action on
Darsona and I left for our sector headquarters at Kallyani. By that time
Captain Mustafizur Rahman gathered detailed information about the
enemy causalty in our Darsana operation. He sent a situation report to
sector headquarters about the brave assault by the Mukti Bahini boys
operating under my command that night. Every one with warmth
received me for my bravery. Major Osman congratulated me for my
gallant action.
[ Raid on Darsana ____________ J
29 JULY 1971

Akbar Bahini
Banpur was a base camp opposite to Darsana in India where I was the
company commander. From the new arrivals at Banpur I used to receive
information about the activities of enemy and Mukti Bahini of my home
Police station Sreepur. I received letters from my sisters who informed
me that Pakistan army would occasionally visit our area. On hearing the
news they deserted the village and took refuge in the house of our
relative in other areas. Mr. Akbar Hussein, chairman of Srikole union
Parishad organized a large force of Mukti Bahini comprising of ex-
army, EPR and the local people. After his matriculation he joined
Pakistan Air Force. He was arrogant and would not accept orders. On
some occasions being bullied, he threw his shoes towards his officers.
He was court martialed at Karachi Air Base and was sent home. In
political career, he would rise, but because of his arrogant attitude he
failed to attain any mentionable political height. He had done lot of
social work. He established college, school and madrashas, constructed
roads in his area. He also sent me a letter. He described that he could not
remove rifle from his shoulder since the war started. It was easy in his
area to kill the enemy. He wanted some machine guns and ammunition.
I dispatched some machine guns, ammunition and antitank mines for
him, which were carried by Khondaker Abu Hossain and Raja.
When the Pak army declared war against unarmed Bengalis on 25
March the Bengalis were in defensive posture, so was the case with
Akbar Hossain. Akbar Hossain along with Awami League workers took
weapons and ammunition from Magura police treasury and established
Mukti Bahini camp at Magura. At one stage Awami league leaders
Shorab Hossain, Ataur Ali, Asaduzzaman and Waliur Rahman, SDO
Magura left Magura for India and after that some so called Mukti Bahini
people engaged themselves in criminal activities and looting.
Situation became disorganized and went out of control of Akbar
Hossain. At last he left Magura for Sreepur with one Chinese and six
.303 rifles. Pakistan army had given instruction and encouraged
criminals to loot the properties of Hindus and Awami League
supporters. Even the police forces were engaged in looting might be by

the instruction of Pakistan army. In the initial phase he started to protect
the lives and properties of the Hindus. His forces had eliminated all
dacoits and criminals of the area. Supporters of Pakistan took refuge in
Pakistan army camps out of his fear.
Mr. Quamruzzaman an ex-air force sergeant also organized Mukti
Bahini force in Sailkupa. While in Pakistan he married a girl from the
state of Suwat and I was told that for this marriage he had to pay the
father of the girl seventy eight thousand rupees. During the war, his
Pathan wife stayed in his village home. While Pakistan soldiers visited
the village, she used to talk with them in poshtu. She told them that she
had left her family and society for the improvements of inter wing
relation and Yahya had sent them to kill Muslim brothers. The old father
of Quamruzzaman was arrested and tortured. The life of the father of
Qumruzzaman was spared by the intervention of the Pathan woman.
Both Akbar Hossain and Quamruzzaman were physically tough
and six feet tall. Their forces eliminated all dacoits and criminals of
Magura and Faridpur. In the process Akbar captured arms and
ammunition from the dacoits. The heinous plan of Pakistan army went
in vain and bounced back. Magura police Inspector Abdul Hakim and
Sripur OC Matiur Rah man joined duty and established some sort of
authority and asked arms holders to surrender their arms and
ammunition to the police. Many complied, but Akbar Hussein did not
pay heed to their instruction. Mullah Nabuat Ali and Khandker Nazayet
Ali became his deputies and close advisers. The chairman of Narua
union and a Bihari barber Chand Khan created reign of terror in the
district of Faridpur. People of Faridpur approached Akbar Bahini to take
armed action against them and relieve them from their atrocities. In
response to their request, Akbar Hussein started his first expedition with
only 18 rifles and destroyed both the criminals along with their gang.
Quamruzzaman met me at Kallayni, in the month of May. He
returned to his area Sailkupa in Bangladesh from India with some arms
and ammunition. He proposed Akbar Hussein to attack on Sailkupa
police station. Akbar Hussein got encouraged and assured
him of all out support. They planned to attack Sailkupa police station.
On 05 August an attack with 50 freedom fighters was launched on
Sailkupa police station. The Police forces there surrendered to this
combined attack of Akbar and Quamruzaman Bahini and 57 rifles and
four thousands ammunition were captured which met Mukti Bahini‟s
acute shortage of ammunition. Montu Bahini of Sailkupa also supported
this operation.
After the defeat at Sailkupa, Pakistan army despatched 25 Baluch
Regiment to that area. Pakistan forces advanced along the banks of river
Kumar. Akbar Bahini organized defensive position at Mingram on the
south bank of river Kumar and Quamruzzaman took position at Alfapur
taking advantage of a big canal. When the Pak forces reached the
western bank of Alfapur canal, Quamrazzaman with his forces opened
fire and engaged in a pitched battle. Quamruzaman, though a sergeant
from air force displayed1 outstanding feat of courage and heroism
defeating a regular Baluch regiment advance. Akbar Bahini extended its
fruitful support from their position on the other bank of the river Kumar.
At that time Kumar River was full with water to its brink. Pak army
suffered 55 killed and were retreated towards Sailkupa and then to
Jessore cantonment. The retreating Pak army killed a valiant freedom
fighter Nazrul Islam along with his group at Abaipur. In this operation
Mukti Bahini captured sizeable quantities of rifles and ammunition.
After liberation Major Abul Manzur asked me to arrest Quamruzzaman,
a valiant freedom fighter. Major Manzur was used to listen back biting
talks of the subordinates and he was to take action accordingly. Silently
I called Quamruzzaman at Magura, told the design of Manzur and asked
him to leave the area. He left the area and settled down in Dhaka.
Another local Mukti Bahini leader Sona Mia was arrested and put in jail
by Major Manzur. Academically Major Abul Manzur was brilliant, but
he did not attain the required maturity. In his subsequent military career,
he had to sacrifice his life for immature behaviour.
In the first week of October last major expedition of Akbar Bahini
with 65 fighters was launched on Ranger and Razaker camp at
Binodpur. Akbar Bahini reached the target area by foot and sometimes
by boat. The operation was partially successful; the position could not be
captured as enemy was reinforced from
Magura. Mukul, a valiant freedom fighter, while advancing from the

down slope of the river was hit by a bullet which pierced through the
helmet into his head and he embraced martyrdom on the spot. Enemy
suffered heavy casualty. Mr. Akbar Hossain and Mr. Quamruzzaman,
valiant freedom fighters should have been awarded gallantry award for
their heroic action in daring operations undertaken by them as
commander. I initiated citation for both the commanders but it was
unfortunate that my sector commander sitting in India during liberation
war ignored their patriotic action. May be my writings will bear the
testimony of their heroism in the history of Bangladesh. General
Mustafazur Rahman told me that he initiated my citation for gallantry
award but it was not published in the gazette for unknown reason.
Guzadanga Base Camp

After the command of Banpur Company, for a short while, I was
assigned the duty of officer commanding Sector headquarters at
Kallyani. Then I was despatched to Guzadaga opposite to Satkhira to
take over the command of 'A* company from Mr. Mahbubuddin
Ahmed who briefed me about the company and area of operational
responsibility. I met Indian Army units at Basirhat. Myself
accompanied by Mr. Muhbubuddin visited 13 Rajput Battalion at the
camp area. There were some Rajput officers. The officers fastened
'Rakhi Bandhan' symbol of friendship and brotherhood on my hand.
They had given me a photograph of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman that was garlanded by a necklace made of photograph of
Mahatma Gandhi.
It will be appropriate here to give a brief background of „A‟ company.
First commander of the company was Captain A T Salahuddin who was
very intelligent and brave officer. He conducted a number of effective
operations in the area. On 29 May 1971, Alpha Company position was
attacked by 22 Frontier Force 'of Pakistan Army. Ex EPR and students
manned our defense position.
The company had one obsolete Vicars heavy machine gun that had
to be cooled by water while firing from it. Even then it had created
devastating effect on attacking enemy. Officer commanding the enemy
forces shouted to capture our position and encouraged
1
them by the assurance that poorly trained Mukti Bahini‟s aim would
not be accurate with their outdated weapons. But in that attack enemy
forces suffered heavy causalities. More than 100 were dead and
ultimately they ran away leaving behind the dead bodies.
Captain A T Salahuddin collected the dead bodies.
I feel sad to mention here that Colonel Muhammad Ataul Ghani
Osmany became furious on Captain A T Salahuddin on some false
allegations from the President of youth League that deserted his
company before an impending attack. The student leader lodged false
complains against Captain Salahuddin that he wanted to kill him. The
student political humbug attached with his company was asked to
accompany him in an attack, instead he ranaway and reported to
Colonel Osmany that Captain Salahuddin planned to kill him. After the
liberation that leader was killed in a coup with his family. Allah does
not tolerate excess.
Captain A T Salahuddin was called back to Calcutta office of
Colonel Osmany. He reported to the commander-in-chief with a
truckload of dead bodies of Pakistani soldiers that included dead
bodies of officers. Colonel Osmany got cooled down to some extent
seeing the dead bodies but his ego and emotion prevailed. Captain A T
Salahuddin was unfortunately removed from the command.
Colonel Osmany was guided by ego and emotion rather than by facts
and truth. As Captain A T Salahuddin was a handsome brilliant officer
always with megawatt smile having a background of intelligence
training and service, Indian intelligence at Fort William picked him up
for their intelligent service. He worked for the Indian intelligence till
the liberation. After liberation I met Major Salahuddin at Army
headquarters and next day I found him Captain.
He used to be demoted in the morning and promoted in the evening by
Colonel Osmany in his office.
The command was given to Mr. Mahbubuddin Ahmed who was
also an intelligent and brave officer. In action Mahbub proved as a
battle seasoned officer although he was an officer of police cadre.
Our main company defense line was at Bhomra in Satkhira.
There was a canal behind our defense position. Two Indian companies
of 13 Rajput Regiment was in the depth position. Two hundred yards
ahead of it was Pakistan enemy position. EPR Nk Jahangir displayed
highest degree of courage in that defense position
'
i
i
and by several attempts the defense could not be dislodged by the

enemy. He was promoted to Naib Subedar. Major Tagore and Major
Bhola commanded the Indian companies. Major Tagore told me that he
took part in 1962 war against Chinese invasion on India. He had to run
back forty miles during withdrawal. But in 1971 he was a battle-
seasoned soldier. Major Bhola was a Rajput and got newly married. He
was fond of betel leaf. I used to carry betel leaves for him whenever I
visited him. It was very unfortunate and sad for me when I enquired
about him after liberation. I came to know that on 16 December when
he was fighting in Siromoni near Khulna town, he was hit from the
burst of LMG fire and got killed.
On the left side of our defense position, there was a vast open rice
field flooded with water extended up to a few miles. It is mentioned
that Aman rice, late autum crop of paddy grows in water. As the water
increases the rice plant also increases to cope with the rise of water.
One morning my troops got hold of a country boat with men and
women wearing Pakistani dress and were brought to my camp. On
interrogation I could know that it was the family of Mr. Durgadas
Bhattacharya, Professor of Dhaka University.
One night while I was sleeping at the base camp in the underground
covered by a tent I was awakened by the arrival of our • new sector
commander Major Abul Manzur. At that time my younger brother
Monwaruzzaman was on his way to join the training camp who had been
staying with me. He got his guerilla training from Chakulia in Bihar and
fought in my area of operation in Magura in the later stage. My second
brother Anwaruzzaman, who was a final year MBBS student, was the
medical officer of 'A' company and B' company of 8 Sector and he
carried out many minor surgeries of wounded freedom fighters.
In the morning after breakfast I took him to show my defense
position at Bhomra. When we were on the bunker describing the area
in front of our defense to Major Manzur, enemy started firing on us.
Major Abul Manzur jumped and took position in a ditch. I shouted and
ordered my troops to open fire. After sometime, enemy fire was
silenced. Major Manzur came out from the hidden bunker and
congratulated me. After that whenever he met me he used to call me
“General”.
Four Bengali military officers escaped from four different places

of Pakistan and assembled at Sialkot. They crossed the Indo-Pak border
and joined our liberation war. In the month of July 1971 three brave,
brilliant and dashing officers reported to Major Manzur in his official
residence in Sialkot They were Major Taher from Kohat, Major
Ziauddin from Rawalpindi and Major Bazlul Ghani Patwary from
Jhelum. Major Manzur was an outstanding officer of Pakistan army,
graduated from Canadian Staff College and had held important
appointments in Pakistan. He served in MS Branch of GHQ of Pakistan
army and was BM of Para brigade of Pakistan army. In 1972 Colonel
Abu Taher, Adjutant General of Bangladesh army met me with his
wife at AHQ officer's mess and described his escape ordeal from West
Pakistan.
Major Abul Manzur was reluctant to defect from Pakistan army.
But Begum Manzur was desperate to leave Pakistan even without
Major Manzur as Bangladesh was bleeding and burning by the
atrocities of Pak army. Major Manzur because of the uncompromising
attitude of his wife left his residence along with his wife and children
accompanied by three officers leaving behind his new car, television
set and other valuables worth about 2 lac rupees. While leaving the
house he switched on his TV and lights of his house to confuse the
authority. He used an old car up to the border and left them behind.
They crossed the Pakistan border at Sialkot and reached Delhi after a
long hurdle. Colonel Osmany went to Delhi to receive these officers.
All these four officers made glorious contribution in our liberation war.
Unfortunately Major General Manzur was killed in a coup, Colonel
Taher was hanged in a failed coup, Lt Colonel Ziauddin was dismissed
and Colonel Bazlul Ghani was prematurely retired.
Raids on Baikhari BOP

Baikari was a border out post in Satkhira occupied by a company of
Pakistan Army. A 100 feet wide River separated the BOP from the
Indian Territory. There was a two-storied building and a mosque
situated in the outer periphery of the BOF facing the Indian side.
Pakistan army used these as pillbox. Mukti Bahini led by Captain
Tawfique-e-Elahi and Captain Mahbubuddin Ahmed several times
attacked this BOP, but the enemy could not be dislodged. The
Government in exile assigned Tawfique-e-Elahi Chowdhury, civil
service of Pakistan and Mahbubuddin Ahmed, police service of
Pakistan the military rank of Captain. It was a very good decision by
the Government. During Second Great War, British officers serving in
civil departments in India were awarded the military rank and were
issued military uniform and sent to Burma front to fight. I was posted
to 'A' Company of 8 Sector Bangladesh Armed Forces in the month of
August 1971 replacing Captain Mahbubuddin Ahmed. The company
headquarters was located in Itinda, other side of Btiomra BOP in the
district of Satkhira. The Company consisted of regulars (Niyomito
Bahini) and citizen soldiers (Gano Bahini) from amongst the civilians.
The strength of Niyomito Bahini was constant consisting mainly of
Army, Bangladesh Rifles and Ansars whereas Gano Bahini, whose
strength fluctuated, consisted of students and other youths. Gano
Bahini boys were assigned specific minor tasks and inducted deep
inside Bangladesh territory as guerilla fighters whereas Niyomito
Bahini kept the bulk of the occupation army committed to the border.
Baikari BOP was situated about 15 miles away from our base
camp. My predecessor Captain Mahbubuddin Ahmed, briefed me about
the company activities and forthcoming operation on Baikhari BOP. On
05 August 1971 I went to reconnoiter Baikhari BOP and its
surrounding areas. I crossed the river mentioned earlier and entered into
Bangladesh territory behind enemy position and gathered information
from the local people about the enemy activities and movements. The
enemy's logistics were supplied from Satkhira. There was no metal
road from Satkhira to Baikhari. The enemy would receive their supply
from Satkhira by bullock cart. The enemy had telephone and wireless
communication with Satkhira. They were equipped with mortars,
machine guns, light machine guns and automatic rifles. I also went to
see the enemy position from the other side of the BOP across the river.
In order to ascertain the enemy strength and their disposition we also
fired some shots from light machine gun and automatic rifles. The
enemy replied back with machine gun, light machine gun and
automatic rifles. At 0200 hrs on
Raid On Baikari BOP
01 August 1971
the night of 06 August 1971, two platoons of Mukti Bahini issued with
arms and ammunition assembled in the base camp. While I was
briefing our Mukti Bahini about the mode of conduct of operations a
Mitra Bahini officer was present there. He wished us all success. I
asked all participating Mukti Bahini fighters to get into the waiting bus
that took us near Baikhari BOP.
I met a Mitra Bahini artillery officer there. He gave me a wireless
set and assigned a code word for me. He also gave me a very- light
pistol for giving green signal to launch assault on enemy position. We
crossed the river by a bridge made of single bamboo through which
only one person can pass at a time in one direction. When we entered
the enemy occupied territory, main body took position 200 yards
behind enemy defense taking advantage of high bank of a pond. The
cut off party was sent at a point between Satkhira and Baikhari BOP.
The task of the cut off party was to cut the telephone wire maintaining
communication link with the rear. I was with the main body. When
every preparation was complete for the assault I fired a very light
signal pistol in the air at an angle of 45° towards the direction of the
enemy to alert Mitra Bahini artillery position that all were set for
action. Mitra Bahini gun started shelling on the enemy position. I
called the wireless operator near me. I took the handset of wireless
equipment and broke the wireless silence and directed artillery gun
position officer to pinpoint the fire on the enemy and corrected the
landing of the shells to fall on the enemy bunkers. We opened all our
weapons. The operation continued for about half an hour. Later on it
was gathered that nine enemy soldiers were killed and the rest
abandoned the position.
After the successful completion of the mission Mukti Bahini task
force returned to our base camp. Mukti Bahini physically occupied
Baikhari BOP the next morning. I was resting the next day, as I was
tired. After a few days I went to Baikhari BOP along with Indian and
British television team to record the scene of the atrocities and
destruction carried out by Pakistan Army.
188 Mukti Baliini Wins Victory
BBC in Liberated Area

Aminul Huq Badsha, a student leader and later on Assistant Press
Secretary to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited my camp at
Guzadanga. I wanted to show the world the action of freedom fighters,
enemy atrocities and liberated Bangladesh territory. I invited him to
visit liberated area of Bangladesh accompanied by journalists from
foreign media. After a few days a team of BBC journalists, Indian
newsmen and television technicians reported to me at my camp. The
team was taken to Baikhari BOP earlier captured by me.
The place was infested with antipersonnel mines. Before
abandoning the position, enemy planted antipersonnel mines. The
explosion of mines injured some civilians who had earlier attempted to
visit the place. Some mines were detected and recovered by us. While I
was entering BOP enclosure, I placed my leg on a hidden mine, my
sixth sense warned me not to put pressure. I used my stick to unearth
the mine. I was miraculously saved by the grace of Allah. As I have
mentioned earlier there was a two-storied building beside BOP facing
the river on the Indian side. The enemy used the building as pillbox. It
was not possible for us to keep the BOP permanently under our control.
So I decided to destroy it. I put some TNT slab on the ground floor that
was pressurized with an abandoned iron safe. The electrical circuit was
made and an electric switch detonated the explosive. The building
became a lump of bricks within a fraction of a second.
There was a mosque beside the river. The enemy also used the
mosque as pillbox disregarding the sanctity of religious place. BBC
made a film on the destruction caused by Pakistan army, the action of
freedom fighters, bunkers abandoned by Pak army and recorded the
local people‟s slogans “Pakistan Murdabad, Yahya Murdabad” voicing
the destruction of Pakistan and Yahya. As a whole almost all liberated
areas of Bangladesh were thus recorded to be shown to the world and
to refute the claim of Pakistan Government that they were in complete
control of Bangladesh territory.
Author accorded Farewell to Indian Brigadier Rajandra Nath,

Commander 62 Mountain Brigade on 23 March 1972 at Magura
190 Mukti Bahirti Wins Victory
Gono Bahini at Satkhira

Gonobahini camp mostly comprising of young students was established
at a distance of few yards from the Mukti Bahini base camp. Most of the
Gono Bahini boys were well to do and came from respectable families.
It would make me sad to think that the lives of these boys might be
sacrificed at such a tender age. An MPA of Bangladesh Government
was posted there for political motivation and as guardian. I used to visit
the Gonobahini camp to see their welfare, training, morale and
operational fitness. There was no medical officer in my camp. So I had
to carry out the medical inspection. On my inspection I found some boys
were affected by syphilis and gonorrhea. Appropriate measures were
taken for their treatment and preventive measures were also undertaken.
The wounded freedom fighters used to be sent to Indian army's Advance
Dressing Station or Base Hospital. One Gonobahini freedom fighter
injured by mine explosion at Baikhani BOP was sent to Barrackpur
hospital for treatment. But he could not be saved. He expired at
Barrackpur Hospital. I was informed that an Imam carried out his
funeral and burial as per Islamic religion. During his evacuation he told
us not to worry for him. On searching his bedding and bag his address
was found and it was known that he belonged to the district of Rajshahi.
Gonobahini freedom fighters with specific missions were inducted in the
district of Khulna. They had carried out a number of successful
operations. In one such operation at Satkhira town anti-tank mines blew
up one bus named 'Balaka' carrying Pak troops. It was later on gathered
that enemy lost forty of its soldiers.
Eagle Company, an heroic Legend

I already commanded two „Mukti Bahini‟ companies comprising
'Niyamita Bahini' and 'Gono Bahini' in two different theatres of
operations in 8 Sector, Bangladesh Armed Forces. I was entrusted with
the task of running administration and controlling logistics in the Sector
Headquarters and to maintain close liaison with the 'Mitra Bahini'. In the
month of October 1971, Major Muhammad Abul Manzur, psc sector
commander, 8 Sector, Bangladesh Armed Forces, asked me to think and
plan intensive guerilla activity deep inside Bangladesh territory. He also
hinted that final offensive by
Bangladesh Armed Forces and 'Mitra Bahini' might be launched in the

last week of November 1971. A paper on the conduct of guerilla warfare
was prepared by me and approved by sector commander. While
preparing the operation plans, I consulted the books written by Che
Guevara and few other books given to me by Brig Shalekh of the Indian
Army. The Sector commander appreciated the paper. The doctrine of
guerilla warfare was based on the following principles.
Mobility. Guerillas must be equipped lightly having personal
weapons, ammunition and clothing. For food, medicine and shelter,
guerillas must rely on the mass people. Guerillas must not be tied down
to a place for long. Speedy manoeuvre is the key to survival.
Surprise. Basic policy of guerilla tactics should be hit and run, wait,
lie in ambush and again hit and run. Enemy must be caught in surprise
and must be struck where he expects the least.
Survival. Guerillas must survive to continue the liberation Struggle
to the end. The guerilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard
of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people. This
is an indispensable condition. The guerilla fighter need to have a good
knowledge of the surrounding country side, the path of entry and
escape, the possibility of speedy manoeuvre and good hiding place; and
the most important, they must count on the support of the people. All
endeavours must be put to gain the support and co-operation of general
population. Supporters of Pakistan army and other political groups
creating hindrance in the conduct of liberation war have to be
liquidated. All efforts must be put to avoid encirclement to fight the
decisive battle.
Security and Intelligence. All possible measures must be taken for
the protection of guerillas and weapons. All activities and movements
must be restricted for nighttime only. Identity of guerillas must be kept
secret and they must mix in the ocean of human population as fish in
water. Intelligence network must be made with company as the nucleus
and other guerilla bands as electron in the periphery of shells.
Information must flow from company to bands and vice-versa.
Composition of forces. Eagle Company comprised of the following
forces, (a) One platoon of 'Niyamita Bahini'. (b) Two platoons of 'Gono
Bahini‟. (c) One wireless team for maintaining communication with
sector headquarters at Barackpore with the help
of a small man pack set weighing ten pounds having long ground ariel.
Power pack containing thirteen 1.5 volts dry cells was the source of
power supply. Cells were readily available in the local market, (d) A
surgical team consisting of doctor with necessary surgical instruments
and medicines.
Besides the above forces, following forces were placed under
command for successful conduct of operations, (a) All trained guerilla
bands inducted earlier or later in our area of operation, (b) All local
'Mukti Bahini‟ person who were trained inside Bangladesh.
Mission of Eagle Company. On final day of induction in the area of
responsibility, Sector commander gave me the following tasks.
In Phase One:: (a) Dominate the area of operations that is, Magura,
Jhenidah, Rajbari and the surrounding areas, (b) Gaining popular support
of the general population by motivation, paying money to war affected
people and free medical service, (c) Elimination of the supporters of
Pakistani army, that is, Razakars, Al-Badr, Al-Shams and members of
peace committee etc.
In Phase Two: (a) All the tasks mentioned in phase one. (b)
Elimination of 'political group' and carrying out sabotage for the cause of
liberation struggle, (c) Minor operations that is, raids, ambush, sabotage
etc.
In phase Three: (a) Cut off and isolate enemy positions, (b) Final
offensive and destruction of Pakistan army.
Final preparation. For about fifteen days before the induction,
persons of guerilla groups had intensive physical, weapon/ and tactical
training in a guerilla base. The route of march was marked on the map.
The guides and carriers were selected and given necessary instruction.
Signal operators learnt necessary cipher codes. The personnel of
company were issued with arms, ammunition, explosives, mines, time
pencils etc. A camera was given by;Brig Shalekh to take photograph- of
important installations, enemy positions, likely river crossing sites etc.
Load carriers were selected for carrying ammunition, explosives,
medicine etc. Route for infiltration was reconnoitered few days earlier.
Days of induction. On 27 October 1971, the day of induction, we passed
a very busy day. At about 2000 hrs the sector commander gave us the
final briefing. The company commander Capt (retd General)
Muhammad Mustafizur Rahman BB, ndc, psc, C and other members
of'Mukti Bahini' present in the base camp wished us every
Eagle Company an HeroicjL
MMM ■ 27 October 1971 to 16 Decembef 1 *
International
Boundary
■ ■■■■■■ Road
Railway Line River
Canal
@ Ammo dump
* Raid
Dudhs;
Ambush
Hideout
Air Stike
INDIA
Barackpur
Map-6
success in our mission and said good bye to us. At about 2100 hrs we
left the base camp. It was a very dark night and things were not visible
even at a distance of five feet. The company including other load
carriers numbering about two hundred moved in a single formation. I
myself was at the head of the company and 2/Lt Golam Mustafa was at
the tail. Muhammad Ali a veteran smuggler was my guide. He acted as
my eye. I had foregone the use of compass and other methods used in
patrolling. Another guide was with 2/Lt Golam Mustafa. We bypassed
enemy position at Jibannagore without being detected and crossed
railway line between Andul Baria and Uthali. Our movement was halted
at Begumpur Bil about three miles from the railway track due to the
presence of breast high water and detection device laid by Pakistan
army. The Pakistan army placed a cord across the bil to feel the
movement of 'Mukti Bahini'. We fell back and bypassed the bill. Baldia
village, eight miles south of Chuadanga three sides of which were
protected by water obstacle was our pre-selected hideout for the next
day. At dawn, we reached four miles short of Baldia, but ultimately we
reached our pre-selected hideout in daybreak and took hasty defense in
the form of a ring without any loss of time.
We contacted the headman of the village, gave him the money and
asked him to arrange our food. From the welcome and treatment that we
had from the local people, we felt as if we were the members of the
same family. It is really difficult for me to express the feelings,
sentiments and love showed to us. Food was cooked in about ten houses
and we had our food at about 1700 hrs.
The same evening we started for the next hideout village Suti on
the north bank of the river Chitra. At Baldia, two student freedom
fighters who used to deliver fiery speeches in the 'Mukti Bahini' base
camp deserted us leaving behind a two-inch mortar and a grenade-
throwing rifle. We spent two days and one night at Suti. At Suti we
heard interesting news that ten thousand freedom fighters with all
sophisticated weapons entered Bangladesh from Mujibnagar. It was the
result of our movement at daybreak near Baldia. It raised the morale of
the general people to the highest ebb and at the same time created
demoralizing effect on enemy.
Next evening after sunset we again started for our next hideout at
Chandpur village five miles northwest of Jhenidah. We crossed
Jhenidah-Chuadanga road at Nagarbattan without detection by the
enemy. We reached Chandpur as per our plan. There I was introduced
to a school teacher who had already organized a local 'Mukti Bahini'
group. As per the instruction of my sector commander I administered
his oath of allegiance to the government of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh and handed over a 'Sanad' authorizing him as local union
commander.
Public support. The people of East Pakistan were totally frustrated
when the Bengali nationalist leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman was termed as traitor and his political party disbanded. When
military government in Pakistan tried to sustain themselves in power by
military force against the will of the people, peace was already
breached. An attitude of resistance throughout East Pakistan was finally
crystallized in an outbreak of fighting, provoked initially by atrocity,
killing and massacre of innocent people. Militant Bengali nation
showed total hostility towards the forces of oppression.
People welcomed us wherever we went. People never hesitated to
provide us food, shelter and enemy information even at the risk of their
lives. I dumped reserved ammunition and explosives in village
Mingram and Umedpur. Secrecy of the ammunition dump was so
maintained that the mother of Dr. Musarraf only knew the location of
the dump in Mingram. She herself dug the ammunition pit to maintain
secrecy. In case of my death the information was to be reported to my
second in command. Dr. Musarraf at the time of liberation war was
personal assistant to Justice Abu Sayeed Chaudhury at London.
The spontaneous co-operation and assistance rendered by local
people exceeded all bounds of expectation. In the darkness of night
while moving through the village, we heard the voices of old men and
women blessing us saying, "May Allah crown these freedom loving
fighters with victory and honour". One night a hundred year old woman
blessed me keeping her hand on my head. I could find the tears rolling
down her cheeks while praying to Almighty for our
victory and protection. We used local guides who took us to our

destination.
One night an old man of seventy years with an axe in his hand
guided us up to the bank on the river Madhumati. We used to cross
rivers and bils by country boats provided by the local people. The
information regarding the enemy advance used to reach us in lightning
speed. Bi-cycle was used to pass enemy information to us. We always
counted the support of local population from where we drew the real
strength. It was impossible to survive without the support of popular
mass.
My saintly father received a Divine message. During the middle of
the war, while I was engaged in fighting specially in enemy dominated
area behind the enemy lines fifty miles inside Bangladesh, my saintly
father was worried for my life. Prophet Muhammad(SM) who had
appeared in dream to my father‟s vision and asked him not to worry for
my life and disclosed early news of victory and liberation of Bangladesh
consoled him. He described this message to me in a pre-selected RV in
the battle zone.
Favourable climate and terrain. The terrain of Bangladesh, watered
abundantly by nature in her generous mood, carpet-like green paddy
fields extended as far as the eye can see and interlaced by countless
streams and rivulets, half hidden under the rich luxuriance of vegetation
is most ideal for guerilla operations. It was most difficult for Pakistani
conventional army to reach rural areas due to bad road communication,
flood water, rivers, canals, forests, hills, bils, marshes etc. Movements
of tanks, artillery guns, and mechanized transports were restricted to
metal roads particularly during the monsoon from the month of May to
October. Guerilla activity in the war of liberation was most active and
effective during these periods. We found no difficulties fighting the
enemy on water and land. It was very difficult for soldiers of Pakistan
army to reach guerilla hideouts covering cross-country distance of 8 to
15 miles through water, mud, crops fields and jungles. They could never
attain the surprise.
Administration in the hideouts. Our movement at daytime was
completely restricted to hideout. Most of our hideouts were in deserted
villages. At daytime, enemy movements were observed
,96 MuktiBahini Wins Victory
from the tops of trees. Sentries were posted all around the camps. At
0400 hrs every day we used to get up and take position covering all
likely enemy approaches. We used to cook our food twice a day. We
managed cooking utensils and rations from the local people on
payment. It was our daily routine to pass situation report in cipher
coded to our sector headquarters by wireless. There were several
combing operations by enemy. Every time we could successfully
escape except in village Kamanna where one local guerilla band was
encircled by battalion strength and in that action twenty-nine freedom
fighters were killed. On the same night, Pakistan army with another
battalion strength encircled village Mingram hardly few miles from
Kamanna where I was putting up with few local guerillas. We could
luckily escape because of the observance of early warning system.
Guerilla operations and other tactical activities. I contacted leaders
of guerilla bands and local 'Mukti Bahini' groups and reorganized them
quickly. I administered the oath of allegiance to the Government of the
People's Republic of Bangladesh to Thana commanders Chairman Mr.
Akbar Hussein Mia for Sripur and Mr. Quamrazzaman for Sailkupa.
Both of them were retired air force sergeants and handed them the
'Sanad' issued and signed by commander 8 Sector. Then we geared up
the activity as per instructions issued earlier.
Police station at Sailkupa manned by West Pakistan rangers, police
and Razakars was raided by a group of 'Mukti Bahini' led by 2/Lt
Golam Mustafa. There was heavy casualty on enemy side and the next
day the police station was vacated.
The next operation was to conduct raid on Sripur police station.
The police station was encircled and the enemy mostly police and
Razakars were compelled to surrender. We captured substantial
quantity of arms and ammunition.
After these operations the whole area of Magura and Jhenidah
subdivisions came under our domination with the exception of Magura
and Jhenidah towns that were heavily protected. One of our guerilla
bands ambushed a military convoy on road running between Magura
and Jhenidah destroying seven military vehicles and causing heavy
casualty to Pak army. A guerilla band ambushed another
military convoy coming from Magura to Langalband Bazaar. A few

officers and NCOs of Pak army were killed and a jeep was captured.
Later on the jeep was sunk in a pond. After this action Pak army came
in strength and started burning village Komlapur. Immediately, I sent a
section with few LMGs to fire from the nearby village and enemy was
forced to return to their strong base at Magura town. On the same day
Pak army was coming with company strength towards Sripur from
Magura. They were ambushed and 23 of them were killed and the rest
fled back to Magura town.
We had time pencils with half an hour and one-hour fuse. We
prepared time bombs with explosives, broken glass, detonator and time
pencil. Breaking the end of time pencil activated the bomb. We planted
number of them in the office of important persons, Razakar and Pak
army camps and in some important installations. These bombs were
placed with the help of our agents planted as Razakars and other
government officials. It created real panic in the minds of Pak army and
their supporters. In the last week of November, 1971 we could hear
from Pangsa at Faridpur the sound of 130mm gun being fired by allied
force from Bangladesh border. We received the instruction from sector
commander through couriers to intensify our activity. We intensified
our operational activities, sent raid parties to enemy positions and
passed battle intelligence to our sector headquarters at Mujibnagar over
wireless communication.
On 02 December 1971 Pakistan attacked India in the Western front,
Pakistan air force bombers put surprise attack on air bases in India. The
full-scale offensive by 'Mitra Bahini and Mukti Bahini' was launched on
03 December 1971. I called the air strike on enemy position at Magura
and the bombing on enemy position was carried out successfully. Pak
army had virtually no security about their activity, movements and
defense layout. We sent raid parties on enemy position at Magura town
on night 05/06 December. Pak army vacated Magura town next day.
'Mukti Bahini' entered Magura town on 07 December 1971. For the first
time I established direct contact with 'Mitra Bahini 1. I was taken to
Brigadier Rajendranath brigade commander 62 Mountain Brigade of
'Mitra Bahini1 and henceforth we started fighting in close co-operation
with 'Mitra Bahini‟.
19S Mukti Bahini Wins Victory
At Magura I received a written message from Pak army that they

would like to surrender to me as I am a Muslim and they would not like
to surrender to any Hindu. Pak army thought that I would fall prey to
their trap. A written message by 'Mitra Bahini‟ asking Pak army to
surrender without further blood shed was sent. Two young men carried
the message across the Madhumati River at Domain with white flag in
their hands. In reply both of them were critically injured and were told
that Pak army never knew how to surrender. The Pak army abandoned
Jhenidah and Magura for my activity without giving any battle and took
deliberate defense in villages Kamarkhali and Domain taking advantage
of natural obstacle, the Madhumati River that was about 300 yards wide.
I went to visit the forward most troops at village Rajadharpur astride the
highway on the south bank of the river Madhumati. I left the jeep and
walked to a battalion headquarters and had discussion with commanding
officer of the battalion about the battle situation. While I was returning
from the battalion headquarters, the area was shelled by enemy artillery;
their observer must have observed the jeep earlier. I went under a
culvert, where a section of 'Mukti Bahini‟ boys were resting. I left under
the heavy showers of artillery shells.
On some other occasions while I was moving by a military jeep
accompanied by a commanding officer of a regiment of 'Mitra Bahini‟
through village Nakoil on the south bank of the Madhumati, one man
came running to stop our jeep. He crossed the river Madhumati; brought
information that enemy had changed the position at Domain. We passed
the information by wireless to our gun position and the enemy
immediately started receiving the heavy pounding. This was one of the
hundred events we came across during the war.
We crossed the Madhumati River on 11 December 1971. I was
given the following tasks:
a. Crossing the river Madhumati at Potra, five miles upstream from
Kamarkhali ferry head in the darkness of night and establish bridgehead
across the river.
b. Providing sufficient number of country boats for ferrying the
troops and their ammunition and equipment etc.
After a group of 'Mukti Bahini' numbering about 150 secured

bridgehead on the other bank of the Madhumati at Potra, 'Mitra Bahini‟
along with a squadron of amphibious tanks crossed the river. One tank
sank while swimming across. Next day attack was launched on enemy
position at village Samadhinagar, Domain and Kamarkhali by the
combined forces of 'Mitra' and 'Mukti Bahini‟. 2/Lt Golam Mustafa and
Nazrul Islam, a local guerilla commander, led 'Mukti Bahini‟. I could
see the allied bombers diving and dropping bombs in enemy position at
village Domain * and Kamarkhali sitting in Indian Brigade headquarters
at Magura.
I was worried for the repeated declaration of cease-fire by Security
Council in UNO and the cruising of American Seventh Fleet towards
the water of the Bay of Bengal. 'Mitra Bahini‟ officer and war
correspondent told me that veto would be applied against cease-fire.
Fifty allied bombers for suicidal mission were kept ready to destroy the
Seventh Fleet. On 16 December 1971 at 1500 hrs while I was busy in
headquarters, 62 Mountain brigade, listened over radio broadcast that
the Pakistan army had surrendered. I was overwhelmed with joy. It was
the happiest moment in my life.
Once again we demonstrated to the world that the Bengalis are a
fighting and martial race. Like our ancestors Isha Khan, Titu Mir, Surja
Sen, sepoys of Bengal Native Infantry, Bengal Cavalry, Bengal Artillery
and East Bengal Regiments had proved this with glories of battles to
their credit.
Marine Warfare and Operation Jackpot 201
Chapter 6
MARINE WARFARE AND OPERATION JACKPOT

Naval Force
In the initial stage no naval force existed in the Mukti Bahini. There was
not even a single naval officer in Mukti Bahini. The first reckonable
numbers of naval seamen were eight submariners who escaped from
France and reached Delhi to join liberation war. Colonel Muhammand
Ataul Ghani Osmany, C-in-C very keenly felt the absence of naval
forces in Mukti Bahini. Bangladesh is a riverine country having two
major seaports one in Chittagong and other in Mongla. Mr. Tajuddin
Ahmed, Prime Minister of the exile Government of Bangladesh and
Colonel MAG Osmany, C-in-C undertook the initiative to raise naval
force to encounter the enemy in sea and rivers. As a result of this
initiative naval training camp code name „C2P‟ was established near the
bank of river Bhagirathi at Plassey in the district of Murshidabad. On
thel3th of May 1971, 357 youths from the different youth camps located
along the Bangladesh border were recruited for frogman training. Later
on the strength of naval recruits was raised to 515. Commander M.N
Sumanth of Indian navy was given the overall responsibility for training
of naval recruits. Lieutenant Commander G.M. Martin, Lieutenant
Samir Kumar Das, Lieutenant Kopil and many other junior officers
assisted him.
While I met Lieutenant Samir Kumar Das at Barrackpur he briefed
me about the training activities of Mukti Bahini frogmen at Plassey.
Bengali youths remained about twenty hours daily in water undergoing
various training under all adverse condition, environment of machine
gun fires and bomb explosions etc. Mukti Bahini trainees were issued
heavy diet on war footing. They were given training how to put limpet
mine in sea going-ship. It was unfortunate that Lt Samir Kumar Das and
Major Nazmul Huq of Mukti Bahini were killed in a road accident while
returning after launching naval attack at Chittagong port. Indian
authority procured World War II made two thousands mines each
weighting 5 Kg from Yugoslavia for use by the Mukti Bahini
commandos against enemy sea target. Each of these limpet mines costed
$1200 each. The training of naval recruits continued till 02 August
1971.
The Great Ordeal

Bengali submarine crews numbering eight underwent through a great
ordeal to escape from their training establishment at Tolon in France to
Bombay in India. Tolon is a beautiful port city in France where Frence
marine academy and dry dock are located.
In 1969 Government of Pakistan signed a contract with its French
counterpart for the procurement of three submarines on barter agreement
of foreign exchange earned by exporting jute and jute goods of East
Pakistan. Two of the submarines left Tolon for Pakistan before 25th
march 1971, the third one PNS Mangro was to leave Tolon seaport on 01
April 1971.
Pakistani seamen were undergoing training on PNS Mangro for its
operation at Tolon seaport where 13 out of 57 were Bengalis. These
Bengali submariners were shocked to hear the news bulletin of BBC and
VOA on the 25th March about the barbarous massacre of Bengalis in
East Pakistan by Pakistan army. They felt distressed at the horrifying
news of motherland.
On 25th march 9 out of 13 Bengali submariners assembled in a
closed-door session for a collective decision and all were unanimous to
sacrifice their lives for the cause of motherland. They were Ghazi Md
Ramatullah, Syed Musarraf Hossain, Amin Ullah Shiekh, Abdul Wahed
Chawdhury, Badiul Alam, Abdur Raquib Mia, Abdur Rahman and
Mannan. On gathering more information about the declaration of
independence of Bangladesh, active resistance by Bangladesh military
and atrocities of Pak army, they assembled again on 28 March and
finally decided to leave the submarine to join liberation war. There were
another group of trainees at Tolon from South Africa who were
approached for assistance in their escape endeavor and they agreed to do
so. South Africa was under colonial rule and knew the painful suffering
of foreign rule. All the 57 passports were kept in the locker of the
submarine. Collections of the passports were a real difficult task. Badiul
Alam and Abdul Wahed Chowdhury very secretly accomplished it. They
got their nine required passports and those were separated and burnt the
rest.
Excepting Mannan all of them reached Marseille 100 km from
Tolon in separate groups. It was confirmed later that Mannan
permanently settled in the United Kingdom and is now a rich
businessman. African friends accompanied them up to Marseille. Then

they reached Geneva but they were denied entry for not having visa. On
being denied entry to Geneva, they reached Leon on the other frontier of
France. They started journey for Spain from Leon. The custom
authorities at Portbo railway station of Spain allowed them entry, as
there was provision to issue visa fori5 days on arrival. They reached
Madrid via Barcelona and contacted Indian embassy. Mr. Bedi, Charge
d Affairs of India, welcomed them and on his initiative they obtained
political asylum in India. They were issued Indian passports. They
reached Bombay on 8 April via Rome and Geneva. Pakistani diplomats
at Rome and Geneva tried their best to take them in their custody. But
their efforts failed with the intervention of Indian diplomats at every
step. On 10 April submariners reached Delhi for debriefing and initial
training in the River Jamuna at Delhi. On 08 May they were sent to
Bangladesh Armed Force‟s HQ and joined Plassey frogman ship
training camp near the river Bhagirati in the district of Murshidabad.
Operation Jackpot
The naval offensive operation code named - „Jackpot‟ was organized
and planned to attack ships, barge, gunboats, pontoons and other
river/water vessels at Chittagong and Mongla sea ports, Chandpur,
Narayanganj river ports and Daudkhandi ferry simultaneously on thel4th
August 1971.
The aim of the operation „Jackpot‟ was to destroy ships and water
vessels at sea and river ports and interrupt the smooth flow of Pakistani
logistic support through the sea and river routes. The success of the
newly formed Bangladesh naval force shattered the moral strength of
the enemy.
After successful completion of training of frogman ship for two and
half months at Plassey five squads were composed as per size of the
task. 60 frogmen in each squad were despatched for two seaports at
Chittagong and Mongla while 20 frogmen in each squad were assigned
for Chandpur and Narayanganj river ports and nine for Daudkhandi
ferry head. All the frogmen were brought to Barrackpur between 02
August and 04 August for despatch to their operational points in
Bangladesh.
On 05th August Indian military aircraft flew the commandos

earmarked for Chittagong, Chandpur, Narayanganj from Barrackpur to
Agartala. On the same day commandos earmarked for Mongla port were
brought by road to Kenning near Diamond harbor 50 km from
Khidhirpur dock.
Operation on Chittagong Port

On 6th August Brigadier Sabeth Singh, commander Delta Sector of
Indian army and Captain Rafiqul Islam welcomed the commandos at
Agartola. Alpha, Bravo, Charlee and Delta Sectors of Indian army were
specially raised to provide logistic support to Mukti Bahini and for the
co-ordination of the operations. Then for the next two days commandos
were briefed on planning, grouping, co-ordination, route, maps and chart
of Chittagong port and Karnafully River‟s tidal behaviour, river current
and some other aspects of naval warfare. Submariner Abdul Wahed
Chowdhary was given- overall responsibility for co-ordination. At the
operational level 60 men groups were sub-grouped into three squads
having 20 frogmen in each of them. The three-squad commanders were
Dr Shah Alam, Mazarullah and Abdur Rashid. Requisite Mukti Bahini
fighters under the command of Lieutenant Mafuz were detailed for
organizing their security and guiding them through the safe routes. Each
of the commandos was issued with a limpet mine, pair of fins, grenade,
explosives, knife, dry food and some clothing, a load of 50 kg.
At the night of 08 August the commandos crossed the international
border at Subroom and entered Bangladesh territory. On 9 August
they reached village Ishakhali of Miresharai. From Suvopur Bridge a
squad of 20 proceeded towards Fauzderhat along the coastline.
On 10th August other two squads started their journey and reached
Samitir hut at the outskirt of Chittagong city on Dhaka- Chittagong
highway. There they purchased vegetable and basket to carry mines,
weapons and equipment. Vegetables were used as cover to conceal the
mines, weapons and equipment in the baskets. The vegetable baskets
were loaded on the roof of a passenger bus. From the bus stand the
baskets were carried by Pick up jeep supplied by Mr. Azizul Rahman
XEN, PDP to Chittagong city‟s different places
like Nizam Road, Kakoli House near CDA market, Moulavi Para,
Sobujbagh, Chauckbazar and East Nasirabad. The commandos entered
separately in the Chittagong city in a group of 2 or 3 to avoid detection.
On 13 August the warning song “Aami tomai Jato Shuniyechilem
gaan” in the voice of Pankaj Maullick was heard over Calcutta radio.
Group leader A.W. Choudhury instructed the commandos to cross the
Karnafully River by 14th August. As per earlier instruction second song
for launching attack would be played after 24 hours. Mines, weapons
and equipment concealed in vegetable baskets were transported to Mazir
ferry head at the bank of Karnafully by Pick up jeep and ambulance
supplied by Mr. Azizul Rahman of PDP. And then weapons were ferried
by boat and taken to a farm at village Charlakkha on the opposite bank
of the river. Two squads of 40 commandos reached the target area and
the third squad that was separated at Shuvopur Bridge could not reach
on schedule. Commandos were waiting to listen the second song on the
14 August. But Pakistan army was alert that Mukti Bahini large-scale
attack would be launched on the 14th August, the Independence Day of
Pakistan. On 15th August second song “Aamar putul azke Jabe prothom
shoshur bari” for lunching attack in the voice of Shandhya
Mukhapadhya was played from Calcutta radio. Attack had to be
launched on subsequent night at 1200- 0200 hours after hearing the
song.
After the sunset on 15 August commandos started to take final
preparation for naval operation. Three of the commandos broke down
and refused to take part. Commandos organized into 12 groups, each
group of three commandos reached carefully to the bank of Karnafully
on the other side of the port. They wore the fins in the legs, mines
fastened with the chest with the help of handloom towel (Gamcha) and
dagger in waist belt. A.W.Choudhury along with three other waited at
the riverbank. At 0100 hrs on the night of 15-16 August commandos
three in a group holding each other‟s hand dived into the river and
started swimming towards the target ships. There were searchlights all-
around in the river. Pakistani gunboats were patrolling in the river.
On reaching the target they dived and cleaned the ship bottom by
the knife where limpet mines had to be attached. By next dive
limpets were stuck at the bottom of the ship. Detonators were activated.
Then all of them started swimming back to safety. No sooner had they
reached the far bank; the mines started exploding one after another.
Enemy force and commercial ships hearing the explosion started
blowing the siren. The naval gunboats started firing indiscriminately.
Ships, barges, gunboats and pontoons started sinking in the river. On
15th August at Chittagong port 10 targets were destroyed and sunk.
Among them were MV A1 Abbas, MV Harmuz, barge Orient, two
gunboats, and pontoons. The news spread all over the world. The
international newspapers published the news as their headlines.
On completion of the operation commandos carefully crossed
Karnafully River and entered the bank to the city. Colonel -Osmani C-
in-C Bangladesh Forces requested foreign shipping companies not to
send ship to Bangladesh water as Mukti Bahini acquired the skill and
potential to strike ships in the Bangladesh Water.
Operation Mongla port

A squad of 60 commandos under the command of submariner
Ashanullah was despatched to Mongla port in the preview of operation
„Jackpot‟ plans.
At Kenning the commandos were briefed for the last minute about
the map, river route, and other details of operation. Six country boats
with roofs and sails were waiting in the river to carry the commandos.
Limpet mines and weapons were loaded in the boats. On 06 August six
commandos and four guerillas embarked in each of the boats. Each
guerrilla was carrying a SLR. Two LMGs were carried for the entire
fleet. Guerilla fighters were detailed for the protection of the team.
Boatmen as well worked as guide for proper direction of the route.
Kenning was a place in India. On 07th August the commandos
reached Koikhali Mukti Bahini camp via Madra and Shamsher Nagar.
They faced roaring high waves to the height of 10 feet at river estuary at
Madra; and dangerous and torrential current had been flowing in the
Rajmongol River.
Koikhali camp was inside Sundarban forest that had special
characteristics. Mukti Bahini boys would live on wooden platform
fixed on the trees for safety from ferocious animal like royal Bengal
tigers and high tide when ground was flooded. Lieutenant Commander
G M Martin and Major Jalil bade goodbye to the Commandos.
Lieutenant Ziauddin was responsible for the protection of the
commandos in river route.
On 07 August the commandos sailed for Mongla port from
Koikhali Mukti Bahini camp. On the way viewing the beautiful natural
scene fascinated them although the journey was difficult and dangerous.
On 12 August they reached Kalabagi under Kaira police station, south
of Khulna. On 13 August they reached a village Sutarkhali and
established temporary camp there. Lieutenant. Ziauddin and guide
Reazuddin along with 12 commandos left the main party for Hiron point
for separate operation.
On 13 August commandos heard the same warning song as
mentioned in operation Chittagong port. Reconnaissance of the port was
carried out on 14 August. On 15 August they heard the final song for
launching attack as mentioned earlier for operation Chittagong port.
From Sutakhali they sailed for village Balia Santa. They were delayed
for high tide to reach opposite bank of Mongla port. They reached at
0430 hours. They fixed fins, limpet mines and dagger and dived in the
river and started swimming towards the targets. There was searchlight in
the port and gunboats were patrolling. They avoided detection by their
high skill of training. The leader of the group Ashanullah instructed to
attack six ships out of total fifteen ships anchored at the port. They put
limpet mines under the ships and swam back to the bank. In this
operation five ships were sunk. Besides American S.S Lighting with war
materials was damaged. Among the destroyed ships, two were
American, two Chinese, one-Japanese and one Pakistani.
No sooner had they reached a safer distance series of explosions
were heard. The covering party from the launching bank of river Passur
opened LMG fire. Pakistan gunboats crews were perplexed and started
fleeing down the stream. The commandos retuned to their hide out by
boat and decided to leave Mongla area for India. But Mukti Bahini
guerrilla fighters refused to return. As a result seven of the commandos
being separated from the main body followed wrong route amidst heavy
thundering and storm and were captured by Pakistan army at Budhata in
Satkhira on 18 August. One escaped.
Failing to extract any information, they tortured and shot dead naval
commando Aftabuddin, and Sirajul Islam. The rest four escaped from
Jessore jail on 18 September. Lieutenant Ziauddin took 11 commandos
to Rajapur instead of Hiran point; as a result there was no operation at
Hiran point. The rest of the group numbering 41 returned Plassey camp.
Chandpur Operation
Chandpur is the most important river port in Bangladesh. The enemy‟s
troops and logistic supplies like weapons; equipment, ration and food etc
were transported through this port from Dhaka and Chittagong to
Barisal, Faridpur, Comilla, Mymensing and Narayanganj. The aim of
this operation was to destroy the major river communication and restrict
and disrupt the movement of enemy logistic supply and movement of
troops.
A squad of 20 naval commandos under submariner Badiul Alam
was entrusted with the responsibility of destroying the steamer, ferry,
barge and pontoon at Chandpur river port. The squad started their
journey from Plassey camp on 03 August and reached Boxnagore border
via Barrackpur, Agartola, Sonamusi and Meghalaya. On 09 August .at
this point Brigadier Sabbeth Sing and Lieutenant Samir Kumar Das bade
farewell to them. Each naval commando was issued with one limpet
mine, a pair of fins, swimming costume, one dagger, hand grenade, and
sten gun. There was no guide for the group. They entered Bangladesh
territory and by passed Mainamoti cantonment and reached a village
where they took shelter in the house of a Muslim league leader keeping
his son as hostage. They spent the day in his house and after sunset
again started the journey taking the son of Muslim league leader with
them as hostage. On 12 August they reached village Dadashi in
Chandpur by boat and on foot. Commando Shajahan Kabir and
commando Shamsul Kabir were two brothers who belonged to this
village. Their father Mr. Ibrahim was an elderly teacher. The commando
squad took shelter in his house. They shifted to another hide out close to
Chandpur river port in the house of Kabir Khan, uncle of Shajahan
Kabir.
As per the earlier instruction they heard the warning song and
launching song from Calcutta radio station on 13 August and 15 August
respectively. They had on reconnaissance already identified six water
vassal targets for destruction. The commandos prepared
themselves with limpet mines, fins and dagger; and dived into the river
and started swimming towards the targets. The river had violent waves
and strong current. There were searchlights all around the river. They
reached the targets. In first dive they went six feet under water beneath
the ships and cleaned the algae. In the second dive they stuck the limpet
mines on the cleaned place and opened the rubber cap to allow water to
enter for activation of mines. Delay time was 45 minutes. They started
swimming back to safety.
In the mean time rocket service ship „Ghazi‟ carrying Pak troops
anchored at the estuary of Meghna and Dakatia River. The commandos
started swimming backstroke keeping nose and eye over the water. They
paddled with the fins only without making noise. They had put water
hyacinth overhead to camouflage against detection. On hearing the
sound of explosion Pak army started firing. By the time commandos
were in safe distance. They missed the rescue boat, as the rescue team
left earlier hearing the sound of explosion. However by forcibly seizing
a fishing boat they reached the house of Ibrahim master. It was licked
out to Pak army that Ibrahim master had given shelter to commandos.
On 17 August Ibrahim master and his son Shajahan Kabir were arrested
by Pak army. In a desperate attempt Shajahan Kabir escaped from the
enemy custody but Pak army killed his father. On 17 August all
commandos assembled together and left for Plassey camp.
Operation Narayanganj River Port.

A squad of 20 naval commandos under submariner Abdur
Rahaman was despatched to Narayanganj via Agartala in the first week
of August. They reached Narayanganj by passing Mainamoti
cantonment through the middle of the enemy ignoring enemy threat.
Like other squads, they brought with them limpet mines, fins, dagger,
sten gun, grenades, dry foods and radio. On 11 August they took shelter
close to Narayangonj river port in the house of an Awami League
leader. They carried out the reconnaissance of Narayanganj river port in
daylight.
On 15 August receiving the executive signal from Calcutta radio
the team leader asked the commandos to get ready. Four groups were
prepared and each group comprised of three commandos. While
approaching the target they encountered Razakers on the way who
were neutralized by using the knife. At 12-30 hours the commandos

dived into the river and reached the target. They cleaned the algae from
the bottom of the ship and stuck the limpet mines there and activated the
detonator. Explosion started while they were in water. Four river crafts
were completely destroyed. In a few days they returned to India.
Daudkhandhi Ferry Head

A squad of nine commandos under the command of Shajahan Siddique
was dispatched to Daudkhandhi ferry head that crossed the Indian border
and entered Bangladesh territory in the first week of August. They
reached village Bandarampur in Daudkhandhi by boat and on foot. They
earned limpet mines, fins, knives, sten guns and radio set. They took
shelter in the house of a Pir Shaheb Allama Shah Kamal of village
Bandarampur. Pir Shaheb rendered all necessary assistance and he was
in prayer until the squad returned from operation. On hearing the
executive signal from Calcutta radio station, they got ready for operation
on 15 August.
The operation on Daudkhandhi ferry head was delayed on 15
August as one of the guides Abul Kalam fell sick on way to the target.
Next day on 16 August operation was launched. In this operation they
used one big boat with a roof and a small open boat. The distance of the
target area was 5 miles from the hideout. They left the big boat 1.5 miles
from the target and reached the target area by small boat in three trips.
They dived into the river and swam to the pontoons and stuck the limpet
mines to the pontoons and activated the detonators. They reached the
small boat by swimming and used the small boat to reach big boat in
three trips. All the mines were exploded at 02-45 hours. Pak army
retaliated by firing indiscriminately on hearing the sound of explosion.
The commandos reached the house of Per Shaheb by boat and proceeded
to Agartala where they reached on 18 August.
Conventional Warfare and Bangladesh Brigades 213
Chapter 7
CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND

BANGLADESH BRIGADES
Bangladesh Brigades
Mukti Bahini was organized to operate in different Sectors in
unconventional way from the month of April 1971. Guerilla warfare
continued to harass, weaken and bleed the enemy through minor
operations like raid, ambush. But it was not capable to gain, hold or
consolidate ground through these types of operations. As per the
teachings of staff college text or military doctrine, only conventional
army can achieve the ultimate victory. The enemy‟s tactical defeat is
only possible in a conventional battle. Colonel Osmany who was a
professional infantry officer who served in the top hierarchy of Pakistan
army, realized this concept and in the month of July in senior officers
conference spelt out his decision to raise brigade size formation.
Z- Force
Armed Forces Headquarters issued raising order of „Z‟ Force on 07 July
1971 under the command of Major Ziaur Rahman, psc. 1st, 3r and 8th East
Bengal Regiments were to be integrated in „Z‟ Force. Major Moinul
Hussein Chaudhury from Sector 3, Major Shafaat Jamil from sector 2
and Major Aminul Haque from Sector 1, were posted to lsl, 3rd and 8th
Bengal Regiment respectably as their commanding officers. The
battalions concentrated in Teldaha, in Tura Hills north of Mymenshing in
early July 1971 for training and making up the dificiencies through fresh
recruitment. Rigorous training was imparted to newly formed brigade
troops for launching operation and by 28 July 1971 the formation was
operational. A battalion or brigade launching an attack would achieve
two main goals - one, initiative would remain with the attacker and two;
morals of troops would remain high.
Battle of Kamalpur
Kamalpur was a strong Pakistani border out post (BOP) in the district of
Jamalpur. It is a land with hills, dense forest, and marshes, ponds and
paddy fields with unusual homesteads in the cluster of villages. The BOP
was located 40 miles north of Jamalpur town and on the south of Garo
hills, at Tura range and one kilometer from
international border. There was road communication between Jamalpur

and Kamalpur for easy movement of mechanical transport.
The BOP was commanded by Captain Ahsan Malik of 31 Baluch of
Pakistan army who had 70 regular troops, one platoon of Rangers and
three 81 mm mortars under him to hold that post against unexpected
Mukti Bahini attack. The BOP had two perimeter defenses, outer and
inner and number of fortified concrete bunkers. The defense had in its
perimeter booby traps, punjees, barbed wire and mine fields.
Communication trenches were dug in to provide easy movements
between the bunkers.
„Z‟ Force planned three operations for three battalions, 1 East
Bengal to capture Kamalpur BOP, 3 East Bengal to attack and destroy
Bahadurabad Ghat enemy complex and 8 East Bengal to capture Nakshi
BOP.
The mission of 1 East Bengal was to capture Kamalpur BOP, D-
Day was fixed as 01 August 1971 and the H- hour was 0330 hours. The
composition of 1 East Bengal was as under:
a) Reconnaissance Group („R Gp‟) - Major Moinul Hussein
Chaudhury, Commanding Officer 1 East Bengal, Lieutenant Colonel
Ziaur Rahman, „Z‟ Force commander also accompanied the R Group to
observe the first attack of his force and located at FUP area.
b) Alfa („A‟) Company led by Captain Mahbub acted as cut off
party at Uthanipara.
c) Bravo („B‟) Company under Captain Hafizuddin Ahmed was
the left forward Company.
d) Delta („D‟) Company under Captain Salahuddin Mumtaz was
the right forward Company.
e) Forming up place (FUP) was 1000 yards north of Kamalpur
BOP, secured by Lieutenant Mannan, Charlie („C‟) Company.
f) Charlee (C) Company worked as Protection Party - Lieutenant
Mannan and Flying officer - Liakot.
g) Assembly area - was at Mahendragonj
On 31 July 1971 after sunset Delta Company under Captain
Salahuddin Mumataz and Bravo Company under Captain Hafizuddin
Ahmed set out for Kamalpur BOP from the assembly area
Mohendragonj. But sudden rain slowed down the movement of the
troops. The guide lost the way as rainfall created complete darkness.
Kamalpur BOP Operation
O l A u g us t 1 9 7 1
Tura Range
Mahendraganj
c Coy (FUFJ) • Brahmanpara
Capt.Salahuddin
Mumtaz embraced
martyrdom here
Kamalpur BOP
/
Battajore
Khasergram
Uthanipara;
Cat off ►A Coy
Party*
Legend/ N
ii
International Boundary
Road e
BakshiganjJ

As a result attacking troops could not reach FUP on schedule. Indian

artillery started pre- H hour bombardment as per timed program before
the Mukti Bahini could reach FUP and make the assault formation. The
artillery fire support was kept on call as well as timed program. The
wireless communication was jammed and disrupted for unknown natural
cause. As a result the artillery fire support could not be called at right
time. The enemy at BOP alerted by the artillery fire started shelling on
the forming up place. Our artillery shells also started landing on FUP. It
was difficult for the assaulting troops to form up. As a result they got
disorganized. At one stage Lieutenant Colonel Ziaur Rahman shouted -
“Come on, act any cost, you will launch the attack”. However, under the
persuasive leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Ziaur Rahman and Major
Moin the attack was launched. But the enemy artillery remained active,
forcing the assaulting troops to hit the ground.
Captain Salahuddin, being a determined soul, shouted at his troops
to march forward and even he used the megaphone-asking enemy in
Urdu to surrender. It worked with tremendous impact. The troops
regained their courage and launched the assault. They crossed the first
line of enemy‟s defense and about 20 of them got inside the community
centre and resorted to hand to hand fight. Only two of them could come
out alive and rest embraced martyrdom. The enemy under the pressure
of the attacking Mukti Bahini fell back to their second line of defense
where from they were preparing to launch a counter attack. Lieutenant
Colonel Ziaur Rahman, who was observing the whole situation from the
close vicinity, shouted “I will accept 95% casualty, but press them out,
Moin”.
Captain Salahuddin was determined to press home the assault. He
was directing his under command by using megaphone, also he was in
white shirt exposed himself to open enemy fire. Suddenly Captain
Salahuddin Mumataz was hit by a machine gun burst in his chest and he
embraced martyrdom. Captain Hafiz miraculously survived in spite of
his stengun being blown to pieces from the splinters of artillery shell.
After the martyrdom of Captain Salahuddin and injury of Captain
Hafizuddin the attack of Mukti Bahini got disorganized.
Appreciating the possibility of no success, the attacking force was

ordered to fall back at 0730 hours on 01 August 1971.
In all eight attacks were launched on Kamalpur BOP, first on 12
June 1971, third on 15 August 1971, fourth on 06 September 1971, fifth
on 10 September 1971, sixth on early November 1971, seventh on 15
November 1971 and eight on 28 November 1971. The position could not
be captured on repeated assault. Ultimately they were starved out for
shortage of food and ammunition. At last at 1900 hours on 04 December
1971 Captain Ahsan Malik hoisted a white flag to surrender and the
battle of Kamalpur finally came to an end. The Baluch Captain
surrendered with 140 men after holding a brigade of besiegers for 21
days without suffering causality in spite of heavy Indian artillery
bombardment and forty sorties of air strikes.
Mukti Bahini casualties were sixty-one dead including Captain
Salahuddin and another sixty-six injured on 01 August 1971. Weapons
lost were one MG, 12 LMG, four stenguns, thirty rifles and one rocket
launcher. Pakistan army casualties were about fifty dead assessed on the
basis of different information.
An important success by Mukti Bahini was achieved at Uthanipara
by the cut off party led by Captain Mahbubur Rahman. The cut off party
ambushed Pakistan army convoy of 3 trucks. Pak army suffered twelve
dead; trucks were destroyed and they retreated to Bakshigonj.
The causes of failure of the attack were assault by raw recruits of
Mukti Bahini, poor Indian artillery fire support, absence of artillery
observer, fortified enemy defense, lacking of counter bombardment of
artillery, and shortage of officers, pin pointed enemy artillery support
and many others.
Battle of Nakshi
Nakshi BOP was situated in the district of Mymenshing. Nakshi, a small
village about 15 miles north of Sherpur town and 17 miles west of
Haluaghat opposite to Tura range of Garo hills of Meghalaya. The area
was covered with shal forest and had somewhat high hills from the plain
ground. The BOP was located in a low land
surrounded by hills. The BOP had plain land and paddy fields in its
immediate adjoining area up to the extent of 600 yards.
A number of natural nullahs passed through this plain land. In rainy
season, heavy water current from the hills passes through this plain
lands. Other villages around Nakshi BOP were connected by road to
Jamalpur via Jinaigathi and Sherpur.
The BOP was occupied by a platoon of 31 Baluch Regiment. The
commanding officer of the regiment was Lieutenant Colonel Sultan
Mahammud who was twice awarded Sitra-e- Jurat (SJ), second highest
gallantry award for Pakistan army for his gallant action. Lieutenant
Colonel Sultan Mahmmud SJ when asked to surrender by Indian
commander, he in a defiant reply sent a letter with a bullet in it asking
him to meet with a sten in his hand instead of a pen. This brave officer
fought all the way from Sherpur to Dhaka and charged Niazi why he had
accepted the instruments of surrender. Besides a regular platoon, BOP
had two platoons of Razakars. The commander of post was Major Riaz.
The platoon had 3-inch mortar supported by artillery battery.
Pak army organized the defense of the BOP as a strong fort. It had
thick mud wall around the BOP. There were number of concrete bunkers
along the walls. There was a 30 feet by 30 feet big concrete bunker in
the middle of the BOP. All the bunkers were capable of withstanding
artillery, mortar and rocket launcher‟s shells. All the bunkers were
interconnected with communication trench.
The defense of the BOP was further strengthened by barbed wire
fencing all-around it. The field of fire was cleared up to 600 yards by
cutting trees. Anti personnel mines and booby traps were laid outside the
barbed wire fencing. Bamboo punjees were fixed around the mud wall.
Besides water stream was flowing around BOP as natural obstacle.
„Z‟ Force was raised in the month of July 1971 at Teldhala across
the Indian border in Maghalaya. It was a large area having wide range
facilities for military training and tactical exercise. The troops were
given extensive training during the month of July 1971 for subsequent
operation against Pak army. 8 East Bengal was tasked to attack and
capture Nakshi BOP. Major A J M Aminul Haq was the commanding
officer of 8 East Bengal. The Bravo and Delta
companies of 8 East Bengal were tasked as assault companies. Two

platoons were detailed as cut off party at Rangutia to prevent enemy
escape through the road. The platoon had additional task to provide
covering fire to attacking force and to act as reserve. To the west of the
BOP a platoon of EPR took up position on a high ground to depict a false
attack. Fire base at a high ground was placed on the north of BOP at a
distance of 800 yards from objective where supporting weapons 106mm
and 75mm recoilless rifles, and machine guns were laid in well prepared
sand bags protection. Besides, battalion had 3-inch mortar detachment in
its outfit. Captain Amin Ahmed Chaudhury was the task force
commander.
Captain Amin Ahmed Chaudhury carried out extensive
reconnaissance for three days from 31 July to 02 August 1971. Subeder
Hakim had served in the BOP before 26 March. He indicated the task
force commander the exact locations of enemy bunkers, barbed wire,
punjees, minefields etc. The enemy strength about 45 regulars‟ troops
was confirmed from a Garo who was a cook in the BOP.
On 02 August 1971 „Z‟ Force Commander Lieutenant Colonel
Ziaur Rahman inspected the weapons positions and other details of the
plan and approved the plan. Haljati village was made assembly area and
shal forest on the east as FUP. H hour was set at 0345 hours on 04
August 1971.
Captain Mahbub (martyr on 08 December 1971) of 1 East Bengal
before launching attack told Captain Amin “ Sir, if you have any
confusion in your mind, don‟t go for the attack”. In reply Captain Amin
said, “I will not die like a fool”. At 1200 hours on 03 August Major
Shafaat Jamil warned Captain Amin “don‟t go for impossible task all by
yourself - All the best”.
An Indian artillery battery was to provide fire support for the attack.
Assaulting troops reached FUP from assembly area. As FUP was not
marked, there was some chaos and confusion although EPR guide
accompanied the assaulting troops to lead them to FUP. The Walking
assaulting troops through water was noiseless as participating troops
practiced the same in previous nights. At the same time two platoons
were sent to Rangutia as cut off party to prevent enemy from escape.
Attack On Nakshi BOP

Conventional Waif are and Bangladesh Brigades 221
The assaulting troops took up position in the FUP at 0335 hours at

night. Bravo Company was on the left and Delta Company on the right.
Prior to H hour the coded signal was communicated through wireless to
the supporting artillery for pre H hour bombardment. Allied artillery
opened up with full vigor and at the same time enemy artillery and
mortar started firing. Own artillery shells started landing in front of FUP
and some right on the FUP, although the Objective was 1000 yards
away from FUP. The poorly trained freedom fighters dashed to the
ground and six of them were seriously injured. Out of 200 freedom
fighters of two companies except 10 army, 8 EPR and 3 police, all were
simple villagers with 4 weeks training.
Indian artillery was very poor in engaging the target in comparison
to Pakistan artillery. Indian artillery was very poor in the preparation of
artillery task table. The poor performance and skill of the Indian gunners
was also experienced from other theatres of war in 1971. The artillery
support should have been on call as demanded by Captain Amin instead
of timed program which could facilitate the assaulting troops to reach
very near to enemy stealthy and could achieve surprise. There was no
artillery observer accompanying the assault troops to observe and direct
the fire.
Machine guns and recoilless rifles from the firebase opened up with
full vigor in tune with the pre H hour bombardment. Advancing troops
advanced towards the objective in an extended line formation. On
reaching the nullah 500 yards ahead and taking its cover Captain Amin
ordered his 2 inch mortar detachment to fire enemy position still 330
yards away from own position. At this poorly trained troops got pinned
down and continued to fire aimlessly towards the enemy from behind
the nullah bank. Captain Amin started shouting, kicking and dragging
the collars of troops. Finally assaulting troops reached very near to BOP
gate. Freedom fighters started battle cry “Yaa Ali, Naraye Taqbir and
Allahu Akbar, Joy Bangla”. Seeing the aggressive spirit of freedom
fighters enemy troops started running away.
At this stage of the battle, when the victory was very close to
freedom fighters, an enemy artillery air burst shell blasted over own
troops killing good number of freedom fighters. Company commander
was hit by a splinter in his right leg. But he further moved 50 yards
before he could realize the effect of the wound. He
reached within 5 yards of enemy bunker and again got hit in his right leg
by punjee. BOP was devastated. Captain Amin yelled out “The BOP has
been destroyed. Move forward”. Own troops were chasing the enemy
but some of them were caught in the minefield, some got hit by bullets
and some were splintered by artillery airbursts. Captain Amin was hit by
automatic weapon fire that had blown off his sten gun.
The hope for the capture of Nakshi BOP was over. In this operation
26 freedom fighters embraced martyrdom and another 50 got injured.
Captain Amin was rescued from dying position by the initiative of Major
AJM Aminul Haq and he spent rest of liberation period in Indian and
German hospitals. The operation at Kamalpur and Nakshi shattered the
morale of freedom fighters and Lieutenant Colonel Ziaur Rahman lost
his face to Indian army.
Bahadurbad Ghat Operation

Bahadurabad Ghat is situated on the eastern bank of Bramaputra River
in Dewangonj Thana of Jamalpur subdivision under Mymenshing
District. Bahadurbad Ghat was a major transshipment point where
railway service arranges transshipment of goods and passengers trains.
During the war this Ghat was used by the Pakistan army for
transshipment of all military cargo and also troops for North Bengal
particularly for Bogra, Rangpur and Dinajpur.
Fulsari Ghat was on the opposite bank of Bramaputra River in
Gaibanda subdivision of the district of Rangpur connected to meter
gauge railway. The defense of Bahadurbad Ghat was the responsibility
of 31 Baluch of Pakistan army. Headquarters of the Regiment was
located at Jamalpur. Commanding officer of 31 Baluch Regiment was
Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Mahmmud. The headquarters of a company
of 31 Baluch Regiment was located at Dewangonj. The company
commander was Captain Rafiq who was away from the company when
the Mukti Bahini assault came in. The defence of Bahadurabad Ghat was
reposed on this company.
„Z‟ Force made a simultaneous plan of operation at Bahadurabad
Ghat, Nakshi BOP and Kamalpur BOP. 3 East Bengal was tasked to
crush Bahadurabad defense complex of Pakistan army. Major Shafaat
Jamil was the commanding officer of 3 East Bengal. „D‟
Company headed by Lieutenant SIM Noor-Un-Nabi Khan, EME was

given the overall responsibility to assault enemy ferry Ghat complex.
One platoon of „A‟ Company was positioned at Sobujpur Ghat opposite
bank of Bramaputra River to form a firebase and to neutralize the
probable gunboat attack in Bramaputra River. Another platoon of „A‟
Company was positioned at Farazipara Bridge between Bahadurabad
Ghat and Dewangonj in the railway track. Rest of the „A‟ Company
headed by Lieutenant Anwar was placed at Jhalur char as a rear guard
with supporting weapons till the withdrawal of main assaulting
Company. Headquarters Company was located in the Madrasha area and
Jhalur char Ghat under the direct command of Major Shafaat Jamil who
would provide mortar support to assaulting company.
Several parties carried out extensive reconnaissance. Lieutenant
SIM Noor-Un-Nabi Khan who obtained full information of enemy
disposition earned out last reconnaissance.
The rear assembly area of the regiment was at the Mazar of Jdazrat
Shah Kamal and the forward assembly area was at Kathar Bil High
School ground on the bank of Moharani Canal. 12 boats were to be
arranged at Moharani canal Ghat for transportation of Mukti Bahini up
to Jhalur char at a distance of 8 miles. Distances of 3 miles from Jhalur
char to Madrasa area had to be covered on foot. Ammunition in
sufficient quantity had to be carried as the operation had to be conducted
deep inside Bangladesh. All preparation for the operation was complete
at Teldhala and the final operation order was given at Kathar Bil High
School ground.
H hour was fixed at 0400 hours on 01 August 1971.The detachment
of recoil less rifles and 3-inch mortar was to accompany the battalion as
alternative of field artillery gun. On 31 July 1971 at 1200 hours A, D
and HQ Company of 3 East Bengal left for Teldhala by military trucks,
covered a distance of 30 km and reached Hazrat Shah Kamal Mazar.
Mukti Bahini entered into Bangladesh at Hazrat Shah Kamal Mazar and
reached Kathar Bil designated Forward Assembly area crossing three
Rivers at a distance of 25 km at 2000 hours. This was the first assembly
area. Here „Viku chairman‟ provided administrative back up including
food and battle
intelligence. The battalion had about 350 soldiers of all ranks consisting
of trained and new recruits. Ghazi Nasser, Commander of Gazi Naseer F
F Company of 11 Sector and a local student belonging to the area of
operation was the main guide. Nasser had 8 platoons Mukti Bahini to
assist him. Besides Nasser other two local Mukti Bahini leaders Lutfor
and Kader also acted as guides.
„D‟ Company under Lieutenant SIM Noor-Un-Nabi Khan lined up
in FUP for attacking Bahadurabad Ghat complex. FUP was along the
ailes of a sugar cane field perpendicular to the objective at a distance of
100 yards. The attacking troops crossed the sugar cane field and got the
full view of the goods train, jetty, search lights tower, generator wagon
and Ghat complex. It was reveille time and enemy troops were in stand
to position. Subeder Karam Ali fired his 3.5-inch rocket launcher at the
generator set kept in the goods train. The Subeder also engaged the
passenger train and destroyed its engine. Simultaneously Subedar Badi
Mia‟s platoon from the right started lobbying hand grenades in the
compartment of the passenger‟s train where Pakistani troops were
sleeping. The attack began to spread all over the Ghat complex. Subedar
Bhola Mia‟s platoon from the right attacked the phontoon and Ferry at
the Ghat area. The railway stations, bogies, railway streamers and jetty
everywhere the enemy‟s weapons sites were destroyed. Bahadurabad
Ghat was thus liberated. Lieutenant Anawer was to protect the Jhalur
char area as rear guard till the withdrawal of main assaulting Company
but he deserted the area earlier. Major Shafaat Jamil expressed his
indignation for undignified act. However in the next attack at
Dewangonj, Lieutenant Anwar displayed achievement.
The next day 02 August 1971 attack was extended up to Dewngonj.
A and D Company engaged in battle with the enemy at Dewangonj
Bazar area, sugar mill and Razakar camp. The enemy was defeated in
Dewangonj. This incursion was a great achievement for „Z‟ Force.
Lieutenant Colonel Zia embraced Lieutenant SIM Noor-Un-Nabi Khan
and told him that he had saved the face of Lieutenant Colonel Zia after
their defeats at Kamalpur and Nakshi.
Battle of Chotokhel
Radhanagar is a Bazaar fall in the axes of Sylhet-Tamabil-Dauki-
Shillong in the district of Sylhet. It is about 10 km from Indian border,
Dauki. The control of the axis was very important from the Pakistan
point of view. The defense of greater Sylhet, Brahambaria, and
Ashugonj up to Bairab Bazaar was dependent upon the control of
Sylhet-Tamabil axis. Enemy established fortified defense around
Khadimnagar, Haripur, Jainta, Darbox, Pukash, and Goinghat and up to
Radhanagar. One Company of 31 Punjab Regiment, one Company of 30
Frontier Force Regiment, one Company of Ranger and a few hundred
Razakars defended Radhanagar complex. Three irregular Mukti Bahini
Companies engaged this enemy complex. At the later part of liberation
war allied command visualized the importance of this axis.
„D‟ Company of 3 E Bengal was operating in Raumari liberated
area in the greater district of Rangpur under Kurigram Sub- Division and
dominated Raumari char area commanded by Lieutenant SIM Noor-Un-
Nabi Khan. Later on „A‟ Company reinforced it. Lieutenant Noor-Un-
Nabi Khan established civil administration in the area, trained few
thousands of freedom fighters. He foiled number of Pakistani attacks in
the area. The important personalities like Finance Minister of
Bangladesh, Mr. Munsur Ali, and Major General Gurbox Singh Gill of
Indian Army accompanied by his wife and Major Ziaur Rahman, lZ‟
Force Commander paid visit to the liberated area.
The 3 E Bengal was withdrawn from Raumari in the first week of
October 1971 and sent to capture Chattack by the order of Colonel
Osmany and Major General Gurbox Singh Gill. The area of
responsibility fell under number 5 Sector and its Sector Commander was
Major Mir Shawkat Ali. The attack on Chattack was planned with
misleading enemy information and reconnaissance reports supplied by
Mir Shawkat Ali . „A‟ and „B‟ Company led by Captain Anwar and
Captain Akbar went for the main attack. Captain Mohasin of „C‟
Company and Lieutenant Noor-Un-Nabi of „D‟ Company were sent as
cut off party. „C‟ Company suffered a major set back, 26 of them were
killed, and most of the surviving soldiers lost their weapons. Captain
Mohasin reached the base camp after
226 Aiukti Bahini Wins Victory
. Lieutenant Noor-Un-Nabi could not consolidate his 1 re.-on at

pre-selected location as because the route to the site ^ hazardous with
water obstacle and marches. The main attack failed Captain Akbar by
his artful leadership could withdraw to safe zone and was saved from
total annihilation as Pak Army blocked the rear of Mukti Bahini. After
the Chattack operation, „A‟ and „D‟ Company were sent to Bholaganj
from where moved to Tamabil
area.
From 6th Nobemberl971, both the Companies were placed for
engaging Pak Army in Radhanagar complex Area. On 26 November
1971, Indian Army planned attack on Rathanagar and Chotokhel enemy
position. According to the preparation for attack Mukti Bahini seized
around the enemy complex by 24 November 1971. One Company of 5/5
Gurkha Regiment would launch attack on Chotokhel. Two Company of
5/5 Gurkha Regiment would launch attack on Radhanagar. FUP at Luni
village for attack on Chotokhel was to be protected by „D‟ Company. A
platoon of *D* Company of 3 E Bengal would accompany the main
attack. FUP at Kafaura village would be protected by „A‟ company of 21
Lieutenant Manzur and which will also provide fire support during the
attack on Radhanagar. „D‟ Company of Minor Tigers would act as cut
off party at Gora and Simultala village to stop any enemy re-
enforcement. Chotokhel was captured,at the cost of 36 soldiers but
ultimately could not be retained. It was withdrawn on the same day at
about 1200 hours at noon under enemy pressure. Allied Forces could not
capture Radhanagar due to the determined resistance by Pak Army. Also
the terrain was unfavorable to the attacker. 67 soldiers including
Company Commander Major B P Singh and four officers of 5/5 Gurkha
Regiment were killed. Total numbers of injured were 167.
In conventional war in a number of operations Mukti Bahini could
not bring any tangible result. Indian Army high command always
insisted Mukti Bahini for conventional attack. Several times Mukti
Bahini participated in conventional attacks but they suffered heavy
casualty. This time the famous elite Force of Indian Army „The Gurkha
Regiment‟ suffered devastating defeat.
Graphics : M. Ziaul Hague
Map-10
Major General Gurbox Singh Gill called Major Shafaat Jamil

Commanding Officer of 3 E Bengal and asked him to launch attack on
enemy position at Chotokhel just next day of the defeat of Gurkhas but
Major Shafaat Jamil was not interested in conventional attack.
Lieutenant Colonel Raj Singh, commander of Indian E Sector
responsible for Mukti Bahini logistic support and operation reached
Luni, „D‟ Company position of 3 E Bengal and started pursuing
Lieutenant Noor-Un-Nabi to launch attack on Chotokhel.He insisted that
when hundreds of Gurkhas sacrificed their lives for the liberation of
Bangladesh, how could Mukti Bahini avoid fighting and remain in safe
zone? Bengalis had to fight themselves for independence; no outsider
would come but liberate their country. They could get some assistance
only. Lieutenant Noor-Un-Nabi Khan realized these matter agreed to go
for the attack but without Indian artillery support. Lieutenant Noor-Un-
Nabi opted to go for silent attack to attain maximum surprise. On the
assurance of Lieutenant Nabi, Lieutenant Colonel Raj Singh left the „D‟
Company position fully satisfied. After the departure of Lieutenant
Colonel Raj Singh, Major Shafaat Jamil reached Lieutenant Nabi‟s
bunker and enquired what Lieutenant Colonel Raj Singh had told.
Lieutenant Nabi narrated everything to Major Shafaat Jamil. Major
Shafaat Jamil passed remarks that the operation would be suicidal and
asked Lieutenant Nabi to give second thought. Lieutenant Noor-Un-
Nabi was determined to have victory or to die, not to back out from the
challenge or commitment given to Lieutenant Colonel Raj Singh.
Lieutenant Noor-Un-Nabi was also a leader in BUET. He was the VP of
the university during 1969 mass movement. He knew the art to motivate
troops under his command. He had been with „D‟ Company for last 8
months. He understood their mind and capability. He had the confidence
in their ability. He called his platoon commanders and told them his
decision and asked them to inform the troops. Later part of the same
night on 27 November 1971, all the troops of ‟D‟ Company were
assembled in the Company Assembly area. It is mentioned that one
platoon from each company of „B‟ and *C* were attached to „D‟
Company by the instruction of Major Shafaat Jamil. Lieutenant Noor-
Un-Nabi addressed the troops to motivate them to go for the attack. He
declared that he would be in the forefront of the
company in assault. There were only three volunteers who raised their
hands to participate in the assault. They were Naik Ibrahim, Naik
Shaheed and Subedar Badi. For the last six weeks „D‟ Company had no
rest, and thus they were exhausted and tired. Even a platoon of ‟D‟
Company participated in the attack launched by Gurkhas. Moreover they
had seen the devastating defeat of 5/5 Gurkhas. Their morale was at the
lowest ebb.
Observing the negative attitude and avoiding tendency of the
troops, Battalion Commander Major Shafaat Jamil raised his hand to
participate in the attack as an ordinary soldier. On this gesture of CO,
the whole company raised their hands. All were determined to do or die.
This is called real spirit-de-corps.
On 28 November at 0350 hours all platoons left the FUP and
reached the assault line at 0355 hours. There was heavy fog all around;
visibility was restricted to 10/20 yards. At a distance of 150 yards Mukti
Bahini opened fire on Pakistani enemy position. At the same time, own
troops from Gora and Duarikhtl opened Machine gun and Recoilless
rifle fires on enemy position at Chotokhel. It was a hell for the Pakistan
Army. In a moment, platoon of Havilder Mannan captured the southwest
side of the village. Next the HQ platoon captured the main position of
the village. Many Pak soldiers were killed and rest of them ran away
with their lives. The platoons of Subeder Badi and Havilder Khair also
entered Chotokhel. Chotokhel was liberated and huge quantities of
ammunition and weapons were captured. Mukti Bahini consolidated in
bunkers and defense prepared by Pak Army visualizing the forthcoming
counter attack by Pak Army. The problem of ammunition was solved, as
it was detected by Naik Ibrahim that G-3 Rifle ammunition could be
fired by SLR. Machine guns, Light Machine guns and Recoilless rifle
captured by Mukti Bahini increased the firepower of Mukti Bahini.
There were several determined counter attacks by Pak Army
supported by artillery fire but Mukti Bahini courageously repulsed these.
Each soldier was issued with 10 hand grenades and a number of energa
grenades. Mukti Bahini extensively used automatic weapons, grenades
and energa grenades to repulse waves of enemy counter attacks.
Unfortunately Major Shafaat Jamil was injured and
evacuated to hospital at Shillong. The promised subsequent attack on

Radhanagar by Indian Army never came. All the forces around
Radhanagar complex were placed under command of Lieutenant Noor-
Un-Nabi by written order of Major Shafaat Jamil.
Failing to obtain any Indian response, on 29 November 1971 at
1500 hours Lieutenant Noor-Un-Nabi decided to attack enemy positions
at Radhanagar complex with the Mukti Bahini Companies deployed in
the area. The attack plan was as under:
a. Companies of Subedar Musarraf and Havilder Rafique would
liberate Mura Basti, Comilla Basti and Islampur village.
b. The Company of Lt Motiur Rahman would cross the River at
Jaflong and capture Jaflong Bazaar.
c. Muzahid Captain Daud Farooq at Vittikhel and „A‟ Company of
3 E Bengal commanded by Lieutenant Manzur at Kafaura would launch
attack on 30 FF Regiment at Radhanagar.
d. All Mukti Bahini Companies around Radhanagar complex
would launch simultaneous attack from their positions.
The result was unprecedented. The enemy fought tooth and nail to
consolidate their position. Chotokhel was the HQ of the enemy and the
capture of Chotokhel was vital for the occupation of Radhanagar, which
was on the route of withdrawal from Radhanagar. Pak Army put
determined efforts to capture Chotokhel but all enemy attempts were
foiled. Ultimately at mid night of 29 November 1971, enemy vacated
Radhanagar and withdrew towards Goain Ghat. Mukti Bahini solely
liberated Radhanagar complex.
Indian high command was astonished seeing the glorious victory of
Mukti Bahini in capturing Radhanagar complex, which the elite force of
Indian Army 5/5 Gurkhas failed. Lieutenant Colonel Raj Singh
recommended Lieutenant Noor-Un-Nabi for a gallantry award of
Bangladesh equivalent MAHAVIR-CHAKRA in the Indian Army.
MAHAVIR-CHAKRA is equivalent to BIR-SHRESTO in Bangladesh
and NISAN-e- HAIDER in Pakistan. Major General Gurbox Singh Gill
sent his congratulation to Lieutenant Noor-Un- Nabi for capture of
Chotokhel and Radhanagar and placed 5/5 Gurkha Regiment and 25
Assam Regiment under his command for the subsequent capture of
Goyainghat and Salutikar. On 01 December 1971 Lieutenant Colonel
Raj Singh issued a written
operational order for capture of Goyainghat Thana Headquarters. In this

operational order Lieutenant Nabi was appointed as operation- in-charge
of the Allied Forces as they reposed full confidence on him. This is a
unique example of the glorious role of Mukti Bahini in liberation war.
Battle of Dhalai
Dhalai BOP is near the international boundary in Sreemongal Thana of
Moulvibazar district. The BOP was located only 500 yards away from
international border and three miles west of Dhalai River within the area
of Dhalai tea garden. Kamalpur, Ganganagar, Mohanpur, Baligan and
Patra Khola tea garden are the important places around Dhalai BOP. A
road from Ambasa (India) to Dhalai BOP and another from Dhalai to
Sreemongal made Dhalai BOP one of the most important enemy
approach into Sylhet sector. Dhalai BOP was the most fortified defense
fort of Pak Army in this area. The enemy defended complex included
Dhalai BOP, Dhalai tea garden, Officer s Bunglow, Tea Factory,
Coolies Lines and Twin Huts. 30 FF Regiment with a Razakar Company
took up strong position in Dhalai BOP controlling Dhalai- Sreemongal
axis and 30 km frontier along the border. The defense was fortified with
barbed wire, concrete bunkers and mine fields. The Mukti Bahini and
Indian Army launched a series of attacks jointly on Dhalai BOP in the
last week of October 1971.
A co-ordination conference was held among Brigadier SDS Yadav,
Commander 61 Mountain Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Zia, Commander
„Z‟ Force and Major Ziauddin, CO 1 E Bengal in mid October 1971, to
formulate the plan to launch offensive on Dhalai BOP..I E Bengal was
given the responsibility to capture Dhalai BOP within the integrated
plan of Joint Force. In the operational plan, Charlie Company under
command of Lieutenant Quiyum would launch attack from the south of
Dhalai BOP and Alfa Company commanded by Captain Mahboob,
Bravo Company commanded by Captain Hafizuddin and Delta
Company commanded by Captain Bazlul Ghani Patwary would
establish blocking position at Patra Khola tea garden at a distance of 3
miles from Dhalai BOP in Dhalai- Sreemongal axis.
Attack on Dhalai BOP
Map-11 Graphics : M. Ziaul Haque

On 28 October 1971 at 0330 hours Charlie Company occupied FUP

at a distance of 600 yards south of Dhalai BOP and 0400 hours* Charlie
Company started assault from FUP. Lieutenant Noor with his left
forward Platoon first assaulted on the enemy. After a while, right
forward Platoon under Subeder Abul Hashem rushed towards the enemy
position. Both the platoons were following fire and move technique. At
the same time MG, 106 Recoilless Rifles and 3-inch mortar provided
fire support from the fire base around FUP. The Pak Army retaliated
with all their weapons. The enemy fire was sa intense that the assaulting
force could not make any headway and halted at a distance of 200 yards
from the objective. A LMG post halted the move of the assaulting force.
Lieutenant Quiyum asked Sepoy Hamidur Rahman to neutralize the
LMG post. Sepoy Hamidur Rahman moved with two LMGs. One LMG
provided him the fire covers. He crawled with the other LMG to enemy
LMG bunker and destroyed the LMG post and killed a number of
enemies. But ultimately he embraced martyrdom. Sepoy Hamidur
Rahman was awarded Bir Shresto for this valiant action. By 0900 hours
on 28 October 1971, Lieutenant Quiyum regained control over his
Company and took up dug down defense position 600 yards south of
Dhalai BOP. Ultimately this served as firebase for subsequent attack by
Indian Army. Meanwhile several reinforcement attempts by Pakistan
Army from the north were foiled by the combined efforts of Bravo
Company and Delta Company at Patra Khola tea garden. At Patra Khola
tea garden Captain Mahbub encountered Pakistan Army where he killed
six of the enemies.
On 01 November 1971, subsequent attacks were launched first by 2
Jat Battalion, then combined forces of 2 Jat and 7 Rajputana Rifles who
captured Dhalai BOP. 2 Jat lost 25 dead and 42 injured. Pakistan Army
left 60 of their dead bodies. Invisible defense of Pakistani fortified
position was destroyed and this shattered the morale of Pakistan Army.
At the same time morale of Mukti Bahini and Indian Army were raised
for victory of subsequent operations.
Battle of Chargram
On 21 November 1971, 4/5 Gurkha Battalion launched attack on Atgram
and captured the position after the hard fought battle. 4/5 Gurkhas lost
one Major, eight Second Lieutenants including a number of soldiers.
Enemy suffered heavy casualties. As the 4/5 Gurkhas suffered heavy
causality, Brigadier Watkey of Indian Army requested Lieutenant
Colonel Zia to clear Chargram Dakbungalow enemy position. Lieutenant
Colonel Zia asked Captain Hafiz of D Company to clear the enemy
position. Captain Hafiz on 21 November 1971 at 0400 hours launched
attack on Chargram from the FUP without artillery support and captured
the enemy position. 20 Thawl Scouts of Pak para military were captured.
Lieutenant Colonel Zia, „Z‟ Force Commander who was sitting in Indian
territory congratulated Captain Hafiz for this unexpected victory. During
the progress of the battle Lieutenant Colonel Zia rebuked Captain Hafiz
who rebuffed the bullshit who was sitting far behind the battle zone.
Prestige of Mukti Bahini was elevated in front of Indian General
Gonsaleve who also congratulated Captain Hafiz.
Martyrdom of Captain Mahabub

1 E Bengal took up temporary defense alongside Surma River at
Gouripur. On 28 November 1971, 31 Punjab of Pakistan Army launched
attack on Alpha Company position of 1 E Bengal. Captain Mahbub of
Alpha Company repulsed the attack. 50 enemies including Major Sarwar
were killed and 25 Pakistanis were captured^ alive. A most tragic
incident happened in this action, at the end of the battle when Captain
Mahbub was guiding the artillery shoot on enemy position by wireless
he was suddenly killed by enemy fire. The patriotic officer Captain
Mahbub escaped from Pakistan to join liberation war. He was buried
near Gouripur mosque. Gouripur was renamed as Mahbubnagar. How
can Bangladesh repay the supreme sacrifices of martyrs- only by
renaming a village? Its citizens are not at all paying respect to the
martyrs. They have forgotten to remember the supreme sacrifices of
million martyrs. They are resorting to corruption and terrorism. There is
no security of life in Bangladesh. People have no faith in law enforcing
agencies. Rousseau, French
philosopher, writer, and political theorist who inspired French

Revolution while interpreting democracy had rightly said that election is
for the day of election and rest of the days its citizens are chained. Then
the autocracy and dictatorship prevailed. Democracy has become
purchaseable commodity in Bangladesh. Democracy in Bangladesh is of
the niucle power and black money, by the mucle power and black
money and for the mucle power and black money. People have become
the hostage of mucle power and black money. Its custodians are stealing
the national treasures. Corruption undermines democracy. It creates a
culture of impunity destroying the rule of law and creating a class of
overlords who need to keep their dark deeds hidden in dark places.
Crooked politician care little for their representative duties and serve
those who can pay rather than those who elected them. They have
achieved a bad name for Bangladesh as being the most corrupt country
in the world for consecutive four years. Now the political scientists
think that the country has earned most of the pre-conditions to reach to
the stage of failed state.
K- Force
„K‟ Force was raised at Melaghar in the Indian state of Tripura with the
troops of 2 Sector and 4 E Bengal in the month of September 1971. 4, 9
and 10 East Bengal Regiments were raised distributing the troops of 4 E
Bengal and some 2 Sector troops under the command of Captain
Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar, Major Ainuddin and Captain Zafar Imam
respectably. Eighteen Sector Companies remained as Sector troops
under Captain ATM Haider. Mujib Battery with field gun was raised
under command of Captain Abdul Aziz Phasa. The command of „K‟
Force and 2 Sector were placed under Lieutenant Colonel Khalid
Musarraf, psc. In his absence Major Shaleq would be „K‟ Force
commander and Major ATM Haider would be 2 Sector commander.
The area of responsibility of 4 E Bengal Regiment was Saldhanadi, 9 E
Bengal Regiment was Kasba and 10 E Bengal Regiment was Belonia.
By first week of October 1971 all these battalions were ready to carry
out offensive operation.
Battle of Saldhanadi
Saldhanadi is a place under Kasba PS in the district of Comilla. It is a
few hundred yards from the Indian border of Tripura state. A railway
line has passed through Saldhanadi. Saldhanadi River passed by the
north-south side of Saldhanadi area Saldhanadi was very important to
Pakistan Army both strategically and tactically since it dominated
Dhaka-Akhaura- Saldhanadi-Comilla-Chittagong railway axis. The base
camp of 4 E Bengal was located at Konaban near Agartola in the Indian
state of Tripura, safe heaven for Mukti Bahini. Pakistanis faced great
difficulties to use the Akhaura- Comilla railway line for movement of
their logistics since their line of communication was often disrupted by
Mukti Bahini ambushes and harassing fire. Roads and tracks with
Mandabagh, Kaimpur, Kuti, Kamalpur, Kasba and Gobindapur
connected Saldhanadi railway station. Pakistan Army deployed strong
force at Saldhanadi area to protect the railway axis. 33 Baluch with the
support of artillery protected the general areas of Kasba, Kamalpur and
Mandabagh while 30 Punjab Regiment covered Saldhanadi and
Nayanpur areas in the south.
Before describing the battle of Saldhanadi, two daring ambushes by
Mukti Bahini needs to be mentioned.
On 18 June 1971 Pakistan Forces were carrying ammunition and
explosive boxes and other logistics in a railway trolley from Kasba
railway station to their position located at Saldhanadi railway station
area. A foot column of Pakistani soldiers was moving along either sides
of the railway line escorting this trolley. Captain Ghaffar detailed a
platoon of 4 E Bengal under command Subedar Abdul Wahab to
ambush the trolley. The ambush party took position 150 yards east of
the railway line of Mandabagh railway station. The platoon had two
MGs, six LMGs, one two-inch mortar and one rocket launcher. At 1430
hours trolley with escort reached ambush site. Mukti Bahini opened fire
on the target. Enemy left the trolley and took position along railway
high ground and returned the fire. Ammunition and explosives caught
fire by Mukti Bahini rocket fire. Enemy suffered heavy causalty. Mukti
Bahini withdrew from the ambush site. It was a big blow to the morale
of Pak Army.
Map of Saida Nadi Area
22 October 1971

On 10 July 1971 Subedar Abdul Wahab received information that a

Pakistani force would move along Saldha River through the village
Jhikura. Subedar Abdul Wahab moved from Konaban camp to ambush
area and observed a speedboat along with seven country boats, which
were advancing southeast through the Saldha River escorted by 100-foot
soldiers who were moving along both the banks of the river. Mukti
Bahini missed the opportunity, as the time was insufficient for
preparation to launch attack on the enemy column passing through
Saldha River. Subedar Abdul Wahab foresaw the possibility that the
enemy would fall back along the same route and decided to ambush
them during their return journey. Subedar Abdul Wahab sited the cut off
party, main body and waited for enemy to reach in their trap. At about
1430 hours one speedboat was seen coming back at a high speed
through the river. When the speedboat entered into the ambush site,
Mukti Bahini opened fire from all their weapons. All passengers of the
boat were killed. Among the killed were seven officers including two
Lieutenant Colonels, one Subedar Major, three Sepoys and one non-
Bengali businessman. Captain Bokhari of 53 Field Regiment Artillery
who committed innumerable atrocities in Comilla town was also killed.
Considering the strategic importance of Saldhanadi railway station,
‟K‟ Force commander Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Musarraf, psc decided
to capture this position. Saldhanadi area was strongly held by 30 Punjab
Regiment. Built up area like the Saldhanadi railway station, go down
and Bazaar area made direct assault difficult. So Captain Ghaffar drew
up an intelligent plan of attack. The plan was in two phases. In one
phase - one company would carry out four raids in the surrounding
enemy held areas. These would be platoon raids and would be
conducted simultaneously. This was to confuse the enemy about the
main attack. As per the plan raiding parties were sent on 07 October
1971 to the nearby enemy camps at Bara Dushia, Chandla, Gobindapur
and Kayanpur to launch faint attack on the enemy. The Pakistanis
retaliated back with heavy MGs and mortar fire from all these camps as
well as Saldhanadi railway station areas. The exchange of fire continued
throughout the night and finally came to an end in the morning.
Mukti Bahini launched full-scale attack on Saldhanadi railway

station at 0800 hours on 08 October 1971. Naib Subedar Siraj, Subedar
Mangal Mian and Subedar Belayet with a platoon each took up position
on the east, north and west of the objective respectively. Subedar Abdul
Wahab‟s a company positioned behind the platoon of Subedar Mangal
Mian. Mukti Bahini‟s attack progressed as planned. The enemy had four
big bunkers on the southern bank of the river. The two of the bunkers
were destroyed by recoilless rifles fire. The enemy left the broken
bunkers and took shelter in the remaining two. Subedar Belayet
immediately took the initiative and jumped into the river with his
troops. They swam across the river and occupied the broken
entrenchment. This action got the enemy in the Bazaar area separated
from those in the station. Captain Ghaffar intercepted an enemy
conversation where he listened that the enemy was not in a position to
hold the position any more. Guessing the weakness and low moral of
the enemy, Captain Ghaffar pressed in his attack more vigorously.
Enemy could not hold the position any more. Around 1100 hours the
enemy started falling back on Nayanpur railway station in the south.
Saldhanadi railway station area at last was liberated. Enemy launched
several counter attacks from Nayanpur area but failed to recapture
Saldhanadi railway station. While carrying reconnaissance for enemy
counter attack, Subeder Belayet was killed by an enemy sniper. Huge
number of weapons and large quantities of ammunition were captured in
this operation. Colonel Osmany sent special congratulation to Captain
Ghaffar for his grand victory.
Here the Government of Bangladesh for the first time during war
announced gallantry award for Captain Ghaffar and Naib Subedar
Belayet (posthumously) who were awarded „Bir Uttam‟ and Subedar
Abdul Wahab was awarded ‟Bir Bikram‟. All other gallantry awards of
Bangladesh liberation war were long after liberation war.
Battle of Kasba
Kasba is a police station in the district of Comilla situated at zero line of
Indo-Bangladesh border. It was strategically important for Pakistan
Army because Dhaka- Brahambaria-Akhaura-Kasba- Comilla-
Chittagong railway line passed through Kasba. The
maintenance of this railway line was very vital for Pakistan Army for
transportation of arms, ammunition and other logistics. It was easy for
Mukti Bahini to attack and disrupt this railway line across Konaban
camp in the Indian state of Tripura. Major Ainuddin commanded the
area between Gangashagar and Kasba within the operational
responsibility of 9 E Bengal. Kasba and Lutamura were strongly held by
the enemy.
Kasba changed hands several times between Mukti Bahini and
Pakistan Army. By the end of September 1971, Sector troops already
inflicted heavy casualty on enemy. When 9 E Bengal became
operationally fit, Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Musarraf, „K‟ Force
commander prepared an operational plan to capture Kasba by 9 E
Bengal supported by Mujib Battery (3.7mm gun). Lieutenant Colonel
Khalid Musarraf remained overall commander of the operation. As per
plan, 9 E Bengal Regiment launched the attack at 0500 hours on 22
October 1971. After pre-H hour bombardment by Mujib Battery, two
Companies led by Lieutenant Abdul Aziz and Subedar Major Shamsul
Huque assaulted the enemy position from the north and the south.
Pakistan Army was taken by surprise and enemy started loosing ground.
9 E Bengal captured Kasba after three hours of fighting. In this battle, 43
Pakistanis including 3 officers were killed and more than 60 got injured.
Mukti Bahini captured huge number of weapons and large quantities of
ammunition in this operation.
A tragic event occurred in this operation. A splinter of enemy
artillery shell hit Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Musarraf. It was a grievous
injury. He was evacuated to Agartala hospital for medical treatment.
Battle of Belonia Bulge

Belonia is a border town of Feni district situated in the southeast of
Bangladesh. Belonia has a unique position sitting in the tip of a piece of
territory of Bangladesh jutting out inside India in the shape of peninsula.
The Belonia Bulge extends from north to south over a space of 16 miles
and from east to west about 6 miles measuring an area of about 100
square miles. It consists of two thanas namely - Parasuhuram and
Chagalnaiya. The river Mahuri runs from north to
south through the Bulge. A meter gauge railway line runs Feni to
Belonia. There are two metal roads, one going from Feni to Belonia and
other from Chhagalnaiya to Belonia. Area is just like the plain of
Bangladesh.
There were a number of BOPs along the Belonia Bulge border
manned by EPR. EPR consisted of Bengali and West Pakistani soldiers.
Bengali EPR killed all West Pakistani soldiers, consolidated at Feni and
formed a full-fledged Company. A platoon of 3 Commando Battalion of
Pakistan Army was tasked to guard tactically important Shubhapur
Bridge over Feni River. This EPR Company attacked the enemy at
Shubhapur Bridge on 31 March 1971 and the whole commando platoon
was annihilated.
The Bengali elements of Pakistan Army fought during the month of
April - May 1971 and fell back to Indian Territory. As per the previous
understanding of Mujib — Indira Gandhi, Indian Border Security Force
(BSF) and Indian Army stationed near the border welcomed the Mukti
Bahini. Major Zia and Major Khalid Musarraf got the sanctuary in
Indian soil in the Indian state of Tripura. These two senior officers
planned to occupy some Bangladesh territory. By May 1971, Major Zia
organized and established 1 Sector and Khalid Musarraf organized and
established 2 Sector. The Pakistan Army did not physically occupy
Belonia Bulge. It was easy to occupy and keep Belonia under
occupation as three sides of the Bulge were surrounded by Indian
Territory. As per plan, on 1 June 1971, troops of 1 Sector entered into
Belonia Bulge through the eastern border immediate south of Chandgazi
and deployed facing south in extended line formation from the border up
to Mohuri River. At the same time troops of 2 Sector also entered from
the western border and took up positions up to Mohuri River linking up
1 Sector. The officers of Mukti Bahini who took part in this operation
were Captain Oli Ahmed, Captain Mafuzur Rahman, Captain Motiur
Rahman, Captain Gaffar, Lieutenant Imamuz Zaman, Lieutenant Shidul
Islam and Captain Jafar Imam. When Pakistan Army discovered the
presence of Mukti Bahini in the area they launched several attacks on
Mukti Bahini. Failing to dislodge the Mukti Bahini after three weeks,
Pakistan Army on 21 June 1971 dropped
Map-14
Pakistani commandos by helicopter sorties behind Mukti Bahini

position. Simultaneously Pak Army launched attacks from the south
supported by tanks and artillery. Mukti Bahini under intense pressure
fell back to Indian Territory. General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff
of Pakistan Army, personally supervised the operation.
When „K‟ Force was fully operational after re-organization and
extensive training, „K‟ Force Commander Lt Colonel Khalid Musarraf
planned to seize territory of Belonia Bulge. The troops earmarked for
this operation was 10 E Bengal commanded by Major Jafar Imam, „A‟
Company of 2 E Bengal of „S‟ Force commanded by Captain Helal
Morshed and troops of I Sector commanded by Captain Mahfuz. Belonia
Bulge was occupied by 15 Baluch Regiment and battalion strength of
EPCAP. The enemy was supported by artillery. The main task assigned
to 10 Bengal was to infiltrate through the enemy gaps from the western
border along the line Chandana - Salia - Gutuma and dig down
overnight facing the enemy from both front and rear. Captain Mafuz
with the troops of 1 Sector was to infiltrate from the eastern border
through Gutuma and link up with the troops of 10 E Bengal. Northern
part of Belonia Bulge covering an area of 50 square miles was to be
sealed so that enemy could not escape.
On the night of 2 November 1971, Mukti Bahini infiltrated during
heavy rain, dug down and took the defense position as planned. Mukti
Bahini carried sufficient ammunition, rations, digging tools and
communication equipment. The position of Mukti Bahini could not be
discovered until a Pak trolley was intercepted when all six Pak soldiers
including an officer, passengers of the trolley were killed. During 03
November - 04 November 1971, Pak Forces from the south tried to link
up with the north but failed. On 04 November and 05 November 1971,
four Pakistani F-86 Sabre Jets strafed Mukti Bahini position. It was
expected that Pakistan Army would surrender to Mukti Bahini seize, but
they were resisting with all their energy. At 1200 hours on 07 November
1971, 3 Dogra Regiment of 83 Mountain Brigade of Indian Army after
heavy bombardment by Indian Divisional artillery launched attack on
enemy in liaison with Mukti Bahini. After heavy fighting, the entire area
was completely captured by first light of 07 November 1971.
Seventy-five Pakistani soldiers were taken as prisoners of war. Mukti

Bahini captured huge number of weapons, ammunition and equipment.
The Headquarters of „K‟ Force was moved into liberated area. The
Bangladesh National Flag was hoisted at Parashuram police station. The
success of the second battle of Belonia Bulge raised the morale of Mukti
Bahini for subsequent operations.
S Force
„S‟ Force was raised at Fatikchhari in the Indian state of Tripura with
the troops of 3 Sector and 2 E Bengal on 01 October 1971. Major K M
Safiullah, psc was appointed as Brigade commander. New battalion 11
E Bengal was raised with the troops of 3 Sector and 2 E Bengal under
command of Major ASM Nasim. Major Moinul Hossian Chaudhury
was appointed the new Commanding Officer of 2 E Bengal. 2 E Bengal
was deployed in general area opposite Singerbil in the north and
opposite to Akhaura in the south facing towards west. 11 E Bengal was
deployed in general area opposite to Mukundapur and Haraspur facing
towards north to stop enemy advance from Sylhet. Sector troops of 3
Sector consisting of ten companies was left at their locations with
Captain Nuruzzaman as its commander.
2 E Bengal and 11 E Bengal were re-organized and given
extensive training to make them as regular strong combat force. „S‟
Force got little time for training for launching in the war.
There was unsuccessful attack on Dharmanagar by 2 E Bengal on
03 September 1971. Captain Subed Ali Bhuiyan launched the main
attack from the southwest of the objective. Two blocking positions were
established, one on the north at Mirzapur by Captain Abdul Matin and
Captain ASM Nasim by two companies of 2 E Bengal and other on the
west at Ahmedpur by Lieutenant Helal Morshed. Artillery support was
provided by Indian artillery. The attack failed due to various reasons
namely - attack launched by new recruits,, attack did not progress as
planned, poor leadership, inadequate artillery support and the quantum
of force needed was insufficient. 18 Rajput of Indian Army on 28
September 1971 launched second attack on the same enemy position.
Mukti Bahini blocking the same blocking positions also failed.
Battle Of Mukundapur
Mukundapur BOP was under Kasba Police Station in the district of
Comilla, close to the border of Indian state of Tripura. Mukundapur
BOP was situated between Mukundapur railway station and
Mukundapur village very close to Indian border. The enemy had
established strong defense position at Mukundapur BOP dominating the
surrounding area. After the unsuccessful attack on Dharmaghar
Commander of „S‟ Force decided to impart more training for the troops.
To improve the combat efficiency, especially on enemy strong points,
the entire month of October 1971 was utilized for training. The battle
plans to capture Mukundapur were - to carry assault by one company of
2 E Bengal led by Lieutenant Sayeed Ahmed, two companies to
establish blocking position south of Mukundapur at Kala Chara River
and 18 Rajput of Indian Army to block the railway line on the south of
Jalilpur. The D-day was fixed on 18/19 night of November 1971. The
direction of assault was planned from the west and the time of attack
was at dawn. Having secured the two blocking positions on the north
and on the south of the objective by 18 Rajput and 2 E Bengal Regiment
respectably, Lieutenant Sayeed Ahmed along with his company decided
to infiltrate into the enemy territory in small groups and to reach the
assembly area in a small orchard in the south of Mukundapur village.
The eastern edge of the village, which was about 800 yards from the
BOP, was selected as FUP. The artillery was kept on call.
The dawn attack was launched on 19 October 1971. Pakistani
Forces reacted and put up a hard fight. Pakistani troops from the
neighboring areas tried to re- enforce their position, but efforts were
foiled by the blocking positions. The battle continued till 1200 hours
and the company of Lieutenant Sayeed Ahmed captured Mukundapur.
31 soldiers of Pakistan Army were taken as prisoners of war. Huge
quantities of arms and ammunition were captured. From the various
battles lessons learnt were that the silent attacks were always successful
without pre-H hour bombardments. Surprise was always the key to
success. This operation once again raised the moral and confidence of
Mukti Bahini.
Smt Indira Gandi, Prime Minister of India, Mobilized International

Political
Suppor for Independent Bangladesh and moved her Military Forces to
assist Mukti Bahini in Leberating Bangladesh.
Attack At Mukunda Pur
19 November 1971

Diplomatic Waif are and Role of UNO 243
Chapter 8
DIPLOMATIC WARFARE AND ROLE OF UNO

Diplomatic Warfare and Role of UNO 245
The Role of Diplomats in Foreign Mission

Bengali diplomats and employees serving in Pakistan Mission all over
the globe played a very important role in our war of liberation. They
defected from Pakistan the most coveted Foreign Service on protest
against genocide in Bangladesh and declared their allegiance to the most
risky and highly uncertain Government of Bangladesh in exile. Thus
they moved the conscience of world community and generated world
opinion in favor of the Government in exile. This act of Bengali
diplomats created tremendous impact in world community through
newspapers and electronic media.
Mr. Hossain Ali, Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan Mission
at Calcutta declared his allegiance to the Independent Bangladesh
Government on 18 April 1971.He created panic in Pakistan Embassies
abroad and set heroic leading role in the field of diplomacy in favour of
Bangladesh Government. Bengali diplomats in other Pakistan foreign
missions followed suit after his action. He established the first foreign
diplomatic mission abroad.
Justice Abu Syed Chaudhury opened the second diplomatic mission
at 24 Cambridge Garden, London on 27 August 1971. The opening of
Bangladesh diplomatic mission was announced in a big public meeting
at Trafalgar Square that had shaken the morals of Pakistani diplomats.
Lord Brookway, Lady Preford, British MP Mr. Tom William and Bob
Edward spoke in favour of Bangladesh Government in the public
meeting. Justice Abu Syed Chaudhury was appointed roaming
ambassador of Bangladesh and he led the Bangladesh delegation to the
United Nations at New York. Dr Fazlur Rahman Khan, famous
Architect established Bangladesh Defense League at Chicago. He
travelled big cities of America and mobilized world opinion against
genocide by Pakistan and gained support for Bangladesh Government in
exile. He was the prime mover to create opinion and support by
investing his money and talent for Bangladesh in America. He
persuaded Bengali diplomats to join Bangladesh Government in exile.
Mr. Abul Maal Abdul Muhith, Economic Counselor opened Bangladesh
Mission at 1223 Connecticut Avenue in Washington, capital of USA on
09 August 1971. Mustafizur Rahman Siddiqi, MP joined Bangladesh
mission as its head at Washington. Bangladesh mission was opened at
Delhi
on 30 August 1971. Mr. Humayun Rashid Chaudhury, Bengali

Counselor of Pakistan Embassy at Delhi took the responsibility of this
mission on 08 October 1971. Professor Rehmam Sobhan, a Bengali
economist escaped from East Pakistan and reached Washington where
he successfully persuaded World Bank and IMF to stop financial aid to
Pakistan. He even took a trip to Paris and could convince the members
of aid consortium to Pakistan to stop their financial assistance for
Pakistan. He was successful in his mission. The lists of Bengali
diplomats and employees who defected from Pakistan Embassy and
declared allegiance to the exile Government of Bangladesh are given
below:
Calcutta
M. Hossain Ali, Deputy High Commissioner, 18 April Rafiqul
Islam Chaudhury, First Secretary, 18 April Anawarul Karim
Chaudhury, Third Secretary, 18 April Kazi Nazrul Islam, Third
secretary, 18 April M Maksud Ali, Assistance Press Attache, 18
April Saidur Rahman, Officer, 18 April
New Delhi
Humayun Rashid Chaudhury, Counselor, 04 October KM
Shabuddin, Second Secretary, 06 April Amjadul Hoque, Assistance
Press Attache, 06 April New York
AH Mammud Ali, Deputy Counselor, 26 April
S Anawarul Karim, Assistance Permanent Representative, 04
August
Washington
Enayet Karim, Minister, 04 August
SAMS Kibria, Political Counselor, 04 August
AMA Muhith, Economic Counselor, 30 June
Abu Rushe Motinuddin, Education Counselor, 04 August
Syed Moazzem Ali, Third Secretary, 04 August
Ataur Rahman Chaudhury, Third Secretary (Accounts), 04
August
Sheikh Rustum Ali, Assistance Information Officer, 04 August
AM Shariful Alam, Assistance administrative Officer, 04 August

Abdur Razzak Khan, Assistance Education Attache, 17 May
London
Mohiuddin Ahmed, Second Secretary, 01 August M Lutful Matin,
Director (Finance), 05 August Rezaul Karim, Counselor, 07
October Abdur Rouf, Deputy Director Information, 08 August
Fazlul Haque Chaudhury, Labour Attache, 11 August
Switzerland
Waliur Rahman, Second Secretary, 02 November
Iraq
AFM Abul Fattah, Ambassador, 29 August Philippines
Kharrum Khan Panni, Ambassador, 13 September Japan
QAMA Rahim, Third Secretary, 02 November A Masud, Press
Attache, 02 November
Nepal
Mustafizur Rahman, Second Secretary, 03 October Laos
Mohiuddin Ahmed Zaigirdar, Third Secretary, 13 September Hong
Kong
Mohiuddin Ahmed, Trade Commissioner, 18 August Egypt
Fazlul Karim, 26 October Argentina
Abdul Momen, Ambassador, 11 October Tunisia
Syed Amirul Islam, Third Secretary, 11 November
Out of 92 Bengali Diplomats serving in foreign mission, 38 owed
their allegiance to Bangladesh Government in exile, 37 returned to
Bangladesh after liberation, 11 were political appointees and from other
services and 6 remained in Pakistan.
US Senator on Bangladesh
I met Senator Edward Kennedy on my way to Barrackpur while I was
going to collect the pay for my company. He was traveling with a big
convoy accompanied by many politicians and journalists of Bangladesh.
Senator Edward Kennedy lost three of his brothers including John F
Kennedy, the 40th President of the United States of America. His eldest
brother was a fighter pilot. He was killed in an air crash. Robert
Kennedy was a Presidential candidate and during the election campaign,
he was assassinated. He has seen premature and untimely death of his
brothers. The human sufferings of Bangladesh refugees in different
refugee camps in India touched his heart.
Senator Kennedy warned the Americans "It is our military
hardware, our guns, tanks and air craft which are contributing to the
sufferings, and that is being done in violation of negotiated agreements
on the use of US military aid". Raising his voice in the US senate on
April 1971 against the killings in East Pakistan, especially of dissident
leaders and intellectuals, he asked the US Government to condemn them
and use its services to stop them.
When he heard the details on the genocide in Bangladesh by the-
army of Yehya Khan he rushed to refugee camps in India. His visa was
denied by Pakistan when he wanted to see for himself the sufferings of
the people of Bengal. He put his all endeavour to create world opinion
against the Pakistan army atrocities.
Senator Edward Kennedy‟s address to Senate on 7 December 1971
is produced below:
“After 8 months of escalating violence and military repression -
after hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed in East Bengal
and 10 million refugees have fled into India - suddenly our national
leadership recognizes that war has swept over South-Asia. But the facts,
Mr. President, show that this war began not last week with renewed
military border crossings, nor last month with escalating crossfire of
artillery between India and Pakistan; this war began on the bloody night
of March 25 with the brutal suppression
by Pakistan army of the free election it held in East Bengal. Now the
administration tells us - 8 months after March 25 - that we should
condemn, not the repression of Pakistan army, but the response of India
towards on increasingly desperate situation on its eastern borders - a
situation which our nation calculatedly ignored. Over the weekend the
administration has belatedly turned to the United Nations, asking it to
implement its peace- keeping machinery - an initiative many of us
supported months ago. The problem is that none of the resolutions, we
have supported recognize the root of the crisis, the interests of
Bangladesh forces or the urgent need for political settlement. Our
Government and the UN must come to understand that the actions of
Pakistan army on the night of March 25 unleashed the forces in South
Asia that have led to war.”
Edward Kennedy is held by Bengalis in high place for his
contribution to our liberation war and as a champion of human rights.
Geopolitics - Polarisation in the Context of

Bangladesh crisis
Indian Reaction. Indian role was neutral till 25 March 1971. When
Pakistan Army cracked down on the innocent people of East Pakistan,
Indian propaganda machineries were geared up. Akash Bani Indian
radio started broadcasting giving the news of Pakistan Army's killing,
atrocities, massacre etc. Bengali military officers approached Indian
security forces for military help. There was no response. Bengali
military units fought the Pakistan Army and ultimately fell back to India
by the middle of April 1971. Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed crossed over to India
made contact with Mrs. Indira Gandhi Prime Minister of India at Delhi
during the 1st week of April 1971. From the month of May 1971 India
started giving Mukti Bahini some quantities of small arms and
ammunition. Refugees- from East Pakistan started pouring in India.
About 10 million Bengali refugees most of them Hindus went to India.
It was a great burden on the poor economy of India. India had no real
friend who would come in her danger. India faced political polarization.
President Richard Nixon of U.S.A. was awarded the highest civil award
by Yahya "Hilalee Pakistan” when Nixon was passing through Lahore
airport in 1970. General Yahya also was working as media between
Washington and Peking for normalization of diplomatic relation.
President Richard Nixon naturally became the blind supporter of
Pakistan. India fought war with China in 1962 and became the
archenemy of China. Pakistan was receiving military fighting machines
both from the U.S.A. and China. India dared not to physically interfere
in East Pakistan because of the threat from U.S.A.and China.
Soviet-Indian friendship Treaty . Soviet-Indian Treaty was the
long-standing Soviet quest undertaken to check China and perhaps the
unfolding of American dialogue with Peking accelerated it. In the
beginning of 1969 after the bloody confrontation between China and
Soviet along the river Usury, Soviet Union undertook the initiative to
sign a friendship treaty with India and other Asian countries. But in
the mean time Soviet Union agreed to supply military hardware to

Pakistan in exchange of her not renewing treaty for American military
base at Badber near Peshawar. Partly because of this India lost her
interest in the proposed friendship treaty and further negotiation was
stopped.
In July 1971 when contact (Kissinger Peking Mission) was
established between China and America at the initiative of Pakistan,
India felt threatened by this move and promptly agreed to sign the
friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on the basis of old draft prepared
in 1969. Mr. Gromico, Soviet foreign minister and Mr. Sarwan Singh
his counter part on 09 August 1971 provided for mutual defense
agreements, signed the treaty of friendship, peace and co-operation.
According to the treaty if India were attacked, there would be immediate
consultation with the Russians to undertake appropriate effective
measures to encounter it. The signing of the treaty coincided with a huge
Congress party rally attended by some fifty thousand people. The mile-
long Rajpath Ceremonial Avenue in the city centre was chocked with
pro-Bangladesh demonstrators in an eight-mile long procession. The
cost of the rally was put at about eight million rupees. Mrs. Indira
Gandhi told the rally that no country could subdue India by threats.
The new Soviet-Indian treaty surely was spun from long-term
geopolitical consideration on both sides. Kremlin was assured itself of a
measure of control over Indian policy in the "mutual consultations"
article. The news of the signing of the treaty was a bombshell to Mr.
Kissinger. The Washington Post, 12 August 1971 issue described that
American support for Pakistan was expanding to an extent that was
much more than the apparent requirement of geopolitics. In the 1st week
of August 1971 President Nixon went as far as to define the issue as a
problem of hunger ignoring the root political issue of Bengali secession
movement. The Washington Post also criticized Mr. U Thant, Secretary
General of United Nations for not telling the simple truth that the
deliberate policies of Pakistan Government, which constituted a
violation of human rights, were creating threats to international peace.
The Washington Post further mentioned that Mr. U Thant should have
understood that the issue was beyond the political calculus of the Soviet
move in the subcontinent. Besides this treaty acting as a deterrent
against
aggression by Pakistan and China, Indian decision makers had two

important considerations in their minds. Firstly, India must get the
regular supply from Soviet Union when direct military confrontation
with Pakistan would start at the time of assisting the Bangladesh
liberation forces. Secondly, Soviet must put veto power against U.N
cease-fire till the complete liberation of Bangladesh. After the signing of
the friendship treaty Indian policy makers planned for the military
offensive. India decided to exploit the situation which would close the
northern passes by snow fall in winter thus preventing Chinese threat
and which would make way for easy victory in eastern front by
lightening military offensive.
Diplomatic Moves in U. N.
Yahya coterie had firm confidence and conviction that at the start
of total war United States with all her military might would come
forward to stop the emergence of Bangladesh and would undertake all
possible measures to create stalemate. On this strategy Pakistan launched
full-scale war on India on 03 December 1971. The Pakistan Air Force
struck Indian airfields of Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Awantipur,
Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra. Pakistan‟s move was promptly
supported by United States. Thus at the end of liberation war global geo-
political conflict created by American administration was a great
obstacle for the expected victory of combined forces of India and
Bangladesh.
On 04 December 1971 acting President and Prime Minister of
Bangladesh requested the Indian Prime Minister for formal recognition
of Bangladesh so as to create congenial atmosphere for world opinion in
favour of India and spell out the intention of the Government of India on
Bangladesh issue, not to merge East Pakistan with India but to liberate
sovereign Bangladesh.
While on the other side on 04 December 1971, Dr Henry Kissinger
briefed Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) about the March
1959 bilateral agreement and SEATO treaty obligations. Diplomats in
the State Department sweated over interpretations of the SEATO treaty
and the secret agreement with Pakistan. The treaty guaranteed U.S
intervention only in the event of communist aggression. Kissinger set out
to orchestrate the U.S. performance at the U.N. The draft statement was
prepared for Mr. George Bush to
be delivered at the U.N Security Council. Professor Kissinger was harsh

to the high level diplomats and military brass for preparing even handed
draft statement and possible course of action to prevent India-
Bangladesh military action. At times, officials artfully sabotaged
Kissinger's desire to help Pakistan. Richard Nixon lacked the moral
support of American people because of the Pakistan Army's killing,
rape, atrocities and plundering of the people of Bengal.
Mr. George Bush the ambassador of United States at U.N. on the
night of 04 December 1971 in an emergency session for Security
Council called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops by
both sides. As the United States proposal failed to identify the root cause
of the issue, that is, atrocities by the Pakistan Army on innocent people
of East Pakistan and problem of refugees in India, Mr. Jacob Malik the
Russian delegate termed the American resolution as one sided and
vetoed the American proposal. Poland joined in voting against; Britain
and France abstained, and following 11 members voted for: China,
Argentina, Nicaragua, Belgium, Italy, Burundi, Somalia, Sierra Leone,
Syria, Japan and the United States*
Two other resolutions called for an immediate end to the fighting,
while one from the Soviet Union sought political solution of the conflict
leading to a cessation of hostilities. The first emergency meeting
deteriorated into a power struggle between Russia and China as they
took diametrically opposed positions on all aspects of the crisis, Russia
siding with India and Bangladesh; and China with Pakistan. An early
clash came when Russia proposed to the council for inviting the
representative of the Bangladesh Government to take part in the debate.
This proposal was vehemently resisted by both China and the United
States. China observed that to let the representative of the rebellious
elements participate in its discussion would be tantamount to asking the
Security Council to interfere in the internal affairs of a state.
China presented her first draft resolution condemning India for
subverting, dismembering and committing aggression against Pakistan.
It attacked India for creating a so-called Bangladesh and called both
sides to withdraw their armed forces. On 05 December 1971, the eight-
power resolution called upon India and Pakistan to reach an immediate
cease-fire and withdraw their armed forces to
i
their own sides of the borders. The resolution recognized in its preamble
the need to deal with issues that gave rise to hostilities and the need for
an early political solution to enable the refugees to return. This was
meant to make the resolution more acceptable to India and Soviet
Union. The sponsors of the Resolution were Argentina, Belgium,
Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia. The vote
was the same as it was on the U.S. resolution, 11 for, two abstentions
(Britain and France) and two against (the Soviet Union and Poland).
Before this vote, China withdrew its draft resolution as it came to a
vote. Soviet draft resolution failed since the resolution did not get the
nine votes for passage. Chinese veto was gratuitous.
On 06 December 1971 India accorded its full recognition for the
People's Republic of Bangladesh.
The General Assembly adopted a resolution on the night of 08
December 1971 calling upon India and Pakistan to cease hostilities and
withdraw their armed forces to their own sides of the borders. The vote
was 104 to 11 with 11 abstentions. The council voted on the night of 07
December 1971 to send the question to the assembly for peace
resolution in the manner originally used to deal with the Korean War in
1950 after two Soviet vetoes and the threat of the third. The assembly
has neither a veto nor the power to make its resolutions obligatory.
While 57 speakers had been expressing their countries views in U
N General Assembly Indian and Bangladesh Forces moved toward
making the People's Republic of Bangladesh a reality on the ground
rather than a fiction of diplomacy.
Gunboat Diplomacy
President Nixon was indecisive for an inordinately long time. He finally
made up his mind to flex American great military muscle. His action
brought America to the edge of a war that would involve USSR and
China. On December 09, President Nixon authorized Admiral Moorer
commander of Seventh Fleet to despatch a task force of eight ships
including nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise from South China Sea off
the coast of Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal on the pretext that Pak Air
Force and armoured forces would be
destroyed and Indian forces would occupy Azad Kashmir. This move
would not be justified to the world community, as the Arabian Sea near
Karachi was three thousand kilometers away from the Bay of Bengal.
The operational responsibility of the seventh fleet was extended to
Bay of Bengal from the Pacific Ocean on 23 November 1971. But in
reality the aim of the task force 74, comprised out of seventh fleet was to
stop the defeat of Pakistan Army by conducting naval, air and land
operations when Bangladesh was almost liberated by the combined
punch of Mukti Bahini and the Indian forces. The composition of the
strong naval Task Force 74 was to foil the blockade by the Indian navy,
to assist Pakistan land forces and to combat the Indian air force to make
the landing of American marines favourable. World‟s most powerful
ship, the USS Enterprise, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier with a crew
of more than five thousand plus seventy-five planes and five helicopters
spearheaded Task Force 74. Also in the task forces were three guided
missile destroyers the King, Decatur and Persons; four gun destroyer,
the Bausell, Orleck, Mckeen and Anderson; and Tripoli, a helicopter
carrier with twenty five marine assault helicopters and two companies of
marines; supply ships were also added to it latter. They were ordered to
assemble in the Strait of Malacca - a 500-mile long channel connecting
the Indian Ocean and the China seas. Rear Admiral D.W. Cooper
commanded the task force 74. The first ship was expected to arrive there
at 7:45 P.M. Washington time December 12. Three days later, at 8:45
P.M., they were to enter the Bay of Bengal. The fleet elements including
the Enterprise and four destroyers were moved from Yankee station off
Vietnam, the Tripoli with three destroyers from Subic Bay of the
Philippines and the Pacific command in Hawaii and the top command
remained in Washington.
In the mean time diplomatic moves were taken up by Richard
Nixon to convince Brezhnev in ending the crisis before the superpowers
were dragged in the war. In the evening of 10 December 1971, after
discussion with Dr Kissinger about the subcontinent and the
disintegration of Pakistan, Mr. Huang Hua, Chinese Ambassador at UN
came to the real concern that a precedent was being set up by which
other countries specially Tibet and
Sinkiang might be dismembered by Indian-Soviet collusion. Mr. Huang

Hua told Dr Kissinger that China would never stop fighting as long as it
had a rifle in its armoury. Dr Kissinger was encouraged and took that as
an indication that China might intervene militarily even at that stage.
Nixon-Kissinger was hopeful with assurance from Mr. Huang Hua
that China, no doubt, would start military campaign against India to
assist Pakistan. Nixon-Kissinger fixed up their mind to retaliate with
nuclear strike against Russia in case Russia dared to launch attack
against China and would not remain as silent spectator. Nixon disclosed
this to Times after fourteen years. Nixon ordered US Seventh Fleet to
proceed towards Bay of Bengal and asked China to move from the north
towards India and Bangladesh. China had no records that they had
invaded and conquered foreign country. They had always been in
defensive role, as they constructed Great Wall to protect its territory
from foreign aggression. China was so threatened by Russia‟s
deployment along her border; she wanted political solution in UN
Security Council.
On the other side, Soviet Union was silently moving its powerful
fleet to Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. On 03 December 1971, three
Soviet warships -- a destroyer armed with surface to air missiles, a
seagoing minesweeper and a naval oiler - passed from the Strait of
Malacca into the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. Soviets had put
sixteen war ships and five submarines reasonably near the combat area
in Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal, China Sea and Arabian Sea. The
movement of the Soviet warships started as early as on 03 December
1971. Russia also placed number of warships in Arabian Sea, Gulf of
Aden, and Persian Gulf. Not content with this naval power alone, the
Russians despatched more warships towards the Strait of Malacca
passing through Sea of Japan into East China Sea. The intelligence
reports from Moscow warned that the Chinese would move against
India. This Chinese manoeuver created an opportunity for USSR to
activate a contingency plan for a preemptive strike against Lop Nor long
advocated by some top Russian military strategists but held in abeyance
by Kremlin leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. Lake Lop
Nor, in China‟s Sinkiang
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province, is as strange as the land surrounds it. On the bank of lake Lop
Nor, there was a Chinese military installation, where China had
detonated nuclear explosion. USSR took Lop Nor as Chinese nuclear
threat, bringing Moscow within the strikiang range of Chinese nuclear
missiles. Inside the Kremlin, marshals talked about wiping out this new
threats to Soviet security before it become a reality. Without committing
their forces to a pre-emptive strike, Russian leaders moved ground and
air forces into position along the Sinking border. Soviet moved forty
divisions along the Usury River and seven divisions along Sinkiang
border. Russian missile men also received word to program their
trajectories for Chinese targets. The Russians would mount a
diversionary action in Sinkiang against any Chinese attack on India or
East Pakistan. The Chinese intention was to come through Chumbi
valley near Sikkim-Bhutan and link up with East Pakistan right through
the end of December.
It was also a good luck for Bangladesh that there was a political
chaos in China in the month of September - October 1971 when attempt
on the life of Chairman Mao Tse Tung by Vice-Chairman and Defense
Minister Lin Piao failed.
Nixon understood that if Russians succeed in humiliating China, all
prospects for world equilibrium would disappear. Alexander Haiq
instructed to tell the Chinese that U.S. would not ignore Soviet
intervention.
On 12 December Nixon ordered the carrier task force to proceed
through the Strait of Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal. In vain
Pakistan authority in Islamabad and Pakistan ambassador in Peking tried
to convince China to come to their rescue. The Chinese played a very
cautious role because of Russian threat. Nixon and Dr Kissinger were
waiting for positive support from Mr. Huang Hua, but the reply was
unfavourable. China wanted UN procedure to be followed and
restoration of the political solution. When Mr. Nixon received the
Chinese message the fleet's movement was stopped.
Earlier on 10 December 1971 Major General Rao Forman Ali
military adviser to Governor of East Pakistan, with the permission of
Yahya sent message to UN for troop‟s withdrawal and transfer of power
to Bangladesh Government which was foiled due to American
intervention through despatch of Seventh Fleet and thus extension of
province, is as strange as the land surrounds it. On the bank of lake Lop
Nor, there was a Chinese military installation, where China had
detonated nuclear explosion. USSR took Lop Nor as Chinese nuclear
threat, bringing Moscow within the strikiang range of Chinese nuclear
missiles. Inside the Kremlin, marshals talked about wiping out this new
threats to Soviet security before it become a reality. Without committing
their forces to a pre-emptive strike, Russian leaders moved ground and
air forces into position along the Sinking border. Soviet moved forty
divisions along the Usury River and seven divisions along Sinkiang
border. Russian missile men also received word to program their
trajectories for Chinese targets. The Russians would mount a
diversionary action in Sinkiang against any Chinese attack on India or
East Pakistan. The Chinese intention was to come through Chumbi
valley near Sikkim-Bhutan and link up with East Pakistan right through
the end of December.
It was also a good luck for Bangladesh that there was a political
chaos in China in the month of September - October 1971 when attempt
on the life of Chairman Mao Tse Tung by Vice-Chairman and Defense
Minister Lin Piao failed.
Nixon understood that if Russians succeed in humiliating China, all
prospects for world equilibrium would disappear. Alexander Haiq
instructed to tell the Chinese that U.S. would not ignore Soviet
intervention.
On 12 December Nixon ordered the carrier task force to proceed
through the Strait of Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal. In vain
Pakistan authority in Islamabad and Pakistan ambassador in Peking tried
to convince China to come to their rescue. The Chinese played a very
cautious role because of Russian threat. Nixon and Dr Kissinger were
waiting for positive support from Mr. Huang Hua, but the reply was
unfavourable. China wanted UN procedure to be followed and
restoration of the political solution. When Mr. Nixon received the
Chinese message the fleet's movement was stopped.
Earlier on 10 December 1971 Major General Rao Forman Ali
military adviser to Governor of East Pakistan, with the permission of
Yahya sent message to UN for troop‟s withdrawal and transfer of power
to Bangladesh Government which was foiled due to American
intervention through despatch of Seventh Fleet and thus extension of
war for another five days. This extension of war caused the massacre of
Bengali intellectuals at Dhaka. On Sunday December 12, as the Indian
and Mukti Bahini columns were closing in on Dhaka, a group of senior
Pak army officers and their civilian counterparts headed by Major
General Rao Forman Ali met in the Presidential residence. They put
together the names of 250 peoples to be arrested and killed, including
the cream of Dhaka‟s professional circles not already liquidated during
the civil war. Their arrests were made on Monday and Tuesday by
marked bands of extreme right-wing Jamat-e- Islam‟s armed gangs
called the Al- Badar, Al-Shams and Razakar only hours before the
official surrender was singed (on 16th). The victims were taken in groups
to the outskirts of the city- Rayerbazaar where they were summarily
executed. On 14-15 December for 21 hours Nixon administration
endeavoured for all efforts and analysis, came to the conclusion that the
Indian sub-continent was not the proper place to use their set principle
of Gunboat Diplomacy because of changing world balance of power and
geopolitical situation. The actions of the United States were
reprehensible throughout the death agony of East Pakistan and the birth
pangs of Bangladesh. Russian intervention came as heavenly assistance
for oppressed people of Bengal, which saved far bigger catastrophe in
South Asia. The Kremlin threat in the form of the deployment of
warships of Soviet Union, then the Super Power, in Indian Ocean and
Arabia Sea; and the Land Forces along Chinese border defused,
prevented and reverted the possibility of Third World War on the issue
of Bangladesh.
Failure of Pakistan and Barth of Bangladesh 259
Chapter 9
FAILURE OF PAKISTAN AND BIRTH OF

BANGLADESH
Final Offensive
General
By late November Bangladesh Forces and the Indian Armed Forces
under the allied command made their plan for final offensive. Before we
go into the conduct of the final offensive let us look at the plan and
preparation of both sides.
Pakistan
Disposition. By this time, the Pakistanis had almost five divisions
operating in different parts of Bangladesh. 9 Infantry Division under
Major General M H Ansari was operating in South Western sector with
its HQ at Jessore. In North Bengal Major General Nazar Hussein Shah's
16 Div operated with its HQ at Natore. In the Eastern sector 14 Division
under Major General Abdul Majid Quazi operated in Brahmanbaria and
Sylhet with its headquarters at Ashuganj. Two newly raised Infantry
Division, the 36 Infantry Division under Major General Jamshed was
looking after Dhaka in addition it had 93 Infantry Brigade operating in
the areas of Jamalpur-Mymensingh and the 39 Infantry Division under
Major General Rahim operated in Laksham-Chandpur area of Comilla.
Besides Pakistan had 55,000 Razakars, Al-Badr, Al-Shams, 15000 West
Pakistani Rangers, Scouts and Mujahids. Besides the land forces, the
Pakistanis had 18 sabers fighter ground attack aircraft and 8 helicopters
based at Dhaka and some gun boats at Chittagong and Khulna.
Pakistan Plan
The main aspects of the plan were to build up communication centres as
strong points and man the border out posts with mixed forces of
regulars, Razakars and West Pakistani paramilitary forces. The Pakistan
army was confined to these strong points due to intense activity of
Mukti Bahini and hostile Bengali population. Pakistan was fully
dependent on external assistance mainly from America and China
against final onslaught by the combined forces of Mukti Bahini and
Indian Army, or to create standstill condition or ceasefire by the
international forum like the United Nation Security Council.
Pak Strategy
For the Pakistani planners it appeared logical that in the event of war, the
Pakistan Army would try and seize the initiative in East Pakistan aimed
at grabbing vital chunk of Indian Territory and in the west they would
launch a massive offensive to capture preferably in the Jammu and
Kashmir sector, and then be in a stronger bargaining position to cater for
any loss in the East. This was to be achieved by an offensive action in
the West while General Niazi was to adopt a posture of defense in the
East.
Options
Faced with the task of defending a long vast line of border Lieutenant
General Niazi, had two options open to him for the defense of East
Pakistan i) To resist the allied forces with all his strength and stop them
at the border, ii) To fight a flexible battle on the border and if successful,
plan to conduct an organized withdrawal back to ground of own
choosing where he could offer protracted resistance. The former has the
advantage, if it succeeds, of not giving up any great extent of territory to
the allied forces but carries the risk of being defeated in detail at the
border. The latter, is likely to result in early loss of territory, gives the
defender an opportunity of fighting a mobile battle and making the best
use of ground.
Decision
Although the final decision regarding which course to adopt often
depended on the political and psychological factors or the personality of
the commander, the most important tactical consideration is the nature of
the terrain. However, General A A K Niazi adopted the former one.
Initial Deployment and
Moves
to Concentration Areas
I
Allied Forces
Allied Forces Strategy

(a) To capture Dhaka within three weeks before any external
intervention and international pressure. To accomplish this objective
Indian army bypassed Pakistani strong points and dashed for Dhaka.
(b) The capture or effective blocking of two major ports of entry to
stop further build up in the region after the outbreak of war. The
blockade was to prevent intervention by the third party.
(c) Mukti Bahini detachments commanded by hardcore officers
with communication equipment etc to concentrate behind the Pakistan
army defense in the last week of November to carry out ambush, raids
and send battle intelligence and to divide the efforts of Pakistan Forces.
Desposition.
Allied Forces built up strength of three corps with 2 Medium Artillery
Regiment, one Regiment of T-55 tanks and two regiments of PT-76
amphibious tanks. In addition, there were enough APCs to carry two
battalions and they had the capability of laying 10,000 feet of bridging at
any given moment. In the reserve was the Parachute Brigade. For this
operation, the Indian Air Force had ten squadrons of MIG21s
(interceptors), Canberras (bombers), Gnats (ground support aircraft) and
SU7s (fighter bombers) together with a large number of transport
aircraft's and helicopters and capability of air dropping the reserve
brigade. The navy had the aircraft carrier Vikrant with 6 Alize
(reconnaissance aircraft), 14 Sea Hawks (fighter) and 2 Sea Kings (anti-
submarine helicopters) embarked, plus an escort of three destroyers and
frigates. The Task Force also included four warships, two submarines,
one minesweeper, five gunboats and three landing crafts. The Eastern
headquarters was at Calcutta and the Eastern Air Command was at
Shillong, Colonel Ataul Ghani Osmani was the Commander-in-Chief of
Bangladesh Armed Forces having 200 battle seasoned army officers to
command more than hundred thousand Mukti Bahini. The Bangladesh
forces comprised of K, S and Z forces formed up in Brigades. 20,000
regulars in eleven sectors including one Naval Commando group
264 Mukti Bahirti Wins Victory
trained at Plassey and 100,000 guerillas. India developed the Inter

Services Joint Command system at the Eastern command HQs. An
allied command was set up between the Indian Forces and the Mukti
Bahini, and necessary coordination between the two forces was made at
every level. Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, GOC-in-C Eastern
Command, was appointed the overall commander for the operations in
Bangladesh.
Allied Plan
The operation to be conducted was code named 1 Jackpot IV'. The three
army corps was to mount three major thrusts from the East, West and
the North, while a lesser thrust was planned on to the Mymensingh -
Jamalpur area. II Crops under Lieutenant General T N Raina with 4 and
9 Mountain Divisions was to advance into the Southwestern sector from
Krishnanagar, West Bengal supported by 8 and 9 Sector Mukti Bahini.
XXXIII Crops under Lieutenant General Thapan with 20 Mountain
Division and an additional Brigade was to advance into North Bengal
from Silliguri and Balurghat supported by 6 and 7 Sector Mukti Bahini.
The IV Crops under Lieutenant General Sagat Singh which had its three
complete Divisions, namely 8, 23 and 57 Mountain Divisions were to
advance from Tripura and capture the Eastern part of the country
including Dhaka supported by K, S and Z Force; and 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
Sector Mukti Bahini. The 101 Communication Zone Sub Area, which
was a Logistic Formation was to advance from Meghalaya with a
Brigade plus and capture Mymensingh, Tangail and finally Dhaka
supported by 11 Sector Mukti Bahini. The crux of the plan was to
contain the enemy strong points at the border, while powerful mobile
thrust by a series of bypassing moves would cut the enemy's lines of
communication and make for the strategic targets. With the cooperation
and support of the air and naval arms, the Allied Army would isolate the
Dhaka Bowl from the bulk of the defending Army.
South-Western Sector
The combined operation by the Mukti Bahini of 8 Sector led by Captain
(later Colonel) Khankaker Nazmul Huda and supported by the 9 Indian
Infantry Division liberated Chaugacha on 24 November.
Failure of Pakistan and Barth of Bangladesh 265 !
Here fierce air and tank battles were fought. Pakistan Army lost all their
aircrafts and tanks encountered in this sector.
The tactics and techniques which were adopted by Allied Forces to
isolate, bypass, attack and to establish blocking position at the rear of
the enemy finally forced the well trained Pakistan Infantry Division
deployed in Jessore- Jhenidah area to vacate. This was an outstanding
feat of achievement that ultimately contributed to defeat of the enemies
in other sectors of operations in Bangladesh. The main routes available
to the Allied Forces were Bangaon - Jhingergacha - Jessore,
Krishnanagar - Jibannagar - Kaliganj - Jhenidah and Meherpur -
Chuadanga - Jhenidah - Magura. Calcutta was linked with most of the
cities and towns of East Pakistan by rails and roads since pre-partition
time, but these were disrupted by partition.
The Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, commanded by Major General M
H Ansari was operating in the southwestern sector with its headqurters
at Jessore. He divided the whole southwestern sector into two sub-
sectors. 57 Infantry Brigade was tasked to defend upto Padma in the
north and Jibannagar - Kaliganj axis to the south. 107 Infantry Brigade
was to defend south of Jibannagar - Kaliganj axis upto Satkhira. The
battalions were to hold the defended areas well forward as long as
possible, then gain time by trading space. Some troops were earmarked
to guard Jessore and Jhenidah fortress.
The responsibility of liberating southwestern sector was given to
Indian II Corps under Lt Gen T N Raina alongwith the Mukti Bahini of
No 8 and 9 Sectors. II Corps divided its area of responsibility into three
sub-sectors with the major thrust against Jessore. Indian 9 Infantry
Division under Major General Dalbir Singh was given the task to
capture Jessore, Khulna. 4 Mountain Division under Major General
Mohinder Singh Barar was employed to capture north of Chaudanga
upto Kushtia. This division was also tasked to capture Magura and ferry
sites across Madhumati River and Harding Bridge area. Satkhira and its
southern area were allotted to Bengal Area, a Logistic Formation with
couple of regular battalions under Major General P Chowdhury. II
Corps composed of 9 Infantry Division, 4 Mountain Division, 50
Parachute Brigade less a battalion, 45 Cavalry (PT-76), one squadron of
63 Cavalry (T-55), Bengal Area, 8 Sector under Major Abul Manzur and
9 Sector under Major Abdul Jalil with
the continuous support of Indian Air Force, was poised for offensive
towards Jessore - Jehnidah and beyond. It may be mentioned here that,
by the end of November 1971, the Mukti Bahini troops of No 8 and 9
Sectors had liberated a number of areas in southwestern sector and
established guerilla bases deep in the interior. I was positioned in
Jhenidah, Magura and Rajbari areas.
Battle of Chaugacha
The successful battle of Chaugacha by allied force was the gateway to
liberation of Bangladesh. The first conventional battle was fought
between allied forces and Pakistani forces in Chaugacha in 1971. The
success of this battle by allied forces off balanced the Pakistani forces in
this theatre of operation.
Chaugacha is a small township covering an area of 75 square km. It
is about 20 km west of Jessore and adjacent to Indian Bayra and
Bagdanga border. River Kobadak was on the west of Chaugacha run
north to south almost parallel to international border. There are few bills
around Chaugacha like Kushtia bill, Pitambarpur bill, and Leharincha
bill. There are few important roads and tracks running towards the
borderline namely Jessore - Chaugacha - Bayra, Uzirpur- Muktarpur-
Garibpur-Kabilpur, and Chaugacha- Mohmmadpur- Bayra and
Chaugacha - Jhigergacha. Important villages like Garibpur, Jahangirpur,
Jaganathpur, Singhajuli, Buraili, Barinda, Ullashirnagar, Bhadra,
Uzirpur, Muktarpara, Afra, Mukundapur and Kabilpur etc surround
Chaugacha.
The Indian plan was to go behind Pakistani defence and make it off
balance by establishing a strong hold. As per the plan 42 Infantry
Brigade was to advance from Bayra to Afra through Garibpur -
Jaganathpur track. According to the operational plan 14 Punjab
Regiment of 42 Infantry Brigade was employed for this task. Lieutenant
Colonel R K Singh was the commanding officer and Brigadier JS
Gharaya was the Brigade Commander. One squadron of tank of 63
Cavalry and 8 Sector Mukti Bahini under Captain K N Huda crossed
international boundary. The allied troops initially tried to cross the
Kobadak River under Bayra. But the crossing site was destroyed by
Pakistani air force. Allied force brought anti aircraft gun near the
crossing site. On 13 November 1971 allied force with
their equipment crossed River Kobadak near Bayra by assault boats and
rafts. Allied force concentrated near Uzirpur and Muktarpara. As a
preliminary operation India 14 Punjab supported by PT-76 tank and
Mukti Bahini of 8 Sector were tasked to advance and secure the area in
and around Garibpur by 20 November 1971.
The Allied force remained undetected till 19 November 1971 after
crossing international boundary on 13 November 1971. After learning
about the presence of allied force 107 Brigade under Brigadier Hayat
was ordered to dislodge the allied force. The Pakistani 9 Division put a
serious effort to eject the allied force and made available the divisional
troops 21 Punjab (R & S) and 6 Punjab for the attack.
To clear Garibpur, two task forces were organized by 20 November
1971. The Task Force (TF) Alpha (A) was composed of 21 Punjab and a
squadron of tank. TF Bravo (B) was comprised of two companies of 6
Punjab. TFs were placed under Lieutenant Colonel Imtiaz Waraich and
Lieutenant Colonel Sharif respectably. They were also given Fire support
of artillery battery.
TF A was to move from Jessore area while TF B was to move from
Chaugacha area. Artillery battery was to be deployed at Salua.
Pakistani command felt the presence of allied force on 19
November 1971. TF-A which was coming from Jessore with a squadron
of tank, concentrated in Jaganathpur village through Mushirnagar
village. TF-B was coming from Chaugacha took up position in village
Singhajuli. Village Garibpur and Jaganathpur were thickly vegetated.
There were paddy Fields between the villages. It was a foggy day.
Visibility was restricted. On the same day Pak 57 Infantry Brigade under
Brigadier Manzur went to village Mingram and Kamanna in Sailkupa PS
to capture me that diverted the effort of Pakistani Army.
The H hour was selected at 0530 hours on 21 November 1971. FUP
for TF-A was selected the Jaganathpur 1000 yards east of Garibpur and
FUP for TF-B was selected at Singhajuli. Taking the advantage of foggy
weather, standing crops, and existing embankment Pakistani forces could
come closely near the forward edge of the village Garibpur, where allied
forces were in the process of occupation. They were not in the form of a
defence. In the morning they were taking tea and reFitting themselves.
Pakistan
forces run over the Charlie company position of the 14 Punjab. At that
point allied force launched counter offensive from Jahangirpur and
encircled Pakistani troops inside Garibpur village. Hand to hand fighting
started inside the village between the two forces. The counter attack was
supported by MIG s and tank. Tank came out from tank hide near
village Bhadra.
Fierce tank battle started in the open field. Allied force could
successfully bring fire on Pakistani tank and troops. As a result Pakistani
forces were disorganized and started withdrawing. Allied force tried to
bypass Pakistani position in Jaganathpur village but they were
encountered by Pakistani troops in Jaganathpur village. Pakistani troops
suffered heavy casualties in and around the village.
They sought for an air support. The Pakistani Sabres (F-86) soon
appeared over the battlefield. Indian MIGs met them. Pakistanis lost all
aircrafts and eleven tanks out of 14. One Pakistani pilot was captured in
Indian territory and taken as POW and other two pilot‟s heads were
chopped off by sharp weapons by the Bengali villagers in Bangladesh
territory.
Pakistani forces Sher Dil Jawans of Yahya ran for their life leaving
behind dead bodies, equipment, destroyed tanks, ammunition inside
village Jaganathpur. Allied Forces suffered 19 killed and 44 wounded
and lost two tanks. Chaugacha remained in the hands of allied force till
the formal declaration of war at 03 December 1971.
Capture of Jessore
Jessore was an old military garrison, 30 km from international border
and 100 km from Calcutta. It is connected by air, rails, and road
networks with rest of the countries. Its main road goes to Dhaka via
Jhenidah, Magura, Faridpur and other one to Khulna, an industrial city,
then to Chalna a sea port to Bay of Bengal. Pakistani 107 Brigade was
tasked to defend Jessore sector. Pakistanis decided to defend Jessore-
Jhenidah road as „No penetration Line‟. Accordingly Brigadier Hayat,
Commander 107 Brigade deployed 6 Punjab to guard Afra defile along
axis Chaugacha- Jessore, 22 FF Regiment on the Jhingergacha-Jessora
axis, 15 FF Regiment Satkhira - Jessore axis, 38 FF Regiment to guard
area between Chaugacha to
n
„j
Jibannagar while 21 Punjab was kept as reserve in Jessore. Brigadier

Hayat placed himself along with his headquarters at Jessore Cantonment.
At the outbreak of hostilities on 3 December 1971, Major General
Dalbir Singh decided to advance towards Jessore with two brigades up.
42 Brigade under Brigadier J S Ghoraya was in contact with the re-
organized Jessore defences along the marshes west of the town. This has
closed other options of outmanoeuvring the Jessore defences. Dalbir
Singh therefore started, rather bullheadedly, a series of hammering
attacks to achieve a breakthrough. Starting at first light on 4 December,
the pounding continued till late 6 December, but there was no sign of
dent in the defences. When the Chief was beginning to lose his patience
at the sluggish progress Dalbir Singh‟s • persistence paid.
After putting up a stubborn and determined stand for two days,
Major General Ansari decided to vacate Jessore. Why he took this
decision, when his troops were well entrenched, holding out stoutly and
inflicting heavy casualties, and no encroachment on his defence line had
yet been effected, is not understood. May be for following reasons,
Jessore was vacated. The morale of the troops was shattered and there
was an apprehension that 5000 Para-troopers seen at Dum Dum airport
would land behind the Pakistani position. The leadership of Major
General Ansari was weak as he left Jhenidah and Magura without
putting any resistence to allied Force. Moreover he followed safer route
of withdrawl, that is, Magura-Faridpur across major obstacle Madhumoti
River leaving other two brigades at their own to accomplish more
difficult tasks. Brigadier J S Ghoraya distinguished himself in this battle
by personally leading the attack from the northwest, which eventually
achieved the breakthrough. He was wounded in the action. 350 Brigade
under Brigadier H S Sandhu advanced along Track Burinda- Kaemkola-
Jessore. Indian 32 brigade under Brigadier Minto Tewari less one
battalion moved from Bangaon and poised behind 42 Brigade along axis
Chaugacha- Jessore. No 8 Sector of Mukti Bahini also moved with the
advancing brigades. By the evening of 7 December 1971 allied 32
Brigade from
the north and 350 Brigade from the south reached the out skirts of
Jessore town.
Jessore fell on 07 December and Captain Khandaker Nazmul Huda
reached Jessore. Later on Major (later Major General) Abul Manzur 8
Sector commander joined him at Jessore. II Crops divided its area of
operations into three axes. The responsibility of the area North of
Chaugacha up to Kushtia was given to 4 Mountain Division; and Jessore
and Northern part of Khulna to 9 Mountain Division; and Satkhira and
the southern areas up to Bay of Bengal to Bengal Area which was again
a Logistic Formation but had a couple of regular battalions.
In the north the 4 Mountain Division along with the Mukti Bahini
under Major Mustafizur Rahman advanced from Jibannagar that had
already been captured on 27th November. Major Mustafizur Rahman
received bullet injury in his stomach at Jibannagore attack and was
evacuated to Barrackpur Hospital and operated upon. Prime Minister
Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed visited Major Mustafizur Rahman at Barrackpur
Hospital. Darsana was taken on 4th December and Jhenidah, where the
Pakistanis had a fortress defense fell on 6th as the Mukti Bahini under
my command-intensified attack on enemy there. From Jhenidah one
column pushed towards Kushtia and the other towards Magura. A
bloody battle was waged at Kushtia from 9th to 11th December where
the leading tanks were shot up just outside the town. Meanwhile Major
A R Azam Chowdhury entered Meherpur with two companies and
marched on to Chuadanga. Captain Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury with
Lieutenant Nur -un- Nabi reached Kushtia. After the battle of Kushtia,
the advance resumed towards Bheramara, but the retreating Pakistani
force had blown up the Hardinge Bridge over the Padma River and fled
to Ishurdi.
I called for Indian Air strike at Magura enemy position over
wireless and enemy position was bombed on 07 December and as a
result enemy hold was untenable and they vacated Magura. The columns
heading for the Madhumati River reached Magura on 8th December.
Lieutenant General T N Raina, Corps Commander II Corps,
accompanied by Major Abul Manzur, Commander 8 Sector, in a
helicopter landed at Magura on 08 December and after a brief stopover
there he departed. The leading column 62 Mountain
~U - ■- ■ - -
j
South-Western Sector
'
Brigade led by Brigadier Rajendranath was halted on the banks of the

Madhumati at Kamarkhali by a strong Pakistani opposition. Here a delay
was caused due to the lack of river crossing equipment. Mukti Bahini
under my command led by Lieutenant Mustafa and guerrilla leader
Nazrul Islam established bridgehead on the eastern side of river
Madhumati by 13 December. Then two squadrons of tanks PT- 76 swam
across the river. Two battalions along with the Mukti Bahini managed a
successful crossing over the river with local country boats managed by
me and chased Pak Army. No helicopter was used to ferry troops across
the river. Kamarkhali defense of the Pakistan Army was routed by 15 th
December. The leading elements of the column reached Faridpur on
16th where the Pakistanis surrendered.
In the Jessore area Jhikergacha was taken on 5th December and a
three-pronged attacks were launched on Jessore. The Pakistanis
abandoned Jessore Cantonment on 6th evening in a hurry and withdraw
towards Khulna. Jessore fell to the allied forces on the morning of 7th
December without a shot being fired. In their run for life, the Pakistanis
left behind huge quantities of arms and ammunition. It was difficult to
understand why the Pakistanis abandoned Jessore without giving any
resistance. Later on it was revealed from Lieutenant General Jacob's
book, "Surrender at Dacca" signal message was intercepted and
misinterpreted by General Niazi that Indian Para Brigade might be
dropped behind Pakistan 9 Division in my area of operation. CBS radio
reported that 5000 paratroops had been seen at Dum Dum airport.
Moreover 10,000 guerrillas were operating behind Pak 9 Division under
my command. I had been sending chipper coded battle intelligenence
reports by wireless to Major Shankar Ray Chaudhury, Brigade-Major of
Charlie Sector of Indian army at Barrackpur everyday. In his subsequent
career he was promoted to the rank of General and appointed as Chief of
Army Staff, Indian Army.
The Allied Forces continued their advance towards Khulna and
after clearing two delaying positions at Rupdia and Naopara contacted
the Pakistani main defense at Siramani. The Siromoni defences occupied
by 6 Punjab Regiment were ideal with marshes on the west and Bhairab
River in the east. As per the offensive plan 32
Brigade was to contain the enemy from the front, 42 Brigade to advance
along the east bank of Bhairab river for capture of Khulna and 350
Brigade was to launch an assault from the north on Siromoni. The Indian
Air Force was very active throughout the operations and gave a good
account of it by providing timely and close support. The Battle of
Siramani was a hard fought battle that lasted for about 5 days until the
surrender on 18th December. I lost my friend Major Bhola of 13 Rajput
Regiment on 16 December at Siromoni. Major Bhola was newly married
and we fought together at Satkhira in the month of August. He received
direct machine gun burst on his face. He was a very brave fighter.
Earlier in my command post at Bhomra, I warned him to be cautious as
his fate line was fading. In the south, 9 Sector Mukti Bahini under
Captain Nurul Huda captured Kaliganj and the Bangladesh Flag was
formally hoisted there. Satkhira was taken on 7th December by two
approaching columns the 9 Sector Mukti Bahini and a battalion of
Bengal Area from the south, and 8 Sector Mukti Bahini from the west
led by SP Captain Mahbub. The 9 Sector Mukti Bahini and Bengal Area
troops reached the southern outskirts of Khulna town on 11th December
and had to wait until the Battle of Siramani was won.
Northwestern Sector
In XXXIII Crops area, the plan was to send the containing columns from
the north while the main thrust went on from Hilli. In the north, the 71
Mountain Brigade under XXXIII Corps HQ with the support of No 6
Sector Mukti Bahini by the end of November contacted and captured the
Thakurgaon defenses on 2nd December. Wing Commander Abul Basher
was 6 Sector Commander of Mukti Bahini.
By 10th December this column reached three miles short of
Dinajpur. Meanwhile 9 Mountain Brigade of 6 Mountain Division took
Kurigarm and Lalmonirhat on 6th December. 6 Sector Mukti Bahini
under Captain Nawazesh Uddin captured Nageswari. During this battle
Lieutenant Ashfaque Samad was killed. The 71 Mountain Brigade met
stubborn resistance at Dinajpur and Saidpur. The 20 Mountain Division
under Major General Lachhman Singh Lehl launched the major thrust
through the Hilli salient. On 24th November 202 Mountain Brigade of
20 Mountain Division captured three villages near Hilli. At the formal
declaration of war on 3rd
NEPA
L
North Western Sector
December, the 202 Mountain Brigade attacked Hilli, not being able to
make much headway at Hilli 340 Mountain Brigade of 20 Mountain
Division pushed northwards to Charkai and the 66 Mountain Brigade of
20 Mountain Divisioin bypassing the Hilli strong point headed on for
Polashbari. From Charkai the 340 Mountain Brigade advanced to
Phulbari and then wheeled eastwards to hit Pirgonj on Rangpur-Bogra
road. Meanwhile, the 202 Mountain Brigades attacked on the Hilli strong
point and met stiffest resistance from 4 FF Regiment.
The biggest tank battle of north Bengal was fought in this area and
the Pakistani anti tank guns knocked out a number of Indian tanks. The
Pakistanis fought to the last and the strong point had to be virtually
crushed before the post could be taken on 09 December. After taking
Hilli 202 Mountain Brigade advanced towards Ghoraghat and linked up
with the 66 Mountain Brigade which was earlier by passing Hilli and
reached Ghoraghat on 12th December. 202 Mountain Brigade was
ordered to proceed towards Bogra via Khetlal, while 340 Mountain
Brigade from Pirganj moved towards south and captured Gobindagonj
with the support of a strong contingent of Mukti Bahini. Meanwhile 66
Mountain Brigade was diverted from Palashbari towards Rangpur and
340 Mountain Brigade moved further south towards Bogra.
In Rajshahi area, a BSF Battalion advanced along with the Mukti
Bahini of No. 7 Sector led by Major Quazi Nuruzzaman. Major
Giasuddin Ahmed Chaudhury and Capt Mohiuddin Jahangir attacked
Chapai Nawabganj town from two sides on an enemy battalion. On the
banks of the Mahananda River at Chapai Nawabgonj, the 7 Sector Mukti
Bahini under Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir faced a strong Pakistani
resistance. Unable to break through the Pakistani defenses, Captain
Mohiuddin Jahangir crawled forwaid to lob a grenade in the enemy‟s
bunker. He managed to reach the bunker and lobed the grenade when he
was fired upon from another post. Due to this gallant action, Mohiuddin
Jahangir was posthumously awarded the highest gallantry award „Bir
Shrestho‟. Chapai Nawabgonj fell on 14 December. Brave and smart
Tareq a student freedom fighter known as Lieutenant Tareq captured
Major General Nazar Hossain
Shah, GOC 16 Division on 8 December at Palashbari. Meanwhile the

340 Mountain Brigade reached Bogra and the Pakistan Brigade there
surrendered to them on the morning of 17th December. In Rangpur
Brigadier Naeem surrendered to 66th Mountain Brigade on 17th
December. The Pakistani 57 Brigade that had retreated from Kushita
over the Hardinge Bridge surrendered to the allied forces at Ishurdi.
Mukti Bahini brought the Pakistani 16 Division GOC Major General
Nazar Hussain Shah who had been captured by Tareq on 08 December
to Bogra on 18th December for official surrender.
Eastern Sector
In the Eastern Sector the IV Crops had three complete divisions besides
the three regular brigades of the Mukti Bahini and the sector troops of
Mukti Bahini. The 8 Mountain Division along with „Z‟ Forces and the
Mukti Bahini of No 4 and 5 Sectors were tasked to capture Sylhet, the
57 Mountain Division along with „S‟ Force and the Mukti Bahini of No
3 Sector to advance to Dhaka via Akhaura - Ashuganj- Bhairab and the
23 Mountain Division along with „K‟ Force and the Mukti Bahini of No.
1 and 2 Sectors to proceed to Comilla, Chandpur and Chittagong.
With the outbreak of the war on 3rd December the 8 Mountain
Division struck Sylhet from two directions. One of its columns along
with 1 E Bengal of „Z‟ Force crossed the border from the east at
Zakiganj and advanced to Charkhai, from Charkhai while the main
column advanced towards Sylhet, 1 E Bengal crossed the river Surma
and moved cross country to Kanairghat. The Pakistanis attacked the
position of 1 E Bengal at Kanairghat, but in a quick and timely counter
attack 1 E Bengal inflicted heavy causalty on the enemy taking 22 of
them as prisoners. 1 E Bengal then advanced north - west and hit the
Sylhet - Tamabil road. 1 E Bengal reached the outskirts of the city on
12th December. Another column of 8 Mountain Division along with 8 E
Bengal entered through the tea gardens of Bhanugach and
Shamshemagar and advanced to Sreemangal. This column captured
Maulavibazar on 8th December. From Maulavibazar 8 E Bengal
followed the railway line and proceeded towards Fenchuganj while the
Indian Brigade was helilifted across the Manu River at Sherpur and it
headed north of Sylhet. In the north of Sylhet, 3 E Bengal along with 5
Sector Mukti
Bahini took Goyainghat and subsequently captured Chatak. From Chatak

3 E Bengal proceeded towards Sylhet but it was held up at the river at
Lama Ghazi. Meanwhile a Gurkha battalion along with a group of
freedom fighters was helidropped just on the outskirts of Sylhet town on
10th December. By this time the Indian and Bangladesh forces were
knocking at the gates of Sylhet from the north, east and the south. With
the heli-landing of the Gurkha battalion the Pakistani 212 Brigade gave
up and surrendered to the Allied forces.
In Brahman Baria the 57 Mountain Division along with „S‟ Force
and the Mukti Bahini of No 3 Sector captured Akhaura on 5th December
after fighting one of the toughest battles of the campaign. The Division
then moved west and captured Brahmanbaria. On 8th December
following the railway line the column advanced to Ashuganj where the
Bhairab railway bridge over the Meghna had been demolished by the
retreating Pakistani forces. Elements of the leading Brigade of 57
Mountain Division and the 2 and 11 E Bengal battalions of the „S‟ Force
crossed the Meghna with the help of local country boats and established
air bridge over Meghna at Bhairab Bazar. On 10th December a fleet of
14 MI-4 helicopters air-bridged the remaining elements of the Division
including its heavy equipment to Raipura. In 36 hours operation
helicopters made 110 sorties. The PT-76 tanks crossed the river with
great difficulty due to the problem of engine over-heating. However,
those tanks were towed across the river with country boats. The advance
resumed on 11th December after the Pakistani position at Bhairab was
contained. The division then advanced to Narshingdi and from there
directed into two columns reached Dhaka, via Tongi and the other via
Demra. The Pakistan Division Commander at Dhaka Major General
Jamshed surrendered to allied forces on 16th December.
In the south, the 23 Mountain Division sent out three of its brigades
in three different directions. One of its Brigades along with 8 E Bengal
crossed the border south of Comilla city and then proceeded to contain
the strong Pakistani Garrison at Mainamati Cantonment. Another
column along with Mukti Bahini of No 2 Sector entered through
Chouddagram and subsequently took Laksham. The Brigade along with
its supporting squadron of tanks
dashed for the Pakistani 39 Division HQ at Chandpur. But before the

column could reach Chandpur, the Pakistani Division Command Major
General Rahim Khan who was wounded by air attack while in a gun
boat reached Dhaka and later on flew off for Burma in a helicopter.
These elements subsequently moved for Daudkandi Ferryghat.
The third Brigade of 23 Mountain Division along with 4 and 10 E
Bengal of £K‟ Force captured Feni on 3rd December and wheeled south
towards Chittagong. After crossing the river obstacles at Subhapur the
main column advanced towards Zoraloganj, while 4 E Bengal was
diverted along Karerhat-Hyaku-Nazirhat axis. The main column
advanced unopposed up to Kumira when on 10th December a strong
Pakistani opposition at Kumira Railway Hospital held up the advance.
The Brigade could not advance further and 10 E Bengal was ordered to
move through the hills and reached Hathazari with a view to encircle the
enemy at Chittagong. But on 14th December the Indian Brigade managed
to break through the enemy defenses at Kumira and proceeded towards
Faujdarhat. Meanwhile, an amphibious force, code named as „Romeo
Force‟ which was composed of a Gurkha Battalion and some freedom
fighters landed * on the beaches of Cox‟s Bazaar. This force advanced
straight to Chittagong without encountering any opposition enroute. Thus
Chittagong was encircled from both north and the south. Brigadier
Ataullah, Command 93 Independent Brigade at Chittagong surrendered to
the Indian Forces at Faujdarhat on 16th December. The Allied Forces
entered Chittagong city on the evening of 16th December with jubilant
crowds welcoming them.
Central Sector
101 Communication Zone Sub-Area was a Logistic Formation based at
Shillong was given the task to advance towards Mymenshingh-
Jamalpur sector. Major General Gurbux Singh Gill GOC 101
Communication Zone was allotted 95 Mountain Brigade which
consisted of 1 Maratha Light Regiment, 6 Sikh Light Infantry and 2
Para Battalion after a drop in general area Tangail. Major General Gill
planned to advance with 95 Mountain Brigade under command
Brigadier H S Kler towards Jamalpur while he ordered Brigadier
Eastern Sector
Sant Singh to advance towards Mymenshingh with 6 Bihar Regiment, 11

Sector Mukti Bahini and 83 BSF Battalion.
The Pakistanis defended the Mymenshingh-Jamalpur sector with
93(A) Infantry Brigade with two regular Battalions and 314(A) ESCAP
Brigade. Brigadier Abdul Quader Khan, commander 93 Infantry Brigade
held the home bank of River Brahmaputra at Jamalpur and Mymenshigh
with a battalion each while he sent advance position and other protective
detachments further up across the river. 31 Baluch was given the task to
hold Jamalpur sending advance position to Kamalpur, 33 Punjab held
Mymenshingh sending delaying position at Haluaghat. The GOC of 101
Communication Zone Major General G S Gill was wounded in a mine
blast during the initial assault near the border; and Major General G C
Nagra replaced him. The Indian 95 Mountain Brigade was faced with
strong opposition at Jamalpur town where the Pakistanis had brought
reinforcements from Mymensingh. 95 Mountain Brigade sent a battalion
to block the enemy's withdrawal route behind Jamalpur. By doing so, 95
Mountain Brigade managed to capture Jamalpur and it advanced towards
Tangail.
Mymenshingh-Tangail-Dhaka axes were visualized by the high
command as the brightest, easiest and shortest route to reach Dhaka.
Eastern Command Headquarters allotted 167 Mountain Brigade to Major
General G C Nagra to augment and expedite the operation in this axis to
reach Dhaka as earliest as possible. Brigadier Irani was the Brigade
Commander, 167 Mountain Brigade. Other two brigades, that is, 340
Mountain Brigade Group, engaged in Bogra under Lieutenant General
Thapan, and 5 Mountain Brigade were also allotted to Major General
Nagra, but could not join this theatre of operation for various limitations
like river crossing, time constraint and engagement in other theatre of
operation. 167 Mountain Brigade was hurriedly brought forward that
struck at Mymensingh for transport resource constraint and crossing of
River Brahmaputra. The alternative plan of Pakistani 93 Brigade at
Mymensingh was to move back to the main defenses along the Lohajong
River north of Tangail and gave the main battle from there. So it was
decided to cut off the Pakistanis withdrawing from Jamalpur and
Mymensingh towards Tangail. In order to achieve this, it was decided to
capture Tangail by
a parachute battalion by then. The Mukti Bahini under Quader Siddique

had liberated the entire countryside of Tangail.
On 11th December at 1600 hours, the 2 Parachute Battalion of the
Indian Army was dropped at Kalihati near Tangail. After reorganizing
itself the 2 Para battalion established several roadblocks on
Mymensingh-Tangail road. The Para Battalion destroyed a number of
Pakistani vehicles, ambushed Pakistani Mortar Battery convoy and
captured Poongli Bridge over Lohajang River, interrupting and
destroying the Pakistani troops retreating from Jamalpur and
Mymenshingh, and in the process facilitating the advance of the main
Indian Force towards Dhaka. But it transpired later that the main
Pakistani column of Mymenshingh and Jamalpur garrison had passed
through before the Para roadblock became effective. A portion of the
Pakistani Brigade was cut off, but some of the officers and troops
managed to slip into the countryside and escaped towards Dhaka. Allied
Forces captured brigadier Quader, the Pakistani Brigade Commander of
93 Brigade. By then, the 2 Para battalion linked up with the advancing
Brigades from Jamalpur and Mynensingh. Major General Nagra
advanced south with his forces, 6 Sikh Light Infantry, 13 Guards, 13
Rajputina Rifles, 10 J and K Rifles and 7 Bihar along road Tangail-
Mirzapur-Kalikor-Mouchach- Kodda-Ghazipur-Tongi-Dhaka to reach
Dhaka. By then, the Kaliakair-Savar link road, which was unmarked on
the map, was discovered by Major General Nagra GOC 101
Communication Zone who ordered 2 Parachute Battalion to advance
along that axis. 3 Guards reached Savar along Mouchak-Savar Link road
and established roadblock at Nayarhat to stop the enemy advance from
Aricha. 3 Guards with 2 Para Battalion also cleared enemy pockets in
Savar. Brigade Commanders Brigadier H S Kler, Brigadier Sant Singh
and Brigadier Irani were assisting Major Genera G C Nagra in the
operation. The redoubtable Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Mahmmud,
Commanding Officer of 31 Baluch Regiment fighting through the
roadblocks and overcoming all hazards with 400 to 500 troops including
paramilitary took defense across river Turag at Kodda. The leading
elements of 167 Mountain Brigade contacted the enemy at Kodda Bridge
and encountered heavy fighting. Here enemy used tanks. It was difficult
to bypass the Kodda Bridge, as the ground around the bridge was
marshy. The units of 167 Mountain
Central Sector (Mymensing-Dhaka Sector)
Brigade by over flanking move crossed Turag River reached Joydeppur

on 13th December. Being confirmed that Indian troops crossed the
Kodda River, enemy retreated towards Joydebpur. From there Allied
troops proceeded further south and on the way encountered enemy at
Chaidana, 3 km south of Gazipur circle towards Dhaka. The enemy lost
three tanks including a number of vehicles on 14th December. By first
light of 16th December the leading elements of the Parachute battalion
had reached the Mirpur Brigade, just on the outskirts of Dhaka city. At
this point Major General G C Nagra joined the Para troopers and at 0830
AM he sent his ADC in a jeep under a truce flag to General A A K Niazi
with the following message addressed to Lieutenant General A A K
Niazi, "My dear Abdullah, I am here, the game is up. I suggest you give
yourself up to me and I will look after you.”
As the Allied Forces were about to enter Dhaka, General Sam
Manekshaw, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army urged Niazi to surrender.
IAF aircrafts were continuously bombing over the Military targets in
Dhaka. But a halt of the bombing was ordered on the evening of 15th
December. When Niazi agreed to surrender, Major General Jack Jacob,
Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, flew to Dhaka at 1230 pm. on the 16th
December with a draft instrument of surrender. Niazi initially objected to
the word „Bangladesh but he ultimately accepted and initialed the draft
instruments of surrender. It is irony of fate that Sher Dil Jawans of
Punjab surrendered to Bengal Tigers. Hindus whom they consider as
inferior race protected lives of Punjabis from being slaughtered by
Bengalis for the revenge of genocide. By that time thousands of freedom
fighters entered Dhaka City. Major General G C Nagra entered Dhaka
with his forces at 9 a.m. and met Niazi 0930 a.m. at his office. The 2 and
11E Bengal and the leading elements of 57 Mountain Division of IV
Corps from Eastern Sector entered Dhaka the same afternoon. General
Jagjit Singh Aurora along with his Air and Naval counterparts and
Group Captain A K Khandakar, Chief of Staff of Bangladesh Forces
flew into Dhaka to attend the surrender ceremony. Pakistan army
surrendered to the joint command of India and Bangladesh. The
instruments of surrender were signed by Victor Lt Gen Jagjit Singh
Aurora General Officer Commanding in Chief Indian and
Bangladesh Forces in Eastern Theatre and other by defeated Lt Gen

Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, Martial Law Administrator Zone B and
Commander Eastern Command of Pakistan army at 4.01 pm. (BST) on
16th December at the Ramna Race Course ground that is now
Suhrawardy Uddayan and Shishu Park.
War Casualty
As per the figures released by Pakistan Government, Pakistan lost 237
officers, 136 Junior Commissioned officers and 3,559 other ranks in
Bangladesh Liberation War before the formal start of Indo- Pak war on
3 December 1971. In all 1606 Pakistan Officers, 2,345 JCOs, 64109
other ranks, 1022 non-combatants enrolled in the Regular Army; 79
Officers, 448 JCOs and 11665 Other Ranks of the Paramilitary Forces;
91 Officers, 30 Petty Officers and 1,292 Ratings of the Pakistan Navy;
61 Officers, 31 Warrant Officers and 1049 Airmen of Pakistan Airforce;
166 all ranks of the West Pakistani Police and 7555 civilians
surrendered in various garrisons all over Bangladesh.
The Indian losses were 1421 killed, comprising 68 Officers, 60
JCOs and 1293 Other Ranks and 4061 wounded, comprising 211
Officers, 160 JCOs and 3690 other ranks and 56 missing.
The losses of Mukti Bahini that were enrolled in Pakistan Defense
Forces were 49 officers, 78 JCOs and 1481 other ranks totaling 1608.
Most of them were arrested on 25 March 1971 and Pak Army earned out
cold-blooded murder. To cite an example eight Bengali Lieutenant
Colonels- Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai, Lieutenant Colonel AF Ziaur
Rahman, Lieutenant Colonel Anawarul Islam, Lieutenant Colonel NAM
Jahangir, Lieutenant Colonel Badiul Alam Chowdhury, Lieutenant
Colonel M A Kader, Lieutenant Colonel M M Rahman and Lieutenant
Colonel M R Rahman were arrested and murdered. This list does not
include citizen Freedom Fighters.
Epilogue
Revolutionary political ingredients and total participation of masses for
liberation war were not found in the textbook of the staff colleges of
India or Pakistan. It was the political acumen of Bangabandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman who utilized these political ingredients.
Mukti Bahini defeated Pakistan army with the support of masses, Indian
army and Russian threat and veto. Pakistan started war by attacking
Indian bases in the hope, US and China would come in their rescue or
UN intervention would come to create standstill or cease fire in East
Pakistan. But Pakistan failed to bring US and China in the conflict,
though Bhutto was bluffing Yahya and his countrymen for such support.
Yahya was dependent too much on US and China‟s support.
In the final analysis, apart from so many factors like exploitation of
resources of East Pakistan and repression of political leaders, main
factors contributing to the disintegration or break up of Pakistan were
the arrogant attitude, selfish conduct and marshal behaviour of the heads
of the state and lastly Bhutto‟s selfish and greedy move and conspiracy
in connivance with General Peerzada, General Umer, General Hamid
and General Gul Hasan. The main players for break up of Pakistan were
Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The first blow was the unconstitutional action of
third Governor General of Pakistan Ghulam Muhammad who dismissed
Khawja Nazimuddin in 1953 and dissolved the first Constituent
Assembly supported by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in 1954.
Iskander Mirza who was pledged to defend, preserve and protect the
Constitution hit the second hammer. When he visualized that he could
not remain President after the 1959 parliamentary election, he made
conspiracy with the support of the Army Chief General Ayub Khan. He
abrogated the Constitution, imposed martial law; dissolved central and
provincial parliament and cabinet. The third piercing hammer stroke
was driven by military dictator self styled Field Marshal Ayub Khan
Nisan-i- Pakistan, Hilal-i-Jurat etc etc who banned ali constitutional
means, methods and procedures, imprisoned all political leaders,
introduced autocratic rule under the cover of Basic Democracy and
fabricated Agartala Conspiracy Case. Yahya put the final hammer by
not
allowing the National Assembly (1971) to function with the connivance

of Bhutto and by directing ruthless military action in East Pakistan.
The economic exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan was
rampant. To cite an example; in first nine years of united Pakistan,
central Government spent 42 crores and 66 lakhs in East Pakistan as
compared to790 crores and 67 lakhs spent in West Pakistan. (Abul
Mansur Ahmed, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, pp.
1818-19, January 16, 1956) The movement for the creation of Pakistan
gathered strength and momentum after the declaration of Lahore
Resolution, later known as Pakistan Resolution which envisaged the
establishment of two Muslim units or states one in North-West Indian
region and the other in Eastern India comprising Bengal and Assam. For
united stand in 1946, all India Muslim League Conference held in
Bombay, an understanding was reached for one Pakistan for the sake of
realization of Pakistan, although the feasibility of one Pakistan was
unrealistic for geographical separation and cultural conflicts. Muslim
leaders initially understood that Muslim majority Punjab and Bengal
could not make one country, one nation for physical, geographical
separation and different languages and culture. Punjabis who had hardly
any contribution for the creation of Pakistan and were loyal to British
Raj never listened to reasons. They always spoke in the languages of
weapons to solve the issues between the East and the West. Ultimately
Punjabis resorted to weapons and violence, but they were crushed by the
brave Bengalis aided by Indian army under the leadership of great leader
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
A tree under another tree cannot grow and similarly Bengali‟s
hopes and aspirations could not flourish under Punjabi dominated
Pakistan. Bangladesh on separation obtained tremendous gains and
benefits in every sphere particularly in political, economic, social,
cultural and foreign affairs. The socio- economic condition of
Bangladesh is 100 times better than those during Pakistan time. Out of
22 industrialist families, there was not a single family from East
Pakistan. Now there are thousands of industrialist families in
Bangladesh. There was hardly any Bengali General or Bengali secretary
or ambassador in Pakistan Government. Now there are more than
hundred generals, secretaries and ambassadors in Bangladesh
Government. During Pakistan time, Bengali‟s share of Government
service was only ten percent. Share in business was one percent only.
Bangabandhu‟s leadership has given full share to Bengalis, but enemies
of Bangladesh had killed him to get the golden eggs all at a time.
Quiad-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah committed blunder in his
first step by announcing * Urdu‟ as the only national languages of
Pakistan, instead, he should have made English as the official languages,
all other regional languages as national languages for national
integration. As a matter of fact English was the official languages of
Pakistan till its disintegration. Pakistan would progress economically
and culturally like all other English-speaking countries. Muhammad Ali
Jinnah himself through out his life spoke in English, never spoke in
Urdu. Urdu was not the language of Punjabis, Bengalis, Sindis, Pathans;
it was the language of refugees. English language and PI A were the two
links between East and West Pakistan.
Pakistan Army, no doubt, committed genocide in East Pakistan oh
their Bengali brethren by the wrong orders of the leaders in power at
that time. Pakistan leadership must repent and beg national apology,
otherwise Jinnah‟s soul will not be in peace, as the process of
disintegration was started by the Punjabis. Punjabis, not the Bengalis,
fired the first shot. Crackdown on innocent Bengalis on 25 March was
not justified. Neither the Bengalis declared war nor did they declare
unilateral independence. Hindu domination, their power, high
handedness and uncompromising attitude had given birth to
Pakistan and the same attitudes of the Punjabis gave birth to

Bangladesh.
It was the Indian Hindu brothers who came forward to rescue
Bengali Muslims from the cruel persecution, killing and rape by their
Punjabi Muslim brethren. They have created dark spot on the eternal
meaning of Islamic brotherhood and put shame on the universal
teaching of Quran and sent bad message about Islam to the non- Muslim
world. Bird and fish made love but could not build nest for their
honeymoon, as was with the Bengalis and Panjabis.
APPENDIX - A
Bangladesh Forces
Headquarters of Bangladesh Forces (BDF)
General M.A.G Osmany, (Expired) Commander - in - Chief
Major General Abdur Rab, Bir Uttam., (Expired) Chief of Staff.
Air Vice- Marshal A. K Khandkar, Bir Uttam., (Retired) Deputy Chief
of Staff and Chief of Air staff.
Major General Shamsul Haque, AMC (Retired) Director General,
Medical Service.
Air Vice-Marshal Sultan Mahumud, Bir Uttam, psc (Retired)
Major General Nurul Islam (Retired)
Brigadier Khurshisd Uddin Ahmed, AMC, (Retired)
Brigadier M Enamul Haque, (Retired) Staff Officer and later ADC to
the President.
Colonel ATM Salahuddin, Bir Pratik, (Pre-mature retirement)
Company Commander and later Military Intelligent Officer.
Lieutenant Colonel Abu Osman Chaudhury, (Pre- mature retirement) 8
Sector Commander and later COS Logistics.
Group Commander Shamsul Alam, Bir Uttam. (Dismissed)
Colonel Shamsul Alam, AMC (Pre-mature retirement)
Lieutenant Colonel Habibullah Bahar, Signal (Retired)
Squadron Leader Badrul Alam, Bir Uttam. (Retired)
Major Fattah Chaudhury, GL officer. (Expired)
Captain Muhammad Ali, (Retired)
Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahmam, Bir Shresto. (Shaheed)
Flight Lieutenant Ahmed Reza, (Retired)
Lieutenant Sheikh Kamal, (Killed in 1975/15 August coup)
No 1 Sector
Lieutenant General Ziaur Rahman, Bir Uttam, (Killed in 1980 Coup).
Major General Harun Ahmed Chaudhury, Bir Uttam, (Retired) Colonel
Raquibul Islam, Retired.

Lieutenant Colonel AYM Mahfuzur Rahman, Bir Bikram, psc, (Hanged
in 1980 Coup).
Wing Commander Sakhawat Hussain, (Retired)

Major Rafiqul Islam, Bir Uttam, (Pre- mature retirement at his own)
Sector Commander since 12 July 1971.
Major Enamul Haque Chowdhury, (Retired)

Major Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury, Bir Bikram, (Absorbed in Foreign
Service in 1973)
Major Quamrul Islam, (Retired)

Major Latiful Alam Chowdhury, (Dismissed)
Major Shaukat Aliey, Bir Pratik, (Dismissed)
Major Fazlur Rahman Farruq, (Dismissed)
Major SM Shahiduzzaman, (Retired)
Major Rezaul Haq, (Retired)
Captain Aftab Kader, Bir Uttam, (Shaheed)
Captain Shamsul Huda, (Expired)
Captain Mansurul Amin, (Dismissed)

:
No 2 Sector
Major General Khaled Musarraf, Bir Uttam, (Killed in 1975Nov. Coup)
Sector Commander
Lieutenant General Harunur Rashid, Bir Pratik, reds, psc (Retired)
Major General Imamuz Zaman, Bir Bikram, psc, (Pre-mature
retirement)
Major General Abu Kaiser Fazlur Kabir, ndc, psc,(Retired )
Major General Ainuddin, Bir Pratik, psc, (Retired in 20 May 1996)
Major General M Ashraf Hussain, psc, (Retired)
Major General Jamil Uddin Ahsan, Bir Pratik, psc Brigadier Abdul
Matin, Bir Pratik, (Pre-mature retirement)
Brigadier Shahidul Islam, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
Brigadier Zillur Rahman, psc (Pre-mature retirement)
Brigadier Fazlur Rahman, psc, (Pre-mature retirement)
Brigadier Miran Hamidur Rahman, (pre-mature retirement)
Brigadier Abdur Rab, psc (Retired)
Brigadier Akbar Yousaf, (Retired)
Colonel Shawkat Ali, MP, (Retired)
Colonel Anwarul Alam, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel ATM Hyder, Bir Uttam, (Killed in 1975 Nov.
Coup)
Lieutenant Colonel Mehbubur Rahman, Bir Uttam, psc, (Killed in 1980
Coup)
Lieutenant Colonel Zafar Imam, Bir Bikram, (Retired in 1980 Coup)
Lieutenant Colonel MA Gaffar Haider, Bir Uttam, (Retired in 1975
Nov. Coup)
Lieutenant Colonel Didarul Alam, Bir Pratik, (Dismissed)
Lieutenant Colonel Aziz Pasha, (Involved in 1975 August coup &

retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Zainul Abedin, psc, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Muklesur Rahman, ( Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Kader
Major Salek Chowdhury, Bir Uttam, (Unnatural death)
Major Bazlul Huda, (Involved in 1975 August coup & retired)
Major Didar Atawar Hussain, (Retired)
Major Syed Mizanur Rahman, psc, (Dismissed)
Major Hashmi Mustafa Kamal, (Retired)
Major Akhtar Ahmed, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
Major Mohammad Solaiman, (Retired)
Major Ekramul Hoque khandkar, (Retired)
Major Kazi Mominul haque (Expired)
Captain Abdul Halim Chowdhury, (Retired)
Captain humayun Kabir, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
Captain Sitara Begum, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
CaptainMumtaz Hassan, Bir Pratik, (retired)
Captain Anwarul Haque Bhuiyan, (Expired)
Captain Jahangir Osman, (Retired)
Captain Sarwar Jahan, (Retired)
Captain M Hafizullah, (Retired)
Lieutenant Shahrier Huda, (Retired)
2/ Lieutenant khondkar Azizul Islam, Bir Bikram, (Shaheed)
No 3 Sector
Major General K M Shafiullah, Bir Uttam, psc, (Retired), Sector
Commander
Lieutenant General ASM Nasim, Bir Bikram, psc, (Removed in May
96)
Major General Moinul Hussain Chowdhury, Bir Bikram, (Retired)
Major General Abdul Matin, Bir Pratik, psc, (Retired)
Major General Subed Ali Bhuiyan, psc. (Retired)
Major General Matiur Rahman, Bir Pratik, (expired)
Major General Azizur Rahman, Bir Uttam, psc, (Retired)
Major General S M Helal Morshed Khan, Bir Bikram, psc, (Retired)
Major General Ejaz Ahmed Chowdhury, (Retired in May 1996)
Major General S M Ibrahim, Bir Pratik, ndc, psc, (Retired in May
1996)
Major General Sayeed Ahmed, Bir Pratik, ndc, psc Brigadier
Nuruzzaman, Bir Uttam, (Expired)
Brigadier Jalaluddin Siddiq, (Retired)
Brigadier Ahmed Ali, AMC, (Retired)
Colonel Kamal Chowdhury, AMC, (Retired)
Colonel Syed Moinuddin Ahmed, Bir Pratik, AMC, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mannan, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Nazrul Islam Bhuiyan, Bir Pratik, psc, (Retired)
Major Monsoorul Islam Majumder, (Retired)
Major Abul Hussain, psc, (Retired)
Major Shamsul Huda Bachu, (Retired)
Major Nasiruddin, (Retired)
Major Sayed Abu Sadek, (Retired)
Major Mahmood Masud, (Retired)

Lieutenant I F Badiuzzaman, Bir Pratik, (Shaheed)
Lieutenant Anis Hasan, (Retired)
Lieutenant Kabiruddin, (Dismissed)
Lieutenant Salim Hassan, (Shaheed)
No 4 Sector
Major General Chitra Ranjan Dutta, Bir Uttam, (Released) Sector
Commander
Major General Abdur Rab, psc, (Retired)
Major General Jiban Kanai Das, ndu, psc Air Commodore ATM Ataur
Rahman, (Retired)
Colonel M M K Z Jalalabadi, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Shariful Huq Dalim, Bir Uttam, (Condemned to
death in Bangabandhu murder case)
Lieutenant Colonel Khairul Anam, (Retired)
Lieutenant ColonelA M Rashed Chowdhury, Bir Pratik, (Condemned to
Lieutenant Colonel Sajjad Zahir, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Niranjan Bhattacharjee, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Chandra Kanta Das, ( Retired)
Squadron Leader Nurul Kader Chowdhury, (Retired)
Major Abdul Jail, (Retired)
Major Zahirul Haque, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
Major Wakiuzzaman, (Retired)

Major Dost Muhammad Sikder, (Retired)

Major Muktadir Ali, (Retired)
No 5 Sector
Lieutenant General Mir Shawkat Ali, Bir Uttam, psc. (Retired), Sector
Commander
Lieutenant Colonel A.S Helaluddin, psc. (Pre-matured retirement)
Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rouf, Bir Bikram, (Pre- mature retirement)
Major Moslemuddin (expired)
Major Taheruddin Akunjee (Retired)
Major S M Khaled (expired)
Major Mahbubur Rahman (Expired)
Flight Lieutenant AKM Fazlur Rahman (Retired)
Captain Abdul Mutalib (Retired)
Flight Lieutenant Mahfuzur Rahman Bhuiyan
No. 6 Sector
Air Vice-Marshal M K Bashar, BirUttam (Killed in air crash), Sector
Commander
Air Vice-Marshal Sadruddin, Bir Patrik (Forced retirement)
Major General Mosahebuddin, AMC, (Retired)
Major General Masudur Rahman, Bir Patrik (Retired)
Brigadier Khurshid Alam Basunia, (Retired)
Colonel Nawazeshuddin, psc (Hanged in 1980 coup)

Major Mahmood Masud, (Retired)

Lieutenant I F Badiuzzaman, Bir Pratik, (Shaheed)
Lieutenant Anis Hasan, (Retired)
Lieutenant Kabiruddin, (Dismissed)
Lieutenant Salim Hassan, (Shaheed)
No 4 Sector
Major General Chitra Ranjan Dutta, Bir Uttam, (Released) Sector
Commander
Major General Abdur Rab, psc, (Retired)
Major General Jiban Kanai Das, ndu, psc Air Commodore ATM Ataur
Rahman, (Retired)
Colonel M M K Z Jalalabadi, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Shariful Huq Dalim, Bir Uttam, (Condemned to
Lieutenant Colonel Khairul Anam, (Retired)
Lieutenant ColonelA M Rashed Chowdhury, Bir Pratik, (Condemned to
Lieutenant Colonel Sajjad Zahir, Bir Pratik, (Retired)

Lieutenant Colonel Niranjan Bhattacharjee, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Chandra Kanta Das, ( Retired)
Squadron Leader Nurul Kader Chowdhury, (Retired)
Major Abdul Jail, (Retired)
Major Zahirul Haque, Bir Pratik, (Retired)
Major Wakiuzzaman, (Retired)

Major Dost Muhammad Sikder, (Retired)

Major Muktadir Ali, (Retired)
No 5 Sector
Lieutenant General Mir Shawkat Ali, Bir Uttam, psc. (Retired), Sector
Commander
Lieutenant Colonel A.S Helaluddin, psc. (Pre-matured retirement)
Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rouf, Bir Bikram, (Pre- mature retirement)
Major Moslemuddin (expired)
Major Taheruddin Akunjee (Retired)
Major S M Khaled (expired)
Major Mahbubur Rahman (Expired)
Flight Lieutenant AKM Fazlur Rahman (Retired)
Captain Abdul Mutalib (Retired)
Flight Lieutenant Mahfuzur Rahman Bhuiyan
No. 6 Sector
Air Vice-Marshal M K Bashar, BirUttam (Killed in air crash), Sector
Commander
Air Vice-Marshal Sadruddin, Bir Patrik (Forced retirement)

Major General Mosahebuddin, AMC, (Retired)
Major General Masudur Rahman, Bir Patrik (Retired)
Brigadier Khurshid Alam Basunia, (Retired)
Colonel Nawazeshuddin, psc (Hanged in 1980 coup)

Lieutenant Colonel Matiur Rahman, Bir Patrik, psc, (Killed in 1980

coup)
Lieutenant Colonel Del war Hussain, Bir Patrik, psc, (Hanged in 1980
coup)
Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Shahrier Rashid Khan, (Condemned to
Lieutenant Colonel Nazrul Haque, Bir Patrik, (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Amirul Islam, (Retired)
Major Mohammed Abdullah, (Retired)
Major Mesbahuddin Ahmed,Bir Patrik, (Retired)
Major Mofizur Rahman, (Retired)
Major Ashrafuddowla (Retired)
Flight Lieutenant Iqbal Rashid (Retired)
2/Lieutenant AMM Samad,BirUttam,(Shaheed)
No. 7 Sector
Lieutenant Colonel Qazi Nuruzzaman, Bir Uttam, (Retired), Sector
Commander since August 1971
Major Nazmul Haque, (Killed in road accident)
Sector Commander up to August 1971
Major General ALM Fazlur Rahman, (Retired)
Brigadier Maqsul Hossain Chowdhury,AMC,(Retired)
Brigadier Gyasuddin Chowdhury, Bir Bikram, psc (Pre- matured rtd in
1980 coup, but not associated with the coup)
Colonel M Abdur Rashid, Bir Patrik, psc, (Hanged in 1980 coup)
Major Bazlur Rashid (Retired)

Major Abdul Quyum Khan (Dismissed in 1980 coup from Jessore for
no fault)
Major A Matin Chowdhury (Retired)

Major Aminul Islam, psc (Retired)
Major Abdul Awal Chowdhury (Retired)
Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir, Bir Shresto, (Shaheed)
Captain Kaiser Haque (Retired)
No. 8 Sector
Lieutenant Colonel Abu Osman Chowdhury (Retired), Sector
Commander up to August 1971
Major General Muhammmad Abul Manzur, Bir Bikram, psc, Sector

Commander since August 1971 (Killed in 1980 coup in Chittagong)
General Muztafizur Rahman,Bir Bikram,ndc,psc,C(retd)

Major General ATM Abdul Wahab (Retired)
Major General Abdul Halim, psc, (Retired)
Major General Nurunnabi (Retired)
Brigadier Shamsuddin Ahmed (Retired)

Colonel Khandakar Nazmul Huda, Bir Bikram (Killed in 3-7
November 1975 coup)
Colonel ATM Salahuddin, Bir Patrik (Retired)

Captain Tawfiq-e-Chowdhury,
Bir Bikram, csp, Ph.D,Secretary (retd)
Lieutenant Colonel AR Azam Chowdhury, Bir Bikram (Expired)

Captain Mahbubuddin Ahmed, Bir Bikram, psp, SP (Taken into

custody in 1975 and released)
Flight Lieutenant Jamaluddin Chowdhury (Expired)
Lieutenant Colonel M Shafiqullah, Bir Patrik (Retired)
Major Mohammad Mustafa (Retired in 1980 coup)

Major Alik Kumar Gupta, Bir Patrik (Retired)
Major Rowshan Yazdani, Bir Patrik, (Hanged in 1980 coup)
Flight Lieutenant Abul Kalam, (returned to USA)
No. 9 Sector
Major MA Jalil (Expired) Sector Commander Major Zainul
Abedin (Retired)
Major A H Ziauddin (Dismissed)
Major Shahjahan Omar, Bir Uttam (Retired)
Major Mehdi Ali Imam, Bir Bikram (expired)
Major Mohmmad Ali (Retired)
Major Sheikh Jamshed Hussain (Retired)
Major ASM Shamsul Arefin (Retired)
Major Md Asadul Haque (Retired)
Major Shah Alam Talukdar (Retired)
CaptainNurul Huda (Retired)
Captain Sachin Karmaker (Retired)
Captain Shamsul Alam, Bir Patrik (Retired)

No. 11 Sector
Colonel M Abu Taher, Bir Uttam, Sector Commander from July 1971
up to November 1971 (Initiated counter coup against General Khaleed
in Novembe And freed General Zia and subsequently tried and
executed)
Colonel Abdul Aziz, psc (Expired)
Wing Commander Hamidullah Khan, Bir Patrik (Retired)
Major Taher Ahmed, Bir Patrik (Retired)
Major Mizanur Rahman, Bir Patrik (Retired)
Major Md Asaduzzaman (Retired)
Major AZ Giasuddin Ahmed (Expired)
Major Moinul Islam (Dismissed)
Major Mohmmad Fazlul Haque (Dismissed)
Major Syed Kamaluddin (Retired)
Major Mohammad Khairul Alam (Retired)
Major Md Akhteruzzaman (Retired)
Z Force
Brigade HO : Teldhala Date of Raisine : 07Julyl971
Lieutenant General Ziaur Rahman, Bir Uttam, (Killed in 1980 coup)
Brigade Commander
Colonel Oli Ahmed, Bir Bikram, retd Brigade Major Brigadier Sadeq
Hussain, retd, DAA&QMG Major General Abdul Halim,retd, Signal
Officer
1 East Bengal Regiment (HQ : Ambashia)

Major Hafizuddin Ahmed, Bir Bikram, (retd in 1975 Nov coup)
Commanding Officer (March-July 1971)
Lieutenant Anwar Hussain, Bir Uttam, Shaheed on 30 March 1971
Major General Moinul Hussain Chowdhury,Bir Bikram, retd
Commanding Officer (July-Augustl971)
Lieutenant Colonel Ziauddin, Bir Uttam, retd, Commanding Officer
(August-Decemberl971)
Squadron Leader Liakot Ali Khan, Bir Uttam,retd, Adjutant
Captain Mahbubur Rahman,Bir Uttam, Shaheed, Company
Commander, A- Company
Major Hafizuddin Ahmed, Bir Bikram,retd, Company Commander, B-
Company
Major Abdul Quayum Chowdhury, retd, Company Commander, C-
Company (1)
Major SHMB Nur Chowdhury, Bir Bikram (Condemned to Death in
Bangabandhu murder case.) Company Commander, C-Company (2)
Captain Salahuddin Mumtaz, Bir Uttam, Shaheed on 31 July‟71
Company Commander, D-Company
Colonel Bazlul Ghani Patwari, Bir Patrik, psc, retd after‟80coup
Company Commander, D- Company
Major Wakar Hassan, Bir Patrik,retd, Company Officer
Major Anisur Rahman, retd, Company Officer
3 East Bengal Regiment (Chattak Area)

Major General Anwar Hussain, Bir Patrik, retd, Officer-in-charge
(March-Junel971)
Colonel Shafat Jamil, Bir Bikram, Retired in 3-7 November 1975 coup,
Commanding Officer (July-December 1971)
Major General Anwar Hussain, Bir Patrik,retd, Company Commander,

A-Company
Lieutenant Colonel Akbar Hussain, Bir Patrik, retd, Company
Commander, B- Company
Brigadier Mohsinuddin Ahmed, Bir Bikram, Hanged in 1980 coup,
Company Commander, C- Company
Lieutenant Colonel SIM Noor-Un-Nabi Khan, Bir Bikram, (Falsely
implicated in a failed coup in 1979, awarded lyear Imprisonment and
later retired) Company Commander, D- Company
Lieutenant Colonel SM Fazle Hussain, (Hanged in 1980 coup though

he was medically unfit for trial) Company officer
Major Manzur Ahmed, Bir Patrik, retd, Company officer

Lieutenant Rafiq Ahmed Sarker, Shaheed
Lieutenant Sirazul Islam, Shaheed
8 East Bengal Regiment (Sylhet Area)

Brigadier AJM Aminul Haque, Bir Uttam, (retd after 1980 coup, not
associated with the coup) Commanding Officer
Brigadier Khalequzzaman Chowdhury, retd, Company Commander, A-
Company
Major General Amin Ahmed Chowdhury, Bir Bikram, psc, retd,
Company Commander, B- Company, Injured on 03 August 1971
Brigadier Sadeq Hussain, retd, Company Commander, B- Company,
From 05 August 1971
Lieutenant Colonel Moddassir Hussain Khan, Bir Patrik, retd Company
Commander, C- Company
Lieutenant Colonel Mahbubul Alam, Bir Patrik, Company Commander,

D- Company
Lieutenant Imdadul Haque, Bir Uttam, Shaheed, Company Officer
Major Syed Munibur Rahman, retd, Company Officer, Company
Officer
2 Field Battery Atillery

Major Abdur Rashid, Condemned to death in Bangabandu murder case.
Officer-in- charge
Major Rashed Chowdhury, Condemned to death in Bangabandhu
murder case. Battery officer
Lieutenant Colonel Sajjad Zahir, retd after 1980 coup. Battery officer Z
Force Signal Company

Major General Abdul Halim, psc, retd, Officer-in-charge
K Force
Brigade HO: Agartala
Date of Raising: 14 October 1971
Major General Khaleed Musarraf, Bir Uttam, Killed in 3-7 November

1975 coup
Major General Abdul Matin, retd, Brigade Major Lieutenant Colonel
Abdul Khaleq Molla, retd, DAA&QMG Brigadier Shahidul Islam, Bir
Patrik, retd, Signal Officer Captain Akter Hussain, retd, Medical officer
4 East Bengal Regiment( Konaban)

Lieutenant Colonel MA Abdul Gaffar Haider, Bir Uttam, Retired after
3-7 Nov 1975 coup, Commanding Officer, Second-in-command
Captain Mumtaz Hassan, Bir Patrik, retd, Company Command, A-
Company
Brigadier Fazlur Rahman, psc, retd in May 1996, Company
Commander, B-Company
Major Hashmi Mustafa Kamal, retd, Company Commander, C-
Company
Major General Jamil D Ahsan, Bir Patrik, psc, Company Commander,
D- Company
9 East Bengal Regiment (Kasba)

Major General M Ainuddin, Bir Patrik, psc, retd in May 1996),
Commanding Officer
Lieutenant General Harun-ur-Rashid, Bir Patrik, reds, psc, Retd,

Company Commander, A- Company
Major General Ashraf Hussain, psc, Company Commander, B-

Company
2/Lieutenant Khondkar Azizul Islam, Bir Bikram, Shaheed, Company

Commander, C- Company
Lieutenant Shahria Huda, retd, Company Commander, D- Company

10 East Bengal Regiment ( Rajnagar)
Lieutenant Colonel Zafar Imam, Bir Bikram, retd, Commanding
Officer
Brigadier Shahidul Islam, Bir Patrik, retd, Second-in- command
Major General Imamuzzaman, Bir Bikram, psc, retd, Commander, A-

Company
Major Syed Mizanur Rahman, psc, Dismissed, Company Commander,
B- Company
Major Didarul Atawar Hussain, retd, Company Commander, C-
Company
Lieutenant Colonel Moklesur Rahman, retd, Company Commander,
D- Company
1 Mujib Battery Artillery

Lieutenant Colonel Aziz Pasha, Involved in Bangabandhu murder
case, condemned to death. Officer-in- charge
Colonel Anwarul Alam, retd, Battery officer
Major Bazlul Huda, Involved in Bangabandhu murder case,
condemned to death. Battery officer
K Force Signal Company
Brigadier Shahidul Islam, Bir Patrik, retd, Officer-in- charge S Force
Brigade HO : Hazamara Date of Raising : September 1971
Major General K M Safiullah, Bir Uttam, psc, retd,

Brigade Commander
Major General Azizur Rahman, Bir Uttam, ndc, psc, retd, Brigade
Major
Brigadier Abul Hussain, psc, retd, DAA&QMG
Colonel Muktar Kamal Chowdhury, AMC, retd, Medical officer
2 East Bengal Regiment

Major General Moinul Hussain Chowdhury, Bir Bikram, retd,
Commanding Officer
Major General Sayeed Ahmed, Bir Patrik, psc, Adjutant

Major General Abul Hussain ,AMC, retd in 2004, Medical officer
Major General Matiur Rahman, Bir Patrik, Expired, Company
Commander, A- Company
Lieutenant I F Badiuzzaman, Bir Patrik, Shaheed on 05 November

1971, Company Commander, B- Company
Lieutenant Salim Qumrul Hassan, Shaheed on January „71,

Company Commander, B- Company
Major General Muhammad Ibrahim,Bir Bikram, ndc, psc, retd
Major General S M Helal Morshed Khan, Bir Bikram, psc,retd in 1996,

Lieutenant Anisul Hassan, retd, Company officer
11 East Bengal Regiment (Mukundapur)

Lieutenant General ASM Nasim, Bir Bikram, psc, Retd in May 1996,
Injured and evacuated. Commanding Officer
Major General Abdul Matin, Bir Patrik, psc, retd, Commanding Officer
Colonel Moinuddin Ahmed, Bir Patrik, AMC, Medical Officer
Major Shamsul Huda Bachu, retd, Company Commander, A- Company
Major General Subed Ali Bhuiyan, psc, retd, Company Commander, B-
Company
Lieutenant Colonel Nazrul Islam Bhuiyan, Bir Patrik, psc, retd,

Major Nasiruddin, retd, Company Commander, D- Company
Major Abul Hussain, psc, retd, Company Officer
S Force Signal Company ( Hazamara)

Flight Lieutenant Abdur Rouf, Officer- in- charge
Note : Last ranks of officers are mentioned.

APPENDIX - B
Pakistan Forces in East Pakistan
Deployment and Locations on Commencement of Hostilities
Formations/units Locations
HQ Eastern Command Dhaka
(Lt Gen A A K Niazi)
Artillery
Formations/units 43 Compo Locations
LAA Regt Dhaka with elements at And
Jessore and Comilla.
46 LAA Bty 36 Inf Div Chittagong
(Maj Gen M Jamshed Khan)
HQ
93 Inf Bde Dhaka
(Brig Abdul Qadir Khan) HQ
83 Indep Mor Bty 33 Punjab
Mymensingh
31 Baluch Kamalpur-Mymensingh
70 Wing Rangers Mymensingh-Phulpur-
71 Wing Rangers Haluaghat
Jamalpur- Tangail
39 Inf Div Mymensingh-Kishoreganj
(Maj Gen Rahim Khan) Sibganj
HQ
53 Fd Regt
53 Inf Bde Chandpur

(Brig M Aslam Niazi) Comilla-Feni
HQ
15 Baluch
Feni
Feni Area
39 Baluch Lakshman-Chaudagram
23 Punjab Meani Bazaar- Parikot
21 AK Bn Laksham- Feni
117 Inf Bde

(Brig Sheikh Manzur Hussain)
HQ
Sqn tanks (Chaffees) Comilla
Comilla Area
30 Punjab
Saldanadi -Bibirbazar
25 FF
Lalmai-Mainamoti
12 AK Bn (minus 2x coys)
Comilla
91 Inf Bde
(Brig Mian Taskinuddin)
HQ (under raising)
24 FF Chittagong
Ramgarh-Chittagong
97 Inf Bde
(Brig Ata M Khan Malik)
HQ Chittagong
48 Baluch (Garrison Bn) Chittagong
2 Cdo Bn Rangamati- Kaptai
60 Wing Rangers Chittagong- Ramgarh
61 Wing Rangers Karerhat-Cox‟s Bazar
14 Inf Div
(Maj Gen Qazi Abdul Majid Khan)
HQ Ashuganj
31 Fd Regt Sylhet-Brahmam Baria
88 Indep Mor Bty Sylhet
171 Indep Mor Bty Comilla
202 Inf Bde

(Brig Asghar Hussain)
HQ Sylhet
31 Punjab Chattak-Sylhet
91 Mujahid Bn (minus 2x coys) Sunamgonj-Sheola Area
Khyber Rifles
Mixed with regular Bns
Thai Scouts
>- and deployed in whole
Tochi Scouts
area of Sylhet
2 Coys ex 12 AK Bn
313 Inf Bde

(Brig Iftikar Rana)
HQ Maulavi Bazar Kalaura-
22 Baluch Juri areas Srimangal-
30 FF Shamsher, Nagar-
Kamalpur area Fenchuganj-
Two Coys 91 Mujahid Bn Sherpur areas Barlekha
Elements Tochi Scouts areas
27 Inf Bde
(Brig Sadullah Khan)
HQ Brahman Baria
Two Tps Tanks (Chaffees) Akhaura
33 Baluch 12 FF Kasba-Saidabad-Kutt
Gangasagar-Akhaura- Paharpur-
Fakiruma areas
16 Inf Div
(Maj Gen Nazi hussain Shah)
HQ Natore
29 CAV less sqn Thakurgaon-Dinajpur-horaghat-
Hilli
48 Fd Regt Thakurgaon- Hathibanda-
Nageswari areas Khetlal-Hilli
80 Fd Regt 117 Indep Mor Bty Nageshwari- Kurigram
23 Inf Bde (Brig Iqbal M

Shafi)
HQ
25 Punjab Saidpur
Hatibanda-Lalmanrhat-
26 FF Nageshwari- Kurigram
Dinajpur-Phulsari
48 Punjab 8 Punjab Thakurgaon-Pachagarh

34 Punjab ( Recce and Sp Bn) Lalmanirhat-Rangpur
86 Mujahid Bn Thakurgaon-Boda- Nilphamari
Hatibanda-Hilli- Gaibanda and
Rangpur
205 Inf Bde
(Brig Tajmmal Hussain Malik)
HQ
32 Baluch 4 FF 3 Baluch Khetlal
Ghoraghat- Gobindaganj Hilli
34 Inf Bde Jaipurhat-Jaipur- Muhabbatpur
(Brig Mir Abdul Nayeem)
HQ
32 Punjab
Coy 12 Punjab 13 FF Natore

Nawabganj-Sibganj- Rahanpur-
Rajshahi
Ishurdhi
Panitala-Rasulbil- Sapahar-
Gondardanga
9 Inf Div
(Maj Gen M H Ansari)
HQ Jessore
Chaugacha (sqn Completely
3 Indep Armed sqn (Chaffees) destroyed On 21 November „71
Satkhira (One Bty) and
55 Fd Regt Jhigergacha (2xBty) Meharpur-
Chuadanga- Kushtia Chaugacha
49 Fd Regt
211 Indep Mor Bty
57 Inf Bde
(Brig Manzur Ahmed) Jhenidah
HQ Kushtia- Beramara
Sqn 29 CAV 18 Punjab Meherpur-Chuadanga-Darsana
50 Punjab 29 Baluch Jhenidah-Kotchandpur
Bheramara-Kushtia
107 Inf Bde

(Brig Malik Hayat Khan)
HQ 22 FF 38 FF 6 Punjab Jessore
21 Punjab (Recce and Sp Bn) Jhingeragacha-Benapole
15 FF Afra- Sajiali-Asanagar
12 Punjab Less Coy Jessore
Satkhira-Kolaroa- Jessore
Jessore
Jessore
Summary
InfDivHq 5
Bde Hq 1
Inf Bns 3
Armd Regt 3
Indep Armd Sqns 5
Fd Regt Arty 1 (Chaffees)
Indep Mor Bty Arty 2 ( plus 2 tps PT-76)
LAA Regt Arty 6
LA A Bty Arty 5
Frontier Corps Wings 1
And Rangers 1
Mujahid Bns : 57
Deployment: East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces
EPCAP (Maj Gen M Jamshed Khan, Director general)

Dhaka Sector
HQ Dhaka
13 Wing Dhaka
16 Wing Dhaka
Jessore Sector
HQ Jessore
4 Win Chuadanga areas
g
5 Wing Khuln-Bagerhat-Barisal areas

15 Wing Jessore-Chaugacha areas
Rajshahi Sector
HQ Rajshahi
6 Wing Rajshahi-Nawabganj-Rahanpur
7 Wing Naogaon-Patnitola areas
17 Wing Bogra-Sirajganj areas
Rangpur Sector
HQ Rangpur
8 Wing Dinajpur
9 Wing Thakurgaon-Pachagarh areas
lOWing Rangpur- Lalmanirhat areas
Comilla Sector
HQ Comilla
1 Wing Comilla
3 Wing Brahman Baria
12 Wing Comilla
Chittagong Sector
HQ Chittagong
2 Wing Feni areas
11 Wing Chittagong areas
14 Wing Chittagong areas Including Cox‟s
Bazar
APPENDIX-C
Indian Forces in Eastern Command for
Operations in East Pakistan, 1971
(Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora. GOC-in-O
II CORPS
(Lt Gen T N Raina)
Corps Tps HQ 8 Mtn Arty Bde

Bty 48 AD Regt Tp 107 AD
Regt (TA)
4 Air Op Fit less two Secs 11
Air Op Fit
CE Corps HQ
58 Engr Regt
268 Army Engr Regt
One PI ex 702 Engr Plant Coy
Det 235 IWT Op Coy with
4xRPLs and 2x40 man boats
Adv Engr Pk Kankinnara
One PI 972 Tpt Coy ASC
(Tripper)
63 Engr Regt
4 Mtn Div
(Maj Gen M S Barar)
Div Tps A Sqn 45 Cav
Hq 4 Mtn Arty Bde

22 Mtn Regt (76 mm)
194 Mtn Regt (76mm)
7 Fd Regt (25 Pr)

181 Lt Regt (120 Tempella)
Bty 78 Med Regt (130 mm)
HQ 7 Mtn Bde (Brig Zail

Singh)
22 Rajput 5 Jat
Naga Regt
HQ 41 Mtn Bde (Brig

Tony Michigan)
5 Guards 9 Dogra 5/1 GR
HQ 62 Mtn Bde (Brig

Rajinder Nath)
5 Maratha LI 4 Sikh LI
2/9 GR
9 Inf Div
(Maj Gen Dalbir Singh)
Div Tps
45 Cav less an Sqn Sqn 63
CAV Hq 9 Arty Bde 6 Fd
Regt (25 Pr)
14 Fd Regt (25 Pr)
78 Med Regt (130 mm)
Less one Bty
88 Lt Regt (120 mm Brandt)
201 Div Loc Bty
264 SBRL Increment (Grad-P)
HQ 32 Inf Bde (Brig M

Tewari)
7 Punjab
8 Madras
13 Dorga
HQ 42 Inf Bde (Brig J M

Zoria)
14 Punjab
19 Maratha LI 2 Sikh LI
HQ 350 Inf Bde (Brig H S

Sandhu)
26 Madras 4 Sikh
I J&K Rif
MAIN IV CORPS (Lt Gen

Sagat Singh)
Corps Tps
No 1 Indep Sqn 7 Cav No 5
Indep Sqn 63 Cav No 5 Ad-hoc
Sqn Ferret Cars
HQ IV Corps Arty Bde Tp 46

Ad Regt (L/60)
124 Div Loc Bty 24 Med Regt
Bty 48 Ad Regt 6 Air Op Fit
II Air Op Fit
CE IV Corps
4 Engr Regt
62 Engr Regt
234 Army Engr Regt
967 Engr Wksp and Pk Coy
Engr Park/Advance Parks

Parks Silchar/Dharmnagar/Teliamura
971 Tps Coy ASC (Tipper)
108 Engr Regt
8 Mtn Div
(Maj Gen K V Krishna Rao)
HQ 2 Mtn Arty Bde

99 Mtn Regt (75/24 mm)
Bty 85 Lt Regt (120 Brandt)
Bty 40 Med Regt (5.5 in)
HQ 59 Mtn Bde (Brig C A Quinn)

9 Guar
ds 6
Rajput
4/5 GR
HQ 81 Mtn Bde (Brig R C V Apte)

3 Punjab
4 Kumaon
10 Mahar
23 Mtn Div ( Maj Gen R D Hira)

Div Tps 3 Engr Regt
HQ 23 Mtn Arty Bde 57 Mtn

Regt (76mm)
197 Mtn Regt (76mm)
198 Mtn Gegt (76mm)
183 Lt Regt (120 Brandt)
262 SBRL Increment (Grad-P)
HO 83 Mtn Bde (Brig B S Sandhu)

2 Rajput
3 Dogra
8 Bihar
HQ 181 Mtn Bde (Brig Y C

Bakshi)
6 Jat
9 Kumaon 18 Kumaon
HQ 301 Mtn Bde (Brig H S

Sodhi)
14 Jat 3 Kumaon 1/11 GR
57 Mtn Div
(Maj Gen B F Gonsalves) Div Tps
15 Engr Regt
Hq 57 Mtn Arty Bde

23 Mtn Regt (75/24mm) 59 Mtn
Regt (75/24mm) 65 Mtn Regt
(75/24mm) 82 Lt regt (120 Brandt)
124 Div Loc Bty
HQ 61 Mtn Bde (Brig Tom Pande)

7 Raj Rif 2 Jat
12 Kumaon
HQ 73 Mtn Bde (Brig Tuli)

14 Guards 19 Punjab 19 Raj Rif
HQ 311 Mtn Bde (Brig Misra)

4 Guards 18 Rajput 10 Bihar
Mizo Hills Range (Alloted to Killo Force) HQ

Mizo Hills Range
31 Jat (Mod 1)
32 Mahar (Mod 10
Ex 2 Mtn Div Alloted to 101 Comn Z

HQ 5 Mtn Bde for Dhaka thrust
3 Rajput
2 Dogra
2 Garh Rif
Ex 5 Mtn Div Alloted to Comn Z

HQ 167 Mtn Bde for Dhaka thrust
6 Sikh LI
6 Bihar
10J&K Rif
X X X I I I CORPS
(Lt Gen M L Thapan)
Corps Tps
63 Cav less Sqn
69 Armd Regt
HQ X X X I I I Cprps Arty
Bde Bty 46 AD Regt Two
Secs 4 Air Op Fit 15Air Op
Fit
CE X X X I I I Corps HQ471
EngrBde llEngr Regt 52 Engr
Regt 111 Engr Regt 235
Army Engr Regt 651 Engr
Plant Coy 342 Engr Wksp
and Pk 585 Engr Park
Bengdubi Br Coy Normal
1133 ASC Bn 972 Tpt Coy
ASC (Tipper) less one PI
6 Mtn Div
(Maj Gen P C Reddy)
Div Tps 51 Engr Regt
HQ 6 Mtn Arty Bde 94 Mtn

Regt (75 mmUSA)
98 Mtn Regt (75 mmUSA)
184 Lt Regt less One Bty
(120 Brandt)
HQ 9 Mtn Bde 5 Grenadiers

4 Rajput
HQ 99 Mtn Bde 18 Sikh 11

Garh Rif 16 Kumaon
20 Mtn Div
(Maj Gen Lachman Singh)
Div Tps 13 Engr Regt
HQ 20 Mtn Atry Bde

64 Mtn Regt (75/28
mm) 95 Mtn Regt (75/24
mm) 100 Mtn Regt
(75/24 mm) 33 Lt Regt
(120 Brandt)
38 Med Regt (5.5in)
HQ 66 Mtn Bde (Brig G

S Sharma)
1 Guard 6 Guards 17
Kumaon
HQ 165 Mtn Bde (Brig

R S Pannu)
20 Maratha LI 16 Rajput
6 Assam
HQ 202 Mtn Bde (Brig F

P Bhatty)
8 Guards
22 Maratha LI 5 Garh Rif
HQ 164 Mtn Bde

9 Grenadies 1 Assam
2/1 GR
340 Mtn Bde Gp

_HQ340 Mtn Bde Gp(Brig Joginder Singh)
4 Madras
2/5 GR
5/11 GR
71 Mtn Bde
(Under Corps HQ)
HQ Mtn Bde (Brig P N Kathpalia)
7 Maratha LI
12 Raj Rif
21 Rajput
50 Indep Para Bde

HQ 50 Indep Para Bde (Brig M Thomas)
2 Para
7 Para
8 Para
17 Para Fd Regt (75 mm USA)
411 Para Fd Coy
Bengal Area
1/3 GR
11 Bihar
12 Garh Rif
CE Bengal Zone
261 Bomb disposals PI
8 Engr E and M Coy
101 Comn Z Area

(Maj Gen Gurbax Singh,
injured on 5 December 1971, Alloted 167 and
Maj Gen G C Nagra) 5 Mtn Bdes
HQ 95 Bde (Brig H S Kler)

13 Guar
ds 1
Maratha
13 Raj
Rif 5/5
GR
56 Mtn Regt (76 mm)
Bty 90 Mtn Regt (75/24 mm)
CE Bengal Zone
94 Fd Coy ex 59 Engr Regt
262 Bomb Disposal PI
583 Engr Pk Narangi
584 Engr Pk Jorhat
Appendix - D
The Indo- soviet Treaty of Peace,
Friendship and Co-operation, 9 August 1971
Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere

friendship between them,
Believing that the further development of friendship and co-
operation meets the basic national interests of lasting peace in Asia and
the world,
Determined to promote the consolidation of universal peace and
security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international
tensions and the final eliminations of the remnants of colonialism,
Upholding their firm faith in the principles of peaceful coexistence
and co-operation between states with different political and social
systems,
Convinced that in the world today international problems can only
be solved by co-operation and not by conflict,
Reaffirming their determination to abide by the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Charter,
The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the other side,
Have decided to conclude the present treaty, for which purposes the
following plenipotentiaries have been appointed:
On behalf of the Republic of India: Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister
of External Affairs.
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. A.A.
Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Who, having each presented their credentials, which are found to be
in proper from and due order, have agreed as follows :
(ARTICLE I)
The high contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and
friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples.
Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the
other‟s internal affairs. The high Contracting Parties shall continue to
develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good
neighbourliness and comprehensive co- operation existing between
them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality
and mutual benefit.
(ARTICLE II)
Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure
enduring peace and security of their people, the high Contracting Parties
declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to
strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race
and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both
nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.
(ARTICLE III)
Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all Contracting
Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and
manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final
and complete elimination.
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other States to
achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in
their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.
(ARTICLE IV)
The Republic of India respects the peace-loving policy of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-
operation with all nations.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India s policy of
non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important
factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security
and in the lessening of tensions in the world.
(ARTICLE V)
Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching
great importance to their mutual co-operation in the international field
for achieving these aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain
regular contacts with each other on major international problems
affecting the interests of both the States by means of meetings, and
exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by officials
delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through
diplomatic channels.
(ARTICLE VI)
Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological
co-operation between them, the high Contracting Parties will continue
to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive
co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and
communications between them on the basis of the principles of
equality, mutual benefit and most - favored nation treatment, subject to
the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous
countries as specified in the Indo- Soviet trade agreement of 26
December 1970.
(ARTICLE VII)
The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties
and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature,
education, public health press radio, television, cinema, tourism and
sports.
* (ARTICLE VIII)
In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the
two countries, each of the high Contracting Parties solemnly declares
that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed
against the other Party.
Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any
aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its
territory for the commission of any act, which might inflict military
damage on the other High Contracting Party.
(ARTICLE IX)
Each High contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any
assistance to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the
other Party. In the event of either being subjected to an attack or a
thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual
consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate
effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.
(ARTICLE X)
Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter
into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more States, which is
incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further
declares that no obligation be entered into, between itself and any other
State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.
(ARTICLE XI)
This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be
automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless
either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving
notice to the other High contracting Party twelve months prior to the
expiration of the Treaty. The treaty will be subject to ratification and
will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of
Ratification, which will take place in Moscow within one month of the
signing of this Treaty.
(ARTICLE XII)
Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty,
which may arise between the High Contracting parties, will
be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a sprit of mutual respect and

understanding.
The said plenipotentiaries have signed the Treaty in Hindi, Russian
and English, all text being equally authentic and have affixed thereto
their seals.
Done in New Delhi on the Ninth day of August in the year One
thousand nine Hundred and Seventy One.
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(Sd.) A. A. Gromyko,
Minister of External Affairs,
On Behalf of the Republic of India
(Sd.) Swaran Singh
Min ister of External Affairs.
Source: Survival, XIII, October 1971, pp. 351-3.
Appendix-E
Interview Given by Gen Sam Manekshaw to
Quarterdeck (1996)
During the time of the 1971 war, there were personalities in the war
room, such as Admiral Nanda and Admiral Dawsan. Can you recall
anything about them in the period leading up to the war, or during the
war, which you still remember, or which strikes you as something
interesting?
I can tell you before the war started. I can‟t remember the date now
- something in April or something like that. There was a cabinet meeting
to which I was summoned. Smt Gandhi was terribly angry and terribly
upset because refugees were pouring into West Bengal, into Assam and
into Tripura.
„Look at this - so many are coming in- there is a telegram from the
Chief Minister of Assam, a telegram from... what are you doing about
it? She said to me.
I said,‟ Nothing. What has it go to do with me?‟
She said, „can‟t you do something? Why don‟t you do something?‟
„What do you want me to do?‟
„I want you to march in.‟
I said, „That means war‟ and she said, „I don‟t mind if it is war‟.
So I sat down and I said, „Have you read the Bible?‟
Sardar Swaran Singh said, „What has the Bible got to do with it?‟
„In the first book, the first chapter, the first paragraph of the Bible,
God said, “Let there be light and there was light” - so you feel that “Let
there be war and there is war”. Are you ready? I certainly am not ready.‟
Then I said, „I will tell you what is happening. It is now end of
April. In a few days time, 15-20 days time, the monsoon will break, and
in East Pakistan when it rains the rivers become like oceans. If you
stand on one side you can‟t see the other. I would be confined to
the roads. The airforce would not be able to support me, and Pakistanis
would thrash me - that‟s one.‟
„Secondly, my armoured division in the Babina area; another
division, I can‟t remember which, is in the Secunderabad area. We are
now harvesting. I will require every vehicle, every truck, all the road
space, all the railway space to move my soldiers and you will not be able
to move your crops‟. And turned to Sri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed, the
Agriculture Minister, and said, „if there is famine in India they will
blame you. I won‟t be there to take the blame‟.
Then I turned around and said, My armoured division which is
supposed to be my strike force has got twelve tanks which are
operational out of the whole lot.‟
Y B Chavan asked, „Sam, why only twelve? I said, „Sir, because
you are the Finance Minister. I have been asking, pleading for months.
You said you have got no money, that‟s why‟.
Then I said, „Prime Minister, if in 1962, your father had asked me
as the Army Chief and not Gen Thapar and you father had said “Throw
the Chinese out”. I would have turned around and told him “Look, these
are the problems”. Now I am telling you what the problems are. If you
still want me to go ahead, Prime Minister, I guarantee you 100 per cent
defeat. Now, you give me your orders.‟
• Then Jagjeeban Ram said, Sam, maan jao na\
I said, „I have given my professional view, now the Government
must take a decision.‟
The Prime Minister didn‟t say anything. She was red in the face and
said, ‘Achccha cabinet char baje milenge. ‟
Everyone walked out. I being the junior most was the last to leave
and I smiled at her.
„Chief, sit down.‟
So I said, „Prime Minister, before you open your mouth, do you
want me to send in my resignation on the grounds of mental health, or
physical?
She said, Oh, sit down Sam. Everything you told me, is true?
„Yes. Look, it‟s my job to fight. It is my job to fight to win. Are you
ready? I certainly am not ready. Have you internally got everything
ready? I don‟t think so. I know what you want, but I must do it in my
own time and I guarantee you 100 per cent success. But, I want to make
it quite clear. There must be one commander. I don‟t
mind, I will work under the BSF, under CRPF, under anybody you like.
But I will not have a Soviet telling me what to do and I must have one
political master who will give me instructions. I don‟t want the refugee
ministry, home ministry, defence ministry all telling me. Now, make up
your mind.
She said, „All right Sam, nobody will interfere, you will be in
command.‟
„Thank you, I guarantee you accomplishment.‟
So there is very thin line between becoming a Field Marshal and
being dismissed! It could have happened! So that was one incident I can
tell you about and you can put it in your own words.
What about the other two Chiefs. When did they come in ?
They were not on the initial meeting, then I had to brief them, I had
to tell them about it.
Source : Quaterdeck, Directorate of Ex- Servicemen‟s Affairs,

Naval Headquarters, New Delhi, 1996.
Appendix -F
Article by Mr. Jack Anderson, 10 January 1972 in
the Context of Soviet-American Naval
Deployment in the Bay of Bengal
The secret White House papers reveal some ominous similarities
between the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin
incident on 4 August 1964, led to America‟s deep involvement in the
Vietnam War.
The American public was told that North Vietnamese torpedo boats
had staged an unprovoked attack upon a United States, destroyer,
although later indicated that the attack was actually provoked.
The risk of similar Naval accident in the Bay of Bengal cause grave
apprehensions inside the State department as a United States task force
steamed toward a Soviet task force at the height of the Indian-Pakistan
fighting.
On 7 December a top-secret warning was flashed to Washington
that three Soviet naval ships, a seagoing minesweeper and a tanker have
begun to move northeastward into the Bay of Bengal.
The units entered the Indian Ocean from Malacca Strait on 5
December and were located approximately 500 nautical miles east of
Ceylon on 7 December.
Urgent huddles in the White House led to a decision on 10
December to assemble in Malacca Strait a United States task force,
spearheaded by the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the Navy‟s most powerful
ship.
The primary purpose was to make a „show of force‟ and to divert
Indian planes and ships from Pakistan.
As the task force moved into position, Adml John McCain, our
Pacific commander, inquired on 11 December about „the feasibility of...
aerial surveillance of Soviet task group located approximately 180 N M
(nautical miles) south-west of Ceylon‟.
Authorization was flashed back the same day „in the event task
force 74 is directed to transmit (to go through) the Strait of Malacca. At
that time appropriate ... screening-surveillance flights are authorized‟.
As the American warships moved through the Strait and headed into
the Bay of Bengal, even more ominous reports reached Washington from
the defense intelligence agency.
„Recent indicators have been received which suggest the People‟s
Republic of China may be planning actions, regarding the Indo-Pakistan
conflict‟.
A top-secret message reported tersely: „According to a reliable
clandestine source, (Pakistan‟s) President Yahya Khan claimed... today
that the Chinese ambassador in Islamabad has assured him that within 72
hours the Chinese army will move towards the border.
„President Yahya‟s claim cannot be confirmed. However, recent
Peking propaganda statements have become more critical of India‟s
involvement in East Pakistan.‟
From Katmandu in the Himalayas, meanwhile, came word that both
the Soviet and Indian military attache‟s had asked Col. Melvin Holst, the
American attache, what he knew about Chinese troop movements and
United States fleet movements.
„USSR attache Loginov‟, said the secret dispatch, called upon the
Chinese military attache Chao Kuang Chih in Katmandu advising Chao
that China „should not get too serious about intervention, because USSR
react, had many missiles, etc‟.
Holst concluded, the dispatch added that „both the USSR and India
embassies have a growing concern that China might intervene.*
Simultaneously, the Central Intelligence Agency rushed out a top
secret report that „the Chinese have been passing weather data for
locations in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border since 8 December.
The continued passing of weather data for these locations is considered
unusual and may indicate some form of alert posture.‟
And from New Delhi, the CIA reported: „According to a reliable
clandestine source, Prime Minster Gandhi told a leader of her
Congress party that she had some indications that the Chinese intend to
intervene along India‟s northern border... Mrs. Gandhi said that the
Chinese action might be in the Ladakh area.‟
Russia‟s Ambassador to India, Nicolai M. Pegov, however,
promised on 13 December that the Soviets „would open a diversionary
action‟ against the Chinese and „will not allow the Seventh Fleet to
intervene‟.
Here are the highlights of this ominous Soviet pledge, which the
CIA claimed to have picked up from a „reliable source‟.
„Pegov stated that a Pakistan is trying to draw both the United
States and China into the present conflict. The Soviet Union, however
does not believe that either country will intervene.
„According to Pegov, the movement of the Seventh Fleet is an
effort by the US to bully India, to discourage it from striking against
West Pakistan, and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani
forces.
„Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that
the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh fleet to intervene.‟
„If China should decide to intervene in Ladakh, said Pegov, the
Soviet Union would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang.
„Pegov also commented that after Dacca is liberated and the
Bangladesh Government is installed both the United States and China
will be unable to act and will change their current attitude toward the
crisis‟.
This is how the big powers danced precariously on the edge of the
brink just before Christmas as people sang about peace on earth and
good will toward them.
Source : Daily Telegraph (London), 10 January 1972.

APPENDIX-G
Appeal to India for Recognition of Bangladesh
Letter from the Government of Bangladesh to Prime Minister of India

December 4, 1971
(Seal of the Government of the
People‟s Republic of Bangladesh)
From
SYED NAZRUL ISLAM
Acting President of the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh
And
TAJUDDIN AHMED
Prime Minister of the People‟s of Bangladesh
To
HER EXCELLENCY MADAME INDIRA GANGHI,
Prime Minister of India, New Delhi
Your Excellency,
We have just learnt with deep shock of the dastardly attack

launched against your country by the military Junta of Pakistan on the
afternoon of the 3rd of December. This latest manifestation of Yahya
Khan‟s reckless violation of international covenants is the final proof of
his determination to subject the countries of this subcontinent to
tensions, destruction‟s and socio-economic ferment. The people of
Bangladesh were conscious of the above inclinations of the Government
of West Pakistan and they launched their struggle for freedom nine
months ago. We had sent communication to your Excellency on the 5 lh
of October and 23rd of November explaining the realities of the situation
and our determination to fight the military Junta of Pakistan till the
complete defeat of the occupation forces is accomplished. The
aggression committed by Yahya and his generals on your country makes
it all the more necessary that the people of India and the people of
Bangladesh stand shoulder to
shoulder to repel the aggressors and fight for democracy and freedom
and the values we cherish in common.
Madame Prime Minister, we have the honour to inform you that in
view of the direct aggression committed by Pakistan against your
country on the 3 rd of December, the freedom forces of Bangladesh are
ready to fight the aggressive forces of Pakistan in Bangladesh, in any
sector or in any front. Our joint stand against military machinations of
Pakistan would be further facilitated, if we enter into formal diplomatic
relations with each other. May we, therefore, repeat our request to your
Excellency that the Government of India accord immediate recognition
to our country and our Government. We would like to take this
opportunity to assure your Excellency that the Government and the
people of Bangladesh stand solidly with you in this hour of peril and
danger to both countries. It is our earnest hope that our joint resistance
to the nefarious plans and intentions of President Yahya Khan will be
brought to a successful conclusion.
We assure your Excellency of your Government‟s full support in
your just struggle against the aggressor.
Renewing, your Excellency, the assurances of our highest esteem.
December 4, 1971.
APPENDIX-H
Recognition of Bangladesh by India on 6
December, 1971
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi‟s Address to the Indian Parliament on

December 6, 1971
The valiant struggle of the people of Bangladesh in the face of

tremendous odds has opened a new chapter of heroism in the history of
freedom movements.
Earlier, they had recorded a great democratic victory in their
elections and even the President of Pakistan had conceded the right of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to become Prime Minister of Pakistan. We
shall never know what intervened to transform his benevolent mood and
realistic approach, if it really was that, to deception and the posture of
open hatred.
We are told that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party, the Awami
League, had planned a non-violent movement of resistance to the
Government of West Pakistan. But they were caught unaware and
overtaken by a brutal military assault. They had no alternative but to
declare for independence. The East Pakistan Rifles and East Bengal
Regiment became the Mukti Fauj and later the Mukti Bahini, which was
joined by thousands of young East Bengalis determined to sacrifice their
lives for freedom and the right to fashion their future. The unity,
determination and courage with which the entire population of
Bangladesh is fighting have been recorded by the world press.
These events on our doorstep and the resulting flood of refugees
into our territory could not but have far-reaching repercussion on our
country. It is natural that our sympathy should be with the people of
Bangladesh in their just struggle. But we did not act precipitately in the
matter of recognition. Our decisions were not guided merely by emotion
but by an assessment of prevailing and future realities.
With the unanimous revolt of the entire people of Bangladesh and

the success of their struggle it has become increasingly apparent that the
so-called mother State of Pakistan is totally incapable of bringing the
people of Bangladesh under its control. As for the legitimacy of the
Government of Bangladesh the whole world is now aware that it reflects
the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, which, not many
Government can claim to represent. In Jefferson‟s famous words to
Governor Morris, the Government of Bangladesh is supported by the
“will of the nation, substantially expressed”. Applying this criterion, the
military regime in Pakistan, whom some States are so anxious to
buttress, is hardly representative of its people even in West Pakistan.
Now that Pakistan is waging war against India, the normal
hesitation on our part not to do anything which could come in the way of
a peaceful solution, or which might be construed as intervention, has lost
significance. The people of Bangladesh battling for their very existence
and the people of India fighting to defeat aggression now find
themselves partisans in the same cause.
I am glad to inform the House that in the light of the existing
situation and in response to the repeated requests of the Government of
Bangladesh, the Government of India have after the most careful
consideration, decided to grant recognition to the Gana Praja Tantri
Bangladesh.
It is our hope that with the passage of time more nations will grant
recognition and that the Gana Praja Tantri Bangladesh will soon form
part of the family of nations.
Our thoughts at this moment are with the father of this new State -
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I am sure that this House would wish me to
convey to Their Excellences the Acting President of Bangladesh and
Prime Minister and to their Colleagues, our greeting and warm
felicitations.
I am placing on the Table of the House copies of the
communications, which we have received from the Government of
Bangladesh. Hon‟ble Members will be glad to know that the government
of Bangladesh has proclaimed their basic principles of State policy to be
democracy, socialism, secularism and the establishment of an egalitarian
society in which there would be no discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, sex or creed. In regard
to foreign relations, the Bangladesh Government has expressed their

determination to follow a policy of non-alignment, peaceful coexistence
and opposition to colonialism, racialism and imperialism in all its
manifestations. These are the ideals to which India also is dedicated.
The Bangladesh Government have reiterated their anxiety to
organize the expeditious return of their citizens who have found
temporary refuge in our country, and to restore their lands and
belongings to them. We shall naturally help in every way in these
arrangements.
I am confident that in future the Governments and the people of
India and Bangladesh, who share common ideals and sacrifices, will
forge a relationship based on the principles of mutual respect for each
other‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit. Thus working together for freedom
and democracy we shall set an example of good neighbourliness, which
alone can ensure peace, stability and progress in this region. Our good
wishes to Bangladesh.
Source: Parliamentary Debates.

APPENDIX-I
Suhrawardy‟s Statement of 27 April 1947
Announcing the United Independent Bengal Plan.
It must be a matter of the greatest regret to all those who were eagerly
looking forward to the welfare and prosperity of Bengal to find that an
agitation for its partition is being vigorously pursued in some quarters.
This cry would never have been raised had it not been due to a sense of
frustration and impatience on the part of some Hindus in as much as the
members of their community have not an adequate share in the Bengal
Ministry in spite of their numbers in the province, their wealth,
influence, education, participation in the administration of the province,
their propaganda and their inherent strength. This frustration is largely
of the result of a failure to realize this present condition in Bengal,
which is linked to India, are not applicable to an independent sovereign
State as I hope Bengal will be. Today we are in the midst of a struggle in
India. Between contending factions of all India importance each intent
on enforcing its views on the other and neither willing to give way
except at a price, which the other is not, prepared to pay. Their disputes
profoundly affect the politics of all the provinces and the problems are
being treated as a whole. An entirely different state of circumstances
will arise when each province will have to look after itself and when
each province is sure to get practical, if not total independence, and the
people of Bengal will have to rely upon each other. It is unbelievable
that under such a set of circumstances there can exist a Ministry of
Bengal which will not be composed of all- important elements in its
society or which can be communal party Ministry, or where the various
sections will be not better represented than they are now. I do not think
that the fact that the Muslims will have a slight preponderance in the
Ministry by virtue of their slender majority will be grudged by the
Hindus as needed this has hitherto been accepted by all as inherent in the
nature of things of Bengal. Does any one seriously conceive that it is
possible under such a set of circumstances to visualize that one section
of the people, say the Muslims, can tyrannise over the minority, namely
the Hindus in
I
Bengal. There are several factors, which make such a thing impossible
and unbelievable. There is the internal strength of the Hindus
themselves, their internal strength which can paralyze any unfair
administration. They are a majority in the services. The administration in
the secretariat is in their own hands. The most important and the
experienced officers of government are Hindus. It is just ridiculous to
think that their position and influence can be ignored. Over and above
this Bengal will have 200 million Hindus in its frontiers who will
certainly make it their cause to see that their coreligionists have a fair
deal in the province. It will just be fatuous and suicidally fatuous for any
Muslim Government to give an unfair deal to the Hindus of Bengal.
2. I have read most fervid fulminations against the government of
Bengal on its alleged treatment of Hindu population. These
denunciations have been built on the most slender and imaginary
foundations. I by no means admit that the demand for the partition of
Bengal is the demand of the majority of the Hindus even of the West
Bengal, let alone of the majority of the Hindus of Bengal. The ties and
culture of Hindus of every part of Bengal are so much the same, that it is
not open to the Hindus of every part of Bengal to dissever those ties in
the hopes of grasping power. Indeed by the same analogy the wishes of
all the peoples of Bengal, Muslims, Hindus and Scheduled Castes and
others ought to be ascertained on the question of partition of Bengal,
which can only be undertaken if there is a substantial majority in its
favor. In these fundamental factors peculiar to Bengal which differentiate
the question of partition of Bengal from the Muslim demand for the
division of India, apart from such factors as economic integrity, mutual
reliance and the necessity of creating a strong workable State. The lead
for partition has been taken by the Hindu Mahashabha which hopes that
by whipping up agitation for the partition of Bengal, for the dismissal of
the Bengal Ministry, imposition of section 93, establishment of regional
Ministries, by arousing fanaticism against the Muslims of Bengal, by
creating disturbances through hartals and violence, they will be able to
ingratiate themselves with the Hindu people and destroy the influence of
the Congress. This is but a vain dream, as they will find to their cost. The
Hindu Mahashabha wishes to stage a comeback. So do Sundry
politicians who have not been
able to find a riche for themselves. But apart from this I maintain that
this agitation started by a small section of the Hindus, vocal it is true,
masters of propaganda as they certainly are, backed by an influential
Press, has not yet the support of the common people. The last elections
have demonstrated most convincingly that neither the Hindu
Mahashabha nor the Congress represents the voice of the Scheduled
Castes. In the Primary elections the candidates of the scheduled Castes
Federation got an overwhelmingly large number of votes against
Congress Scheduled Caste candidates, although ultimately the
Federation candidates were defeated in the joint selection. Again
amongst the Caste Hindus themselves there are certain grades of Hindus
who though classified as Caste Hindus do not follow either the Congress
or the Hindu Mahashabha and will be happier under a rule that will
work for the common man than a rule of the privileged classes which
will certainly pull for the rights of the privileged classes from which the
Congress and the Hindu Mahashabha drive their strength. The agitation,
therefore, for the partition of Bengal is not so universal amongst the
Hindus as it made out to be, though propaganda may make it appear
otherwise. There will hardly be found a thana where the Caste Hindus
including depressed section amongst them are in a majority. An
examination of the 1941 census is most revealing. The Muslim have
claimed that the 1941 census which was taken over a number of days
has been unfair to them and has been heavily loaded in favor of the
Hindus who reacted fully to the propaganda conducted by the Hindu
Mahashabha that numbers were of paramount importance in the future
constitution and interpreted as an indication, which it was meant to be,
that they should make every effort to increase their numbers in the
census. In spite; therefore of the emphatic assertions of their economists
and observers that the Hindus of West Bengal were a decaying race,
while the Muslim were virile and prolific, the proportions between the
two remained almost identical with the proportions recorded in 1931. In
1941 census there is a large and indeterminate group of Hindus who
have refused to record the castle to which they belong. It will be recalled
that at that time a vigorous propaganda was being carried on amongst
the Scheduled Castes to induce them not to record their castes but to
declare themselves as Hindus only; and it can thus be safely argued that
those who have
not recorded their castes mostly, if not wholly belong to the Scheduled
Castes. Even in the district of Burdwan the Caste Hindus are 32.36 and
the non-returned Hindus are 18.6. Similar proportions are reflected in
each of it subdivisions. In the district of Birbhum the Caste Hindus are
29.04 and the non-returned Hindus are 9.71 and this proportion is
reflected in its two subdivisions. In the district of Bankura the Caste
Hindus are 48.74 and the non-returned are 7.34. fiven here the Caste
Hindus are not in a majority, and with the non- returned Hindus they
make a very narrow margin indeed. In the district of Midnapore, the
Caste Hindus are 42.66, the non-returned are 30.87. In the Sadar
subdivision they are 46.64 and 17.23 respectively. In Jhargam 52.45 and
4.76, in Ghatal 63.14 and 11.57. In the last two subdivisions therefore
they are in an absolute majority. In Tamluk they are 39.78 and 40.45
respectively and in Contai 26.45 and 60.91. In the district of Hooghly the
proportion is 45.49 and 16.48. In Sadar they are 36.20 and 16.35, in
Serampore 46.29 and 22.9, in Arambagh 54.78 and 4.8. In the district of
Howrah they are 37.69 and 29.45. In the Sadar subdivision it is 26.89
and 42.71 and Ulberia 51.27 and 12.77. Indeed there are some thanas in
this district where the Caste Hindus, even if we give them credit for all
non-returned Hindus, are in a majority and some in which the Muslims
and Scheduled Caste population even constitute a majority. In the
Presidency Division in the district of 24 Parganas as a whole the
proportion of Caste Hindus and non-returned Hindus is 22.10 and 22.20.
The Muslims and the declared Scheduled Castes here (without taking the
non returned Caste Hindus into consideration) constitute the majority. In
the Sadar Subdivision the Muslim and the Scheduled Castes together are
56 per cent, the Caste Hindus are 14.98 and the non- returned Hindus
26.91. Where ever I have given the proportion of Scheduled Castes I
have counted only who have so declared themselves, and not drawn from
the category of no returned Hindus or from the category of “others”. In
two thanas of Matiaburuz and Bhanga the Muslims are in an absolute
majority. In the Barrackpore subdivision Caste Hindus are 26.47, the
non-returned 39.6. In the Barasat subdivision the Muslims are in an
absolute majority 57.65, the Scheduled Castes are 13.48, the Caste
Hindus 15.91 and non- returned 12.16. In all the thanas of this
subdivision the Muslims are in absolute majority except in Rajarhat,
where they are 34.88 and
scheduled castes are 31.71. In the Bashirhat subdivision the Muslims are
43.33, Scheduled Castes 23.32, Caste Hindus 17.83 and non- retumed
10.73. In four thanas out of the six the Muslims are in absolute majority
and in the other two they constitute a majority with the Scheduled
Castes, in the Diamond Harbour subdivision they are the least, the
Muslim are 22.62, Scheduled Castes 26.3 Caste Hindus 35.18 and non-
returned 15.05. These figures speak louder than words how limited the
demand for partition can be, even if we were to concede, which I
certainly do not do, that all Caste Hindus desire partition. In the districts
of Nadia and Murshidabad and Jessore the Muslims are in an absolute
majority. Khulna may call for some comments. The Muslims are 49.36,
Scheduled Castes 24.21, Caste Hindus 16.51 and the no- returned 9.59.
This is more or less reflected in the Sadar subdivision. In the Bagerhat
and Satkhira subdivisions however the Muslims are in a absolute
majority. Analysing the thanas of Bagerhat there are in an absolute
majority in three thanas, nearly equal in four and in one thana they are
38.72 with the Scheduled Castes 17 per cent. In the Satkhira subdivision
the Muslim are in an absolute majority. Of the thanas they are in an
absolute majority in four, nearly equal in two and of course have a
comfortable majority along with the scheduled Castes and in one thana ,
namely Debhata their proportion is 42.61, scheduled castes 21.32. Some
attempt has been made of late to stake a claim to some areas in North
Bengal. I will analyze this. In Rajshahi district the Muslims are 74.66
per cent. We can leave it out. In Dinajpur district they are 50.20 percent,
the scheduled Castes 20.73, the Caste Hindus 17.21 and non- returned
2.26. In the districts of Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogra, Pabna and
Malda the Muslims are in a majority. In Jalpaiguri the Muslims are
23.08, the scheduled castes 29.88, Caste Hindus are 14.23, non- returned
6.53, and there is a large population classed as others who are 26.28. In
the Sadar subdivision of Jalpaiguri the proportions are
28.82,33.56,13.21,6.15 and others 18.26. In this area there are three
thanas where the Muslims are in an absolute majority; in five thanas
they are in a huge majority along with the Scheduled Castes and in four
thanas they are in a majority if added to “others” a tricky classification
in this district. In these thanas the „others‟ are 34.06,63.75,60.87,45.14
and include mostly tribals, santals, undeclared Rajabansis whom the
Hindus cannot add
to themselves for practical purposes. In no thana do the caste Hindus

along with the non- returned Hindus constitute a majority. In the Alipur
Dooars subdivision much the same position exists. The demand for
partition of a portion of Jalpaiguru, as a part and parcel of West Bengal
is fantastic and illustrate to what extent the agitators have lost their sense
of proportion. The district of Darjeeling has to be considered on its own
merits as it contains a considerable amount of Nepalis and Hill tribes
who can hardly be drawn into this discussion.
I have placed all the relevant facts and figures before public and it is
now for us to judge to what extent the demand for partition of Bengal
actually exists, in the whole of Bengal or for the matter of that even in
West Bengal.
But let us once more consider the validity of the demand itself. Why
should the Bengalee Hindus want a separate homeland? Let me proceed
on the assumption for the time being that the demand is not limited to a
few but is put forward by all Caste Hindus, Scheduled Castes and those
who have not returned their castes. Now has their culture, their religion,
their language suffered under the present regime and how do they think
that in a future set up they will suffer so that they can only flourish and
safeguard theirs culture and life if they have a small portion of West
Bengal. To my mind, I think, the demand is suicidal from the point of
view of Hindus. Even if it did happen an eventually which I cannot
conceive that the rule passed solely into the hands of Muslims, intent on
crushing the Hindus as a whole, an attitude which would combine the
entire population of Hindus in opposition to the Muslims, could such a
policy possibly succeed or be put into effect, where any Government of
Bengal would have to carry its own servants along with it, and most of
them belong to the Hindu community. Then again industry, business, the
professions are in their hands. Their youth are well advanced and know
their rights and know how to achieve their claims. Not only is the present
attitude due to a sense of impatient frustration, not only is it short-sighted
but is a confession of defeatism which one hardly expected from the great
Hindu community of Bengal. Noakhali is constantly cited as an indication
of what might happen in future setup of an independent State? I have
already said that would be ridiculous to draw conclusions for the future
from the present set-up
but let us pause here for a moment. Can Noakhalu and the incidents of
that area be considered typical and an augury for the future, and are there
not many other districts where the Muslims are in a convincing and
overwhelming majority, and yet has not peace been preserved in these
districts, and have not the Hindus carried on exactly as before with all
their powers and privileges. It is said that this Government is handing
out patronage to Muslims in the way of posts, educational facilities and
business. It is a pity that this is considered to be a cause for grievance. It
is indeed a pity because the patronage (mostly bom of the war and
shortly to disappear) is of pitiful dimensions, hardly worth noticing and
is merely an attempt to do some justice to the Muslims after their
relegation to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water. But
surely in the context of the great unity of Bengal that I dreamed of, I do
not think that whatever arguments may be advanced at this stage to
arouse feelings of hatred against the Government and give force to a
demand for separation, the Hindus themselves will object to raising the
Muslims and Scheduled Castes and the backward classes to such a level
that may be able to participate adequately in the advancement of the
country.
And let us pause for a moment to consider what Bengal can be if it
remains united. It will be great country indeed, the richest and the most
prosperous in India, capable of giving its people a high standard of
living, where a great people will be able to rise to the fullest height of
their stature, a land that will truly be plentiful. It will be rich in
agriculture; rich in industry and commerce and in course of time it will
be one of the most powerful and progressive states of the world. If
Bengal remains united, this will be no dream, no fantasy. Any one can
see what its resources are and the present state of its development, will
agree that this must come to pass if we ourselves do no commit suicide.
And suicide for what? Need I repeat, if that assurance is once more
wanted, that often enough has Mr. Jinnah made it clear that there can be
no government whatsoever, such as he visualizes, which can function in
an independent context without the closest co-operation of the minorities
and this dictum is more applicable to Bengal than to any other province
in India.
If we can have a secured Bengal, if all of us are united with a
purpose of making this great, then surely our claims to the districts of
342 Miikii Bahini Wins Victory
Manbhum and Singbhum, perhaps the district of Pumea, certainly to the

Surma valley, if not to Assam as a whole (of course with their consent
which I think will be forthcoming when the tussle disappears and gives
away to co-operation and mutual reliance) are bound to find favor on the
principle of self-determination and then we can have a portion of the
world that will certainly surpass any other country of like dimensions.
I have visualized all along therefore Bengal as an independent State
and not part of any Union of India. Once such States are formed their
future rests with them. I shall never forget how long it took for the
government of India to realise the famine conditions in Bengal in year
1943, how in Bengal‟s dire need it was denied food grains by
neighboring province of Bengal how since then every single province of
India has closed its doors and deprived Bengal of its normal necessities,
how in the councils of India, Bengal is relegated to an undignified corner
while other provinces wield undue influence. No, if Bengal is to be great,
it can only be so if it stands on its own legs and all combine to make it
great. It must be a master of its own resources and riches and its own
destiny. It must cease to be emulated by others and shall not continue to
suffer any longer for the benefit of the rest of India. So in the end the
tussle will rage round Calcutta and its environments built up largely by
the resources of foreigners, inhabited largely by people from other
provinces who have no roots in soil and who have come here to earn their
livelihood, designated in another context as exploitation. Alas, if this is
the main objective, as my figures would demonstrate, then no claim for
the partition of Bengal can remain static, and a cause f° r enmity and future
strife would have been brought into being of which we can see no end. To
those, therefore of the Hindus who talk so lightly of the partition of
Bengal, I make an appeal to drop this movement so fraught with
unending mischief. Surely, some method of Government can be evolved
by all of us sitting together, which will satisfy all sections of the people
and will revivify the splendour and glory that was Bengal.
APPENDIX-J
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Seal of Bangladesh The Government of the People‟s
Government. Republic of Bangladesh.
I Major Abul Manzur commander of Southwestern areas (8 &9
Sectors) Bangladesh Armed Forces Hereby
Appoint Captain ATM Abdul Wahab as military commander of
Magura, Jhenidah and surrounding areas.
AH the Forces engaged in Liberation War in that areas will
participate in battles under his operational instructions.
25-10-71 Signed/M Abul
Manzur Military Commander
Bangladesh Forces Southwestern
Areas (8&9 Sectors)
APPENDIX-K
Battle of Plassey
Battle of Plassey opened the gateway to establishing British Empire in
India. India became jewel in the British crown. The consequences of
Battle of Plassey were enormous. It set the British on a path that would
eventually lead to the conquest of the whole of India. It brought a source
of confidence to the British and a shiver of fear to the Indian princes
who later capitulated one after another.
Failed to secure extra favour as well as to stomach the insult from
the young king, Mir Zafar, the commander-in-chief of the army and
married to Aliverdi‟s half sister; Jaget Seth, the court banker, and Raj
Durlabh, the chief minister hatched conspiracy to overthrow Nawab
Siraj-ud-Daula. Ghasita Begum, rich and influential lady Nawab‟s aunt
joined with the conspirators.
Young Nawab Siraj-ud-Daula possessed neither the diplomatic nor
the political skill; he invited rebellion from courtiers by antagonizing
them by the authority of his kingship. Since the time of his grand father
Aliverdi the members of the Royal Court had shown little loyalty to
young Nawab.
When the conspiracy of Jaget Seth, Mir Zafar, Rajballba with the
English traders were known to the Nawab and receipt of the news of
building of the fortification of Calcutta; he tried to resolve the dispute
diplomatically. But the British governor Roger Drake proved
intransigent treated Nawab‟s envoy with contempt. Nawab declared,
“How dare a few traders who have not yet learnt to wash their bottoms,
reply^ to the ruler‟s order by expelling, his envoy?” He mobilized his
forces and captured the trading post of Kasimpur in the first week of
June 1756. He marched to Calcutta and defeated the English on 20 June
1756.
The governor Roger Drake with his traders hurriedly boarding their
ships, fled to the safety of flotilla in the sea. Nawab‟s triumph at
Calcutta forced French and Dutch to pay tribute to the Nawab. He
defeated and killed Shaukat Jung who challenged the claim to the
throne, obtaining the appointment of Nawab from the Emperor in Delhi.
English re-enforcement was dispatched from Madras under

command of Clive. After reaching Calcutta and secret negotiation with
Jaget Seth and Mir Zafar, Clive begun his march towards
Murshiddabad, had approximately 613 European troops, 100 Eurasians,
171 artillerymen, 2,100 Indian infantry plus 12 artillery pieces. He
reached Plassey on June 22 at midnight, and discovered that the advance
guards of the Nawab‟s army were only a few miles away.
The site of the battle field as described by Luke Scrafton, one of
Clive‟s chroniclers as “The main British force, protected by a mud bank
and a ditch, was concentrated about fifty yards from Bhagirathi River in
a mango grove about 800 yards long and 300 yards wide; the Europeans
in the center and the Indians on the sides.” Sirajrud- daula was camped
strategically and safely on the other side of an entrenchment, which ran
along the river Bhagirathi and extended about 200 yards inland. His
forces under Mir Madan faced the British with the French artillery about
two hundred yards from the enemy lines. On a redoubt just below this
entrenchment, the French mounted one of their large caliber cannons.
The troops of Mir Zafar, Rai Durlabh, and Yar Lutuf Khan formed
a crescent from the entrenchment to within half a mile of the southern
angle of the mango grove, with Mir Zafar‟s division encircling and
outflanking the English. The Nawab‟s total force, as reported by
historians, numbered 35,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 53 field-gun
pieces. Mir Madan commanded the loyal army numbering 12,000.
Separate divisions were under the command of Rai Durlabh, Yar Lutuf
Khan and Mir Zafar remains mystery.
The battle began at 8 AM when the French artillery under M. de St.
Frais opened fire on British positions. The morning passed in an artillery
duel with Nawab‟s forces slowly gaining the upper hand. The Nawab‟s
army advanced slowly and took up new firing positions. By 11 AM
Clive had concluded that his situation was hopeless. He decided to
abandon his positions and withdraw his troops to mango grove and then
retreat under the darkness to their boats anchored up the river.
Napoleon had once remarked that he wanted lucky generals, not
necessarily skilled ones. At Waterloo, he certainly could have used
Clive‟s luck at Plassey. At about noon the heavens opened up, and
for about an hour or so, a severe thunderstorm broke over the warring
forces. Torrential downpours that deposit enormous quantities of water
in short period of time have become synonymous with this part of this
world. The British accustomed to such monsoon rains of Bengal,
immediately covered their artillery and ammunition with tarpaulins,
which the less experienced French did not. Their ammunition was
soaked and their guns fell silent. Thinking that the rains had silenced
enemy‟s guns, a section of the Nawab‟s cavalry led by Mir Madan
attacked. They were met by heavy artillery fire. Mir Madan was
mortally wounded and the cavalry retreated in disarray with elephants in
a stampede.
Confusion reigned in Siraj-ud-daula‟s camp. The death of Mir
Madan unnerved the Nawab. Nawab placed his turban in Mir Zafar‟s
hand and request him to join the battle, but Mir Zafar was unmoved.
However, Khwaja Abdul Hadi Khan and Mohan Lai took the control of
the battle after the death of Mir Madan. Major Kilpatrick seeing
confusion in Nawab‟s army ordered for the attack, but Clive was furious
on Major Kilpatrick. Later on it appeared the attack was bearing fruit.
Clive continued the battle sending another detachment under command
of Eyre Coote. While some of the Nawab‟s forces fought back, Siraj-ud-
daula lost heart and abandoned them. He obtained a swift camel and
with his bodyguards fled to Murshidabad. The news of his flight
disheartened his troops - the Battle of Plassey was lost. The battle was
over by 5 PM. The forces of Mir Zafar, Rai Durlabh and Yar Lutuf
Khan remained intact because they had not participated in the battle.
Siraj-ud-daula‟s flight from the battlefield not only sealed the fate of his
forces but also his rule as the Nawab of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and
subsequently subjugations of whole of India.
APPENDIX-L
Instrument of Surrender singed at Dhaka at 1631
Hours (1ST) on 16 Dec 1971
The Pakistan Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN
Armed Forces in Bangladesh to Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH
AURORA, General Officer Commander in Chief of the Indian and
BANGLADESH Forces in the Eastern Theatre. This surrender includes
all PAKISTAN land, air and naval forces as also all paramilitary forces
and civil armed forces. The forces will lay down their arms and
surrender at the places where they are currently located to the nearest
regular troops under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT
SINGH AURORA.
The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of
Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA as soon as this
instrument has been singed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as
a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with in accordance
with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of Lieutenant-
General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA will be final, should any doubt arise
as to the meaning or interpretation of the surrender terms.
Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA gives a solemn
assurance that personal who surrender shall be treated with dignity and
respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with the provisions of
the GENEVA Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of
all PAKISTAN military and para-military forces who surrender.
Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and
personnel of WEST PAKISTAN origin by forces under the command of
Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA.
(JAGJIT SINGH AURORA) (AMIR ABDULLAH KHAN NIAZI)
Lieutenant-General Lieutenant-General
General Officer Commanding in Chief Martial Law Administrator
Indian and BANGLADESH Forces in Zone B and Commander
The Eastern Theatre Eastern Command (PAKISTAN)
16 December 1971 16 December 1971
APPENDIX-M
An appeal to Indian Brethren for Arms
An appleal to Indian Brethren by Mr. Towfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury,
SDO, Meherpur (Sub-Sector Commander 8 Sector, Ph. D from Harvard
University and Former Secretary of the government of Bangladesh who
received gallantry award for his heroic actions in the battle field) in his
official pad with official seal on 26 March 1971. It was published in
most of the Indian Dailies, which drew the attention of the people of
India. This action established the contact with Indian civil and military
bureaucrats and through this bureaucratic channel Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed,
first Prime Minister of Bangladesh reached Delhi to meet Smt Indra
gandhi, Prime Minister of India. Deposit Receipt of Rs. 4,40,89,678
(Rupees Four crores fourty lac eighty nine thousand six hundred
seventy eight) and gold ornaments weighing 20 kgs 410 grams
including other security bonds are exhibited below.
*w swroSl «n<«i m*i

© OfQoa Of tha RUM* Daot. swfR
Oart.of Smcladaah.
DaUfarad raid raealfad 78(aaranty tlx) aaalad M
bona aald to arntala

l) IK. 4,«0 (39978( Kyaai four araraa f arty
lakhs alihtynlaa thousand six hutdrad ad aaranty
alfht only)
S) rrlia boodi worth Iv XO/-((Upas a two

hadrad and fifty only.
3) KMC a worth Ba. na thou»«id( Rs. 1000/.) mlr

4) Oold ora r» anti walEhlnf 20 kgs 410 fraaa.
8)>taal t rink si 78 plaoas.
8)lookii 70 plaaaa.
*
7)Solas of iaUia qaantltlas fraw c-ft.
Mahbootuddln Atead, 070. Jhaaldah and Cqpt. TnrflQ-

-a-Maht chovthury, 8.D.O., Kaharpor at tha Snxln.
dash Klaalon, Oiloutta at 0030 t«s. an 28Ui May, 1971.
Tha aald feoxoa ahall ba opnsd far aamtlnc In
fiat at althar of tha abara-naitlcntd pararaa ar
bath ar any raprosantatlvs fra 8aotar Itq.Jaissrs
f^r . «'■
Saata. "ftssto*'''
Oajt. Tavfl>a. lnhiI ” l ,a1' &'••• ■ •” "n'-Wta*
Choud.nry,
■{ IA
8.0.0., Naharpu liMimW,
Capt. Kahbaabud Lin Aha ad,
8.D.P.O. Jhanldih.
Oiltrarara.
Bibliography
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Dhaka, Ministry of Information, Govt. Of Bangladesh
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Oxford University Press, 1974
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Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1983
5. Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh Constitutional Quest for Autonomy,
Dhaka, The University Press Limited, 1979
6. Salik Saddiq, Witness to Surrender, Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 1977
7. Gauhar Altaf, Ayub Khan, Dhaka, The University Press Limited,
1996
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Commando, Dhaka, Shirin Rahman, 2001
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Suhrawardy, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1991
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University Press, 1993
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New Delhi, Vikash Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1980
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Aubasthan, Dhaka, The University Press Limited, 1995
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VERSO, 2001
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Radhanagar, Dhaka, Columbia Prokashini, 1999
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(Pvt) LTD, 2000)
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Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Dhaka, The
28. Ahmed Sirajuddin, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
Dhaka, Vashkar Prokasoni, 2001)
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33. Mody Piloo, Zulfi my friend , 1973
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Lt Gen A A K Niazi of Pakistan signs the surrender document as

Gen Aurora of Allied Forces Commander looks on.

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What events led to the division of Pakistan in 1971?

What events led to the division of Pakistan in 1971?

How was the Mukti Bahini organized and what was its role in the liberation war?

How was the Mukti Bahini organized and what was its role in the liberation war?

Pak Military Oligarchy Divides

Major General ATM Abdul Wahab, retd

Major General ATM Abdul Wahab, retd

Cover Design, Graphics & Makup

Chapter 2 March 1971 : Pakistani Military Agression and

Chapter 3 Beginning of Armed Resistance

Chapter 5 Guerilla Warfare of Freedom Fighters

5.1 Barrackpur 171

Chapter 6 Marine Warfare and Operation Jackpot

Chapter 7 Conventional Warfare and Bangladesh Brigade

Chapter 8 Diplomatic Warfare and Role of UNO

Chaptr 9 Failure of Pakistan and Birth of Bangladesh

National Congress was established in 1885. Muslim League was born in

Three political leaders Bangabandhu, Bhutto and Yahya truly held

Major General ATM Abdul Wahab, retd

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

18 Mulcti Bahini Wins Victory

In Quranic doctrine, Muslims are those who have entered the

in metropolitan Bombay, came to visit. Jinnah loved Auntie‟s witty,

when Bombay‟s acting Advocate General; John Molesworth

The Rowlatt Act was passed in March 1919 to give the

resolution was greeted with deafening, prolonged cheers and applause,

except Bengal Muslim League was defeated in all the provinces.

On 28 July 1946 Muslim League at its Council meeting at Bombay

The protests against this declaration were instantaneous and Sheikh

Rule of Oligarchy in Pakistan

Election on Pakistan Issue

Suhrawardy remained undecided just at the time of partition of India or

Prime Minister of Bengal

Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy

Prime Minister of Bengal

Sher-e-Bangla A. K. Fazlul Haque

bloodshed and trouble.‟Jinnah was correct. Millions of Muslims,

a despot he despised; Hyderabad become an enormous, indigestible

three million Muslims of Bengal to be put under the domination of any

Muslim League and Pakistan Resolution

him Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army. The Governor General

had handed over power to another Army autocrat General Mohammed

upholding democracy in Pakistan in his inaugural speech in the National

General Yahya became rubber stamp in the hands of the Punjabi

lapsed on 15 August 1947.The Governor General was presumed to act

Governor General and Prime Ministers of Pakistan from 1947 to 1958

Governor General had no power of any kind to dissolve the Constituent

of the United Front and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardhy, leader of the

but there was no pronouncement to guarantee parity in appointments,

Orissa. He was later to remark about Murshidabad, “ as extensive,

harem and Abyssinian girl used to serve as maidservant in Royal court.

Ambrose Dundas, the secretary of defense, sent Iskander Mirza to set

abrogation of 1956 constitution framed by nine years of hard labour;

01 March 1960 without any constitution. Ayub like Iskander Mirza

constitution of 1962 contained 250 Articles divided into twelve parts

exploitation of the resources of East by the West. This six-point

points were assured to be suitably accommodated in Ayub‟s 1962

Agartala Conspiracy Case

Sister Dunhum found a piece of cardboard and fanned Jinnah s