Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)
- German philosopher
- father of the philosophical movement known as
- Phenomenology can be roughly described as the sustained attempt to describe
experiences (and the "things themselves") without metaphysical and theoretical
speculations.
"What can remain, if the whole world, including ourselves with all our cogitare, is
excluded?"
Husserl had already employed the spatial metaphor in the 1913 text, although without explicit
reference to himself as explorer. In chapter I-1 of Ideen I he had distinguished states of affairs
( also known as a situation, is a way the actual world must be in order to make some
given proposition about the actual world true; in other words, a state of affairs (situation) is
a truth-maker, whereas a proposition is a truth-bearer. Whereas states of affairs (situations)
either obtain or fail-to-obtain, propositions are either true or false) Sachverhaltnis) from
essences ( important quality/ identity/ or what makes something what it is) (Wesen) by
assigning them to two "spheres": the factual or material, and the formal or eidetic ( vivid or
informal), respectively. These spheres are connected only by the mind's ability to
pass between them as easily as moving around within either of them; they do not connect on
their own, as it were. That is, no causality obtains between them. "Movement between" and
"movement within" are of course further elaborations upon the spatial metaphor, and serve to
designate the ability of consciousness to flow along, concentrate itself, linger, combine,
focus, or disperse as it will. Such acts of consciousness belong to these spheres. They are
worldly. They are "psychological."
Husserl's task is to get from those spheres into another "field" that is quite unlike them. It will
be the sphere of absolute consciousness, consciousness when it isn't going anywhere. As the
title of chapter II-3 puts it, this will be "The Region of Pure Consciousness." You can't "go
there" with consciousness; instead you have to let the worldly go away and then inhabit
what's left. This is the import of the infamous fantasy that opens paragraph 33: "(W)as
kannals Sein nochsetzbar sein, wenn das Weltall, das All der Realit
‰teingeklammertbleibt?" (In Kersten's paraphrase: "What can remain, if the whole world,
including ourselves with all our cogitare, is excluded?"
Now, it's quite curious that Husserl should choose the spatial metaphor to introduce and
induce his phenomenological reduction. This metaphor invites confusion for anyone familiar
with Descartes-- who after all named spatial extension as the substantial attribute of material
being. None of Husserl's "spheres" is literally extended, in the Cartesian sense; yet all are
coextensive (coincident) with material being--inasmuch as there's literally nowhere
else besides the material universe where they could be. Why then should Husserl choose such
an incongruous and counterproductive metaphor? A different metaphor (such as "fabric" or
"organism," for example) could have conveyed the notions of coherence, separation, and
access that Husserl intended. What is distinctive about the spatial metaphor, however, is that
it connotes exploration and conquest. If transcendental consciousness is a promised land, then
you need a Moses to lead you toward it. You need Husserl. When Husserl remarks, in the
1931 Introduction, that he can look down across that land that he has discovered, but that
others will enter, this is a literary allusion to the figure of Moses, who led his people to
Canaan, "the promised land," but did not lead them into it (Deuteronomy 34).
Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-
person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being
directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is
directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object)
together with appropriate enabling conditions.
Phenomenology as a discipline is distinct from but related to other key disciplines in
philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Phenomenology has been
practiced in various guises for centuries, but it came into its own in the early 20th century in
the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others. Phenomenological issues
of intentionality, consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent in
recent philosophy of mind.