Merton1969 PDF
Merton1969 PDF
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t C(s),w(s) } (18)
+ I [W (t),t] I ( 14') and
If t = to + h and the third partial derivatives (kw[w*;C*;W;t] - 0 = (a-r) DW
of I[W(to),to] are bounded, then by Taylor's
theorem and the mean value theorem for in-
+ WWr2. (19)
tegrals, (16) can be rewritten as
I[W(to,to] = Max E(to) {
ePtU[C(t)] A set of sufficient conditions for a regular in-
{C,w} DI[W(t0),t0] terior maximum is
+ I[W(to),to] + at
4ww < 0; oce < 0; det[ ww OweJ > 0.
iOew O ea
+ aI[W(to),to] [W(t) - W(to]
Owe = ?tw = 0, and if I[W(t),t] were strictly
1 D2I[W(to),;t] concave in W, then
2 DW2 = U"(c) < 0, by the strictconcavityof U
[W(t) - W(to)]2 + O(h2) } and
(20)
where t-E [to,t]. (17)
2 The basic derivation of the optimality equations in this 30(w,C:W:t) is short for the rigorouso[w,C; 3It/3t;
section follows that of S. E. Dreyfus [2], Chapter VII. aIt/DW; alItlaW'; It: W;t].-
t+z* = + -
t vo1) - 2 (t)z
[C* C*2a I (52)
= Wo >
V W(t)
= (46) Therefore, by combining the effects of (51)
where V = the marginal propensity to consume and (52), one can see that individuals with low
out of wealth. relative risk-aversion (O < 8 < 1) will choose
The tools of comparative statics are used to to consume less now and save more to take ad-
examine the effect of shifts in the mean and vantage of the higher yield available (i.e., the
variance on consumptionbehavior in this mod- substitution effect dominatesthe income effect).
el. The comparison is between two economies For high risk-averters (8 > 1), the reverse is
with different investment opportunities, but true and the income effect dominates the sub-
with the individuals in both economies having stitution effect. In the borderline case of Ber-
the same utility function. noulli logarithmic utility (8 = 1), the income
If 0 is a financial parameter, then define and substitution effect just offset one another.'2
[ DC ] the partial derivative of consump-
In a similar fashion, consider the case of
0 = - T*2213 then from, (46) and (48), we de-
tion with respect to 0, IO[WO]being held fixed, rive
as the intertemporal generalization of the
effect,[ a
Hicks-Slutsky"substitution" ]U ( ( -2) ) = W2V (53)
DO U and
for static models. [DC*/DO- (DC*/DO)1O]
will be defined as the intertemporal "income" ( )) = 2 < , the substitution
or "wealth" effect. Then, from equation (22) effect. (54)
with Io held fixed, one derives by total differen- Further, DC*/D(-Go*2) =
(8-1)WO/2, and so
tiation, D DC* C* A
=-^1
0 Db(f Wo + b(O) (DW o J- 3(-(r2 ) 3( r2
* ) 10
-8-1
)
DO Do'1
(47)
= 2 WO > O, the incomeeffect.
From equations (24) and (46), b(O) = V-1,
in (47), we can
and so solving for (DWO/DO)1O (55)
write it as To compare the relative effect on consump-
tion behavior of an upward shift in the mean
awO -swo av
(48)
versus a downward shift in variance, we ex-
Do Io (8-1)V 30
amine the elasticities. Define the elasticity of
Consider the case where O= a*, then from consumption with respect to the mean as
(46), DC*
aV (8-1) Elct - /C* a*( -1)/8V (56)
_
(9) Da*
Da* 8
and similarly, the elasticity of consumption
and from (48), with respect to the variance as,
(DC* wo (50)
E2 D2aC* / C*= _2(8_ 1)/2V (57)
Da Io V
Thus, we can derive the substitution effect of For graphical simplicity, we plot el
an increase in the mean of the composite port- [VE,/a*] and e2 - -[VE2/a*] and define k
folio as follows,
( I D
[DV W ]Io
'2Many writers have independently discovered that Ber-
noulli utility is a borderline case in various comparative-
Da* Ii0 LDac Dat* i0 static situations. See, for example, Phelps [6] and Arrow
w0 [1].
[1 Because increased variance for a fixed mean usually
=- < 0. (51)
-
(always for normal variates) decreases the desirability of
investment for the risk-averter, it provides a more sym-
Because DC*/Da* = (V/Da*))Wo= [(8-1)/8] metric discussion to consider the effect of a decrease in
Wo, then the income or wealth effect is variance.
high risk averter (8 > 1) will always increase equations (6) and (7) can be written as,
present consumption more with a decrease in E(to) [W(t) -W(to)]
variance than for the same percentage increase = [w' (to) (a-r) + r] W(to) k
in mean. Because a high risk-averter prefers -C(to)k + 0(h2) (6)
a steadier flow of consumption at a lower level and
than a more erratic flow at a higher level, it E(to) [(W(t) -W(to) )2
makes sense that a decrease in variance would = w'(to) a w(to) W2(to)h
have a greater effect than an increase in mean. + 0(h2) (7)
On the other hand, for relatively low variance where
(k < 1), a low risk averter (0 < 8 < 1) will w'(to) [wi(to), .... ,wn(to)], a n-vector
always decrease his present consumption more at - a,, ... 1 a<]
with an increase in the mean than for the same = [r,...,r] a n-vector
percentage decrease in variance because such Q [fj[], the n X n variance-covariance
an individual (although a risk-averter) will matrixof the risky assets
prefer to accept a more erratic flow of con- a is symmetricand positivedefinite.
sumption in return for a higher level of con- Then, the general form of (35) for m-assets is,
sumption. Of course, these qualitative results in matrix notation,
will vary depending upon the size of k. If the O=Max [U(C)-p J(W)
riskiness of the returns is very small (i.e., {C,w}
k < < 1), then the high risk-averter will in- + J'(W) { [w'(a-r) + r] W - C}
crease his present consumption more with an
upward shift in mean. Similarly, if the risk- + 2 J"(W) weQ wW2] (58)
level is very high (i.e., k > > 1) the low risk and instead of two, there will be m first-order
averter will change his consumptionmore with conditions correspondingto a maximization of
decreases in variance. (35) with respect to w, .. . , wn, and C. The
The results of this analysis can be summed optimal decision rules corresponding to (42)
up as follows: Because all individuals in this and (43) in the two-asset case, are
model are risk-averters, when risk is a domi- A A