Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA 1
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced
if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.
MARCELINO BUYCO vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO BRANCH, Iloilo City 2
FACTS:

Marcelino Buyco is indebted to PNB in the amount of P5.102.90 plus interest. This came from the deficit
of his crop loan from the said bank.
Marcelino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgement Certificate under RA 897 in the amount of
P22,227.69 which is payable within 30 years.
On April 24, 1956, he offered to pay the debt with his backpay acknowledgment certificate however 3
months after (April 18, 1956) PNB answered that since their motion for reconsideration is still pending
before the SC in a different case (Marcelino Florentino vs PNB) they cannot grant Marcelino's request
just yet.
SC denied PNB's MR for the said case so 10 months after or on (February 15, 1967) Marcelino wrote PNB
again reiterating his request to pay the obligation with said certificate.
PNB answered 3 days after claiming that, it could not accept petitioner's certificate in view of the
amendment of its charter on June 16, 1956 (APRIL PA NYA GUSTO MAGBAYAD BWISET KAYO TAPOS
BABAGUHIN NYO!!!)
Marcelino asked for reconsideration and it was sent to PNB's legal department.
Said department expressed that despite the the decision of the SC, PNB could not accept the certificate
because of the amendment of its Charter heretofore mentioned.

CFI: In favor of Marcelino. ordered the respondent bank "to give due course on the vested right of the
petitioner acquired previous to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1576.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of the petitioner to pay his
obligation with his backpay certificate.

RULING:

PNB in SC's decision in the Florentino's case therein was declared authorized to accept backpay
acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of any holder thereof.

That Although the Florentino case was promulgated on April 28, 1956, four (4) days after April 24, 1956,
the date the appellee offered to pay with his backpay acknowledgment certificate, it is nevertheless
obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956, the right to have his certificate applied for the payment of
his obligation with the appellant already existed by virtue of Republic Act No. 897, which was merely
construed and clarified by this Court in the said Florentino case.

that when the PNB in its letter of July 18, 1956. replied that "in the meantime that our motion for
reconsideration of the said decision is still pending the resolution of the Supreme Court, we regret to
advise that we cannot yet grant your request", the said appellant already knew or should have known
that a right was vested, only that its enforcement had to wait the resolution of this Court which it
handed on February 15, 1957, by maintaining its decision.

A vested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has
become fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Considering the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case, we agree with the lower court that the
appellant herein had impliedly admitted the right of the petitioner to apply his backpay certificate in
payment of his obligation.

This notwithstanding, whether implied or expressed the admission by the appellant of appellee's right,
has already lost momentum or importance because the law on the matter on April 25, 1956, when the
offer to pay the obligation with the certificate was made, or the law before the amendatory Act of June
16, 1956, was that the PNB was compelled to receive petitioner's backpay certificate.

Retroactivity of Laws
But What would be the effect of this law upon the case at bar? One which was passed on June 17, 1956;

Because "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code).
It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have
formally given that effect to some legal provisions.
that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective
effect.

Ruling:

Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be
implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has
no retroactive effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in
question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in
force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin
G.R. No. L- 27860 and 27896 | 1974-03-29
3
Facts: Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on
November 22, 1952
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of Charles Newton Hodges, her husband. She also
stated in her will that should Charles later die, the said estate shall be turned over to her brother and
sister.
Charles died while domiciled here. The lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court
while there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie so that a certain Avelina Magno may be
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the most trusted employee of the Hodges
when they were alive and who had been employed for around thirty (30) years. It was manifested that
Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. The judge approved the
appointment of Magno as administratrix.
Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Magno
opposed the said petition. The probate of Charles’ will was granted. The Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed the administrator. Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno arugued that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and
sister. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death and that under Article 16
of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law. Under the Texas law, Linnie’s
will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes.

PCIB applied the renvoi doctrine – the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because
Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death.

Issues
WON the Texas Law should apply

Held:
NO.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be
more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the
principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will
appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that
Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances
presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position
to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve
said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove
indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage,
Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges,
her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her
whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his
lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot
be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what,
as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons
since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share
would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under
Article 900 of the Civil Code.
Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086) 5
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice
of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of
real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents
Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the
said taxes thereon.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned
decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being
used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively
for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said
petition on 17 August 1974.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational
purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In
the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot
by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of
exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.

The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed
tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being
used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education
(residence of the director).
GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

People vs. Jabinal

6
FACTS:

Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to
be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as
Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from
the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs.
Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and
abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:

Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet” — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the
time it was done was held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252 7
FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January
7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month
before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or
divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and
obligations of w/c rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law w/c defines and
prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of w/c in
its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any
shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation,
so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time and none other. When the
legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and
controlled by the state or govt upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the
parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.

The law provides that the H, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by
paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option
given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the H to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home bec. of the H's own wrongful acts. In
this case, where the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode bec. of the lewd designs and physical
assaults of the H, the W may claim support from the H for separate maintenance even outside of the
conjugal home.
APIAG VS CANTERO

79 SCAD 327 (1997)

8
FACTS:

 Maria Apiag and Esmeraldo Cantero were married on August 11, 1947. This marriage bore two
children, Teresita and Glicero (complainants)
 Esmeraldo Cantero abandoned his wife and children in Hinundayan, Southern Leyte.
 Respondent-judge resurfaced in Hinundayan, the complainants begged for support but he
ignored their please.
 On September 21, 1993 the complainants wrote a letter to the respondent-judge as formal
demand for maintenance and support and also to be named the respondent-judge’s compulsory
heirs and legal beneficiaries.
 The complainants learned that respondent-judge had contracted another marriage with Nieves
C. Ygay and they had 5 children.
 In a letter complaint dated Nov. 10, 1993, complainants charged Esmeraldo Cantero with gross
misconduct for bigamy and falsification of public documents (for misrepresenting himself as
married to Nieves Ygay).
 In his comment, respondent Judge claimed:
o His marriage with Apiag was invalid because it was done in jest and without his consent
freely given, alleging that we was only called tome by his parents to attend his sister’s
wedding but he later found out that he was made to appear in a drama marriage and
was forced to acknowledge their signatures in the marriage contract.
o They had an affair which resulted to the pregnancy. And he allegedly got married with
the complainant to “save name and shame”. After said marriage, they separated
without living together as husband and wife.
o The respondent Judge also mentioned that Apiag was living another man.
o He didn’t file annulment or judicial declaration because he believed that the marriage
was void from the beginning.
 March 1994, the two parties had an agreement that Teresita will get part of retirement benefits
from GSIS, be a beneficiary and inherit properties in case of respondent’s death, and receive
monthly support of P4,000 on the condition that they withdraw and dismiss the case filed in the
Supreme Court. The complainants followed through with the charges.

ISSUE: WON his marriage with Nieves Ygay in spite of the fact that there was no annulment judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage.

RULING:

YES. The marriage in question was celebrated before the promulgation of Wiegel v Sempio-Diy and
the effectivity of Article 40 of the NCC both of which provides that there be judicial declaration of
nullity before remarriage. Odayat v Amante which provides that no judicial decree is needed to
establish void marriages is more appropriate for this case. The charge of Falsification of documents
will not prosper as well since bigamy was disproved.
REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013 9
FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a petition to
nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter
into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed
to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did
not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or
build a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

RULING:

No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage
may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no
longer needed.”