Dinapol V Babaldo DIGEST
Dinapol V Babaldo DIGEST
Dinapol V Babaldo DIGEST
FA CTS:
An Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 775-G (Rollo, 31-32) was filed against accused Crozoro Palermo and Jovy
Palermo on 28 February 1992 by 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Diosdado Hermosa of Negros Oriental before the
respondent Judge's sala (Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental), No bail was recommended .
3 March 1992, the respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
On 9 March 1992, before the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over their persons, accused filed through their counsel, the
Paras and Associates law office, a motion to grant and fix bail which the respondent Judge set for hearing on 24 April 1992.
On 10 April 1992, Evangeline Dinapol, the complaining witness and a sister of the victim in the murder case filed a vigorous
opposition to the motion, in view thereof, the respondent Judge issued an order (a) denying the motion to grant bail on the
ground that the court "has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused," (b) ordering the issuance of an alias
warrant of arrest and (c) directing the PNP of Guihulngan "to exert utmost efforts for the arrest of the accused".
On 28 April, 1992, accused through counsel filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the 24 April 1992 Order on the
ground that "the accused are forthcoming, and are willing to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court," which the trial
judge grant the motion and fix bail for 7 May 1992 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, subject to the condition that "the accused
shall surrender to the custody of the court.
On 7 May 1992, the accused failed to appear on the set date. The respondent Judge issued on the said date an order
resetting, once again, the hearing of the motion for 30 June and 1 and 3 July 1992, , subject to the condition that "on or before
June 30, 1992, accused shall have voluntarily surrendered and submitted themselves to the custody of this court [RTC]"
The Prosecution filed on 24 June 1992 a "Motion Entreating Hon. Ismael O. Baldado to Consider Whether or Not to Continue
Presiding Over the Above-Entitled Case" , is alleged therein that the respondent Judge had acted with patent bias and
partiality in the accused's favor as may be gleaned from his (Judge's) actuations.
In his comment, respondent Judge maintains that he had in fact denied in his 24 April 1992 Order the accused's motion for bail
precisely because his court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused .
ISSUE:
1. WON the Judge erred in setting the motion for bail for hearing.
2. WON the accused can file a motion for bail even if the court has not acquired jurisdiction over them.
RULING:
1. YES, the Judge has "committed a jurisdictional lapse in the procedure he adopted in setting the case for hearing the Motion to
Bail filed by the counsel of the accused on the mere allegation that the accused are forthcoming and are willing to voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court." (Office of the Court Administrator). Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
that an accused can move for the granting of bail only if the court has acquired jurisdiction over his person. It then
recommends that the respondent Judge "be sternly admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
violation in the future will be dealt with more severely."
Since the accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G were not arrested by virtue of both the original warrant arrest and the
alias warrant of arrest, and did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they had no standing in
court to file a motion for bail. Nor did the court have any business setting the same for hearing. By setting the said
motion for hearing despite the fact that his court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, the
respondent Judge blatantly disregarded established rule and settled jurisprudence. While he subsequently rectified his error by
denying the motion in his Order of 24 April 1992, he nevertheless backtracked by granting the motion for reconsideration and
setting anew the hearing of the motion for bail this time with a warning to the prosecution that its failure to present evidence
on the scheduled date "will be considered as lack of strength of its evidence."
These acts of the respondent Judge compounded his already questionable disregard of the rule and doctrine aforecited. He
opted to perpetuate his defiance thereto and experiment on a new procedure which we cannot sanction. According to Canon
18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, a Judge violates his duty as a minister of justice if he seeks to do what he may personally
consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him.
2. NO, it is axiomatic that a court cannot entertain an accused's motion or petition for bail unless he is in the custody of the law.
Bail is defined Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court as "the security given for the release of a person in custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under the conditions"
specified in Section 2 thereof. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law(a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a
warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities . Elsewise stated, the purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 [1975],
citing Green vs. Petit, Sheriff, 54 N.E. 2d 281). Accordingly, it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free (Feliciano vs.
Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 [1961], citing Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405; see also Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, 51
SCRA 369 [1973]). The right to bail is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. .
...
Only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the
benefits of said provision" (Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 [1945]). Thus, it logically follows that no petition for bail can be
validly entertained for as long as the petitioner is NOT in the custody of the law. Since the accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G were
not arrested by virtue of both the original warrant arrest and the alias warrant of arrest, and did not voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, they had no standing in court to file a motion for bail.