Dela cruz vs.

Garcia

Facts:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz
(Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house
of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-
lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. 1 After almost two months, or on November 2,

2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein
co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino"

Jenie applied for registration of the child‘s birth where she used Dominique‘s surname
Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar. She attached to the Affidavits a
document entitled “Autobiography” which is a handwritten document by Dominique
himself. The said document states that he and Jenie fell in love with each other, then
became good couples, and they decided to live together upon knowing that Jenie is
pregnant. However, the Civil Registrar denied the application of Jenie. According to it,
the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint

ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented sufficiently proved the filiation of Jenie’s child.

Ruling

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to
the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. 20 Third, Jenie’s testimony
is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo
Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could
be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in
his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in
Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with
the other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie
were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’
house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique
died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to
the child – they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.

People vs. Gallano

Facts

Private complainant, AAA, and her brother lived with their maternal aunt, BBB, BBB's
husband, herein appellant, their children and BBB's brother in Baranggay Guimbala-on,
Silay City (TSN, October 6, 2003, pp. 3-4).

On January 2, 2003, BBB went to the hospital to take care of her father and stayed
there for days. AAA was home and was about to make her brother go to sleep. She
went inside the bedroom to a mat when appellant took her aside, undressed her and
laid her down on the bed. Standing over her, appellant pointed his penis at her and
warned her not to tell her mother, otherwise, he would kill her. When appellant's penis
touched AAA's vagina, she felt pain and instinctively kicked him away. Feeling
distraught, AAA ran outside and cried (TSN, October 20, 2003, pp. 5-7).

On January 8, 2003, BBB's brother went to the hospital, he told BBB that he saw AAA
and appellant inside the room, standing and facing each other. This prompted BBB to
ask AAA about the incident. At first, AAA hesitated and refused to talk but later
admitted that she was raped. 

ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of AAA and BBB suffice to prove AAA's minority even
if coupled with Gallano's supposed admission of the same.

Ruling

Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving
only the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. 23 As such, the accused
may be convicted of rape on the basis of the victim's sole testimony provided such
testimony is logical, credible, consistent and convincing. 24 Moreover, the testimony of a
young rape victim is given full weight and credence considering that her denunciation
against him for rape would necessarily expose herself and her family to shame and
perhaps ridicule. Indeed, it is more consistent with human experience to hold that a
rape victim of tender age will truthfully testify as to all matters necessary to show that
she was raped.

the CA correctly ruled that the crime of rape was established beyond reasonable
doubt even upon the lone testimony of the victim herself. With the lower courts not
being shown by Gallano to have overlooked any matter or circumstance of weight
that could alter the result in his favour, their appreciation must be viewed with
respect. It is settled that the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great
weight, and are even held to be conclusive and binding unless they were tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight
TALIDANO v. FALCON MARITIME

Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and Allied
Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel
owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea. His one
(1)-year contract of employment commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the
monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of $270.00 and leave pay of $75.00.

Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against and
maltreated the vessel’s Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to
the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a
measure that allegedly was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was
dismissed on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October
1999.

Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the vessel
after having been warned several times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an
incident involving petitioner’s incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route
at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner who was then supposed to
be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date
of incident, reporting the vessel’s deviation from its course due to petitioner’s neglect of
duty at the bridge, as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the
master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.

Issue:

ISSUE: Whether the fax messages can be considered as res gestae.

Ruling

Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res gestae,
namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is
the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements accompanying
the equivocal act. We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.

To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.

Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its course—
is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax messages
were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned to
determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the
critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the
first kind.

Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility are: (1) the
principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the
issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a legal
significance to the equivocal act.

Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be one.
Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by
any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time
has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the
purported equivocal act. Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The
matter of route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the
fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only from the Japanese
port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.

JOSE v. MICHAELMAR

Facts

Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the Philippine agent of Michaelmar Shipping

Services, Inc. (MSSI). In an undertaking 7 dated 2 July 2002 and an employment
contract8 dated 4 July 2002, MSSI through MPI engaged the services of Bernardo B.
Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of M/T Limar.

In connection with the employment contract, Jose, Jr. signed a declaration 10 dated 10 June 2002
stating that:

In order to implement the Drug and Alcohol Policy on board the managed vessels the following with
[sic] apply:

All alcoholic beverages, banned substances and unprescribed drugs including but not limited to the
following: Marijuana Cocaine Phencyclidine Amphetamines Heroin Opiates are banned from Stelmar
Tankers (Management) Ltd. managed vessels.

Jose, Jr. began performing his duties on board the M/T Limar on 21 August 2002. On 8
October 2002, a random drug test was conducted on all officers and crew members of
M/T Limar at the port of Curacao. Jose, Jr. was found positive for marijuana. Jose, Jr.
was informed about the result of his drug test and was asked if he was taking any
medication. Jose, Jr. said that he was taking Centrum vitamins.

Jose, Jr. was allowed to continue performing his duties on board the M/T Limar from 8
October to 29 November 2002. In the Sea Going Staff Appraisal Report 11 on Jose Jr.’s
work performance for the period of 1 August to 28 November 2002, Jose, Jr. received a
96% total rating and was described as very hardworking, trustworthy, and reliable.
On 29 December 2002, M/T Limar reached the next port after the random drug test and
Jose, Jr. was repatriated to the Philippines. When Jose, Jr. arrived in the Philippines, he
asked MPI that a drug test be conducted on him. MPI ignored his request. On his own,
Jose, Jr. procured drug tests from Manila Doctors Hospital, 12 S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic,
Inc.,13 and Maritime Clinic for International Services, Inc. 14 He was found negative for
marijuana.

Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and MSSI for illegal dismissal with
claim for his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract.

Issue:

ISSUE: Whether the drug test result was properly considered as part of entries in the
course of business.

Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of admissibility.
There are kinds of evidence known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be invariably
signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him because of necessity and under
circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are
called entries in the course of business, which are transactions made by persons in the regular
course of their duty or business. We agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test result constitutes
entries made in the ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer of the vessel. The tests
administered to the crew were routine measures of the vessel conducted to enforce its stated policy,
and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued and released by the medical officer.
The ship’s physician at Curacao under whom the tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It
was under his name and with his handwritten comments that the report on the respondent came out,
and there is no basis to suspect that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of
his duty. As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does not require
additional supporting evidence except if it appears that the drug test was conducted not in
accordance with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says, has even been suggested in
this particular case.

In the present case, Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of Appeals’ ruling is violative
of any law or jurisprudence. Section 43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in
a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

the Court laid down the requisites for admission in evidence of entries in the course of business: (1)
the person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were
made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the person who made the entry
was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in a professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.

Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2) the entries were made
near the time the random drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a position to know the facts
made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in his professional capacity and in the
performance of his duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.

The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Jose,
Jr. was not found positive for marijuana.

DST Movers Corp. vs. People’s General Insurance Corp

Facts

In a Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
PGIC alleged that at about 10:30 p.m. on February 28, 2002, along the South
Luzon Expressway and in the area of Bilibid, Muntinlupa City, a Honda Civic sedan
with plate number URZ-976 (sedan) was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck with
plate number UAL-295 (truck). PGIC underscored that the sedan was on a stop
position when it was hit. The sedan was then allegedly pushed forward, thereby
hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then allegedly escaped. 8

In support of its recollection of the events of February 28, 2002, PGIC relied on a
Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe
Tomas (PO2 Tomas) of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the
Philippine National Police.

 MTC: ruled in favor of PGIC; RTC: affirmed; CA: affirmed; MR was also denied.
 Hence, this petition insisting that the MTC’s reliance on the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report was misplaced as it was supposedly improperly identified and
uncorroborated.
ISSUE: Whether it was an error for the MTC to admit and lend evidentiary weight to the
piece of evidence chiefly relied upon by PGIC: the Traffic Accident Investigation Report.

Ruling

The subject Report should not have been admitted as evidence for violating the
Hearsay Rule. Bereft of evidentiary basis, the conclusion of the lower courts cannot
stand as it has been reduced to conjecture.

Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Hearsay
Rule. It renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons
who are not presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated.
This rule proceeds from the basic rationale of fairness, as the party against whom it
is presented is unable to cross-examine the person making the statement:

Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence enumerate

the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Of these, Section 44—regarding entries
in official records— is particularly relevant to this case:

SECTION 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in

the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Respondent presented proof of the occurrence of an accident that damaged Fidel
Yuboco's Honda Civic sedan,44 that the sedan was insured by respondent, 45 and that
respondent paid Fidel Yuboco's insurance claims. 46 As to the identity, however, of
the vehicle or of the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan, all
that respondent relies on is the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.

It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not matters that were
personally known to PO2 Tomas. 
Dela Llana vs. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, 04 December 2013

FACTS

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota
Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City. 4

His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain
Calimlim was at the backseat.5

Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light
turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand
suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the
impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass
splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela
Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries. 6

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel
Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck
and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr.
Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she
suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and
hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition
did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.9

She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a
cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the
compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5
and the C6 vertebrae. 10

The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her
profession since June 2000 

ISSUE: Whether the truck driver’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury.

Ruling

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s
negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must
establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. 36

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:

(1) the pictures of her damaged car,

(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and

(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show
the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In
other words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts
by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established The medical
certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence

even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not
on the witness stand. 39

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence  except in very
40

unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.

Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical
certificate.  However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to
1âwphi1

identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of
her findings. We also point out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless
did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra.
dela Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a
result of the vehicular accident.

A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition,
i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed
to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather,
the medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical examinations
Estate of Rogelio Ong vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, 17 December 2007

FACTS
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne
Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong
(Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City

As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio
got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this
time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil
wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V.
Valdez.5

From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together
at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.

From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and was born

on 25 February 1998

Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne,
falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.

Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and
refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus
leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.

 RTC rendered a decision declaring Joanne to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio with
Jinky.
 Pending appeal, defendant died and was substituted by his Estate.
 The Court of Appeals remanded the case for the issuance of an order directing the
parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the
paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in
coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
 Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Estate of Rogelio was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:

Whether the appellate court erred in remanding the case for DNA testing

Ruling

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving
paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a  prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
child.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the
child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may
be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA
analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of
support for minor Joanne.  the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for
purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.
People vs. Kinok

After taking supper at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of September 23, 1989, Luz
Aguipo, together with four of her five children, went upstairs in her house at Kimlawis,
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, while her husband, William Aguipo proceeded inside the store
in the first floor and slept therein. At around 8:30 o’clock of the same evening, Luz heard
two persons calling out to buy rice. When William later called out to Luz whether she
had change for P100.00, she answered that she had none. She went down the house
and saw accused Julius Kinok and Tapante Saligan. The duo were thus unable to buy
the rice as the couple had no change . The two accused then asked if the couple had
corn grits. They replied that there was none available. Thereafter, the two accused
requested William to accompany them to the store owned by Roger Miñoza (id.).
William acceded (id.).

At around 12:30 o’clock past midnight, Luz was awakened by a muffled gunburst. She
immediately got up, looked over the window and saw the two accused both holding
guns which were pointed at where her husband, William, was later found dead (pp. 8-
9, id.). She was able to identify the two as the moon and stars were shinning brightly
and besides there was a pile of woods and bamboos (‘bagacay’) which were burning
around eight (8) meters away from where the two accused were (p. 9, id.). Not long
after, the two accused ran away (id.). Thereafter, Luz went back to lie down on her bed
(p.10, id.). She could not go back to sleep because she was scared that the two would
come back to strafe their house and kill them all.

Accused-appellant Kinok was charged with and convicted by the trial court of murder.
During trial, Kinok did not take the witness stand. For his defense, only Alfredo Canacan,
barangay councilman and Flaviana Solo, barangay captain, testified. On appeal, Kinok
contends the evidence for the prosecution has not established the identity of the
perpetrators of the said crime.

Issue:

Whether the prosecution was able to properly discharge the burden of proof necessary for
the conviction of the appellant? - YES

Ruling.

In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not
only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of
proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor.This burden of proof
does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial.
However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by
presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the
information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in
order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case. Appellants’
unexplainable silence, in the midst of the overwhelming evidence established by the
prosecution against them, leads to no other conclusion than that they are guilty as
charged. Anent Luz Aguipo’s delay in reporting the incident to the proper authorities, we
agree with the Solicitor General that such delay, which covered only sixteen (16) days,
was satisfactorily explained by her. Luz testified that she feared for her life as well as
her family. She was also convinced that appellants would flee to the mountains and
might no longer be apprehended. Likewise, in her barangay, many residents have been
killed in the past. Although the culprits were identified, the barangay officials would
usually "fix the cases" because they themselves are afraid of the people in the
mountains. Similarly, she did not immediately bring the matter to the police authorities
because she was then busy attending to the burial arrangements of her husband.With
these things in her mind, compounded by the traumatic shock of finding herself
suddenly a widow with five children to support, Luz could not be expected to
immediately take the proper action.

PEOPLE v. URZAIS
Facts:

The present case is a review of the Decision by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
which dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant Fabian Urzais y Lanurias
and affirmed with modification the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping with homicide through the use of unlicensed firearm.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato (Shirley), Senior

Police Officer 2 Fernando Figueroa (SPO2 Figueroa) and Dr. Jun Concepcion
(Dr. Concepcion). Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding
her husband's disappearance and discovery of his death. SPO2 Figueroa of
the Philippine National Police (PNP), Cabanatuan City, testified concerning
the circumstances surrounding accused-appellant's arrest. 
Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and the cause of
his death. the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the
crime charged. The RTC anchored its ruling on the disputable presumption
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. It held that the
elements of carnapping were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt through the recovery of the purportedly carnapped vehicle from the
accused-appellant's possession and by his continued possession thereof even
after the lapse of one week from the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant decries the appellate court's error in relying on the

disputable presumption created by law under Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court to conclude that by virtue of his possession of the vehicle, he
is considered the author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and the killing
of its owner. Accused-appellant asserts that such presumption does not hold
in the case at bar.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in convictong accused-appellant based on the presumption
under Sec. 3(j) of Rule 131.

Ruling:
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1.
The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the elements of the crime for
which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime.

Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing" since the
non-return of the victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the check-point had begun
before then, as early 3 November 2002, as stated by the prosecution witness raises doubts
about the prosecution's version of the case. 

The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged
carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such
possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.

In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and
adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by
the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not seamless, once the
explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from the unexplained
possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the
prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense of the accused
improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to discharge. 

People v. Concepcion

FACTS

Petitioner Gerardo Conception and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29,
1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s parents in Fairview, Quezon City.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.

Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground
of bigamy

He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10,
1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing
in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old.
She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never
lived with Mario at all.8

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter
for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a
result. Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their
marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the 'bastardization' of
Gerardo. She further maintained that Jose Gerardo's surname should be
changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule
that an illegitimate child shall use the mother's surname On appeal, the CA held
that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage, based the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code. For
his part, petitioner impugns the legitimacy on the basis of Art. 166 (1)(b) of the same code.

ISSUE

Whether the presumption of legitimacy stands

RULING

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the
Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of
his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect
his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of

legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy
to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption
on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled
the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary.

To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such
as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance,
when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never
together during the period of conception.  Or, the husband was in prison
during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took
place through the violation of prison regulations.

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in
Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers
apart.

Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also
that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between
them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa
and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it
physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the

assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is
no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose
Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands.