Name: CORINNE SALCEDO BL 1.

5B

DOUBE JEOPARDY

Article III Section 21 - “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by law or an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.”

Three elements to exist in order to validly claim double jeopardy, to wit:

(1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and

(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first

Furthermore, there is double jeopardy only:

(a) when there has been a valid indictment,

(b) before a competent court,

(c) after arraignment,

(d) a valid plea having been entered, and

(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

   There are two exceptions to the foregoing  rule,  and  double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was
with the consent of the accused:

1.    If there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him, and
2.    Where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial
PEOPLE vs. CITY COURT OF SILAY
G.R. No. L-43790
December 9, 1976
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.

FACTS:

The record shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y
Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with falsification by private individuals and use of
falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. After the prosecution had presented its
evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the
evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion,
respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as
narrated above do not constitute the crime as charged. In their comment on this Petition, private respondents
claim that there was no error committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency
of evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy.

On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the case was
dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal having been made with their consent, they waived their
defense of double jeopardy, citing various cases in support thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plea of double jeopardy is present in this case.

RULING:

Yes, Double Jeopardy is present in this case.

It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a motion
filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one on the merits of
the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of
double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the
complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being
one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked. It is clear
to us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was erroneous. As correctly stated in
the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas"
with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the
sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company.
The act of making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the
accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish
as part of their duties- Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the
offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter. The affirm the dismissal
of the second Information for reasons of double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court constrained to dismiss the petition of the people.

FACTS:

When Consolacion Naval, the herein private respondent, was separately accused of having committed the crime of
estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and of falsification in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21,
both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal of the Seventh Judicial District stationed at Pasig, Rizal, she sought the
quashal of the latter charge on the supposition that she is in danger of being convicted for the same felony.

Her first attempt in this respect did not spell success but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding Judge of Branch 21
was persuaded to the contrary thereafter on the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of
committing estafa. It is this perception, along with the denial of the motion for re-evaluation therefrom which the
People impugns via the special civil action for certiorari now before Us.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent was in danger for being convicted twice for the same criminal act.

RULING:

The Supreme Courted ruled that, No, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an
appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous
conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused.

Moreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case for estafa.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
People v. Adil
G.R. No. L-41863
April 22, 1977
BARREDO, J

FACTS:

Margarito Fama, Jr. at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at Aquino Nobleza St., Municipality of
January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused, while armed with a piece of stone, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack
and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar
on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would have required and will require medical
attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto
attached. Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28, 1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo an information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., for serious physical injuries.

On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that
since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy, if
Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This motion was opposed by the Fiscal and the Court required both parties
to file their respective memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Is Double Jeopardy present in this case?

HELD:

No. When the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in which the
injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be
suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the
wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. In other words, in the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold.

Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity that would be left by a
wound on the face of a person cannot be pre-determined. On the other hand, whether or not there is actually a
deformity on the face of Viajar is a question of fact that has to be determined by the trial court. In other words, in
the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It
was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No.
5241
People vs. Relova
GR L-45129
March 6, 1987
FELICIANO, J.

FACTS:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8
November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia
on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration . On 1 February 1975,
members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with
a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from
the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by the private
respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to
lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and
cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that
he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric
meter. The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a
motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that
the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the
first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be convicted of the same act charged in
which he has already been acquitted.

HELD:

Yes, Petitioner could be convicted of the same act charged against him, In the case of Yap vs. Lutero, our Bill of
Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The
second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." In the case at bar, it was very
evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy
wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was
acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of
the 1st offense charged against Mr. Opulencia.
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172176
November 17 2010
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in first case and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in second case for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

Petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in second case, including the arraignment on 17
May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing
his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.

HELD:

The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.  

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in second case as proof of
his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing
and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day
period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not
ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing. The two charges against the
petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC, as
amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi offenses. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi offense.
Merencillo vs. People
G.R. No. 142369-70
April 13 2007
CORONA, J.

FACTS:

In the morning of September 13, 1995, Lucit Estillore went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) office in
Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation of taxes due on the sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc.
and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration (CAR). At the BIR office, she was entertained by revenue
examiner Lourdes Fuentes who computed the documentary stamp tax (₱37,500) and capital gains tax (₱125,000)
due on the transaction. The computation was approved by petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor. Estillore
paid the taxes in the bank and returned to apply for a CAR. She submitted the application together with relevant
documents to Fuentes for processing. Fuentes prepared the revenue audit reports and submitted them together
with the application for the CAR to petitioner for preliminary approval. The application was to be forwarded
thereafter to the Revenue District Officer (RDO) for final approval. Fuentes advised Estillore that the CAR would be
released after seven days. At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Cesar received a call from
Estillore. She was told that petitioner wanted to see her "for some negotiation." She proceeded to petitioner’s office
where the latter demanded ₱20,000 in exchange for the approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that she needed to
confer with her two brothers who were her business associates.

Merencillo denied the charges during trial and that the allegations only existed in Cesar’s mind after she was told
that there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be paid.   The RTC found petitioner guilty
as charged and sentenced him to suffer 8 years and 1 month to 15 years of imprisonment. During the trial,
Merencillo’s evidence consisted of nothing more than a general denial of charges against him. The trial court found
him guilty of the charges, which was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan where he appealed the case. In his appeal to
the Court, Merencillo maintained that he was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juanito Merencillo was placed in Double Jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Section
3(B) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

HELD:

Petitioner was not placed in Double Jeopardy.

The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither
material nor relevant to the elements of the offenses for which he was charged. For instance, whether or not it was
petitioner himself who handed the CAR to private respondent was immaterial. The fact was that petitioner
demanded and received money in consideration for the issuance of the CAR. Minor discrepancies or
inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the
witness’s honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions
corroborate and substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus,
inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be
successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal.

 Sec 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement, “In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law…”  One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under
the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with
a felony under the Revised Penal Code.  There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or
successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code. The petition is hereby DENIED.
PS Bank vs. Bermoy
G.R. No. 151912
September 26, 2005
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

That on or about May 11, 1994, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank a banking
institution, duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws, thru falsification of a public document. Upon
arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.

When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Puruganan, who entered her appearance as private prosecutor and
Atty. Albino Achas, defense counsel, appeared and upon their stipulation, they admitted the jurisdiction of the
Court and the identities of the accused. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused. The trial
court dismissed the case.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial court was
correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of
the accused.  But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either
on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Double Jeopardy is attached in this case

RULING:

Yes. For Double Jeopardy to apply. It can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two
separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or
acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case.

In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the
latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule
admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial. In the case
before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Hence,
it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and
this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.

As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present. Thus, the Information for
estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction.  The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. 

Paulin vs. Gimenez

FACTS:

The petition before us arose from a November 10, 1989 incident when the jeep ridden by private respondent and
Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the
spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with dust. Irked by this incident, Mabuyo followed
the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of Rattan Originals in Tanke, Talisay Cebu. Inquiring from a nearby
security guard as to who owns the Nissan Patrol, he was informed that it belonged to and was driven by petitioner
Dr. Ramon Paulin. Mabuyo was investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr.
Ramon Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a companion of the
spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to call the police in Talisay and the rest
to block the exit of the spouses and their lone companion. Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put
their guns down and upon the arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the police station. On the same
date, Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and
Bacho, herein petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204.

The cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu (Branch IX), acting on
a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204. On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a,
"Motion for Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3,
1990.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a
subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal as the same would violate petitioners' right against
double jeopardy.

HELD:

For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the following requisites must have been obtained in the
original prosecution;

a) a valid complaint or information;

For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where
the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his
protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. The
municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on double jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal for
the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely
terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its
evidence. It follows then that the decision of respondent regional trial court sustaining that of the court of origin
cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Rule on Summary Procedure was correctly applied
by the public respondents in this case.
Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 95642
May 28, 1992
PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987 with the Supreme court against then
acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, herein petitioner Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of
authority, manifest partiality and incompetence.

The administrative complaint arose from two (2) orders of detention dated 18 and 27 November 1986 issued by
the said acting judge against complainant (Magbago) for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to
comply with a fifth alias writ of execution.

Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, complainant Magbago also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same letter-
complaint earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Solicitor General's memorandum in the present case states that the office of the Tanodbayan received another
complaint from the same Romana Magbago (complainant in TBP-87-00924) which was docketed this time as TBP-
87-01546. The exact date of filing of the second complaint is not stated but the records of the case were allegedly
among those transmitted to the then newly created office of the Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted
records did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924.

Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the case (TBP-87-01546) appeared
completely unaware of the earlier case, TBP-87-00924, because the following transpired in TB-87-01546.

The petitioner's motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 29 June 1990 resolution, of respondent court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was placed in Double Jeopardy

HELD:

It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present
controversy because the Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in character while
the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature.

When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and
control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies.
Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain
conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same
acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid
arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these elements do not
apply vis-a-vis the administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's contention that said administrative
case against him before the Supreme Court, which was, as aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise the defense
of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan.
Lejano vs. People
G.R. No. 176389
December 14, 2010
ABAD, J.

FACTS:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were
brutally slain at their home in Parañ aque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered
them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose
interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

The Regional Trial Court of Parañ aque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only
seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as
its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of
the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband. But
impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible
witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling
cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and
May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused
Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who
helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed
once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acquittal of the accused can be reconsidered in this case

RULING:

As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The
Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of
which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the
full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the
same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated
litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

Although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under
such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no
grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence. But he has not specified the violations of due
process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. Visconde claim that "the
highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision"cralaw
is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.

Wherefore, the acquits accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately released from detention
unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
Galman vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 72670
September 12, 1986
TEEHANKEE, C.J

FACTS:

Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to undergo successful heart
surgery. He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed
at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as
Rolando Galman, was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President Marcos was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate "the treacherous and vicious
assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983. The fact is that both majority and
minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent
Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that the evidence shows to the contrary that
Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Petitioners filed the present action alleging that respondents
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage
of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order
restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan. New Solicitor submitted submitted that this would require reception of
evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body of commissioners and that if petitioners' claim
were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the
verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double jeopardy claim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

HELD:

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The
courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. There could be no double jeopardy. It is
settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases
is denied due process. More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where
as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from
the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope
with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or
prevent them from testifying.

Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be
appealed or re-opened, without being put in double jeopardy. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at al. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained.
Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
People vs. Balisacan
G.R. No. L-26376
August 31, 1966
BENGZON, J.P., J.

FACTS:

Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. To this charge the
accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. On the basis of the
above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated,
the prosecution appealed therefrom.

This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No appellee's
brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the appeal was certified to Us by the
Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to Double Jeopardy.

A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to
defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law
under the circumstances. In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating
circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the
merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In the case at bar, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the
course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony,
therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision, had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a
quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be
entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court
a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.