FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 185160. July 24, 2013.]

POLYMER RUBBER CORPORATION and JOSEPH ANG,

petitioners, vs. BAYOLO SALAMUDING, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J : p

The instant petition 1(1) assails the Decision 2(2) dated June 30, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98387 directing the recall of the alias writ
of execution and the lifting of the notice of levy on the shares of stocks of petitioner
Joseph Ang (Ang). The Resolution 3(3) dated November 5, 2008 denied the motion
for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Herein respondent Bayolo Salamuding (Salamuding), Mariano Gulanan and

Rodolfo Raif (referred to as the complainants) were employees of petitioner Polymer
Rubber Corporation (Polymer), who were dismissed after allegedly committing
certain irregularities against Polymer.

On July 24, 1990, the three employees filed a complaint against Polymer and
Ang (petitioners) for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime
services, violation of Presidential Decree No. 851, with prayer for reinstatement and
payment of back wages, attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. 4(4)

On November 21, 1990, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads: ESTcIA

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 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complainant
unfair labor practice (sic) but directing the respondent the following:

1. Reinstate complainants to their former position with full

back wages from the time they were illegally dismissed up to
the time of reinstatement.

2. To pay individual complainants their 13th month pay and

for the year 1990 in the following amount:

a. Mariano Gulanan [P]3,194

b. Rodolfo Raif [P]3,439

c. Bayolo Salam[u]ding [P]3,284

3. To pay individual complainants overtime in the amount

of [P]1,335 each.

4. To pay individual complainants overtime in the amount

of [P]6,608.80 each.

5. To pay individual complainants moral and exemplary

damages in the amount of [P]10,000 each.

6. To pay attorney's fee equivalent to ten (10) percent of the

total monetary award of the complainants.

SO ORDERED. 5(5)

A writ of execution was subsequently issued on April 18, 1991 to implement

the aforesaid judgment. 6(6)

The petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC). SIaHTD

On April 7, 1992, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with

modifications. The NLRC deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages,
service incentive pay, and modified the computation of 13th month pay. 7(7) The
corresponding Entry of Judgment was made on September 25, 1992, 8(8) and an alias
writ of execution was issued on October 29, 1992, based on the NLRC decision. 9(9)

The case was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court (SC) on a petition
Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 2
for certiorari. In a Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Court affirmed the
disposition of the NLRC with the further modification that the award of overtime pay
to the complainants was deleted. 10(10)

On September 30, 1993, Polymer ceased its operations. 11(11)

Upon a motion dated November 11, 1994, the LA a quo issued a writ of
execution on November 16, 1994 based on the SC resolution. Since the writ of
execution was returned unsatisfied, another alias writ of execution was issued on June
4, 1997. 12(12)

In the latter part of 2004, Polymer with all its improvements in the premises
was gutted by fire. 13(13)

On December 2, 2004, the complainants filed a Motion for Recomputation and

Issuance of Fifth (5th) Alias Writ of Execution. The Research and Computation Unit
of the NLRC came up with the total amount of P2,962,737.65. Due to the failure of
the petitioners to comment/oppose the amount despite notice, the LA approved said
amount. 14(14)

Thus, on April 26, 2005, the LA issued a 5th Alias Writ of Execution 15(15)
prayed for commanding the sheriff to collect the amount.

In the implementation of this alias writ of execution dated April 26, 2005, the
shares of stocks of Ang at USA Resources Corporation were levied.

On November 10, 2005, the petitioners moved to quash the 5th alias writ of
execution, and to lift the notice of garnishment. 16(16) They alleged that: a) Ang
should not be held jointly and severally liable with Polymer since it was only the
latter which was held liable in the decision of the LA, NLRC and the Supreme Court;
b) the computation of the monetary award in favor of the complainants in the amount
of P2,962,737.65 was misleading, anomalous and highly erroneous; and c) the
decision sought to be enforced by mere motion is already barred by the statute of
limitations. 17(17) TCaAHI

In an Order 18(18) dated December 16, 2005, the LA granted the motion. The
LA ordered the quashal and recall of the writ of execution, as well as the lifting of the
notice of levy on Ang's shares of stocks.

The LA ruled that the Decision dated November 21, 1990 did not contain any
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pronouncement that Ang was also liable. To hold Ang liable at this stage when the
decision had long become final and executory will vary the tenor of the judgment, or
in excess of its terms. As to the extent of the computation of the backwages, the same
must only cover the period during which the company was in actual operation.
Further, the LA found that the complainant's motion to execute the LA's decision was
already barred by the statute of limitations. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, an order is hereby rendered

quashing and recalling the Writ of Execution and lifting the Notice of Levy on
the Shares of Stocks of respondent Joseph Ang. 19(19)

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the LA in a Decision 20(20)

dated September 27, 2006. It, however, made a pronouncement that the complainants
did not sleep on their rights as they continued to file series of motions for the
execution of the monetary award and are, thus, not barred by the statute of limitations.
The appeal on the aspect of the lifting of the notice of levy on the shares of stocks of
Ang was dismissed. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated December 16, 2005 is hereby

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION declaring the rights of the complainants to
execute the Decision dated November 21, 1990 not having barred by the statute
of limitations. The appeal is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. 21(21) HSTAcI

On January 12, 2007, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing decision. 22(22)

Undeterred, Salamuding filed a Petition for Certiorari 23(23) before the CA.

On June 30, 2008, the CA found merit with the petition. 24(24) The CA stated
that there has to be a responsible person or persons working in the interest of Polymer
who may also be considered as the employer, invoking the cases of NYK Int'l.
Knitwear Corp. Phils. v. NLRC 25(25) and A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v.
NLRC. 26(26) Since Ang as the director of Polymer was considered the highest
ranking officer of Polymer, he was therefore properly impleaded and may be held
jointly and severally liable for the obligations of Polymer to its dismissed employees.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The Decision dated

September 27, 2006 and the Resolution dated January 12, 2007 of respondent
NLRC are hereby annulled and set aside insofar as they direct the recall and

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 quashal of the Writ of Execution and lifting of the Notice of Levy on the shares
of stock of respondent Joseph Ang. The Order dated December 16, 2005 of the
Honorable Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes is nullified.

Let the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for
execution of the Decision dated November 21, 1990 as modified by the NLRC
against the respondents Polymer Rubber Corporation and Joseph Ang. 27(27)

Aggrieved by the CA decision, the petitioners filed the instant petition raising
the following questions of law:

a. That upon the finality of the Decision, the same can no longer be
altered or modified[;] ACTIcS

b. That the Officer of the Corporation cannot be personally held

liable and be made to pay the liability of the corporation[;]

c. That the losing party cannot be held liable to pay the salaries and
benefits of the employees beyond the companies [sic] existence;

d. That the separation pay of employees of the company which has

closed its business permanently is only half month salary for every year of
service. 28(28)

There is merit in the petition.

"A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers
and employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the directors' and officers' acts as
corporate agents, are not their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the
corporation they represent. As a rule, they are only solidarily liable with the
corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they acted with
malice or bad faith." 29(29)

To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two

requisites must concur: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the director or
officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or that the officer was
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the officer
acted in bad faith. 30(30)

In the instant case, the CA imputed bad faith on the part of the petitioners
when Polymer ceased its operations the day after the promulgation of the SC
resolution in 1993 which was allegedly meant to evade liability. The CA found it
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necessary to pierce the corporate fiction and pointed at Ang as the responsible person
to pay for Salamuding's money claims. Except for this assertion, there is nothing in
the records that show that Ang was responsible for the acts complained of. At any
rate, we find that it will require a great stretch of imagination to conclude that a
corporation would cease its operations if only to evade the payment of the adjudged
monetary awards in favor of three (3) of its employees. DCSTAH

The dispositive portion of the LA Decision dated November 21, 1990 which
Salamuding attempts to enforce does not mention that Ang is jointly and severally
liable with Polymer. Ang is merely one of the incorporators of Polymer and to single
him out and require him to personally answer for the liabilities of Polymer is without
basis. In the absence of a finding that he acted with malice or bad faith, it was error
for the CA to hold him responsible.

In Aliling v. Feliciano, 31(31) the Court explained to wit:

The CA held the president of WWWEC, Jose B. Feliciano, San Mateo

and Lariosa jointly and severally liable for the monetary awards of Aliling on
the ground that the officers are considered "employers" acting in the interest of
the corporation. The CA cited NYK International Knitwear Corporation
Philippines (NYK) v. National Labor Relations Commission in support of its
argument. Notably, NYK in turn cited A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v.
NLRC.

Such ruling has been reversed by the Court in Alba v. Yupangco, where
the Court ruled:

"By Order of September 5, 2007, the Labor Arbiter denied

respondent's motion to quash the 3rd alias writ. Brushing aside
respondent's contention that his liability is merely joint, the Labor
Arbiter ruled: CaEATI

Such issue regarding the personal liability of the officers

of a corporation for the payment of wages and money claims to
its employees, as in the instant case, has long been resolved by
the Supreme Court in a long list of cases [A.C. Ransom Labor
Union-CLU vs. NLRC (142 SCRA 269) and reiterated in the
cases of Chua vs. NLRC (182 SCRA 353), Gudez vs. NLRC (183
SCRA 644)]. In the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court
has expressly held that the irresponsible officer of the
corporation (e.g., President) is liable for the corporation's
obligations to its workers. Thus, respondent Yupangco, being the

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 president of the respondent YL Land and Ultra Motors Corp., is
properly jointly and severally liable with the defendant
corporations for the labor claims of Complainants Alba and De
Guzman. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As reflected above, the Labor Arbiter held that respondent's

liability is solidary.

There is solidary liability when the obligation expressly so states,

when the law so provides, or when the nature of the obligation so
requires. MAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC, on solidary
liability of corporate officers in labor disputes, enlightens:

. . . A corporation being a juridical entity, may act only

through its directors, officers and employees. Obligations
incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents are not theirs
but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent.
True solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when
exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the
following cases: aHIEcS

1. When directors and trustees or, in

appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation:

(a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts

of the corporation;

(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in

directing the corporate affairs;

xxx xxx xxx

In labor cases, for instance, the Court has held corporate

directors and officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the
termination of employment of employees done with malice or in bad
faith." 32(32) (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)

To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment of the
LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and later by the SC had already long become final and
executory. It has been held that a final and executory judgment can no longer be
altered. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the

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modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. 33(33) "Since the alias writ of
execution did not conform, is different from and thus went beyond or varied the tenor
of the judgment which gave it life, it is a nullity. To maintain otherwise would be to
ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without
due process of law." 34(34) aAHISE

Anent the computation of their liability for the payment of separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement in favor of Salamuding, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
LA that it must be computed only up to the time Polymer ceased operations in
September 1993. The computation must be based on the number of days when
Polymer was in actual operation. 35(35) It cannot be held liable to pay separation pay
beyond such closure of business because even if the illegally dismissed employees
would be reinstated, they could not possibly work beyond the time of the cessation of
its operation. 36(36) In the case of Chronicle Securities Corp. v. NLRC, 37(37) we
ruled that even an employer who is "found guilty of unfair labor practice in
dismissing his employee may not be ordered so to pay backwages beyond the date of
closure of business where such closure was due to legitimate business reasons and not
merely an attempt to defeat the order of reinstatement." 38(38)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30,

2008 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 98387 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated September 27, 2006 is REINSTATED. Let the records of the case
be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for proper computation of the award in accordance
with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-16.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo F.
Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring; id. at 17-31.
3. Id. at 33-34.
4. Id. at 18.
5. Id. at 18-19.

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 6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 19-20.
8. CA rollo, p. 28.
9. Rollo, p. 20.
10. CA rollo, p. 29.
11. Rollo, p. 26.
12. CA rollo, pp. 29-30.
13. Rollo, p. 28.
14. CA rollo, pp. 48-50.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 51-55.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 40-47.
19. Id. at 47.
20. Id. at 26-36.
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 37-39.
23. Id. at 2-24.
24. Rollo, pp. 17-31.
25. 445 Phil. 654 (2003).
26. 226 Phil. 199 (1986).
27. Rollo, pp. 30-31.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Peñaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 177114, April
13, 2010, 618 SCRA 208, 216.
30. Francisco v. Mallen, Jr., G.R. No. 173169, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 118,
123-124.
31. G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186.
32. Id. at 218-219.
33. Manning International Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83018, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA
155, 161.
34. Alba v. Yupangco, G.R. No. 188233, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 503, 509, citing B.E.
San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul, G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 402, 433 and
Cabang v. Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172.
35. Durabuilt Recapping Plant & Co. v. NLRC, 236 Phil. 351, 358 (1987).
36. J.A.T. General Services v. NLRC, 465 Phil. 785, 798-799 (2004).
37. 486 Phil. 560 (2004).
38. Id. at 572, citing Pizza Inn/Consolidated Foods Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.
L-74531, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773, 778.

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 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 157907. November 25, 2004.]

CHRONICLE SECURITIES CORPORATION and ROBERTO

COYIUTO, JR., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER ARIEL C. SANTOS and
NEAL H. CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision 1(39) of the Court of Appeals dated November 13, 2002 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 67933, entitled, "Chronicle Securities Corporation, et al. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al.," which denied the Petition for Certiorari 2(40)
and affirmed the February 28, 2001 Order 3(41) of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

The factual antecedents of the present petition are as follows:

Sometime in September 1993, petitioners hired private respondent Neal H.

Cruz, who was then the executive editor of the Today newspaper, as the publicist and
the editor in chief of its national daily broadsheet, the Manila Chronicle. As
compensation for his services, private respondent received a monthly compensation
of P60,000.00 plus a brand new car. 4(42)

Thereafter, private respondent quit his job with Today to assume the duties and
responsibilities as the editor in chief of the Manila Chronicle. Private respondent went
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about the task of improving the over-all image of the Manila Chronicle. He made full
use of its color capabilities and introduced new columns and sections. In time, these
initiatives helped improve the financial condition of the Manila Chronicle, boosting
circulation and increasing advertising revenue. 5(43)

However, due to private respondent's role in the publication of a controversial

article that was carried by the newspaper sometime in July 1994, petitioners
terminated his services. Consequently, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against herein petitioners. 6(44)

On January 2, 1997, Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos rendered a decision 7(45)

holding that private respondent Neal Cruz was illegally dismissed. The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CHRONICLE

SECURITIES CORPORATION, ROBERTO COJIUTO (sic) JR., AND
ONOFRE CORPUZ are hereby held guilty of ILLEGAL DISMISSAL and
directed to reinstate complainant to his former position as Editor-in-Chief of
Manila Chronicle immediately even pending appeal without loss of seniority
rights and other benefits accruing during the pendency of this case. If
reinstatement is no longer feasible, then, separation pay of one month for every
year of service in addition to full backwages is hereby decreed.

In addition to the above, respondents must comply with the following:

1. Considering that respondents did not interpose any

objection to the pleading of complainant that ownership of the vehicle
assigned to him as part of the compensation package when he was lured
by respondents to join the Manila Chronicle, the same is hereby awarded
to him.

2. To pay complainant moral damages in the sum of TEN

MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS considering the mental anguish,
social shock and besmirched reputation not to mention his near brush
with death due to shame and humiliation.

3. As a correction and example for the public good in order to

prevent the repetition of the same to employees equally situated like
complainant, FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) PESOS is hereby
awarded as exemplary damages. ISHaCD

4. Ten percent of all sums owing to complainant is awarded

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 as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners appealed the decision with the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the labor arbiter's decision with modification
by reducing the moral damages to P500,000.00 and exemplary damages to
P200,000.00.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on September 15,

1998. 8(46) Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. However, the petition was subsequently dismissed on May 4, 1999.
9(47)

Upon the finality of the Court of Appeals' decision, private respondent Neal
Cruz filed a Motion for Immediate Execution 10(48) of the NLRC's Decision. On
October 16, 1999, Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos issued the Writ of Execution. 11(49)
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash 12(50) the writ of execution, which was denied on
August 29, 2000. 13(51)

Petitioners received copy of the Order denying their motion to quash on

October 10, 2000. Hence, they had until October 20, 2000 to file their appeal.
However, on October 20, 2000, Friday, at 3:30 p.m., the NLRC suspended work due
to a Luzon wide power blackout.

The following Monday, October 23, 2000, petitioners filed a Manifestation

with Urgent Motion to Admit 14(52) with the NLRC. Attached to this motion are the
petitioners' Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal. On February 28, 2001, the
NLRC denied petitioners' appeal for being filed out of time. 15(53) Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied on August 20, 2001. 16(54)

A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals.
17(55) Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, the petition was
dismissed on November 13, 2002. 18(56) Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
19(57) was likewise denied. 20(58)

Hence, this petition for review, assailing the November 13, 2002 Decision and
the March 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the following alleged
errors:

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 12
 1. That the delay in the filing of petitioners' Appeal with the NLRC
was justifiable and purely due to extraordinary circumstances, without fault on
the part of petitioners and;

2. That the enforcement of the assailed resolutions of the Court of

Appeals, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter would result in the award of a grossly
excessive and unconscionable amount to the respondent since the backwages
due him were erroneously computed.

Petitioners claim that they were prepared to file their appeal within the
prescribed period, were it not for circumstances beyond their control. On October 20,
2000, Friday, Romeo A. Blanca, messenger of petitioners' counsel, left the office at
2:00 p.m. to file the appeal with the NLRC. His itinerary for that afternoon included a
trip to the post office to mail a copy of the appeal to the private respondent, then to
the NLRC's office in Bookman Building in Quezon Avenue, Quezon City for the
filing of the appeal. Purportedly, at around 2:30 p.m. of that day, Mr. Blanca arrived
at the Makati City Post Office and was able to send a copy of the Notice of Appeal
with Memorandum of Appeal to adverse counsel by registered mail under Registry
Receipt No. 16488. 21(59) However, when he arrived at the NLRC at around 3:30
p.m., he was informed by the security guard that, owing to a Luzon-wide power
failure, the NLRC has suspended its operations as early as 12:00 p.m. of that day.
Thus, there was no one at the Docket Section to receive the Notice of Appeal and
Memorandum. Mr. Blanca then attempted to file the appeal by registered mail, but
post offices were ordered by the Postmaster General to cease operations at 3:30 p.m.
that day. 22(60) Thus, petitioners were able to file their appeal only the following
Monday, October 23, 2000, which resulted in the dismissal thereof.

Petitioners argue that the peculiar facts surrounding their failure to file their
appeal on time warrant a review of the dismissal of their appeal by the NLRC.

We agree.

The right to appeal is a purely statutory right. Not being a natural right or a
part of due process, the right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the rules provided therefor. Failure to bring an appeal within the
period prescribed by the rules renders the judgment appealed from final and
executory. 23(61) However, it is always within the power of this Court to suspend its
own rules, or to except a particular case from its operations, whenever the purposes of
justice require it. 24(62)

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 In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the
merits. This is in line with the time honored principle that cases should be decided
only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.
Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions.
In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to
promote the administration of justice. 25(63)

In Philippine National Bank, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 26(64) we allowed, in

the higher interest of justice, an appeal filed three days late. AaIDCS

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 27(65) we ordered the Court of Appeals to

entertain an appeal filed six days after the expiration of the reglementary period;
while in Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 28(66) we accepted an appeal filed thirteen
days late. Likewise, in Olacao v. NLRC, 29(67) we affirmed the respondent
Commission's order giving due course to a tardy appeal "to forestall the grant of
separation pay twice" since the issue of separation pay had been judicially settled with
finality in another case. All of the aforequoted rulings were reiterated in our 2001
decision in the case of Equitable PCI Bank v. Ku. 30(68)

Moreover, the facts herein are akin to the case of Surigao del Norte Electric
Cooperative v. NLRC, 31(69) where we upheld the NLRC's order taking cognizance
of an appeal filed one day late since the delay in filing was caused by the onslaught of
typhoon Besing, resulting in the closure of the Surigao Post Office on the last day for
the appellant to file her appeal.

Verily, the respondent NLRC's dismissal of the petitioners' appeal in this case
failed to consider the valid reasons for not being able to timely file the same.

Anent the second issue raised by the petitioners, i.e., the matter of the proper
computation of the backwages due the private respondent, we resolve the same in
favor of the petitioners. We have gone through the portions of the records pertinent to
the resolution of this issue and we find that the Court of Appeals and the NLRC
committed reversible error in laying down the basis for the computation of private
respondent's backwages.

There is no question that petitioners illegally dismissed private respondent

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 14
Neal Cruz. Even petitioners themselves are no longer questioning the findings of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on this aspect. Petitioners main concern in this petition
is the proper computation of backwages to be awarded to the private respondent who
is rightfully entitled to the payment of backwages, the only question that remains is
how much?

Backwages, in general, are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a

worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal. 32(70) It represents
compensation that should be earned but was not collected because an employer has
unjustly dismissed an employee. 33(71) Thus, the payment of backwages is a form of
relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal. 34(72)

Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that:

An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to

reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up
to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Republic Act No. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are
entitled to full backwages, among others, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. If
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of
their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. 35(73)

In the instant case, petitioners are questioning the basis of the Labor Arbiter's
computation of private respondent's backwages as reflected in the August 29, 2000
Order. 36(74) In the said order, the Labor Arbiter computed the total award to the
respondent as follows:

1. BACKWAGES:
Basic Wage:
9/15/94–9/15/2000
P60,000.00 x 72 mos. = P4,320,000.00
13th Month Pay
1/12 of 4,320,000.00 360,000.00
2. SEPARATION PAY:
(Reinstatement no longer feasible)
Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 15
 10/1/93–9/15/2000 = 6 yrs. & 11 mos.
P60,000.00 x 7 yrs. = P420,000.00
––––––––––––
TOTAL = P5,100,000.00
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES

10% of P5,100,000.00 = P510,000.00

4. MORAL DAMAGES = 500,000.00

5. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES = 200,000.00

––––––––––––

TOTAL AWARD P6,310,000.00

––––––––––––

Petitioners contend that contrary to established jurisprudence, the Labor

Arbiter's computation of the amount due to the private respondent was principally
based on the mistaken premise that complainant was entitled to backwages even
beyond the closure and cessation of petitioners' newspaper business on January 19,
1998. 37(75) Petitioners argue that this should not be the case because the amount of
backwages should only be computed from the date of illegal dismissal up to the time
when reinstatement was still possible. Reinstatement could not have been possible
beyond the date of the closure of the Manila Chronicle on January 19, 1998.
Therefore, backwages should only be computed from September 15, 1994, the
effectivity of private respondents termination by the petitioners until the date when
the Manila Chronicle ceased publication. SHAcID

Petitioners further contend that they only had one newspaper business and,
with the closure of the same, the reinstatement of private respondent Neal Cruz to his
former position as Editor-In-Chief became a physical and legal impossibility. Private
respondent could not claim that he should have been appointed to another position
with the petitioners because he was hired solely for his editorial skills. There is
simply no equivalent or substantially equivalent position to which private respondent
could be assigned in petitioners' organization. 38(76)

This is not the first time that we resolved an issue of this nature. In the case of
Pizza Inn/Consolidated Foods Corporation v. NLRC, 39(77) we ruled that:

An employer found guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing his

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 16
 employee may not be ordered so to pay backwages beyond the date of closure
of business where such closure was due to legitimate business reasons and not
merely an attempt to defeat the order of reinstatement. 40(78)

In the case at bar, the Manila Chronicle ceased publication on January 19,
1998. The cessation of publication was a permanent one and it was precipitated by the
paper's dire financial condition which was aggravated by a crippling strike causing it
to finally shut down. Petitioners' closure of their newspaper business was made on
legal and valid grounds. It was never resorted to as a means to deprive the private
respondent of the opportunity to be reinstated to his former position. To allow the
computation of the backwages due the private respondent to be based on a period
beyond January 19, 1998 would be an injustice to the petitioners.

Our power to exact retribution from erring employers for cases of illegal
dismissal should not go beyond what is recognized as just and fair under the
circumstances. While we are inclined more often than not toward the worker and
uphold his cause in his conflicts with his employer, such favoritism has not blinded us
to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of
the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. 41(79)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 13, 2002 Decision

of the Court of Appeals as well as its March 17, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
67933 are SET ASIDE. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to petitioners' appeal for a determination
of the amount of backwages to be paid to private respondent with further instructions
to receive or require such further evidence as may be necessary. Pending the final
determination of the correct amount of backwages due the private respondent, the
NLRC is ENJOINED from conducting any enforcement or execution proceedings
with respect to NLRC NCR Case No. 10-07187-94.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., is on official leave.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Versola and concurred in by Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 17
 and Amelita G. Tolentino of the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals.
Rollo, pp. 85–91.
2. Rollo, pp. 131–163.
3. Id., pp. 246–247.
4. Id., p. 173.
5. Id., p. 174.
6. Docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-10-07187-94.
7. Rollo, pp. 171–192.
8. Id., pp. 211–212.
9. Id., pp. 240–241; composed of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a
member of this Court) and Associate Justices Bernado P. Abesamis and Jainal D.
Rasul.
10. Id., pp. 243–244.
11. Id., pp. 249–253.
12. Id., pp. 256–258.
13. Id., pp. 259–263.
14. Id., pp. 277–281.
15. Id., pp. 165–167.
16. Id., pp. 169–170.
17. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67933; Rollo, pp. 131–163.
18. Decision penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, Chairman of the Third Division and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino; Rollo,
pp. 19–25.
19. Rollo, pp. 29–41.
20. Id., p. 52.
21. Id., p. 94.
22. Affidavit of Mr. Romeo Blanca, Rollo, pp. 120–124. Refer also to the Certification of
the Postmaster of the Makati Central Post Office that work at all government post
offices were suspended due to the Luzon wide power blackout. Rollo, p. 124.
23. Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140473, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 377.
24. Equitable PCI Bank v. Rosita Ku, G.R. No. 142950, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 309.
25. El Reyno Homes, Inc. v. Ernesto Ong, G.R. No. 142440, 17 February 2003, 397
SCRA 563.
26. G.R. No. 108870, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 304.
27. G.R. Nos. L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 453.
28. G.R. No. L-44050, 16 July 1985, 137 SCRA 570.
29. G.R. No. 81390, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 38.
30. Supra, pp. 316–317.
31. 368 Phil. 537 (1999).
32. Torillo v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 77205, 27 May 1991, 197 SCRA 471.
33. Lim v. NLRC, G.R. No. 79907, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 328.
34. Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76721, 21 September 1987, 154 SCRA 166.

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 18
35. Buenviaje v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147806, 12 November 2002, 391 SCRA
440.
36. Rollo, p. 262.
37. Id., p. 36.
38. Id., p. 37.
39. G.R. No. L-74531, 28 June 1988, 162 SCRA 773.
40. Citing Columbian Rope Co. of the Philippines v. Tacloban Association of Laborers
and Employees, G.R. No. L-14848, 31 October 1962, 6 SCRA 425. See also Durable
Shoe Factory v. CIR, G.R. No. L-77831, 31 May 1956.
41. Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corporation, G.R. No. 48926, 14 December 1987,
156 SCRA 392.

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 Endnotes

1 (Popup - Popup)
1. Rollo, pp. 3-16.

2 (Popup - Popup)
2. Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo F.
Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring; id. at 17-31.

3 (Popup - Popup)
3. Id. at 33-34.

4 (Popup - Popup)
4. Id. at 18.

5 (Popup - Popup)
5. Id. at 18-19.

6 (Popup - Popup)
6. Id. at 19.

7 (Popup - Popup)
7. Id. at 19-20.

8 (Popup - Popup)
8. CA rollo, p. 28.

9 (Popup - Popup)

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 20
 9. Rollo, p. 20.

10 (Popup - Popup)
10. CA rollo, p. 29.

11 (Popup - Popup)
11. Rollo, p. 26.

12 (Popup - Popup)
12. CA rollo, pp. 29-30.

13 (Popup - Popup)
13. Rollo, p. 28.

14 (Popup - Popup)
14. CA rollo, pp. 48-50.

15 (Popup - Popup)
15. Id.

16 (Popup - Popup)
16. Id. at 51-55.

17 (Popup - Popup)
17. Id.

18 (Popup - Popup)

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 21
18. Id. at 40-47.

19 (Popup - Popup)
19. Id. at 47.

20 (Popup - Popup)
20. Id. at 26-36.

21 (Popup - Popup)
21. Id. at 35.

22 (Popup - Popup)
22. Id. at 37-39.

23 (Popup - Popup)
23. Id. at 2-24.

24 (Popup - Popup)
24. Rollo, pp. 17-31.

25 (Popup - Popup)
25. 445 Phil. 654 (2003).

26 (Popup - Popup)
26. 226 Phil. 199 (1986).

27 (Popup - Popup)

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 22
27. Rollo, pp. 30-31.

28 (Popup - Popup)
28. Id. at 10.

29 (Popup - Popup)
29. Peñaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 177114, April
13, 2010, 618 SCRA 208, 216.

30 (Popup - Popup)
30. Francisco v. Mallen, Jr., G.R. No. 173169, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 118,
123-124.

31 (Popup - Popup)
31. G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186.

32 (Popup - Popup)
32. Id. at 218-219.

33 (Popup - Popup)
33. Manning International Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83018, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA
155, 161.

34 (Popup - Popup)
34. Alba v. Yupangco, G.R. No. 188233, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 503, 509, citing B.E.
San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul, G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 402, 433 and
Cabang v. Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172.

35 (Popup - Popup)

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35. Durabuilt Recapping Plant & Co. v. NLRC, 236 Phil. 351, 358 (1987).

36 (Popup - Popup)
36. J.A.T. General Services v. NLRC, 465 Phil. 785, 798-799 (2004).

37 (Popup - Popup)
37. 486 Phil. 560 (2004).

38 (Popup - Popup)
38. Id. at 572, citing Pizza Inn/Consolidated Foods Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.
L-74531, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773, 778.

39 (Popup - Popup)
1. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Versola and concurred in by Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
and Amelita G. Tolentino of the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals.
Rollo, pp. 85–91.

40 (Popup - Popup)
2. Rollo, pp. 131–163.

41 (Popup - Popup)
3. Id., pp. 246–247.

42 (Popup - Popup)
4. Id., p. 173.

43 (Popup - Popup)
5. Id., p. 174.

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 44 (Popup - Popup)
6. Docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-10-07187-94.

45 (Popup - Popup)
7. Rollo, pp. 171–192.

46 (Popup - Popup)
8. Id., pp. 211–212.

47 (Popup - Popup)
9. Id., pp. 240–241; composed of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (now a
member of this Court) and Associate Justices Bernado P. Abesamis and Jainal D.
Rasul.

48 (Popup - Popup)
10. Id., pp. 243–244.

49 (Popup - Popup)
11. Id., pp. 249–253.

50 (Popup - Popup)
12. Id., pp. 256–258.

51 (Popup - Popup)
13. Id., pp. 259–263.

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 52 (Popup - Popup)
14. Id., pp. 277–281.

53 (Popup - Popup)
15. Id., pp. 165–167.

54 (Popup - Popup)
16. Id., pp. 169–170.

55 (Popup - Popup)
17. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67933; Rollo, pp. 131–163.

56 (Popup - Popup)
18. Decision penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, Chairman of the Third Division and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino; Rollo,
pp. 19–25.

57 (Popup - Popup)
19. Rollo, pp. 29–41.

58 (Popup - Popup)
20. Id., p. 52.

59 (Popup - Popup)
21. Id., p. 94.

60 (Popup - Popup)
22. Affidavit of Mr. Romeo Blanca, Rollo, pp. 120–124. Refer also to the Certification of
Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 26
 the Postmaster of the Makati Central Post Office that work at all government post
offices were suspended due to the Luzon wide power blackout. Rollo, p. 124.

61 (Popup - Popup)
23. Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140473, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 377.

62 (Popup - Popup)
24. Equitable PCI Bank v. Rosita Ku, G.R. No. 142950, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 309.

63 (Popup - Popup)
25. El Reyno Homes, Inc. v. Ernesto Ong, G.R. No. 142440, 17 February 2003, 397
SCRA 563.

64 (Popup - Popup)
26. G.R. No. 108870, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 304.

65 (Popup - Popup)
27. G.R. Nos. L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 453.

66 (Popup - Popup)
28. G.R. No. L-44050, 16 July 1985, 137 SCRA 570.

67 (Popup - Popup)
29. G.R. No. 81390, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 38.

68 (Popup - Popup)
30. Supra, pp. 316–317.

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 27
 69 (Popup - Popup)
31. 368 Phil. 537 (1999).

70 (Popup - Popup)
32. Torillo v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 77205, 27 May 1991, 197 SCRA 471.

71 (Popup - Popup)
33. Lim v. NLRC, G.R. No. 79907, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 328.

72 (Popup - Popup)
34. Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76721, 21 September 1987, 154 SCRA 166.

73 (Popup - Popup)
35. Buenviaje v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147806, 12 November 2002, 391 SCRA
440.

74 (Popup - Popup)
36. Rollo, p. 262.

75 (Popup - Popup)
37. Id., p. 36.

76 (Popup - Popup)
38. Id., p. 37.

77 (Popup - Popup)
39. G.R. No. L-74531, 28 June 1988, 162 SCRA 773.

Copyright 1994-2015 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Labor and Social Legislation 2014 28
 78 (Popup - Popup)
40. Citing Columbian Rope Co. of the Philippines v. Tacloban Association of Laborers
and Employees, G.R. No. L-14848, 31 October 1962, 6 SCRA 425. See also Durable
Shoe Factory v. CIR, G.R. No. L-77831, 31 May 1956.

79 (Popup - Popup)
41. Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corporation, G.R. No. 48926, 14 December 1987,
156 SCRA 392.

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