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THIRD DIVISION

GEORGE A. ARRIOLA, G.R. No. 175689

Petitioner,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., J, Chairperson,

PERALTA,
. *
-versus- VILLARAMA, JR.,
MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ

PILIPINO STAR .NGAYON, INC. Promulgated:

and/or MIGUEL G. BELMONTE,

x-------------------~~~~~~~~~~~~------------~~~-----x
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four

years from the time the cause of action accrued. This four-year prescriptive
period, not the three-year period for filing money claims under Article 291
of the Labor Code, applies to claims for backwages and damages due to
illegal dismissal.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals'

decision 1 and resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91256, affirming the decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission. The Commission affirmed the

Villarama, ·Jr., J., designated as Acting Member per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014 in
.£
view of the vacancy in the Third Division.
Rollo, pp. 50-57. This decision is dated August 9, 2006. Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a
Justice of this court) penned the decision, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Enrico A.
Lanzanas concurring.
Id. at 58-59.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 175689

Labor Arbiter’s findings that there was no illegal dismissal in this case and
that petitioner George A. Arriola abandoned his employment with
respondent Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.

In July 1986, Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. employed George A. Arriola

as correspondent assigned in Olongapo City and Zambales. Arriola had held
various positions in Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. before becoming a section
editor and writer of its newspaper. He wrote “Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs”
until his column was removed from publication on November 15, 1999.
Since then, Arriola never returned for work.3

On November 15, 2002, Arriola filed a complaint4 for illegal

dismissal, non-payment of salaries/wages, moral and exemplary damages,
actual damages, attorney's fees, and full backwages with the National Labor
Relations Commission. In his position paper,5 Arriola alleged that Pilipino
Star Ngayon, Inc. “arbitrarily dismissed”6 him on November 15, 1999.
Arguing that he was a regular employee, Arriola contended that his rights to
security of tenure and due process were violated when Pilipino Star Ngayon,
Inc. illegally dismissed him.7

Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. and Miguel G. Belmonte denied Arriola’s

allegations. In their position paper,8 they alleged that around the third week
of November 1999, Arriola suddenly absented himself from work and never
returned despite Belmonte’s phone calls and beeper messages. After a few
months, they learned that Arriola transferred to a rival newspaper publisher,
Imbestigador, to write “Boses ng Pamilyang OFWs.”9

In his reply,10 Arriola denied that he abandoned his employment. He

maintained that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. ordered him to stop reporting for
work and to claim his separation pay. To prove his allegation, Arriola
presented a statement of account11 allegedly faxed to him by Pilipino Star
Ngayon, Inc.’s accounting head. This statement of account showed a
computation of his separation pay as of November 30, 1999.

Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco decided the case. At the outset,

she ruled that laches had set in, emphasizing that Arriola took three years
and one day to file his complaint. According to the Labor Arbiter, this was

3
Id. at 7–8.
4
Id. at 60–61.
5
Id. at 62–72.
6
Id. at 64.
7
Id. at 65–67.
8
Id. at 85–91.
9
Id. at 87 and 63.
10
Id. at 141–155.
11
Id. at 136.

.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 175689

“contrary to the immediate and natural reaction of an aggrieved person.”12 If

Arriola were indeed aggrieved, he would not have waited three years and
one day to sue Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.13

The Labor Arbiter found that Arriola abandoned his employment with
Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. to write for a rival newspaper publisher.14 She
also noted Arriola’s admission that he did not contemplate the filing of an
illegal dismissal complaint but nevertheless filed one upon his lawyer’s
advice.15

On Arriola’s money claims, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they have
already prescribed.16 She cited Article 291 of the Labor Code, which
requires that all money claims arising from employer-employee relations be
filed three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Since Arriola
filed his complaint on November 15, 2002, which was three years and one
day from his alleged illegal dismissal on November 15, 1999,17 the Labor
Arbiter ruled that his money claims were already barred.

Thus, in the decision18 dated July 16, 2003, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed Arriola's complaint for lack of merit.

On Arriola’s appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission

sustained the Labor Arbiter’s findings and affirmed in toto the decision dated
July 16, 2003.19 The Commission likewise denied Arriola’s motion for
reconsideration20 for lack of merit.21

Arriola filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.22

The Court of Appeals noted that the petition for certiorari questioned
whether Arriola was illegally dismissed. According to the appellate court,
Arriola raised a factual issue “beyond the province of certiorari to resolve.”23
It added that the Labor Arbiter’s factual findings, if affirmed by the National
Labor Relations Commission, bound the appellate court.24

12
Id. at 97.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 98.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 98–99.
17
The year 2000 was a leap year.
18
Rollo, pp. 95–99.
19
Id. at 100–104.
20
Id. at 105–118.
21
Id. at 119–120.
22
Id. at 50.
23
Id. at 53.
24
Id.

.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 175689

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals resolved the factual issue “in the
interest of substantial justice.”25

The Court of Appeals ruled that Arriola was not illegally dismissed.
Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. had the management prerogative to determine
which columns to maintain in its newspaper. Its removal of “Tinig ng
Pamilyang OFWs” from publication did not mean that it illegally dismissed
Arriola. His employment, according to the appellate court, did not depend
on the existence of the column.26

The appellate court enumerated the following factual findings belying

Arriola’s claim of illegal dismissal:

a) In his complaint, Arriola alleged that he did not receive his

salary for the period covering November 1, 1999 to November
30, 1999. This implied that he had worked for the whole month
of November 1999. However, this was contrary to his claim
that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. dismissed him on November 15,
1999.

b) Sometime in 1999, an Aurea Reyes charged Arriola with libel.

Pilipino Star Ngayon Inc.’s counsel represented Arriola in that
case and filed a counter-affidavit on November 24, 1999, nine
days after Arriola’s alleged illegal dismissal.

c) Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. never sent Arriola any notice of

dismissal or termination.27

Similar to the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was Arriola who
abandoned his employment.28 The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that his
money claims have all prescribed based on Article 291 of the Labor Code.29

Thus, in the decision30 dated August 9, 2006, the Court of Appeals

found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor
Relations Commission and dismissed Arriola's petition for certiorari.

Arriola moved for reconsideration,31 but the Court of Appeals denied

25
Id.
26
Id. at 54.
27
Id. at 54–55.
28
Id. at 55.
29
Id. at 55–56.
30
Id. at 50–57.
31
Id. at 58.

.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 175689

the motion in its resolution32 dated November 24, 2006.

In his petition for review on certiorari,33 Arriola maintains that he did

not abandon his employment. He insists that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.
illegally dismissed him when it removed his column, “Tinig ng Pamilyang
OFWs,” from publication.34

On the finding that he abandoned his work in Pilipino Star Ngayon,

Inc. to write “Boses ng Pamilyang OFWs” in Imbestigador, Arriola presents
a certification35 from Imbestigador’s Managing Editor, Almar B. Danguilan,
stating that Arriola started writing for Imbestigador only on February 17,
2003. This was after he had filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on
November 15, 2002.

As to the finding that his money claims have prescribed, Arriola

argues that the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor
Code should be counted from December 1, 1999, not November 15, 1999.
According to Arriola, Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. computed his separation
pay up to November 30, 1999, as evidenced by the faxed statement of
account. Consequently, he was deprived of his salary as a regular employee
beginning December 1, 1999. His cause of action for payment of backwages
and damages accrued only on December 1, 1999.36

Arriola argues that assuming that his cause of action accrued on

November 15, 1999, he pleads that his one-day-late filing of the complaint
be excused.

This court ordered Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. and Belmonte to

comment on Arriola’s petition for review on certiorari.37

In their comment,38 respondents argue that this court should not

entertain Arriola’s petition for review on certiorari. Arriola raised questions
of fact not allowed in a Rule 45 petition. They highlight that the Labor
Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals
all found that Arriola was not illegally dismissed and that he abandoned his
employment. These factual findings, respondents argue, bind this court.39

Respondents maintain that Arriola was not illegally dismissed. On the

32
Id. at 58–59.
33
Id. at 3–49.
34
Id. at 15–22.
35
Id. at 140.
36
Id. at 25–29.
37
Id. at 58, resolution dated January 29, 2007.
38
Id. at 59–70.
39
Id. at 59–60.

.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 175689

contrary, it was Arriola who abandoned his employment in Pilipino Star

Ngayon, Inc. According to respondents, they “must not be faulted if they
presumed that [Arriola] was no longer interested in [writing for Pilipino Star
Ngayon, Inc.]”40 considering that he did not report for work for more than
three years.

On Arriola’s money claims, respondents argue that these have all

prescribed. According to respondents, Arriola’s one-day late filing of the
complaint cannot be excused because prescription is a matter of substantive
law, not technicality.41

Arriola replied to respondents’ comment, reiterating his arguments in

his petition for review on certiorari.42

The issues for our resolution are the following:

I. Whether Arriola’s money claims have prescribed

II. Whether Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. illegally dismissed Arriola

The petition lacks merit.

Arriola’s claims for backwages and

damages have not yet prescribed when he
filed his complaint with the National
Labor Relations Commission

The Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the
Court of Appeals all ruled that Arriola’s claims for unpaid salaries,
backwages, damages, and attorney’s fees have prescribed. They cited
Article 291 of the Labor Code, which requires that money claims arising
from employer-employee relations be filed within three years from the time
the cause of action accrued:

Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from

employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause
of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

40
Id. at 63.
41
Id. at 64–66.
42
Id. at 75–105.

.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 175689

Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay,43 holiday pay,44 service
incentive leave pay,45 bonuses,46 salary differentials,47 and illegal deductions
by an employer.48 It also covers money claims arising from seafarer
contracts.49

The provision, however, does not cover “money claims” consequent to

an illegal dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover claims for
damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed by Article 1146
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four

years:

(1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff[.]

In Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.,50 Virgilio Callanta worked

as a salesperson for Carnation Philippines, Inc. beginning in January 1974.
On June 1, 1979, Carnation filed with the Regional Office No. X of the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment an application for issuance of clearance
to terminate Callanta. The application was granted, and Callanta’s
employment was declared terminated effective June 1, 1979.51

On July 5, 1982, Callanta filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with

claims for backwages and damages. In its defense, Carnation argued that
Callanta’s complaint was barred by prescription.52

Carnation stressed that Callanta filed his complaint three years, one
month, and five days after his termination. Since illegal dismissal is a
violation of the Labor Code, Carnation argued that Callanta’s complaint was
barred by Article 290 of the Labor Code. 53 Under Article 290, offenses
penalized under the Code shall prescribe in three years.54

43
Texon Manufacturing v. Millena, 471 Phil. 318 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
44
Id.
45
Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, 497 Phil. 863 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second
Division].
46
Republic Planters Bank v. NLRC, 334 Phil. 124 (1997) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
47
University of Pangasinan v. Hon. Confesor, 344 Phil. 134 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
48
Anabe v. Asian Construction (Asiakonstrukt), G.R. No. 183233, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 213
[Per J. Carpio Morales, First Division].
49
Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr., G.R. No. 167678, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 361 [Per J. Del
Castillo, First Division].
50
Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 229 Phil. 279 (1986) [Per J. Fernan, Second Division].
51
Id. at 283.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 283 and 285.
54
LABOR CODE, art. 290 provides:
Art. 290. OFFENSES. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.

.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 175689

As to Callanta’s claims for backwages and damages, Carnation

contended that these claims arose from employer-employee relations. Since
Callanta filed his complaint beyond the three-year period under Article 291
of the Labor Code, his claims for backwages and damages were forever
barred.55

This court ruled that Callanta’s complaint for illegal dismissal had not
yet prescribed. Although illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code, it
is not the “offense” contemplated in Article 290.56 Article 290 refers to
illegal acts penalized under the Labor Code, including committing any of the
prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts, unfair labor practices, and
illegal recruitment activities.57 The three-year prescriptive period under
Article 290, therefore, does not apply to complaints for illegal dismissal.

Instead, “by way of supplement,”58 Article 1146 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines governs complaints for illegal dismissal. Under Article 1146,
an action based upon an injury to the rights of a plaintiff must be filed within
four years. This court explained:

. . . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or

means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's
dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated
“upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,” as contemplated under Art.
1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4]
years.59

This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not

the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. A
claim for backwages, according to this court, may be a money claim “by
reason of its practical effect.”60 Legally, however, an award of backwages
“is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the
labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the
unlawful act committed by the employer.”61 Though it results “in the
enrichment of the individual [illegally dismissed], the award of backwages is
not in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command
upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor
Code.”62

Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions

“upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.” Article 1146 of the Civil Code
55
Rollo, p. 285.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 286.
58
Id. at 288.
59
Id. at 289.
60
Id. at 287.
61
Id.
62
Id.

.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 175689

of the Philippines, therefore, governs these actions.63

Callanta filed his complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for
backwages and damages three years, one month, and five days from his
termination. Thus, this court ruled that Callanta filed his claims for
backwages and damages well within the four-year prescriptive period.64

This court applied the Callanta ruling in Texon Manufacturing v.

Millena.65 In Texon, Marilyn and Grace Millena commenced work for
Texon Manufacturing in 1990 until Texon terminated their employment.
Texon first dismissed Grace on May 31, 1994 then dismissed Marilyn on
September 8, 1995.66

On August 21, 1995, Grace filed a complaint for money claims

representing underpayment and non-payment of wages, overtime pay, and
holiday pay with the National Labor Relations Commission. Marilyn filed
her own complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of full
backwages and benefits on September 11, 1995.67

Texon filed a motion to dismiss both complaints on the ground of

prescription.68 It argued that Grace and Marilyn’s causes of action accrued
from the time they began working in Texon. Their complaints, therefore,
were filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the
Labor Code.69

This court ruled that both complaints had not yet prescribed. With
respect to Grace’s complaint for overtime pay and holiday pay, this court
ruled that the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor
Code applied. Since Grace filed her claim one year, one month, and 21 days
from her dismissal, her claims were filed within the three-year prescriptive
period.70

With respect to Marilyn’s complaint for illegal dismissal with claims

for backwages, this court while citing Callanta as legal basis ruled that the
four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines applied. Since Marilyn filed her complaint three days from her
dismissal, she filed her complaint well within the four-year prescriptive
period.71
63
Id. at 287–288.
64
Id. at 289.
65
471 Phil. 318 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
66
Id. at 321.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 322.
69
Id. at 323.
70
Id. at 324.
71
Id. at 325.

.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 175689

Applying these principles in this case, we agree that Arriola’s claims

for unpaid salaries have prescribed. Arriola filed his complaint three years
and one day from the time he was allegedly dismissed and deprived of his
salaries. Since a claim for unpaid salaries arises from employer-employee
relations, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies.72 Arriola’s claim for unpaid
salaries was filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period.

However, we find that Arriola’s claims for backwages, damages, and

attorney’s fees arising from his claim of illegal dismissal have not yet
prescribed when he filed his complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch
for the National Capital Region of the National Labor Relations
Commission. As discussed, the prescriptive period for filing an illegal
dismissal complaint is four years from the time the cause of action accrued.
Since an award of backwages is merely consequent to a declaration of illegal
dismissal, a claim for backwages likewise prescribes in four years.

The four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 also applies to

actions for damages due to illegal dismissal since such actions are based on
an injury to the rights of the person dismissed.

In this case, Arriola filed his complaint three years and one day from
his alleged illegal dismissal. He, therefore, filed his claims for backwages,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees well within the
four-year prescriptive period.

All told, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Arriola’s claims for
damages have already prescribed when he filed his illegal dismissal
complaint.

II

Arriola abandoned his employment with

Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.

In general, we do not entertain questions of fact in a petition for

review on certiorari.73 We do not try facts.74 Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court is clear that in a petition for review on certiorari with this court,
only questions of law may be raised:

72
University of Pangasinan v. Hon. Confesor, 344 Phil. 134 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division];
Chavez v. Hon. Bonto-Perez, 312 Phil. 88 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
73
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.
74
New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third Division].

.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 175689

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.

A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final

order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
(Emphasis supplied)

A question of fact exists “when the doubt arises as to the truth or

falsity of the alleged facts.”75 On the other hand, there is a question of law
“when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.”76 As
this court explained in Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas:77

. . . For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve

an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.78

This court has made exceptions to this rule. We may review questions
of fact in a petition for review on certiorari if:

(1) the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or

conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) in making its findings, the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.79

In his petition for review on certiorari, Arriola raises questions of fact.

He invites us to examine the probative value of a faxed letter80 containing a
computation of his separation pay, and a certification81 from Imbestigador’s
Managing Editor, stating that Arriola started writing for Imbestigador only
75
Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157, 166 [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].
76
Id.
77
G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
78
Id. at 166–167.
79
Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, 597 Phil. 494, 498 (2009) [Per J. Carpio Morales,
Second Division], citing Uy v. Villanueva, 553 Phil. 69, 79 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
80
Rollo, p. 136.
81
Id. at 140.

.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 175689

on February 17, 2003. These pieces of documentary evidence allegedly

prove that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. illegally dismissed Arriola and that he
did not abandon his employment.

This court has ruled that the issues of illegal dismissal82 and
abandonment of employment83 are factual issues which cannot be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. Arriola also failed to persuade us why we
should make an exception in this case.

We agree that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. did not illegally dismiss
Arriola. As the Court of Appeals ruled, “the removal of [Arriola’s] column
from private respondent [Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.’s newspaper] is not
tantamount to a termination of his employment as his job is not dependent
on the existence of the column ‘Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs.’”84 When
Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. removed “Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs” from
publication, Arriola remained as section editor.

Moreover, a newspaper publisher has the management prerogative to

determine what columns to print in its newspaper.85 As the Court of Appeals
held:

. . . it is a management prerogative of private respondent [Pilipino

Star Ngayon, Inc.] to decide on what sections should and would appear in
the newspaper publication taking into consideration the business viability
and profitability of each section. Respondent [Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.]
decided to replace the “Pamilyang OFWs” section with another which it
ought would better sell to the reading public. Every business enterprise
endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or devise
means designed towards that goal. Even as the law is solicitous of the
welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to
exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. . . . The free will of
management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purposes
cannot be denied.86

Arriola abandoned his employment with Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.

Abandonment is the “clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee
to continue his employment, without any intention of returning.”87 It has
two elements: first, the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason and, second, a clear intention to sever employer-employee

82
Cañedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 179326, July 31, 2013, 702 SCRA
647, 658 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
83
Pure Blue Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, 337 Phil. 710, 716 (1997) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
84
Rollo, p. 54.
85
See Orozco v. The Fifth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals, 584 Phil. 35 (2008) [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division].
86
Rollo, p. 54.
87
Camua, Jr. v. NLRC, 541 Phil. 650, 657 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division], citing Cruz v.
NLRC, 381 Phil. 775, 784 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].

.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 175689

relations exists.88 The second element is “the more determinative factor and
is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee
has no more intention to work.”89

Assuming that Arriola started writing for Imbestigador only on

February 17, 2003, he nonetheless failed to report for work at Pilipino Star
Ngayon, Inc. after November 15, 1999 and only filed his illegal dismissal
complaint on November 15, 2002. He took three years and one day to
remedy his dismissal. This shows his clear intention to sever his
employment with Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.

Contrary to Arriola’s claim, Villar v. NLRC,90 Globe Telecom, Inc. v.

Florendo-Flores,91 and Anflo Management & Investment Corp. v. Bolanio92
do not apply to this case. In these cases, the dismissed workers immediately
took steps to remedy their dismissal, unlike Arriola who “slept on his
rights.”93 In Villar, the workers filed their complaint within the month they
were dismissed.94 In Globe, the employee filed her complaint two months
after she had been constructively dismissed.95 In Anflo, the employee filed
his complaint one day after he had been dismissed.96

With respect to the computation of Arriola’s separation pay allegedly

faxed by Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.’s accounting head, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that this does not prove that Arriola was illegally
dismissed:

[The faxed computation] does not conclusively show that the

salaries were withheld from petitioner Arriola starting 01 December 1999.
It could not likewise be given probative value as the said document does
not bear the signature of an unauthorized representative of private
respondent PSN[.] [N]either does it bears (sic) the official seal of the
company. Besides, the abovementioned computation for separation pay is
not a conclusive proof of the existence of dismissal or termination from
work. It is just a mere computations (sic) which the authenticity thereof is
being assailed.97 (Citations omitted)

Considering the foregoing, we will not disturb the Labor Arbiter’s

findings that Arriola was not illegally dismissed and that he abandoned his
employment. This is true especially since the National Labor Relations

88
Id. at 657.
89
Id.
90
387 Phil. 706 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
91
438 Phil. 756 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
92
439 Phil. 309 (2002) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
93
Rollo, p. 97.
94
387 Phil. 706, 709–710 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
95
438 Phil. 756, 760–761 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
96
439 Phil. 309, 313 (2002) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
97
Rollo, p. 56.

.
 Decision 14 G.R. No. 175689

Commission and the Court of Appeals affirmed these factual findings. 98

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'

decision dated August 9, 2006 and resolution dated November 24, 2006 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91256 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

l\1ARVIC MARIO WCTOR F. LEONEN:

/' Associate Justice

WECONCUR: ·

J. VELASCO, JR.
As.f.>ciate Justice
Chairperson

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been/eached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the oti'nion of the
Court's Division.

PRESBITErR. VELASCO, JR.

Asso rnte Justice
Chairper on, Third Division

98
Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 486 Phil. '27(i. 283-284 (2004) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second
Division].
Decision 15 G.R. No. 175689

. CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice