TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS. TANGLAO, 866 SCRA 278

Facts:

Accused-appellant was charged with statutory rape after having carnal knowledge with his
daughter (AAA - 7 yrs. old), who was then staying with him on Sept. 14, 2000. In his defense,
accused-appellant asserted that AAA could not have been truthful in her narration of what took
place on 14 September 2001, because she failed to state that prior to that incident she and the
accused-appellant had gone to the NBI to complain about BBB, EEE, and Reyes: (BBB is the
mother, EEE other older brother, Reyes BBB’s live in partner).

To prove its case against the accused-appellant, the prosecution called to the witness stand the
following: BBB, AAA's mother; DDD, AAA's older brother; AAA; Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot),
a pediatrician at the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit (PGH-CPU); and Dr.
Cynthia Leynes (Dr. Leynes), chairperson of the PGH psychology department and a consultant
of the PGH-CPU.

RTC - Convicted; CA - affirmed.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to private complainant’s testimony

Held:

NO.

Clearly applicable in this case is the well-settled rule that the testimony of a rape victim who
is of tender age is credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused
deserves full credence. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
The child's willingness to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent
testament to the truth of her complaint. The same can be said of her brother DDD who, despite
being a minor during the time he took the witness stand, courageously and credibly testified
against the accused-appellant. Most importantly, a review of AAA's and DDD's respective
testimonies proves that neither wavered in their statements despite the gruelling cross-
examination by the defense.

What makes the case against the accused-appellant stronger were the medical findings on
AAA. According to Dr. Baluyot, the photographs of AAA's genitalia validated that she was
sexually abused.

Jurisprudence has trenchantly maintained that when the issue of credibility of witnesses
is presented before the Court, certain guidelines should be followed, viz:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of
the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness
on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the
RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower
court's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome
of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.

The Court has stringently reviewed the records of this case but found nothing that would support
a conclusion that the findings of the RTC and the CA were arrived at arbitrarily, or that
significant facts or circumstances were overlooked, misapprehended or misappreciated that,
if properly considered, would have affected the outcome of this case.

LEE VS. CA, 625 SCRA 66

This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent’s right
not to testify in a case against his children.

Facts:

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s
as immigrants from China; they had 11 children (Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve
as housemaid. The Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into
another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

After Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee claimed that they, too,
were children of Lee and Keh. The Lee-Keh children then requested the NBI to investigate the
matter. According to NBI’s report, the hospital records of the Lee’s other children, Keh’s
declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other
children, numbering eight.

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children,
Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother,
when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was
born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth.

Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions before the RTC-Caloocan City for the deletion from
the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh
and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name. They then filed with
the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu,
Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case.

The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was
oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental
privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother. The RTC then quashed the subpoena it issued for
being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the
obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s
mother. CA reversed.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the
certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh’s daughter.

Held:

NO.

As the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of
the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals that the
Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of
birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate
object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children were not children of
Keh; that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to
petitioners' contention that the petitions were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is
no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they would
want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner
Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lee’s other children were not
hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu’s
testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the
attendance of such a material witness.

Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter,
petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his
parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies
only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the
prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents
and other direct ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner
Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct"
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry . A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the
family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

REPUBLIC VS. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT, 498 SCRA 220

Facts:

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent of a concrete perimeter fence around
some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of
prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property.

Upon learning that the land covered by respondent’s titles was within Villamor Air Base, the
Republic, thru OSG, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates
of title in behalf of the Republic against respondent.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice
and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration
and titling. During the congressional hearing, Atty. Garlitos, respondent’s former counsel was
summoned. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an unsigned
draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name
was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally
signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion to declare
respondent in default, predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that,
since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even
known to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. RTC granted and Republic
presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its evidence.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order which declared
respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer

Held:

Yes.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement .
Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements
of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him. This is the essence of
the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person

when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person. By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes
the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when
a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further
points which he or she has heard the other make or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At
no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It went to great
lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos’ testimony as well as its implications.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals
as well as in the comment and memorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as its own.

Respondent’s adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive
on it.

PEOPLE VS. CACHUELA, 698 SCRA 161

Facts:

Accused-appellants were charged with robbery with homicide after robbing Weapons System
Corporation (WSC) and killing one of its employees. They were arrested thru an entrapment
operation when Melvin Nabilgas (who was sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of
firearms) was made part of the entrapment. Cachuela and Ibañez were arrested.

At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy (one of WSC employees-kasabwat) pointed to the appellants,
during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of
Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in
the crime. Thus, on the strength of such out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial
confession they were found guilty.

Issue: Whether the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession are
admissible

Held:

NO to both.

As to the out-of-court identification

People v. Algarme explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine its admissibility, as follows:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru 1 show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is 2
done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru 3 line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group
of persons lined up for the purpose

x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of

suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given
by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.

In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the
appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not
state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons
in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up);
and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants.
Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and
whether there had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on
Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants.

Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that
renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt identification.

As to extrajudicial confession

The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must
satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's
choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."

Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed the
alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.

Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were
provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself.

At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants
in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against
his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of
evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired
with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must
be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by
the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
Pero guilty gihapon sila tungod sa circumstantial evidence.

PEOPLE VS. PALANAS, 759 SCRA 318

Facts:

Palanas was charged with murder of SP02 Ramon Borre. Before SPO2 Borre died, he told
Ramil (his stepson), PO3 Zapanta, and his wife Resurreccion that it was Palanas who shot him.
The RTC found Palanas guilty through the positive identification of the eyewitnesses to the
incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre’s statements that Palanas shot him constituted an ante
mortem statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as evidence
against Palanas. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct in admitting SPO2 Borre’s statements on his way to the
hospital as evidence, both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae

Held:

Yes.

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4)
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness;
and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the
declarant is the victim.

On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus,
constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of
the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they
pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number
and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a
fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware
of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the
declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to
speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation
equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res
gestae. "Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected
with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony." In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence,
i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2
Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made
in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of
SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

Notes:

Alibi

It is axiomatic that alibi is an inherently weak defense, and may only be considered if the
following circumstances are shown: (a) he was somewhere else when the crime occurred;
and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
alleged crime. In this case, the RTC correctly observed that aside from the admission that travel
from Parañaque City to Pasig City only takes about one (1) hour, the incident occurred on a Sunday
when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas had access to a motorcycle that allowed him to
travel faster on the date and time of the incident. Under the circumstances, there is the possibility
that Palanas could have been present at the locus criminis at the time of the shooting. Accordingly,
his defense of alibi must fall.