Tort Law - Ryland V Fletcher Lecture Notes
Tort Law - Ryland V Fletcher Lecture Notes
Tort Law - Ryland V Fletcher Lecture Notes
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Rylands v Fletcher
3 Liability under Rylands v Fletcher
4 Who can sue?
5 Who can be sued?
6 Defences
7 Remedies
8 Human Rights Act 1998
1. Introduction
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher protects an occupier of land against interference due to an isolated
escape from neighbouring land.
It was clear the ICs had been negligent but P sued D, who had not been shown to be negligent. The
courts had always rejected claims in private nuisance for isolated escapes so this was a problem for P
in his suit against D.
The rule
Although the case reached the House of Lords, the classic statement of legal principle was given by
Blackburn J in the Court of Exchequer Chamber:
“We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his
lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his
own peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape”.
This statement was approved of by the House, with Lord Cairns adding the term “non-natural user” in
explaining the rule.
This decision caused controversy. Blackburn J reached his conclusion through reasoning by analogy
to torts such as cattle trespass and nuisance. He clearly did not believe he was laying down a new
principle of law.
It has often been explained as a tort that imposes liability of person who conduct ultra-hazardous
activities on their land. The US imposes strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities based on
the case of Rylands v Fletcher: see the Restatement (Third) of Torts (2001). This idea of imposing
strict liability was rejected by the Law Commission in its 1970 report, Civil Liability for Dangerous
Things and Activities.
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The House of Lords in Read v Lyons [1947] rejected strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities.
And in Cambridge Water [1994], Lord Goff took the view that strict liability for operations of high
risk would be more appropriately imposed by statute than the courts.
In Australia, the rule has been absorbed into the law of negligence: Burnie Port Authority v General
Jones [1994]. In a 5:2 decision the High Court decided that the occupier of land was liable for fire
damage caused by negligence of ICs under the rules of negligence due to the existence of a non-
delegable duty of care. This approach has not gained support in the UK.
For Lord Goff the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is an extension of private nuisance rather than an aspect
of negligence: see His Lordship’s decision in Cambridge Water.
In 2013, the House of Lords in Transco Plc v Stockport MBC [2003] confirmed that the rule is a sub-
species of private nuisance. The House:
- Rejected the suggestion that R v F should be subsumed into the law of negligence as in
Australia and Scotland
- Rejected the suggestion that the rule should be applied more generously. They favoured a
restrictive application of the rule to things brought onto land that pose an exceptionally high
risk if they escape.
- Clarified that only those with rights to land could sue in R v F.
3.1D brings onto land something for his own purposes which is likely to do mischief
This requires a voluntary act of D in bringing something onto his land. What is likely to do mischief?
Water was in this category in R v F itself. Other cases have found that electricity, oil, vibrations, and
noxious fumes may be things likely to do mischief.
In Transco, Lord Bingham commented that the “mischief” requirement should not be easily satisfied.
It must be something that gives rise to “an exceptionally high risk of danger” if there is an escape, no
matter how unlikely that escape may have been thought to be.
3.2Escape
Proof of escape of the dangerous thing is essential. In Read v Lyons an inspector of munitions was
injured by the explosion of a shell while inspecting D’s munitions factory. the House of Lords
reviewed the law and found that there had been no escape. An escape involved the object leaving the
premises over which D had control.
Can an intentional release be an “escape”? Taylor J in Rigby v Chief Constable of
Northamptonshire [1985] it was held that trespass is the correct tort for the intentional and direct
infliction of harm. However, this was questioned in Crown River Cruises Ltd v Kimbolton
Fireworks Ltd [1996] where the intentional release was deliberately aimed in the direction of C or
with the intention on impinging on his property. Taylor J’s decision in Rigby is more consistent with
the traditional understanding of the separation between trespass and nuisance. Lord Goff has returned
to this traditional view in Cambridge Water.
3.3Non-natural User
Blackburn J stated that the rule of law applied when D brought something onto land that was not
originally there. Lord Cairn in the House of Lords interpreted this as “non-natural user” of land. Over
time the “non-natural user” requirement has been interpreted as “non-ordinary user”.
Lord Moulton in Rickards v Lothian [1913] stated the position as: “it is not every use to which land
is put that brings into play the principle. It must be some special use bringing with it increased
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danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of land or such a use as is proper for the
general benefit of the community.”
The term “non-natural user” must now be reconsidered in the light of Goff J’s comments in
Cambridge Water and the House of Lords ruling in Transco.
6. Defences
The first three defences derive from Blackburn J’s judgment in Rylands itself.
6.1C’s default
6.3Act of God
6.4Statutory Authority
6.5Consent
7. Remedies
7.1Injunction
7.2Abatement
7.3Damages