NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY

BHOPAL

PROJECT – LABOUR LAW

CONSTITUTION AND LABOUR LAWS

SUBMITTEDTO SUBMITTED BY:

Mr. Mahendra Soni Surbhi Laddha

Assistant Professor 2016BALLB76

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This project is an analysis of Constitution and Labour Law. I would like to begin with
acknowledging our Assistant Professor MAHENDRA SONI who gave us this opportunity to
work on a project work, giving us full autonomy to choose our topics as well as guidance where
ever needed. I would also like to thank the director of the university Mr. V. VIJAY KUMAR
and the administration who have given us all the requisite facilities like library, Wi-Fi
connection, and computer lab, photo stat which make the task much easier and efficient. Also, I
would like to extend my gratefulness to my batch mates and parents who have supported me
throughout in thisEndeavour.

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 CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. CONSTITUTIONAL BEARING ON INDUSTRIAL LAWS AND INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS

3. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
 Article 14&16
 Article 19(1)(c)
 Article 21
 Article 23& 24

4. LABOUR LAWS WITH REFERENCE TO DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE

POLICY
 Article 38
 Article 39
 Social Security provisions
 Working conditions
 Living Wage
 Workers participation in management

5. CONCLUSION

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 INTRODUCTION

Majority of the constitutions throughout the world have a basic document of Government called
“Constitution”. The Constitution of a country is the fundamental law of the land on the basis of
which all other laws are made and enforced. Every organ of the state, be it the executive or the
legislative or the judiciary, derives its authority from the constitution and there is no authority,
no department or branch of the State, which is above or beyond the Constitution or has powers
unfettered and unrestricted by the Constitution. Thus, a Constitution is supreme or fundamental
law of the country which not only defines the framework of the basic political principles, but
also establishes what the different government institutions should do in terms of procedure,
powers and duties. A Constitution if the vehicle of a nation’s progress. The Constitution is the
supreme law of the country and it contains laws concerning the government and its relationships
with the people.
Labour law also known as employment law is the body of laws, administrative rulings, and
precedents which address the legal rights of, and restrictions on, working people and their
organizations. As such, it mediates many aspects of the relationship between trade unions,
employers and employees. In other words, Labour law defines the rights and obligations as
workers, union members and employers in the workplace.

STATEMENT OF OBJECT
The project seeks to analyses the relation between Constitution of India and Labour
Laws.Fundamental rights and DPSPs helped in molding the Labor Laws.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How Constitution is embedded in Labour Laws
2. How Constitution provides safeguards to the laborers

HYPOTHESIS
Indian constitution provides numerous safeguards for the protection of labour rights. These
safeguards are in the form of fundamental rights and the Directive principle of State policy.

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The researcher has used doctrinal method of research. The researcher has excessively relied on
sources such as websites, blogs, books, journals and reports for making this project. The sources
are secondary in nature

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 CONSTITUTIONAL BEARING ON INDUSTRIAL LAWS AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS

Industrial relations affect not merely the interest of labor and management, but also the social
and economic goals to which the State is committed to materialize. Therefore, it develops within
the province and function of the State to regulate these relations in society desirable channels.
The extent of state control or intervention is determined by the stage of economic development.
In developed economy, work stoppages to settle claim may not have much impact, unlike in
developing economy. Countries like the U.S. and England, etc. with advanced and free market
economy only lay down bare rules for observance of employers and workers giving them
freedom to settle their disputes. In the U.S., States intervention in industrial dispute is eliminated
to actual or threatened workers’ stoppages that may imperil the national economy, health or
safety. However, in developing economy, the States rules cover a wider area of relationship and
there is equally greater supervision over the enforcement of these rules. This is emphatically so
in developing countries with labour surplus. It is a concern of the state to achieve a reasonable
growth rate in the economy and to ensure the equitable distribution thereof. This process
becomes more complex in a country with democratic framework guaranteeing fundamental
individual freedoms to its citizens. Hence, the a state in a developing country concerns itself not
only with the content of work rules but also with the framing of rules relating to industrial
discipline, training, employment and so on. The founding fathers of democratic Constitution of
India were fully aware about these implications while they laid emphasis to evolve a welfare
state embodying federal arrangement. Entries about labour relations are represented in all the
three lists in the Constitution. Yet most important ones come under the Concurrent list. These are
industrial and labour disputes, trade unions and many aspect of social securities and welfare like
employer’s’ liability, employees’ compensation, provident fund, old age pensions, maternity
benefit, etc. Thus, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948, etc. come under the concurrent list. Some States have
enacted separate amendment Acts to some of the above legislations to meet local needs. Such
amendments are recommended either with the assent of the President of India or by
promulgating rules pursuant to the powers delegated by the Central Act. Under the rule making

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powers delegated by the Centre, the States have often been able to adopt Central Act to local
needs without the President’s assent. The Central acts often delegate such powers. For example,
Section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act delegates to the appropriate government, which in
many is the State Government, the power to promulgate such rules as may be needed for making
the Act effective. Similarly, Section 29 and Section 30 of the Minimum Wages Act and Section
26 of the Payment of Wages Act delegated the rule making power to the State. In pursuance to
this, several States have promulgated separate minimum wages rules and payment of wage rules.
The Factories Act also contains similar provisions and they have been similarly availed of.
Further, the goals and values to be secured by labour legislation and workmen have been made
clear in Part IV, Directive Principles of the State Policy of the Constitution. Thus, the State shall
secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people and certain principles of policy
should be followed by the State towards securing right to adequate means of livelihood,
distribution of the material resources of the community to subserve the common good,
prevention of concentration of wealth via the economic system, equal pay for equal work for
both men and women, health and strength of workers including men, women and children are not
abused, participation of workers in management of industries, just and humane conditions of
work and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation against exploitation and
against moral and material abandonment. By and large industrial and labour legislations have
been directed towards the implementation of these directives. Factories Act, 1948, ESI Act,
1948, Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 are focused to the regulation of the employment of
the women and children in factories, just and humane conditions of work, protection of health
and compensation for injuries sustained during work. Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the
Payment of Wages Act, 1936 regulate wage payment. Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 seeks to
bridge the gap between the minimum wage and the living wage. However, the directives relating
to distribution of wealth, living wages, equal pay for equal work, public assistance, etc. have not
been generally implemented as yet.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Articles 12 to 35 of the Constitution pertain to Fundamental Rights of the people. The Indian
Constitution guarantees essential human rights in the form of Fundamental Rights under Part III
and also Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV which are fundamental in the governance
of the country. Freedom and civil rights granted to all under Part III have been liberally
construed by various pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the last half a century. The object
has been to place citizens at a centre stage and make the State accountable. Fundamental Rights
must not be read in isolation but together with directive principles and fundamental duties. The
need for protecting and safeguarding the interest of labour as human beings has been enshrined
in Article 14, 16, 19, 21, 23 and 24 giving an idea of the conditions under which labour had to be
for work.

Article 14: Equality before law and Article 16: Equal opportunity for all citizens
Equality is one of the magnificent corner-stones of Indian Democracy. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India reads as under: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” Article 14 bars
discrimination and prohibits discriminatory laws. The said Article is clearly in two parts – while
it commands the State not to deny to any person ‘equality before law’, it also commands the
State not to deny the ‘equal protection of the laws’. Equality before law prohibits discrimination.
It is a negative concept. The concept of ‘equal protection of the laws’ requires the State to give
special treatment to persons in different situations in order to establish equality amongst all. It is
positive in character. Therefore, the necessary corollary to this would be that equals would be
treated equally, whilst un-equals would have to be treated unequally. Article 16: Equality of
opportunity in matters of public employment
1. There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the State

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2. No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence
or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect or, any employment or office
under the State
3. Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to
a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any
local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within
that State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment.
4. Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the
State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.
5. Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent
of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any
member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or
belonging to a particular denomination Article 16 assures equality of opportunity in matters of
public employment and prevents the State from any sort of discrimination on the grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. This Article also
provides the autonomy to the State to grant special provisions for the backward classes, under-
represented States, SC & ST for posts under the State. Local candidates may also be given
preference is certain posts. Article 16 is an instance of the application of the general rule of
equality before law laid down in Article 14. The concept of equal protection and equal
opportunity undoubtedly permeates the whole spectrum of an individual’s employment from
appointment through promotion and termination to the payment of gratuity and pension. Equality
is for equals, that is to say, those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal
treatment but the principle of equality under Articles 14 and 16 cannot be carried beyond a point.
There is no bar of reasonable classification of various employees and there is no question of
equality between separate and independent classes of employees. The court cannot interfere with
a promotion policy unless it is vitiated by arbitrariness or discrimination; a court or Tribunal
cannot issue directions in this regard. In the case of Randhir Singh v. Union of India1, the apex
court observed: “It is true that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not expressly
declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal.

1
Randhir Singh v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 879

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Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims “equal pay for equal work for both men and women”
as a Directive Principle of State Policy. “Equal pay for equal work for both men and women”
means equal pay for equal work for every one and as between the sexes. Directive Principles
have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the
Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all
citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These
equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of
the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned
with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some
substance if equal work means equal pay. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane
they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality
clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the Constitution
declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist
Democratic Republic. Again the word ‘Socialist’ must mean something. Even if it does not mean
‘to each according to his need’, it must at least mean ‘equal pay for equal work’.”
In the case of Dhirendra Chamoli and Anr. v. State Of U.P. 2, the Court stated: “The fact that
these employees accepted employment with full knowledge that they will be paid only daily
wages and they will not get the same salary and conditions of service as other Class IV
employees, cannot provide an escape to the Central Government to avoid the mandate of equality
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. This Article declares that there shall be equality
before law and equal protection of the law and implicit in it is the further principle that there
must be equal pay for work of equal value. These employees who are in the service of the
different Nehru Yuvak Kendras in the country and who are admittedly performing the same
duties as Class IV employees, must therefore get the same salary and conditions of service as
Class IV employees. It makes no difference whether they are appointed in sanctioned posts or
not. So long as they are performing the same duties, they must receive the same salary and
conditions of service as Class IV employees.”
In Daily Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India, 3it has been held that “the daily rated casual
labourers in P & T Department who were doing similar work as done by the regular workers of
2
Dhirendra Chamoli and Anr. v. State Of U.P. AIR 1982 SC 879
3
Daily Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India 1987 AIR 2342

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the department were entitled to minimum pay in the pay scale of the regular workers plus D.A.
but without increments. Classification of employees into regular employees and casual
employees for the purpose of payment of less than minimum pay is violative of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. It is also opposed to the spirit of Article 7 of the International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. Although the directive principle contained in
Articles 38 and 39 (d) is not enforceable by virtue of Article 37, but they may be relied upon by
the petitioners to show that in the instant case they have been subjected to hostile discrimination:
Denial of minimum pay amounts to exploitation of labour. The government cannot take
advantage of its dominant position. The government should be a model employer.

Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution

Article 19 (1) (c) speaks about the Fundamental right of citizen to form an associations and
unions. Under clause (4) of Article 19, however, the State may by law impose reasonable
restrictions on this right in the interest of public order or morality or the sovereignty and integrity
of India. The right of association pre-supposes organization as an organization or permanent
relationship between its members in matters of common concern. It thus includes the right to
form companies, societies, partnership, trade union and political parties. The right guaranteed is
not merely the right to form association but also to continue with the association as such. The
freedom to form association implies also the freedom to form or not to form, to join or not to
join, an association or union.
In the case of Damyanti Naranga v. The Union of India 4, the court observed that: “The right to
form association necessarily implies that the persons forming the society have also the right to
continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the association. Any
law by which members are introduced in the voluntary association without any option being
given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those
who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form association. The right
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) cannot be confined to the initial stage of forming an association. if
it were to be so confined, the right would be meaningless because as soon as an association is
formed, a law may be passed interfering with its composition so that the association formed may
not be able to function at all. The right can be effective only if it is held to include within, it the

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Damyanti Naranga v. The Union of India 1971 SCR (3) 840

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right to continue the association with its composition as voluntarily agreed upon by the persons
forming the association. And, Article 19(4), on the face of it, cannot be called in aid to claim
validity for the Act.”
In the case of P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India5, the apex court held: “The argument is that action
has been taken against the appellants -under the rules, because they are Communists and trade
unionists, and the orders terminating their services under R. 3 amount, in substance, to a denial to
them of the freedom to form associations, which is guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). We have
already observed that that is not the true scope of the charges. But apart from that, we do not see
how any right of the appellants under Art. 19(1)(c) has been infringed. The orders do not prevent
them from continuing to be Communists or trade unionists. Their rights in that behalf remain
after the impugned orders precisely what they were before. The real complaint of the appellants
is that their services have been terminated; but that involves, apart from Art. 31, no infringement
of any of their Constitutional rights. The appellants have no doubt a fundamental right to form
associations under Art. 19(1)(c), but they have no fundamental right to be continued in
employment by the State, and when their services are terminated by the State they cannot
complain of the infringement of any of their Constitutional rights, when no question of violation
of Art. 311 arises.”
In the case of M.H. Devendrappa v. Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corpn, 6, the
Supreme Court has dissented from the Balakotaiah ruling entailing freedom v. service. The Court
has now said that legitimate action discreetly and properly taken by a government servant with a
sense of responsibility and at the proper level to remedy any malfunction in the organisation may
not be barred. A person who legitimately seeks to exercise his rights under Art. 19 cannot be told
that you are free to exercise the rights, but the consequences will be so serious and so damaging,
that you will not, in effect, be able to exercise your freedom. This means that the Balakotaiah
approach saying that a government servant is free to exercise his freedom under Art. 19(1)(a) or
(b), but at the cost of his service, clearly amounts to deprivation of freedom of speech. Therefore,
what the Court has to consider is the reasonableness of service rules which curtail certain kinds
of activities amongst government servants in the interests of efficiency and discipline in order
that they may discharge their public duties as government servants in a proper manner without

5
P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India 1958 SCR 1052
6
M.H. Devendrappa v. Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corpn, AIR 1998 SC 1064 : (1998) 3 SCC
732

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undermining the prestige or efficiency of the organisation. If the rules are directly and primarily
meant for this purpose, “they being in furtherance of Art. 19(1)(g)”,87 can be upheld although
they may indirectly impinge upon some other limbs of Art. 19 qua an individual employee.
Courts ensure that such impingement is minimal and rules are made in public interest and for
proper discharge of public interest. “A proper balancing of interests of an individual as a citizen
and the right of the state to frame a code of conduct for its employees in the interest of proper
functioning of the state, is required”. Thus, M.H. Devendrappa case reduces somewhat the
harshness of the Balakotaiah ruling. Balakotaiah seemed to suggest that a government servant
cannot exercise any freedom under Art. 19 and he can enjoy his freedom only if he gives up
government service. But Devendrappa ruling permits some space to a government servant to
enjoy his freedoms subject to proper functioning of the state. A balance has to be drawn between
the interests of a government servant as a citizen and the interests of the state as an employer in
promoting the efficiency of public service. Dealing with the question as to whether temporarily
engaged employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual
basis, contractual employees and the like), are entitled to minimum of the regular pay-scale,
alongwith dearness allowance (as revised from time to time) on account of their performing the
same duties, which are discharged by those engaged on regular basis, against sanctioned posts,
the Court said that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ constitutes a clear and
unambiguous right and is vested in every employee – whether engaged on regular or temporary
basis. The bench of J.S. Khehar and S.A. Bobde, JJ said that in a welfare state, an employee
engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and
responsibilities. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human
dignity as anyone, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. The
Court, however, clarified the legal position for the application of the principle of ‘equal pay for
equal work’.
Some of the principles highlighted by the Court are as follows: • The ‘onus of proof’, of parity in
the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post, under the principle of
‘equal pay for equal work’, lies on the person who claims it. • Mere fact that the subject post
occupied by the claimant, is in a “different department” vis-a-vis the reference post, does not
have any bearing on the determination of a claim, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal
work’. However, for equal pay, the concerned employees with whom equation is sought, should

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be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and
sensitivity. • Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can
also be placed in different pay-scales. Such as – ‘selection grade’, in the same post. But this
difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as – merit, or seniority, or some
other relevant criteria. • The reference post, with which parity is claimed, under the principle of
‘equal pay for equal work’, has to be at the same hierarchy in the service, as the subject post. • A
comparison between the subject post and the reference post, under the principle of ‘equal pay for
equal work’, cannot be made, where the subject post and the reference post are in different
establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in
different geographical locations, though owned by the same master. • Different pay-scales, in
certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy
in the cadre if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed
to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not
be applicable and also when, the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial
decisions, and that is not so for the subject post.

Right to Strike
In the case of All India Bank Employees vs National Industrial Tribunal 7, the court held: “The
object for which labour unions are brought into being and exist is to ensure collective bargaining
by labour with the employers. The necessity for this has arisen from an incapacity stemming
from the handicap of poverty and consequent lack of bargaining power in workmen as compared
with employers which is the reason for the existence of labour organizations. Collective
bargaining in order to be effective must be enforceable labour withdrawing its co-operation from
the employer and there is consequently a fundamental right to strike a right which is thus a
natural deduction from the right to form unions guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of cl.(1) of Art. 19. As
strikes, however, produce economic dislocation of varying intensity or magnitude, a system has
been devised by which compulsory industrial adjudication is substituted for the right to strike.
This is the ratio underlying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 under which
Government is empowered in the event of an industrial dispute which may ultimately lead to a
strike or lock-out or when such strikes or lock-outs occur, to refer the dispute to an impartial

7
All India Bank Employees vs National Industrial Tribunal 1962 SCR (3) 269

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Tribunal for adjudication with a provision banning and making illegal strikes or lock-outs during
the pendency of the adjudication proceedings. The provision of an alternative to a strike in the
shape of industrial adjudication is a restriction on the fundamental right to strike and it would be
reasonable and valid only if it were an effective substitute.”
In the case of Mineral Miners’ Union v. Kudremukh Iron Ore Co. Ltd 8, the court held: “The
consequential hardship to go on strike, due to the delay in the action of the authorities under the
Act, was held to be unfortunate, by the Supreme Court; but such a delay would not vest a right in
the workmen to ignore the mandatory requirements of the law. The remedy of workmen lies
elsewhere. As the Act now stands, it is not possible to entertain the plea put forth by the learned
Counsel for the workmen.” Even a very liberal interpretation of Article 19(1) (c) cannot lead to
the conclusion that the trade unions have a guaranteed right to an effective collective bargaining
or to strike, either as part of collective bargaining or otherwise. The right to strike or the right to
declare a lockout may be controlled or restricted by appropriate industrial legislation9.

Article 21 of the Constitution

Article 21 assures every person right to life and personal liberty. The term ‘life’ has been given a
very expansive meaning. The term ‘personal liberty’ has been given a very wide amplitude
covering a variety of rights which go to constitute personal liberty of a citizen. Its deprivation
shall only be as per the relevant procedure prescribed in the relevant law, but the procedure has
to be fair, just and reasonable. The right to life enshrined in Article 21 has been liberally
interpreted so as to mean something more than mere survival and mere existence or animal
existence. It therefore includes all those aspects of life which go to make a man’s life
meaningful, complete and worth living. In course of time, Article 21 has come to be regarded as
the heart of Fundamental Rights. Article 21 has enough of positive content in it and it is not
merely negative in its reach. This liberal interpretation of Article 21 by judiciary has led to two
very spectacular results within the last two decades, viz.: (1) Many Directive Principles which, as
such, are not enforceable have been activated and have become enforceable. a) Right to
livelihood b) Right to live with human dignity c) Right to medical care d) Health of labour e)
Sexual harassment f) Right to health g) Economic Rights (2) The Supreme Court has implied a
number of Fundamental Rights from Art. 21.
8
Mineral Miners’ Union v. Kudremukh Iron Ore Co. Ltd. ILR 1988 KAR 2878
9
Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2002 SC 1124

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In the case of Olga Tellis & Ors v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 10, the Court held: “As we
have stated while summing up the petitioners’ case, the main plank of their argument is that the
right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will
be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their
eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of
argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted
from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the
question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood.
We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life
conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be
extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death
sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to
life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live
without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not
treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person his right
to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such
deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it
would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in
accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a
part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life
livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his
right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive
migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of
livelihood in the villages. The motive force which people their desertion of their hearths and
homes in the village is that struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is
the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live:
Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they
have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas J. in Baksey
that the right to work is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live
and the right to life is a precious freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois,

10
Olga Tellis & Ors v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180

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(1877) 94 U.S. 113, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition
against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed”
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In the case of D.K. Yadav vs J.M.A. Industries Ltd , the court held: “Article 21 of the
Constitution clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the
glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. When it is
interpreted that the colour and content of procedure established by law must be in conformity
with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness
despising opportunity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence. The order of termination
of the service of an employee/workman visits with civil consequences of jeopardising not only
his/ her livelihood but also career and livelihood of dependents. Therefore, before taking any
action putting an end to the tenure of an employee/workman, fair play requires that a reasonable
opportunity to put forth his case is given and domestic enquiry conducted complying with the
principles of natural justice.”
In the case of Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal 12, a mazdoor fell
from a running train and was seriously injured. He was sent from one government hospital to
another and finally he had to be admitted in a private hospital where he had to incur an
expenditure of Rs. 17,000/- on his treatment. Feeling aggrieved at the indifferent attitude shown
by the various government hospitals, he filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court under Art. 32.
The Court has ruled that: “the Constitution envisages establishment of a welfare state, and in a
welfare state, the primary duty of the government is to provide adequate medical facilities for the
people. The Government discharges this obligation by running hospitals and health centres to
provide medical care to those who need them. Art. 21 imposes an obligation on the State to
safeguard the right to life of every person. Preservation of human life is thus of paramount
importance.” Occupational accidents and diseases remain the most appalling human tragedy of
modern industry.
In the case of Vishakha & Ors. v.State of Rajasthan 13 whereby a woman was assaulted and
harassed at her workplace, the Supreme Court observed: “Each such incident results in violation
of the fundamental rights of ‘Gender Equality’ and the ‘Right of Life and Liberty’. It is clear
violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of Constitution. One of the logical

11
D.K. Yadav vs J.M.A. Industries Ltd 1993 SCR (3) 930
12
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1996 SC 2426
13
Vishakha & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241

17
consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right under
Article 19(1) (g) ‘to practice any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or businesses.”
The Parliament enacted Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition
and Redressal) Act, 2013 on December 9, 2013 that seeks to protect women from sexual
harassment at their place of work. This statute superseded the Vishakha Guidelines for
prevention of sexual harassment introduced at work place by the Supreme Court of India.

Article 23 and Article 24: Right against Exploitation

According to Article 23(1), traffic in human beings, begar, and other similar forms of forced
labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in
accordance with law. Article 23(1) proscribes three unsocial practices, viz., (1) begar; (2) traffic
in human beings; and (3) forced labour. The term ‘begar’ means compulsory work without any
payment. Begar is labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any
remuneration for it. Withholding of pay of a government employee as a punishment has been
held to be invalid in view of Article 23 which prohibits begar. ‘To ask a man to work and then
not to pay him any salary or wages savours of begar. It is a Fundamental Right of a citizen of
India not to be compelled to work without wages.’14The expression ‘traffic in human beings,’
commonly known as slavery, implies the buying and selling of human beings as if they are
chattels, and such a practice is constitutionally abolished. The words ‘other similar forms of
forced labour’ in Article 23(1) are to be interpreted ejusdem generis. The kind of ‘forced labour’
contemplated by the Article has to be something in the nature of either traffic in human beings or
begar. The prohibition against forced labour is made subject to one exception. Under Article
23(2), the State can impose compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such
service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or
class or any of them. The State may thus exempt women from compulsory service for that will
be discrimination on the ground of sex and this has not been forbidden by Article 23(2). The
Supreme Court has given an expansive significance to the term “forced labour” used in Art.
23(1) in a series of cases beginning with the Asiad case15 in 1982. The Court has insisted that
Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of forced labour even if it has origin in a contract.
14
Suraj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1960 MP 303
15
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473

18
Article 23 strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative
of human dignity and is contrary to the basic human values.
In Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan 16case, it was held that when a person provides labour or
service to another for remuneration which is less than the prescribed minimum wages, the labour
so provided clearly falls within the ambit of the words ‘forced labour’ under Article 23. The
rationale adopted was that when someone works for less than the minimum wages, the
presumption is that he or she is working under some compulsion. Hence it was held that such a
person would be entitled to approach the higher judiciary under writ jurisdiction (Article 226 or
Article 32) for the enforcement of fundamental rights which include the payment of minimum
wages. Article 24 of the Constitution of India is also enforceable against private citizens and lays
down a prohibition against the employment of children below the age of fourteen years in any
factory or mine or any other hazardous employment. This is also in consonance with Articles
39(e) and (f) in Part IV of the Constitution which emphasizes the need to protect the health and
strength of workers, and also to protect children against exploitation. The Child Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 specifically prohibits the employment of children in
certain industries deemed to be hazardous and provides the scope for extending such prohibition
to other sectors. Article 39(f) of the Constitution of India enumerates the importance of
protecting children from exploitation and to give them proper opportunities and facilities to
develop. These ideas are in consonance with the prohibitions against ‘forced labour’ and
employment of children below the age of fourteen years, which have been laid down under
Article 23 and 24 respectively

16
Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan, 1983, SCR (2) 271

19
 LABOUR LAWS WITH REFERENCE TO DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE
POLICY

The makers of the Constitution had realized that in a poor country like India, political democracy
would be useless without economic democracy. Accordingly, they incorporated a few provisions
in the Constitution with a view to achieve amelioration of the socio-economic condition of the
masses. Today we are living in an era of welfare state which seeks to promote the prosperity and
well-being of the people. The Directive Principles strengthen and promote this concept by
seeking to lay down some socio-economic goals which the various governments in India have to
strive to achieve. The Directive Principles are designed to usher in a social and economic
democracy in the country. These principles obligate the state to take positive action in certain
directions in order to promote the welfare of the people and achieve economic democracy. These
principles give directions to the legislatures and the executive in India as regards the manner in
which they should exercise their power. The Courts however do not enforce a directive principle
enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution unlike rights enshrined in Part III. The reason behind the
legal non-enforceability and non-justiciability of these principles is that they impose positive
obligations on the state. While taking positive action, government functions under several
restraints, the most crucial of these being that of financial resources. The constitution-makers,
therefore, taking a pragmatic view refrained from giving teeth to these principles. They believed
more in an awakened public opinion, rather than in Court proceedings, as the ultimate sanction
for the fulfilment of these principles. Nevertheless, the Constitution declares that the Directive
Principles, though not enforceable by any Court, are ‘fundamental’ in the governance of the
country, and the ‘state’ has been placed under an obligation to apply them in making laws. The
state has thus to make laws and use its administrative machinery for the achievement of these
Directive Principles. Articles 38, 39, 41, 42 and 43 have a special relevance in the field of
industrial legislation and adjudication. In fact, they are the substratum or rather ‘magna carta’ of
industrial jurisprudence. They encompass the responsibility of the Government, both Central and
State, towards the labour to secure for them social order and living wages, keeping with the
economic and political conditions of the country.

20
 Article 38
Reading Articles 21, 38, 42, 43, 46 and 48A together, the Supreme Court has concluded in
Consumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India 17, that “right to health, medical aid to
protect the health and vigour of a worker while in service or post retirement is a Fundamental
Right...to make the life of the workman meaningful and purposeful with dignity of person.”
Health of the worker enables him to enjoy the fruit of his labour, keeping him physically fit and
mentally alert for leading a successful life, economically, socially and culturally. Medical
facilities to protect the health of the workers are, therefore, the fundamental and human rights of
the workmen.

Article 39
The Supreme Court has taken recourse to Art. 39(a) to interpret Art. 21 to include therein the
“right to livelihood.” The Supreme Court has observed in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation,18, that : “If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate
means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to
livelihood from the content of the right to life.” The Supreme Court has however put a rider on
the right to livelihood. The state may not be compelled, by affirmative action, “to provide
adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens.” But the state is under a negative
obligation, viz., not to deprive a person of this right without just and fair procedure. Thus,
according to the Court: “But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except
according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as
offending the right to life conferred by Art. 21.” In a major pronouncement in Madhu Kishwar v.
State of Bihar19, with a view to protect the economic interests of tribal women depending on
agriculture for their livelihood, the Supreme Court has ruled that on the death of the last male
holder in an agricultural tribal family, the dependent family female members have the
constitutional remedy of continuing to hold the land so long as they remain dependent on it to
earn their livelihood. Otherwise, the females will be rendered destitute. It is only on the
exhaustion of, or abandonment of land by such female descendants, can the males in the line of

17
Consumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 923
18
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180
19
Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 1870

21
descent takeover the holding exclusively. The Court has come to this conclusion on the basis of
Article 39(a) which puts an obligation on the state to secure to all men and women equally, the
right to an adequate means of livelihood.

Social Security provisions

Article 41 requires the state, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, to make
effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases
of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want.
Social security is guaranteed in our Constitution under Articles 39, 41 and 43. The Employees’
State Insurance Act, 1948 is a pioneering piece of legislation in the field of social insurance. The
Employees’ State Insurance Scheme provides for benefits in cash except the medical benefit,
which is in kind. The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and
the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 are also social security measures to help fulfill the objectives of
directive principles of our Constitution. The Provident Fund Scheme aimed at providing
substantial security and timely monetary assistance to industrial employees and their families.
The Maternity Benefit Scheme is primarily designed to provide maternity leave with full wages
and security of employment. The object of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is to provide a
scheme for the payment of gratuity to employees employed in factories, mines, oil fields,
plantations, ports, railways, shops and establishments. Besides social security benefits, efforts
have also been made to provide ample opportunities for employment and for workers’ education.
The Apprentices Act, 1961 was enacted to supplement the programme of institutional training by
on-the-job training and to regulate the training arrangements in industry. Employment exchanges
play an important role for the job seekers. The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory
Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1969 has made it obligatory on the employers to notify vacancies
occurring in their establishments to the prescribed employment exchanges before they are filled.
The voluntary workers education scheme was launched in our country in 1958 to educate the
workers in trade union philosophy and methods, and to promote physical awareness of problems,
privileges and obligations as workers and citizens.

22
 Working Conditions
Article 42 requires the state to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work
and for maternity relief. Article 42 provides the basis of the large body of labour law that obtains
in India. Referring to Arts. 42 and 43, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Constitution
expresses a deep concern for the welfare of the workers. By reading Article 21 with several
Directive principles including Art 42, the Supreme Court has given broad connotation to Art 21
so as to include therein “the right to live with human dignity”. Substantial steps have been taken
to fulfill the object of Article 42 of the Constitution. The Factories Act, 1948 provides for health,
safety, welfare, employment of young persons and women, hours of work for adults and
children, holidays and leave with wages. Labour welfare funds have been set-up to provide
welfare facilities to the workers employed in different mines such as coal, mica, iron ore and
limestone. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act of 1970, a piece of social
legislation, provides for the abolition of contract labour wherever possible and to regulate the
conditions of contract labour in establishments or employments where the abolition of contract
labour system is not considered feasible for the time being. Article 42 is one of the hall marks of
the Indian Constitution as it takes into consideration the very specific context of pregnancy
related discrimination in the context of employment and therefore it directs the State to make
provisions for securing not only just and humane conditions of work but also for Maternity
Relief. It is in this context that the Government of India went on to enact the Maternity Benefit
Act, 1961 which enables women in the labour force who have been employed for 160 days in a
year to provide leave with pay and medical benefit.

Living Wage
Article 43 requires the state to endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation, or economic
organisation, or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a
living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full employment of leisure
and social and cultural opportunities. In particular, the state is to promote cottage industries on
an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas. Article 43 imposes an obligation towards
ensuring the provision of a ‘living wage’ in all sectors as well as acceptable conditions of work.
This provision enunciates the revolutionary doctrine that employees are entitled as of right to
certain reliefs. A ‘living wage’ is such wage as enables the male earner to provide for himself

23
and his family not merely the bare essentials of food, clothing and shelter, but includes education
for children, protection against ill-health, requirements of essential social needs, and a measure
of insurance against the more important misfortunes including old age. A ‘minimum wage’, on
the other hand, is just sufficient to cover the bare physical needs of a worker and his family.
Minimum wage is to be fixed in an industry irrespective of its capacity to pay. Fixation of
minimum wage is in public interest and does not impose an unreasonable restriction on the right
to carry on a trade guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g)20.

Workers Participation in Management

Article 43-A which was introduced by the 42nd Amendment in 1976, has a direct bearing on
labour laws, in so far as it provides that the State shall take steps by suitable legislation or any
other means to secure the participation of workers in the management of industrial
establishments. The workers’ participation in management is not a novel and imported idea from
outside. It can be dated as far back as 1920 when Mahatma Gandhi suggested participation of
workers in management on the ground that workers contributed labour and brains while
shareholders contributed money to the enterprise and that both should, therefore, share in its
property. He said that there should be a perfect relationship of friendship and cooperation among
them. For the unions, he said that the aim should be to raise the moral and intellectual height of
labour and, thus, by sheer merit, make labour master of the means of production instead of the
slave that it is. After independence, the first major step in the direction of workers’ participation
in management in India was the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with the dual
purpose of prevention and settlement of industrial disputes. The Industrial Policy Resolution,
1948 advocated Workers Participation in Management by suggesting that labour should be in all
matters concerning industrial production. The First Five-Year Plan and the successive plans
emphasised the need for workers’ participation in management. For example, the Second Five-
Year Plan’ stressed the need for Workers Participation in Management in the following words:
“It is necessary in this context that the worker should be made to feel that in his own way he is
helping build a progressive state. The creation of industrial democracy, therefore, is a
prerequisite for the establishment of a socialist society”.

20
Edward Mills Co. v. Ajmer, AIR 1955 SC 25

24
CONCLUSION

Constitution and Labour Laws are intertwined.Indian constitution provides numerous safeguards
for the protection of labour rights. These safeguards are in the form of fundamental rights and the
Directive principle of State policy.
The relevance of the dignity of human labour and the need for protecting and safeguarding the
interest of labour as human beings has been enshrined in Chapter-III (Articles 16, 19, 23 & 24)
and Chapter IV (Articles 39, 41, 42, 43, 43A & 54) of the Constitution of India keeping in line
with Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy. The Labour Laws were also
influenced by important human rights and the conventions and standards that have emerged from
the United Nations. These include right to work of one’s choice, right against discrimination,
prohibition of child labour, just and humane conditions of work, social security, protection of
wages, redress of grievances, right to organize and form trade unions, collective bargaining and
participation in management.

25