People v. Santiago

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with automobile that
he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, and to pay the
costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court below committed
four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was being
prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of the
evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional
and the proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution
of appellant without due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and over the subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in sentencing
him to one year and one day of prison correccional and to the payment of costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the record and find that
the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are sufficiently sustained
by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meter wide,
notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side
of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where the were two young boys, the appellant did
not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and did not proceed
with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to
avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran over the
boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a shade of doubt about them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal with the fundamental
questions as to whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was
filed, is valid and constitutional.
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General Orders No. 58, the
defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend General Orders
No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have the character of
constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against the
persons charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine Island is made the
plaintiff in this information, contains the following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen

hundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense."
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutions of the
States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory
law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which its great powers
will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake
of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would
probably never be understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316,
407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State has the
authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal
procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in creating and
defining criminal offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal protection of the laws
if it prescribes a different procedure in the case of persons in like situation. Subject to this
limitation, however, the legislature has large measure of discretion in prescribing the modes
of criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs. Johnston, 237 U.S., 502; 35
s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S., 57; 30 S.
Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such as the
Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories and
possessions of the United States may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more
often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, the organization
of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in the several States or in Congress, which
is often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but within the
scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon
all subjects within the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress. By act of Congress their
power extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States;" and this includes the power to define and punish crimes. (16 C.
J., 62.)

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.

SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen

Let us examine the question.

As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:

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