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Army Field Manual (AFM)
Command

Land Warfare Development Centre Army Code 72062

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or she is using the latest version of this publication. If in doubt the individual should contact the Warfare Branch
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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Summary of Change Author Version Date
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Foreword
CFA Foreword to Command

Thoroughly understood and properly implemented doctrine is the most effective force multiplier
known to man: it creates mutual understanding and enables decentralisation, pursuit of the
initiative and generates tempo. So it is only right that we have spent significant time and effort
on revising the Army’s doctrine for command. The freedoms inherent in our philosophy of
Mission Command, are enabled by the implementation of effective and commonly understood
planning and execution systems; they are the basic staff skills on which everything else is built.

AFM Command describes the articles of faith which deliver Mission Command and the processes
that underpin them. It sets out: the philosophies through which we command; the framework
to enable commanders to assess situations and plan and execute the integration of capabilities;
and how and why we structure staffs and command posts. It also introduces dispersed and
distributed command.

Given the importance of multinational operations AFM Command emphasises the need for
interoperability between components and nations and sets out the practical application of that
process. It recognises the steps that we must take to build the most effective partnerships,
offering insights into partners’ approaches to planning to allow us to better prepare for and
understand how they think. As such, it sets out a genuinely multinational and cross-agency
approach to the coordination of operations in the modern world.

AFM Command will be followed by two new publications: The Planning and Execution
Handbook will offer a practical to allow staffs to really get to grips with the estimate process
in all its forms; the new-look Staff Officers’ Handbook will refocus on providing the data
and information which staff need to deliver effective execution of plans. AFM Command will
remain the core document, providing everything we need to deliver the direction and control
of operations. The ideas and procedures set out in AFM Command provide the common basis
for the exercise of command in UK land forces; we must all read, understand and practise the
approaches it lays out. I commend it to you.

Commander Field Army

May 2017
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Preface

Army Field Manual (AFM) Command, 2017 is the primary source of practices and procedures
for the Command and Control of UK land operations. It replaces AFM Command and Staff
Procedures, 2007 and is essential reading for all commanders and headquarters staff in the
land environment.

AFM Command supports and complements the Army’s capstone doctrine – ADP Land
Operations, 2017, particularly Chapter 9 – Commanding Operations. ADP Land Operations,
2017 provides essential context for all its supporting AFMs and must therefore have been read
by users of AFM Command.

AFM Command re-establishes ownership of the enduring command doctrine that has resided in
Part C of the Staff Officers’ Handbook since 2014. The forthcoming edition of the SOHB, 2017
will therefore focus on data and aides memoire rather than authoritative doctrine.

AFM Command is increasingly aligned with tactical North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
and Defence doctrine. The key change to previous UK command doctrine is the adoption of
NATO’s Operations Process (Assess, Plan, Prepare, Execute) as a replacement for the PREE process
(Plan, Refine, Execute, Evaluate). AFM Command’s sister NATO publication, which it draws
on heavily in Part B – Exercising Command and Control, is Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.2 -
Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

AFM Command is broken into three parts:

Part A - Command and Control. Part A describes the UK’s Command and Control doctrine
in relation to commanders, their staff and the Command Posts from which they operate.

Chapter 1 - Command. Chapter 1 describes the nature of command and its

corresponding principles, philosophy and characteristics.

Chapter 2 - Command Support. Chapter 2 describes the people, places, systems and
processes that support the commander.

Chapter 3 - Command Posts. Chapter 3 describes the functions and structures of

Command Posts.

Part B - Exercising Command and Control. Part B describes the processes and procedures
involved in exercising Command and Control using the Operations Process as a framework.

Chapter 4 - Introduction to the Operations Process. Chapter 4 gives a brief overview of

the Operations Process.

Chapter 5 - Assess. Chapter 5 describes the process of assessment.

Chapter 6 - Plan. Chapter 6 describes the UK’s tactical planning process and a range of
supporting planning tools.

Chapter 7 - Prepare. Chapter 7 describes the spread of preparatory activities that take
place prior to execution with a focus on those undertaken by a headquarters staff.

Chapter 8 - Execute. Chapter 8 describes the processes involved in the execution of

operations.
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Part C - Command and Control in a Combined, Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental and

Multinational (CJIIM) Environment. Part C provides considerations and doctrine for commanders
and staff working in a CJIIM environment.

Chapter 9 - Multinational Interoperability. Chapter 9 describes the definitions, dimensions

and considerations involved in multinational interoperability.

Chapter 10 - NATO and Allied Planning Processes. Chapter 10 gives an overview of the
planning processes of our principal allies.

Chapter 11 - UK Resilience Operations. Chapter 11 gives an overview of UK Resilience

Command and Control doctrine as well as a range of considerations for supporting land
commanders.

This manual continues the evolution of land forces’ doctrine using ADP Land Operations,
2017 as the framework. Where possible it complements NATO and joint doctrine and, whilst
not exhaustive, the key command-orientated doctrine publications are shown overleaf in the
Command and Control Doctrine Hierarchy schematic.
 Command and Control Doctrine Hierarchy

NATO
AJP 01 AJP 3 AJP 3.2 AJP 5 Supporting
Allied Joint Allied Joint Doctrine Allied Joint Planning for Allied Comd
Joint for the Conduct of Doctrine for Land Ops COPD
Doctrine Operations
Operations Operations Ver 2

ATP 3.2.2 APP 6

NATO Allied

AAP 6
Tactical Command and Joint
Control of Allied
Glossary of
Land Forces Terms Symbology
iv  |  Army Field Manual I Command

JOINT
JDP 02 J
i.JDP 2-00 JDP 3-00 JDP 3-70 JSP 900
UK Ops: the Defence Understanding
D & JDP 04
contribution to Resilience Intelligence support
Campaign Battlespace UK Targeting
Understanding Policy
& Sy to Joint
P Operations Execution Management
0
2
ADP Land
LAND ii. U
AFM Intelligence, K Operations Army Leadership
Surveillance & Doctrine
O
Reconnaissance p
s
:
AFM Command
t
h
DN Fires e
UK Land and Joint Doctrine

DN OPSEC and
D
e Planning & Counter -
f Staff Officers’ surveillance
Execution
e Handbook
n Handbook*
c
e

Legend: JDP - Joint Doctrine Publication ATP - Allied Tactical Publication

ADP - Army Doctrine Publication JDN - Joint Doctrine Note AAP - Allied Administrative Publication
AFM - Army Field Manual JSP- Joint Service Publication APP- Allied Procedural Publication
DN - Doctrine Note * Expected publication late 2017 AJP- Allied Joint Publication
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Contents

Foreword I

Preface ii

Contents v

PART A - COMMAND AND CONTROL PA-1

Chapter 1 - Command 1-1

Introduction 1-1
Nature of Command 1-2
Principles of Command 1-4
Application of Mission Command 1-4
Additional Command Considerations 1-6
Command in a CJIIM Environment 1-7
Command in the Land Component 1-8
The Commander 1-10
Deputising Command 1-15
Span of Command 1-17
Command States 1-17
Control 1-21

Chapter 2 – Command Support 2-1

Introduction 2-1
The Staff 2-2
The Staff Officer 2-3
Relationships involving the Staff 2-5
Organisation of the Staff 2-6
Communication and Information Systems 2-7
Liaison 2-8
Procedures and Instructions 2-9

Annex A - Use of Information 2A-1

Annex B - How to be a Staff Officer in a Brigade Headquarters 2B-1

Annex C - Functional Application Services 2C-1

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Chapter 3 – Command Posts 3-1

Introduction 3-1
Purpose 3-1
Common Requirements 3-2
Organisation 3-2
Distributed and Dispersed Command 3-5
Application of the Tactical Functions within a Command Post 3-6
Functional and Integrating Cells 3-7
Speciality Cells 3-8
The Operation of Command Posts 3-12
Command Post Siting 3-12

PART B - EXERCISING COMMAND AND CONTROL PB-1

Chapter 4 - Introduction to the Operations Process 4-1

Introduction 4-1
Interrelationship of activities within the Operations Process 4-2
Delineation within Activities 4-2
Setting and maintaining the Operation’s Direction 4-3

Chapter 5 - Assess 5-1

Introduction 5-1
Seizing the Initiative 5-1
Process 5-1
Measures of Effectiveness and Performance 5-3
Information Requirements 5-4
Commanders Critical Information Requirements 5-5
Recognising Variances 5-6

Chapter 6 - Plan 6-1

Section 1 Overview of the Operational and Tactical Planning Processes 6-1
Decision Making in General 6-2
Estimates 6-2
Assessment During Planning 6-3
Planning Overview 6-3
British Army Estimates 6-9
Choice of Tactical Estimate 6-10
Sequences within the UK Estimates 6-11
Staff Groupings 6-12
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Section 2 Operational Level Planning Process 6-13

Overview 6-13
Section 3 The Tactical Estimate 6-17
Introduction 6-17
Stage 1 – Analysis of the Environment and Mission 6-18
Step 1 – Understanding the Situation 6-18
Step 2 – Understand the Problem 6-19
Stage 2 – Development of the Plan 6-19
Step 3 – Formulate COAs 6-19
Step 4 – Develop and Validate COAs 6-20
Step 5 – COA Evaluation 6-20
Step 6 – Commander’s Decision and Development of the Plan 6-21
Tactical Estimate Summary 6-22
Section 4 The Combat Estimate 6-23
Introduction 6-23
Stage 1 – Analysis of the Environment and Mission 6-24
Q0 – Baseline Preparation and Understanding 6-24
Q1 – What is the situation and how does it affect me? 6-24
Q2 – What have I been told to do and why? 6-25
Q3 – What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give in
order to develop a plan? 6-26
Stage 2 – Developing the Plan 6-27
Q4 – Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? 6-27
Q5 – What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect? 6-28
Q6 – When and where do the actions and effects take place in relation
to each other? 6-28
Q7 – What control measures do I need? 6-29
The COA Decision Brief 6-29
Section 5 Common Planning Processes 6-31
Section 5.1 Analysing the Environment and Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlefield 6-32
Introduction 6-32
Intelligence Preparation of the Environment 6-33
IPE Stage 1 – Operational Area Evaluation 6-34
IPE Stage 2 – Threat Evaluation 6-36
IPE Stage 3 – Situation Integration 6-38
Section 5.2 Mission Analysis 6-39
Section 5.3 The Effects Schematic and CONOPS Development 6-41
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The Effects Schematic 6-41

CONOPS Development 6-42
Section 5.4 Wargaming 6-44 `
Introduction 6-44
COA Wargaming 6-45
Section 5.5 Red Teaming 6-49
Section 6 Risk Management 6-52
Introduction 6-52
Risk Management 6-53
The Risk Management Tool 6-54
Consequence Management 6-57
Dispensation and Waivers 6-58
Section 7 Control of Operations 6-59
Section 8 Control of Operations 6-61
Directives, Plans and Orders 6-61
OSW Formats 6-63
Orders Groups 6-65

Chapter 7 - Prepare 7-1

General 7-1
Assessment during Preparation 7-1
Activities during Preparation 7-1

Chapter 8 - Execute 8-1

Introduction 8-1
Command and Control during Execution 8-2
Assessment during Execution 8-3
Decision Making in Execution 8-5
Directing Action 8-8
Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process 8-9
The Operations Centre 8-15
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PART C - COMMAND AND CONTROL IN A COMBINED, JOINT, INTRA-

GOVERNMENTAL INTER-AGENCY AND MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT pC-1
Chapter 9 - Multinational Interoperability 9-1
Introduction 9-1
Dimensions 9-1
Considerations on Multinational Operations 9-4
Liaison Officers 9-10

Chapter 10 - NATO and Allied Planning Processes 10-1

Introduction 10-1
Allied Planning Process Comparison 10-1
NATO Planning Overview 10-3
Allied Planning Processes – NATO OLPP 10-5
Allied Planning Processes – US Model 10-8
Allied Planning Processes – FR Model 10-11
Allied Planning Processes – GE Model 10-15

Chapter 11 - UK Resilience Operations 11-1

Introduction 11-1
Context Civil Primacy and Direction 11-1
Military Support to Resilience Operations 11-2
Planning and Execution of Resilience Operations 11-4
Summary 11-8
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AFMTitle
Pub
Command PART
Chapter
A ?
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PART A
Command and Control

Part A of AFM Command covers commanding

Part A – Command and Control
within the British Army. It addresses the skills and
 Command
qualities needed in a successful commander, as
 Command Support
well as describing the roles of a commander, both
 Command Posts
in barracks and in combat. The British Army’s
philosophy of Mission Command and its application
Part B – Exercising Command and
is also reviewed. Part A, Chapter 2 discusses the
Control
organisational support to the commander provided
• Introduction to the Operations
by the staff. This chapter reviews the duties of the
Process
staff, the interaction of the staff and how a staff is
• Assess
functionally organised to assist the commander in
• Plan
the Operations Process. It also describes the duties
• Prepare
for staffs in brigade, division and corps headquarters.
• Execute
Finally, in Chapter 3, the NATO term Command Post is
introduced. This chapter describes how commanders Part C – Command in the CJIIM
and staff perform their duties in a Command Environment
Post. The chapter also examines Command Post
• Multinational Interoperability
organisation and deployment, as well as reviewing
• NATO and Allied Planning Processes
different command and control methods.
• UK Resilience Operations
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AFMTitle
Pub
Command Chapter
Chapter1?
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Chapter Title?
Command
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Chapter 1
Command

• Introduction
‘On command …..acquire the best • Mission Command
information, sift and assess it, turn it over • Nature of Command
in your mind and judge when to make a • Command Authority
decision knowing full well you have not • Functions of Command
all the information…..that to my mind is • Principles of Command
the essence of command’. • Application of Mission Command
• Additional Command Considerations
Field Marshal The Lord Carver
• Command in a CJIIM Environment
• Command in the Land Component
• The Commander
Introduction • Deputising Command
1-01. Mission Command. Mission Command • Span of Command
is the British Army’s command • Command States
philosophy. This is an approach which • Control
empowers subordinate commanders
and promotes initiative as well as freedom and speed of action. Critically, it focuses
on achievement of the higher intent through mission-type orders. It empowers
leaders at every level and is intended to generate agility and tempo. This enables
us to overcome an enemy in the most chaotic and demanding circumstances and
unlocks everyone’s potential to seize winning opportunities.1 See Chapter 6 of ADP
Land Operations (para 0607) for additional discussion on Mission Command.

1-02. Mission Command: An Approach. Mission Command applies equally to the

commander as to the team. Through its exercise, Mission Command bridges organisations
and capabilities to deliver outcome. This chapter address the nature of Command,
its principles and functions that apply to an individual – the commander. It also
discusses how the commander applies Mission Command across the team to win.

1-03. Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the
direction, coordination and control of military forces. It includes the processes by which
commanders, supported by their staff, make decisions, convey intent, and impress their
will in order to accomplish missions. Command is a blend of subjective art and objective
science. It is founded on an understanding of the desired outcome; an appreciation
of concepts, missions and priorities; and the allocation of resources. Its subjective
components include: assessment of factors such as the impact of surprise, politics and
morale; decision making where there is little or no information; and anticipating the
enemy. It also requires objective analysis to control the operation and to resolve issues
relating to the mechanics of movement, logistics, and Communication and Information
Systems (CIS). Control, as a function of command, is the oversight, direction and
coordination of assigned forces in accordance with the commander’s plan and intent.2

1 ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 0607

2 ADP Land Operations, 2017 para 0902.
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Nature of Command Command Authority

1-04. Command Authority. Command authority is vested
„„ Authority
in an individual for the direction, coordination and
control of military forces. It has a legal and constitutional „„ Responsibility
status, codified for the Army in Queen’s Regulations,
„„ Accountability
and is vested in a commander by a higher authority
that gives direction and assigns forces to accomplish
a mission. The exercise of command is the process by
which a commander makes decisions, impresses their will on and transmits intentions to
subordinates. It entails authority, responsibility and accountability. Delegation3 is
closely linked with Command Authority. A commander needs to have all four in balance
to command effectively. This requirement is derived from the Military Covenant.4 With
the right to enforce decisions, however, comes the responsibility for the consequences.
To command is to direct with authority, whilst taking full responsibility for outcomes.

a. Authority. Authority is the power and right to give orders and enforce obedience. It
is necessarily accompanied by an equal responsibility for what one does and fails to
do. A commander can delegate specific authority to subordinates to decide and to act
within their own areas of delegated responsibility, but the commander retains overall
responsibility.

b. Responsibility. Responsibility is the ability and obligation to act independently and

make decisions. Responsibility is also the legal and ethical obligation that a commander
assumes for their actions, accomplishments, or failures and those of the subordinates.
The commander is responsible for the readiness of the force including training, health,
welfare, morale and discipline of personnel, as well as the maintenance of equipment
in their command. In combat, a commander assumes responsibility for the loss or
preservation of human life and the destruction or preservation of materiel and real
estate. Commanders can only be held responsible if they have been given sufficient
authority to complete the required tasks.

c. Accountability. Accountability is the requirement and expectation to justify actions

and decisions. Accountability links authority and responsibility, ensuring that authority
is applied appropriately and that responsibilities are fulfilled. It requires, therefore,
that responsibility and authority are aligned. Additionally, specific to the military, it
requires commanders to answer to a superior officer and ultimately to the Crown for
the effective and efficient use of force. This ultimately affects the life of every soldier
under their command. The concepts of individual and command accountability are
enshrined in law. Individual members of the armed forces are accountable for their
own actions on operations, for example by not giving or obeying orders to commit war
crimes. Commanders have additional accountability in that they can be held criminally
accountable if they knew, or ought to have known, that crimes were being committed,
or were about to be committed and failed to take all necessary and reasonable action
to prevent or investigate them.

d. Delegation. A commander can delegate specific authority to subordinates and

staff officers to make decisions and to act within their own areas of responsibility.
Subordinate staff officers must understand their authority, responsibility and
accountability as they relate to their relationships with the commander, other

3 ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 0604.

4 ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 0329.
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staff officers and subordinate commanders. As part of the philosophy of Mission

Command a commander can delegate specific authority to subordinates to decide
and to act within their own areas of delegated responsibility. The commander retains
responsibility and accountability even when authority is delegated.

1-05. Functions of Command. In British Army Doctrine, there

are three functions of command: decision making, Functions of Command
leadership, and control.
„„ Decision Making
a. Decision making. Decision making is critical to
„„ Leadership
commanding, leading and Mission Command. A
defining characteristic of great military leaders is the „„ Control
ability to make the right decision at the right time,
under immense pressure and in the worst conditions.
Decision making and its constituent parts are described in detail in Part B.

b. Leadership. Leadership is exercised at all levels within the Army and is not the sole
domain of command. At the individual soldier level, leadership is displayed by making
the right choice in difficult situations, often when isolated. It is included in paragraph
1-23a as a skill and quality required by a commander.

c. Control. Control is the primary tool commanders use to achieve mission success.
Control is almost always coupled with Command. Control is explained at paragraph
1-45 and in Part B.

1-06. Command Support. At all but the very lowest tactical levels, Command is
enabled through Command Support, which is described in detail in Chapter 2.

Functions of Leadership
Command

Decision Control
Making

Elements of
Command
Support

CI Provision of a HQ
S; P s
rocesses & Procedur e

Figure 1.1. – The Command Model

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Principles of Command
1-07. Principles of Command. Joint Doctrine describes Principles of Command.5
Use of these principles is critical in Army, joint and multinational operations.
These principles will be addressed in various sections of the manual.

a. Unity of Command. Unity of Command provides the necessary cohesion for planning
and executing operations. Commanders achieve this authority by establishing
command relationships when a force is established.

b. Continuity of Command. Continuity of Command describes the ability for command

authority to be exercised continually, over time, in a given area of operations. It
depends on appropriately trained, structured and resourced command support, as well
as establishing measures of deputising that are widely understood.

c. Chain of Command. A chain of command describes the succession of commanders,

from a superior to a subordinate, through whom command is exercised. It is a
hierarchical structure that links points of command and defines their relationships.
A clear chain of command, understood by all, strengthens integration between
formations and units, enhancing Unity of Command. Subordinates must be in no
doubt as to the command state within which they are operating, to whom they
are responsible and for what. On multinational operations absolute clarity must be
established over national responsibilities and those of the coalition or alliance.

d. Integration of Command. The command structure should ensure that the capabilities
of the force are integrated to achieve the commander’s objectives in the most effective
way. The specific task organisation will reflect the higher commander’s requirements.

e. Mission Command. Described in more detail below.

Application of Mission Command

1-08. Principles of Mission Command. Mission Command comprises one guiding
principle and five further principles. The fundamental guiding principle of Mission
Command is the absolute responsibility to act to achieve the superior commander’s
intent. In order to successfully achieve the guiding principle, commanders rely
on the additional principles of Mission Command, which are as follows:

a. Unity of Effort. Unity of Effort is the coordination and cooperation among all forces
to achieve a common objective. Understanding the commander’s intent two levels up,
coupled with coherent subordinate planning, assists in establishing Unity of Effort. It
requires common and accepted processes and procedures. Incorporated is a common
military language which includes terminology, symbology, orders formats, reports and
returns, SOIs and SOPs. Unity of Effort starts during IPE, continues through actions
on the objective through to reconstitution and is necessary in all military activities
from combat to peace keeping. When Unity of Effort is not achieved mission failure
becomes a tangible risk.
b. Freedom of Action. Freedom of Action is the default condition of mission
command. It assumes that subordinates have the freedom to achieve the commander’s
intent though commanders should specify necessary constraints to subordinates. These
constraints should be kept to the bare minimum. Freedom of Action enables

5 JDP 01 UK Joint Operations Doctrine, Nov 14

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initiative, which allows subordinates to adjust their actions after the commencement
of an operation or mission. Within Mission Command, Freedom of Action is best
executed through decentralised execution.

c. Trust. Trust is a vital component in the relationship between commanders and

subordinates and goes both ways. Although trust is built through time and experience,
it should be the start point of a command relationship. As commanders see the
strength of subordinates through training and execution, trust in their ability should
increase. Likewise, subordinates build trust in their leaders. Subordinates will
develop and achieve the skills needed to win in combat if they are allowed, by wise
commanders, to discover and correct their weaknesses through honest mistakes in
training.

d. Mutual Understanding. The basis for mutual understanding rests in working to a

common doctrine. Understanding, like trust, builds on shared experiences. Mutual
understanding is easiest achieved at the unit level and below, but becomes increasingly
difficult as the span and complexity of command increases. Mutual understanding
requires immense effort to achieve and maintain in multinational operations. It is
critical that commanders work through the barriers that prevent, degrade, or erode
mutual understanding.

e. Timely and Effective Decision Making. Commanders and leaders make decisions.
During the initial planning process, commanders have more time to understand
the situation through a comprehensive gathering of information. To succeed on
operations, reduce risk and maximise effectiveness, commanders should analyse and
exploit information and knowledge that is already held. However, there will always
be gaps preventing a complete understanding of the situation. During the execution
phase, commanders will have less time and information on which to make critical
decisions. Good judgement is required so that decisions can be made at the right time
in order to influence the decision cycle. Commanders should use analytical tools, as
well as the staff, to assist in decision making as much as possible. Timely decisions
will influence tempo and behaviour resulting in favourable change in the rational
calculation of all stakeholders (or actors).

Application of Mission Command

„„ Commanders ensure that their subordinates understand the intent, their own
contributions and the context within which they are to act.

„„ Commanders exercise minimum control over their subordinates, consistent with the
context and nature of the mission and the experience and ability of subordinates, while
retaining responsibility for their actions.

„„ Subordinates are told the outcome that they are contributing to, the effect that they are
to realise and why.

„„ Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

„„ Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent.

„„ Subordinates must communicate their plan to the commander to ensure situational

awareness.
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Additional Command Considerations

1-09. Legal and Ethical Considerations.

a. Commanders are morally and legally responsible for their soldiers, even when
exercising Mission Command where there is often a minimum of direct supervision
and a maximum of delegated authority to subordinates. Creating a culture of respect
for the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) within their commands will improve morale and
discipline, demonstrate legitimacy of purpose and reduce the incidence of violations.

b. The UK is legally bound to investigate potential violations of the LOAC6 and, if

substantiated, prosecute those concerned. While individual members of the armed
forces are accountable for their own actions on operations, commanders have an
additional accountability under the doctrine of command responsibility.

c. In preparation for operations, the commander must take account of the LOAC
when establishing procedures or conducting training. In the planning and conduct
of operations during an armed conflict, the commander must consider the LOAC
when issuing all orders and instructions. Commanders must also take steps to
prevent violations of the law, report violations if they occur and, if necessary, institute
disciplinary action.

d. The legal framework for command responsibility states that a commander has an
obligation to be aware of the attitudes and actions of those under their command.
Accordingly, commanders may be held criminally liable:

(1) If they participate7 in conducting a war crime, particularly by ordering its

commission; or

(2) For failing to act, if they know, or should have known, that war crimes were
being committed, or about to be committed, by forces under their command and
fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent
their commission, or to submit the matter to the relevant competent authority for
investigation and prosecution.8

e. Legal advice. Commanders are at the heart of a potentially complex international

legal framework during operations. Their own actions must be compliant with the
applicable law and must also fulfil their wider command responsibilities, including their
central role in both the service disciplinary justice system, laid down by the AFA 06 and
the Army administrative system.9 To assist them in incorporating legal considerations
into their decision making, the commander must have access to a legal advisor.10

6 The Hague Convention (HC) IV Art 3; Geneva Convention (GC) 1 Art 49, GC II Art 129, GC IV Arts 29 &
146, Additional protocol (AP) 1 Art 91 and the Armed Forces Act 2006 (AFA 06) sections 113 to 115.
7 All individuals are responsible for violations if: they commit the crime on their own or jointly with others, order, solicit or
induce a crime which is committed or attempted, aid, abet or otherwise assist in the commission of the crime, including
providing the means for its commission, or contribute to the commission or attempted commission of the crime by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose. International Criminal Court Statute, 1998 (Rome Statute), Article 25.
The UK has enacted this Statute and brought this into domestic law via the International Criminal Court Act 2001.
8 AP I Article 86(2) Rome Statute, Article 28, International Criminal Court Act 2001 Section 65(2) & (3).
9 Army General Administrative Instruction, Volume 2, Chapter 67 (AGAI 67).
10 AP I Article 82.
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‘For Western societies that are increasingly sceptical about the use of military
force in interventions of choice, perceived to have only a tenuous link to national
interests, the ethical and legal justification underpinning these operations is vital
ground, before and during the operation. This is most acute because ethics and
morality have become weapons used by non-state players against states. The ever-
present spectre of the ‘propaganda of the deed’ ensures that any armed conflict is
conducted in several theatres simultaneously. Therefore, while a particular incident
in a campaign may have little operational effect on the ground, it could generate
strategic effect within public opinion of the country concerned and consequently
on the world stage. The ethical narrative used in the justification to deploy military
forces must therefore be sustained by the ethical component within that operation
both in the actions and behaviour of military personnel but also in the manner in
which the operation is conducted by commanders at all levels’.

AGILE WARRIOR Report 2014/2015, page 70, June 2015

1-10. Flexibility. Commanders and their headquarters must be flexible, energetic and
capable of swift change when required. Headquarters are scalable by design so that
they can configure themselves (possibly with augmentation) to adapt and undertake a
number of different roles and tasks. The size and shape of the force under command,
the range of actors with whom the headquarters must interact, as well as the tasks
allocated, will determine how a headquarters should be configured. See Chapter 3.

Command in a Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency

Multinational Environment (CJIIM)

The art of coalition command - whether it is here in Afghanistan, whether it was

in Iraq or in Bosnia or in Haiti - is to take the resources you are provided with,
understand what the strengths and weaknesses are and to employ them to the
best overall effect.

General David Petraeus

1-11. Land forces operate in a Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency Multinational

(CJIIM) environment which is characterised by the requirement to work with forces
from other components, governmental and non-governmental organisations, as well as
agencies (police, intelligence etc) from the UK and other countries, coalition partners and
host-nation forces. In addition, UK forces are likely to have force elements from other
countries under command. Different CJIIM actors will have different objectives and may
be guided by different principles and motivation. Command in a CJIIM environment may
require a modified approach.

1-12. Each CJIIM element is likely to have its own bespoke authority, accountability and
command procedures. The differences between multinational elements, between civilian
and military, or between deployed forces and the host government, may be acute,
with serious implications for decision making and operational tempo. Understanding
these differences, including where decisions can be informed and shaped, is key to the
collective effort.
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1-13. The headquarters is likely to provide a point of coordination, alignment and integration.
Early integration is vital and where possible should be included in pre-deployment training
and in the Reception, Staging and Onward Integration (RSOI)11 process.

1-14. Interoperability requirements will depend on the level of integration deemed appropriate
between the CJIIM actors. In some cases, an awareness of a particular activity, including
how it contributes to the mission and can be exploited, combined with suitable
deconfliction, may suffice. In other circumstances, such as a multinational force,
interoperability will lie at the heart of success. Challenges may range from differing
doctrine to different law, through language, to critical variations in techniques, tactics,
procedures and sustainment. Interoperability risks must be understood in detail and
actively managed. See Part C.

1-15. Coalition Command. The commander will create and manage the bespoke formation.
This requires an understanding of the political, strategic and national issues associated
with each troop-contributing nation and those of the lead nation, should it not be the
UK. The commander must also understand the respective national interpretations of
international law and domestic law that will often combine with policy to result, for
example, in differing national Rules of Engagement (ROE). There may be times when
a coalition is imposed upon the commander for reasons that relate to the greater
strategic good, thus creating interoperability frictions at the tactical level that will require
a great deal of patience and pragmatism to overcome. Effective communication
between the commander and contributing nations can mitigate this friction.

1-16. Inter-Agency Integration. The commander will be at the heart of the effort to integrate
and command joint, contractor-provided, inter-agency and multinational capabilities.
The commander will need to devote time and effort to the establishment of key inter-
agency relationships, the integration of working practices and procedures and the fusion
of objectives and goals. Essentially this is leadership by persuasion. In particular the
commander will focus on improving unity of effort and organisational agility. Personal
involvement by the commander is crucial.

Command in the Land Component

1-17. Land Component Command (LCC). Usually a separate LCC is designated to sit above
tactical formations. During major combat, this should be assumed as essential, unless
the formation HQ has been specifically structured and trained for this task. Occasionally
an HQ may be required to act as an LCC as well as a formation HQ, which this is the
most demanding case. There is inherent tension between the tactical responsibilities
of a formation commander and the operational aspects of component command. This
increases with the degree to which the commander has to focus, simultaneously, on
tactical decision making, while supporting the development of the campaign plan. The
diagram at Figure 1.2 shows how the LCC interfaces between the Operational and
Tactical levels of conflict.

1-18. The Land Component Commander is responsible for planning and executing tactical-
level operations. The commander does this by using allocated land forces and capabilities
temporarily allocated from other components. Operational-level objectives are translated
into tactical-level plans through the operations planning process by the Joint Force
Commander and the component commanders.12

11 NATO uses RSOM&I.

12 AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Section 5, Edition A Version 1, March 2016.
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Alliance
Strategic plans
Strategic Strategic end-state
Strategic on employment

Military strategy
General direction and guidance
Military strategic Limitations on employment

Operational

Land Component
Campa gic)
ign end state (based on strate

Command
Cam ons
paign erati
objectives and plan and major op
Tactical

Battles, engagements, activities

Figure 1.2. – Land Component Command and the levels of conflict

1-19. Items that a Land Component Command handles that a formation command does
not, include:

a. Time and Space. A component command plans for the entire campaign and not for
any specific period ahead of the current battle. It normally considers necessary actions
and desired effects within the entirety of a nominated Joint Operations Area (JOA).

b. Level. Component commanders and their staff contribute to operationa-level planning

in close conjunction with the operational-level HQ. However, component command is
the highest level at which tactical activity is conducted, including joint tactical activity.
The Land Component Commander and staff should have a deep understanding of
operational art and the role of the Land Component at the operational level, which
require additional training and education above that required by a tactical HQ.

c. Resources. Component commanders should be prepared and resourced to plan at all

levels, in conjunction with other components, including subordinate tactical levels if
necessary for a particular joint objective.

d. Staff Functions. At the Land Component-level there are specialist staff functions that
may not be represented in a tactical formation-level HQ. These include: political and
legal advice, campaign planning, targeting, information operations, media operations
and community relations activities, military police activities, civil-military relations and
national intelligence cell activities.

e. Liaison. There is a significant requirement for liaison at the component level,

particularly with the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and other components,
subordinate formations and national contingents, with the host nation, civilian
agencies and organisations. Most of this liaison will be on a reciprocal basis.
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1-20. Responsibilities of the Land Component Commander. When acting as a Land

Component Commander, the additional responsibilities of a commander include:

a. Contributing to the campaign planning process and advising the Joint Force
Commander (JFC) on the employment of all land forces under command.

b. Planning, directing and coordinating operations in support of the JFC’s intent and
concept of operations.

c. Executing elements of the campaign plan and coordinating operations with other
component commanders.

d. Contributing to the joint coordination of the campaign.

e. Providing direction and guidance on the requirements for CIS to subordinate

commanders and any other communications supporting elements. For operations with
technologically incompatible multinational land force systems, the Joint Force Land
Component Commander (JFLCC) may have to validate additional communications
support requirements to the JFC for adjudication.

1-21. Selection of the Land Component Commander. The key factors in the selection
of a Land Component Commander include the requirement for a commander of the
appropriate rank and authority to influence the operational employment of land forces,
as well as the requirement to interact and liaise with the CJTF commander. A tactical
formation commander’s first duty is the command of their formation. If the additional
requirements pertaining to the role of Land Component Commander would significantly
detract from their ability to command, another officer should be appointed as the Land
Component Commander. That officer might be of the same rank, but would normally be
senior and have greater authority assigned. In some circumstances it might be appropriate
to appoint a deputy to the formation commander, with responsibility for operational-level
aspects of command.

The Commander

When times are bad...there will come a sudden pause when your men stop and
look at you. No one will speak: they will just look at you and expect leadership.
Their courage is ebbing: you must force it to flow back and it is not easy

Field Marshall Slim

1-22. The Role of the Commander. The role of a commander at any level is to make decisions
regarding the actions of forces under command, to lead those forces and to control them.
The commander must do so at a pace that contributes to the generation and maintenance
of tempo and in a way that achieves success. A commander exists to make things
happen and does this in two primary ways: through leadership and through decision
making. In order to do this, commanders require a number of skills and qualities.
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‘Be an example to your men, in your duty and in private life. Never spare yourself
and let your troops see that you don’t in your endurance of fatigue and privation.
Always be tactful and well-mannered. Avoid excessive sharpness or harshness of
voice, which usually indicates the man who has shortcomings of his own to hide.’

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

1-23. Skills & Qualities. There is no unique formula for the right combination of command
skills and qualities. Clausewitz described two indispensable qualities of command:
‘First, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the
inner light which leads to the truth and second, the courage to follow this faint
light wherever it may go’.13 Churchill’s view was that ‘there is required for the
composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning
power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain,14 an original, queer
and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten’.15 The list of
skills and qualities below is not exhaustive, but deficiencies in any one of these will
compromise the ability of a commander to lead, make decisions and control:

a. Leadership. Military leadership is characterised by the projection of personality

and purpose onto people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding
circumstances.16 Commanders lead through a combination of example, persuasion, and
compulsion. While providing leadership is a commander’s primary responsibility, it is
also a responsibility of every military superior, including officers and non-commissioned
officers. Leaders (and thus commanders) need to be the cutting edge of the force,
leading by example, innovating and shaping values and behaviours to ensure that
the force performs well and without moral blemish.17

‘I would like you to be quite clear under the conditions in which you will have to
exercise leadership. You will be frequently tired. You may also be cold and wet and
hungry and thirsty. You may be dripping with sweat, or may be freezing with cold.
You won’t know precisely what is going on, you won’t know exactly where the
enemy is, you certainly won’t know what he is going to do or what his capabilities
are of doing anything. You may not know where your own people are or what they
are going to do. To put it briefly, you have got to exercise leadership in conditions
of fatigue and fear, uncertainty and ignorance and often in isolation. That is what
makes it extremely difficult and that is why leadership on the battlefield calls, in my
view, for the very highest qualities’

Field Marshal The Lord Harding of Petherton, addressing the Senior Division when C.I.G.S., July 1953,
taken from Serve To Lead.

13 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),
page 102.
14 Legerdemain is a French word meaning ‘sleight of hand’, a display of skill or cleverness for deceitful purposes.
15 Winston S Churchill, The World Crisis Vol II, 1915, (London, 1923) page 21.
16 Developing Leaders: A British Army Guide.
17 Ibid.
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b. Understanding. Understanding the nature of

Skills and Qualities
the operation about to be embarked is central to
fighting effectively and understanding continues „„ Leadership
throughout and, importantly, after the operation
„„ Understanding
has ended. Exploiting existing knowledge is essential
for effective mission command as it enables units „„ Decision Making
to learn and adapt faster than their adversaries to
„„ Vision and Intellect
improve mission performance. However, developing
understanding across the force cannot occur unless „„ Initiative
effective command and control arrangements are
„„ Judgement
in place. These are mutually supporting activities.
Understanding is command led. Commanders ask „„ Building Relationships
the questions that drive the process and the activities
„„ The Ability to
that inform the force. Supported and informed
Communicate
by staff, commanders are enabled to make better
decisions. „„ Learning from
Experience
c. Decision Making. The ability to make difficult
decisions in complex situations is central to the
exercise of command and requires a balance between
analysis and intuition. In the pursuit of the timely decision-making required by
Mission Command, a commander should have confidence in their own judgement.
A commander should maintain the chosen course of action until they are aware that
there is, or will be, a sufficiently significant change in the situation to require a new
decision. It will be a conscious choice to delay or refrain from making a decision at
that specific time. Good commanders anticipate decisions (deciding when to decide)
and can make conscious choices to abstain from making decisions (deciding not to
decide). A commander requires the moral courage to adopt a new course of action
and the mental flexibility to act purposefully when the opportunity of unexpected
success presents itself. While decision making is one of the three functions of
command, authority to make routine decisions can be delegated to the staff, although
responsibility remains with the commander. This is not to say that decisions are made
by the commander in isolation. A commander will require detail from the staff and
specialist advisors in order to increase understanding in the decision-making process.

d. Vision and Intellect. Understanding a complex problem and deciding what to do

require vision and intellect. Vision is the ability for a commander to describe the
outcomes sought. Without vision, the command would be unable to develop a plan
or express intent. Intellect embraces clarity of thought (including the ability to seek and
identify the essentials), originality (based on imagination), judgement and initiative.

e. Initiative. Initiative is the ability to seek, recognise and grasp opportunities. It requires
flexibility of thought and action. A command climate of freedom, trust, confidence
and encouragement is essential in allowing initiative to flourish. For example, to make
reasonable mistakes in training is allowing and encouraging initiative. Subordinates
must be encouraged to take the initiative rather than fear the consequences of failure,
as this will unlock their good ideas and promote development. It will also encourage
subordinates to act to achieve the commander’s intent, without deference to higher
authority. This requires a culture that promotes calculated risk-taking, daring to be
right rather than being afraid to be wrong. Initiative does, however, need to be
tempered by good judgement.
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Nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Old English saying

f. Judgement. Judgement is a matter of common sense, informed by experience. As

responsibility increases, broader and deeper judgement is required of commanders. To
succeed, a commander must be able to read a wide range of situations and interpret
them correctly and quickly, sometimes with little information. This depends on a
refined combination of experience, knowledge, intellect and intuition. However, a
commander seldom has a complete picture of the situation, as many of the factors
affecting decision making cannot be subject to precise calculation. To weigh up the
imponderables in a confusing situation, a commander needs a clear mind, exercising
sound judgement to distinguish the essentials from a mass of detail and to identify
practical solutions.

g. Building Relationships. Commanders build relationships on many levels. As well as

the traditional relationships associated within a chain of command, commanders need
to create, build and maintain effective relationships with inter-agency, multinational
and joint actors. These relationships are often less defined, if at all, than those of
military groups. While robust leadership may be required, commanders must be
empathic and patient, prepared to collaborate and compromise through persuasion
and negotiation. Finally, commanders need to build and maintain their relationship
with the staff, some of whom will be augmentees and may not know, or be known by,
the commander.

h. Communicating. The ability to communicate effectively is an important aspect of

command. A commander’s powers of analysis and decision making may be exceptional,
but they will be of little use if the commander cannot express intentions clearly in
orders that others can act upon. Orders and directives are described in Chapter 6
section 8.
i. Learning. Commanders must strive to continually improve themselves professionally.
Two aspects of improvement are the need to learn from experience (their own and the
experiences of others) and the need to learn from history. For the former, this includes
the need to have the humility to admit when they have made mistakes and then have
the courage to learn and recover from these mistakes. All commanders, however
experienced, make mistakes, though a successful commander will never make the
same mistake again. It is best to learn from the mistakes of others and from history.

‘The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by
your men’s experience), ie the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’
experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work
where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men.

Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never
at a loss for how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully)
before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path
ahead.’

General James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis USMC

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1-24. Creating and Fostering the Command Climate. A commander, by the nature of their
personality, command style and general behaviour, has a considerable influence on
the morale, sense of direction and performance of the command organisation. It is the
commander’s responsibility to craft and sustain a climate of mutual respect and trust.
This climate is fundamental for the team to be a learning organisation; improving over
time and with experience. Successful Mission Command thrives in a command climate
that encourages subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently, to take the
initiative and to be uninhibited in telling superiors accurate and, at times, unwelcome
information. It is chiefly the commander’s responsibility to build, foster, and maintain
such a climate. A great commander sets the conditions for the team to contribute.

1-25. Understanding and Managing Risk. Commanders at all levels must understand the
risk inherent in the operations they are commanding but not be constrained by it. This
includes understanding the higher commander’s appetite for risk and then setting the risk
appetite across the command without hindering the ability to make tactical decisions.
This requires dialogue, trust, transparency, understanding and anticipation. A poor risk
culture will constrain initiative, degrade the force, or hamper it with needless process.
An effective risk culture will protect the force, its legitimacy, exploit opportunity and
play to the strengths of mission command. Risk is examined further in Chapter 6.

1-26. The Position of the Commander. Commanders must decide where they can
best understand and influence events and outcomes. They must identify the best
position to observe, assess, and lead.18 In doing so, the commander must
consider the position in relation to the force, the means of command at their
disposal and the mission. The commander must understand where and when they
can add value and achieve influence, both in a physical and mental sense, and
position accordingly. The enduring moral requirement to ‘lead from the front’ will
influence this decision, particularly at the tactical level. However, when positioned
forward, there is always a real risk of being distracted by the immediate dangers
and losing the ability to command. The following factors shape this decision:

a. The ability to assess the situation, including judging the condition and morale of the
force and being able to impose will upon it.

b. Access to other information which is important to the mission, such as assessments

that relate to the condition of the enemy.

c. Secure and reliable communications to the various points of command.

d. Access to staff support for planning and decision making in order to maintain
continuity.

e. Security, including physical and electronic protection, taking into account the size and
signature of a Command Post and its constituent parts. Siting of a Command Post is
found in Chapter 3.

1-27. The principal role of the commander is that of commanding the battle, assigning
missions, tasks and resources, understanding enemy intentions and taking key
decisions to achieve objectives. The commander should decide where to be best
placed so that they can influence the decisive action. Often, through interaction

18 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

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with host-nation actors and key inter-agency partners, the commander will take
on the additional functions of contributing significantly to the understanding
generated in the HQ and furthering key campaign goals through direct influence.
The commander must understand where and when they can add value and achieve
influence. The commander’s personal involvement is likely to carry significant weight.

The position of the commander is where he can get the best information, then
after making a decision have it known to all so action can be taken. He may well be
up front or back at main.

Field Marshall The Lord Carver 1978

Deputising Command
1-28. Requirements. A deputy, in the form of a second in command, exists from section up
to battlegroup level, but this has not traditionally been the case at formation levels of
command. This has changed at the divisional and brigade levels, however the deputising
of command is not necessarily synonymous with appointing deputy commanders and
seconds in command. There is a requirement for a deputy when one or more of the
following conditions apply:

a. When there is a need to provide short-term relief for the commander. For example,
when they rest or are absent from their place of command, either on or off duty.

b. When succession in the chain of command must be provided (for example, in the event
that the original commander is killed or wounded in action or, for whatever reason,
relieved of command).

c. When there is a need to reduce the burden on a commander by delegating

responsibilities.

d. At both the tactical and operational levels, when deputy commanders of multinational
or joint forces are required, in order to promote the cohesion of such forces.

1-29. Authority, Responsibility, Accountability. The authority, responsibility and

accountability of the commander remain unchanged.

1-30. Span of Command. The span of command, or the nature of operations, can make the
appointment of a deputy expedient, if only to supervise preparations or to control discrete
force elements not in contact. This enables the commander to perform their command
role unfettered from having to be concerned about the detail of tasks that are not so
critical or immediate.

1-31. Reliefs. In the absence of established deputy commanders, senior arms advisors or
principal general staff officers, such as chiefs of staff, can provide reliefs for commanders
for short periods. Lack of sleep can have a significant effect on the physical and cognitive
performance of a commander. Attention lapses and reduced insight, leading to reduced
understanding and an over-estimation of one’s own abilities, are some of the common
symptoms. Commanders have a duty to impose adequate sleep routines on themselves
and on their subordinates.
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1-32. Succession. A second in command provides succession at the lower tactical levels and is
normally available to assume command at little or no notice if the original commander is
no longer available to exercise command. On operations at formation level, procedures
for alternate command rest on nominating a subordinate commander to assume
command. The potential practical difficulties of adopting this procedure should be
recognised when setting up the command organisation for a particular campaign or major
operation. A subordinate not only has to move to join the superior headquarters (if it still
exists), which will take time, but must also acquaint themselves fully with the situation at
that level of command before they are in a position to assume command effectively. This
will be achieved more quickly if they are fully conversant with the predecessor’s intent.

1-33. Delegation. Delegating command responsibilities allows the senior commander to

concentrate on particular areas or concerns, leaving a nominated deputy to concentrate
on others. For example, deputy commanders may have specific, delegated powers of
budgetary and financial responsibility in peacetime. On operations, if the commander
were to fall in action or be otherwise incapacitated, the nominated deputy commander
would be available to take their place. Alternatively, those who deputise for the
commander in peacetime may not necessarily deploy with a formation and may be
retained at the home base to look after the residual responsibilities of deployed
commander and to train reinforcing units.

1-34. Deputies of Multinational or Joint Forces. Deputy commanders of multinational forces

may be appointed to help strengthen the collective command of an alliance, or to bond
coalition forces together, giving a visible expression of national representation in the
higher levels of command.
1-35. Deputy Commanders. The scale and complexity of operations, particularly at the
divisional level, mean that command cannot be exercised without the support of a deputy
commander (DComd19) who exercises command when the commander is absent from the
HQ. The DComd may also be used to control a particular phase or geographical area
of the operation which requires forward command:

a. The relationship between the deputy and the staff is unique. Staff members do not
work for the deputy commander unless the commander directs this relationship. Each
commander describes the deputy commander’s roles, duties and relationships with the
COS, the staff and the commanders of subordinate units. Normally, the commander
assigns specific fields of interest and responsibilities to deputies, to decentralise
decision making while maintaining overall command.20

b. Deputy Commanders normally do not have a dedicated staff. When they have specific
responsibilities, the HQ staff assists them as the commander prescribes. Deputy
Commanders give orders to the COS (or direct to the staff) within the commander’s
limits and may go to the COS at any time for staff assistance. If a deputy commander
needs a staff, the commander may detail officers from the HQ or subordinate units to
help, or make a subordinate unit’s HQ available.

19 NATO abbreviation for Deputy Commander is DCOM.

20 ATP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied land Forces.
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Span of Command
1-36. There is a limit to the number of subordinate organisations that a commander can
effectively command. This number will depend upon several factors including the
complexity of the task, geographical spread and nature of the organisation. If the span
of command is too great it will impact upon the ability of the commander to maintain
understanding and make timely decisions. The task organisation of a unit or formation
must take this into account. The number of external organisations including agencies,
allies, coalition members and host-nation force elements with which a commander has
to interact should also be considered. The Army’s experience suggests that for complex
manoeuvre operations in contact with the enemy, a span of command should not exceed
five subordinate manoeuvre groupings. This rule is not absolute, but is a good principle
for organising brigades, battlegroups and sub units. The fewer the points of command,
the more rapid the tempo.

1-37. For ground-holding or framework security operations, the span of command may be
exceeded as a static headquarters has greater capacity for complex communications
and information systems, with the commander and staff being less concerned with the
requirement to manoeuvre. In a static headquarters, tempo is generated by managing and
processing large amounts of information while generating multiple plans and executing
missions concurrently.

In 1976 as part of saving money it was decided have all divisions in Germany
command without any intermediate brigade headquarters direct to battle groups.
This span meant commanding ten battle groups in contact over a 30km frontage.
This was too big and by 1980 the brigade level of command was formally returned.

From Craftsmen of the Army by JM Keene Vol 2 page 186

Command States
1-38. A common understanding of the degrees of authority is a prerequisite for effective
cooperation. Command arrangements must always be qualified by the DTG at which
they begin. They should also specify the DTG at which they are likely to end and must
accommodate the situation prior to and after transfer of authority (TOA). Note that when
working in a multinational environment, the authority granted through command states
must be clarified with the issuing commander.

1-39. Command States explain the status of formations, units and commanders, relative to
each other. States of command are concerned primarily with the ability to assign an
independent mission, to reorganise a unit to suit its task, or to direct specific tasks within
an agreed mission. They exist in order to:

a. Allow a higher headquarters to prioritise resources and effort.

b. Protect the integrity of force structures and where appropriate to protect the
independence of non-organic forces.

c. Assist with force packaging when working with limited resources.

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In general, the command state should be set at the highest level possible, whereas control
should be held at the lowest level possible. Control at too high a level can result in a loss
of flexibility and tempo. Conversely, command at too low a level can result in the inability
to concentrate resources and will hamper the ability to rapidly switch priorities.

1-40. Full Command (FULLCOM). FULLCOM is the military authority and responsibility of a
commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations
and administration and exists only within national Services. The term ‘command’, as
used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely
national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has FULLCOM over the assigned
forces of other nations. Only OPCOM or OPCON (see below) can be delegated across
national lines.

1-41. Operational and Tactical Command States:

a. Operational Command (OPCOM). OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander

to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units and to
reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be
necessary. It includes the authority to assign separate employment to components of
the units concerned. It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics
(see ADCON, below).

b. Operational Control (OPCON). OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander

to direct assigned forces so that they may accomplish their specific missions or tasks,
usually limited by function, time, or location, to deploy units concerned and to retain
or assign tactical control to those units. OPCON allows a commander to issue missions
and tasks to subordinates, within the scope of the mission issued by higher authority.21
It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of components of the
units concerned. Nor does it include administrative or logistic control.

c. Tactical Command (TACOM). TACOM is the authority delegated to a commander to

assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission
assigned by higher authority.

d. Tactical Control (TACON). TACON is the detailed local direction and control of
movement, or manoeuvre which is necessary to accomplish missions or assigned tasks.

21 Note that this is the authority to issue Missions and Tasks to OPCON subordinates is a UK interpretation
reflecting the likelihood of the definition being revised by NATO in the near future.
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OPCON
Authority FULLCOM OPCOM TACOM TACON (7)
(2)

Task organise the assigned element (1) X X

Assign missions to the assigned

element (3) X X X(4)

Assign tasks to the assigned element

for the purpose of which it has been X X X X (5)
assigned.

OPCOM OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON

May further delegate command OPCON OPCON TACOM TACON
authority (6) TACOM TACOM TACON
TACON TACON

Coordinate movement, local defence,

and force protection. X X X X X

Planning and coordination X X X X X

Administrative and logistic

X
responsibility

FULLCOM full command OPCON operational control TACON tactical control

OPCOM operational command TACOM tactical command

Notes:
(1) The gaining commander may task organise the assigned unit and thus assign separate missions to it and its
component parts. This is limited to FULLCOM and OPCOM. A commander assigned forces under FULLCOM or
OPCOM may employ those forces for any purpose.
(2) For forces allocated under OPCON the gaining commander may not break up the organisational integrity
of the force for separate employment. Under OPCON forces assigned may only be employed within certain
constraints such as function, time or location imposed by the higher authority. For example, the forces may
only be assigned for a single phase of a particular operation. This may be done for national purposes in the
case of a multinational context, where it is in a participating nation’s interest to constrain in some fashion the
employment of the contributed force. In other cases the assigning commander may require the force for other
purposes later in the operation.
(3) A mission is defined as: A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose (AAP-06).
(4) Under OPCON the gaining commander may assign a mission to the assigned element that is distinct from,
but related to, the gaining commander’s overall mission. OPCON is normally applied to assigned manoeuvre
elements such as infantry and armour forces.
(5) Under TACOM the gaining commander may only allocate to the assigned force a specific task consistent for the
accomplishment of the mission and purpose assigned by the higher commander, that is, within the parameters
of the current mission given by the higher authority. TACOM is used where the superior commander recognizes
the need for additional resources for a task but requires the resources intact for a later role. Under TACOM the
assigned force is allocated for specific tasks and is allocated normally for a limited period of time. This prevents
the gaining commander from employing the assigned force in a role or manner not intended by the higher
commander. When the task is complete or the specific time frame expires, the TACOM relationship with the
gaining force ends. TACOM is usually applied to specific situations and to combat support elements that have
unique capabilities. Example of forces and situations in which TACOM would likely be used is: an engineer sub-
unit assigned to an infantry unit to assist in building field fortifications for a specific period of time.
(6) With the exception of FULLCOM, a gaining commander may further delegate the same or a lesser command
authority over the allocated force to a subordinate commander, but within the same constraints initially given.
(7) TACON is generally used to indicate those units that will be located within another unit or formation’s assigned
geographical boundaries, and by so assigning, the gaining unit becomes responsible for coordination aspects
within the shared area of operations. The gaining commander has authority to coordinate local defence, force
protection and terrain allocation.

Table 1.1. - Summary of Command State Authorities

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1-42. Control and Coordination Terms. The following terms may be ascribed independently
to operational and tactical command states to delegate elements of authority:

a. Administrative Control (ADCON). ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority

over subordinate or other organisations in respect of administrative matters such
as personnel management, supply, services and other issues not included in the
operational mission of the subordinate or other organisations. Therefore, ADCON is
assigned separately to a given command state.

b. Logistic Control (LOGCON). LOGCON is the authority to execute logistics functions

and activities within the agreed limits of logistic control in accordance with the Transfer
of Authority.22

c. Coordinating Authority (CA). CA is the authority granted to a commander, or an

individual that assigns responsibility to them for the coordination of specific functions,
or activities, involving forces of two or more countries, or commands, or two or more
services, or two or more forces of the same service. The CA has authority to request
consultation between the organisations involved or their representatives, but not to
compel agreement. In the event of irreconcilable disagreement, the CA shall refer the
matter to the appropriate higher authority.

d. DIRLAUTH. DIRLAUTH is most commonly used by UK and some allied forces (US) to
mean direct liaison authorised.23 However, there is the potential for confusion with this
term when operating with multinational partners. AJP-3(B) uses the term DIRLAUTH as
Direct Liaison Authority, which is a synonym for CA. AAP-624 does not recognise the
term DIRLAUTH.

1-43. Understanding C2 Authority. The following examples explain the status of

assigned forces:

Can I break up force elements and

Only OPCOM authorises the commander to split force elements and use
direct the separate employment
component parts separately.
of their component parts? 

Only OPCOM authorises the commander to assign missions to force

Can I use force elements for any
elements. OPCON authorises the commander to assign missions or tasks
purpose (give them missions)?
for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

Can I give force elements tasks in TACOM allows tasks to be issued to subordinates within the mission given
accordance with their mission? to them by their OPCOM or OPCON commander.

Can I delegate control to other

Only OP command states (OPCOM and OPCON) can authorise delegation
force elements (is the relationship
of control to another force element.
OP or TAC)?

Table 1.2. - Status of Assigned Forces

Notes:
(1) AAP-6 defines a mission as a ‘clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose’.
(2) AAP-6 does not define a task. Within the context of command states, tasks are undertaken within (and are
subordinate to) the subordinate force element’s mission. Tasks are usually limited by function, time or location.

22 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces, Annex C.

23 AAP-15. NATO Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO Documents and Publications, 2016.
24 AAP-06. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.
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1-44. Example Employment of Assigned Force Elements:

Command
Ser Example Authority
State
(a) (b) (c) (d)
The commander has the authority to employ
A BG Comd issues orders to
1 FULLCOM forces for any purpose. FULLCOM only
organic sub-units.
applies to national force elements.

The commander has the authority to give

A BG Comd is assigned an Armd
2 OPCOM the Sqn a mission or he can break it up and
Sqn OPCOM. 
give a separate mission to each Tp.

The BG Comd cannot give the Sqn a

mission that varies from that which
was issued by higher authority. The BG
A BG Comd is assigned an Armd Comd can issue a mission to the Sqn in order
Sqn OPCON. The BG’s mission is to that the BG can accomplish its mission to
3 OPCON
‘Defend Warminster iot Protect key Defend Warminster. For example, a mission
infrastructure’. to ‘Secure the railhead’ or ‘Delay the enemy
for three hours between Line TIGER and Line
DOG iot enable preparation of the MDA’,
would be appropriate.

A BG Comd is assigned a Heavy

As this Pl is TACOM, the BG Comd
PM Inf Pl TACOM. The Pl’s mission
can assign tasks to it, (VCP on Rte
4 TACOM is to escort CPERS from the Unit
SALAMANCA), as long as it is part of the Pl’s
Holding Area to the Bde Collecting
mission.
Point. 

The BG Comd can direct the location of

A BG Comd is assigned an AD Det the Det’s position and can control their
TACON. The AD Det’s mission is movement in the battlespace. The BG Comd
5 TACON
to defend A1 Ech and the CPERS cannot give them additional tasks (VCP
Handling Facility against air attack. on Rte SALAMANCA), or defend BG Main
against air attack.

Table 1.3. – Employment of Assigned Force Elements

Control
1-45. Control is the detailed direction, coordination and regulation of the activities of
subordinate units and formations, enabled by processes and systems and by the staff. At
the lowest tactical levels, command and control are often vested in a single individual.
At higher levels, it is delegated by a commander and exercised on their behalf by the
operations staff.25 It includes the responsibility for ensuring that the commander’s orders
and directives are implemented and that the decisions and actions of subordinates
conform to the intent expressed by the commander.

1-46. Control can enable decentralised execution by apportioning battlespace within which
subordinates are given the freedom to act. However, control measures will be used
by a higher headquarters to enable the activities of subordinates to be deconflicted.
Commanders should, wherever possible, increase the freedom of action of
subordinates through decentralisation and delegation, controlling only when absolutely
necessary, perhaps because of limits on resources or the complexity of the task. However,
a commander is unlikely to be successful if they are not supported by a well-organised,
well-trained and efficient headquarters, which is practised in exercising the right degrees

25 This includes branches such as Arty Ops, Engr Ops, CSS Ops and the like.
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of control in the most demanding conditions. These conditions include those encountered
during manoeuvre in contact with an enemy, while coordinating combined arms actions.
The deduction is that formation and battlegroup headquarters should be as proficient at
exercising control from mobile platforms, with sufficient protection (e.g. under armour),
as they would be in a staff training environment.

1-47. Control has two elements, procedural control and positive control:26

a. Procedural Control. Procedural control relies on the implementation of commonly

understood procedures across a force for the regulation of activity within and between
force elements. One example is Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Procedural
control can, for example, be used to allocate a volume of battlespace to individual
force elements for a period of time. Although sometimes perceived as an air-control
technique, procedural control should be applied across all environments. In the land
environment, such control also includes measures to coordinate land, air and maritime
fires. While procedural control is simple, it is also less flexible than other forms of
control and can curtail a commander’s ability to exploit developing opportunities.

b. Positive Control. Instead of using general, procedural means, a commander may

wish to direct the control of discrete force elements in a particular place for specific
periods of time. Positive control allows for the control of activities in real time, using
automated means. However, even when resolution of the position of friendly forces
is good, that of the enemy, adversaries and the population is seldom neither timely
nor accurate enough to support positive control as the sole means of battlespace
management.

1-48. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). CIS is a key enabler of control.
The use of battle management systems enable control measures to be specified with a
high degree of accuracy. They allow for changes to be rapidly disseminated across the
command and they provide near real-time feedback on the progress of operations to a
commander and the staff. CIS capabilities and limitations, such as range, bandwidth,
interoperability, latency and security must be factored in to all plans by the functional
staff working to the integrating cells. CIS is further discussed in Chapter 2.

1-49. Control is discussed in Part B.

26 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

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AFMTitle
Pub
Command Chapter
Chapter2?
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Chapter Title?
Command Support
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Chapter 2
Command Support

Introduction • Introduction
2-01. Command support consists of the people, • The Staff
places, systems and processes that assist • The Staff Officer
the commander in exercising command • Relationships involving the Staff
and control. The commander uses • Organisation of the Staff
command support to regulate the force • Communication and Information
elements and functions of subordinate and Systems
supporting units, to ensure that a mission • Liaison
is accomplished. At every level of command • Procedures and Instructions
above the lowest tactical level, there are Annex A
four basic elements to Command Support
• Use of Information
as listed below. These are also represented
in the Command Model at Figure 2.1. Annex B
• Gen Irwin’s ‘How to be a Brigade
a. The Staff. The staff comprises the
Staff Officer’
personnel who assist the commander in
the exercise of command and control. Annex C
The role of the staff and the individual • Functional Application Services
requirements of staff officers are explained
in this chapter.

b. Provision of an HQ. The HQ is a secure base for the commander and the staff, which
includes the Command Post (CP) and the administrative and security organisations that
protect, sustain and move the commander and the staff. HQs and CPs are described in
Chapter 3.

c. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). CIS is an assembly of equipment,

methods and procedures and, if necessary, key personnel organised to accomplish
information transfer and processing functions.27 CIS is described both within the main
body of this chapter and in Annex A – Use of Information.

d. Processes and Procedures. Standard procedures, including those for decision making
and the dissemination of orders, focus command and staff effort within and between
headquarters.

27 AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.

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Functions of Leadership
Command

Decision Control
Making

Elements of
Command
Support

CI Provision of a HQ
S; P s
rocesses & Procedur e

Figure 2.1. – The Command Model

2-02. Effective use of information is a critical seam which runs through the entirety of the
Command Model. Annex A – Use of Information provides further detail for both the
commander and staff on this essential function, especially with regards to
Information Management.

The Staff
2-03. The staff, as an organisation, has no authority by itself. It derives authority from the
commander and exercises that authority in their name. Thus, all staff activities are
undertaken on behalf of a commander.

2-04. Duties of the Staff. Regardless of the level of command, the staff has three main roles:
to support the commander; to support subordinate formations and units; and informing
other HQs. The commander’s intuition (the art) should be balanced by the staff’s rigorous
analysis (the science), with the two being complementary and not antagonistic.

a. Supporting the Commander. The staff has the duty to support, advise and caution
the commander. The staff supports by focusing on the functions of control: oversight,
directing and coordinating. Under the function of coordinating, the staff supports
the commander by gathering, processing, analysing and presenting information in a
manner that helps the commander to select a particular course of action. The staff
is then responsible for planning, as well as the preparation and dissemination of
procedural control measures, normally promulgated in the form of orders. The staff
provides part of the feedback mechanism essential for subsequent, timely decision
making. The staff must also provide advice which takes many forms including technical
and special to arm. This advice will at times be cautionary. This is not the application of
a handbrake, rather it is the considered advice given to a commander to alert them to
any omissions and conflicts within their intent/plan.
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b. Supporting Subordinate Formations and Units. The staff also exists to support
subordinate formations and units, whose ability to live, train and fight depends to a
large extent on the actions of the staff within their superior headquarters. In the eyes
of both superior and subordinate commanders and staffs, the hallmark of a proficient
headquarters is the capacity of the staff to work in a timely, efficient and cooperative
manner. It is the responsibility of the staff to ensure that all relevant information
is passed to subordinate formations and units as well as flanking force elements.
Staff must not sit on information. The staff must have a two-down mindset. It is the
responsibility of the staff at all levels to put subordinate forces into action at their best
advantage.

‘The staff must be the servants of the troops and that a good staff officer must
serve his commander and the troops but must himself be anonymous’.

Field Marshal Montgomery

c. Informing other HQs. The third role of the staff is to inform the wider force, in
particular the higher, flanking, agency, allied and partner headquarters. This will help
deliver unity of effort and understanding across the force.

2-05. Decision Making by the Staff. As explained in Chapter 1, the commander is not
the sole decision maker in any organisation/hierarchy. The commander always retains
the responsibility for decision making but may delegate the authority to subordinates
and members of the staff. This allows the commander to concentrate on the essential
decisions applicable to the command. Giving the staff and subordinates the authority to
make routine decisions is an important element of Mission Command.

The Staff Officer Read Annex B

2-06. The staff officer assists the commander by:
This subsection is
a. Understanding the commander’s future supported by Lieutenant
requirements and offering informed advice when General Irwin’s timeless
called for, or if an important factor has been guidance for brigade staff
overlooked. officers at Annex B. The
notes are applicable to
b. Providing the commander with information to
almost any situation a
assist in reaching decisions, while making routine
staff officer will face in any
decisions within the staff officers’ delegated areas
headquarters or CP.
of responsibility, thus protecting the commander
from irrelevant detail.

c. Developing and implementing the commander’s

plan by issuing and monitoring the execution of directives and orders on the
commander’s behalf.
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2-07. Qualities of a Staff Officer. Many of the qualities

Qualities of a Staff Officer
required by commanders also apply to staff officers.
This is particularly so for senior staff officers in „„ Character
both national and multinational appointments,
„„ Intellect
who may have considerable delegated powers of
command and responsibility. Staff officers also work „„ Hard work
with subordinates and support personnel (such as
„„ Technical competence
clerks and signallers) and will be required to lead
others. In addition to the fundamental quality of „„ Wider awareness
leadership, shared by all officers, the following
personal qualities typify a good staff officer:

a. Character. A staff officer must be loyal, tactful, trustworthy and supportive of the
commander, yet at the same time retain an independence of thought and judgement.
The staff officer must accept responsibility willingly and stand by their decisions. The
staff officer must advise, consult and cooperate with others, as well as be prepared to
represent the decisions of others, sacrificing self or vested interests. A wise staff officer
will also cultivate a pleasant disposition. As Staff Duties in the Field, 1962, advised
‘Good manners and a sense of humour will often help a staff officer to achieve results
which could not be otherwise obtained’. Fifty years later this is still true.

b. Intellect. The better a staff officer’s knowledge and intellect the more capable
they will be. Their duties include research and subsequent mastery of their areas
of responsibility. The staff officer must be knowledgeable, imaginative, capable of
anticipating, acting and reacting in a flexible manner, thinking and working under
pressure and must communicate accurately, both verbally and on paper, with emphasis
on clear, succinct, powers of expression. Above all, the staff officer must be capable of
taking a broader view of their responsibilities and not become too compartmentalised
in their outlook.

c. Hard Work. The object of most staff work is to relieve the commander of routine and
detailed work. Therefore, despite the requirements for originality and creativity, the
reality of much staff activity is solid hard work. This requires a methodical, systematic
approach and an eye for detail. If a staff officer is responsible for a team, they must
be able to delegate responsibility to subordinates, coordinate their work and present
solutions, based on team effort, succinctly, accurately and on time.

d. Technical Competence. As CIS and associated systems proliferate, a staff officer must
achieve and maintain the technical skills required to operate and exploit both these
systems, services and the information that they enable. This is a particular challenge
when a CP requires a high number of augmentees.

e. Wider Awareness. The staff and the operation that they are supporting do not sit
in isolation of the UK nor of the deployed location. A staff officer must have a high
level of cross-cultural awareness and political sensitivity. Cross-cultural awareness
accepts and creates an environment which allows each culture to contribute its values,
perspectives and behaviours in constructive ways, to enhance outcomes.

2-08. Functions of a Staff Officer. There are three functions of a staff officer: thinking and
deciding, communicating and organising. These functions are not discrete activities,
but are cognitive processes that serve as a framework within which each is mutually
supported by the others.
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a. Thinking and Deciding. Excellent staff work requires intelligence, experience and
thought. Staff officers who can deliver this level of excellence take time to reflect
on their work, understanding that quality is not related to hours spent at their desk,
but rather to the quality of thought that underpins their work. Understanding how
thinking can be exploited in order to address different types of issue is important.
Analysis is the detailed examination of the elements or structure of an issue. To get to
quality analysis, a staff officer must know the context in which the issue lies. Thinking
leads to understanding and once there is an adequate level of understanding, effective
decisions can be made. Excellent staff work is not judged by the speed of decision
making, it is judged by the quality and timeliness of the decisions made.

b. Communicating. Communicating is the most visible skill of the staff officer. The best
thought-out plans and the most sensible decisions will matter little if they are not
effectively communicated to all who need to know. The contemporary battlespace is
connected. There are more lines of communication open than ever before. Managing
coherent, mutually supporting messages across a wide range of media is as important
as the content of the messages themselves. Excellent staff work, either written or
verbal, considers the requirements of the audience and the task/issue in order to
effectively deliver the right message.

c. Organising. Organising is the third function and is the crucial enabling activity that
binds the other functions together. Organising is the process of arranging resources
such that they are in the best position to enable exploitation, which means the skilled
management of information and people.

Relationships involving the Staff

2-09. Between Commander and the Staff. While opportunities for access to, and the
development of close relationships with, the commander will depend on the size and level
of headquarters, the fundamentals of the relationship between commander and staff
endure. It should be characterised by a climate of loyalty, respect and individual initiative,
rather than one that is sycophantic and unquestioning. The independence of thought and
timely action implicit in Mission Command is vital.

2-10. Between Staff and other Levels of Command. How the staff interact with
subordinate, flanking and superior headquarters is critical. Staff must be careful not to
presume or to hide behind the rank of the commander, while at the same time working to
deliver the commander’s intent. They must develop open and positive relationships with
other staffs based upon mutual respect developed through a conscientious, determined
and helpful approach to problem solving. Anything less will undermine confidence in the
exercise of command at all levels.

2-11. Staff Integration and Teamwork. The creation of an effective and closely knit staff
team within the HQ and between the HQ and subordinate force elements is essential.
A staff cannot work efficiently without complete cooperation between all branches
and services. There must be no secrets between branches and no abrogation of
responsibilities. The COS and other principal general staff officers have a key role in
fostering this atmosphere. This environment can be frustrated by frequent changes in
personalities and infrequent opportunities to exercise under operational circumstances.
Groupings and work practices are unlikely to remain static. Many of the British
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Army’s past and present operations have been characterised by the forming of ad hoc
headquarters, formations and units, with the integration of additional personnel from
coalition partners and the reserves. Team building is a command skill which requires effort
and practice.

2-12. Access to the Commander. While it is important that a commander strives to maintain
two-way communications with all members of the staff, this becomes increasingly
impractical at higher levels of command. At battlegroup level, the staff will have frequent
contact with the commander in training and on operations. At higher levels, commanders
may choose to allow a wide range of staff officers to have direct access to them in
barracks. However, during operations this may become less feasible and a commander
may elect to limit access. The personal relationships created in barracks, which are so
essential to the maintenance of trust, can be fostered by involving a large number of staff
officers during information briefings. This will acknowledge their contribution, as well as
allowing them to hear the commander’s deliberations. However, decision briefings may
often have to be restricted to that smaller group who have contributed to the decision
making process.

Organisation of the Staff

2-13. Staff Branches. Traditionally, the staff is organised into branches using the G1-9
structure, with general responsibilities shown in the table below. Staff structures will
at all times be flexibly adapted on operations to achieve the effects required by the
commander. The integration of the staff, in whatever groupings required, will bring the
necessary synergy to act and achieve those desired effects. The basic organisation and
structure will be influenced by the operational situation, the level of command and the
mission. When acting in any routine or land-based role, the G1-9 structure is used, but if
an HQ is required to act as a JTF HQ, it will transfer to the joint nomenclature (J1-9). The
differences in name (and to a lesser extent function) between Army, Joint and NATO staff
branches are shown in the table below:

UK Military Functional
Joint (From JDP 3-00) NATO
Staff Branch

G1 Personnel & Administration J1 Personnel & Administration Personnel & Administration

G2 Intelligence & Security J2 Intelligence Intelligence

G3 Operations J3 Operations Operations

G4 Combat Service Support J4 Logistics Logistics

G5 Future Plans J5 Plans Plans & Policy

G6 CIS J6 CIS CIS

G7 Doctrine & Training J7 Doctrine & Training Doctrine & Training

G8 Finance J8 Finance Budget, Finance & Contracting

G9 Policy, Legal & Presentation J9 Civil Secretariat CMI/CIMIC

Table 2.2. – Summary of Staff Branches

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2-14. Principal Staff Officer – The Chief of Staff (COS). As the senior staff officer, the
COS ensures that the commander’s intent is turned into workable plans, which are
communicated to subordinate formations and units, as well as the HQs of superior and
flanking formations. Although the COS at formation level is not the commander’s deputy,
compared to the DCOS and others of equal rank, the COS is ‘primus inter pares’. The COS
must be capable of acting on behalf of the commander, including decision making in the
commander’s absence and coordinating the work of all staff branches. In this respect, the
development of a close working relationship, based on mutual understanding and trust
between the commander and the COS is vital.

Communications and Information Systems

2-15. Introduction. CIS is an essential part of military operations and provides commanders
with the means to exercise command and control and to disseminate information.
Employed effectively, CIS enable a commander and staff to exercise significant advantage
in information sharing, situational awareness and the execution of command and
control. CIS is an assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary,
key personnel, organised to accomplish information transfer and processing functions.28
The flow of information between organisations should be seamless, within the
constraints of system and protective markings. Commanders establish the climate and
approve the policies that enable effective communication through the available CIS.
Thorough training on CIS is critical. Commanders should use simulations and command
post exercises to gain and maintain proficiency on these staff tools and services.

2-16. CIS Strengths and Weaknesses. The strengths and weaknesses of these systems will
directly affect how command is enacted across the force. CIS is often optimised for
particular types of operations, but may be used in a much broader range of circumstances.
They also have finite reach and capacity. These characteristics require commanders
to direct their priorities for command in terms of time, space and the information
required in order to enable the staff to configure CIS in the most appropriate ways to
support the operation. Formations and units should give consideration for redundancy
and procedures to operate in a contested Electro-magnetic Environment (EME). It is
a false assumption that CIS will unconditionally work in a contested environment.

2-17. Operational CIS (OpCIS). The divisional level operates upwards (and sometimes
sideways) using OpCIS and reach-back services, as well as operating downwards to its
subordinates on Tactical CIS (TacCIS). This requires the divisional staff to be proficient
on two systems that operate with different services and applications. Thus, additional
burdens may be placed on the staff in terms of transferring information from OpCIS
to TacCIS. OpCIS is designed to operate in a more static environment, though it does
allow for a degree of information flow from the strategic level down to the operational
and higher tactical commands, via gateways. Applications are likely to be constrained
or limited between CJIIM actors and between different security classifications.
2-18. Tactical CIS (TacCIS). Brigades and below operate on a common TacCIS, which provides
voice communications, data (for passage of OSW), shared situational awareness,
planning tools and functional applications (eg fire control). TacCIS is fully deployed
from sub-unit level to division level. TacCIS must be rugged enough to allow for almost
continuous mobility and must be able to operate in a contested electronic battlefield.

28 AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.

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2-19. Applications and Services. Specialist applications29 are provided to enable the
commander and staff to exercise effective command and control and information
dissemination. They enable functional activity and provide planning and execution tools.

Liaison
2-20. Liaison is defined as ‘that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements
of military forces, to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action’.30
Liaison may be a continuous, informal process, normally achieved through consultations
between the respective commanders or their staffs, either by face to face contact or
electronically. Liaison is a standing requirement, especially in multinational operations and
must not become an after-thought on deployment. Liaison must be reciprocal when:

a. A force is placed under the command or control of an HQ of a different nationality.

This is described further in Part C.

b. Brigade-sized and higher formations of different nationalities are adjacent.

2-21. When liaison is not reciprocal, responsibility for its establishment is governed by the
following principles:

a. From left to right.

b. From rear to front for units of the same echelon.

c. From higher to lower echelon.

d. From supporting to supported unit.

e. From the incoming force to the outgoing force during the relief of combat troops.

2-22. The selection of Liaison Officers (LOs) is critically important. The contribution of one
high-grade and well-motivated LO to the cooperation and mutual understanding between
headquarters can be out of all proportion to the individual’s rank and appointment. As
they represent their commander, LOs should know them, understand their plans and
be able to express their views cogently to the commander and headquarters to which
they are attached. It is the responsibility of the despatching headquarters to select, train
and exercise their LOs, brief them on the current situation before their deployment and
keep them informed of developments. The receiving headquarters must provide access
to commanders, briefings and any information relevant to their liaison duties. Liaison
detachments must provide 24-hour cover and maintain the necessary communications.

2-23. There will be occasions when the exchange of liaison officers or liaison detachments will
be insufficient to ensure adequate understanding and cooperation between formations.
This is most likely to be the case in joint or multinational operations. Integration of staff
into each other’s headquarters provides a solution.

29 e.g. fires, targeting, logistics, planning, intelligence, geographic etc.

30 AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.
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2-24. When electronic communication is impossible, unreliable or not interoperable, it is

imperative that formations or units which are operating closely together exchange
LOs. This may be done for a specific purpose and for a limited period of time, such as
providing a LO at a reserve demolition to report when their force elements are clear.
Liaison may have to be conducted over a more protracted period when, for example,
the activities of a number of formations or units have to be tightly coordinated. This is
especially important if they are from different nations, or if they have not trained together
for the activity they are about to undertake. In this case, LOs should be exchanged
between headquarters and, if they need to be effective for a significant period, they may
have to be built up into a liaison detachment.

2-25. LOs can play an important role in ensuring that mismatches in assumptions, values,
language or expectations are identified and bridged. Cultural differences in cognition
are also important when assessing potential enemy courses of action. Commanders must
understand that an allied partner’s thinking, wholly rational as it is to them, can be very
different to their own.31

Procedures and Instructions

2-26. In order to standardise activity across the Field Army and within subordinate formations
and units, prescribed procedures and instructions are used.

2-27. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).32 SOPs are Field Army-wide directives that
cover those features of operations that require a standard procedure in order to generate
optimum capability. SOPs are designed to:

a. Standardise procedures for the conduct of operations.

b. Prevent repetition in orders.

c. Give a clear understanding of individual responsibilities.

d. Promulgate and follow agreed joint, coalition and NATO procedures.

e. Implement best practice.

f. Enable the efficient use of CIS.

g. Enable efficient augmentation and regrouping.

h. Ensure unity of command, effort, and purpose (see Chapter 1).

i. Simplify education and training.

2-28. Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs). SOIs are detailed instructions produced
at formation and unit level and are developed from SOPs. SOIs should take into
account variations in the operational environment (threat, equipment, roles, mission,
environment, chain of command). SOIs may amplify but must not contradict SOPs.

31 JDP 04 Understanding, 2010.

32 Formation SOPs Pt 1, 2010.
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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2

Use of Information for

Command Support

Introduction
Use of Information
2A-01. Commanders and staff must be adept
• Introduction
at using information to command and
• Information Superiority
control effectively. This requires an
• Information Management
understanding of what information is
• Roles of Commanders and Staff
relevant, as well as the employment
of effective Communications and
Information Systems (CIS). The chance of making the right decision is increased with
the fidelity and accuracy of the information on which that decision will be based.
Information must therefore be accurate, unambiguous, concise, clear, consistent and
timely. The origins (provenance) and status (such as historic or current, draft or final)
of the information must be known and it should be in a form which is accessible
and usable, as well as stored and passed in a way that ensures it is protected.

2A-02. As an aiming mark, commanders and staff should strive to have Information Superiority
over the enemy. Whilst it is an inherently difficult measure, Information Superiority
is defined as ‘possessing a greater degree of information about the battlespace,
being able to exploit the information more rapidly and preventing the adversary from
obtaining or exploiting information which could give combat advantage’. In broad
terms, Information Superiority requires getting the right information to the right
people, at the right time and in the right format. To do this, commanders and their
staff must have, at the core of everything they do, a deep understanding of how
they use information. Use of information is broken down into three key areas:

a. Information Management (IM). IM is the continuous provision of relevant

information to the right person, at the right time and in a usable form to facilitate
situational awareness and decision making. It uses procedures and systems to collect,
process, store, display and disseminate information. It provides structure through
which to communicate and transform information as part of decision making and
puts decisions into action. IM is essential in determining critical information, routing
information rapidly and accurately, transforming information and disseminating
information in a timely manner.

b. Information Exploitation (IX). IX is defined as the use of information to gain

advantage and improve situational awareness, to enable effective planning, decision
making and the coordination of those activities required to realise effects. IX enables
understanding.
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c. Information Assurance (IA). IA is defined as the confidence that the information

within the Defence Community is maintained reliably, accurately, securely and
is available when required. IA protects and defends information by ensuring its
availability, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. IA is vital for ensuring that a
high degree of confidence is maintained. This includes the provision of protection
for, and the restoration of, CIS.

2A-03. The remainder of this annex will briefly discuss the concept of Information Superiority
before going into further detail on the core area of IM. This annex does not consider
IX and IA in detail. The IM subsection is broken down into a contextual view of
information, corresponding management activities and CIS. The annex then considers
the key information-related roles and responsibilities within a headquarters.

Information Superiority
2A-04. Striving to achieve Information Superiority over an enemy or adversary is a critical goal.
However, measuring attainment of it is transitory, subjective, largely intangible and
highly contextual and personality dependent. In addition, expending effort attempting
to know the unattainable can distract valuable resources. Commanders must therefore
be prepared to proceed with a limited picture, accepting that the situation may become
clearer in time. A valid tactic to break an impasse is to take action that triggers a
revealing response from other actors. Given the fluid nature of opportunities and
threats, there will always be a degree of interpretation and improvisation required by
those involved and therefore a degree of risk. To wait for certainty is not an option
for field commanders and staff. Instead, commanders must apply their judgement and
experience to manage risk and exploit opportunity.

2A-05. It is easier to know when you do not have Information Superiority than when you do.
When commanders struggle to obtain sufficient information to make timely decisions, it
is likely that they do not have Information Superiority.

2A-06. Information Superiority is relative. Any advantage generated can be relative to other
actors, relative to our ability to meet the demands of a situation and affected by the
degree to which actors are able to assess these relative advantages.

2A-07. It is almost impossible to prevent our adversaries from accessing information.

Commanders may therefore wish to do the opposite and provide an enemy, or an
adversary, with information to persuade them of the futility of their position, deceive
them, or to make them dependent on its availability. Deception is beyond the scope of
this AFM, but is described in more detail in AFM Protection.
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Information Management A commander should

2A-08. General. consider basing their
IM guidance on:
a. Commanders and their staffs assess the effectiveness
of IM by considering how information contributes to „„ Their willingness to
reducing uncertainty. IM narrows the gap between cope with uncertainty.
the information the commander requires and the
„„ Number and types of
information he has. All information must be relevant
decisions they expect
and the staff must ensure it is also accurate, timely,
to make personally.
usable, complete, and precise. Tactical operations
produce large amounts of information. Commanders „„ Gaps in relevant
and staffs can avoid potential information overload information for specific
by establishing criteria for what information to decisions.
present to the commander. Guidance on these
„„ The ability to obtain
criteria must come from the commander.
relevant information.
b. Effective IM facilitates the rapid flow of information
„„ The degree of control
in all directions. Improvements in technology
they wish to have over
for distributing information allow users to
subordinate actions.
identify relevant information among the totality
of information flowing across CIS. Effective IM „„ Their use of LOs
facilitates communications vertically (within the chain and informal
of command) and horizontally (among adjacent, communications
supporting and supported units). Redundancy in networks.
transmission paths safeguards against disruption
and battle damage. However, the transmission paths
along which information flows is less important than
whether it reaches the right destination, at the right time and in a usable format.

2A-09. Information. This subsection discusses the cognitive hierarchy of information, examples
of how to categorise information and, finally, what constitutes relevant information.

a. Cognitive Hierarchy. As described in Annex 8A of ADP Land Operations, 2017,

a cognitive hierarchy consists of four different levels of information. A principal
task of IM and its subsequent exploitation is to collect and then transform this
information by adding progressively greater meaning at each level, raising it from the
lowest data level, to understanding at the highest level. With understanding, the
commander can make better decisions and can regulate actions by the forces more
effectively. See Figure 2A.1 on the next page.
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Understanding

Judgement
Information
Knowledge requirements

Cognition
Internal External
Education Information Regulated
Experience Unregulated

Processing

Data

Figure 2A.1. - Cognitive Hierarchy

b. Categorising Information. NATO doctrine provides frameworks to categorise

information – Operational and Mission Variables. Both are now used within the
UK military and are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding
of an operational environment and mission. Operational Variables describe an
operational environment in terms of six inter-related variables: Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII). Additionally, the PMESII
model can extend to include the Physical Environment and Time (PMESII-PT), if
necessary. Mission Variables include the following six factors: Mission, Enemy
Forces, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available (friendly forces), Time
Available and Civil Considerations (METT TC).

c. Relevant Information. Relevant information

is important to the commander and staff in Commanders and staff
the exercise of command and control. Relevant should know:
information is the foundation for the Common
„„ Incomplete or imprecise
Operating Picture (COP). Relevant information
information is better
answers questions the commander and staff deem
than no information
necessary to exercising effective command. These
at all.
questions, or requirements, are categorised as
Information Requirements (IR) and corresponding „„ Untimely or unusable
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements information is the same
(CCIR) and are discussed in greater detail in as no information at all.
Chapter 5 - Assess. Large amounts of relevant
„„ Irrelevant or inaccurate
information are collected routinely in operations
information is worse
and are provided by standard reports and ISR
than no information
activities. Other relevant information is mission
at all.
specific and assets must be specifically tasked to
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collect it. CCIRs and IRs are used to prioritise the tasking of these collection assets.
Information becomes relevant if it supports a mission and if it is accurate, timely,
usable, complete and precise. Relevant information provides the basis for creating
and maintaining the COP and is the basis for achieving Situational Awareness
(SA). In the context of this publication, SA is the understanding of an operational
environment in the context of the commander’s mission.

Requirements Information

Analysis
Produce
reconnaissance and COP
surveillance tasking
CCIR
Situational
Awareness
IR

Decisions
(Questions)
Modified IR (Answers)

Analysis

CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirement

COP Common Operational Picture
IR Information Requirement

Figure 2A.2. – Illustration of the IR to CCIR to decision development cycle. The process is likely to begin with IRs
considered critical to the success of the mission.

2A-10. Information Management Activities. IM consists of five activities: collecting,

processing, storing, displaying and disseminating. In practice, the different activities
overlap and complement one another. CIS is critical to the effective functioning of
information management activities:

a. Collecting. Collecting is the continuous acquisition of relevant information about

the operational environment and specific mission, by any means. This can include
direct observation, other organic ISR assets, or official, unofficial, or public sources
from the information environment. The commander establishes the collection
priorities through IRs and CCIRs and continuously revises these during the operations
process as the situation changes. Collection takes two basic forms - information
push and information pull:
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(1) An information-push system collects information by pushing it from the source

to the user, either as the information becomes available or according to a
schedule. This system is best for managing routine reports, which include
information that is not time sensitive. A properly designed information-push
system alleviates the problem of distracting subordinate units from their
operations with excessive requests for information. An information-push
system does not work well in obtaining information to meet unforeseen
information needs. The difficulty of fully anticipating the commander’s needs in
an information-push system can lead to information overload by attempting to
deliver all possible information.

(2) In an information-pull system, the user generates IRs and the source provides
information in response. A common database can serve this system by allowing
authorised users to interrogate the database for information and retrieve it
in their requested format. An information-pull system can help focus scarce
resources on critical tasks. It can deliver information specifically tailored to the
commander’s information needs and only produce information the commander
requests. An information-pull system provides exceptional information and
commanders should reserve their use of information-pull collection for such
exceptional cases.

b. Processing. Processing involves raising the meaning of information from data to

understanding. It is similar in definition to Information Exploitation (see para 2A-
2b). Processing adds meaning to relevant information by applying progressively
more complex cognitive processes that produces a COP. It includes lower-level
mechanical and mechanistic methods such as organising, collating, plotting and
arranging data and information. However, effective processing requires analysis
and evaluation (higher-level cognitive methods) for it to become knowledge and to
support SA. Processing depends primarily on well-trained and adaptive analysts to
provide insight. Decision makers apply judgment to knowledge, in order to achieve
understanding. Understanding enables informed decision making with less than
perfect data and thus generates action.

c. Storing. Storing retains relevant information in any form, usually for orderly, timely
retrieval and documentation, until it is needed for exercising C2. Information is
stored because not all information collected or processed can be displayed at the
same time, nor is it all relevant all of the time. Common databases provide powerful
tools for transforming data into the information and knowledge required for military
decision making. The database provides a bridge, allowing different systems, with
different purposes, to interoperate in support of military decision making.

d. Displaying. Displaying involves representing relevant information in a usable, easily

understood audio or visual form, tailored to the needs of the user that conveys the
COP for decision making and exercising C2 functions. Displays should be meaningful
images rather than simply masses of data. A good display should allow a commander
to look across the area of interest in space and time and rapidly focus on decisive
points, identifying opportunities, threats or gaps in information. Good displays
should also allow the commander to communicate with subordinates in a manner
that facilitates understanding of the desired outcome. There are three ways to
present information: written reports, verbal narrative reports and graphic displays.
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Standard formats ensure that all relevant information is included and assist the
user in finding information. Displays do not require lengthy instructions and should
be intuitive, thereby shortening communications. Properly executed displays use
doctrinal terms, graphical conventions and presentational formats that enable the
rapid understanding of complex concepts.

e. Disseminating. Disseminating involves communicating relevant information of

any kind, from one person or place to another, in a usable form, by any means,
to improve understanding, to initiate or govern action. It takes two basic forms:
broadcast, or point-to-point dissemination. IM activities should consist of an
appropriately balanced combination of broadcast and point-to-point forms of
dissemination.

(1) Broadcast. Senders may broadcast information simultaneously to anyone with

access to the information network. A broadcast gets information to the widest
audience in the shortest amount of time, however the information cannot be
tailored to any specific commander’s needs. Undisciplined use of this method
can quickly lead to information overload.

(2) Point-to-Point. In point-to-point dissemination, information goes to a specific

user or group of users. Information then passes sequentially from one user
to the next. CIS can tailor information to meet the specific needs of each
recipient. Point-to-point dissemination has built-in control mechanisms that
broadcast transmission lacks. Information reaches a broad audience slowly and
the chances of distortion increase through each node of dissemination.

Common Operational Picture (COP)

The COP is an operational picture tailored to the user’s requirements, based on common data and
information shared by more than one command. CIS can now provide all levels of commanders
with near real-time information on the current situation as a COP. The COP is derived from data,
information and knowledge common to all echelons. The commander and staff tailor its display
for resolution and content appropriate to their echelon of command and the mission. Reports and
returns generally convey information to inform the COP.
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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 2

How to be a Staff Officer in a

Brigade Headquarters

The following guidance was compiled by the then Brigadier A S H Irwin when serving as
Commander 39 Infantry Brigade in 1993. The notes are applicable to almost any situation a
staff officer will face. The guidance is pitched at brigade level but is also suitable for higher
formations.

Introduction
2B-01. It strikes me that not enough is made of the skills and requirements associated with
the business of the staff officer relating to his commander and to others with whom he
must deal.

2B-02. This brief note is intended to give some guidance on this subject. It is of course a
personal view; others may not agree with what follows. It assumes that the commander
for whom you work is possessed of at least a small dose of humanity! For those working
for the few whose behaviour is malignantly dictatorial there can be no guidance other
than never to make a mistake and to keep the helmet on!

Relationships
2B-03. With the Commander. Nothing is more important than the relationship between the
commander and his principal staff officers. This is the goal:

a. In age there is probably 12 years between the two. In that 12 years the commander
will have acquired, by whatever devious means, higher rank and more experience
than his staff. But otherwise there is no difference between the two. It follows
that the staff officer must, by convention, observe protocol and must pay due
consideration to the wisdom that experience should have conferred on the
commander.

b. But it also follows that in every other way there should be a free interplay of ideas
between the two. This interplay can only take place in a relaxed and informal
atmosphere. The knocking at doors, parade ground drill and the excessive use of the
word ‘sir’ all tend to interfere with the interactions of minds. It is of importance to
note that others judge the competence and standing of the staff officer at least in
part by the self-confident way in which he relates with his chief.

c. Between the two there should develop a profound sense of trust. This cannot be
manufactured but can be helped by following some of the tenets suggested below.

d. There should be few secrets between the two; the commander is allowed to keep
more than the staff officer!
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e. And best of all, the two should be friends. But if this is not possible (and why should
it always be so?) there must at least be no antagonism. If there is, guess who goes!

2B-04. With the Staff. There is no doubt at all that the very best headquarters are not only
professionally competent but also happy. There is equally no doubt that if there has to
be a choice between the two, professional competence must come first. Principal staff
officers must insist on the highest standards, while recognising that SO3s generally have
to learn their staff techniques on the job. For this they need advice and help. This advice
and help is much better received if people are cheerful. If the commander is an ogre,
the principal staff officer has to work hard to brighten the horizon for the junior staff:
if the commander is a jolly old card, the principal staff officer may have to work equally
hard to ensure that the general air of levity does not deteriorate into inefficiency.

2B-05. With Others. The staff officer must also develop good working relationships outside
the brigade:

a. With Brigade Units. If one remembers that the job of a brigade headquarters is
not only to command but also to serve, the nature of the relationship between the
principal staff officer and commanding officers, seconds-in-command, adjutants
and quartermasters becomes clear. Units must not feel reluctant to speak to brigade
headquarters; they must never feel that it is useless to do so. If principal staff officers
are any good they will be used by commanding officers to sound out ideas, to test
the water; this is greatly to be encouraged, provided that the staff officer knows his
commander’s mind.

b. With Higher Formation. Higher formation is almost always an ass. But it does
have its uses and it is a good plan to cooperate. Higher headquarters tend to be
less asinine towards those brigades that produce timely and accurate information.
Brigade staff officers should get to know their counterparts upstairs at an early date.
Charm them with smiles and expressions of undying admiration; stroke the ass’s ear.

c. With Civilians. When dealing with civilians, whether or not associated with the
MOD, pay them the common courtesy of speaking and writing to them in English.
The military language is intimidating and incomprehensible to the average mortal.
Even we soldiers can be defeated by this language, particularly the MOD dialect that
is especially associated with budgets. Stop the rot.

The Skills
2B-06. The ideal staff officer will never make a mistake but that is impossible. But he should
strive to achieve the following:

a. Professional Competence. Perhaps it goes without saying, but the staff officer
must know what he is doing. Sometimes he will be appointed to a job for which he
has no previous experience. In this case he will have to spend much time and effort
finding out about it. Do not be arrogant; you do not know all the answers.
b. A Good Memory. Some are blessed with an amazing ability to remember detail with
instant recall. Most are less lucky and must rely on the taking of notes (see below).
Either way the staff officer must be able to focus quickly onto the subject raised;
otherwise he will waste a lot of his own and other people’s time while he searches
for the relevant detail.
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c. Accuracy and Honesty. It is terribly important that the information and written
work given to the commander is completely accurate. You should feel bad all day
if your commander returns work to you with minor [Staff Duty] (SD) corrections. If
you do not know the answer never guess; always declare your hand and find out the
accurate answer as soon as you can. The phrases “I imagine”, “I suspect”, “I think”,
are unacceptable. “I don’t think so but I will check” is fine. There will be times when
you discover that despite your best efforts the answer you have given is incorrect.
Always own up at the earliest opportunity. This is where honesty comes in. It will
be a very silly commander indeed who discourages you from taking this line; he will
be ill-served and will make the wrong decision based on incorrect information. But
the distress that you will cause to the commander if he discovers that you are both
imprecise and less than honest will be hard to imagine. In short, do not bluff your
commander.

d. Good Filtering. This is one of the most difficult skills for the staff officer to acquire.
“What do I tell the commander?” “What does he need to see/read?” “Can I make
a decision without reference to him?” Only experience will provide answers to these
questions. To begin with it will be better to refer more to the commander than less.
Get him to say whether or not it is an appropriate subject for him. But the aim is to
protect the commander from unnecessary detail. The briefing process should include
the aim of reducing the amount of reading that the commander has to do. It saves
his ageing eyes and allows him more time to do what he should be doing.

e. Firmness. Almost all staff work can be done by friendly persuasion. But there will be
times when a difficult decision has to be forced through. The staff officer must not
flinch from this and should particularly avoid blaming a decision on his commander,
implying that he himself does not agree with it.
f. Laughter. He should be dissatisfied with himself if he does not make his commander
laugh at least once a day. Remember that the commander, great being though he
might be, has but limited reserves of cheeriness. This he passes onto the men in
the brigade with selfless extravagance. His reserve must be topped up. Often those
he is visiting will cheer him up more than he does them; but he may need priming
before he goes out and this is the job of the staff officer. The obverse of the coin
is also true; try very hard not to be boring, particularly when briefing. It is quite
extraordinary how much less important a vital subject appears to be if it is described
in a manner and tone so dull that even Nigel Mansell seems hilarious.

Methods and Techniques

2A-07. The following spring to mind:

a. Visits. The staff officer cannot do his job unless he gets out and about. His should
be a familiar face in all the units of the brigade. [I once served in a brigade where
the commander forbade his COS from visiting – ludicrous!] The visits should have the
aim of finding out and of helping.

b. Briefing the Commander. Develop the technique of storing up subjects for the
commander. Do not go into him immediately a new matter arises for his attention
unless it is genuinely urgent; even commanders sometimes have work to do and
continuous interruption is not good for the blood pressure! It is important as well to
avoid the temptation to demonstrate your undoubtedly detailed grip on a problem
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by reciting at length the entire history of the case. State the situation now and
only expand on the past in response to a question. Do not waste time telling the
commander things he knows already.

c. Reacting to the Commander’s Instructions. Sometimes you will receive

instructions that need to be passed on immediately as orders. At other times you will
be given instructions that require staff action. You will quickly learn which is which.
But in the latter case always take some time to think through what has to be done
and how to achieve the required result. It is usually a mistake to rush bull-nosed into
a problem; never force a lock!

d. Feedback. Ensure that you always report back to the commander any results of
work that he has asked you to do. If you have reached no conclusion give him a
progress report. Regard it as a failure if he has to ask how things are getting on.
e. Follow-up Action. Do not assume that a written or verbal instruction from you
to the units in the brigade constitutes an end to the matter. Most of the time the
relevant action will be taken. But earn yourself a reputation for checking and then
the relevant action will always be taken.

f. Value-Added Staff Work. Much of your work will originate in your own
headquarters. But a great deal will also filter down from above. Never make the
mistake of merely acting as a post office. Always add value to the material received
by passing it down in précis or extracted form, or by adding helpful explanation,
perhaps drawing units’ attention to particular parts of a lengthy document.

g. Dealing with the Commander’s Bright Ideas. Nowadays you are unlikely to find a
commander who is content to leave things as they are. You may not want to believe
it but he will have too much brain-power to be content with a dormant existence.
All the ideas put forward by commanders are of course brilliant but some are more
brilliant than others. As a staff officer it is your duty to point out the pitfalls of the
less good ideas. But for the good ones, and the less good ones that the commander
insists on seeing through, there is an overridingly important requirement; you must
tackle the job wholeheartedly as if the idea were your own. It is never good enough
to parade a succession of reasons why something cannot be done. A positive and
enthusiastic approach is required. The best defence against a stream of brigadorial
notions is to go active yourself; match the commander idea for idea and earn
yourself a reputation as a dynamic thinker, a mover, a forger of events.

h. Note Taking. Everyone has his own method, but method there must be. Any will
do provided that it does not rely on loose bits of paper; this never seems to work.
It gives the commander enormous confidence if he sees his staff officers consulting
well-ordered note books.

i. Relax!

Conclusion
2B-08. Whatever appointment comes your way after your staff training, you face
the prospect of a rewarding and thoroughly enjoyable tour. You will certainly
make good friends; you will be privileged to have the chance to influence
significantly the way that things are done and with luck you will form a bond
with your commander that will long outlast your time in the Army. In any event
you will learn much and you will be a better person for the experience.
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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 2

Functional Application Services

2C-01. Currently the British Army can use the top ten NATO Applications without any
additional cost as the UK contributes to the development of these applications. The use
of these applications on British systems is not restricted to NATO operations. The British
Army can use these applications on bilateral or even unilateral operations. Below are the
ten applications available to the British Army:

a. JChat – XMPP Chat.

b. NIRIS – Network Interoperable Real-Time Information Services.

c. ICC – Integrated Command and Control (COP Viewer).

d. JTS – Joint Targeting System.

e. NITB – NATO Intelligence Toolbox.

f. JOIIS – Joint Operations Intelligence Information System.

g. JOCWATCH – JOCWatch event log.

h. LogFAS – Logistics.

i. TopFAS – Tools for Operations Planning.

j. iGeoSIT – Interim Geographical Spatial Intelligence Tool.

2C-02. The following provides a brief description of the NATO application listed above:

a. JChat. Is centred on time-critical operations in order to prevent casualties and to

minimize reaction time. NATO troop-contributing nations maintain multiple chat
rooms which are used in a federated network. This makes it possible for users, who
are typically connected to a local server, to join chat rooms on local and remote
servers. It also allows user accounts to be manually managed by each source (NATO,
nation or organisation) within their individual context and at their respective security
classification levels. The NATO C2 suite includes the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP)-based JChat capability.

b. NIRIS. Provides a real-time C2 picture for air, land and maritime operations.

c. ICC. Provides capabilities for integrated planning, tasking, intelligence, targeting

and operations, information management and decision support to operational
and tactical-level operations, during peacetime, exercise, crisis and conflict. ICC is
capable of displaying a Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP), fully supports the
joint targeting cycle (through JTS) and also has interfaces to gain access to ISR data
from Coalition Shared Databases (CSD - MAJIIC), as well as display friendly force
tracking information.
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d. Joint Targeting System (JTS). Provides a network-enabled capability for integrated

joint objective and effects−based targeting, target development, target list
management, target folder preparation, target imagery management and Battle
Damage Assessment (BDA).

e. NITB. Is an integrated software capability that provides a collection of intelligence

tools within a single application, allowing the user to remain in the same
environment while working with different types of information. The NITB data can be
easily searched based on numerous criteria and the results can be overlaid on a map
or previewed in a browser.

f. JOIIS. Is a NATO-wide Situational Awareness (SA) tool that supports management

and analysis of the Battle Space Objects (BSOs) that are relevant to local
commanders.

g. JOCWatch. Is a web-based incident/event logging and monitoring tool for the

Joint Operations Centre. Incident/event information can be updated over time,
correlated and exported in various formats. JOCWatch maintains the ‘legal log’ for
the commander.

h. Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS). Is NATO’s suite of software that

supports logistical planning, execution, tracking and reporting, using an integrated
series of computer programmes.

i. Tools for Operations Planning Functional Services (TOPFAS). Is a NATO tool

suite and designed to provide an integrated set of tools to support systems analysis,
planning, execution and assessment of operational campaigns. Information objects
created in any one of the tools are available in all others, providing seamless
transition of products between various functions of the operations planning group.
j. iGeoSIT. Provides situational awareness through the network-centric sharing of
geospatial data and operational overlays. It is an interim web map server provider for
other FAS. It will be replaced by Core GIS.
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AFMTitle
Pub
Command Chapter
Chapter3?
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Chapter Title?
Command Posts
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Chapter 3
Command Posts

Introduction • Introduction
3-01. This chapter describes the different • Purpose
types of Command Posts found at the • Common Requirements
various command levels, as well as the • Organisation
functions conducted within them. It covers • Distributed and Dispersed Command
considerations regarding the organisation • The Application of Tactical Functions
of a Command Post (CP) and the factors within a CP
that determine its location. The way • Functional and Integrated Cells
in which command is conducted on a • Specialist Cells
traditional conventional battlefield, through • Operation of CPs
to command in a rapid, expeditionary • CP Siting
environment is also described. Two additional • Operational Level CP
Command and Control (C2) doctrinal • Land Component CP
concepts are introduced - Distributed
and Dispersed Command. The command
and control of a Land Component CP can be found at the end of this chapter.

3-02. A CP is a location from which command is exercised. It consists of a physical structure,

the staff and its associated Communication and Information Systems (CIS). The CP
supports the commander by analysing and presenting relevant information, by providing
the means of control and by providing the communications through which orders are
passed and information is exchanged. Principles for the design of formation CPs, from
corps level downwards, are generally described in terms of their organisation and
function. The UK has traditionally used the term HQ to describe what NATO calls the CP.
An HQ is typically the command and control node in barracks. An HQ in the field may
have several CPs. The UK is now aligned with NATO doctrine and all deployed HQs will be
referred to as CPs.

Purpose
3-03. CPs perform the role of a deployed HQ for a unit or formation. They are where the
commander and staff conduct their activities. The CP provides a facility for exercising
C2 and should be flexibly organised to meet changing situations, as well as the
requirements of a specific operation or action. They enable operations by assisting
the Commander in the Operations Process (assess, plan, prepare and execute). This is
explained in detail in Part B. The primary function of the CP is to provide information
for the commander to gain Situational Awareness (SA), from which the commander and
staff are then able to conduct oversight, give direction and coordinate actions.
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Common Requirements
3-04. All CPs have a number of common requirements.

a. Deployability. A CP must be structured so that it can be deployed easily to, or

within, a theatre of operations. This ease of deployment is dependent on the size
and the mobility of its component parts, including CIS, power generation and staff
sustainment.

b. Continuity of Command. When operational, a CP must be able to enable the

exercise of command. This requirement is met primarily by maintaining external
communications. Continuity of command further depends on the manning of the
CP to maintain constant coverage. Continuity of command requires the survivability
of CP infrastructure, including CIS, from ground, air, cyber and electronic magnetic
environment (EME) threats. Thus there is a requirement for a degree of redundancy.
This redundancy may require reversionary procedures.

c. Fusion of Command and Staff Effort. The staff exists to provide command and
decision support to the commander and to provide control of subordinates. Within a
CP, the command and staff efforts must be fully integrated. Layout, organisation, CIS
and staff processes are the key factors that help enable this integration.

Organisation
3-05. Design of CPs. The detailed design and organisation of a CP must reflect the level and
nature of the command and the type of campaign, or operation which is to be conducted.
In simple terms, form must follow function, tempered by the needs of standardisation.

3-06. Permanent HQ. The home location of the HQ is known as the Permanent HQ. At corps
level and potentially at divisional level, it has the ability to host the Main CP from the
Permanent HQ’s Operations Centre which enables distributed and/or dispersed command.
See paragraph 3.9.

3-07. Types of CPs. There are four principal categories of

operational CPs, each providing differing levels of Types of CPs
command support to the commander. The four CP
„„ Main CP
types do not apply at all levels of command.
„„ Forward CP
a. Main CP. The Main CP is the central controlling
CP at all levels. It is where all staff and tactical „„ Tactical CP
functions are coordinated and where control of
„„ Alternate CP
subordinates is concentrated. The location of the
Main CP will depend on the operational situation,
as well as the location of higher and subordinate
CPs and the location of other key interlocutors. Additionally, at corps and divisional
level, the Main is where the fundamentals of Integrated Action are orchestrated
and synchronised.
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(1) Corps Main CP. The corps Main CP controls current operations, performs
detailed analysis and plans future operations. Execution is devolved where
possible to subordinate divisions. The corps Main CP is moveable, but it is not
tactically mobile. A moveable CP implies that it is more static in location and that
considerable time and transportation resources are needed to relocate it. If the
corps Main CP relocates, an Alternate CP will need to be established at a new
location. The corps Main CP can operate from the Permanent HQ in conjunction
with a Forward or Advanced CP (for example during a deployment). Typically
a Corps HQ will maintain a separate Tactical CP. During longer, campaign-type
operations, the Tactical CP can integrate with the Main CP.

(2) Divisional Main CP. The primary functions of the divisional Main CP are
planning, preparing and executing, while continually assessing. Execution is
devolved where possible to subordinate formations under divisional control. The
division’s primary role is shaping the environment to enable freedom of action for
subordinate formations. The divisional Main CP is moveable, but it is not always
tactically mobile. A tactically mobile CP means that it can conduct its C2 mission
with minimal external support for its mobility and minimal time for set up. The
divisional Main CP can operate from the Permanent HQ location, in conjunction
with a Forward CP (for example during a deployment), or with an Advanced CP.

(3) Brigade Main CP. The brigade Main CP’s primary purpose is to control the
current battle. It is designed so that it can execute one tactical action whilst
concurrently planning another. The brigade Main CP is tactically mobile.

(4) Battlegroup (BG) Main CP. In their standard configuration, Battlegroup CPs are
designed to plan and coordinate execution, but not concurrently. Assessment
during the execution phase and making necessary adjustments is not dedicated
planning. Within a BG, the Main CP is where the majority of planning and
coordination takes place. The battalion Main CP is tactically mobile.

b. Forward (Fwd) CP. A Fwd CP is designed to allow a commander to exercise C2 near

the forward edge of the battlefield, or near a decisive point where leadership can best
be applied to shape a favourable outcome. It may also be deployed early into a theatre
or area of operations, as a base for planning, or be used by the commander in specific
operations of limited duration. In order to achieve its role, it must be small and mobile.
As a result the Forward CP’s capabilities are limited in time and scope. A Fwd CP is
resourced at the divisional and brigade levels but not at BG, or below. At the divisional
and brigade the DComd may move forward and make decisions with authority
delegated by the commander.
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XX
X Obj RED
TAC
XX

X TAC
MAIN

X
X
X
MAIN
Obj GREEN

XX
MAIN

XX

Figure 3.1. – Geographical Representation of CP Locations

c. Tactical (Tac) CP. The TAC CP is the smallest-sized CP at any level of command. A TAC
CP allows a commander to bring personal presence to bear, as the tactical situation
dictates. In order to do this it should have protection, mobility and CIS. The TAC CP
offers limited functionality, endurance and connectivity. A TAC CP may be under
poncho; in a soft skin vehicle; under armour; or on an aircraft, rotary or fixed wing.
The mission, time and resources available will influence the best platform for a TAC CP.

d. Alternate (Alt) CP. An Alt CP provides continuity of command when a CP either needs
to be moved, or is put out of action due to the enemy, equipment failure, or poor
siting. There are a number of ways to achieve this, but the price of added flexibility
is the need for additional resources. A CP may be duplicated in its entirety to allow
control to be passed from one CP to another, prior to the first moving. A technique
may be to split the Main CP into two like Alt CPs to exercise Distributed Command
(see paragraph 3.9).

3-08. Functions of Command Posts. The operational requirements dictate the functions of the
four types of CPs described. The primary purpose of a Fwd, Tac or Alt CP is to provide the
commander with an advanced, or step up C2 capability.

a. Advanced (Adv) CP. The Adv CP is based on the standard Forward CP concept. It is an
agile CP that has the capacity to assess and execute. It does so by combining a limited
number of forward-deployed staff with the ability to reach back to the balance of the
Main CP. The Main CP may be in theatre, or may remain at the formation’s Permanent
HQ. This reach-back enables the Adv CP to exploit the ability of the Main CP to reach
out to wider UK Defence capability (PJHQ, Army HQ, national agencies and other
formations). In this manner, the Adv CP is able to exert significant early influence in
the land environment through a relatively light deployment scale.
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b. Step-up CP. Step-up describes that element of the CP that moves prior to a Change of
Control (ChoC). At divisional level, Step-up CP is in the form of a Fwd CP, although a
Step-up CP can also be provided by a Tac CP, or an element of the Main CP.

Distributed and Dispersed Command

3-09. Advances in technology, constraints on sustainment, political requirements to minimise
the force structure and the need for agility, are changing how C2 is applied. Two
emerging doctrinal concepts provide additional ways to exercise Command and
Control. These two command approaches are Distributed and Dispersed Command.

a. Distributed Command. Distributed Command is the ability to exercise effective C2

leveraging cross-governmental, defence-wide expertise, while deploying forward
bespoke functionality as required. The ability to use technology to reach back and to
reach forward is crucial to the successful implementation of Distributed Command.
Some functions, such as intelligence and planning, may stay within a non-deployed
Main CP at the Permanent HQ’s Operations Centre, while current operations, forward
CIS elements and sustainment functions deploy to a Fwd CP in the area of operations.
Some of the required cross-government capability and non-governmental organisations
can only be leveraged in the UK. These assets must therefore be incorporated within
the non-deployed CP, either physically with an LO or remotely by CIS. There are five
considerations for Distributed Command:

(1) Modular and scalable command infrastructure.

(2) Common Operating Picture (COP) that is near real time.

(3) Collaborative Planning within a well-trained and self-disciplined staff.

(4) Robust network technology that allows over the horizon connectivity.

(5) Flexible C2 nodes that are adaptable and scalable.

b. Impacts of Distributed Command. The employment of Distributed Command

can optimise staff where they can be most efficient and effective, which may not
necessarily be collocated. It can also reduce the forward footprint of the command
element showing a smaller physical and EM signature. By having a significant CP
presence at home station, it may increase access and use of UK whole-government
capability. However, by splitting the staff, the commander loses immediate access to
the entire team. This may result in plans or actions taking longer to complete. There is
also a danger that a staff function like the Future Plans cell may become marginalised
due to their physical distance from the commander. The CIS requirements to effectively
implement Distributed Command are significant. It also requires a greater flow of
information to compensate for the lack of personal interaction among staff members;
replacing face to face exchanges. Information must be accessible in a timely manner to
positively influence decision making. Distributed Command is extremely challenging.
It is executed at the operational or at times, higher tactical levels. It is best suited for
smaller scale, limited, short period operations.

c. Dispersed Command. Dispersed Command sees the staff and the application of
selected tactical functions deployed forward, but not centrally located. For an agile,
expeditionary force, the functions of command may best be applied from various
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locations and nodes and not necessarily collocated. In effect, it is massing the
command capability without massing the staff support. Dispersed Command may also
provide redundancy in degraded conditions and ensure some level of continuity.

d. Impacts of Dispersed Command. Dispersed Command can reduce the physical and
EM signatures of the CP. This will increase survivability of C2 ability against an enemy
with near peer or peer capabilities. The smaller C2 nodes will blend in physically
and electronically with other force element nodes. On rapid-tempo, long-range,
expeditionary operations, Dispersed Command could enable flexible manoeuvre by
eliminating a large, static and cumbersome Main CP. It could also allow the placement
of bespoke C2 activities across the area of operations, i.e. sustainment or C2 functions
at the point where it is best coordinated. However, this agility and flexibility comes
with a cost. Decision making is more difficult due to the physical separation of the CP.
The COP will never be completely accurate which may impact the ability to make bold
shifts or adjustments during execution. More so than Distributed Command, Dispersed
Command requires a robust CIS architecture and additional power generation to
execute. The ability to successfully utilise this approach must be well resourced and
trained.

3-10. CP Size. The size of a CP affects its deployability and survivability. In broad terms,
a larger CP may provide greater endurance, but often at the expense of tactical
security and mobility, while a smaller CP may limit support to the commander.
Added redundancy in the numbers, or size of the CP, gives greater flexibility, but
at the cost of greater resource requirements in manpower, vehicles and CIS, as
well as reduced deployability. Moreover, work usually expands to fill capacity,
reducing agility and tempo. The key is to strike the right balance, producing a
responsive and agile organisation. Active measures must be taken to identify those
elements that are absolutely necessary and exclude those that are not of value.

3-11. CP Augmentation. Standard CPs and their staff structures are not necessarily manned
and configured for all possible C2 scenarios within Combined, Joint, Inter-Governmental,
Inter-Agency, Multinational (CJIIM) operations. The core CP structure should be capable of
absorbing additional elements and personnel, as well as withdrawing them, according to
the type of operation being conducted.

The Application of Tactical Functions within a CP

3-12. The Tactical Functions represent the full breadth of land forces activities
when conducting operations. They provide a checklist which describes the actions
that land forces take prior to, during and after operations.33 They describe actions
and activities, but leave the commander to determine how these should be ordered,
sequenced and applied to achieve desired effects. Land operations should be conducted
with an understanding of the situation (enabled by appropriate points of command),
the synchronisation and application of fires, manoeuvre, information activities and
capacity building, as well as ensuring that our own freedom of action is protected
and sustained. Divisional and brigade CPs should organise themselves so that each
of the tactical functions is represented in each of the Functional Cells.

33 ADP Land Operations, Chapter 8.

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Functional and Integrating Cells

3-13. Functional Cells. The staff branches outlined in Chapter 2 should be organised
into Functional Cells based upon the Tactical Functions. A staff section may have
representation in more than one Tactical Function cell within a CP. During the course of
an operation, a staff member may move from one cell to another. This requirement is
directed by the COS to optimise the staff.

3-14. Integrating Cells. Each of the Functional Cells provides staff to the Integrating Cells
during the Operations Process (Plan, Prepare, Execute and Assess). Future Plans (FPlans)
focuses on the Plan function. Future Operations (FOps) aligns with Prepare and Current
Operations (CUops) is central to Execute. The Assess function is continuous throughout.
As a result of this amalgamation, the outputs from the CP’s planning and executing
activities are fully coordinated.

Command Plan Prepare Execute

Intelligence
Staff Braches cross Tactical Functions

Future Future Current

Plans Operations Operations
Manoeuvre
External Integration

Vertical Integration

Fires
Unified
Output
Information Activites
Assess
Capacity Building

Protection

Sustainment

Horizontal Integration

Figure 3.2. – The Integrating and Functional Cell Structure

3-15. CP considerations for the Integrating Cells. A CP should be organised into integrated
cells. The integration is based on the traditional G staff as well as specialist capabilities.
Vertical integration is primarily composed from the G staff. A G staff element may sit in
more than one functional cell. Horizontal integration is based on the Operations Process:
Assess, Plan, Prepare, and Execute. By populating the functional cells horizontally and
vertically, expertise is better placed to meet the commander’s requirements. The COS
should ensure that functional cells are integrated into the Operations Process (Assess,
Plan, Prepare, and Execute) and not remain stovepiped.

a. Plan. At the corps and divisional levels, plans are initiated in the FPlans integrating
cell. These plans are developed using one of the planning processes described in Part
B. The FPlans cell contains representatives from the functional cells, which deliver the
necessary expertise appropriate to all the Tactical Functions. Future Plans at brigade
and above is conducted and led by the G5 staff. Once a plan is completed, it is
transferred to FOps. At battlegroup, planning is conducted by the G3.
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b. Prepare. At corps, division and brigade levels, FOps is where the plan enters the
Prepare Phase of the Operations Process and is distributed to subordinate formations,
units and supporting force elements. During this phase, rehearsals are conducted and
refinements to the plan are made. At a corps and divisional CP, the FOps function is
conducted by the G35 staff, while at brigade and battalion it is conducted by the G5
staff. At brigade level, the FOps cell does not have the full range of functional staff
representatives, although such teams can be formed for bespoke planning activity.
Once the operation is about to commence, responsibility for its execution is transferred
to COps. At battlegroup, prepare is also conducted by the G3.

c. Execute. The COps team is at the centre of a CP. It is not simply a substitute for the
traditional G3 Ops function as it has a far wider remit and supports the execution of
the commander’s plan by seamlessly coordinating all staff branches and functional
cells. COps guides and controls subordinate formations and units. Relevant information
is managed, collated and displayed within the Operations Centre (described below
under Operation of CPs), which is a critical element of the CP that supports the
commander in the decision-making process. At the heart of the Operations Centre is
the Common Operating Picture (COP). The commander gains critical elements of SA
and thus understanding through the COP, with information being expressed in any
appropriate medium (pictorial, textual or verbal). The COP brings together essential
elements of the G2, G3, G1/4 staff branches, Fires, ISR and any other element deemed
critical at the time. COps is typically centred around the G3 staff.

Speciality Cells
3-16. CP Augmentation. While the majority of the CP is manned by members of the
permanent headquarters staff, there is augmentation that supplements capabilities
needed during an operation. Higher level CPs typically require more augmentation
from speciality or niche capabilities. The augmentation may come in the form of a
cell from a functional unit or by an individual specialist. While at division and below,
augmentation from specialist cells is on an ad hoc basis, at corps this specialist capability
is more habitual. It is critical that specialist cells and individuals are well integrated into
the CP. There is danger that these cells could become stovepiped if not incorporated
into the plan by the COS resulting in poor planning and unsynchronised execution.

3-17. Air Land Integration. The coordination of air operations is conducted through
the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), sitting within the Air Component;
this is a theatre-level organisation. The Air Component and the CAOC plans,
refines and executes all air operations in its assigned areas in support of the Joint
Force Commander. Its orders are delivered in the form of an Air Tasking Order
(ATO) and Airspace Control Order (ACO). Air Command and Control is delegated
to subordinate units such as Control and Reporting Centres (CRCs), Air Support
Operating Centres (ASOCs), and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft.

3-18. Liaison. Effective liaison between components is essential, with senior officers liaising
directly between their respective component commanders. They are responsible for
presenting component perspectives during the planning and execution of joint operations
and assist with the integration of their component’s participation in joint operations. In
addition, specialist staff provide component planning and tasking expertise as follows:

a. Liaison. Liaison is established by the Air Component within the Joint Task Force
headquarters and at various levels within the Land Component. Liaison includes:
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(1) Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). The ACCE is the Air
Component Commander’s senior air liaison team within the Joint Task Force
HQ. The ACCE is headed by a senior airman and team members will usually
include representation from across the Air Component HQ. This allows the Air
Component Commander to be appropriately represented at the various joint
boards and working groups that inform the Joint Task Force Commander’s
decision-making process.

(2) Air Liaison Elements (ALE). ALE are the Air Component Commander’s joint
air and space subject matter experts established within component HQs. They
are experienced in joint air planning and execution, the four air power roles,
space and airspace management. ALE assist in planning the Air Component
Commander’s supporting and supported requirements, exchange current
intelligence and operational data and coordinate the integration of Airspace
Control Means (ACMs) and Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs).

(3) Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land). The AOCC(L) is an ALE,

functionally subordinate to the CAOC and integrated at corps level. The
AOCC(L) provides a socket which is augmented by liaison elements from the Air
Component and provides advice on the capabilities and limitations of air power.

(4) Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC). Located across corps, division and
brigade, the ASOC is the primary command and control agency responsible for
the execution of all air support allocated to the Land Component (CAS, ISTAR,
Air Interdiction), as well as the processing of immediate requests submitted by
ground manoeuvre forces. When the CAOC has granted the ASOC the authority
over missions assigned to it on the ATO, the ASOC can directly task on-call
missions, or divert scheduled missions to satisfy approved immediate requests.
The ASOC may also distribute Air Staff Officers (ASOs) to augment the embedded
divisional ASOs in their Plan and Refine role (an SO1 Air is positioned in the
divisional JFC, while SO2s are placed in FPlans and FOps). In addition, the ASOC
will task its subordinate TACPs within its assigned area of control.

(5) Brigade Level. ASOs are also distributed to brigade level where they provide
subject matter expertise and coordinate directly with the brigade JFC to integrate
and synchronise air operations in support of land forces. The ASOC may also
provide a Dynamic Procedural Controller (DPC) to assist the brigade TACP with
the execution of air operations.

(6) Battlegroup Level. At battlegroup level, the main ALE is the TACP. The primary
task of the TACP is to support the FAC during the terminal control of CAS.

b. Land Liaison Elements. Land liaison elements are placed within the air component
and include:

(1) Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Army) (BCD(A)). The land component

establishes the BCD(A), collocated with the CAOC, to act as the interface
between the land and air components. The BCD(A) processes ground force
requests for air support, monitors and interprets the ground battle and provides
the necessary interface for the exchange of information.

(2) Ground Liaison Officers (GLO). GLOs serve with fixed wing and rotary wing
squadrons where they perform the liaison function through the BCD(A).
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JTF HQ
ACCE

Air Liaison Elements (ALE)

AIR LAND
Component
(CAOC) BCD(A) & GLOs Component

AOCC(L)
XXX

XX
ASOC & Air Staff Officers

TACP
II

ACCE: Air Component Coordination Element

CAOC: Combined Air Operations Centre
BCD(A): Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Army)
GLOs: Ground Liaison Officers
AOCC(L): Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land)
ASOC: Air Support Operations Centre
TACP: Tactical Air Control Party

Table 3.3. – Liaison structures between the Air and Land Components

3-19. ISR Cell. At all levels of command an ISR commander will be present, supported by
specialist staff. The ISR commander is the principal intelligence officer within the
integrated Intelligence Functional Cell, coordinating intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance activities. The ISR commander provides the overall assessment of the
operating environment and is also the conduit through which the formation prioritises IR
collection efforts and resources. Additionally the ISR commander advises the manoeuvre
commander on the employment of ISR capabilities and is responsible for developing the
collection plan and its integration into the overall manoeuvre plan, normally through an
Intelligence Annex. The ISR commander coordinates all ISR capability on behalf of the
supported manoeuvre commander.

3-20. Deployed Scientific Support (DSS) Cell. DSS has two elements: Operational Analysis
(OA) and Scientific Advisors (SCIAD).
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a. Operational Analysis (OA). OA provides objective, robust, timely analytical advice

to the deployed commander and staff in order to inform the planning, execution and
assessment of military operations by supporting decision making. The advice given by
OA staff is independent and evidence based. Operational Analysts should be located
near the commander and be able to be called upon by all staff branches and functional
cells. Examples of their work include the assessment of local variations from standard
planning data (movement rates, equipment failure rates, ammunition and fuel use) and
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).

b. SCIAD. SCIADs provide scientific and technical advice to the commander and the staff
in timescales commensurate with the operational need. This advice is provided by
deployed SCIADs with reach-back to the MOD’s wider Science & Technology network.34
SCIADs also support the delivery of enhanced capability into theatre and provide
user feedback to the wider S&T network. SCIADs require access to reach-back
communications systems and their advice and reports must be fully integrated into IM
systems (see Chapter 10).

3-21. Speciality cells are provided to the CP based on operational requirements. This publication
does not provide a list of all the various specialist cells.

3-22. Individual Specialist. Although most speciality personnel will augment higher tactical
CPs, depending on the nature of the operation, augmentation can take place as low as
battlegroup level. At corps level, many of these specialists are organic to the staff.
Below is a list of some speciality skills which may augment a CP to assist the commander
and staff.

a. Cultural Advisors (CULADs). CULADs advise the commander and staff on cultural
norms and practices of the partner nation and assist the staff in understanding the
environment in which they are operating. They are key members of the planning team
and can be used as a Red Team player offering contrary views from the partner nation
aspect.

b. Policy Advisors (POLADs). While normally held at brigade, divisional or corps level,
POLADs may be task organised with a battlegroup for specific missions or activities.
They are responsible for advising on aspects of UK defence policy and practices that
affect decision making.

c. Legal Advisors (LEGADs). LEGADs are usually military lawyers, held at brigade,
divisional or corps level but may be task organised with a battlegroup for specific
missions or activities. They are responsible for offering legal advice to the deployed
force. They have a wide range of duties, covered in detail in JDP 3-46.

d. Stabilisation Advisors (STABADs). STABADs are deployed civilian experts from the
Stabilisation Unit. They are responsible for advising the commander and integrating
cross-government stabilisation strategies and programmes into planning. They are key
members of the planning staff.

34 This includes Dstl, DE&S, Industry and Academia.

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The Operation of CPs

3-23. The principal staff officer (typically the COS depending on the level and function of the
CP – see Chapter 2) provides the human focus for activity within the CP. Regular briefings
(for the COS and the commander) aid the flow of information and hence the integration
of staff effort. There will also be a need for a physical focus within the CP where all staff
cells have access, which will provide a display of the most up to date information. Ideally,
this should be centred around the map on which the current battle is being tracked

3-24. All the cells within a CP are concerned with overseeing, directing and coordinating, in
order to support the execution of the commander’s intent and mission. While all cells
should have clearly defined responsibilities, no cell will be able to operate effectively
in isolation; therefore coordination between them will be important. The interaction
between cells must be identified early in the process of structuring the CP and
arrangements should be made to ensure they are equipped and manned to work, not
only with other cells within the CP, but also with similar functional cells in other CPs.

3-25. Understanding and Information. An effective CP should be adept at using information,

rather than becoming swamped or driven by it, particularly during times of high tempo. It
is vital to have robust, consistent and well-understood methods. A CP requires proficiency
in Information Management (IM - integrated processes and services to provide exploitable
information, such as RFI handling), Information Exploitation (IX – the use of information
to gain advantage), Information Assurance (IAssurance - the confidence that information
is reliable, accurate and secure) and Information Superiority (ISup - possessing better
information relative to the enemy or an adversary). Effective methods in these areas also
help to capture lessons and support disclosure when required. This is considered in more
detail in Chapter 2 Annex A.

3-26. Endurance. The ability of a CP to plan and/or execute on an enduring basis must be
balanced against the need to operate continuously. Working the staff hard in the early
stages of an operation or campaign will result in a high level of initial output, but this rate
of activity will not be sustainable over time. Options to mitigate the impact include having
day/night-shift COps staff, dedicated rest time (primarily for the FPlans cell as they are
unlikely to be split into day/night shifts), or the rotation of staff between different cells
(which could have the added benefit of wider understanding and increased capability).

CP Siting
3-27. General. Reliable communications, together with the administration and security of
the commander, staff and the other supporting elements, are vital to the continuity and
effectiveness of command. CPs and the CIS that support them are indispensable in the
exercise of C2 and are therefore high-value targets for enemies and adversaries. Thus,
the siting of a CP is as critical as its design. The grouping and responsibilities of those
responsible for selecting CP locations are described in detail in divisional, brigade and
BG SOIs.
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3-28. Tactical Level CP. The tactical considerations

Tactical Considerations for
affecting the siting of a CP are:35
a CP
a. Communications. The site must offer good
„„ Communications
communications to subordinate and other CPs.
If possible, the CP siting should be screened „„ Concealment
to prevent enemy EW detection. Access to civil
„„ Protection
communication and information systems may
also be important. Although electromagnetic „„ Accessibility
signatures can assist the enemy in locating a CP,
„„ OPSEC
proper siting and electromagnetic discipline can
reduce the possibility of detection.

b. Protection. Woods or built-up areas offer the best concealment from view, while
the use of barns, large sheds, or factory complexes helps counter Thermal Imagery
surveillance and provides some basic protection against chemical attack. Good
fieldcraft is essential in maximising concealment - siting is not enough.

c. Security. CPs must provide a secure working environment for the commander and the
staff. Security is achieved through physical and electronic concealment and protection,
as well as CBRN defence measures. There may also be a need to assign forces to
protect the CP and its associated communications. In order to balance the needs for
robust communications, concealment and security, CPs should remote their antennae
as far away as possible.

d. Accessibility. The site should be easily accessible but not liable to accidental discovery
by enemy ground, or aerial reconnaissance. The use of tac-signing, a useful peacetime
expedient, should be controlled carefully on operations.

e. OPSEC. In addition to the physical security mentioned above, OPSEC must also be
employed. This is increasingly critical in the modern battlespace. An OPSEC Plan is
normally developed in the Protection Cell. The OPSEC plan will normally consist of
a number of force-wide measures, together with specific measures (often imposed
for a limited period only) for individual units, equipment, installations or areas. The
measures selected will be governed by the specific requirements of each CP element
and whether it needs to be protected or controlled.36

f. Additional Considerations. Consideration should also be given to the needs of

the commander and elements of the staff to meet with CJIIM agencies and local
interlocutors. This will often be best achieved at a location other than the Main CP.
This may require the use of Fwd or Tac CPs.

3-29. Operational Level CP. In principle, the siting of an operational-level CP follows

the same considerations for a tactical CP, but additional factors apply. In addition
to communications with subordinate forces, the operational-level CP must have
communications to the host nation and to the home base or Land Component HQ.
Infrastructure requirements and access to ports, or fixed-wing airfields may also
determine siting.

35 Additional security and protection doctrine will be published in AFM Warfighting Tactics and AFM Protection.
36 Further detail can be found in Doctrine Note 16/3 OPSEC and Counter Surveillance.
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3-30. Land Component CP. In principle, the siting of a Land Component CP follows the same
considerations for other land CPs, but additional factors apply. Communications to the
JFC, host nation and to the home base are essential. The Land Component CP may also
host allied members or LOs as well as host-nation military and political personnel. Political
considerations may also be important. Infrastructure requirements and access to ports or
fixed-wing airfields may also determine siting. Typically, Land Component CPs are static.
Since no two operations will ever be identical, the requirements for staff and command
posts will vary with every operation. However, a number of broad principles apply:

a. An LCC should conduct an estimate of the requirement for staff and CPs as soon as it
is warned for an operation. To assist such an estimate, contingency planning for a wide
range of potential scenarios should allow a set of base assumptions that will influence
the options for HQ design.

b. Most staff functions within an LCC are largely independent of the scale and
anticipated duration of an operation, although the staff numbers required to fulfil
those functions may vary considerably. Such functions depend more on the nature of
the operation than its scale.

c. Timely deployment of the LCC HQ will contribute to campaign success. A potential

LCC HQ should be designed and structured for rapid deployment, with staffs held
on appropriately high readiness levels. Typically, forward liaison and planning teams
should be held at the highest readiness, followed by elements of a Fwd CP.

d. Training as an LCC HQ is essential to achieving operational readiness. Integrated

training programmes, incorporating joint force and other component headquarters, are
required. It is usually beyond the resources of a service or formation command to train
itself to serve as an LCC, therefore it should be trained by a superior headquarters.
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AFMTitle
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Chapter
B ?
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PART B
Exercising Command and Control

Overview Part A – Command and Control

• Command
Part B switches focus to the exercising of Command
• Command Support
and Control (C2) described in Part A. It does so
• Command Posts
using the Operations Process of Assess, Plan,
Prepare and Execute as its structure.37 Of these four
Part B – Exercising Command and
activities, assessing is continuous and is therefore
Control
discussed in general and again within the sections on
 Introduction to the Operations
planning, preparing and executing. Part B does not
Process
go into absolute detail on the procedures involved
 Assess
in these activities, but provides the definitions,
 Plan
purpose and method behind each.38 The operational
 Prepare
processes used by our principal allies, especially
 Execute
in the planning domain, are included in Part C.
Part C – Command in the CJIIM
Environment

• Multinational Interoperability
• NATO and Allied Planning Processes
• UK Resilience Operations

37 ADP Land Operations, 2017 adopted the NATO Operations Process of Assess, Plan, Prepare and
Execute as a replacement for the UK PREE Process (Plan, Prepare, Execute and Evaluate).
38 At the time of writing, Warfare Branch intends to capture the detailed mechanics of how commanders and
their staffs plan and execute in the Planning and Execution Handbook, due for publication by the end of 2017.
Further detail on the Combat Estimate can be found in Doctrine Note 15/06, The Combat Estimate.
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Chapter
Operations
Title? Process
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Chapter 4
Introduction to the
Operations Process

Introduction Introduction to the Operations

4-01. Exercising Command and Control (C2) Process
takes place dynamically throughout the • Introduction
Operations Process of Assessing, • Interrelationships of activities within
Planning, Preparing and Executing. As the Operations Process
Figure 4.1 shows, the commander is central • Delineation within activities
to the process. While the activities are cyclical • Setting and maintaining the
and continuous, they do not necessarily operation’s direction
occur sequentially. It is important to note
that planning, preparing and executing do
not always have distinct start and end points. Planning is a continuous activity within
the process. While preparing for one operation, or during its execution, formations or
units will be refining the current plan, or planning for future operations. Preparation is
also a continuous activity, even when a formation or unit is not executing an operation.
Preparation always overlaps with planning and continues throughout execution for some
subordinate units. The task of Assessing surrounds and permeates the other three
activities. Finally, staff must understand that subordinate formations, or units within the
same command, may be in different stages of the Operations Process at any given time.

P
s

A
es

RE

sse
N
Ass

PA
PLA

ss
RE

Commander

EXECUTE
A ssess
Figure 4.1. – The Operations Process
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Interrelationship of Activities within the Operations Process

4-02. Figure 4.2 below shows how emphasis on each of the four activities within the
Operations Process fluctuates throughout a hypothetical operation. While only a
theoretical example, Figure 4.2 underlines the points that assessment remains relatively
constant and that the other activities, though continuous, are not sequential.

Figure 4.2. – Interrelationship between Operations Process Activities

Delineation within Activities

4-03. Table 4.3 over the page shows the tasks that fall within each of the four activities of the
Operations Process. This is not an all-encompassing breakdown and this delineation is
used as the framework for Part B.
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Plan Prepare Execute

Estimates ISR activity Decision making
Planning tools and processes Refinement of the plan Execution activity
Operational Staff Work Commander’s Back Brief Adjustment activity
Orders Coordination and liaison Directing action
Task Organisation and
Integration
Rehearsals
CP pre-execution checks
Assessment During Planning Assessment During Assessment During
Monitor the situation Preparation Execution
Evaluate courses of action Monitor preparations Monitor operations
Evaluate preparations Evaluate progress
Continuous Assessment
Situational Awareness
Monitoring – situation, operations, MOP, MOE and variances
Evaluating – forecasting, seize, retain and exploit the initiative

Table 4.3. – Exercising Command and Control

Setting and Maintaining the Operation’s Direction

4-04. The Tactical Functions39 represent the full breadth of land force activities when
conducting operations. However, those that are predominantly focussed internally,
setting and maintaining the direction for the operation or action, are Command and
Intelligence.40 Figure 4.4, taken from ADP Land Operations, 2017 also underlines the
importance of a secure network of information services to underpin the effectiveness
of all Tactical Functions. These Tactical Functions, coupled with information services,
provide the context for the Operations Process and are considered below:

a. Command. Command in the tactical land environment is described in detail in Part

A. However, in relation to the Operations Process, the centrality of the commander is
fundamental. Commanders must lead the process.

b. Intelligence. Intelligence is the product of information that has had judgment applied
to it and is critical to effective C2 throughout the Operations Process. To maintain the
initiative, the commander must seek to make decisions with a tempo that is superior
to that of the enemy. This requires an ability to assess an operational environment,
assess the enemy’s decision-making cycle, identify opportunities for exploitation and
disseminate critical information. Intelligence directly supports the commander by
producing assessments and reports that support decision making regarding probable
Courses of Action (COA). Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) staff
synchronise and integrate the output of collection capabilities by processing, exploiting
and disseminating the resulting information in direct support of planning, preparation,
and execution.

39 ADP Land Operations, 2017: Command, Intelligence, Manoeuvre, Fires, Information

Activities, Capacity Building, Protection and Sustainment.
40 ADP Land Operations, 2017.
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c. Information Services.41 Modern warfare relies more than ever on the capability to
collect, process, display, store and disseminate information and orders in a way that is
faster and better than what the enemy can achieve. This capability requires complex
C2 system technologies and well-trained staff. These requirements also constitute
vulnerabilities that the enemy can attack. During conflict, a commander will seek
to degrade the enemy’s ability to make correct, timely decisions and disseminate
information, while simultaneously protecting friendly C2 systems from enemy action.

Fires, Manoeuvre
Intelligence Command Capacity Building
Information Activities

Information Services

Protection and Sustainment

Figure 4.4. – Interrelationship between the Tactical Functions

41 ADP Land Operations, 2017.

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Chapter 5 S P

AS
ES

RE

SES
N
ASS
Assess

PA
PLA

S
RE
Commander

EXECUTE
ASSESS
Introduction42
5-01. Assessment within the context of the
Operations Process is the monitoring and Assess
evaluation of the Current Operational Picture • Introduction
(COP).43 It is continuous throughout planning, • Seizing the Initiative
preparation and execution and is dependent • Process
on good Situational Awareness (SA), to which • MOEs and MOPs
it also contributes. Critically, assessment is • Information Requirements
guided by Information Requirements and • Commander’s Critical Information
provides the basis for the decision making of Requirements
commanders and staff. It is also an essential • Recognising Variances
supporting activity in the constant fight for
understanding – one of the fundamentals of
Integrated Action. Within a Command Post (CP), the commander and staff therefore
strive for accurate SA to evaluate progress, forecast opportunities or threats and identify
variances from the plan, in order to seize and exploit the initiative. These tasks also
provide the essential feedback for the C2 of the Operations Process.

Seizing the Initiative

5-02. Initiative is the ability to dictate the course of events, to decide and act before our
opponents do and thus gain advantage. Seizing and holding the initiative is one of the
tools of the Manoeuvrist Approach and is dependent on effective and timely assessment
to generate quicker decision making in relation to the enemy. This generation of tempo
and momentum provides opportunities for exploitation and pre-emption, all of which
enable commanders and staff to gain, regain and exploit the initiative.

Process
5-03. Assessing consists of two distinct tasks: monitoring the current situation and the
progress of the operation, as well as evaluating the operation against Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). Monitoring and evaluation
take different forms during planning, preparing, and executing. Together, they allow
commanders to assess the situation in terms of their expectations and the actual progress
of the operation.

42 As AFM Command is the first UK AFM to describe the Operations Process, much of this chapter is drawn
from NATO’s ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. Whilst assessment has always been a
fundamental and integral part of the UK’s procedures during planning and execution, it has not previously
been defined as a distinct step until ADP Land Operations, 2017 introduced the Operations Process.
43 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.
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a. Monitoring:

(1) Definition. Monitoring is the continuous observation of the COP and therefore
produces SA. The commander and staff will typically focus on Priority Information
Requirements (PIRs). These can include confirmation of current understanding
and planning assumptions, to ensure they remain valid, as well as identifying new
information and assumptions that will affect subsequent planning. In addition,
monitoring should identify indicators that relate to opportunities, threats to the
force and gaps in information. Information requirements are described further at
paragraph 5-05.

(2) Relationship to Situational Awareness (SA). Monitoring informs SA. SA is

the perception of a particular area of interest, problem, or situation, bounded
by time and space, in the context of a mission or task. SA provides the ability to
identify what has happened and what is happening, but not necessarily why it
has happened. Assessment of SA provides greater comprehension of an issue.
Applying judgement to this comprehension provides understanding.

(3) Considerations. Often, reports and returns are adequate for monitoring at the
lower tactical levels. However, as the complexity of the battlefield increases,
CIS enable more timely and accurate representation of the COP. As a guiding
principle, the best monitoring mechanisms are those that are least intrusive to a
force element or event.

b. Evaluating:

(1) Definition. Evaluating compares relevant information on a situation or operation

against criteria to determine success or progress. Evaluating uses relevant
information from the COP to measure, analyse and report the performance
of friendly forces and broader-actor activity against MOEs and MOPs, to
identify variances from the plan, or its assumptions and to forecast trends.
For example, functional cells within a CP may generate assessments, often
directed by the commander, on factors such as timelines, distances, loss rates,
consumption rates, unit effectiveness, enemy actions and facts and assumptions.
They incorporate such evaluations into their staff estimates which, in turn,
present recommendations to the commander. The commander considers these
assessments or recommendations, makes decisions and directs action.

(2) Considerations. The commander and the staff continuously evaluate the current
and projected situation to determine if changes are necessary to accomplish the
mission, achieve the commander’s intent more effectively, or protect the force.
One aid to evaluation is the use of targeted information requirements, often in
the form of questions. By evaluating the answers to these questions against the
MOEs and MOPs, the commander and staff can determine variances from current
understanding or assumptions made during planning, or from expected progress
during execution.
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Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and

Measures of Performance (MOPs)
5-04. MOEs and MOPs are fundamental to evaluation of all military operations. They are
criteria developed during the Operations Process to measure mission accomplishment,
but do not represent the assessment itself. A MOE helps to determine if a task is
achieving its intended results. A MOP helps to determine whether a task is completed
as directed, to a standard and are also commonly used to evaluate training and help
determine whether activities are being conducted correctly; they simply measure the
performance of a task. There is no direct hierarchical relationship between a MOP
and a MOE. MOPs do not feed MOEs, or combine in any way to produce MOEs. The
staff develops MOEs and MOPs in planning and they are normally expressed either as
an explicit evaluation of the present situation, or a forecast of the degree of mission
accomplishment. They take different forms during planning, preparing and execution.
For example, the commander’s directed assessment criteria for COA comparison can
be described as a form of MOE and MOP; note, they often differ from the MOE and
MOP used to evaluate the progress of operations against the expectations of the
plan. In addition, MOEs and MOPs can, and should, change during execution. Finally,
MOE and MOP require relevant information44 to evaluate in the form of indicators.

a. Measure of Effectiveness. A MOE is a criterion45 used to assess changes in system

behaviour, capability, or operational environment, linked to measuring the attainment
of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of a desired effect. MOEs
help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. It is important to
note that the term measurement of effect46 is subtly different and relates solely to
the measurement of the consequences (positive or negative) of actions taken. MOEs
help to answer questions regarding whether a force is conducting the right actions.
Examples of a MOE for the objective to provide a safe and secure environment may
include:

(1) Decrease in insurgent activity.

(2) Increase in population trust of host nation security forces.

b. Measure of Performance. A MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions

that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs help determine whether a
specific action was taken, or whether it was completed to the required standard.
MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all echelons in synchronisation matrices.47
Evaluating task accomplishment in line with the synchronisation matrix is relatively
straightforward and often results in yes or no answers. Examples include:

(1) Route X cleared.

(2) Hill 785 secured.

(3) Generators delivered, are operational and are secured at villages A, B and C.

44 Relevant information is defined as ‘all information of importance to the commander and staff in the
exercise of command and control.’ ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.
45 The singular form is criterion and the plural form is criteria. It is a common mistake to use
criteria as if it were singular, as in a further criteria needs to be considered.
46 ADP Land Operations, 2017 - an effect is a change (or not) created in a particular object as the consequences of
actions taken.
47 Often referred to as Execution Matrices in NATO doctrine.
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c. Indicators.48 In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information

that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. Indicators take the form of reports from
subordinates, surveys and polls, as well as responses to information requirements.
Indicators provide guidance as to the current status of a MOE or MOP. A single
indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. CIS can support assessment activities
by the automated monitoring of critical indicators of success, identification of
variances from expectations and forecasting the magnitude of change. Example
Indicators for the MOE decrease in insurgent activity are:

(1) Number of hostile actions per area, each week.

(2) Number of munitions caches found per area, per week.

(3) Number of reports of insurgent activity by the population per area, per week.

Measure of Effectiveness Measure of

Indicator
(MOE) Performance (MOP)
Used to measure attainment of an Used to measure task Used to provide insight into an MOE
end state condition, achievement accomplishment. or MOP.
of an objective, or creation of a
desired effect.

Answers the question: Answers the question:

Answers the question:
Are we doing things What is the status of this MOE or MOP?
Are we doing the right things?
right?

Measures what Information used to make measuring

Measures why (unifying purpose)
(completion of tasks what or why possible.
in the mission statement.
specified) in the mission.

No direct hierarchical relationship No direct hierarchical Subordinate to MOE and MOP.

to MOP. relationship to MOE.

Often formally Often formally tracked in formal

Often tracked in formal
tracked using the assessment plans.
assessment plans.
Synchronization Matrix.

Typically simple to Typically as challenging to select

Typically challenging to choose the
choose the appropriate appropriately as the supported MOE
appropriate criteria.
criteria. or MOP.

Table 5.1. – Summary of MOE, MOP and Indicators

Information Requirements (IRs)49

5-05. IRs50 represent the full spread of information that must be collected in order to
meet the requirements of the commander and staff for the successful execution
of operations. In that context, commanders and staff must focus, prioritise and
manage IR in order to ensure that mission-focussed information is with the right
person at the right time. IRs are therefore sub-divided into five categories:

48 The term Indicator is an adopted NATO term that has previously been referred to as a measure in UK doctrine.
49 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.
50 Information regarding an adversary or potentially hostile actors and other relevant aspects of the operational environment
that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. APP-6. NATO
Joint Military Symbology.
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a. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). An IR that relates to the enemy and its
operating environment is categorised as PIR. They are essential to the planning and
conduct of operations and consist of specific questions aimed in a focussed manner.
Their identification and drafting initiates and drives the intelligence process. PIR can
be further subdivided into Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR), which are specific
questions aimed in a focussed manner for input to the Intelligence Collection Plan
(ICP).

b. Neutral Information Requirements (NIRs). NIRs relate to information regarding

the environment or human terrain. These IRs are likely to be collected by a range of
Non-Traditional ISR methods (NTISRs), such as defence engagement teams, human
terrain recce patrols, as well as by conventional ISR capabilities. NIRs are not currently
recognised in NATO doctrine.

c. Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs). An IR that relates to friendly

forces, or local indigenous forces, are categorised as FFIRs; ‘how we see ourselves’.
They are not the responsibility of ISR staff to answer directly and are more usually
answered by the commander or staff.

d. Essential Elements of Information (EEI). An IR can be broken down into more

detailed questions known as EEI. They add the details to the SIR and allow the
production of a collection task list as part of an ICP. EEI could be related to several
IRs and should provide enough guidance to allow analysts to produce a complete
and satisfying answer to each requirement. EEI are the basis for creating collection
requirements and for establishing the relevant tasking and coordination with organic
sources, or relevant agencies.

e. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). EEFI are not IR in the traditional
sense, but are those elements of information regarding friendly forces that must be
protected from compromise. EEFI will inform OPSEC and deception planning. As with
FFIRs, they are not the responsibility of the ISR staff to answer directly.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

5-06. Information concerning areas that are either critical to the success of the mission,
or represent a critical threat are expressed as CCIRs. They are set by the commander
(though the staff may recommend CCIRs) to inform staff and subordinates regarding
what information is necessary for their decision making and to focus resources on
collecting that information. CCIRs are not static. The commander adjusts and updates
them throughout the progress of an operation to reflect changing information needs. The
fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources.
CCIRs can range across all five of the IR categories. The relationship between IRs and
CCIRs is shown in Figure 5-2.
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CCIR are:
„„ Specified by the commander for each mission or operation.
„„ Related to planned decisions.
„„ Applicable only to the commander who specifies them.
„„ Situation dependent - directly linked to present and future missions.
„„ Time sensitive. Answers to CCIRs must be immediately reported to the commander
by any communications system available.
„„ Always included in operational staff work (OSW).
importance
Increasing

Increasing
OPSEC
CCIR

IR

PIR NIR FFIR EEFI

EEI EEI EEI
EEI EEI EEI
Figure 5.2. – Information Requirements

Recognising Variances
5-07. Variances are the differences between the actual situation at a given point during
an operation and the forecast of the situation at that time. CIS can display relevant
information in the COP that highlights the existence of variances. In such instances,
the staff will use objective and subjective criteria to assess the COP, to determine the
existence of a variance, its significance and how it will affect the plan. If necessary, the
staff will update its estimates and recommend COAs to the commander. The commander
will direct any necessary subsequent action to exploit opportunities, or counter threats to
the mission. If the evaluation reveals no substantial variance, the commander may direct
minimal corrective action to ensure that operational progress conforms to the plan.
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5-08. There are two forms of variance. The first is an unexpected threat to mission
accomplishment, or to the force. When a threat is recognised, the commander must
adjust the plan to counter the enemy advantage and restore the initiative. The second
form of variance is the presence of an unexpected opportunity that will enable the
more effective accomplishment of the mission, or will lead to unexpected success
against the enemy. When recognised, the commander should alter the plan51 to exploit
the opportunity, if such an amendment can be made without compromising the plan,
or incurring unacceptable risk. The philosophy of Mission Command empowers the
commander to exploit opportunity, or seize the initiative within their commander’s
intent52. In evaluating variances, assessment must identify opportunities and threats
quickly in order to react effectively.

51 Although the concept may, and the intent will usually, remain the same.
52 The classical decision-action cycle – sometimes referred to as the OODA loop (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act).
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AFMTitle
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Chapter Title?
Plan
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Chapter 6 P

PLA s

As RE
es

RE

ses
N
Ass
Plan

PA

s
Commander

EXECUTE

Overview A ssess

6-01. The UK uses three formal processes to

assist a commander with decision making Plan
– the Operational Level Planning Process • Overview of the Operational and
(OLPP),53 the Tactical Estimate (TE) and the Tactical Planning Processes
Combat Estimate (CE). This chapter will • Operational Level Planning Process
describe these processes, but will primarily • Tactical Estimate
focus on the tactical level (TE and CE). As • Combat Estimate
the problem-solving tools and processes • Common Planning Tools
within each estimate are not exclusive • Intelligence Preparation of the
to it, this chapter will first describe the Environment
respective estimate sequences before going • Mission Analysis
into further detail on the planning tools • Effects Schematic and CONOPS
and supporting procedures common to all. Development
Part C gives an overview of those planning • Wargaming
processes used by our principal allies, • Red Teaming
including the OLPP/NATO Comprehensive • Risk Management
Operational Planning Directive (COPD). • Control of Operations
Of note, due to the necessary procedural • Operational Staff Work
focus of this chapter, it has a unique style
within the publication that encompasses
a number of sections and subsections.

53 SOHB, 2014 describes the Army’s approach to operational planning as the Operational Estimate. With the
UKs increasing alignment to NATO, the SHAPE endorsed NATO Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
(COPD) is now recognised as the authoritative source for Operational Level Planning Process direction.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 1
Overview of the Operational and
Tactical Planning Processes

Decision Making in General

6-02. Individuals and formalised groups are tasked with making decisions every day. These can
vary from very simple, almost unconscious decisions, to extremely complex ones. However,
common throughout this spectrum is the generic process that people go through to
make a decision. This process, at its simplest, can be reduced to four key steps:

a. Define the problem.

b. Gather and consider information.

c. Identify possible solutions.

d. Select the best solution

6-03. This simple problem-solving model establishes the base logic for the formalised estimate
processes used by the Army and by nations within NATO.54

Estimates
6-04. Against the backdrop of this generic framework,
The estimate is a logical
military estimates have been developed as a formal
process of reasoning by
process to consider problems and construct Courses
which the commander,
of Action (COAs). Estimates are planning tools
faced with an ill structured
that enable military commanders to make timely
problem, arrives at a
and appropriate decisions and to generate plans
decision for a course of
and orders. Decision making in the military context
action to be taken in order
is unique in that poor decisions, or inefficient
to achieve their mission.
process have the potential to increase the risk to
friendly forces, leading to loss of life. The formal
definition of an estimate is: ‘a logical process
of reasoning by which the commander, faced with an ill-structured problem, arrives
at a decision for a course of action to be taken in order to achieve the mission.55

6-05. Military estimates range in complexity from the extensive analysis and briefings that take
place in headquarters or Command Posts (CPs), where there is a full staff and plenty of
time, down to the rapid assessment and decisions made in contact by commanders at
subunit level and below.

54 The classical decision-action cycle - sometimes referred to as the OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop.
55 AJP-5. Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning, 2013.
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6-06. As the situation changes, the mission and relevant elements of a plan should be
reassessed. Therefore, where a situational change requires an amendment to the plan,
estimates should be revisited. They must be looked at as a continuous cycle rather than a
linear and inflexible planning tool.

6-07. When conducting an estimate, individuals and staff branches are responsible for
discrete elements of it. The commander is responsible for ensuring that coherence is
maintained, but it is the responsibility of the whole staff to know how their element of
the analysis links to the work being conducted by others. The commander is responsible
for mission analysis, as well as identifying the unit or formation’s role in supporting the
higher commander’s intent and for identifying potential COAs for the staff to develop
into a plan.

Assessment During Planning

6-08. Assessment is procedurally engrained within UK estimates, especially within Intelligence
Preparation of the Environment (IPE), Mission Analysis and COA evaluation. As the
plan develops within the estimate process, it is tested against a constantly changing
situation in order to refine the decisions made, as well as identify and mitigate risks.
Such refinement, drawing on the tools of red-teaming, wargaming and Operational
Analysis (OA), precedes the issuing of orders. Planning is typically the stage in the
operations process where the staff creates the initial COP from which to achieve shared
Situational Awareness (SA) and identify opportunities, threats and information
requirements. Assessment during planning also identifies measure of effectiveness (MOE)
and measure of performance (MOP) that are used for subsequent assessment during
preparation and execution.

Planning Overview
6-09. The Commander. In British doctrine, estimate processes have traditionally been led
by the commander and not driven by the staff. However, the autonomy afforded
to the staff is not absolutely fixed. In joint headquarters, at the higher tactical and
operational levels within NATO, a greater degree of responsibility may be accorded to
the staff. As the commander is responsible for the direction of the decision-making
cycle, they must be fully involved in the estimate at its initial stage and, as they make
the decision on a COA, they have to be involved in the final stage. The extent to
which the commander is involved in the detailed evaluation of the factors and COA
development, in between, will depend on a number of considerations including:

a. The time available to make a decision.

b. The state of training and experience of the staff.

c. The level of decision making required.

d. The complexity of the required decision.

e. The style and personality of the commander.

f. The availability of the commander - there will always be a requirement for

reconnaissance, visits and briefs during a planning process.
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6-10. A good commander also knows that:

a. To achieve tempo, a plan that is 80% complete but delivered on time is preferable to
one that is 100% complete but late.

b. To enable Mission Command, commanders must provide clear and timely direction,
particularly regarding their intent. They must direct one down, but always think and
resource two down.

c. The estimate is a means to an end. The actual decision the commander makes is more
important than the decision-making process. However, elements of that process,
particularly the IPE to develop understanding, are important components to help
inform their decision making.

6-11. The Staff. The staff is responsible for completing the bulk of the estimate under
the direction of the commander or the principal staff officer, usually the Chief of
Staff (COS). The COS provides the essential bridge between the commander and
the staff advising, managing and coordinating the work of the staff. At lower
tactical levels the staff is mainly concerned with detailed evaluation of information
and the conduct of staff checks on behalf of the commander. At the operational
(particularly in joint and multinational operations) and higher tactical levels, the staff
will often be required to develop possible COAs for the commander to compare
and decide upon. The UK’s estimate processes require that the staff has open access
to the commander in order to obtain clarification and advice as necessary.

6-12. Planning Guidelines. At the operational level, AJP-5: Allied Joint Doctrine for
Operational Level Planning articulates the principles of planning.56 At the tactical
level, planning is not allocated specific planning principles, noting that the Principles
of War and the requirements of the Manoeuvrist Approach offer sufficient
considerations for a commander. There are however, regardless of the method
of estimate being used, a number of guidelines that should be referred to:

a. Commander’s Intent. In line with Mission Command, commanders at every level

must act to achieve or support their higher commander’s intent. This has a direct
correlation to the requirement to constantly focus on the intent and mission during
planning. Plans and orders must be consistent with the higher commander’s intent
and clearly articulate what that intent is. Subordinates have a duty to ensure that
they understand the intent, while commanders must ensure that subordinates
understand it.

b. Information and Intelligence. The estimate should be command led, but

information and intelligence-driven. Not only will information and intelligence
requirements come to light during the estimate, it is also incumbent on intelligence
staffs to anticipate requirements and to be proactive in meeting them. Commanders
must have clarity in their own minds as to what they are planning against.

c. Agility Based on Preparation. Mental agility underpinned by sound preparation

is essential to the estimate process. It will likely be conducted with incomplete
information, in changing circumstances, to achieve sometimes ambiguous objectives
and against challenging timelines. Clear direction, delegation, proven standard
operating procedures and concurrent activity at all levels will mitigate the frictions.

56 Definition of Objectives, Unity of Purpose, Sustainment, Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility,
Initiative, Maintenance of Morale, Surprise, Security, Simplicity in Plans and Orders and Multinationality.
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d. Practise. A well-practised team will be capable of working through complex

problems and meeting tight timelines. A disciplined working environment should be
created, which needs to be as tidy, as uncluttered and as free of as many internal
frictions as possible. However, it should not be assumed that this work can always
be done in secure and sterile spaces with plenty of workable information technology.
Headquarters should be comfortable with conducting estimates in more austere field
conditions, perhaps on the move, perhaps in contact with an adversary or in a chaotic
situation. The problem faced is likely to be difficult to solve and probably ill-structured,
therefore the best estimate teams place a premium on rigour, time-keeping, concurrent
activity and cooperation.

e. Enabling mindset. Within the application of Mission Command, it is the duty of the
staff in higher headquarters to create the freedom for their subordinates to operate.
To do this requires staff to think two-down and to use their access to greater resources
to reduce the burden on subordinates. This is particularly important when facilitating
enabling actions.

f. Use of Time. Effective planning requires a sensitive awareness of and an efficient use
of time in order to maximise the subordinate commanders’ time for battle procedure.
For staffing, the commonly accepted 1/3 – 2/3 rule is applied to allocate sufficient time
to subordinates to conduct their own planning and battle procedure. This allocation
can be supported by the prompt issuing of warning orders to generate concurrent
activity. As a guide, the staff should give 2/3 of the time available to subordinate levels
of command and use the remaining time as follows: 30% to understand the situation
and the problem, 50% to develop and validate COAs and 20% to produce and issue
formal direction.

6-13. Integrated Action. Integrated Action is the application of the full range of lethal
and non-lethal capabilities to change and maintain the understanding and behaviour
of audiences to achieve a successful outcome.57 This doctrine, formalised in ADP
Land Operations, 2017 has therefore created a slight shift in the Army’s approach to
planning, rather than any change in the estimate processes themselves. At its simplest,
it ensures that commanders and their staffs consider the full range of lethal and non-
lethal means (capabilities and actions) available. It ensures that the use of force is a
means to an end, rather than simply the default main activity. Where appropriate,
plans should therefore be expressed in terms that integrate the full range of relevant
actions available to the force. To that end, the application of Integrated Action in a
planning cycle is most relevant at the divisional level and above, as it is here that all the
tactical functions can be resourced effectively and where the full spread of Combined,
Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency and Multinational (CJIIM) actors are likely to
be represented and available. However, as a mindset, it remains as applicable at the
lower tactical level. The purpose of Integrated Action is to achieve fully integrated,
interdependent actions, leading to more appropriate effects and outcomes.

57 ADP Land Operations, 2017.

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6-14. Manoeuvrist Approach. The Manoeuvrist Approach

Manoeuvrist Approach
is the Army’s fighting doctrine for the tactical level
Considerations
and determines how we fight enemies across the
spectrum of operations. An in-depth understanding „„ Is there an emphasis on
of this approach is important for commanders and understanding (constant
staff conducting tactical planning. Commanders assessment)?
must always make time to consider how
„„ Is the plan innovative and
manoeuvrist their direction and plans are to avoid
original - are we doing the
conducting predictable, slow and unimaginative
unexpected?
tactical actions. A non-exhaustive list of planning
considerations drawn from the Manoeuvrist „„ Is the full range of
Approach is shown in the adjacent text box. capabilities in the TASKORG
synchronised to deliver
6-15. Mission Command. In line with Mission Command
effect?
the commander must specify the desired outcome.
At the operational level, the superior commander’s „„ Effect is more important
intentions are expressed in a statement of the than method (consequence
commander’s intent. At the tactical level, the over action).
superior commander’s concept of operations
„„ Manoeuvre the mind - are
should include their intent, scheme of manoeuvre
behaviours and perceptions
and main effort. A well-framed commander’s
being influenced?
intent allows subordinates to exercise initiative
in accordance with their commander’s vision. „„ Is risk managed
All UK estimate processes are designed to give a appropriately to generate
subordinate commander the freedom of action opportunity?
to decide how they will achieve desired effects,
„„ Are weaknesses
within their superior’s overarching intent.
(vulnerabilities) struck in
6-16. Planning is Continuous. Planning is a dynamic strength?
process of interrelated activities rather than a
„„ Will we act before the
single linear process. Commanders and staff
enemy?
must have the agility to adjust a plan based on
new information and changing circumstances. „„ Understand the maximum
Thus, simple plans will likely deliver the necessary capacities of the capabilities
flexibility and tempo. Commanders and staff must at your disposal.
also be aware that refinements to a plan that
„„ Is there a relentless
has already been communicated will add another
determination to succeed?
layer of considerations onto time-constrained
subordinate battle procedure. Refinement
therefore requires efficient staff procedures
driven by sharp situational awareness. Refinement
is covered in further detail in Chapter 7.

6-17. Planning Horizons. Planning involves an

appreciation of planning horizons. Because the future is always uncertain, planning
should not specify future actions with precision. Rather, future plans must remain
flexible and adaptable, allowing the opportunity to pursue a variety of options. As plans
extend further into the future, they become less a matter of trying to direct events and
more a matter of identifying options and possibilities. Critical to this is the ability to
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determine future enemy actions, therefore assumptions on which to plan against must
be made and continually validated. If unable to predict enemy actions with reasonable
certainty, the plan must keep options open until intelligence builds a clearer picture.

6-18. Outcome, Objectives, Effects, Actions (OOEAs). Within British doctrine, an

understanding of the relationship between Outcomes, Objectives, Effects and
Actions is crucial to successful planning, especially during a commander’s Mission
Analysis. It not only helps a commander to understand where they sit in the higher
commander’s CONOPS, but also aids the analysis of specified and implied tasks. When
considering OOEAs within planning, it is essential that staff understand that actions
might not necessarily result in desired effects and they must therefore build the
necessary simplicity and flexibility into plans58. In addition, while establishing cause
and effect can sometimes be difficult, especially with regard to human behaviour,
it is critical to effective assessment. Appropriate MOEs and MOPs must therefore
be established during planning. The ‘layered’ relationship between Outcomes –
Objectives – Effects – Actions, with definitions, is depicted in Figure 6.1.1. The OOEAs
interrelationship expressed succinctly is Actions create Effects; Effects achieve
Objectives, and numerous Objectives deliver the desired Outcome. In the context
of UK planning, tasks are defined as something a formation or unit is required to
do – they can include actions and effects, as well as a range of other direction.

Outcome
Favourable or enduring situation

Objective Objective
A clearly defined and achievable goal
Effect Effect

Effect Effect Action Action

A change which is the
consequence of an Action
Physical Will and
capability cohesion
Action Action
Action
A task to create an effect
taken by the force.
integrated with those not Understanding Action Action
under direct control

Changed or maintained understanding and behaviour

Figure 6.1.1. – Outcome, Objectives, Effects and Actions (OOEA)

6-19. Analytical Tools. The three-column format (3CF) is a basic but highly effective analytical
tool used at all stages of the estimate, though it is particularly applicable during Mission
Analysis, Table 6.1.2 refers. It is a mechanism that helps a commander and staff to
interrogate the factors within a problem and to record the analysis as deductions with
a series of outputs. It therefore provides an audit trail of the logic upon which a plan is

58 Note: The OOEA relationship is not intended to be mathematically precise.

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based. This enables a commander and staff to revisit the logic flow and, where necessary,
test and adjust the deductions when either the situation changes or the plan fails. The
output from the 3CF is a series of staff tasks or constraints, using a commonly understood
Staff Planning Lexicon, as detailed in other handbooks. During the estimate, this drives
the staff to comprehensively examine a problem through a Planning Guidance Matrix
(PGM).
Factor Analysis Output
Input Process Planning Guidance Matrix

Question or Factor So What?

raised during the What are the key Use Staff Planning Lexicon
estimate deductions from the
factor/question

Table 6.1.2. – 3CF Template

6-20. Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies. Integrated Action doctrine defines and
describes the people who observe, perceive or are the targets of, our operational activity
as audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies, see Figure 6.1.4. The Audience is all those
relevant to the attainment of our outcomes. Some of the audience outside the area of
operations could exert influence on the operation itself (an example is the UK population,
the media or politicians). Those individuals or groups in the audience who take action or
directly exert influence are defined as Actors. The actors most relevant to land forces are
those who have effects on the operation. They may be friendly, neutral (even-handed)
or hostile to us and will usually be in the theatre of operations. Adversaries are those
individuals or groups that seek to prevent us from achieving our objectives such that the
use of force against them may be considered. An Enemy is a particular type of adversary
who seeks to oppose us through armed, lethal means. Consideration should be given
to the regular reassessment of people’s classification (audiences, actors, adversaries and
enemies) as the classifications are not fixed and will likely alter in response to FF or enemy
action or inaction. Additionally, the criticality is not simply to label the people within the
classification but to assess how to apply Integrated Action against them appropriately.

Audiences Audience. All the groups and individual

people whose perception and interpretation
of events and subsequent behaviour contribute
to the success or otherwise of military action

Actors Actors. A group or person that

takes action or directly
exerts influence

Adversary. A group or person that

Adversaries
seeks to prevent us from achieving
our objectives

Enemy. A group or person that seeks

Enemies to defeat us through armed lethal means

Figure 6.1.4. – Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies

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British Army Estimates

6-21. Ideally, the Army would have one process with a common format and which works for
both the most complex problems and the most straightforward, irrespective of the level of
understanding and time available. However, the differing situations in which commanders
and staff conduct an estimate means that the Army uses three different estimates, all of
which are command led:

a. Operational Level Planning Process (OLPP). At the operational level, the

commander and their staff use the OLPP to produce a campaign or operational plan,
usually at the Joint Force Command (JFC) level. The OLPP incorporates Planning
Concepts (often referred to as Campaign Planning Concepts) which support the
detail of the campaign plan. The OLPP is referred to in Section 6.2 for completeness,
recognising it as a planning process; the detail of the OLPP is addressed in Chapter 10
NATO and Allied Planning Processes.

b. Tactical Estimate (TE). The TE, also known as the Six Step Estimate, can be used by
corps59, division, brigade and battlegroup HQs. It is designed for circumstances where
military problems are complex and plans may be longer term, involving significant
sequencing. The TE is suitable where there is an emphasis on detailed planning and
understanding, rather than on high-tempo decision making. The TE can incorporate
Planning Concepts, which have utility in framing longer-term, more complex tactical
planning. The TE is further explained in Section 6.3.

c. Combat Estimate (CE). The CE is derived from the TE but presents the analysis, plan
creation and decision making in a sequence of seven questions. This is intended
to enable the rapid understanding of a problem and to allow swift decision making,
as part of an accelerated battle procedure. The CE is designed to generate plans for
single, urgent tactical problems, yet can be adapted for more complex, deliberate
actions. It assumes that the operating environment and general tactical situation are
already well understood. It is used at the divisional and brigade levels for problems
that require quick execution (as a guide, within 72 hours) and it is always the tool
that is used at battlegroup level and below. Consequently, the CE can be used by
an individual commander or with a supporting headquarters staff. The CE is further
explained in Section 6.4.

(1) Individual. The Individual/Hasty CE is conducted by a commander on their own

where there is either no staff, or there is no time to use them60. It is always used
at subunit level and below and often by battlegroup commanders, see Figure
6.1.5; its use is not described further in this publication.

59 If the OLPP is the process utilised by the JFC at the operational level, then Corps (as the highest tactical headquarters)
should either use the TE, or a hybrid process that blends OLPP with the TE, to ensure the Corps remains tactical in function
but aware of the operational level.
60 All Arms Tactical Aide Memoire, 30 May 2016.
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7Q REMINDER HASTY ESTIMATE

Baseline prep and understanding Regain initiative - Suppressive fire, drills, get clear of killing area, fix with
Create space to think indirect fire etc. Need to get situation stable enough to think

Talk through what is going on out loud - e.g. en position

Regain initiative - with a machine gun on the high ground. Distinguish
1. What is the situation and how does Create space to think between the important and unimportant
Q1
it affect me?
What is the enemy up to? A very simple assessment on the en MLCOA. May identify
what is not immediately evident - potential depth a ‘come
on’, a show of force

2. What have I been told to do and why? Focus on the Mission and identify the options that support
What does my comd Q2
want me to do? your comd’s intent
3. What effects do I need to achieve &
what direction must I give?
What do I need to do? Q3
A quick plan. What do you need to do, where should you do
4. Where can I best accomplish each it from and who is best placed/equipped to do it? What else
action or effect? Where do I need to do it? Q4 do i need to ask for? Think to the finish.

5. What resources do I need to What do I need to do it with? Q5

accomplish each action of effect?

6. When and where do the actions take When? Q6 Timings related to fire support
place in relation to each other?
How can I stop things Visualise the plan to identify where things are going to go
7. What control measures do I need Q7
going wrong? wrong. Use of Reference Pts and FSCM crucial. Synchronise
to impose?
fire. Hazard to locals considered here?

Figure 6.1.5. – The Individual/Hasty Estimate

(2) Staff. The Staff CE is command led, with the commander giving direction to
the staff regarding the key points on which to focus. The staff contribution is a
collaborative team effort. The staff must therefore be well trained to be able to
work through the questions quickly and efficiently, generating Operational Staff
Work (OSW) as they go, without becoming fixed by process.

d. Bespoke Estimates. A number of bespoke estimates exist to support specialised force

elements such as UKSF, CIS and CSS. These are often framed around the TE or CE and
are not included in this AFM.

6-22. Allied Planning Processes. The majority of NATO nations use their own tactical planning
processes; US, German and French estimates are outlined in Part C. NATO uses the
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), which is best suited to problems at
the strategic and operational levels.

Choice of Tactical Estimate

6-23. Key Differences. As described, at the operational level the UK uses the OLPP. This
enables a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)61 to frame a problem and then, through
a flexible and adaptive process designed to address ill-structured problems, establish
suitable courses of action to achieve campaign success. However, at the tactical level,
formation commanders need to decide whether to use the TE or CE.62 At divisional level,
the decision is typically straightforward, due to increased planning horizons and well-
defined Future Plans and Future Operations planning responsibilities.63 At battlegroup
level and below, the CE will be the default. This therefore leaves the brigade as the
formation most regularly having to make a decision as to which estimate to use. Table
6.1.6 highlights the principal differences that should govern the choice between using
either the TE or the CE.

61 For example, a Corps Commander (ARRC).

62 In the recent past, the CE was the default estimate at formation level due, in large part, to a lack of staff
training on the TE. The Army is addressing this shortfall. ICSC(L) will teach the TE from 2017.
63 Divisional Future Plans typically use the TE and Future Operations will almost always use the CE.
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Planning Criteria TE CE
Complex problem requiring detailed Broadly understood tactical
The challenge analysis and sequenced mission delivery challenge, normally focussed on
over time. enemy and ground.

Detailed contextual analysis required. Context broadly understood

Step 1 likely to be iterative as
Level of Understanding
understanding develops and its
implications to the plan are considered.

Significant planning time required and Time-constrained tactical

Time available available, not less than 24hrs and usually problem.
more.

Table 6.1.6. – Criteria for appropriate estimate selection

Sequences within the Uk Estimates

6-24. Table 6.1.7 shows the separate stages of each of the UK’s three estimate processes. The
first column is designed to highlight the commonality between each estimate. Experience
has shown that staff can initially be intimidated by the prospect of learning another
estimate, once they have established a solid understanding of the CE. However, it has also
been shown that the similar flow of the estimates enables a logical transition from one
to another, noting that all are supported by the same group of problem-solving tools and
processes. These common tools and processes are described at Section 6.5.

Common to all OLPP TE CE

Understand the Step 1. Initiation of Step 1. Understand the Q1. What is the situation and how does it
Situation/Problem Planning. situation. affect me?

Step 2. Problem Step 2. Understand the Q2. What have I been told to do and why?
and Mission problem. (2A Mission
Analysis. Analysis, 2B Evaluation of Q3. What effects do I need to achieve and
Factors, 2C Commander’s what direction must I give in order to
Guidance) develop a plan?

Consider and Step 3. COA Step 3. Formulate and Q4. Where can I best accomplish each
Develop COAs Development. consider COAs. action/effect?
Step 4. COA Step 4. Develop and Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish
analysis. validate COAs. each action/effect?
Step 5. COA Step 5. COA evaluation. Q6. When and where do the actions take
Validation and place in relation to each other?
Comparison. Q7. What control measures do I need to
impose?
Make a Decision / Step 6. Step 6. Commander’s Commander’s decision
Communicate Commander’s decision.
Decision.
Execute and Assess Step 7. Operational
level CONOPS and
Plan Development.
Step 8. Campaign
Assessment and
Plan Review/
Revision.

Table 6.1.7. – Stages of UK Estimate Process64

64 Note: Steps 7 and 8 of the OLPP equate to OSW production and execution assessment respectively in both the
TE and CE. Whilst not defined stages of the TE and CE they are obviously part of the Operations Process.
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Staff Groupings
6-25. Command and Staff Groupings during the TE and CE. SOIs should specify who is
in which group, reflecting the experience, manning and ability of the staff. Groupings
will change as staff take leave, are employed on other tasks, or become casualties. The
COS must rehearse the groupings to ensure that all planning tasks are covered. Typically
the staff are organised into a Command Group (CG) supported by staff branches.
Further groups, such as the Principal Planning Group (PPG) and the Staff Planning
Group (SPG) also exist for the planning cycle - roles for these planning groups should
be defined in SOPs. Additional functional groupings may be created for specific tasks.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 2
Operational-Level Planning Process

Overview
6-26. Overview. The operational level is described as: the level of operations at which
campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish
strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations65. The operational level provides
the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. This
publication is concerned with Tactical Doctrine; the Operation-Level Planning Process
(OLPP) sits above the tactical level and is therefore only referred to in Chapter 6 Planning
for completeness to recognise where OLPP sits relative to the TE and CE. The detail of
OLPP and NATO COPD is contained with Chapter 10 NATO and Allied Planning Processes.

6-27. Operational Level. The operational level is described as: the level of operations at which
campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish
strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations66. The operational level
provides the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces.
Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions would lead to the achievement of a
strategic end-state. Tactical actions must be linked by the operational level such that they
conform to the aims of the overall strategy. The strategy should also be linked through
the operational level in order to achieve an understanding of what is tactically realistic.
The operational commander must clearly understand how activities mesh within other
strategic lines of operation.67

6-28. Operational Art68. Operational art is defined as the employment of forces to attain
strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and
conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. It is the orchestration
of a series of tactical actions, if necessary along multiple tactical lines of activity.
Operational art is often regarded as an aspect of command at the operational (joint)
level. It is described here because although its understanding and application is implicit
to land force commanders with operational-level responsibilities, tactical commanders
also need to understand it. It informs the design of the campaign or operation to which
they contribute, and is therefore the source of their higher commander’s intent. It is also
relevant as a tool at the tactical level, when sequencing multiple tactical activities to
achieve objectives, which in turn contribute to operational-level outcomes. This is often
relevant in the case of a unit with long-term responsibilities for an area of operations.

6-29. Planning Concepts at the Operational Level. Operational Plans are designed and
managed using Operational-Level Planning Concepts. These focus effort, assist a
commander to visualise how their operation or campaign may unfold, provide a common
lexicon for disseminating ideas and instructions and assist in mission execution.

65 Within NATO the operational level is often referred to as the joint level.
66 Within NATO the operational level is often referred to as the joint level.
67 AJP-01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Dec 2010.
68 Extract from ADP Land Operations, 2017 para: 8-11.
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The planning concepts are normally displayed at first in an operational framework and
will become the operational design once the commander takes ownership and applies
their commander’s initial intent (see Figure 6.2.1). Tactical level HQs (component HQs and
high-level Land formation HQs) will deliver military activities and supporting effects that
underpin campaign success. Planning Concepts, which have utility at both the operational
and higher tactical levels, are shown below in Table 6.2.2.
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Current Situation Favourable Situation

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Shape Attack Transition
Line of
Operation 1 DC 3
(Maritime) Campaign Campaign
Objective A End-State
Line of Opponent
Operation 2 DC 4 Operational DC 6 The Withdrawal
(Land) CoG of Country ‘X’
Campaign
Objective B Invading Force
Line of from Island
Operation 3 DC 1 DC 2 DC 5 ‘Y’ and the re-
(Air) Campaign establishment of
4a - Governance Objective ‘Y’ host nation
DC 9 DC 10 D
Line of authority
Operation 4
(Civil-Mil) DC 7 DC 8

4b - Infrastructure Campaign
Objective C

Campaign End-State
The Withdrawal of Country ‘X’ Invading Force from Island ‘Y’ and the Re-Establishment of ‘Y’ Host Nation Authority

Campaign Objective A Campaign Objective D

Campaign Objective B Campaign Objective C
Defeat ‘X’ Conventional Re-Establish HN (‘Y)
Secure ‘x’ Withdrawal Restore Essential Services
Forces Authority

DC1 ‘X’ C2 Neutralised DC5 Air Control Established DC7 Potable Water Provided DC9 ‘Y’ Armed Forces and
DC2 Air Superiority Gained DC6 ‘X’ Land Forces DC8 Electric Power Restored Police Re-Asserted
DC3 Seas Denied Repatriated DC10 ‘Y’ Governing Authority
DC4 ‘X’ Land Forces Defeated Re-Instated

Campaign End-State Centre of Gravity (CoG) Decisive Condition (DC)

Campaign End-State
DC
Brief Narrative Centre (number)
Equates to the sum of of
the campaign objectives Gravity DC descriptor expressed
Campaign DC as a noun or verb in
Description its completed from
Objective DC

Support Effect (SE) Line/Grouping of Operation Phase

SE (number) Line Line

Line / Grouping Line / Grouping

SE descriptor expressed
as a noun or verb in
Grouping
its completed from

Contingency Plan Operational Pause Culminating Point

Figure 6.2.1. – Operational Schematic using Planning Concepts69

69 JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition.

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Planning Concepts Definition

Provides the focal point to achieve the National Strategic Aim. Although the
Operational End-State or the outcome is singular and synonymous with the end-state, a series of outcomes
Outcome can exist at each level of warfare.

Characteristic, capability or influence from which a nation, alliance, military

force, civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, its strength, cohesion
Centre of Gravity (CoG) or will to fight. Political or Strategic CoG can often be a moral entity, such
as ‘the ruling elite’ or a strong willed population. CoGs representing physical
strength and power exist in principle at each level of command.

These are vital considerations in the design of an operation. Will include the
Transition and Termination resolution of a conflict as well as mutual acceptance of terms and conditions.
Commanders and staff must clearly understand exit criteria.

A goal which contributes to the desired outcome. Objectives can sit at the
Objectives strategic through to the tactical level noting that, at the tactical level, they
should be clearly defined and attainable.

A decisive combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a

Decisive Conditions (DC)
campaign or operational objective.

The intended consequences of actions. When these effects are realised, decisive
(Supporting) Effects
conditions are realised.

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive conditions or points in

Lines of Operation (LOO) time and space on the path to the Centre of Gravity. Lines may be functional,
thematic or environmental.

Sequencing is the logical arrangement of effects and activities based on their

Sequencing and Synchronising interdependencies. Synchronisation applies time and space considerations to
sequences and thus establishes their feasibility.

These represent distinct stages in the progress of a campaign leading to decisive

Phases
conditions to reach the outcome.

A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors
Contingency Plans (Branches have been identified or can be assumed. Branches provide alternative ways to
and Sequels) achieve DCs within a phase. Sequels provide an alternative option for the next
phase, based on the outcome of the current phase.

A culminating point is reached when the current situation can be maintained,

but not developed to any greater advantage. To attempt to do so, without a
Culminating Point
pause or reinforcement, would risk over-extension and the vulnerability this may
cause.

An operational pause can be imposed on an operation or campaign out of

necessity or through choice. Although a pause tends to reduce tempo in the
Operational Pause short-term, it may increase it later on. Pauses are used to avoid culmination.
They should be exploited to regain or strengthen a hold on the initiative and
increase momentum.

The point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating,

equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly. One side
Fulcrum* starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly. The very act of
attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria, however, can help to identify
opportunities and create the requisite conditions for success.

* Tipping Point is also used; note that neither Fulcrum nor Tipping Point are accepted NATO terminology.

Table 6.2.2. – Planning Concepts for the Operational and Higher Tactical Levels70

70 SOHB.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 3
The Tactical Estimate (TE)

Introduction
6-30. Overview. As described in Section 6.1, the Tactical Estimate (TE), also known as the
6-Step process, is used when the tactical problem is complex and plans may be longer
term and involve significant sequencing. There must therefore be sufficient time71
to complete a thorough assessment of the situation and the resultant plan may well
link a number of tactical actions, through time and across the battlespace. Although
it is typically the preserve of the higher tactical level (corps or division), a brigade HQ
should use the TE when planning a deliberate, complex, multinational operation, and
the CE for subsequent tactical actions. The TE will typically be used within the context
of an operational or campaign plan and where the planning concepts (see section 6.2)
have been decided at the operational level by the JTFHQ. As with the OLPP and the
CE, the TE seeks to produce plan that is focussed by the commander’s direction.

6-31. Process. The TE consists of analysis in six linked stages, common in format, processes
and outputs to the OLPP. It requires both concurrent and sequential analysis and
is designed to enable the commander, supported by the staff, to understand the
problem, identify the art of the possible, select a winning concept and translate it into
a workable plan within the available time. It consists of the following steps, each of
which is described in further detail in the latter stages of this section. Each step has a
clear purpose, product and outcome. As with the CE, the TE is split into two stages;
a subsequent third stage relates to the communication of the plan, Table 6.3.1.
Stage 1 - Analysis of the Environment and the Mission
Step 1 Understand the situation

Step 2 Identify and analyse the problem. This step is split into three further sub steps:

2A Mission Analysis

2B Evaluate Objects and Factors (includes Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE))

2C Commander’s Analysis and Guidance

Stage 2 - Development of the Plan

Step 3 Formulate and consider Courses of Action (COAs)

Step 4 Develop and Validate COAs

Step 5 COA Evaluation

Step 6 Commander’s Decision

Stage 3 - Communication of the Plan

Delivery of OSW and orders.
In the subsequent Preparation activity, subordinate back-briefs and a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill
ensure clarity of understanding across the Chain of Command.

Table 6.3.1. – The Stages and Steps in the Tactical Estimate

71 Over 96 hrs as a rule of thumb.

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6-32. Operating within the context of an Operational or Campaign Plan. At the

higher tactical level the TE will typically be used to produce a tactical plan in support
of an overarching campaign/operational plan. This will often be depicted by an
operational schematic. Component and higher-level tactical HQs therefore have to
deliver military activities and supporting effects that underpin the campaign. They may
therefore decide to use planning concepts which, derived from the operational level,
assist in breaking down, ordering and visualising complex tactical military plans.72

6-33. Planning Concepts at the Tactical Level. The planning concepts methodology,
explained at Section 6.2, has wider utility beyond the operational level. Some planning
concepts such as Centre of Gravity and Phases, are a useful method to bring order to
higher-level tactical plans where they are complex, sequenced or managed over significant
periods of time. For example, a brigade conducting a complex stabilisation operation
that spans years may find a planning concept such as a Line of Operation (LOO) of use.
The HQ may also choose to display its tactical plan using a schematic based on planning
concepts. The use of planning concepts at the higher tactical level is about exploiting
a useful methodology; it is not about campaign planning at the tactical level, nor is
it a mandatory part of tactical planning. Planning concepts may be self-generated in
the tactical planning process or may derive from an analysis of a higher HQ’s planning
concepts. HQs should restrict themselves to examining 1 and 2-up plans only and should
not search higher and higher in the hope of discovering planning concepts relevant to
their activity.

STAGE 1 – Analysis of the Environment and Mission

STEP 1 – Understanding the Situation
6-34. Overview. The purpose of Step 1 is to develop a thorough understanding of the
character and nature of the operating environment and its corresponding challenges
in order to allow the commander to frame the problem within its operational context.
Step 1, which initiates the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) and
the Intelligence Estimate (IE), is critical because it establishes the baseline for the
remainder of the estimate. As with the other steps, it is likely to be iterative and
may be refined at any stage of the estimate. WngO 1 will be sent during Step 1.

Step 1 – Understanding the Situation

Purpose: To develop a broad but thorough understanding of the character and nature of
the operating environment in order to allow the commander to frame the problem within
its operational context.

Product: A Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB) and an Operational Environment Brief

followed by WngO 1.

Outcome: An understanding of the operational context in which the tactical problem sits.

72 When planning concepts are used at the higher tactical level UK doctrine has previously referred to them as Tactical
Planning Concepts.
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STEP 2 - Understand the Problem

6-35. Overview. ‘Understanding the problem’ is the process by which the commander narrows
their focus on the complexities of the problem – what are the key factors and why, what
is their theory of change from the current conditions to the future desired conditions,
and what risks and opportunities exist? The commander should also envisage how the
problem might change over time as a result of events both in and out of their control.

Step 2 – Understand the problem

Purpose: Allows the commander to narrow their focus on the complexities of the problem
– what are the key factors and why, what is their theory of change from the current
conditions to the future desired conditions, and what risks and opportunities exist?

Product: 
• 2A – Mission Analysis. Planning Guidance, deductions in relation to Planning Concepts
(i.e. FF CoG, Decisive Act and Decisive Conditions), IRs, tasks, assumptions, constraints
and areas of risk to the plan. Effects Schematic and Intent.
• 2B – Object and Factor Analysis. ML and MD En COA, ICP, Draft DSO/DSOM and analysis
of specific factors – typically related to CCIRs.
• 2C – Commander’s Confirmation. Output of MA, Intent Schematic and further Planning
Guidance for remainder of estimate.
• WngO 2.

Outcome: A full understanding of the operational environment, the outcome to be

achieved in the context of the overall design for operations (higher intent and SoM),
the objectives and tasks necessary to fulfil the mission, what constraints apply and what
further decisions are required as the operation progresses.

STAGE 2 – Development of the Plan

STEP 3 – Formulate COAs
6-36. Overview. Formulation of COAs is the stage in which the staff take the commander’s
direction from Step 2 and generate outline COAs. The commander should have already
generated a number of workable COAs in their own mind at this point and they must
now focus staff effort on providing sufficient detail for each of these. Step 3 does not
follow a set procedure - its purpose is to create credible and feasible COAs using balanced
planning teams that can then be further developed in Step 4. Where the situation is
complicated the commander may examine a wider range of COAs or task bespoke
planning teams to scope the feasibility of certain contingency plans. When time is short,
the situation simple, or options limited, command judgement needs to be applied to
limit what is considered. In sum, it is a relatively quick transitory step which allows the
commander to rule out options and select the most credible COAs to take forward.
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Step 3 – Formulate COAs

Purpose: Creation of credible and feasible outline COAs that can be further developed in
Step 4.

Products:
• COA summary sheet for each COA.
• COA back brief to commander.

Outcome: Commander has selected COAs for further development in the remainder of
the estimate.

STEP 4 – Develop and Validate COAs

6-37. Overview. Development and validation of the COAs is the step in which the staff work
up the detail of the selected COAs to ensure that credible and feasible COAs can then
be tested against one another in the next step. Of note, by this stage in the process the
complex nature of operations at the higher tactical level may dislocate the commander
from the HQ so staff must work diligently within the commander’s intent to ensure that
the process does not lose tempo.

Step 4 – Develop and Validate COAs

Purpose: Development and validation of detailed COAs in order to create mature options
that can be tested against each other in Step 5.

Products:
• DSO/DSOM, SoM, TASKORG and Synch Matrix for each COA.
• Commander’s Step 4 Outbrief.

Outcome: Commander gives further direction on the development of the plan.

STEP 5 – COA Evaluation

6-38. Overview. COA evaluation is the step where alternative COAs are evaluated against the
likelihood of achieving the operational or tactical outcome and the associated objectives.
At a minimum each COA should therefore have a fully developed CONOPS and Ops
Trace with any additional product specified in formation SOIs. Although there is an
opportunity for further refinement of the CONOPS, Step 5 is primarily designed to assist
the commander in making a COA decision noting that they should have previously set
the criteria for evaluation. Step 5 consists of four stages and the results are briefed to the
commander.
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Step 5 – COA Evaluation

Purpose: Step 5 is primarily designed to assist the commander in making a COA decision;
alternative COAs are evaluated against the likelihood of achieving the operational or
tactical outcome and the associated objectives.

Products:
• Captured results of the COA evaluation.
• Refined COAs.
• Commander’s Step 5 Outbrief.

Outcome: COAs refined and evaluated sufficiently to allow the commander to select a
COA for development into a detailed plan.

STEP 6 – Commander’s Decision and Development of the Plan

6-39. Overview. In this step the commander decides which of the COAs the staff will develop
into the plan. They must explain precisely what the COA will involve in the form of a
Commander’s Decision Brief to the staff or, if time is constrained, to the PPG for it to
brief to the remainder of the staff subsequently. WngO 3 is produced following the
Commander’s Decision Brief.

Step 6 – Commander’s decision and development of the plan

Purpose: Commander selects their chosen COA for development into the plan.

Products:
• Commanders Decision Brief to the staff.
• WngO 3.
• The Plan – full OSW and supporting product. (Golden Thread product includes: Ops
Schematic, TASKORG, Synch Matrix and DSO/DSOM.)

Outcome: A finalised plan.

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TE Summary
Tactical Estimate – The 6-Step Process
Stage 1 - Analysis of Env & Msn

Understand the Situation Commander & Staff

1
Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB)
Understand the Operating Environment
Operating Environment Brief
WngO 1

Understand the Problem

2

Commander Staff Commander

Step 2A: MA Step 2B: Evaluate Objects Step 2C: Comd’s Analysis
and Factors & Guidance

Formulate & Consider Commander & Staff

3 COAs
Operational Schematic
Effects Schematic
Risk
Set Evaluation Criteria
Stage 2 - Developing the Plan

Commander
Comd’s Guidance for COA Development

Develop & Validate COAs Staff

4
Develop COAs
Validate with FACES
Wargame

COA Evaluation Commander & / or Staff

5
Evaluate against Comd’s criteria
Wargame/Red Team/OA

Commander’s Decision
6

Figure 6.3.2. – Overview of the Tactical Estimate

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 4
The Combat Estimate (CE)

Introduction
6-40. Overview. The CE was initially produced for commanders planning at subunit level
and below, but it is also suitable for commanders and staff in battlegroup, brigade
or divisional headquarters. It is designed to generate plans for tactical problems that
typically need resolving urgently. The CE assumes that the commander and staff of a
unit or formation has a good base understanding of the situation and there is therefore
no need (and no time) to analyse the broader issues arising from tools such as ASCOPE
(Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events) or PMESIIPT (Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical, Time).73 The requirement to
generate tempo is foremost.

6-41. Process. The manner in which the CE is used depends on the problem to which the
estimate is being applied and the amount of time available. A summary of the process
and outputs is at Figure 6.4.3. It is a process, not a template, with each question having a
clear purpose, product and outcome. The CE format is a guide that requires the individual
or staff conducting the estimate to identify the factors most relevant to the problem, and
to analyse them under the most appropriate question. This section deliberately focuses
on the conduct of a staff-supported CE. When conducting the CE as an individual the
purpose and outcome of each question is identical but the level of product will obviously
be limited. Of note, planning concepts (see Section 6.2) are not used in the CE though the
staff should clearly be aware of the tactical level plan/schematic that they are supporting.
The CE is split into two stages, while a third stage relates to the communication of the
plan. Table 6.4.1 refers.
Stage 1 - Analysis of the Environment and the Mission
Question 0 Baseline Preparation and Understanding.

Question 1 What is the situation and how does it affect me?

Question 2 What have I been told to do and why?

Question 3 What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give to develop the plan?
Stage 2 - Development of the Plan
Question 4 Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?

Question 5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

Question 6 Where and when do the actions/effects take place in relation to each other?

Question 7 What control measures do I need to impose?

Stage 3 - Communication of the Plan

Delivery of OSW and orders.
In the subsequent Preparation activity subordinate backbriefs and a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill ensure
clarity of understanding across the Chain of Command.

Table 6.4.1. – The Two Stages of the CE

73 ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events) and PMESIIPT (Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical, Time) are described further at Section 6.5.
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STAGE 1 – Analysis of the Environment and the Mission (Q0 – 3)

Q0 – Baseline Preparation and Understanding
6-42. Overview. ‘Baseline Preparation and Understanding’ is the first stage in the CE. The
aim of this stage is for the commander and staff to frame the problem that faces them
and to focus the staff on the key issues that must be considered during the estimate. It
follows the same logic as Step 1 of the TE, though unlike the TE it assumes that everyone
has a broad understanding of the context within which the tactical problem sits.

Q0 – Baseline Preparation and Understanding

Purpose: To frame the problem and focus the staff on the key issues to be considered
during the estimate.

Product: Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB) followed by WngO 1.

Outcome: The context of the tactical problem understood and the staff aware of the
key issues to be considered.

QUESTION 1 – What is the Situation and How does it affect Me?

6-43. Overview. Q1 is the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE).74 It is the analysis
of the environment (physical and human) and the enemy to identify what the enemy
is most likely to do and how the environment will affect the operation, summarised at
Figure 6.4.2.

Q1 – What is the situation and how does it affect me?

• Purpose: To analyse the physical environment, human terrain and enemy focussing on
the object and factors that the force will have to overcome to achieve its mission.

Products:
• The Q1 Back Brief.
• Draft ICP.
• Draft Decision Support Overlay (DSO).
• En focussed Event Overlay.
• En most dangerous (MD)/most likely (ML) COAs.

Outcome: The context of the tactical problem understood and the staff aware of the
key issues to be considered.

74 Sometimes referred to as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Battlefield (Annex 7c to AJP-2). NATO use the term
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).
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Operational Area Evaluation Threat

Evaluation
Human
Terrain Met
Terrain
Analysis Analysis Doctrine Strength
Analysis1

Impact of the
Likely
Environment
Tactics
on the enemy

Situation
Impact of the
Environment on Integration
friendly forces

Enemy
Note 1 – Human Terrain Analysis may be omitted if it is
clear that the population has no bearing on the operation.
MLCOA
Urban areas are covered in the Terrain Analysis.

Fig 6.4.2. – CE IPE Summary75

QUESTION 2 – What have I been told to do and Why?

2C-44. Overview. MA is an analytical process to allow the commander to understand the
superior’s intent, the mission and the context in which it is set. More specifically,
it allows the commander to develop an understanding of the role in achieving the
higher commander’s desired end state, identify specified and implied tasks and the
factors that constrain decision making. Q1 and Q2 are best conducted sequentially
to reduce the risk of flawed assumptions. To make best use of limited time,
conducting Q1 and Q2 concurrently has merit; Table 6.4.3 over the page shows a
recommended ‘blended’ compromise. The key Q2 outcome is that the commander
and staff must be absolutely clear on what situation is being planned against.

75 Note: Human Terrain Analysis may be omitted if it is clear that the population has no bearing on the operation. Urban
areas are covered in the Terrain Analysis.
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Q2 – What have I been told to do and why?

Purpose: An analysis of the orders to identify/confirm the intent and tasks that must be
completed and the freedoms and constraints imposed.

Product: Planning guidance incorporating the identification of:

• Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Information
Requirements (PIRs), Requests for Information (RFIs).
• Tasks, assumptions, constraints.
• Risk Register (Areas of risk for the plan).
• Planning Guidance Matrix.

Outcome: A full understanding of the outcome to be achieved in the context of the

overall design for operations (higher intent and SoM), the objectives and tasks necessary
to fulfil the mission, what constraints apply and what further decisions are required as the
operation progresses.

What is the situation and how does it Initial Q1 Brief Q1 Final analysis
Q1
affect me? (70%) (30%) Q1 Final
Q2 Brief
What have I been told to do and Comds Q2 Continued Brief
Q2
why? (Individual) Guidance (PPG)

Table 6.4.3. – Example format for concurrent Q1 and Q2

QUESTION 3 – What Effects do I need to Achieve and what

Direction must I give In order to Develop a Plan?
6-45. Overview. Q3 allows the commander to consolidate their analysis into the key
effects they need to achieve and to construct their corresponding intent and planning
guidance. To do this the commander must review and refine their CCIRs, assumptions
and constraints before confirming the effects to be imposed on the enemy, the
broader spread of actors and any terrain or capabilities (friendly or enemy). Once the
commander has identified the effects they need to achieve, the Intent and Main Effort
can be written. Q3 is complete when the commander has briefed the staff on the
desired effects, the intent and given their planning guidance. This must be disseminated
to subordinates in WngO 2. Development of the Effects Schematic and Intent is
described in further detail in Section 6.5.3. After Q3, the commander might choose
to deploy with his Recce Gp to see the ground, leaving the COS and staff to develop
COAs in Qs 4-6. It is therefore essential that the COS and staff fully understand the
commander’s direction and guidance; the COS or COA team leads must read back the
direction and guidance to the commander to demonstrate complete comprehension.
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Q3 - What Effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give in order to
develop a plan?
Purpose: To review and refine tasks, CCIRs, assumptions and constraints in relation to the
outcome and objectives; in order to enable the identification of the effects that must be
achieved and the drafting of a commander’s intent.

Products:
• Comd’s Intent Statement.
• Effects Schematic.
• Comd’s Guidance
• WngO 2.

Outcome: An understanding of the effects that need to be imposed.

STAGE 2 – Developing the Plan (Questions 4 – 7)

6-46. Overview. Stage 2 is the development of the plan, taking the commander’s Effects
Schematic, relating it to the ground, then resourcing each effect and synchronising and
deconflicting activity. Qs 4 - 6 need to be conducted sequentially. If the commander
outlined more than one COA for development, additional teams are used to develop each
COA. The chosen COA should then be wargamed76, refined and Q7 applied. Note, once
a CP is ‘worked up’ and mature in its use of the CE process, the option of conducting Qs
4 – 6 concurrently becomes viable as it offers the possibility to reduce planning time with
a streamlined process.

6-47. Risk Register. The Risk Register will have been generated by the Principal Planning Group
(PPG) during Q2 and the commander will have specified CONPLANS for development at
Q3. In addition, throughout Stage 2, the COA Team(s) should continue to capture risks.
The risks and corresponding mitigation measures are presented to the commander at the
COA back-brief.

QUESTION 4 – Where can I best Accomplish each Action or Effect?

6-48. Overview. The purpose of Q4 is for selected staff, most commonly in COA teams,
to place the effects and related actions on the enemy and physical and human
terrain where they will best achieve their purpose. The teams should also stipulate
what and where to observe in order to confirm the situation and enemy COA.

76 Wargaming is described in further detail in Section 6.5.4.

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Q4 – Where can I best accomplish each Action or Effect?

Purpose: To identify where the commander’s desired effects on enemy or adversary will
and cohesion, physical capability and understanding should take place.

Products:
• DSO.
• Developed Decision Support Overlay Matrix (DSOM).

Outcome: An understanding of where to allocate resources in order to achieve the

identified effects and supporting actions. The identification of where to look, where to
act and where to decide.

QUESTION 5 – What Resources do I need to Accomplish each

Action or Effect?
6-49. Overview. The purpose of Q5 is to decide on the necessary resources and grouping
to enable each effect or action; it is the resourcing of the DSO. This process should
not be constrained to the combat power under command of the formation or unit and
may therefore prompt a bid for additional resource or the sequencing of activity.

Q5 – What Resources do I need to accomplish each Action or Effect?

Purpose: To identify the resources required for each action.

Products:
• DSOM.
• TASKORG.
• Ops Schematic.
• Updated Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP).
• Initiation of the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP).

Outcome: An understanding of what resources are required to achieve each action and
effect and how they should be grouped and allocated.
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QUESTION 6 – When and where do the Actions and Effects take

place in relation to each other?
6-50. Overview. Detailed synchronisation follows on naturally from the resourcing of
activity. Q6 aims to synchronise the actions, effects and resources in relation to time
and space. COA Team(s) must refine when and where to look (NAIs), where to act
(TAIs) and where to decide (DP/DLs), while ensuring there is synergy in the plan by
bringing together the full spectrum of activities across the staff branches. The key
output from Q6 is the SoM which is supported by the Synch Matrix; COA teams
must also: confirm the TASKORG, missions and tasks, record key events in draft
coordinating instructions and continue to develop CONPLANs against the MDCOA
and the Risk Register. At the end of Q6, the staff will have the information required
to be able to brief the commander on the COAs. In addition, any final developments
made during Q6 must be reflected in the updated DSO, DSOM, TASKORG, Ops Trace,
SoM, ICP and Risk Register. Staff will have a clearer understanding of the operational
timings at this stage and should cue any prelim or early moves where appropriate.

Q6 – When and Where do the Actions and Effects take place in relation to each
other?
Purpose: To synchronise the effects and their supporting actions by resource, time and
space.

Products:
• Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM), supported by Synch Matrix.
• Refined TASKORG.
• Missions and Tasks.

Outcome: The identification of the sequence in which the effects and actions should be
conducted and the identification of likely missions and tasks.

QUESTION 7 – What Control Measures do I Need?

6-51. Overview. Q7 considers what control measures are required to support the plan.
Control measures, such as boundaries, are the means by which Battlespace Management
(BM) is conducted; they are the glue that holds a plan together. Owned by G3, BM
is the adaptive method that enables the dynamic synchronisation, prioritisation
and deconfliction of activity across all dimensions within the operational area.
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Q7 – What Control Measures do I need?

Purpose: To identify the measures required to effectively coordinate and control activity.

Product: No single product is produced but information from Q7 is required to complete:

• Ops Trace.
• Coordinating instructions.

Outcome: The required deconfliction (including fire support coordination measures), C2

relationships, protection and sustainment coordination measures identified to support the
coordination of the effects and their supporting actions.

The COA Decision Brief

6-52. Overview. A COA decision brief is the formal presentation of COAs to the commander
to allow their decision on a single COA to develop into a detailed plan. A commander
may elect to receive this brief and decide on a COA at any time during Stage 2 of
the CE depending on the situation. The most important factor governing when the
commander makes a decision is the time available for planning, combined with the
availability of information to make a decision. For example, the commander may decide
on a single COA at Q3 (more likely when time is limited), or may choose to have COAs
presented on the completion of Q5 based on the DSO/DSOM with or without a SoM.
The commander can also make a decision after Q6 based on COAs with a Synch Matrix.
Finally, the results of the wargame can be used for the basis of a decision though this is
more likely at formation level or when time constraints are less pressing. Following the
commander’s decision, Q4–7 for the selected COA are typically revisited in detail in order
to refine the plan and to capture any further planning guidance from the commander.
 STAGE 1 - ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND MISSION
QUESTION 1 QUESTION 2 QUESTION 3
QUESTION 0 What is the situation and What have I been told to What effects do I need to achieve
Baseline preparation and do and why? and what direction must I give in
how does it affect me?
understanding order to develop a plan?
IPE MISSION ANALYSIS
REVIEW/INTENT/DIRECT

Staff Planning Time Line OAE:

2.1 What is the Higher Comd’s intent? 3.1 Review and Refine key output
Operational Time Line - Meterological Effects Trace
- Sketch 1 UP CONOPs from Q1 and 2
ROOB - Terrain Overlays
- Identify your role, desired outcome, - Review and refine tasks, CCIRs, IRs,
Direction for WngO 1 - Infrastructure Overlays
Comd’s ME. Task Org changes, supporting/ assumptions and constraints
- Human Terrain Analysis
supported, any likely Tasks/Objectives. - confirm key effects
- MC and AA Overlay
INITIATE 2.2 What are the specified & implied tasks? 3.2 Comd’s Effects Schematic and Intent
- Key Terrain and Vital Ground
- Tasks (Actors and effects), Planning - Link effects to objectives and purposes
Threat Evaluation
Guidance, Assumptions, Constraints, RFIs, IRs - ID ME
- Enemy Doctrinal Overlays
2.3 What are the freedoms and contraints? - Write intent
CSS ESTIMATE - Force Ratios and Capabilities
- Time, space and resources. 3.3 Comd’s Guidance/Direction
- SWOT Analysis
2.4 Has the situation changed? How might - COAs, planning guidance (against criteria),
CIS ESTIMATE - Enemy Intent Schematics
the situation change and how might it
- Draft HVTL key risks. En COA to plan against, CONPLANS
affect me?
- Draft HPTL - COA team leaders to read back comd’s
- Amend plan?
Situation Integration guidance/direction
- ID key areas to Risk, Risk Register
- Situation Overlays
- MLCOA and MDCOA (Including timetable)
- Event Overlays
WngO 1 - Draft ICP WngO 2
- Draft DSO
Q1 Brief

STAGE 2 - DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN (COA Development) STAGE 3 -

COMMUNICATION
QUESTION 4 QUESTION 5 QUESTION 6 QUESTION 7
Where can I best accomplish each What resources do I need to When and where do the actions/ What control measures do I need
OF THE PLAN
action/effect? accomplish each action/effect? effects take place in relation to to impose?
each other? O&W Prep
TARGET RESOURCE SYNCHRONISE CONTROL
WARGAME OGp Rehearsal
OGp
DSO DSOM Synch Matrix BSM/Control Measures
- Where to look (NAI), act (TAI) - Location, purpose and force - Sequences adversary activity, - Deconfliction Subordinate Back
and decide (DP/DL) elements allocated to each manoeuvre, fires and IA in time - Integration Briefs
- Pull through ‘golden thread’ action/effect and space - C2
product from Q1 - match Draft TASKORG Refined TASKORG - Enhance Protection ROC Drill
Event Overlay to DSO - Groups capabilities together for - Enable Sustainment
each task, refined in Q6 SoM and Missions and Tasks Ops Trace/Co-ord instructions
Draft Ops trace and SoM (to feed Q6)
Initiate STAP

COA Decision Brief Options

Page 4
Page 2

Refine choosen COA

Fig 6.4.3. – CE Summary

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5
Common Planning Processes

6-53. Overview. This section describes the

Common Planning Processes
definitions and broad methodology for the
key planning processes common to both • Intelligence Preparation of the
the TE and the CE. It does not go into the Environment
detailed mechanics of how to conduct each • Mission Analysis
process as this information can be found • Effects Schematic and CONOPS
in supporting handbooks. In Table 6.5, Development
the similarities between the two tactical • Wargaming
level estimates are highlighted, with the • Red Teaming
progression from the CE to the TE being more
logical than may first appear.

Process TE CE
Intelligence Preparation of the Environment Step 1 and 2B Q1 (continual)
(IPE)

Mission Analysis (MA) Step 2A Q2

Step 2A/C Q3
Effects Schematic and CONOPS Development
Step 2 - 3

Step 5 Most commonly after

Wargaming
selected COA fully developed

Red Teaming Optional Optional

Table 6.5. – The Key Planning Processes Common to both the TE and CE
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.1

Analysing the Environment and
Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield

Introduction
6-54. Analysing the Environment in the Tactical Estimate (TE) and Combat Estimate (CE) is
the overarching definition given to the understanding the character of the conflict
and the human dimension within it. It is continual throughout the Operations Process
and is essential to the provision of a unified staff effort. The key is that analysing the
environment is not an end in itself; the purpose is to inform the commander’s decision
making and planning. At the tactical level, Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
(IPE) will often be fed by Joint IPE,77 and at every subsequent level, G2-led analysis will
draw on the intelligence analysis of the higher HQ.

6-55. Types of Intelligence. IPE and the Intelligence Estimate (IE) are able to draw on
numerous sources of information and intelligence during planning and execution. While
these may not be available during the prosecution of all military activities, commanders
and staff need to be aware of the range of capabilities so that formal requests for a
capability can be submitted to the higher HQ. Figure 6.5.1.1 depicts the intelligence
collection disciplines.

77 Joint IPE is explained in JDP 2-00 – Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
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Foreign
Strategic
HUMINT
Intelligence Collection Disciplines Instrumentation &
Signals Intelligence
(FISINT)

Agent Electronic Warfare Electronic

Handling & (EW)4 & Signals Intelligence
CASCON Intelligence (ELINT)
(SIGINT)
Communications
Human Intelligence
Debriefing Intelligence Geospatial
Intelligence (COMINT)5
HUMINT
(GEOINT)
Interrogation
& Tactical Electronic Support
Questioning Measures (ESM) -
(TQ)1 Comms & Non
Comms
Surveillance Measurement
Acoustic
& Signature
All-Source Fusion Intelligence Intelligence
(ACINT)
(MASINT)
Forensics
& Biometrics Synthetic
Intelligence Apeture Radar
(FABINT) (SAR)6

Seized Imagery
Media Analysis Intelligence Infra Red (IR)7
(SMA) Open Source (IMINT)
Material & Intelligence
Personnel (OSINT)
Document Exploitation Electro-Optical
Exploitation (MPE) (EO)7
(DOCEX)

Limited Sources
Technical 1. AFM ISTAR Part A Chapter 3 Annex A.
Intelligence Internet Media Distribution
Material 2. JDP 2-00 Chapter 2 Section V.
(TECHINT)2

Notes on All-Source Fusion:

1. Interrogation and TQ are HUMINT disciplines but are integrated with MPE disciplines operationally.
2. TECHINT incorporates Wpns Int and CHEMEX.
3. Depending upon the task, all-source fusion and further processing produces intelligence in support of operations (OPINT), including specific functions such as
targeting, or it produces Security Intelligence (SI) which informs Counter-Intelligence activities and security measures. This function is supported by a number of
specialist processing disciplines including Intelligence Applications Management and Intelligence Requirements Management and Collection Management.
4. EW also includes ECM and EPM.
5. COMINT includes Cyber Exploitation Activities.
6. SAR may be classed as IMINT or MASINT.
7. Both IR and EO IMINT may be produced from imagery or FMV.

Figure 6.5.1.1. – Intelligence Collection Disciplines

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

6-56. Overview. IPE,78 occasionally still referred to as the IPB, is a set of analytical procedures
to assist the commander and his staff in planning and mission execution. The IPE process
has application across all military activities and improves a force’s understanding across all
environments. It analyses the Physical Environment, the Human Terrain, the Information
Environment, and the enemy/adversary, leading to the creation of the Intelligence
Collection Plan (ICP), the draft Decision Support Overlay (DSO), and the draft Surveillance
and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP). The commander and staff conduct IPE during Steps 1
and 2B of the TE, and Q1 of the CE. An IE is also conducted by the G2 staff, particularly
during the TE.

78 Intelligence Preparation of the Environment/Battlespace is explained at Annex 7C to AJP-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for
Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security, 2016.
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6-57. Purpose. The purpose of IPE is to:

a. Define the total operating environment and its effects on the operation.

b. Determine, describe and evaluate the enemy/adversary or intended target. This involves
identifying possible threats to the operation and identifying areas where intelligence
collection assets must be used in order to monitor or detect threats or to determine if
actions and effects are having the intended results.

c. Identify places where friendly forces can influence events or opinions through
physical or cognitive means (potential TAIs). This includes identifying DPs at which the
commander must decide on a COA and areas in which Indicators and Warnings will
confirm what the target’s COA is (NAIs).

6-58. 3-Stage Process. IPE consists of three stages which lead to the production of a draft
DSO. A staff proceeding through each stage has the option of producing a number of
overlays and matrices which are designed to help improve the understanding; the depth
of analysis depends on the time available. Some products can be prepared in advance of
planning.

IPE STAGE 1 – Operational Area Evaluation

6-59. Analyse the Physical Environment.

a. Define the Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) and the Area of Intelligence
Responsibility (AIR). The AII is the area in which a commander requires intelligence
on those factors likely to affect the outcome of his current and future operations. The
AIR is the area in which a commander is responsible for the provision of intelligence
within the means at his disposal. All formations, units and subunits are allocated
their respective AII and AIR by their next higher level of command. The AIR given to a
commander will usually mirror their AOO.

b. Methods for Terrain Analysis. The best terrain analysis, which includes weather
analysis, is based on a recce of the ground, supplemented by further analysis
conducted by the Engineer staff in the HQ. It is vital that the key deductions from
this analysis are at hand throughout the estimate, particularly during wargaming. For
example, identifying that low cloud has an adverse effect on the ability of ISTAR assets
to observe NAIs, DPs and TAIs should be raised at the Step 2B / Q1 back-brief and
played out during wargaming. Useful handrails for terrain analysis include OCOKA79
and ROBOT80. Deductions must be related to the mission i.e. ‘The northern route will
take 30mins longer than the southern route, but it affords cover from view and fire
which the northern route does not’.

c. Infrastructure Analysis. In many cases it will be necessary to analyse the

Infrastructure as well as the ground. The mnemonic SWEAR-MSO is useful: Sewage,
Water, Electricity, Academic (locations only), Refuge, Medical, Security (locations only)
and Other.

79 OCOKA (offensive focus): Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain, Avenues of
Approach.
80 ROBOT (defensive focus): Routes, Obstacles, Boundaries, Observation, Terrain.
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6-60. Analyse the Human Terrain (HT). People cannot be separated from the ground,
either symbolically or physically. It is extremely difficult to envisage the consequences of
actions without understanding the HT. HT is defined as the social, political and economic
environment, belief systems and forms of interaction of the people among whom soldiers
will operate. It encompasses every facet of social anthropology. Analytical tools include:

a. Human Terrain Analysis (HTA). This is the process by which an understanding of

the HT is developed and analysed. This can include a wide range of military and open-
source inputs. While it is tempting to disseminate more information than not, the staff
must focus on the key themes and trends, corroborating information across several
sources where possible. Depending on the time available and the depth and breadth of
analysis required, the G2 Staff may choose to use the following frameworks:

(1) PEST / PESTLEI. – Political, Economic, Social and Technological (Legal,

Environmental and Information).

(2) PMESII-PT. – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information,

Physical and Time. This is a widely used and effective US model for COIN
operations.

(3) STEMPLES. – Social, Technological, Environmental, Military, Political, Legal,

Economic and Security.

(4) ASCOPE. – Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events.

(5) Combinations. A particularly useful tool is to combine PMESII-PT and ASCOPE

into a single matrix, which can then provide a basis for collection planning and
further analysis.

b. HT Mapping (HTM). This is the process of using a geographic map to display those
comparatively static demographic features e.g. population density, demographics,
income distribution, social features (e.g. tribe, ethnicity, religion) or the location of
physical items of social importance. There may be specific ROE within the LOAC which
prohibit the use of certain institutional buildings, such as mosques and churches,
museums and power stations. The staff may capture these on a Prohibited Target List
(PTL). These rules may not apply to the enemy. Human Terrain Mapping can usefully
form the basis of a ‘Human Terrain DSO’ on which the commander may wish to plot
his Human Effects and Actions.

c. Link Analysis. Link Analysis aims to map the linkages between various actors in the
operating environment. It is particularly good for showing hierarchies and leaders.
The linkage between actors can be shown as an information path to show how that
interaction happens. And those linkages may provide opportunities for targeting as
well as the actors themselves.

d. Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies. It is essential to examine

the interaction between these grouping (defined in Section 6.1). For example:
relationships, political affiliations, political objectives, power brokers, funding lines and
depth of ideology. Biometric Data Analysis assists the force in gaining information on a
wide range of the population.
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e. Shade Shift. The Shade-Shift81 approach encourages the indirect approach to shaping
the HT; the system generates clear options for the commander using the simple
model. In practical terms, Shade Shift presents the commander with an enhanced
understanding of the HT. From this, the commander is better able to identify areas
of risk (consequence) and potential exploitation in the planning of operations.
Subsequently, this detailed understanding allows the commander to identify how best
to mitigate and exploit the consequences of actions within the HT during the execution
of operations.

6-61. Analyse the Information Environment. The third component of OAE is the Information
Environment. This is where humans and automated systems observe, orientate, decide
and act upon information, and is therefore the principal environment for decision making.
Relevant actors include leaders, stakeholders and organisations. The centrality of influence
in shaping perceptions depends on commanders and their staffs understanding and
utilising this environment. At the operational and tactical levels this involves Information
Activities:

a. Information Activities. These are actions designed to affect or manipulate

information, or perceptions of information and information systems. They include
protective measures. Examples include Info Ops, Media Ops and OPSEC.

b. Informational Systems Analysis (ISA). ISA provides a clear understanding of the

opposition’s means of executing their communications and influence strategy. This
knowledge will provide the foundations to proactively track and refute or interdict and
disrupt their communications strategy messages and in doing so counter a significant
element of their influence campaign.

c. Electromagnetic Environment (EME). The EME is contested space which presents

opportunities (to exploit other actors’ use of the spectrum), constraints (ability to C2)
and threats (to our information and C2) to the mission. EME needs to be considered
early during planning process and continually during the mission in order to maintain
freedom of manoeuvre and information superiority. EME analysis and understanding
needs to consider own-force requirements, and the use of the EME by coalition
partners, HN, NGO and hostile actors.

IPE STAGE 2 – Threat Evaluation

6-62. Introduction. Threat Evaluation is the identification, evaluation and analysis of
adversaries and enemies; it is unconstrained by the environment. It involves an assessment
of an enemy capacity to conduct operations and, from considering their doctrine or
modus operandi (MO), the tactics which are likely to be used in operations against
friendly forces.82 It assesses the enemy’s likely objectives within the AO. The result of the
Threat Evaluation is a series of overlays showing deployment and tactics for each doctrinal
COA. Any gaps in our knowledge will subsequently become IRs. Typically, it is conducted
in three stages.

81 Further detail at: Land Influence Handbook, Army Code 71951, dated March 2011.
82 Whilst irregular adversaries may not conform to any ‘doctrine’, they will have established TTPs. LIFC(A)
produce a range of theatre-specific reference work that will assist in identifying these.
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a. Analysis of Adversary Capabilities (ORBATs, Frontages, Eqpt capabilities, Wpn ranges,

dispositions, Intent).

b. Analysis of Adversary Doctrine and Tactics (Doctrine, TTPs, Historical Precedents).

c. Identification of Adversary Vulnerabilities (HPTL, HVTL, SWOT, CoG).

SWOT Analysis and CoG Analysis, discussed below, are tools that are available for use
when an enemy is particularly complex, and weaknesses are not immediately evident.

6-63. Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis. CoG Analysis83 is a tool that is utilised during the TE
or OLPP, but can have applicability wherever a CoG can be identified. The key output of
CoG Analysis is the identification of vulnerabilities which may then be exploited (enemy)
or protected (friendly) or both (civilian). Figure 6.5.2 refers.

Centre of gravity analysis

Assessed aim and desired outcome

The actor’s main goal and desired conditions

2) Critical capabilities
1) Centre of gravity
The Actor’s primary means to
The actor’s Primary element of power.
enable the COG.

4) Critical vulnerabilities 3) Critical requirements

Weakness, gaps or deficiencies Those key system elements and
through which the COG may be essential conditions required to generate
influenced or neutralised and sustain the COG’s critical capabilities

Conclusions
The actor’s weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies which could be exploited to change the behaviour of
an actor and improve conditions in the operational environment.

Figure 6.5.1.2. – Centre of Gravity Analysis

6-64. SWOT Analysis. SWOT Analysis is a method of identifying a group’s Strengths and
Weaknesses, and the Opportunities and Threats which are available. As with COG
analysis, it is a useful way of breaking down an organisation’s characteristics such that
they can be exploited or mitigated against. Table 6.5.1.3 refers.

Strengths (internal) Weaknesses (internal)

„„ ID the capabilities that give an advantage. „„ ID the capabilities that give a disadvantage.
„„ ID the characteristics that give an advantage. „„ ID the characteristics that give a disadvantage.
„„ ID how the object might exploit those „„ ID how they might be exploited.
advantages.

Opportunities (external) Threats (external)

„„ ID the external conditions available and helpful „„ ID the external conditions that could damage
to the object. the object.
„„ ID how opportunities may be enhanced or „„ ID how those threats may be enhanced or
denied. reduced.

Table 6.5.1.3. – SWOT Analysis

83 COG Analysis is further discussed in Annex 8B of ADP Land Operations 2017.

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IPE STAGE 3 – Situation Integration

6-65. Introduction. Step 3 of the IPE fuses the results of the OAE and Threat Evaluation
from Steps 1 and 2 respectively. It aims to identify how the operating environment will
shape enemy or adversary capability, doctrine and tactics and effectively turn it into
practice, identifying potential COAs (including most likely (ML) and most dangerous
MD)) and/or the civilian population’s COA. The key outputs are the draft DSO and
deductions, which then constrain or provide opportunities to the commander’s plan.

6-66. DSO, DSOM and DSM. The DSO is an overlay which reflects where the activities of
a specific actor should be targeted by Fires, Manoeuvre, Information Activities84 and
Capacity Building. It will show how the enemy or adversary COA will be confirmed or
identified. It identifies, in time and space, when the commander might need to take
a decision based on own and adversary time lines. DPs can be related to time, such
as Time Phase Lines (TPLs), or space as Decision Lines (DLs) on the DSO or as specified
criteria as explained in the DSOM. It is the graphical display of the commander’s plan.
The DSO must be supported by a DSOM, a table that lists all elements of the DSO and
the action that is to take place and who is responsible for that action. Likewise a DSOM
should be supported by a DSM, a table that summarises all the DPs, related CCIRs
and indicators (see Chapter 5) and the conditions for subsequent/linked actions. At
formation level a full DSO might be produced for each assessed COA. The DSO is the
precursor to the STAP, which is simply a DSO that has been resourced with ISTAR assets.

84 To note, Information Activities can only be targeted if a physical delivery method can be identified; they cannot be
targeted if delivered via cyber or electronic means.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.2

Mission Analysis

6-67. Mission Analysis (MA). MA is conducted in both the Tactical Estimate (TE) (Step 2A) and
the Combat Estimate (CE) (Q2) and asks the commander and the Principal Planning Group
(PPG) an identical set of four questions. A useful mechanism for both estimates is for the
COS to state 2-up’s intent and the CONOPs of 1-up before the commander questions his
force’s role and contribution. This must include an appreciation of what critical activity
the superior commander intends to implement, and when he is likely to make decisions.
The three-column format described in Section 6.1 is the principal analytical tool used to
conduct MA and is assisted by a clear understanding of OOEA (see Section 6.1).

6-68. Q1 – What is the Higher Commander’s Intent? A force’s role in the operation can
be identified and subsequently analysed from the Intent of the commander 2-up and
the CONOPS of the commander 1-up. This sub-question seeks to allow the commander
to understand their commander’s Outcome, Objectives and Main Effort, the context in
which they will be operating and the nature of the problem to be solved. The ‘Intent’ of
other key Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency and Multinational (CJIIM)
actors should also be analysed. This is the same for both estimates although the scale and
subsequent assessment differ, especially as the TE involves the formal consideration of
Tactical Planning Concepts (TPCs) and the higher commander’s narrative. The CE, which is
not designed for longer-term operational planning, does not consider TPCs.

6-69. Q2 – What are the Specified and Implied Tasks? During MA, the commander and
PPG must confirm the specified and implied tasks. These are extracted directly from
the higher HQ’s Operation Order (OpO), Operation Plan (OPLAN) (if they have not been
updated in a specific Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)) and supporting operational staff work
(OSW). Specified Tasks are given in orders as something you must do, either as an Effect
or Action, in order to achieve an Objective and an Outcome. Implied Tasks are those
unstated tasks, either as Effects or Actions, which have to be carried out to achieve the
specified tasks, the mission, or to support the Main Effort (ME)85. Implied tasks may be
best discovered by asking the following six questions:

a. What must I do on the ‘objective’?

b. What must I do before?

c. What must I do concurrently?

d. What must I do after?

e. What must I do to support others?

f. What do I need others to do for me?

85 The relationship between: Outcomes – Objectives – Effects – Actions is discussed in Section 6.1.
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6-70. Q3 – What are the Freedoms and Constraints? Mission Command is the British Army’s
command philosophy. This is an approach which empowers subordinate commanders
and promotes initiative as well as freedom and speed of action. Critically, it focuses
on achievement of higher intent through mission-type orders. It empowers leaders at
every level and is intended to generate agility and tempo. This enables us to overcome
an enemy in the most chaotic and demanding circumstances and unlocks everyone’s
potential to seize winning opportunities, however fleeting86. Freedoms should be
identified to allow the staff to develop COAs later in the estimate and should be
exploited; freedoms in relation to enemy weaknesses may become the ‘Battle-Winning
Idea’. Constraints are those things that must be done, or a restraint, something that
must not be or cannot be done. Some constraints will be imposed from above and
some are simply ‘life’. Examples of freedoms and constraints include; time, space, legal,
C2, ‘physics’, resources, OPSEC, media and restrictions. Imposed constraints may be
challenged in order to allow greater freedoms.

6-71. Q4 – Has the Situation Changed and How Might it Affect Me? A commander
needs to determine whether the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant a review
of the estimate. Using MA, the commander reassesses the progress of their operation
against the mission as the situation develops. The commander can ask at any time ‘has
the situation changed – and do I need to make another decision?’ As well as ‘No – no
change’, there are three possible responses:

a. “Yes – the situation has changed but my plan is still valid.”

b. “Yes – the situation has changed. My original mission is still feasible but I need to
amend my plan.”

c. “Yes – the situation has changed and the original mission is no longer valid.” In this
case the commander should consult the superior but if, for whatever reason this is not
an option, own initiative will have to be used to support the superior commander’s ME,
in keeping with the original Intent. This will have to be balanced against implications
for the commander’s Intent two levels of command up.

6-72. During initial planning a commander should also ask ‘How might the situation
change?’ As part of MA Q2.4, a commander also examines the risks to the operation,
and the opportunities they might present. This requires formal Risk Analysis and
Management noting that, at the lower tactical level, it is very important to ensure that
risk management is simple and based on sound military principles and common sense;
not a laborious process conducted for its own sake. At the tactical level, the basic
tools are judgement, experience, intuition and understanding – understanding the full
span of the higher commander’s intent, the force’s capability, the likely consequences
of actions, and likely and dangerous enemy COAs. Risks must be identified and
mitigated, but complicated tables and spread sheets often do not contribute much
to this sort of basic risk assessment. Risk Analysis must then continue throughout
the estimate. Risk Analysis and Management are further explained in Section 6.6.

86 Further detail on Mission Command is at page 6-4 in ADP Land Operations, 2017.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.3

The Effects Schematic and
Conops Development

The Effects Schematic87

6-73. Overview. The Effects Schematic is common to both estimates.88 When combined
with the commander’s intent and planning guidance it is known as a Combined Effects
Schematic. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for each effect must be identified during
planning in order that assessment of the over or under delivery of the plan can occur.

A Note on Effects Schematics. Actions and Effects will be combined with output from the IPE to create the
commander’s Effects Schematic. This should be aligned to his Intent Statement.

Mission
Effect Objective Purpose
List all effects and their related
objectives and purpose Fix
Draw a schematic of intended effects Block

Add any additional Effects and their

purpose not already identified

Draft an Intent Statement using Outcomes, Intent

Objectives and Effects that the Comd wishes
to have on the adversary/people
Main Effort
State Main Effort

Assessment is explained in Chapter 5.

Figure 6.5.3.1. – The Effects Schematic

6-74. Commander’s Guidance. It is essential that commanders backbrief their staff following
Mission Analysis in particular, but also at other times during the estimate process, to
ensure that they are ‘in his/her mind’.89 The direction and guidance will come from two
key sources; the Planning Guidance Matrix (created as a product of the 3CF), and the
Effects Schematic. It should include planning guidance against the Tactical Functions or
other doctrinal principles, direction on which COAs the commander wants their staff to
develop, the criteria against which they will judge them and a draft an intent. In terms of
process, this guidance is often summarised on an Effects Schematic, Figure 6.5.3.1 refers.

87 In nomenclature terms, the Effects Schematic has replaced the Intent Schematic. Effects – Objective –
Purpose – terminology has replaced Task and Effect. (Note this is a change from SOHB, 2014).
88 In the TE, the commander may have sufficient information to produce an Effects Schematic at the end of Step 2A,
but will deliver it to the SPG in Step 2C. In the CE, the commander produces an Effects Schematic as part of Q3.
89 A Commander will do this formally at Step 2C in the TE and Q3.3 in the CE.
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CONOPS Development
6-75. Formulating Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).90 The commander needs to select
what will be decisive to their mission and how to achieve it. At the tactical level, what a
commander is to achieve is given in the mission, which should be described in terms of
tasks, written as Actions or Effects, with a unifying purpose. Since an understanding of
what is to be achieved is determined in Q2.1, how the commander intends to achieve it
is at the core of the remainder of the estimate. It requires the commander to select an
action that would be decisive, together with the remaining actions necessary to achieve
the intended effect and outcome. Whilst the Intent will be generated after Mission
Analysis, the Scheme of Manoeuvre will necessarily follow later in the estimate once
COAs have been analysed and the commander has selected the preferred COA. The use
of Outcome, Objectives, Effects and Actions91 as described in Section 6.1 will bring clarity
to the CONOPS.

6-76. CONOPS. COAs should include one decisive action92 and a number of supporting shaping
or sustaining actions, each leading to an intended effect. The commander must then
decide on the COA to be taken forward in planning terms. Where possible, the selected
COA may be cleared with the superior commander via a confirmatory back brief and
thereafter, the CONOPS is written comprising three elements:

a. Intent Statement. The Effects Schematic leads to the Intent statement. Written by
the commander, the Intent statement is, at its simplest, a statement of the outcome
that the commander wishes to accomplish. But it may be clearer to express Intent
using objectives, effects, and desired outcome. It represents what the commander
wants to achieve and why – the change required in a given situation to be delivered
by the operation, that binds the force together and sets the tone for what is to follow.
Intent must be written in language the recipients will understand, noting that they
may be from other nations, or not be military. The best Intent paragraphs are clear
to subordinates without the requirement for additional amplifying detail. A typical
sequence for writing an Intent is:

(1) Describe the overall purpose of what is trying to be achieved (the outcome).

(2) Describe the Objectives and the Effects using time or space to group them.

(3) Summarise what success looks like and indicate what follows next.

But, most importantly, an intent is personal to a commander. An intent should therefore

be creative and allow the commander to inject their own personality. Ultimately, the
Intent is what subordinates will refer too for guidance when the situation changes.

b. Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM). The SoM expands the Intent to describe how the
commander sees the operation unfolding – the method to achieve the change
identified in the Intent. It explains where, when, how and with what, in relation to
each other, the force is to achieve its purpose, so that subordinates can understand
their roles in the plan and the effects and actions that they and others are to realise.
Because it is related to time, a SoM can only be completed once the Sync Matrix has
been confirmed. A clear intent should minimise the length of the SoM. A SoM may

90 ADP Land Operations, 2017, Chapter 9.

91 Effects and Action terms are defined in the SOHB.
92 The Main Effort (ME).
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helpfully use the conceptual frameworks93 to provide clarity. In turn, the conceptual
frameworks may be preceded by a ‘preliminary activity’ statement and followed by an
‘enduring’ statement. Phases should be used with caution as they can serve to stilt
subordinate action.

c. Main Effort (ME). The ME is that activity that the commander considers critical to
the success of the mission. To give it substance sufficient resources must be allocated
to the unit assigned to deliver it. Illuminating the ME ensures that when the situation
becomes more chaotic that activity will be remembered and it will provide the rallying
point for effort. The ME may change throughout an operation in accordance with
the situation. It should be expressed as an action, together with the primary force
responsible for its delivery.

6-77. Missions. A mission statement is a clear and direct order to a subordinate and
consists of action/task verbs and a unifying purpose (effect), traditionally preceded
by the words ‘in order to’. There are three types of mission: a single statement with a
unifying purpose; a series of tasks with a unifying purpose; and for reserves, a series
of ‘be prepared to’ tasks, without a unifying purpose. Missions should be listed in a
logical order of activity, reflecting the SoM, rather than in Army precedence as this will
enhance the visualisation of the operation. Tasks contained within mission statements
should be substantive. Lesser tasks, such as conducting prelim moves or establishing
liaison should be omitted from the mission, and are better located within Coordinating
Instructions. Mission statements will often be written personally by the commander.

93 Conceptual frameworks include: deep, close and rear (with these terms relating to effect, time and space, geography) or
shape, sustain, protect and enable decisive operations.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.4

Wargaming

Introduction
6-78. COA Wargaming, Red-Teaming, Rehearsal of Concept Drills. Course of Action (COA)
Wargaming, Red-Teaming and Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drills are closely related,
but discrete tools that support different elements of decision making. The distinctions
between them are outlined in Figure 6.5.4.1. Red-Teaming is further described in Section
3.5.5 and ROC Drills are discussed in supporting handbooks.
Tool What Why Who (illustrative) When
A systematic Chief Controller
method of (e.g. COS, BG 2ic)
analysing a plan Blue Team
To identify risks During any or all of:
to visualise the Red Cell
COA and areas of 1. COA development
ebb and flow of Staff branches
Wargaming weakness in a 2. COA evaluation
an operation or SMEs
forming plan 3. COA refinement
campaign. An (OA)*
adversarial ‘stress (Commander)**
test’ (Red Team)***

The provision To challenge

Red- of honest, assumptions An independently
Teaming constructive and fully explore constituted group
(further and objective alternative of SMEs with
Throughout the estimate
detail at criticism to outcomes to appropriate skills
Section improve a reduce threats for the project
6.5.5) commander’s and increase under consideration
decision-making opportunities

Comd
A visual, Chief Controller After orders have been
To enhance
sequenced Staff branches delivered and therefore sits
ROC Drill understanding of a
rehearsal of a Unit/sub-unit within ‘preparation’ activity
formed plan
plan commanders of the Operations Process
SMEs

* If available. ** If desirable. *** If formed.

Table 6.5.4.1. - COA Wargaming, Red-Teaming and ROC Drill distinctions

6-79. Common Misconceptions:

a. ‘Wargaming’ and ‘COA Wargaming’ are not synonymous terms. COA Wargaming
is but one of many wargaming techniques; in UK doctrine it generally takes place
towards the end of the planning process. Other forms of wargaming can usefully be
undertaken earlier in the decision-making process and elsewhere in Defence.94

b. ROC Drills might look and sometimes feel like a COA Wargame but they are not the
same; they are a separate technique used at a different point in the military decision-
making process and with separate aims.

94 Other forms of wargaming are detailed in the DCDC A Guide to Wargaming, 2013. This explains that COA Wargaming is
but one wargaming technique in the decision-support ‘golf bag’. Other opportunities exist to wargame, particularly in the
early stages of the estimate. Techniques and methods by which this can be achieved are contained in the DCDC guide.
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c. A Red Team is not synonymous with a Red Cell. A Red Team challenges assumptions
and explores alternative outcomes; a Red Cell plays enemy/adversary actions in a given
situation.

d. ‘Simulation’ is not synonymous with ‘wargame’. A simulation (computer or manual)

might be used to support a wargame, but it is not the wargame.

COA Wargaming
6-80. Introduction. COA Wargaming is a systematic method of analysing a plan in a conscious
attempt to visualise the ebb and flow of an operation or campaign. Adversarial by nature,
COA Wargaming superimposes friendly, neutral and hostile elements together to identify
risks and shortcomings in potential or selected COAs. It pitches planners against each
other in a deliberate attempt to spark debate and generate insights into a plan. By COA
Wargaming, commanders and staffs attempt to foresee the dynamics of action, reaction
and possible counteraction of battle. COA Wargaming is an essential part of the planning
process.

6-81. Purpose. The purpose of a COA Wargame is to: identify risks (opportunities and threats)
and areas of weakness in a forming plan; provide a thorough understanding of the
interactions of various actors to the plan; highlight additional tasks which may have been
overlooked in planning and; refine the synchronisation, resourcing, activity, prioritisation
and coordination of a COA(s). COA Wargaming can apply to multiple COAs for
comparative reasons or in a single selected COA to refine it and add robustness; to ‘bullet
proof’ it. Hence a COA Wargame must rigorously test the plan.

6-82. Participants. The HQ personnel listed below are typically involved in COA Wargaming.

a. Chief Controller (e.g. COS). The Chief Controller directs and controls the COA
Wargame.

b. Blue Team/Friendly Forces (G3 and/or G3/5 staff). The Blue Team, who has
developed the plan, and that should include key G5 and G3/5 planners, controls
Friendly Forces during the COA Wargame. It might include, as appropriate, G1/G4,
G6, G3 staff, coalition partners, Consequence Management staff and other Integrated
Action ‘lever’ SMEs.
c. Red/Adversary Cell. Generally a G2 staff officer, who controls the adversary during
the COA Wargame.

d. Red Team95. If the HQ has established a Red Team it can be used during the COA
Wargame to:

(1) Allow G2 staff to play Red Cell, while the Red Team stands back and takes an
independent view of the game, offering advice to the commander as appropriate,
based on its broad perspective of the overall plan.

(2) Play a free-thinking adversary who reacts to the Blue plan.

(3) Inject situational and contextual changes and any ‘friction’ factors.

95 Further detail on Red Teaming in Section 6.5.5.

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e. SMEs and CJIIM Actors. Available SMEs and CJIIM Actors should support COA
Wargaming, sharing their time between the Blue and Red Teams where necessary.

f. Operational Analysis (OA) Personnel. OA delivers quantitative rigour and objectivity

to operational planning and decision making. OA, when available, should be engaged
as early as possible (well in advance of the COA Wargame) to give analysts time to
conduct meaningful analysis to feed into the COA Wargame, as appropriate.

g. The Commander. Typically, a commander would wish to attend a COA Wargame to

add greater insights based on their experience. These benefits, however, should be
balanced against other effects that may be realised by their presence. Staff may be
uneasy about criticising those elements of their plan they assess as unsatisfactory,
resulting in the plan not being robustly tested.

h. Subordinate Commanders. Subordinate Commanders may be invited to observe a

wargame – when time is short, it can act as a pictorial warning order. The commander
must weigh up the benefit of doing so against the likelihood that the subordinate will
take away a snap shot which, by nature of the purpose of a wargame, may change.

6-83. When to COA Wargame. There are three occasions when a COA Wargame is
appropriate, as shown in Figure 6.5.4.2.

Develop Evaluate Comd’s Orders Rehearse

COA COA Decision Operation

COA COA Plan ROC Drill

Development Evaluation Refinement (Mission Rehearseal)

Execute
COA Wargaming Operation
Opportunities

Figure 6.5.4.2. - Opportunities to COA Wargame

a. COA Development. COA Wargaming can help to visualise an embryonic COA,

indicating the art of the possible and enabling impractical COAs to be discarded at an
early stage. Early wargaming should yield a better understanding of a proposed COA.
Finally it also helps to ensure that COAs are truly distinct and not merely a variant on
the same scheme of manoeuvre.

b. COA Evaluation. COA Wargaming can be used to compare each friendly COA with
appropriate opponent COAs and any other relevant factors to determine the likelihood
of success. Wargaming at this stage provides information on the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each individual COA for evaluation against a commander’s COA
selection criteria.

c. Plan Refinement. Once the commander has selected their COA, wargaming can
contribute significantly to its refinement, including identifying risks, areas of weakness
and further CCIRs. In addition, wargaming assists in the production of coordinating
instructions, indicates specific requirements for battlespace management and
highlights potential tasks and associated readiness for reserves.
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6-84. Wargame Methodology. A COA Wargame requires three phases to deliver: plan;
prepare; and execute.

a. Plan.

(1) Select the Event(s) to be COA Wargamed. The first task is to identify the
event(s) to be COA Wargamed, based on what the commander wishes to achieve
in the time available. The event(s) should be those the commander believes to
hold most risk, either due to vulnerability to opponent action or perhaps the
complexity of coordination required.

(2) Determine the Time Available. COA Wargaming is time pressured; there
is rarely sufficient time to COA Wargame all desired aspects of a plan. Hence
the time available will dictate the number of critical events that can be COA
Wargamed and the time dedicated to each, which becomes the length of the
relevant ‘turn’.

(3) Select the Method. The COA Wargame method96 selected will depend on the
events to be COA Wargamed. The scope of the Wargame will be bounded by
time, space and resource. Thus the COA Wargame could focus on the activity
of a single sub-unit, or of the entire unit. It could focus only on activity on the
objective, or solely on preliminary moves. Or it could look at activity from a
point in time to another. It is tempting to wargame the whole plan, but time for
wargaming will always be limited and it is therefore best to restrict the Wargame
to those areas likely to induce the most friction and where the plan needs testing
most.

(4) Select the Adversary COA. In the unlikely event that the commander has not
specified which enemy COA he is planning against, the Red Team and/or G2
cell should advise the commander/Chief Controller on which adversary COA
to wargame. The choice is usually between the adversary’s Most Likely (ML) or
Most Dangerous (MD) COA. Because COA Wargaming is an adversarial activity
consideration should be given to selecting the adversary MD/WC COA as a
default; the Blue plan will only be fully tested if Red is doing everything it can to
win.

(5) Select the Recording Method. The output of the COA Wargame should be
captured either as a narrative, a work sheet or as a Joint Action Synchronisation
Matrix as a consolidated stand-alone product. In addition, any amendments
required to be made to other staff products by individual branches should be
documented.

b. Prepare. Despite the increasingly digital nature of command and control there is an
argument for considering manual forms of SA to enable COA Wargaming. Digital
media such as BOWMAN/ComBAT and PowerPoint have their advantages, but so
do manual media such as a bird-table, map(s) and ‘stickies’ or counters. Whatever
media are used, visual aids need to be prepared. Relevant OSW is also required97. In a
particularly complicated or large COA Wargame, rehearsals are recommended.

96 There are three recommended techniques - the Belt, the Avenue-in-Depth, and the Box; further detail can be located in
Annex D to ATP 3.2.2 and supporting handbooks.
97 DSO, DSOM, Synch Matrix, TASKORG, CCIRs and other products in accordance with Unit SOPs.
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c. Execute. COA Wargaming is turn-based. Each turn covers one or more area or event
of the plan being developed or refined. The basic mechanism for each turn is: Action
- Reaction - Counteraction - Consolidation. Traditionally the side with the initiative
takes the first action. However, consideration should be given to Blue always having
the first action irrespective of the initiative holder as the Blue plan is the one that
requires rigorous testing and therefore there is merit in Blue consistently getting the
counteraction phase. That said, whichever side goes first, the process remains the
same. SME input should be injected as appropriate and accurate recording of findings
is vital.

6-85. Outputs. COA Wargaming will result in a number of observations which will be required
to refine the plan and subsequently enable the OSW and planning products to be
updated.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.5

Red Teaming

Introduction
6-86. A Red Team is a team that is formed, under a nominated red team leader, with the
singular objective of subjecting an organisation’s plans, programmes, ideas and
assumptions to rigorous challenge. Red teaming is the work performed by the red team
in identifying and assessing, inter alia, assumptions, alternative options, vulnerabilities,
limitations and risks for that organisation. Red teaming is a tool set, the use of which
will provide the end user (commander or decision maker) with a more robust baseline for
decision making.

6-87. Benefits. The specific benefits of red teaming include:

a. Broader understanding of the Operational Environment.

b. Filling gaps in understanding.

c. Identifying vulnerabilities, opportunities, risks and threats.

d. Identifying bias, group-think, flawed assumptions and the tendency to jump to

conclusions.

e. Revealing how external influences, adversaries or competitors could affect plans,

concepts and capabilities.

f. Identifying second and third-order effects and unforeseen consequences.

g. Identifying further or improved measures of effectiveness.

h. Identifying the need for contingency plans.

i. More focussed intelligence collection and improved information requirements.

6-88. Composition. A red team should be tailored appropriately for the project under
consideration. Critical and creative thinkers will form the core of the team; the wider
team may comprise a diverse mix of skills and experience or may be focussed in one
particular area, depending upon the issue being addressed. There is a need to include
experts, but there must also be room for people who are able, and unafraid, to ask
naïve questions. Members of the team should be selected for their critical and creative
thinking skills, their subject matter expertise, or their analytical ability. Where the
team is to employ an alternative perspective, cultural advisers who are able to provide
an understanding of the different perspectives will be required. The size of the team
is important and can constitute as few as two to over 25, dependent upon the task.
However the optimum number for a red team is generally considered to be between
five and nine. The reasons for this are twofold; when a team exceeds nine, facilitation
becomes unwieldy, and, when a team is less than five creativity starts to decline.

6-89. Characteristics and Skills of a Red Team. The characteristics and skills
of a Red team are articulated in table 6.5.5.1 over the page:
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Characteristics Additional Task Dependent Skills

„„ Intellect and imagination. „„ Familiarity with different cultural perspectives, cultural
„„ Critical and creative thinking skills. appreciation and empathy.
„„ The ability to see things from alternative „„ Expertise in specific operational analysis techniques.
perspectives. „„ Understanding of the aims and objectives of other
„„ The confidence to challenge traditional relevant parties (eg partners and neutrals).
thinking. „„ Knowledge of the relevant organisational philosophy,
„„ The ability to think strategically (able to theory and doctrine.
connect the dots). „„ Knowledge of the relevant capabilities and
„„ Attention to detail and analytical skills. developments.
„„ The ability to ask questions that stimulate „„ Understanding of the wider context.
.thought without creating conflict.
„„ Communication skills.
„„ Self-awareness.

Whatever their background, in addition to the attributes above, red teamers must bring an open and
agile mind to the problem.

Table 6.5.5.1. – Characteristics and Skills of a Red Team

6-90. Red Cell. Care should be taken, in a planning situation, not to conflate the role of
the red team with that of the red cell. The role of the red team is to challenge the
perceived norms and assumptions of the Commander and their staff in order to
improve the validity and quality of the final plan. The red cell is a G2 or J2-led98
entity which focuses on the activities of potential adversaries and threats. A red cell may
also play the adversarial role(s) in any wargaming or debate undertaken to assist decision-
making during the planning process.

6-91. Guidelines for Good Red Teaming. The art of good red teaming is
founded on the following guidelines being applied by the end user:

a. Plan red teaming from the outset. It cannot work as an afterthought.

b. Create the right conditions. Red teaming needs an open, learning culture, accepting of
challenge and criticism.

c. Support the red team. Its contribution should be valued and used to inform decisions
and improve outcomes.

d. Provide clear objectives.

e. Fit the tool to the task. Select an appropriate team leader and follow their advice in
the selection and employment of the red team.

f. Promote a constructive approach which works towards overall success.

g. Poorly conducted red teaming is pointless; do it well, do it properly

6-92. The Golden Rules of Red Teaming. There are many factors which can influence the
success and impact of the red team. However, red teaming is critically dependent on a
realistic time frame, the quality of the product and results being presented to key decision
makers in time to be acted upon. Therefore effective red teaming is founded upon:

a. Timeliness: The product must be delivered in time to be useful to the end user.

b. Quality: The work of the red team must be of high quality to retain the credibility of
the team and the usefulness of the product.

98 JDP 2-00 Understanding and Intelligence Support to Operations.

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c. Access: The red team’s findings must be presented at the correct level within the end
user’s team if it is to influence the decision maker.

6-93. Failure to meet any of these criteria means that success in red teaming is unlikely.

6-94. When can Red Teaming be Used? The red team can participate in any stage of TE
or the CE; its involvement will usually depend on the complexity of the problem and
the time available. Hence the concept has more utility for the TE than the CE. In either
case, the Red Team should be present at all briefings and cross-briefings in order to
build their own SA, but also to enable them to spot occasions where the planning
team’s thinking and decision making might be distorted by human and organisational
fallibility99 and to allow them to challenge accepted wisdom, scrutinise planning
assumptions and discover potential weaknesses in the plan, thereby improving the
validity and quality of the final campaign plan. Time will often be limited, but the
Red Team must have the opportunity to brief their conclusions, even though their
deductions may be uncomfortable for the planners. JDP 5-00100 offers a fuller explanation
of the application of red teaming as applied to the campaign planning process.

6-95. How Red Teaming is Conducted. There are three key phases of Red Team activity:

a. The Diagnostic Phase. Is the information accurate, well-evidenced, logical, and

underpinned by valid assumptions?

b. The Creative Phase. Is the problem artificially constrained; have all possible options
been considered; have the consequences been thought through?

c. The Challenge Phase. Are the options offered robust; are they resilient to shock,
disruption or outright challenge; which of the options is the strongest; what are the
chances of a successful outcome?

6-96. But, the process is not linear, nor the activities within it discrete – the process is
iterative and incremental. Within this framework, a Red Team leader will choose the
most appropriate techniques for the task in hand. On the completion of each phase, the
red team should check back to ensure that any new findings or information have been
subjected to the same diagnostic scrutiny as the initial information provided. This iterative
application of red teaming ensures that the final product has been comprehensively
examined.

99 JDP 4 Understanding and Decision Making (Second Edition).

100 JDP 5 (Second edition) Campaign Planning Annex I.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 6
Risk Management

Introduction
6-97. Prior to any discussion of Risk Management, commanders and staff must have a clear
understanding the Army’s capstone doctrine on risk as described in Annex 9A of
ADP Land Operations 2017. Its key introductory paragraph on risk, with definitions
highlighted, is quoted below.

Land operations require commanders at all levels to identify and seize

opportunities. But they also necessarily involve significant and often fatal risks.
Understanding risk is therefore essential. Military organisations broadly understand
risk as: potentially damaging; made up of cause, effect and consequence; explained
in terms of likelihood or probability and impact; and something that has to be
accepted on the route to success. Distinction is also made between operational
and operating risks. Clarity of communication within the land force and with
NATO allies is imperative and so this doctrine uses the term risk as it is commonly
understood and defined by the Concise Oxford English Dictionary: “the possibility
that something unpleasant may happen”. Risks, therefore, are described as
potential negative outcomes in relation to the force or the mission. The
events or conditions that lead to those negative outcomes are causes. The interplay
between cause and effect is inherently uncertain and requires commanders
and staff to manage risk. Risk management is the process of identifying,
assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors, and making
informed decisions that balance risk with mission benefits.

ADP Land Operations, 2017 Annex 9A

6-98. In addition, ADP Land Operations emphasises:

a. To achieve success commanders have to understand, judge and accept risk.

b. Taking risk involves seeking opportunities and then vigorously seizing and exploiting
them within the superior commander’s intent.

c. Risk has different implications at different levels of operations with actions taken at
one level potentially incurring risk at another.

d. At the tactical level, to judge what is appropriate, commanders need to understand the
risk appetite at the higher levels of command.

e. Operational Risk. Which is the focus of this section, involves two areas which are not
mutually exclusive:

(1) Risk to Force. Which comprises loss of elements of the force or damage to its
fighting power.
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(2) Risk to the Mission, which on its own is the risk that the mission will not
succeed. Obviously Risk to Force, if realised may contribute to mission failure.

f. The causes of Military Risk fall into three broad and non-exclusive groups:

(1) Enemy or adversary actions (i.e. attrition of friendly forces our will and
capabilities).

(2) Environmental factors (weather, disease, darkness etc).

(3) Own actions (errors of judgement, poor co-ordination, limited assessment,

inaction etc).

g. Operating Risk. Relates to the potential negative outcomes born out of operating
technical military capabilities. Such risks can only be fully understood by qualified and
experienced specialists and are not the focus of this Risk Management Section.
6-99. Opportunities.101 It is important to note that anticipated opportunities are considered
within and throughout the tactical planning process rather than by using any bespoke
opportunity analysis mechanism or tool. Indeed the Manoeuvrist Approach places
significant emphasis on identifying enemy weaknesses (a potential opportunity) and then
exploiting them. As risk analysis regularly highlights potential opportunities there are
references to both risk and opportunity within this section. Both risk and opportunities
must be considered and planned for accordingly.

Risk Management Lower Tactical Level

6-100. Risk in Planning. Ultimately the commander of any Risk Management
force, supported where applicable by the staff, is
At the lower tactical
responsible for judging and accepting risk. Superior
levels, certainly at unit
headquarters will support this task by communicating
level and below, risk
their risk analysis and any corresponding management
management is usually
plans in OSW. Direction on risk will therefore be
straightforward. Units
considered in subordinate commanders’ Mission Analysis.
usually operate in a
In addition, commanders will identify additional risks
formation context,
during their own Mission Analysis; particularly at step 2.4
so much of the risk
when they consider ‘how might the situation change’.
management is done
The commander and staff will also identify and consider
for them. In that
risks during the rest of the estimate. This should involve
context, units and
understanding potential causes, likelihood and impact in
sub-units identify
the context of the operation. At the tactical level when
and plan mitigation
time is at a premium, the key is then to focus on the
by using the Combat
potentially ‘game changing’ risks, mitigate the causes
Estimate process,
where possible, knowingly accept the residual risk, and
including wargaming
where possible prepare contingency plans. The following
and rehearsals. This
considerations are of particular relevance during planning:
allows concurrent
a. At formation level, risk management tools, supported considerations of risks
by operational analysis, can provide a useful, objective and opportunities.
measure of risk.

101 The Oxford English Dictionary defines an opportunity as ‘a favourable time or set of circumstances for doing something’.
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b. Superior commands must articulate their risk appetite and management plans.
Therefore, units operating in a formation context should have a reduced Risk
Management burden.

c. At lower tactical level, Risk Management should be relatively straightforward. Units

and subunits identify and plan risk mitigation using the Combat Estimate process,
including wargaming and rehearsals. This allows concurrent considerations of risks and
opportunities.

d. Appropriate application of Mission Command during planning (i.e. minimum control

measures imposed) provides the freedom of action for subordinates to react to
unidentified risks (within their commander’s intent) during execution.

e. Likewise, the Manoeuvrist Approach emphasises offensive action to seize and retain
the initiative, compelling enemies and adversaries to respond to our actions. Remain
active rather than passive.

f. There is a tendency for risks only to be examined in terms of their proximity when in
fact, the greater impact may lie further downstream. Commanders and staff should
think through second and third-order effects.

6-101. Risk in Execution. Risk will expose itself during execution as well as during planning.
Ideally the risk will already have been identified and planned for during the estimate
process but there will inevitably be risks which have not been anticipated. Where these
represent a significant risk to the mission or force they will be managed through reactive
planning or direction. When a risk is realised it represents a change to the situation and is
considered accordingly through execution procedures. In addition, the second and third-
order consequences of actions can often represent a risk and the continual assessment
cycle must be alive to such dynamics. Execution is described in further detail in Chapter 8.

The Risk Management Tool

6-102. Introduction. As described at para 6.6-4, risk is managed effectively within the UK’s
tactical-level planning estimates (Tactical Estimate (TE) and Combat Estimate (CE))
and their corresponding operational staff work (OSW). Risks, once identified during
the appropriate estimate process, can then be further analysed and managed using
the Risk Management Tool (a complementary process to the estimate process) which
allows commanders and staff to further analyse and manage risks, once they have been
identified. It is most appropriately used at formation level where planning staff have more
time and resources. The process is described in the following model at Figure 6.6.1.
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Risk Analysis Risk Management

Identify

Assess
• Risks
(Activitys and Events)
Plan
• Likelihood
• Impacts
• Owners/Those at Risk
Manage
• Terminate
• Treat
• Tolerate
• Transfer
• Take • Responsibility
• Indicators & Warnings
• Reassessment

Figure 6.6.1. – The Risk Management Tool

6-103. Risk Analysis. Risk analysis identifies those activities and events that may lead to risk
and assesses the likelihood and potential impact of that event occurring as well as the
risk ownership. It is conducted twice, once to identify and analyse the inherent risk;
and secondly, once a plan has been devised to identify and assess the residual risk.

a. Risk Identification. The basis for risk analysis is the identification of risks. Risks
comprise three elements: the cause, the event that precipitates the risk and the
consequence of the event. In the context of planning in the Land Environment, this
will typically relate to Operational Risk. Analysis of risk can regularly highlight potential
opportunities which must then be considered and planned for accordingly.

b. Risk Assessment. Having identified risks, assessment seeks to understand the

likelihood of the event occurring, the potential severity of the outcome (its impact),
and who owns the risk. While risks have to be analysed individually, the compound
effect of multiple and linked risks and their consequences at different levels, also
require consideration. There are a number of techniques and methods, using
subjective and objective data, to assess the likelihood and impact of every risk. It is
the combination of the impact and the likelihood which is important as it will give
the overall significance of that activity or event occurring. It should be noted that the
impact of a risk occurring is a subjective judgement which will change as the context
and perceptions change. Commanders may then articulate their risk tolerance level.
Attributing weighting/importance to each risk assists the prioritisation of mitigation/
reduction measures and aids the development of CONPLANS. A method of displaying
risk graphically is shown at Figure 6.6.2.
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Impact Impact Criteria

Very High High Med Low Very Low
The impact of a risk occurring is a subjective judgement. Com-
Very manders will need to make their judgement of the impact against
High
the context in which they are operating. Commanders must
L
consider the 2nd and 3rd-order effects of risk as well as the im-
i High mediate impact and also consider the compound, cumulative effect
k of multiple risks occurring. The realisation of risk will normally
impact upon:
e
• Mission, objective or outcome
l Med
• Resources and Capability (manpower, time, space, csups)
i
• Relationships (HN, LN, Coalition/alliance, National, Regional,
h
International)
Low
o
• Reputation
o
Context will be informed by experience and knowledge and
d Very
shaped by understanding the superior’s approach to, and appetite
Low for risk.
Notes on the Risk Assessment Matrix

Example Likelihood Criteria The Risk Assessment Matrix allows risks to be plotted on a graph
and allows a comparison of Likelihood and Impact of that risk oc-
Very >80% chance of risk Regular occurrence,
circumstances frequently curring. The boxes may then be shaded to display those risks which
High occurring encountered are acceptable (green); those risks which are tolerable (yellow);
Occurs occasionally and those risks which require treatment (red) (though noting that once
51-80% chance of
High may happen again in the treated, the risk should fall into the yellow or green bands); and
risk occurring near future
those which are unacceptable and must therefore be terminated
Has occurred before but
or transferred, or indeed taken if an opportunity rather than a
21-50% chance of
Med not often and may have threat. A commander’s risk tolerance line is the boundary between
risk occurring been in a limited way
red and yellow segments. Scoring provides an alternative method
Seldom happens or
of displaying and helping to judge risk. Risks are given a numerical
6-20% chance of
Low incident happens in a value - usually 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). The overall score is
risk occurring limited way
a multiplication of Impact x Likelihood. Thus a Very High Impact
Very <5% chance of risk Has rarely / never hap- risk which is Very Highly likely to occur would be given an overall
Low occurring pened before
score of 25.

Figure 6.6.2. – Graphical Display of Risk and an Example of a Risk Tolerance Line

6-104. Risk Management. Risk management creates plans and directs activity to reduce the
possibility of negative events occurring; to mitigate their consequences as they occur or;
to exploit the opportunities they may present.

a. Plan to deal with risk. Having identified and assessed likely risks, and a commander’s
appetite for them, commanders and staff should develop measures to reduce their
likelihood, and mitigate unfavourable outcomes. A commander may decide to deal
with risks in a variety of ways, some resulting in requests for dispensations/waivers.
There are five options to deal with risk:

(1) Terminate. Termination removes the risk entirely by changing the plan so the risk
is eliminated, or terminating that aspect of the plan which is affected by the risk.

(2) Treat. Treating a risk to reduce its likelihood, or mitigate likely adverse outcomes
to reduce impact, is the most common response. Commanders should consider
how activity might be conducted differently in order to reduce the threat.
Residual risk after treatment should be reassessed.

(3) Tolerate. Provided that a risk falls below the tolerance line, a commander may
decide to tolerate the risk without attempting treatment. Where the reward is
sufficiently great, a commander may choose to tolerate the threat. Risk appetite
may also be increased to accommodate a specific threat.
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(4) Transfer. Where a risk cannot be treated, and a commander is unwilling to

tolerate it, the option to transfer the risk elsewhere may be sought, usually up the
chain of command for the higher HQ to ‘own’ the risk and then create plans to
mitigate or exploit it.

(5) Take. Where an opportunity exists, the philosophy of Mission Command

empowers commanders to seize it by operating within their superior commander’s
intent and attitude to risk. Taking risk is a key way to seize the initiative. To
achieve success, commanders have to judge and accept risks. Taking risk is
inherent in effective military operations, in which commanders at all levels achieve
their intent by seeking opportunities then vigorously seizing and exploiting them.
The nature of conflict means that military activity is seldom, if ever, risk-free102.

b. Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). CONPLANs are the pre-considered actions to

mitigate risks or exploit potential opportunities should they occur. Indicators required
to trigger them must be linked clearly to CCIRs and corresponding Decision Points.
The depth of planning to support a CONPLAN will vary according to the impact and
likelihood of the risk occurring and the time available to plan.

6-105. Risk Registers. At formation level, once a COA has been selected for development into a
plan, risk mitigation options are further refined to the point where they can be managed
effectively during the operation. Each risk should be clearly articulated in the operational
staff work. It is essential that ownership, potential impacts, assessed likelihood, indicators
and warnings and plans for risk mitigation are clearly understood by subordinates. Risks
will vary during the course of an operation and need to be revisited regularly. Simple risk
registers that list risks and outline any mitigating actions, may assist in the long-term
management of risk.

6-106. Reserves. Some risks will occur which are unforeseen. Operationally, a commander will
always keep a reserve, traditionally not less than 1/9th of their force, to mitigate risks
or exploit opportunities. They may also warn a reserve to mitigate or exploit risks or
opportunities using ‘be prepared to’ tasks in the reserve’s mission.

Consequence Management (CM)

6-107. Overview. CM is activity undertaken to exploit or militate against a situation which
has occurred in order to preserve or improve the planned outcome. It is a form of
CONPLANing and occurs most frequently to militate against negative, unintended effects
on White, Green and Blue. These can appear in multiple forms, most commonly collateral
damage (CD), including civilian casualties, damage to property, including dwelling and
crops and damage to infrastructure. Whilst the generic risk may have been identified in
the estimate, CM generally occurs once the detail of the event is understood. The origins
of the incident will usually be in Blue action and the management of the consequences
usually aims to mitigate the impact on reputation and legitimacy, though there may be
circumstances which allow exploitation of an opportunity to enhance reputation and
legitimacy. It is more usual for CM to be applied during less intense and more enduring
operations.

102 ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 9A-02.

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6-108. Aims. The aims of CM are:

a. Mitigate against/plan to exploit events through anticipation.

b. Manage the negative impact of events.

c. Exploit the positive impact of events.

d. Control the flow of information relating to an event.

e. Learn from the event to encourage or prevent recurrence.

Although CM is executed reactively, it can nevertheless be prepared for in advance.

Dispensations and Waivers

6-109. TTPs direct the way in which activity is conducted and Safety Cases direct how equipment
is used such that threats, usually to personnel safety, are reduced to an acceptable level.
Both are usually generic. In certain, usually more mature, theatres, commanders may
need to request clearance to change the way in which they conduct operations or how
they use equipment to better match the operational need. The dispensation and waiver
process exists to allow commanders to assess and manage risks associated with operating
outside of approved TTPs or equipment operating guidelines. The process is not designed
to prevent a commander from making immediate decisions should the tactical situation
require it. If the commander identifies that the requirement is likely to continue, a
dispensation or waiver will allow them to do so with the associated risks acknowledged
by the chain of command.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 7
Control of Operations

6-110. Control. Control involves the oversight, direction and coordination of assigned forces
in accordance with the commander’s plan and intent. At the lowest tactical levels, C2
is often vested in a single individual. At higher levels, it is a key function of the staff to
exercise control over certain aspects of operations in accordance with the principle of
Mission Command.

6-111. Mission Command. Mission Command provides staff and subordinates with the
opportunity to accomplish the commander’s intent by using their initiative. Normally
this approach takes place through decentralised execution, where commanders increase
the freedom of action of subordinates, controlling only when absolutely necessary.
However, there are times when more centralised execution and tighter levels of control
are required, for example during complex operations that involve more than one
subordinate operating in close proximity to each other, such as during withdrawals,
reliefs of troops, and obstacle crossings. In such cases, commanders need to impose and
exercise greater levels of control to ensure the tempo of the operation is sustained and
that the possibility of fratricide is minimised. Mission Command is still exercised during
these operations but the control of individual elements is more coordinated. Control
has two basic forms which are not mutually exclusive and can be used simultaneously.

a. Procedural control. Relies on the implementation of commonly understood

procedures across a force for the regulation of activity within and between force
elements. Examples are standard operating procedures, boundaries and NATO
standardised procedures. Procedural control can, for example, be used to allocate a
volume of battlespace to individual elements for a period of time. Although sometimes
perceived as an air-control technique, procedural control is applied across all
environments. For successful Mission Command, the commander always uses only the
minimum essential procedural control measures.

b. Positive control. Allows for active control of activities in real time. It is used when a
commander wishes to direct control in a particular place or on specific elements, for
specific periods of time. However, even where resolution of the position of friendly
forces is good, that of adversaries and the population is seldom sufficiently timely
nor accurate enough to support positive control as the sole means of battlespace
management.

6-112. Land Environment. Land operations necessarily demand degrees of control over
the activities of many different groups, on the ground and in the air, within a
given geographical area. Those aspects of an area of operations that require active
management are described as the battlespace, and battlespace management103 (BM)
refers to the adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation
of activity. Applying BM provides the control mechanisms for effective and efficient

103 Further detail regarding BM is contained within JDP 3-70.

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execution of Integrated Action, synchronising, integrating and coordinating battlespace

activities with respect to time, forces and capabilities. The key challenge for commanders
and staff is enabling maximum freedom of action for subordinates while maintaining
control consistent with the context and nature of the mission. Of note, tighter measures
are typically required as the density and complexity of the battlefield increases. At
the tactical level, the spectrum of BM tools include commonly understood symbology
used to identify units, locations and functions, to fire support control measures, and
information exchange procedures and processes on CIS and targeting systems.

6-113. Procedures. C2 procedures must be simple, efficient and flexible to enable timely and
effective decision making. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (which are set by a
higher authority or formation to its subordinates) and Standard Operating Instructions
(SOIs) (how SOPs are implemented in a given context) must be clearly written,
understood, rehearsed and used.

6-114. Information. Headquarters must be adept at using information to exercise control

effectively. This requires appropriate procedures and communications systems; further
detail is at Chapter 2 Annex A.

a. At times of high tempo, it is vital to have robust, consistent and well-understood

methods. A headquarters requires proficiency in Information Management
(integrated processes and services to provide exploitable information); Information
Exploitation (use of information to gain advantage); Information Assurance
(the confidence that information is reliable, accurate and secure); and Information
Superiority (possessing better information and able to exploit it faster relative to an
adversary).

b. These procedures all in turn depend on CIS. These enable control measures to be
specified with a high degree of accuracy, allow for changes to be rapidly disseminated
across the command, and provide near real-time feedback on the progress of
operations to commanders and their staff. CIS capabilities and limitations, such as
range, bandwidth and security are factors of all plans.

6-115. Directives, Plans and Orders. Directives, plans and orders provide the principal
means by which a commander’s intentions are conveyed to subordinates as well as
the control framework for the operation. Directives, plans and orders must be concise,
clear, accurate and timely. Further detail on Operational Staff Work is in Section 6.8.
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Chapter 6 - SECTION 8
Control of Operations

6-116. OSW is produced to deliver an understanding of the situation, to enable control of

activity, and to ensure effective communication between subordinates, flanking,
and higher headquarters. Excellent staff work finds the right balance between detail
and clarity, simplicity and complexity, and giving context and making decisions.

Directives, Plans and Orders

6-117. Introduction. Directives and orders provide the principal means by which a commander’s
intentions are conveyed to his subordinates. Commanders and staffs must be aware of
the appropriate decision point to allow timely preparation and dissemination of directives,
plans and orders. The time required for dissemination is easily under estimated. Late
directives or orders risk becoming inappropriate before they can be carried out; ultimately
their execution may prove impossible. Directives, Plans and Orders must be Concise,
Clear and Accurate.

6-118. Terminology. The terms ‘directive’, ‘plan’ and ‘order’ may appear to be close in meaning
but have distinct definitions in military use:

a. Directives. A directive is used at the higher levels of command to initiate activity and
to give both general and specific guidance to subordinate commanders. It will be less
formal, rigid and prescriptive than an order. It may include missions to subordinates
but need not necessarily do so.

b. Plans. Plans are mainly issued for contingency planning purposes and have no
executive authority until activated by an order. They are also the term used to describe
the output from the planning process prior to being converted into directives and
orders by the commander.

c. Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). CONPLANs are a plan which is developed for

possible operations where planning factors have been identified or can be assumed.
This plan is produced in as detail as possible, including the resources needed and
deployment options, as the basis for subsequent planning104.

d. Orders. Orders are defined as ‘a communication, written, oral or by signal, which

conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate’. Orders are used in all spheres
of military activity and at all levels of command. They include sufficiently detailed
direction to subordinates (in the form of missions and/or tasks) so that they can
achieve specific activities, such as the deployment and employment of troops.

(1) Warning Order (WngO). WngOs are also issued immediately after the receipt
of a WngO from a superior HQ, and may be issued at any other time it is judged
to be useful to subordinates. A WngO is delivered on three occasions during the
Tactical Estimate (TE) and Combat Estimate (CE):

104 JDP 5 definition.

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(i) On completion of the ROOB.

(ii) Once the commander has drawn the Effects Schematic as part of MA.

(iii) Once the COA has been decided.

At all times, maximum information should be included to facilitate subordinates’ planning

processes.

(2) Operation Order (OpO). To give subordinate commanders the essential

information and direction required to plan and execute an operation.

(3) Fragmentary Order (FRAGO). FRAGOs are an abbreviated form of OpO. They
may be used in three ways:

(i) To issue timely changes to existing orders. This is the most commonly used
form of a FRAGO.

(ii) To issue key sections of an order before the complete order has been
produced.

(iii) To provide specific instructions to commanders who do not require the

complete order.

(4) Combat Service Support Order (CSSO). A CSSO may be produced in support
of the main OpO to deliver the CSS plan. Details of the operational plan should
be included in the CSSO to inform those CSS units which do not receive the main
OpO.

6-119. Dissemination. At the tactical level the means of disseminating orders are:

a. Oral Orders. Oral dissemination of orders will usually involve a formal O Group.
Orders may also be passed over TacCIS, by liaison officers or staff officers representing
the commander, or by briefings by the commander himself during visits to
subordinates.

b. Written Orders. Written Orders are more likely when time is available to produce
them. They are particularly useful for conveying complexity where detail may be lost
if delivered verbally. Staffs should be particularly aware of the ability of those they
are ordering to print orders and traces if disseminating the written order by data
means. It is usual for attendees at verbal O Groups to receive printed OSW and traces
from the Higher HQ, but the process of reproduction should not be underestimated.
The requirement for written orders will increase as fatigue begins to impair mental
performance and comprehension of verbal orders. A useful addition is the ‘2-pager’,
a summary105 of the orders to enable subordinates to have the key information in
an easily accessible format – the 2-pager should only be provided in addition to a
full set of orders and is never to be considered a substitute. Note that much of the
detail of written orders can be inserted during the planning process. It is inefficient,
and frequently impossible, to leave the writing until the end of the estimate. Clarity,
accuracy and brevity are essential. There are two principal types of written order:

105 Products to be considered: Intent, Pictorial SoM, Msns and Tasks, Key Timings, Sync Matrix, DSM, Extracts from CSSO
(AXPs, ECPs etc).
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(1) MS Word. An order may be written in MS Word, usually using a two-column

format on a landscape A4 page. The structure remains that of an order, but the
commander can insert as much detail as is relevant by increasing the number of
sub-paras used. This method allows detailed and complex plans to be recorded
fully; the risk is that staff loses proficiency with ComBAT.

(2) ComBAT. The ComBAT OSW tools are particularly useful at the tactical level.
They allow for collaborative working and easy disseminated by data. It links to the
stand-alone tools which will have been used during the estimate.

c. Quick Verbal or Radio Orders. Although a variation on oral orders, quick verbal,
or radio orders provide an important option for disseminating orders. Common
formats such as Standard Orders Cards (SOCs) should be used in order to improve
comprehension.

6-120. The need for confirmation. Receipt of OSW must be acknowledged by the subordinate
HQ to the Issuing HQ. Comprehension may also be confirmed through the use of back
briefs and ROC Drills.

OSW Formats
6-121. OSW Formats. While staff work is about the intelligent application of thought to enable
activity, there is a vital difference between OSW and that which is non-operational. For
the latter it is said that slavish adherence to templates and structures at the expense of
common sense and expediency undermines command intent rather than reinforcing it. In
many ways this is also true for OSW but because OSW is produced and disseminated on
OpCIS and TacCIS, the formats and templates that these systems provide must be used.

6-122. Orders Generic Format. It is widely acknowledged that the formats for OpOs, WngOs,
FRAGOs and CSSOs are essentially the same with varying degrees of detail. A generic
format is shown below in Table 6.8.1.
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OpO / WngO / FRAGO CSSO

Prelims Prelims

TASKORG TASKORG

Ground Situation

White (LN and Govt)

Green (Indigenous Armed

Forces)

Red (En Forces)

Black (Criminal Elms)

Situation
Fr Forces 2 Up – Intent and ME

1 Up – Mission and
CONOPS

Flanking Fmns

CS

Air / Avn

Mission Mission*

CONOPS Intent CONOPS

Scheme of Manoeuvre Scheme of Manoeuvre

Main Effort Main Effort

End State End State**

Subordinate Missions Subordinate Tasks

CS Missions / Tasks / Materiel and Services

Priorities Medical
Execution Personnel
Civil – Military
Miscellaneous

Coord Instrs Timings

Locations
Con Measures
Fireplan
Deception and Sy
Movement
Key information from
annexes

Concept Contained in Execution

Log
Service
ES
Support
Med

Pro
Command Command and Signal
and Signal

* Note that there is only one mission for elements organic to the formation – that in the Main Body. Sub-units assigned
to the formation TACOM will have missions issued by their OPCOM Commander. Tasks may be issued by the formation
commander.
** Note that end states are not normally used at the tactical level.

Table 6.8.1. – Generic Orders Format

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6-123. Annexes. OpO annexes should follow the taxonomy below. If annexes are not
used then the words ’not issued’ should be annotated alongside that letter.

A. TASKORG. L. EOD & Search.

B. Situation. M. Information Activities.

C. Ops Trace & Effects Schematic. N. Legal.

D. DSO / DSOM. O. ROE / use of force.

E. Outline SoM. P. Lessons.

F. Air and Avn. Q. Civ / mil coord and assessment.

G. BM. R. CIS.

H. ISTAR. S. Pro.

I. Jt Fires and Tgting. T. MovO.

J. Engrs. U. Indigenous Forces Dev / Partnering.

K. CSS. V. Media.

Orders Groups (O Gps)

6-124. Introduction. Commanders will usually prefer to issue orders in person so that they can
impose their will and personality on their subordinates, emphasise key points and allow
subordinates to ask any questions immediately.

6-125. Rehearsals. An orders group is a stage-managed affair. Therefore a rehearsal is essential,

if not always practical. If a rehearsal is not held the individual responsible for organising
the O Gp should ensure that the content and delivery of the orders are coordinated and
coherent.

6-126. Timings. Subordinate commanders will often have to travel some distance to get to
an O Gp. If possible ComBAT orders should be transmitted to subordinate commanders
as soon as possible. This may allow them to be at least partially read in prior to arrival
at the O Gp. It is a significant decision to delay an O Gp. To do so will invariably
reduce subordinates’ own battle procedure and administrative time, which may have
consequences. Note that the production of OSW takes time – COSs should consider
producing the OSW early and issuing pencil amendments at the start of the O Gp, rather
than delaying an O Gp because the OSW is still being printed.

6-127. Post O Gp. After the O Gp staff cells may use the opportunity to amplify areas of
the orders with subordinate specialists who may have attended the O Gp with their
commander. For example, at BG level, the BC will often wish to gather the subunit FST
commanders together to expand on the Fireplan. Staff should be careful not to use up the
subordinates’ ‘2/3’ of planning time in doing so. Once subordinates have had sufficient
time to plan, it is usual for them to back-brief the commander on their plan and for the
commander to host a ROC drill.
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6-128. Briefing responsibilities. The decision on who briefs which paragraph at O Gps rests
with the commander but the suggested breakdown is shown below in Table 6.8.2.
Heading Detail Responsible
Security COS / G3/5

Introductions

Map Folds
Prelims Briefing Products

Confirmation of Issued OSW and any pencil

changes to it

TaskOrg

Ground Engr / Met Offr

Weather

Visibility (incl light levels)

Situation White G2 / CULAD / STABAD

Red G2

Black G2

Friendly (incl Indigenous Forces) COS / G3/5

Mission Comd

CONOPS Comd
Intent
Scheme of Manoeuvre
Main Effort
Execution (End State)*

Subordinate Missions Comd

Coordinating Instructions COS / G3/5

Combat DCOS / G4
Service
Support
Command COS (Comd)
and Signal G6 (Signal)

Summary Comd

* Note that End States are not usually used at the tactical level.

Table 6.8.2. – Responsibilities within O Gps

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Chapter 7 P

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General A ssess

7-01. Preparation, within the context of the

Prepare
Operations Process, includes the activities
• General
conducted by a formation or unit prior to
• Assessment during Preparation
execution in order to improve its ability to
• Activities during Preparation
conduct the operation. These activities
106

include, but are not limited to, plan refinement,

rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, checks and movement. Preparation generally
occurs any time a formation or unit is not executing a specific mission; it starts with
receipt of a warning order and ends when execution begins. Preparation requires staff,
unit, subunit and individual action noting that this publication, by its nature, places more
emphasis on the activities of the commander and their staff at this stage in the process.

Assessment During Preparation

7-02. Assessment during preparation assists in plan refinement and oversight of formation
and unit readiness to conduct the operation. Not only must commanders have the
ability to adjust the plan based on new information and changing circumstances but
they must have a firm grasp of the readiness and combat effectiveness of subordinate
units. The latter should be linked to MOPs established in the planning process.

Activities During Preparation

7-03. Preparation consists of many activities which involve work at staff, unit, and soldier
level. The most common activities which have a direct impact on the commander and
staff within a CP are listed below and then described in further detail in subsequent
paragraphs. Of note, NATO doctrine highlights a broader range of subordinate unit
tactical activity which can take place during preparation. These additional activities are
detailed at paragraph 7-11.

a. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activity.

b. Refinement of the plan.

c. Commander’s Back Brief.

d. Coordination and liaison.

e. Task Organisation and Integration.

f. Rehearsals.

g. CP pre-execution checks.

106 This chapter focuses on preparation within the context of the Operations Process (once committed to a specific operation)
rather than the cycle of generic preparation that deployable formations and units are locked into: the Formation
Operational Readiness Mechanism (FORM).
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7-04. ISR Activity:

a. ISR activity is regularly the most important part of the preparation phase. It is
focussed on answering the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)
and those of the higher formation. In turn, these will inform decision making. Of
note, commanders often deploy ISR assets early in the planning phase in order to
inform subsequent planning and refinement. ISR feed will also be coming into the HQ
from both higher and subordinate HQs throughout the preparation period. Where
appropriate commanders and staff should continue to request ISR resources from
higher formations.

b. ISR activity must be managed dynamically by the commander and the staff following
the assessment of new information. The updated collection plan will focus on the most
important remaining unknowns, emphasising established or revised CCIRs. ISR feed will
directly inform any refinement of the plan, which is discussed below.

7-05. Refinement of the plan:

a. Planning is a continuous process; commanders must have the agility to adjust the plan
based on new information and changing circumstances. For example, the enemy may
do the unexpected, unforeseen opportunities may arise, assumptions on which the
plan is based may be proven true or false and friendly forces’ status may change. In
any of these cases the change must be assessed against the plan and the commander
must decide if the new information:

(1) Validities the plan with no further changes.

(2) Requires minor adjustments to the plan.

(3) Requires major adjustments to the plan.

(4) Means the mission is no longer valid and direction from higher is required.

b. The Operations Process therefore places significant emphasis on the requirement

to continually assess and refine a plan, even after orders have been delivered. Staff
must also note that refinements to a communicated plan will add another layer of
considerations onto time-constrained subordinate battle procedure; the process
therefore requires agile staff procedures driven by sharp situational awareness if it is to
deliver mission success.

c. Refinement of a plan will involve revisiting some or all of the stages of the respective
estimate process. This level of refinement will depend on the current battle picture,
the maturity of the plan and the time and staff resources that can be allocated to the
task. At divisional and corps levels, there may be a significant time gap between the
initial preparation of a plan and its execution. This therefore demands a dedicated staff
and formalised process to refine the plan after orders have been delivered in order to
reflect evolving understanding of the context and requirement. At brigade level and
below in combat operations, planning may flow immediately into execution and any
deliberate refinement of a plan will typically take place within the estimate process
itself. For example, as the result of a wargame, BGHQ staff could be tasked to develop
a CONPLAN or to revisit battlespace management.

d. Formation level Process and Outputs. Within formation headquarters, planning

staff (FPlans) will typically handover the plan to operations staff (FOps or COps)
once the allocated 1/3 of planning of time has been used. The operations staff, then
responsible for the plan, have three key outputs as described below:
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(1) Refinement of the Plan. Further detailed refinement of the plan can be initiated
by the commander at any stage but is likely to be triggered by the following
deliberate procedures/factors:

(i) Receipt of the Plan. Following the handover of the plan from Plans to
Operations staff, the fresh eyes of another layer of SMEs may identify critical
areas of weakness or incoherence for refinement.

(ii) Commander’s Back Brief. Subordinate commanders deliver Commander’s

Back Briefs to the commander following their own mission analysis. This
invaluable step in the planning process will regularly identify areas for
refinement, especially with regard to BM. Commander’s Back Briefs are
described in further detail at paragraph 7.6 below.

(iii) ROC Drill. By the time of the ROC Drill, subordinates should have completed
their planning and issued their own orders. Any changes to the plan must be
captured in a sweep up FragO.

(iv) Impact of the Current Battle. Staff must continue to routinely reassess
the plan against the current battle. This must include a deliberate staff check
of assumptions.

(v) Operations Updates/Resource Availability. Many of the bids for critical

resources (such as air and aviation) will not have been confirmed on takeover
of the plan. Staff must track availability and refine where appropriate.

(2) CONPLAN Development. Contingency planning can be initiated as a result

of risk identification at any stage of the planning process. On an operational
schematic using Planning Concepts (see Section 6.2) they will typically fall into
two categories: Branches or Sequels. CONPLANS that cannot be developed by
the plans staff may be prioritised and handed over to operations staff. The typical
format for the communication of CONPLANS developed after delivery of orders
will be a FragO containing a series of ‘be prepared to’ tasks, the criteria for
enactment of the CONPLAN and any assumptions.

(3) Reactive Planning. The current battle picture may dictate that, while the mission
is still valid, major amendments are required to the plan. In this instance staff
must revisit key stages of the estimate. The level of tactical understanding and the
planning horizons will drive whether the Tactical Estimate, Combat Estimate or
rapid commander’s direction is used.

e. Planning Considerations for Teams Responsible for Plan Refinement:

(1) Continuity within Planning Teams. Within any headquarters where a plan
is handed over from one team to another, thought must be given to creating
a level of staff continuity within each team. This level will be driven by the
complexity of the plan and the time available for subsequent refinement.
However, due consideration should be given to embedding some operations staff
in the initial planning cell so that they can move with the plan on handover and
operations staff attendance at key planning back briefs. In some cases (most
likely for complex plans requiring input from an SME pool of limited depth) it
may be necessary to maintain an Operational Planning Team (OPT) in its entirety
throughout both the plan and refinement.
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(2) Handover Procedure. To mitigate the risk of information being lost during
handover from Plans to Operations and to maximise the benefits of a fresh set
of eyes looking at the plan, a very deliberate and detailed handover from one
team to the other is essential. Typically, this handover will be tied to a key stage
of the planning process such as the wargame, delivery of orders or the ROC Drill
and must be outlined in detail in formation SOIs to ensure that the appropriate
versions of OSW are transferred efficiently. Efficient IM is critical.

7-06. Commander’s Back Brief. The Commander’s Back Brief is delivered to the commander
or senior officer by a subordinate to demonstrate understanding and compliance with the
direction received. The format for the briefing should be articulated in SOIs. It differs from
a Confirmation Brief - typically a short-notice read back of direction in that subordinate
leaders should have been given time to formulate a plan, or at least a draft CONOPS.
As a minimum, it should therefore be conducted once a subordinate commander has
completed their Mission Analysis and should focus on confirmation of the mission, the
CONOPS, key coordinating instructions, Requests for Information (RFIs), headline risks and
areas of concern.

7-07. Coordination and Liaison:

a. NATO doctrine describes coordination as the actions taken to maintain synchronisation

and prevent confusion and problems.107 When these actions are not covered in SOPs
or SOIs they should be identified in planning and specified in the ‘Coordinating
Instructions’ paragraph. The majority of this coordinating activity should take place
during preparation noting that formations and units must coordinate with higher,
lower, adjacent, supporting and supported units. Coordination should, of course,
continue throughout execution where it enables effective synchronisation of activity
and dynamic resource management. It should include human, procedural and technical
considerations and is driven by effective relationships as well as staff process. The
effective use of Liaison Officers (LO) and/or teams is therefore of particular importance.

b. Effective coordination supports a broad range of the fundamentals of UK doctrine. For

example, it supports effective integration of the full spread of CJIIM actors, ensures the
commander’s intent gets to the right people at the right time, avoids duplication of
effort and increases tempo.

c. Internal coordination occurs within the unit HQ. It initiates activities among the staff
and ensures that it remains fully informed of relevant information affecting their areas
of responsibility. Internal coordination also resolves problems, conflicts, and resource-
allocation challenges in support of subordinate unit preparations.

d. External coordination involves communication with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting

and supported units as well as other agencies or organisations. The external
coordination challenge is magnified in multinational operations or between forces in
non-contiguous areas of operation. Staff should also note that coordination lines or
points between units or formations represent a potential weakness ‘or seams’ that the
enemy may choose to exploit.

107 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

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e. Establishing and maintaining liaison is one of the most important means of external
coordination. Liaison may commence with planning and continue through preparing
and executing, or it may commence as late as execution, depending on resources and
the need for direct contact between sending and receiving HQs. The earlier liaison can
be established, the more effective the coordination.

7-08. Task Organisation and Integration. Task organisation involves organising available
resources and establishing command and support relationships according to the plan.
During this process the commander and staff ensure that personnel and units are
assimilated into the force in a posture that allows them to contribute effectively. They
must also prepare new units and personnel for the upcoming operation.

a. As a handrail, the key tasks involved during integration involve:

(1) Receiving and introducing new units and military personnel to the force and
environment.

(2) Familiarisation to places or work, roles in the force and operation.

(3) Establishing C2, sustainment, and communications for and with them, within
the force.

(4) Exchange of LOs.

b. Additional multinational considerations include defining when and where transfer

of authority takes place; clarifying command states; understanding any national
reservations or caveats (red card issues) and clarification of ROE.

7-09. Rehearsals. Rehearsals are defined in NATO doctrine as the practice of actions designed
to improve performance during execution. All rehearsals for the operation occur during
preparation. The extent of rehearsals depends on the time available. Rehearsals allow
participants in an operation to become familiar with and to translate the plan into a visual
impression that orients them to their environment and other units during execution.
They also imprint a mental picture of the sequence of key actions in the operation
and provide a forum for subordinate and supporting leaders and units to coordinate.
While rehearsals are designed to enhance the understanding and execution of a mature
plan or activity, they may reveal unknown coordination or synchronisation problems.
In such instances solutions should be addressed in a sweep-up FRAGO. Where time is
constrained, rehearsals should focus on the key areas of the operation as directed by the
commander. As an example, this could include the most complex enabling operations
and/or the Main Effort. NATO doctrine108 lists a full range of specific rehearsal techniques.

7-10. Command Post Pre-Execution Checks. A full range of preparatory checks need
to take place within the CP prior to execution. These will vary depending on the
size and complexity of the CP, but must be covered in detail in SOIs. Critical to
all, however, is the requirement to ensure that ‘Golden Thread’ planning output
has been handed over by the Planning staff and is understood by the Operations
staff. This includes the Operations Trace, Synchronisation Matrix, Decision
Support Overlay and supporting Decision Support Overlay Matrix, CCIRs and
any outstanding RFIs and any other supporting plans and overlays. Examples of

108 ATP 3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces (Annex F).
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other activities include CIS configuration/preparation109 and functionality checks,

joint and interagency staff integration and confirmation of battle rhythm.

7-11. Broader Preparation Activity. NATO doctrine captures a broader range of tactical
activity that can take place during preparation. For reference, elements of this non-
exhaustive list are shown below.

1. Security.
Security is always a critical operational consideration but is of particular importance
as the main body of a force is orientated towards preparation rather than execution.
Therefore security operations including local security, operations security (OPSEC) and
counterintelligence are all designed to prevent the enemy from discovering the friendly
force’s plan and to protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security operations
should also be focussed on preventing the enemy from gathering Essential Elements
of Friendly Information (EEFI). As with reconnaissance, security is a dynamic effort that
anticipates and thwarts enemy intelligence-collecting efforts (friendly counter-ISTAR).
When successful, security operations should provide the main body of the force with
adequate time and manoeuvre space to react to enemy initiatives. To accomplish this, the
security plan must be synchronised and meshed at every level of command as well as with
any local unit or host nation security.

2. Force Protection.
Force protection employs a combination of active and passive measures to deter, defeat,
or mitigate hostile actions against friendly forces. Force protection is not a discrete mission
assigned to a single unit, but a continuous process executed by all commanders regardless
of their mission, location, or threat. It conserves the fighting potential of a deployed force,
preserving its integrity and capability by countering the wider threat to all its elements
from the enemy, natural and environmental hazards, and fratricide. It consists of a broad
set of unit-specific, coordinated actions executed to protect the entire force across the
range of military operations. The commander and staff develop and initiate actions for
force protection during planning, but conduct them mainly during preparing and execution.
Commanders, at all levels, have the responsibility to set force protection measures,
estimating risks and vulnerabilities in conducting operational and tactical activities,
including adequate self-defence measures.

3. Logistics Preparation.
Resupplying, maintaining, and issuing special supplies or equipment takes place during the
preparation phase, as does any repositioning of critical logistic assets. As with preparatory
movement, OPSEC must remain a fundamental consideration when coordinating logistical
preparation so as not to reveal friendly intentions.

109 To include: the input of logistical and medical data into applications such as Log FAS; air and maritime integration; the
migration of information from in barracks to deployed systems (including profiles); and the preparation of integrated
electronic communication plans for the whole force.
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4. Training.
Training prepares forces and individuals to execute actions in accordance with doctrinal
philosophy and principles as well as Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). While
formations and units deployed on operations are likely to have conducted significant
pre-deployment training as well as a reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI)
package, there may well be a requirement for further Mission Specific Training (MST)
during preparation. This requirement is especially pertinent to multinational formations
that have been dynamically task organised in theatre. In such circumstances lead
nation tactics, techniques and procedures should provide the backbone of the training
requirement.

5. Pre-Operations Checks and Inspections.

Preparation includes completing pre-operations checks and inspections to ensure that
formations, units, personnel and systems are ready to execute as time and resources permit.

6. Movement.
All movement allowed or required to preposition units for execution takes place during
preparation. The commander must integrate movement with OPSEC measures to ensure
that it does not reveal any intentions to the enemy. As an example, such movement could
include advance party reconnaissance of assembly areas or route reconnaissance to
support a march.
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Chapter 8 P

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Introduction A ssess

8-01. Execution involves the application of combat

Execute
power110 to accomplish a mission as well
• Introduction
as assessment of operational progress
• Command and Control during
in order to inform decision making. It
Execution
begins when committed assets physically
• Assessment during Execution
enact their issued orders. Decision making
• Decision making in Execution
involves both deciding when to execute
• Directing Action
planned actions - execution decisions, as
• Rapid Decision Making and
well as deciding whether to amend the
Synchronisation Process
plan based on changes in the situation
• The Operations Centre
- adjustment decisions. Command is
exercised throughout execution by the
commander who will typically focus on directing the application of combat power
and significant adjustment decisions. Control delegated to the operations staff
involves the oversight, direction and coordination of the operation within established
parameters; on which the staff must be absolutely clear. Assessment, which informs and
contributes to situation awareness, is of particular importance to C2 during execution;
commanders and staff must decide and act at a higher tempo than the enemy.

8-02. Execution is therefore more than just putting the plan into action and can be broken
down into a continuous cycle of three broad activities:

a. Assessing. The current state of the operation and forecasting its progress.

b. Making execution and adjustment decisions to account for unforeseen enemy actions
and to exploit opportunities.

c. Directing. Actions that apply combat power to accomplish the mission.

8-03. The ability of a CP to plan and execute concurrently will be driven by the tempo
of operations and the manning available to do so. For example, BGs are not
established to plan and execute concurrently, but may be able to do so for limited
periods or during less intense operations – for example during stabilisation.

8-04. This chapter will first describe the relationship of C2 during execution before going
into further detail on execution’s three key activities: assessment, decision making and
directing action. The Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process is articulated
and the chapter concludes with a section on the CP’s Operations Centre (Ops Cen).

110 APP 2015 – Combat Power is the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can
apply against the opponent at a given time.
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Command and Control During Execution

8-05. Command. The fundamentals of command involve leadership, decision making and
control.111 A commander, supported by their staff, will exercise all three of these during
execution to overcome friction, maintain tempo and to enable Mission Command. The
key to successful command during execution is clear direction from the commander to
the staff on their intent, planning assumptions, remaining CCIRs, success factors and
concerns. The commander must make clear the acceptable level of detail required for
their Situational Awareness (SA)112 and decision making, which decisions they anticipate
making and when and which decisions they are content for others to make. They must
also specify the amount of risk they are prepared to accept.

8-06. Control. As a function of command, control is the oversight, direction and coordination
of assigned forces in accordance with the commander’s plan and intent. Above sub-
unit, a defined level of control may be delegated to the staff. This empowers them,
through standardised processes and procedures, to coordinate actions in line with the
commander’s intent.113 To that end staff must have a thorough understanding of the
CONOPS and supporting OSW. Within all CPs this is driven by an efficient handover of the
plan from plans to operations staff as well as access to and understanding of the ‘golden
thread’ planning output shown in the text box below. Oversight of execution requires
constant reference to the COP in order provide the SA for effective and appropriate
coordination. As a guiding principle, staff controlling the execution of operations should
maintain an enabling mindset focussed on provision of appropriate resources and
freedom of action to subordinates – using control measures only when necessary.

Golden Thread Planning Product used to Fight the Battle

• Synchronisation Matrix.
• DSO and DSOM.
• Op Overlay and Control Measures trace.
• CCIRs and any outstanding RFIs.
• Any other supporting plans and overlays (e.g. Fireplan, MovO, obstacle trace).

111 ADP Land Operations, 2017.

112 SA is defined as the perception of a particular area of interest, problem or situation bounded by time and space in the
context of a mission or task.
113 ADP 1, 2017.
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Assessment During Execution

8-07. General. As already discussed in Chapter 5,
In Sum
assessment consists of monitoring and evaluating.
During execution, assessing the operation is a Commanders and staff assess
deliberate comparison of forecast outcomes to current progress, the probable
actual events. Established MOE and MOP should outcome of the mission
be used to judge operational success at any point and likely impact on future
during an operation. The assessment should identify operations.
the magnitude and significance of variances in
performance from expectations and determine
the need for adjustments. Commanders and
staffs should also assess the probable outcome of an ongoing operation to determine
whether alterations are required to accomplish the mission, react to possible threats or
take advantage of opportunity. They also assess the impact of the current situation and
expected progress with regards to its impact on likely future operations in order to shape
their early development. In sum, commanders and staff assess current progress, the
probable outcome of the mission and likely impact on future operations. Figure 8.1 refers.

Assess Decide Direct

Monitor Evaluate

Update reconnaissance
and surveillance tasking
Execution
Criteria of success

Apply
combat
Progress

Yes
Situational
CCIR awareness power
No

Adjustment
Modifies information
requirements

Changes
Chan
ges

Creates new reality

start process again

CCIR commander’s critical informantion requirement

Figure 8.1. – Assessment during Execution

8-08. Monitoring an Operation. Monitoring the operation informs the SA of the commander
and staff. In turn, they determine if the operation is progressing according to the
plan (including FRAGO initiated modifications). More specifically, the staff monitors
known facts and planning assumptions to ensure they remain valid and to seek new
information and assumptions that will affect current and future operations. This output
should be reflected in the CP’s dynamic management of its IRs and any corresponding
MOEs and MOPs. During execution, staff monitoring the COP must have the ability to
filter and present relevant information to the commander to give a clear picture of the
current operation. They must also be clear on what constitutes a critical event or piece
of information that must be passed to the commander, or appropriate staff sections,
immediately.
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NATO Evaluation Questions

• Is the enemy acting as anticipated? If not, do enemy actions invalidate the current plan?
• Is the friendly force accomplishing the mission at an acceptable cost? If not, what
changes are required to put the plan back on track?
• Is the progress of the operation leading to a disposition of friendly forces that can
transition effectively to anticipated future operations?
• Has the situation changed so that friendly forces can exploit unanticipated opportunities
to attain the end state more effectively than what is called for in the original plan?

8-09. Evaluating an Operation. Evaluation during execution considers the monitored

unfolding situation against that which was planned for and allows adjustments to be
made to mitigate or exploit the identified change, or variance. At the lower tactical levels
and during simple operations, the commander may be able to conduct the evaluation
function with limited support. During more complex operations, the commander will rely
more heavily on the staff to assess the situation and inform decision making. Evaluation
also improves tempo by anticipating future operations and identifying links to current
operations.

a. Process. Evaluation compares relevant information on the situation or operation

against criteria to determine success or progress. The outcome of the comparison
represents assessment. During execution the commander and staff continuously use
MOEs and MOPs, including forecasted performance, to determine variances and
their significance. Variances may occur for a variety reasons noting that friendly,
enemy, neutral and environmental activity will all have an impact and cause an
under or over delivery of the plan. In all such cases, the commander and empowered
staff make decisions based on the assessment. In addition, staff cells continuously
update functional estimates based on their assessments which should feed back into
centralised decision making.

b. Conclusions. During an operation the commander and staff continually ask the
question: Has the situation changed and how might it affect me?114 This broad
question should focus on friendly, neutral, enemy and environmental factors which
impact on the progress of an operation in relation to the desired outcome. Of note,
NATO uses a set of questions to prompt such conclusions as shown in shown in the
above quote box. Assessing progress can result in two conclusions:

(1) First, that the operation is progressing satisfactorily and that observed variances
between the expectations and current (or forecast) performance are within
acceptable tolerance levels. In this case progress continues to meet the
commander’s intent and the concept of operations remains relevant to the
situation. This evaluation results in allowing the operation to proceed according
to plan. It leads to execution decisions foreseen by the plan.

114 Q4 of Mission Analysis.

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(2) Secondly, that the operation as a whole, or one or more of its major activities, is
not proceeding according to expectations (either better or worse than expected).
In either case, the commander should make an adjustment decision to take
advantage of the opportunity or to counter the threat.

Decision Making in Execution

8-10. The commander should not hesitate to modify the plan or discard it altogether if
it is necessary to accomplish the mission (and save the force) or to achieve greater
success. Commanders at all levels must consider whether the benefits of modifications
outweigh the costs of disrupting the current plan, particularly its synchronisation.
If modifications are required they are initiated by two forms of decisions:

a. Execution Decisions. If the progress of the operation is meeting expectations, what

needs to be done next according to the plan?

b. Adjustment Decisions. What must be done to exploit opportunity or restore mission

accomplishment?

8-11. The difference between execution and adjustment decisions lies in whether the plan
anticipates the situation requiring a decision. In execution decisions, the variances
in MOEs and MOPs are within limits for planned actions such as coordination
of manoeuvre or the initiating of a CONPLAN. For adjustment decisions, the
variances are greater than expected in the MOE and MOP. Table 8.2 refers.
Type of Decision Situation Action
Execute Planned Actions
Minor Variances from the
Plan. Commander or responsible staff member decides
which planned actions best meet situation and
Execution Plan working well. Variances
directs or confirms their execution. Staff complete
in MOE and MOP are within
follow-up actions. Decision may simply be
acceptable limits.
permissive; FRAGO not normally issued.

Execute CONPLAN
Commander or staff review CONPLAN
(branch or sequel) if prepared; commander
Anticipated Situation linked receives assessments and recommendations
to established Decision Point. for modifications to plan and issues guidance
Execution
Variances within limits for or decision for further actions. Participation
CONPLAN initiation. by commander and refinement of CONPLAN
determined by situation and time available. Staff
completes follow-up actions. FRAGO issued if
modifications to CONPLAN are complex.

Unanticipated Situation - Commander recognises threats or opportunities

Friendly Success and determines time available for decision
Significant unanticipated positive making. Selects estimate method. If no time for
variances are to the friendly full estimate, outlines decision on single COA for
forces’ advantage for mission staff to refine or directs actions by subordinates
accomplishment. to counter threats or exploit opportunities and
exercise initiative in accordance with higher
Adjustment Or commander’s intent. Normally will not attempt
Unanticipated Situation - to restore plan. Verbal WngO or FRAGO issued to
Enemy Threat subordinate commanders. Staff resynchronise the
Significant, unanticipated operation, modify MOE and MOP, and commence
negative variances are not to the operations assessment in accordance with new
friendly forces’ advantage for decisions.
mission accomplishment.

Table 8.2. – Summary of Decision/Action relationships during Execution

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8-12. Execution Decisions. An execution decision selects what needs to be done next
according to the plan if the progress of the operation is meeting expectations. They
are informed by the ‘golden thread’ planning product used to execute operations: the
Decision Support Overlay, Decision Support Overlay Matrix (including Decision Points and
their criteria/indicators) and the Synchronisation Matrix. Therefore the most basic form of
an execution decision results in the application of resources or conduct of tactical actions
as outlined within the plan, or within minor tolerances of the plan. The critical ongoing
functions during execution, discussed below, are also execution decisions when they
support planned activities. Of note, the initiation of a developed CONPLAN represents an
execution decision.

a. Facilitating planned actions. One form of execution decision is permissive - to

allow planned actions to take place. This usually requires the commander or staff to
recognise that a particular directed action has met preconditions for execution and
then directing execution of a pre-planned activity. Taking planned actions includes
modifying them to fit the circumstances at the time of execution.

b. CONPLAN. A CONPLAN, also known as a Branch or a Sequel in operational-level

planning, is a planned action. The criteria (MOE and MOP) used to evaluate progress of
an operation help identify events that trigger them.

c. Critical routine tasks. Formations and units must accomplish routine tasks during
execution, even if the plan is progressing satisfactorily. Failure to consider these routine
tasks can waste precious resources, squander opportunities, or even lead to failure.
Many of these critical tasks help to keep minor variances from becoming threats to
mission accomplishment.

d. Resource the Main Effort. Typically, the majority of the force is supporting the Main
Effort. During execution, situations may render some supporting operations irrelevant
or result in supporting assets being out of position. The commander and staff must
continuously survey all assets and ensure that, where appropriate, they are in position
and tasked to support the Main Effort, or that they are moving to a position where
they can provide that support.

e. Conduct Continuous ISR and Counter Intelligence Activity. ISR activity is

continuous. The commander should rarely keep IR assets in reserve; they should always
be looking for weaknesses in the enemy disposition. For example, when the main body
directly engages the enemy, ISR assets should be observing the flanks, looking beyond
the area of close combat and seeking opportunities for the commander to exploit. The
commander and ISR staff should phase or sequence the use of ISR assets to ensure
continual availability.

f. Continue Security Operations. Security forces have specific missions for many
operations. As a generalisation, these tasks may be completed or handed over to an
alternate force prior to mission success. Therefore, the commander and staff should
always look beyond initial security tasks and continually assess the 360 degree threat
throughout an operation.
g. Adjust Information Requirements. The commander and staff continuously review
the full spread of Information Requirements during execution, particularly CCIRs. For
example, as CCIRs are answered or the situation changes, the commander develops
and disseminates new CCIRs. The staff must allocate resources accordingly.
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h. Adjust Control Measures. A combined arms operation often requires the dynamic
modification of control measures during execution. As a guiding principle, the
commander or staff should enable freedom of action by using control measures
sparingly and only for the minimum amount of time necessary. Manoeuvre forces
should be given appropriate space in which to operate.

i. Perform Battle Tracking. Battle tracking is defined as monitoring elements of the

COP that are tied to MOEs and MOPs. Battle tracking requires special attention
on the part of all staff officers but is of particular relevance to Battle Captains and
Watchkeepers in the Ops Cen.

j. Employ Airspace Control Means (ACM). Closely allied to graphic control measures
and battle tracking, but separate for discussion, are ACM. Airspace control is a joint
responsibility normally assigned to an Airspace Control Authority (ACA), usually the Air
Component Commander (ACC). All commanders, units and staff officers must remain
aware of current ACM, their integration with and implications for ground operations.
They must also consider the same for ground operations on airspace control and adjust
as necessary.

k. Continue Liaison and Coordination. These essential ongoing functions of the

commander, staff and specific LOs enable the synchronisation of execution and
adjustment decisions, both internally and externally. SOIs must establish procedural
controls to ensure that communications across the chain of command continue to
function effectively.

l. Conduct Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the
appropriate response to them while taking account of operational requirements and
capabilities. The process is integral to Integrated Action and underpins the lethal
and non-lethal actions that must be directed at specific targets in order to realise the
commanders’ intended effects in the physical, virtual and cognitive domains. It is either
pre-planned (deliberate) or dynamic. Therefore, the decision to initiate pre-planned
targeting in line with established criteria (MOEs or MOPs) is defined as an execution
decision. Targeting is further detailed in AFM Fires.

m. Manage Sustainment. Concentration of force at the decisive point and time

requires manoeuvring, not only combat, but also the full range of CS and CSS
assets. Commanders and staffs must deliberately and dynamically coordinate and
direct supporting and sustaining operations in order to deliver mission success.
During execution, experience has shown it is possible for staffs to lose sight of,
or underestimate, the sustainment challenge. This is particularly relevant during
combined arms manoeuvre. The first principle of sustainment states ‘it is the collective
responsibility of all elements of the force to share logistic information, capabilities and
resources to support the force’. Sustainment is further detailed in AFM Sustainment.

8-13. Adjustment Decisions. Adjustment decisions initiate a course of action that requires
a modification to the plan as a result of unanticipated opportunities or threats. When
the commander makes an adjustment decision they choose a decision-making approach
appropriate to the situation. This can be one that relies heavily on intuition, or a more
deliberate approach that requires parts or all of the estimate to be revisited. It is often
a blend of both as combining approaches provides a holistic perspective on the many
factors that affect decisions. When deliberate planning is involved, it is usually conducted
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by plans staff allowing those in the Ops Cen to focus on controlling the ongoing
operation. During this pressurised process staff fight to maintain SA in the broader
headquarters and functional cells focus on assessing the impact of the commander’s
decision in their areas of responsibility. The commander pays particular attention to the
implications of adjustment decisions on targeting and gives sufficient guidance to initiate
and support the targeting process. Adjustments may take one of three basic forms:

a. Minor Change. An example of a minor change would be making a boundary change

or reallocating resources. The latter usually provides additional assets to the Decisive
Actions or Main Effort; however, it may also require reinforcing a shaping or sustaining
operation. Of note, commanders do not reinforce a failing effort without a clear
indication that additional resources will result in success. On the other hand, they
reinforce success if this creates opportunities for more success within their superior
commander’s intent. Minor changes require OSW to be reissued as a FRAGO.

b. Major Change. Major changes involve a significant change to the plan requiring
new OSW issued as an OpO or a FRAGO. Examples could include switching the Main
Effort as a result of unexpected threats or opportunities, tasking the reserve on an
unforeseen mission or even changing the CONOPS – providing it still accomplishes the
1-up Intent.

c. Plan invalid. If the plan becomes invalid, commander and staff begin planning again
within the superior commander’s intent. However, such a significant adjustment will
typically be supported by new orders from the higher HQ.

8-14. Decision Briefs. For adjustment decisions and significant execution decisions (often
related to key Decision Points), a Decision Brief is the principal method for generating
a commander’s decision. Staff act quickly once the unexpected change or appropriate
criteria have been identified noting that well-practised SOIs enhance tempo. The Decision
Brief presents relevant information and provides options for action from which the
commander directs additional analysis or makes a decision. Decision briefs must be short,
succinct and relevant.

Directing Action
8-15. Implementation of a decision requires communication of the decision and corresponding
orders for the application of combat power. Therefore after a commander’s decision
the staff must distribute any new orders and associated OSW as soon as possible. The
challenge lies in making sure that subordinates and Operations Centre staff are able
to conduct the new actions without disrupting those elements of the existing plan and
broader activities which remain extant. In a fast-moving operation, the potential for
confusion is significant. Plans staff must consider carefully how best to disseminate
the new orders. For example, it will rarely be possible to reconvene an OGp, therefore
staff must exercise efficient IM/IX procedures founded on established SOIs.

8-16. The authority for changed OSW products is provided by a covering FRAGO. Verbal
instructions must be recorded in the Operations Centre log. Version control is essential
and subordinates must be in no doubt which version of OSW products are to be used.

8-17. The operations staff must also be briefed on the new orders and products as quickly
as possible. Given the dynamic nature of an operation, the operations staff must
anticipate the impact of the changes to existing activity. The new instructions
may lead to a subsequent change in situation and the cycle will start afresh.
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8-18. Table 8.3 below summarises the range of possible actions with respect to decisions made
during execution.

Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process115

8-19. The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process is a technique that a commander
and staff can use during execution. While identified here with a specific name and
method, the approach is not new. Commanders and staffs should develop this capability
through training and practice. When using the technique, the following considerations
apply:

a. Speed is more important than process.

b. Much of it may be mental rather than written.

c. It should become a battle drill for the operations staff.

8-20. While the military three estimates seek an optimal solution (see chapter 6), the rapid
decision-making and synchronisation process seeks a timely and effective solution
within the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. Using the rapid
decision-making and synchronisation process lets commanders avoid the time-
consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing courses of
action (COAs). Operational and mission variables continually change during execution.
This often invalidates or weakens COAs and decision criteria before a commander
can make a decision. Under the rapid decision-making and synchronisation process,
a commander combines their experience and intuition to quickly reach situational
understanding. Based on this, workable COAs are developed and refined.

8-21. The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process facilitates continuously integrating
and synchronising the warfighting functions to address ever-changing situations.
It meets the following criteria for making effective decisions during execution:

a. It is comprehensive, integrating all warfighting functions. It is not limited to any one

warfighting function.

b. It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the
commander’s intent and concept of operations.

c. It allows rapid changes to the order or mission.

d. It is continuous, allowing a commander to react immediately to opportunities and

threats.

The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process is based on an existing order

and a commander’s priorities as detailed in the orders. The most vital elements are
the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs). The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process includes five
steps. The first two may be performed in any order, including concurrently. The last three
are performed iteratively until the commander identifies an acceptable COA, Figure 8.3
refers.

115 FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organisation and Operations, dated May 2015.
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Performed
„„ Compare the current situation to the order. concurrently or
„„ Determine that a decision, and what type, is required. sequentially.

„„ Develop a course of action. If the action is

„„ Refine and validate the course of action. unacceptable,
„„ Implement. develop a new
course of action.

Figure 8.3. – Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process

8-22. Step 1. Compare the Current Situation to the Order. A commander and staff will identify
likely variances during planning and identify options that will be present and actions
that will be available when each variance occurs. During execution, a commander and
staff will monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions. Then they ask if these
changes affect the overall conduct of the operation or their part in them and if the
changes are significant. Finally, they identify if the changed conditions represent variances
from the order, especially opportunities and risks. Staff should look for indicators of
variances that affect their areas of expertise; Table 8.4 refers for examples of indicators.

8-23. Staff will be focussed on seeking answers to CCIRs that support anticipated decisions.
Furthermore, staff will also seek exceptional information, that which would have
answered one of the CCIRs if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as
one of the CCIRs. Exceptional information usually reveals a need for an adjustment
decision. When performing the rapid decision-making and synchronisation process, the
current operations staff first compares the current situation to the one envisioned in the
order. They may require assistance from the assessment branch or the red team for this
analysis. If the situation requires greater analysis, the COS may task plans to conduct
the analysis. At BG level, this task will be completed by either plans or operations staff.
Types Indicators
„„ Answer to a CCIR.
„„ Change in mission.
„„ Change in organisation of unit.
Command „„ Change in command of unit.
„„ Change in capabilities of subordinate unit.
„„ Impending changes in key military command.
„„ Receipt of a FRAGO or WngO from higher headquarters.
„„ Effective adversary information efforts on civilians.
„„ Loss of contact with a CP or commander.
„„ Jamming or interference.

„„ Identification of enemy main effort.

„„ Identification of enemy reserves or counterattack.
„„ Indications of unexpected enemy action or preparation.
„„ Increase in enemy solicitation of civilians for intelligence operations.
„„ Identification of an IR.
„„ Insertion of manned surveillance teams.
„„ Disruption of education systems.
Intelligence
„„ Unexplained disappearance of key members of intelligence community.
„„ Use of enemy electronic attack.
„„ Identification of high-value targets.
„„ Unmanned aircraft system launch.
„„ Answer to a PIR.
„„ Enemy Air or Avn (incl UAV) use.
„„ Identification of threats from within the population.
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„„ Success or failure in breaching or gap crossing operations.

„„ Capture of significant numbers of enemy PoW, enemy CP, Logistic elements or artillery
units.
Manoeuvre
„„ Establishment of road blocks along major traffic routes.
„„ Success or failure of a sub-unit task.
„„ Modification of an airspace control measure (ACM).

„„ Receipt of an air tasking order (ATO).

„„ Battle damage assessment (BDA) results.
„„ Unplanned repositioning of artillery units.
„„ Identification of high-payoff targets.
Fires
„„ Identification of an IR.
„„ Execution of planned fires.
„„ Modification of a Fire Support Coordination Measure (FSCM).
„„ Effective enemy counter-fire.

„„ Identification of an IR.
„„ Climate changes or natural disasters impacting on the population, agriculture, or
industry.
„„ Interference with freedom of the press or news media.
Information „„ Indicators of illicit economic activity.
Activities „„ Increased unemployment within the population.
„„ Interference with freedom of religious worship.
„„ Loss of civilian communications nodes.
„„ Negative effects of fires on civilians.
„„ Destruction of any place of worship by friendly fire.

„„ Signing or implementation of peace treaty or other key political arrangement.

„„ Change in role of host-nation military force.
„„ Upcoming local election.
Capacity „„ Changes in key civilian leadership.
Building „„ Unexplained displacement of neighbourhoods within a given sector.
„„ Numbers of dislocated civilians sufficient to affect friendly operations.
„„ Damage to civilian infrastructure affecting friendly mobility.
„„ Loss of one or more critical transportation systems.

„„ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) report or other indicators of enemy

CBRN use.
„„ Report or other indicators of enemy improvised explosive device (IED) use.
„„ Indicators of coordinated enemy actions against civilians or friendly forces.
„„ Increased criminal activity in a given sector.
Protection „„ Increase in organised protests or riots.
„„ Identification of threats to communications or computer systems.
„„ Reports of enemy targeting critical host-nation infrastructure.
„„ Identification of threat to base or sustainment facilities.
„„ Escalation of force incidents.
„„ Loss of border security.

„„ Significant loss of capability in any class of supply.

„„ Opening or closing of civilian businesses within a given area.
„„ Identification of significant incidences of disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) casualties.
„„ Closing of major financial institutions.
„„ Mass casualties (MASCAL).
„„ Receipt of significant resupply.
„„ Disruption of one or more essential civil services (water or electricity etc).
„„ Enemy contact on a supply route.
„„ Answer to a FFIR.
Sustainment
„„ Mass detainees.
„„ Degradations to essential civilian infrastructure by threat actions.
„„ Civilian MASCAL event beyond capability of host-nation resources.
„„ Identification of significant shortage in any class of supply.
„„ Outbreak of epidemic or famine within the civilian population.
„„ Medical evacuation launch.
„„ Dislocated civilian event beyond capability of host-nation resources.
„„ Disruption of key logistics lines of communication.
„„ Changes in availability of host-nation support.

Table 8.4. – Examples of change indicators

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8-24. Step 2. Determine the type of decision required. When a variance is identified, the
commander directs action while the COS leads the staff who are conducting the
quick comparison of the current situation to the expected situation. This assessment
accomplishes the following:

a. Describes the variance.

b. Determines if the variance provides a significant opportunity or threat and examines

the potential of either.

c. Determines if a decision is needed by identifying if the variance:

(1) Indicates an opportunity that can be exploited to accomplish the mission faster or
with fewer resources.

(2) Directly threatens the success of the main effort.

(3) Threatens a shaping operation such that it may threaten the main effort.

(4) Can be addressed within the commander’s intent and concept of operations,
and therefore determine what execution decision is required.

(5) Requires changing the CONOPs substantially and therefore determine what
adjustment decision or new approach will best suit the circumstances.

8-25. For minor variances, the COS works with the staff to determine whether changes to
control measures are required. If so, they determine how those changes affect other
warfighting functions and changes, within authority (execution decisions), are directed
to affected CPs and staff elements. A commander should intervene directly in cases
that affect the overall direction of the unit - they should describe the situation, direct
their subordinates to provide any additional information required, and order either
implementation of planned responses or development of an order to redirect the force.

8-26. Step 3. Develop a COA. If the variance requires an adjustment decision, the staff and
affected CP recommend the implementation of a COA or obtain commander’s guidance
for developing one. The following conditions to screen possible COAs should be used:

a. Mission.

b. Commander’s intent.

c. Current dispositions and freedom of action.

d. CCIRs.

e. Limiting factors, such as supply constraints, boundaries, and combat power.

8-27. The new options must conform to the commander’s intent. Possible COAs may alter
the CONOPS and CCIRs, if they remain within the commander’s intent. The commander
must approve any changes to the CCIRs. Staff identify areas potentially affected within
their areas of expertise by proposed changes to the order or mission. COA considerations
include, but are not limited to, those shown in Table 8.5.
8-28. The commander is as likely as anyone else to detect the need for change and to sketch
out the options. Whether the commander or COS detects the need, Plans or Ops will be
directed to further develop the concept and draft the order. The commander, or COS,
will have the decision-making authority, depending on the commander’s delegation of
authority. Commanders may delegate authority for execution decisions to their deputies,
COSs or operations officer. A commander must retain personal responsibility for all
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decisions and will normally retain the authority for approving adjustment decisions. When
reallocating resources or priorities, commanders assign only minimum essential force
elements to shaping operations. All other force elements should be prioritised to the
decisive operation.

8-29. A commander should direct the ops staff to prepare a FRAGO, setting conditions for the
execution of the new COA. If a lack of time precludes a full estimate, or if a quick action
is desirable, commanders should make an immediate adjustment decision, using intuitive
decision making, in the form of a focussed COA. Developing the focussed COA often
follows mental wargaming by a commander until an acceptable COA is determined. If
time is available, a commander may direct the plans staff to develop a new COA using
the relevant estimate process and the considerations for COA planning, Table 8.5 refers.
Types Indicators
„„ Move communications nodes.
„„ Move CPs.
Command „„ Loss of C2 nodes capability.
„„ Adjust themes and messages to support the new decision.
„„ Revise recommended protected targets.

„„ Modify PIR and other IRs.

„„ Update NAIs & TAIs.
„„ Update the Intelligence Estimate.
Intelligence
„„ Update the enemy situation template.
„„ Modify the ICP.
„„ Confirm or deny enemy MD / ML COA.

„„ Assign new objectives.

„„ Assign new tasks to sub-units.
„„ Adjust BM.
„„ Use of obscurants.
Manoeuvre „„ Modify ACM.
„„ Make boundary changes.
„„ Emplace obstacles.
„„ Clear obstacles.
„„ Establish and enforce movement priority.

„„ Deliver fires against targets or target sets.

„„ Modify the HPTL and the attack guidance matrix.
Fires „„ Modify radar zones.
„„ Modify the priority of fires.
„„ Modify FSCM.

Information Activities „„ Modify information priorities for employing information as combat power.

„„ Adjust measures for minimizing civilian interference with operations.

„„ Recommend modifications of stability tasks, including employment of civil
Capacity Building affairs operations and other units, to perform civil affairs operations tasks.
„„ Inform HN authorities.
„„ Coordinate HN SF to secure routes.

„„ Move AD weapons systems.

„„ Establish decontamination sites.
„„ Conduct CBRN recce.
„„ Establish movement corridors on critical lines of communications.
Protection
„„ Change AD weapons control status.
„„ Enhance survivability through engineer support.
„„ Revise and update personnel recovery coordination.
„„ Reassign or reposition reserve force elements.

„„ Prioritise MEDEVAC assets.

„„ Reposition logistic assets.
„„ Position and prioritise detainee assets.
Sustainment
„„ Reposition and prioritise engineer assets.
„„ Modify priorities.
„„ Modify distribution.

Table 8.5. – COA Considerations

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8-30. Step 4. Refine and Validate the COA. Once a commander has articulated the new
COA, the ops staff conduct an analysis to validate its feasibility, suitability, and
acceptability. If acceptable, the COA is refined to resynchronise the warfighting
functions to generate and apply the required combat power. The detail should be
captured in a FRAGO and the commander, or COS, may direct an ‘on-call’ operations
synchronisation meeting to perform this task to enable rapid resynchronisation.

8-31. Validation and refinement should be achieved quickly. Typically, the commander and
staff conduct a mental wargame of the new COA. Potential enemy reactions, the unit’s
counteractions, and potential consequences that might affect the force’s synchronisation
should be considered. The following checklist should be addressed at this stage:

a. Is the new COA feasible in terms of my area of expertise?

b. How will this action affect my area of expertise?

c. Does it require changing my IRs?

(1) Should any of the IRs be nominated as a CCIR?

(2) What actions within my area of expertise does this change require?

(3) Will this COA require changing objectives or targets?

d. What other CP branches or cells does this action affect?

e. What are potential enemy reactions?

f. What are the possible friendly counteractions?

(1) Does this counteraction affect my area of expertise?

(2) Will it require changing my IRs?

(3) Are any of my IR potential CCIRs?

(4) What actions within my area of expertise does this counteraction require?

(5) Will it require changing objectives or targets?

(6) What other CP branches or cells does this counteraction affect?

8-32. The validation and refinement will determine if the COA will solve the problem
adequately. If it does not, the COS will direct modifications via additional analysis, or a
new COA will be developed. The COS will then inform the commander of any changes
made to the COA.

8-33. Step 5. Implement. When the COA is accepted, the COS recommends implementation
to the commander or implements it directly, in accordance with delegated authority.
Implementation normally requires a FRAGO; in exceptional circumstances, it may require
a new OPO. That order changes the CONOPS (in adjustment decisions), resynchronises
the Tactical Functions, and disseminates changes to control measures. Staff should use a
WngO to alert subordinates to a pending change and will also establish sufficient time
for the unit to implement the change without losing integration or being exposed to
unnecessary tactical risk.
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8-34. A commander will most likely issue orders to subordinates verbally in situations requiring
a quick reaction. At BG and higher levels, a written FRAGO be utilised to confirm verbal
orders, and to ensure synchronisation, integration, and notification to all force elements.
If time permits, commanders may verify that subordinates understand the critical tasks via
a back brief.

8-35. After the analysis is complete, ops staff will update decision support templates and
synchronisation matrixes. When time is available, the ops staff should continue analysis
out to the end of the operation. Staff should then begin the synchronisation required to
implement the decision. The synchronisation involves collaboration with other Command
Post (CP) branches/cells and subordinate staff. The staff will determine how actions in their
areas of expertise affect others; these must be coordinated to eliminate undesired effects
that might cause friction. Results of the synchronisation should then inform the COP.

The Operations Centre

8-36. Introduction. The Operations Centre (Ops Cen) within a CP is at the heart of assessing,
deciding and directing activities that have already been discussed in this chapter. As well
as monitoring and evaluating, empowered operations staff control execution through
execution decisions and staff activities in support of the commander’s adjustment
decisions. Operations staff must also package and pass relevant information to branches,
subordinates, flanks, higher HQs and the commander to generate and maintain SA.

8-37. Composition. The composition of the Ops Cen depends upon the availability and
effectiveness of voice and data communications, SA feeds, space, the level at which the
HQ is operating and the type of operation being conducted. Membership is not necessarily
a strictly defined single entity. It will frequently include staff from outside the core HQ.
Composition may change during an operation. The COS will usually be responsible for
the design and manning of the Ops Cen and will do so based on the following criteria:

a. Complexity of the Operation. Operations comprising a large number of differing

capabilities provided by different organisations, and even different nations, will require
a large number of expert staff in the Ops Cen. This will be particularly evident when
working in the CJIIM environment. See Part C for further CJIIM detail.

b. Stability and Reliability of Communications. Although the Ops Cen will be sited as
part of the CP, and that siting will usually have the requirement to communicate at its
core, there may be occasions when specialist communication users are required to be
detached to operate from different locations.

c. Phase of Operation. Specialist staff will be required for different phases of the
operation. A particularly complex resupply operation will require logistic staff to be
present in the Ops Cen but they may not be permanent members. The COS or Ops Cen
Director (Dir) will set the conditions for appropriate manning in accordance with the
mission.

d. Location of Other HQs. Where a Forward CP is deployed, the Ops Cen may split. The
Forward Ops Cen will restrict its activity to providing SA for the commander. When CPs
are moving, the Ops Cen will also split so that control can be exercised from both.

e. Example Manning. Manning will be dictated by tempo, activity and availability. Note
that manning may need to allow for a shift system to provide continuous coverage.
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8-38. Infrastructure. The size and composition of the Ops Cen will determine the level and
complexity of the infrastructure required to support it. Where power and lift limitations
exist, the COS will have to balance these factors against the requirements of the
Operations Centre. Default layouts for CPs should be contained in formation and
unit SOIs.

8-39. Functional Cell’s Ops Cens. Within a CP, different cells support the commander as
well as the main Ops Cen. Depending on the complexity and size of an operation and
the concomitant size of the cell staffs, it may be necessary for Functional Cell Ops Cens
to be established to support the main Ops Cen. The greater the number of Cell Ops
Cens, the greater the potential of decreased SA in the Main Ops Cen. It is critical that
defined relevant information is passed from Cell Ops Cens to the Main Ops Cen.

8-40. Control of the Ops Cen. The Ops Cen is controlled by the Ops Cen Dir, usually the senior
G3 officer in the CP. At BG and Bde level, this role is usually fulfilled by a Battle Captain.
The Dir/Battle Captain’s responsibilities include those listed below and key questions for
the Ops Cen in Table 8.3:

a. To fight the battle.

b. To report and monitor friendly force information (strengths, dispositions, capabilities,

readiness, holdings, activity and critical assets).

c. To report and monitor enemy force information (usually provided by G2).

d. To report and monitor flank and higher activity (including air, aviation, maritime, SF,
NGO and OGD activity as required).

e. To maintain visual displays and a COP.

f. To brief the commander and staff as required.

g. To monitor and report on CCIRs.

h. To identify and predict deviations from the plan in accordance with MOEs and MOPs.

i. To initiate and cue decisions within the authority granted by the commander.
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Key Questions in the Ops Cen

Anticipate Decide / Operate
„„ What could change? „„ What is the priority?
„„ What next? „„ What else should I be doing?
„„ What / where is the risk – is it an „„ Whose decision is it and when does it need to be taken?
opportunity or a threat? „„ Is this what we expected?
„„ Where is the reserve; what is its „„ What is the impact?
NTM? „„ Am I integrating, synchronising, easing and facilitating
activity?
„„ What is happening on the flanks?
Inform „„ Are we being calm and disciplined?
„„ When was the last SITREP – up and „„ How can I add value?
down? „„ Is the force balanced?
„„ Am I in a position to give an accurate „„ What is our Combat Effectiveness?
SITREP?
„„ Who else needs to know?
„„ Is what I am telling them fact or
assumption?
„„ Can we communicate with all
elements of the Force?
„„ Do we need to move?
„„ Is this a CCIR?

Table 8.3. – Key Questions for the Ops Cen

8-41. Log Keeping. Relevant Information and decisions are recorded in the Log, usually by the
Watchkeeper. Log Keeping is an essential element of Operational Record Keeping (ORK).

8-42. The Common Operating Picture (COP).116 The detail shown on the COP will vary
depending on the situation and command level. The COP may be digitised or be a bird
table, or a combination. It presents geospatial, textual, pictorial and verbal information
to the CP staff. Once an order has been enacted, its execution will be monitored through
the COP and the display enables a commander’s SA. The accuracy of the COP is critical
and must be controlled by the Ops Cen Dir. Of note, the commander may also have a
COP from which to monitor the situation when away from the Ops Cen. It will usually
be a mirror image of the Main Ops Cen, but may be reduced if there are bandwidth
constraints. Typical content of the COP and other information displays are shown in
Table 8.4.

116 British Doctrine has adopted the term COP for what was previously called Local Operations Picture (LOP).
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Geospatial
Detail Remarks Other detail Remarks
information
FF locations Net diagram Note that much of
FSCMs Comms States this information
Routes c/s matrix can be displayed
Obstacles TASKORG electronically,
Report Lines NTM details but doing so
Ops Trace Objectives Key staff locs detracts from the
AD coverage Own Combat space available to
DFs Effectiveness display map-based
Key weapon range Key Battle Rhythm information
Installations events
Key CSS locs Effects Schematic
Comd’s Intent
DSO

Sync Matrix

Route class May not be

Physical
Bridge Class permanently
Terrain Trace
Going displayed

May not be
Met Trace permanently
displayed

Locations
EF Weapon effect
(particularly CBRN)

Table 8.4. – Content of the COP

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AFMTitle
Pub
Command PART
Chapter
C ?
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PART C
Command in the Combined, Joint,
Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency and
Multinational (Cjiim) Environment

Overview Part A – Command and Control

Part C of AFM Command covers the aspects of • Command
Interoperability117 that should be considered by a • Command Support
commander operating in a CJIIM environment. It • Command Posts
describes the definitions, dimensions and some
considerations relevant to operating within a Part B – Exercising Command and
Control
multinational arena, or context, including the vital
roles and requirements for effective Liaison Officer • Introduction to the Operations
(LO) cooperation. It further outlines the decision- Process
making and planning processes of NATO and our • Assess
key strategic partners118, as well as those within • Plan
the UK MOD, UK National Resilience Operations. • Prepare
• Execute

Part C – Command in the CJIIM

Environment
 Multinational Interoperability
 NATO and Allied Planning Processes
 UK Resilience Operations

Figure 3.1. – The Interoperability Model

117 ADP Land Operations, 2017, Chapter 7 describes ‘Interoperability’ as a national inter and intra service, as well as an inter-
agency and multinational, enabling activity – see Figure 3.1.
118 US, France and Germany.
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AFMTitle
Pub
Command Chapter
Chapter9?
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Chapter Title? Interoperability

Multinational
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Chapter 9
Multinational Interoperability

Introduction Mulitnational Interoperability

9-01. Coalition, combined or multinational • Introduction
operations are not new. In the future • Dimensions
it is almost inconceivable that UK Land • Considerations on Multinational
Forces will operate without allies, or other Operations
agencies. However, interoperability still • Liaison Officers
remains a critical gap at the strategic,
operational and tactical level. The better
the understanding of the challenges, dynamics and complexity of combined operations,
the better able commands will be to deliver. In its broadest sense, interoperability is a
requirement even within units, arms and services within the British Army. However,
for the purposes of this Chapter, the focus will be on multinational interoperability.

9-02. NATO defines interoperability119 which is reflected in UK doctrine,120 as ‘the ability for
Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational
and strategic objectives’.121 As with ‘jointery’, ‘interoperability’ is not an end in itself, but
a means by which we are better able to improve our joint, multinational and inter-agency
capacity to assess, plan, prepare and execute operations. Interoperability should be
considered in three dimensions:

a. Levels of Ambition of Interoperability.

b. Breadth of Interoperability.

c. Depth of Interoperability.

Dimensions
9-03. Dimensions. Interoperability requires nations to spend money, take risk and cede
sovereignty in order to increase legitimacy, cohesion, mass and agility. The level of
ambition for each relationship will depend on the cost/benefit, risk appetite and likelihood
of use. During the course of a combined operation, involving a number of multinational
contributions, UK force elements (FEs) may find themselves alongside Partner Nations
(PNs) with whom they can only operate at deconflicted levels. However they may find
themselves concurrently operating at an integrated level with other forces. It should be
noted that forces may wish to operate together at a lower level of interoperability than
can be mutually achieved, dependent on the discrete requirements of that particular
operation.

119 AAP-06. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

120 The UK doctrinal definition (AAP-06) is similar: ‘Interoperability describes the ability of UK Forces and, when appropriate,
forces of partner and other nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions
and tasks.’
121 AAP-42 Edition B Version 1, NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and Definitions, 2011.
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a. Levels of Ambition:

(1) Level 1 - Integrated. Forces that are integrated are able to merge seamlessly
and are interchangeable. This high level of interoperability has only been achieved
within coalition headquarters and niche areas, such as the Regional Command
(South West) Coalition Targeting Cell in Afghanistan. It is difficult to achieve
between units at the tactical level.

(2) Level 2 - Compatible. Forces that are compatible are able to interact with each
other in the same geographical battlespace in pursuit of a common goal. This
level of interoperability was achieved in RC(SW) in the final years of Op HERRICK.
This is the area where the majority of bilateral interoperability development lies.

(3) Level 3 - Deconflicted. Forces that are deconflicted. This is where two nations’
forces work together towards a common goal, but need to divide the battlespace
into nationally-led areas of responsibility. This was the level of interoperability
exercised on Op GRANBY and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This is the base level
of interoperability provided by NATO procedures.

Integrated
Forces able to merge seamlessly and are

e
is
om
interchangeable

pr
om
us / c
Compatible of isk
e
r
oo I) /

Forces able to interact in the same

o
el (B
d

geographical Battlespace
lik nt
ih
e
an stm
ve

Deconflicted
d
In
of
ce

Forces can co-exist but

n
la

not interact. Base-level

Ba

Figure 9.1. – Levels of Ambition

b. Breadth. Interoperability in its breadth spans the human, the procedural and the
technical domains, with the human being by far the more critical:

(1) Human Interoperability. Time and effort developing and strengthening

multinational relationships on operations and in training will create and improve
trust and mutual understanding. Nations will always retain authority for such
areas as national control of caveats and have to work to overcome the challenges
of synchronising technological differences. Therefore human interoperability is
the vital ground, because the mutual trust generated through shared experience
drives solutions on the ground and strengthens the moral component of fighting
power.
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(2) Procedural Interoperability. This generates synergy and efficiency through

common policy, doctrine and procedures.

(3) Technical Interoperability. Technical interoperability should enable systems

and equipment to communicate with each other through the exchange, display
and exploitation of each other’s information. Technical interoperability must
be designed into our systems and equipment from the outset in conjunction
with Partner Nations (PNs). Until this is achieved nations must work together to
establish workable solutions to current technical interoperability challenges.

Human Technical Procedural

Vital for success on operations, Not designed effectively The OIL that lubricates
takes time to develop / fades rapidly into current force the interoperability cogs

• Understanding • Secure Voice • Standard Operating

Procedures
• Relationship building • Data sharing
• Rules of Engagement
(Mission Network)
• Goals & Objectives Doctrine
• Shared Battlespace • Tactics Training &
• Mutual trust Management Procedures
• Practice - frequent • Digital Fires • National Policy &
training opportunities Caveats
• Shared Intelligence • Pairing Arrangements
• Progress meetings
• Theatre Entry, • LEGAD / POLAD
Integrated Log, CIMIC & Intro Ops
Commodity sharing,
Med, Air Maritine &
Aviation, Mobility /
Counter Mobility,
Training & Sim, Cyber
Sy, Combat ID,
Science & Tech EMS

Figure 9.2. – Breadth of Interoperability

c. Depth. Interoperability takes time to develop and is more effective and affordable
if it is designed into capability development from the initial concept. Armies will
simultaneously be developing, refining and maintaining interoperability in the near,
mid and far-terms. In the far-term (10 years +) nations collaborate in conceptual
development and science and technology (S&T) research to share the cost and ensure
the relevance and effectiveness of their conceptual force. In the mid-term (5-10 years)
nations develop common standards and doctrine, and align procurement requirements
in order to maximise the employability/versatility and effect of their future force.
This may include experimentation and the harmonisation of national policies. In the
near-term (0-5 years) nations will re-engineer in-service equipment, mitigate national
policy obstacles, validate standards and train the current force in order to generate
interoperability at readiness. Interoperability is perishable and therefore must be
maintained to avoid a cycle of relearning the same lessons.
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Human Interop Procedural Interop Technical Interop

Mutual trust & understanding Policy, caveats, ROE, TTPs Comms, data sharing, COP 3
Breadth of Interoperability 1 Leveles of
Near Ambition for
Fight Readiness, Exercises & Visits Interoperability
Tonight
Depth of Interoperability

Mitigation Integrated:
Current Experimentation Forces are able to merge
Force seamlessly and are
interchangeable
Mid Liaison Compatible:
Solutions
& Staff Talks & Forces are able to interact
Future
Force Exchange Engagement with each other in the same
geographical battlespace in
pursuit of a common goal

Far Deconflicted:
Acquisition Forces are geographically
Designed-in
deconflicted: they can
Conceptual 2 co-exist but not interact with
Force
each other
Concepts, War Games
and S&T Collaboration

Interoperability Definition (NATO):

‘The ability for Allies to act together coherently, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives’.

Figure 9.3. – Dimensions of Interoperability

High levels of interoperability take time and resources to develop and maintain. Therefore the
level of interoperability to be achieved will often be directed by the political level of ambition.

Considerations on Multinational Operations

9-04. Although there may be varying degrees of similarity, no two armies are the same and
ill-informed assumptions will lead to operational misunderstandings, mistakes and
ultimately frictions which in turn have the potential to damage reputations, relationships
and trust. Complete homogeneity is unlikely to be achieved between two separate
national land force elements (and is probably not always desirable – as each will
come with different, and ideally compensating, strengths and capabilities). Superficial
similarities can often mask a myriad of differences from military culture, experience,
backgrounds, ethos, histories, training and deployment standards and regimes as well
as respective appointments’ roles and responsibilities. Therefore it is to be expected
that each Partner Nation may think, react and respond to circumstances differently,
to each other, and to that that might be expected within UK land forces. There are a
number of ways to mitigate these challenges but the importance of developing mutual
understanding through engagement, combined training and the exchange of empowered
and respected LOs, should be emphasised. These issues described below are a non-
exhaustive list of considerations that need to be mutually agreed and understood:

a. Mutual Trust and Common Understanding. The key element to effective

interoperability is mutual trust and common understanding. Within a military context,
understanding is defined as the perception and interpretation of a particular situation
in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision
making122. The deeper the reciprocal comprehension, the better the ability to harness

122 JDP-04.
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and employ respective coalition

Multinational Considerations
partners’ strengths. This will also
prevent, or minimise any errors or „„ Mutual trust and common
miscalculations. This is best achieved understanding
by developing strong links with likely
„„ Developing understanding
partners prior to, and ideally well
before, any operational deployment. „„ The implications of understanding
For example, through a broad range for Commanders and Staff
of liaison visits, unit and individual
„„ Language and culture
exchanges, combined/joint exercises
and course attendances, etc. It should „„ Leadership
also be recognised that interoperability
„„ Multinational command
is a perishable commodity; effort,
time and resources must be provided „„ National Contingent Commanders
in order to ensure it is maintained.
„„ Operational Staff Work and
Mutual trust and common
Operational Record Keeping
understanding will be ‘Key Terrain’
that enables partners to overcome the „„ Liaison Officers
many other procedural and technical
„„ Command and Control Relationships.
challenges that they will face. In
developing mutual understanding, „„ Communications
prior to any multinational deployment
„„ National Caveats (Red Cards)
it is a sound investment to understand
a contributing PN’s Ends, Ways and „„ National Agendas
Means:
„„ Operational Standardisation
(1) Ends. – What ends are the PN
„„ Operational security
seeking by contributing to this
particular operation? „„ Medical
(2) Ways. – What ways may be „„ Media and visits
limited to a PN during the
„„ Finance and sustaining
execution of this operation?
„„ Risk
(3) Means. – What priority of
direction and orders will the PN
unit need to follow (who owns
the means and dictates, and
directs, your ways)?

‘A key point of confusion for the foreigner lies in the apparent contradiction
between the British culture of modesty and understatement which is at odds with
the underlying success driven value system in the culture. Critical to understanding
the British is being able to ‘read between the lines’. What is said is not always what
is meant.’

Professor Geert Hofstede - Culture’s Consequences.

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b. Developing Understanding123. Understanding flows from developing the

most inclusive perspective of an actor, group, environment or situation. Building
understanding takes time. Developing understanding is based on:

(1) Clear articulation of the requirement by commanders.

(2) The development of networks and systems.

(3) A detailed knowledge of the human domain.

(4) Situational awareness derived from a COP of the operational environment.

(5) The coherent integration of:

(i) Information management, exploitation and assurance.

(ii) Communications and information technology.

(6) Education and training.

c. The Implications of Understanding for Commanders and Staff. Understanding is

as much an attitude of mind as an activity; the burden of responsibility to understand
works both ways in any partnership. This has implications:

(1) A change of ethos and philosophy; a duty to share proactively.

(2) There is a greater requirement to understand our allies and equally for our allies
to understand ourselves.

(3) A change in how we produce our vision and intent, our thought and planning
processes and in the way we make decisions.
(4) We must be comfortable working with complex and ambiguous problems.

(5) We must monitor and evaluate the effects and consequences of our decisions in
order to learn, adapt and make better decisions in the future.

d. Language and Culture. Language and culture have a significant impact on how
situations and communications are perceived. Commanders and staff must ensure
that both written and verbal communications use plain and simple English in order to
mitigate the risk of differing perceptions developing among Partner Nations. Although
a coalition formation, or individual, may display excellent command of the English
language, do not automatically assume that everything that is implied, nuanced, or
expressed is fully understood. Deliberate effort should be made to ensure that mutual
comprehension is confirmed, prior to any decisions being agreed. The use of national,
formation or unit vernacular and abbreviations, should be avoided as they can very
easily lead to confusion or mistakes. Much of this is mitigated through the use of
NATO-approved terminology124 and the confirmation of understanding by the proper
application of the formal planning and orders process, including the use of:

(1) Commanders’ Back Briefs after the receipt of orders.

(2) Wargaming.

(3) Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drills.

123 JDP-2.00.
124 AAP-06. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
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‘The HQ staff of the DANBAT on HERRICK 15, when reading staff work sent
from HQ Task Force Helmand, with a paragraph heading BLUF (Bottom Line Up
Front) understood it to actually mean it was a ‘bluff’ or a deception strategy,
thus distorting the whole meaning, and their understanding, of the rest of the
document.’

DComd DANBAT H15, Post Operational Interview

e. Leadership. The leadership theory, styles and principles exercised by our multinational
allies can, and do, vary markedly from those employed within the British Army.125 This
can range from the leadership exercised within the field unit chain of command, where
leadership styles may be more firmly transformational as opposed transactional; and
to headquarters modus operandi where the staffing processes can be ‘staff driven’ as
opposed to ‘command led’. The key will be for commanders and staffs to identify and
understand the different leadership methods and attitudes employed by whichever PNs
they might be operating with.

f. Multinational Command. Operating multinationally, either as part of a formal

alliance or as an ad hoc coalition, introduces many challenges for both the
multinational force commander and for contributing contingent commanders. A
multinational force commander will be required to exercise a degree of political
judgement, patience and tact. Routine engagement by the commander (or the
nominated deputy) with Senior National Representatives (SNR) from each PN in the
command is an effective way to identify and resolve many of the issues and challenges
that develop in combined operations. The role of the SNR is to represent and help
resolve their national contingent interests. Depending on the level, or echelon of the
command, the SNR may also be the designated National Contingent Commander.

g. National Contingent126 Commanders. On deploying forces as part of a combined

operation most, if not all, contributing nations will deploy a national contingent
commander (in UK terms, often referred to as COMBRITFOR) who may be separate to
the operational contingent commander, dealing with rear-link issues back to national
capitals and HQs. With the exception of the lead nation, each country contributing
forces to a multinational operation can be expected to deploy a national contingent
commander who will exercise national command and represent national interests at
the operational level.127 Where PNs have forces under UK command, the interactive
role, location and communication requirements of their Contingent Commander may
have to be considered.

h. Operational Staff Work (OSW) and Operational Record Keeping (ORK). PNs
within a multinational operation will have different approaches to OSW and ORK.
This is to be expected, but the essential role that ORK plays in post-operations
activities (including lessons, and Parliamentary and legal enquiries) is considerable. It is
recommended that the UK CoC issues clear policy and assures itself that it is confident
that any subordinated multinational units are compliant with the UK ORK procedures
and requirements.

125 Army Leadership Doctrine, Edition 1, 2016.

126 Note that AAP-06 uses the term ‘Component’ instead of ‘Contingent’.
127 JDP 0-01.1.
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i. Liaison Officers (LOs). The correct selection, preparation and exchange of LOs will be
key to mitigating many of the potential areas of confusion and confliction that might
arise during the course of an operation. ATP-3.2.2 specifies the circumstances when
reciprocal liaison must be established in a multinational environment. Further details
on the duties and responsibilities of an LO are contained in para 5.

j. Command and Control (C2) Relationships. C2 relationships should be mutually

understood and agreed prior to any deployment, or retasking, of multinational
contingents. Notwithstanding what may be articulated by the various Command States
within NATO doctrine128 and reflected in the UK’s, in a multinational environment it is
vitally important that both, or all, partners agree to a common understanding of the
actual definitions129 and any ‘Supported and Supporting’ relationships are settled. In
order to reach a common understanding and a Common Operating Picture (COP) it
might require that the agreed C2 relationships are articulated, and confirmed, in-
person at every level.

k. Communications. In multinational operations, especially where the participating

forces are not operationally ‘integrated’, there will always be a varying degree of
human and technical challenges e.g. secure comms, data transmission and COP.
However, many of these can be at least mitigated to a degree with the passage of
mutually understandable, accurate and timely communications over a robust and well-
practised network.

l. National Caveats (Red Cards). In multinational operations, each nation contributing

forces will have national caveats and certain areas which for them might mean a
potential national caveat (‘Red Card’) issue. It is imperative that national caveats (or
even the ‘professed’ lack of them)130 are fully explored and agreed. Additionally it
is important to understand where the Red Card issues might fall, and who, and at
what level has the authority to exercise them. It should also be recognised that these
national caveats may evolve, and change, during the course of the operation as it
develops. So commanders may sometimes need to exercise tactical patience in order to
protect and preserve strategic coalitions.

m. National Agendas. It is important during combined operations, especially where the

UK has multinational units under command, that the PNs’ motivation for participation
on particular operations are understood, and factored within the planning processes.
This might include such areas as strategic communications messaging to both national
and international audiences (especially to senior partners). During any operation,
including NATO Article 5, as with the UK, partner nations will almost certainly have
national agendas and objectives, especially with the more discretionary operations.
These may, or may not, be the same as the UK’s and ideally have been mutually
considered in order to allow for some equity, especially for junior partners. Ideally
these will have been discussed, clarified and agreed by each nation’s senior operational
headquarters (in the case of the UK, this will most probably be PJHQ) prior to
deployment. If these have not been articulated in advance, guidance should be sought,
up through the chain of command. Where partner nations wish to influence and

128 AJP-3(B). Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, 2011.
129 As an example, US command states are different to NATO’s.
130 This may often occur when some partner nations find themselves exposed to situations and challenges that they had not
previously experienced, or envisaged prior to deployment.
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contribute to the operations conducted by their participating forces, from J3-5. This
must ideally be negotiated prior to deployment, or retasking and correct procedures
agreed (see Ends, Ways and Means para 4.b).

n. Operational Standardisation. Although NATO should be the framework for

operational standardisation, the current tempo of technical change often outstrips
the ability for NATO (and some allies) to keep pace. It would therefore be naïve not to
continue to develop doctrinal initiatives and national Tactics Technics and Procedures
while NATO standardisation catches up. Early opportunities for mutual training
activities and ideally some form of joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement and
Integration (RSOI), ideally with an in-theatre training package, will do much to aid
standardisation within a multinational force.

o. Operational Security (OPSEC). PNs will have different approaches to OPSEC and
any critical areas should be identified at the earliest opportunity and clear policy
guidance should be issued and confirmation of understanding may be required. The
areas that may need to be considered range from the operational security and passage
of information (including Emission Control EMCON) to the use of mobile phones and
personal electronic devices (PEDs).

p. Medical. Medical standards vary from nation to nation. UK commanders assuming

command of multinational FEs should ideally understand the medical condition
of these forces in order that it does not incur an unexpected heavy usage of UK
apportioned medical support.

q. Media and Visits. A multinational force commander should expect a number of

media and senior representative visits from the contributing nations during the course
of a deployment. While maintaining any OPSEC requirements, these visits need to
be supported and positively and sensitively handled as they will be important in
maintaining PNs’ political, and national, willingness and support.

r. Finance and Sustaining. During multinational operations the financial and

sustainment issue may also have to be considered, especially where PNs are dependent
on a lead nation for enablers and logistical support. Additionally, consideration may
also have to be given to the different approaches PNs may have to Host-Nation (HN)
support.

s. Risk. Operating as part of a multinational force will normally always engender

a greater degree of risk than would be experienced in a purely national context.
Commanders at whatever level should identify what the risks might be, who holds the
risk, and what possible mitigation strategies might be available.
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Liaison Officers
9-05. Multinational Operations131. Mutual confidence is the key to making liaison successful.
Liaison activities require the explicit coordination of doctrine and techniques, patience
and tact during personal interaction, and a thorough understanding of the strategic,
operational, and tactical aims supporting any international military effort. Cultural
differences and sensitivities may require special communications and liaison arrangements
to ensure explicit understanding across the alliance or coalition partners. In addition,
significant technological differences may exist because of each force’s differing degrees
of development, which will require sensitive and careful liaison to overcome. Further,
the LO may need to deploy with additional communications support and equipment.

9-06. Selection and Preparation. The correct selection and preparation of LOs132 will be a
crucial element to the success of combined operations. The roles and responsibilities
of a liaison officer are detailed in NATO STANAGs,133 but in essence an LO is an
officer who is exchanged between two forces and is empowered to represent and
make appropriate recommendations on behalf of their commander. The LO must be
prepared to be able to amplify the commander’s intent and points of detail when
appropriate. Moreover, a liaison officer shall assist their own commander through
the timely exchange of information, intentions and situational awareness.

9-07. Functional Requirements. The following factors are required for the LO to function
effectively and efficiently:

a. Accreditation. The LO must hold the appropriate accreditation for security, authority
and delegation.

b. Continuity. Ideally, the rotation of the LO team staff should be limited to ensure
continuity.

c. Credibility. Understanding the cultural norms of the receiving unit and appointing
the appropriate individuals should be considered (rank, service component, gender,
religious beliefs, professionalism, trust of the commander) in order to enable LOs to
conduct their duties effectively.

d. Command. There should be a clearly defined C2 relationship between the receiving

and sending units.

e. Flexibility. While deployed within a Div/Bde HQ, the LO needs to have a multi-
disciplinary understanding in order to be effective across the breadth of staff functions.

f. Mobility. LOs should deploy with organic transportation to allow freedom of

movement compatible with the receiving unit mobility.
g. Protection. LOs should be equipped to operate at the appropriate level of force
protection.

h. Security. LOs may be required to transport classified material between organisations

and commensurate protection will be required.

131 ATP-3.2.2
132 The term Liaison Officer also refers to Liaison Team, and could include, but is not limited to an Officer, Senior
NCO and signaller.
133 ATP 3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces, Annex E.
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i. Communications. Secure communications will be required between sending and

receiving organisation.

j. Administration. Clearly understood arrangements should exist for supporting LOs to

minimise any logistic burden on the receiving unit.

9-08. Typical Role and Tasks. NATO STANAG 2199 (also known as ATP 3.2.2) is
the authority for LOs. However, a useful guide to training and preparing LOs
is contained in the ABCANZ Standard No 2069,134 describing the minimum
performance, conditions and standards for conducting LO duties:

Ser Performance Standards

Sound understanding of the sending unit Able to clearly articulate the sending unit
1
commander’s intent, concept of operations, ROEs commander’s plan

Received appropriate military familiarisation training

Understanding of receiving unit’s doctrine,
2 of the receiving unit’s doctrine, capabilities and
capabilities and procedures
procedures

Be able to understand and communicate the Able to clearly articulate the receiving unit
3
receiving unit’s intent, concept of operations, ROEs commander’s plan to the sending unit commander

Knowledge of own doctrine, capabilities and Qualified to the appropriate level in staff and tactics,
4
procedures and capabilities of the sending unit

Relevant military experience and expertise for the Commensurate to the complexity of the operation
5
environment and sending unit’s mission/role in the operation

Received intelligence briefs, country overview,

6 Understanding the relevant operational environment campaign plan, national/strategic issues
commensurate to the operational context

Trained to operate equipment provided to meet

7 functional requirements of the LO (mobility, Proficient with own equipment
protection, CIS etc)

8 Understand the duties of an LO IAW STANAG 2199, within Coalition HQ

Have the personality traits required of an LO (such as

No standard provided, subjective measure by sending
9 proactivity, discretion, maturity, flexibility, reliability,
unit commander
integrity, dynamism, moral courage, confidence)

Includes negotiation, communication with non-mil

10 Sound interpersonal communications skills
organisations

Qualified to operate within a staff environment at a

11 Staff skills
level appropriate for the receiving unit HQ

Understand, or communicate through an interpreter,

the receiving unit’s primary language. Language
12 Language capabilities or use of an interpreter ability (of the LO or interpreter) to be fluent and
comfortable with military terminology relevant to the
environment

Received appropriate cultural awareness training for

13 Cultural knowledge relevant to the environment
the receiving unit and environment

Team has conducted pre-deployment collective

14 Ability to work within an LO team
training

Table 9.4. – Requirements of an LO

134 ABCANZ (American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand) Standard Number 2069 Amendment 1,
Liaison Officer Training.
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Vignette of A British LO on Attachment to the 3/6 Bn USMC in Helmand

Province in 2010

The role of a Liaison Officer (LO) at Battalion level is to be a link man between
two Commanding Officers. Therefore, it is absolutely key that the LO has a clear
understanding of the intent of the respective commanders. To achieve this for the
parent unit is straightforward. To achieve this within the USMC requires the LO
to spend as much time with the Commanding Officer and his staff as possible. As
such, the LO should be part of all key meetings and discussions in the Battalion
Combat Operations Center (COC).

An LO is a guest of the USMC and should behave accordingly. The USMC is

susceptible to inherent British politeness, charm and good humour, all of which
should be brought to the table. An LO represents not only their regiment but
also the British Army and thus every effort must be made to maintain the highest
standards of professionalism. The USMC are fastidious about orders of dress and
personal grooming, and whilst the LO does not necessarily need to adopt a Marine
crew cut, he should ensure his kit and equipment are beyond reproach – think
RMAS standards and stick to them.

LO to the 3/6 Bn USMC in Helmand Province, 2010

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AFMTitle
Pub
Command Chapter
Chapter10
?
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NATO and
Chapter Title?
Allied
Planning Processes
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Chapter 10
NATO and Allied Planning Processes

Introduction • Introduction
• Allied Planning Processes Comparison
10-01. All of our allies’ military planning
• NATO Planning Overview
processes are similar. First, they seek to
• Allied Planning Processes – NATO OLPP
understand the situation. Second, they
• Allied Planning Processes – US Model
develop Courses of Action (COAs) to
• Allied Planning Processes – FR Model
address the problem/situation. Third, they
• Allied Planning Processes – GE Model
compare the COAs against a common
filter; this is often called wargaming.
Fourth, after the commander selects a COA as the basis for a plan it is communicated
through an Orders/Operational Staff Work process. Within this context Chapter 10
provides an overview of the planning processes used by NATO and our principal allies.

10-02. Although not exhaustive, the list of multinational partners UK land forces could expect to
be operating alongside includes the US, FR and GE. However they may also include Joint
Expeditionary Force (JEF) partners, NATO and coalitions allies (possible ABCANZ/5 EYES,
and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)) as well as national and international
civilian agencies. Consistent with all of these potential multinational partners, as well as
those on UN operations, is the likelihood that the majority will work to NATO standards
and procedures.

10-03. Commanders and staff with a good understanding of their own national planning
processes will naturally have a grasp of the fundamentals of planning. In addition,
experienced commanders and staff will have the ability to flex and adapt planning
doctrine depending on the situation and their experience. The process is just a means to
an end. This agility is particularly critical in a CJIIM environment and will allow them to
adapt quickly to the processes of partner nations.

Allied Planning Processes Comparison

10-04. Within combined operations each of the participating nations’ land force may well bring
with them a slightly different approach to the decision-making and planning process,
even when standard recognised coalition processes are used. Table 10-1 provides a
comparison of the various estimate processes used with NATO, as well as those used
nationally by the US, French and German armies, at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels. This table is not intended to provide a solution to integrate and combine
national processes seamlessly; rather it should be used to recognise that there are subtle
differences between each stage and each process. Notwithstanding, common themes to
each process exist, which should enable commanders and staff to understand how each
of the processes is used; these themes are shown in Table 10-1:
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a. Understand the situation/problem (in blue).

b. Consider and develop the COAs (in orange).

c. Communicate (in green).

d. Execute and assess (in white).

When operating in a combined environment, the decision-making and planning process

of the lead nation will be used.

Strategic Operational Operational Operational

Higher
Level to Operational to to to
Tactical
Operational Tactical Tactical Tactical

UK Tactical
NATO COPD
Process NATO OLPP US MDMP FR MEDO GE MDMP Estimate
Phases
(6 Step)

Phase 1- Initial 1. Initiation of 1. Receipt of 1. Initiation 1. Situation 1. Understand

Assessment Planning Mission Assessment the Situation
Phase 2 -
Operational
Understand Appreciation
the situation/ of Strategic
Problem Environment

Phase 3a 2. Problem 2. Mission 2. Orientation 2. Mission 2. Understand

Mission and Mission Analysis (Mission Analysis the Problem
Analysis Analysis Analysis)

Phase 3b 3. COA 3. COA 3. Concept Orientation 3. Formulate

COA Development Development Development & Consider
Development (COA Dev & Estimate of the COAs
4. COA Analysis 4. COA Analysis Assessment) Situation
Phase 4a (Wargame) 4. Develop &
CONOP 5. COA Friendly COA Validate
Consider and Development Validation & 5. COA Development COAs
develop COAs Comparison Comparison
COA Decision 5. COA
6. Comd COA 6. COA Evaluation
Decision Approval
6. Commander’s
Decision

Phase 4b 7. CONOP & 7. Orders 4. Plan 3. Planning

OPLAN CONPLAN Production Development
Communicate Development Development 4. Issuing of
Orders

Phase 5 - 8. Campaign 5. Plan Review

Execute Execution Assessment
and & Plan
Assess Phase 6 - Review/
Transition Revision

Table 10.1. – Estimate Model Comparisons

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NATO Planning Overview

10-05. Introduction. The primary role of NATO military forces is to promote peace and to
guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member
states. Alliance forces should therefore be configured to deter and if necessary defeat
adversaries, either to defend or restore the territorial integrity of Alliance nations or to
enable security and stabilisation operations. NATO recognises that the military alone
cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. A comprehensive political, civilian and military approach
is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other
international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis,
planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and
effectiveness of the overall international effort.135 Planning within a multidimensional
environment will be conducted always as an integrated civilian-military approach.
Strategic, operational and tactical are the three levels utilised by NATO to categorise
echelons of command and operations activities. The NATO strategic commander for
operations is Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The commander at the
operational level is normally the commander of the Joint Forces Command (JFC) at one
of NATO’s standing joint force headquarters. Further detail on land component command
can be found in Chapter 1.

10-06. NATO Command Models. The NATO military structure allows for three command
models. Each model offers a C2 option that may be appropriate to specific operations:

a. Fully Integrated. This model integrates forces on the basis of ‘proportional shares’.
This may result in a binational or multinational construct for operational and
component level headquarters. The working language and procedures are agreed by
the contributing nations. Commanders of such multinational formations are usually
appointed on a rotational basis.

b. Lead Nation. This model sees one nation assume responsibility for the planning and
execution of an operation. The commander, staff, C2 capability, information and
communications capacity, doctrine and logistic coordination of the force is provided by
one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and
fill staff positions within the lead nation headquarters.

c. Framework Nation. This model sees one nation provide the C2 framework. The key
elements of the staff and the headquarters support come from the framework nation.
The working language and procedures however are based on Alliance standards.

10-07. NATO Planning Categories. To prepare for its roles and mission the Alliance has two
main operations planning categories: Advance Planning and Crisis Response Planning.
Both planning categories can incorporate Article 5 and Non Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations:

a. Advance Planning. Advance planning is conducted with a view to preparing the

Alliance to deal with possible future security risks. Advance planning calls for three
distinct types of plans: a Standing Defence Plan (SDP), a Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
and a generic CONPLAN.136 Additionally, a fourth type – the Graduated Response Plan
(GRP) – has been introduced.

135 Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD Interim V2.0) dated 04 October
2013. Available at http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/8/Docs1/20140621.10/20131104-shape_aco_copd.pdf.
136 AJP5 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning.
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b. Crisis Response Planning. Crisis response planning is conducted in response to an

actual or developing crisis and calls for the development of an OPLAN. If a crisis is
foreseen, the OPLAN might be developed from an appropriate CONPLAN or generic
CONPLAN. If the crisis is not foreseen the OPLAN must be developed in response
to the prevailing circumstances. An OPLAN is a detailed and comprehensive plan
capable of execution as soon as forces are assigned in accordance with the Combined
Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). Because of the rapid manner in which
crises can develop, it is essential that procedures are in place throughout the NATO
command structure to allow for the timely and efficient development of OPLANs. In
circumstances where multiple operations are conducted concurrently within a single
region, it may be deemed necessary to develop a single, theatre-wide OPLAN/campaign
plan to ensure proper coordination, unity of purpose and economy of effort of all
military activities involved in the execution of, and support for, these operations.

10-08. NATO Planning Processes. The purpose of NATO planning is to produce an operational
plan (OPLAN), based on strategic guidance that can be quickly given to tactical units
in order to produce an operations order (OPORD). The goal is to use a collaborative
process to allow tactical commanders to employ mission-command fundamentals to
quickly win or resolve the problem. The basic reference document for planning staffs
within the military command structure is the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive
Operations Planning Directive (COPD).137 It shapes the OPP at the strategic military and
the operational-level planning process (OLPP) at the joint level. It addresses all aspects of
an OPLAN and provides guidance on the conduct and methods of planning as well as the
factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan. It also specifies
the standard structure and content of OPLANs. As such, it can be a reference for planning
at tactical levels, especially for HQs operating at the high end of the tactical level.

a. Strategic. At the strategic level, the strategic-level operations planning process (OPP)
is used. This process is carried out by SHAPE as guided by SACEURs direction and
guidance. The strategic level OPP comprises six phases that are aligned with the NATO
Crisis Management Process (NCMP) to harmonise the interface between SHAPE and
NATO HQ. The phases of the strategic level OPP and the interface are depicted in
Figure 10.1. These phases are specifically designed to develop strategic assessments,
planning products and directives and orders in support of the NCMP, required by the
political military and operational levels.

b. Operational. Within NATO, operational planning is military planning at the

operational level to design, conduct and sustain campaigns and major operations in
order to accomplish strategic objectives within given theatres or areas of operations.138
The OLPP (see below) is designed to support a Joint Force Commander and the staff
in conducting operational level planning. The steps can be arranged and/or phased
by the commander to fit the planning circumstances, such as complexity or time
constraints.139 The phases are shown in Figure 10.1. They should be read in conjunction
with COPD Chapter 4. It is also increasingly used as reference at the tactical level.

137 Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD Interim V2.0) dated 04 October
2013. Available at http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/8/Docs1/20140621.10/20131104-shape_aco_copd.pdf.
138 AJP 5, para 0116.
139 AJP-5 para 0301.
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c. Tactical. At the tactical level, NATO FEs use a decision-making process. In practice, one
of several planning estimates may be used; this is largely dependent on the nationality
of the unit designated. In many NATO operations, there will likely be a combination
of national forces in corps and below formations. Conceptually, a corps may use a
different planning process than a subordinate division. Subordinate brigades within
a division may all use distinct planning processes. It is important to understand how
allied partners conduct their planning.

Allied Planning Processes – NATO OLPP

10-09. Operational-Level Planning. Operational-level planning leads to the production of
an Operation or Campaign Plan, defined as: a set of military operations planned and
conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area,
which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.140 It demands a way of thinking and
specific processes that enable the effective use of military capability, usually as part of a
comprehensive response,141 to achieve favourable outcomes. A Joint Force Commander
(JFC) plans and executes the campaign, in concert with other actors, on the basis of
allocated campaign objectives and set in the context of an overall desired outcome.
Campaigns evolve from the relationship between Operational Design and Operational
Management.142 Detailed guidance on joint planning and joint operations is articulated
in NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, dated Oct 13 and in AJP-5: Allied
Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning, dated Jun 13.

10-10. Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP) Overview. The OLPP is designed to

support a JFC and staff in the conduct of operational-level planning, an overview of the
NATO COPD Crisis Response Planning is at Figure 10.2.

a. The eight steps of the process can be rearranged and phased by the commander to fit
the planning circumstances. The steps can also be arranged to align planning at the
operational level with the operations planning process at other levels and the NATO
crisis management process. This is a task which may be fulfilled through the Allied
Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).143

b. The eight steps of the OLPP enable a JFC and staff to develop the Operations Plan
(OPLAN), including the conduct of the operational estimate process. The OLPP also
includes an assessment step, which enables revision of the plan as necessary, during
execution. The OLPP steps are:

140 AJP-01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Dec 2010

141 Use of the full spread of CJIIM actors.
142 Operational Design develops and refines a commander’s operational ideas to provide detailed, executable plans. It is
underpinned by a clear understanding of the political and strategic context together with an effective framing of the
problem. Operational Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and
assesses progress. Both Operational Design and Operational Management are interrelated – one continually informs the other.
143 COPD describes operations planning at the strategic level, and the connectivity between planning activities at the political
level (North Atlantic Council), the military strategic level (SHAPE), and the operational level (Allied Joint Force Commands).
The Allied Joint Publication 5 (AJP-5) is aimed at operational–level planning, specifically commanders and staffs employed
in joint force command headquarters and component command headquarters. AJP-5 describes the fundamental aspects
of planning joint operations at the operational level. In sum, the COPD directs connectivity between planning activities and
AJP-5 is an Op level planning activity guide.
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(1) Initiation of the OLPP.

(2) Problem and Mission Analysis.

(3) Course of action (COA) development.

(4) COA analysis.

(5) COA validation and comparison.

(6) Commander’s COA decision.

(7) Operational-level Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and plan development.

(8) Campaign assessment and plan review/revision.

c. The results of the OLPP steps are designed to respond to the requirements of the
operational-level planning at the strategic and the high-end tactical planning levels.
For the strategic level, the OLPP will deliver the operational-level products that will
inform or reflect the initial strategic assessment, strategic design, plan development
and operations assessment. For the tactical operations planning the OLPP will produce
direction through its products, mainly the operational planning directive, operational-
level CONOPS and OPLAN, including Wng Os and activation orders (ACTORDs).
 NATO Crisis Response Planning

PME Strategic Political - Military Plan (SPMP) Strategic Political - Military Review
Development
Phase 1
Indications and Phase 2 Phase 3
Assessment Development Phase 4 Planning Phase 5 Phase 6
Warnings of Execution Transition
of the of Response

NAC
Potential/Actual
Crisis Crisis Options
NAC Decision Endorsed
Request or Request or Endorsed Approved Force Endorsed Approved NAC Request or Endorsed Sheet for
NID SPMP Transition
Task the NMA’s Task the NMAs Strategic Strategic Activation Strategic Strategic Execution Task NMA’s Mission Transition OPLAN
Information for SMA for MROs CONOPS CONOPS Directive OPLAN, OPLAN, Directive for PMR Progress Planning NAC
Sharing with (FAD) SORs ROE REQ, Report Execution
Endorsed
SMA and SMA and Ilustrative CJSOR ROE REQ TCSOR Transition Directive
SSA MROs and TCSOR OPLAN
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Indications and Assessment Development Phase 5 Phase 6
Warnings of Phase 4 Planning Execution Transition
of the of Response

MC
Potential/Actual Crisis Options
Crisis
NAC Approved
Strategic NAC FAD Strategic Approved SPMP NAC Tasker for SACEUR’s NAC DS for Strategic NAC
Tasker for SSA Tasker for MRO CONOPS Approved with MC OPLAN Strategic Execution Periodic Mission Transitions Transition Execution
Information Military NID with MC with Strategic Guidance SORs OPLAN, Directive Mission Progress planning with OPLAN Directive
SACEUR’s llustrative CJSOR CONOPS ROE REQ with MC Review Report MC Guidance with MC
Sharing Strategic Response Guidance ROE REQ, with
Options and TCSOR with MC TCSOR with Guidance Strategic MC Guidance
Assessment Guidance
(SSA) (MRO) MC Guidance Transition Guidance
OPLAN
Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 4 Strategic Plan Development
Initial Situational Phase 2
Strategic Military Phase 4b
Phase 5 Phase 6
Awareness of Response Phase 4a Execution Transition
Assessment Strategic OPLAN Development
Potential/Actual Strategic CONOPS Development

SHAPE
Options (Force Generation)
Crisis

Strategic SACEUR’s Draft MROs Strategic Draft Op Strategic Op Draft Op Strategic Op ACTORD Operations Strategic Disengagement
Information Warning Strategic Planning
Sharing CONOPS, CONOPS CONOPS OPLAN OPLAN OPLAN ROE IMP Assessment Planning Planning
Order Assessment Directive llustrative SORs Approval SORs Approval Directive
Operational ROE REQ
Advice

Phase 1
Initial Situational Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Operational Plan Development
Operational Appreciation Operational Estimate Phase 4a
Phase 5 Phase 6
Awareness of

JHQ
of the Phase 3a Phase 3b Operational CONOPS Phase 4b Execution Transition
Potential/Actual Mission COA Development Operational OPLAN Development
Crisis Strategic Environment Analysis Development

Notes: 1. Following FAD receipt, SACEUR will release provisional CUSOR with ACTWARN to commence formal Force Generation
2. As part of the collaborative planning process documents submitted to the MC will also be passed to subordinate Cdrs

Figure 10.2. – NATO Crisis Response Planning Overview

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Allied Planning Processes – United States Army Model

10-11. The United States Army uses three methodologies for planning. Commanders and staffs
determine the appropriate mix of these methodologies based on the scope and familiarity
of the problem and the time and staff availability. The three methods are described in
more detail below:

• US Army Design Methodology.

• Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
• Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs).
10-12. US Army Design Methodology.

a. The US Army Design Methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative
thinking to understand, visualise, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to
solving them. It is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that uses
elements of operational art to conceive and construct an operational approach to solve
identified problems. Commanders and their staffs use US Army Design Methodology to
assist them with the conceptual aspects of planning. It is typically used at Corps level
and above.

b. US Army Design Methodology entails framing the operational environment, framing

the problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. US
Army design methodology results in an improved understanding of the operational
environment, a problem statement, an initial commander’s intent, and an operational
approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning. Based on
their understanding and learning gained during design methodology, commanders
issue planning guidance, to include an operational approach, to guide more detailed
planning.

Frame an operational environment

Current state Desired end state

What is going on? What should the

environment look like?
Understand the current
conditions of the Visualize desired conditions
of the operational
operational environment. environment.

Frame the problem

Develop
Develop an
operational approach the plan
What are the
obstacles impeding What broad general actions
progress toward the will resolve the problem? Using the military
desired end state? desicion-making
process.

Continuous assessment and reframing as required

Figure 10.3. – The US Army Design Methodology Continuous Assessment 10.13
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10-13. Military Decision-Making Process. The Military Decision-Making Process is an

iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop
a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. It is used at battalion
level and up for both operational and tactical levels of warfare and consists of
seven steps. It is designed for a time-constrained problem, so is similar to the British
Army’s Tactical Estimate (6-step). The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed
aspects of planning and integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate
headquarters, and other partners throughout the planning process. The MDMP helps
leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge
to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. The
MDMP results in an improved understanding of the situation and a plan or order that
guides the force through preparation and execution (ADP 5-0). Joint Force Headquarters
use the Joint Operation Planning Process (known as JOPP), which is similar to the
Army’s MDMP. US Marine Corps headquarters use the Marine Corps Planning Process,
which is similar to both the MDMP and the Joint Operation Planning Process.

a. The MDMP facilitates collaborative and parallel planning as the higher headquarters
solicits input and continually shares information concerning future operations with
subordinate and adjacent units, supporting and supported units, and unified action
partners through planning meetings, warning orders, and other means. Commanders
encourage active collaboration among all organisations affected by the pending
operations to build shared understanding, participate in course of action development
and decision making, and resolve conflicts before publication of the plan or order.

b. The MDMP consists of a series of steps that have various inputs and outputs. The
outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation facilitating the next step
of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially;
however, they may revisit several steps in an iterative fashion, as they learn more
about the situation before producing the plan or order. These are summarised in Figure
10.4. The MDMP is very similar to the UK Tactical Estimate (6-step). There are subtle
differences when compared with the UK Combat Estimate (7 Qs); these are highlighted
over the page.
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Macro Difference I: Key Inputs Steps Key Outputs Macro Difference II:
Comd gives guidance rather Beware Staff stovepipes
• Higher headquarters’ plan or order Step 1: • Commander’s initial guidance
than own direction (at Q3) and superficial PPT analysis
or a new mission anticipated by the Receipt of Mission • Initial allocation of time
commander
Warning order
Difference 1:
“Q1” subsumed • Higher headquarters’ plan or order • Mission statement Difference 2:
• Higher headquarters’ knowledge • Initial commander’s intent Specified, implied and
within Step 2 Step 2:
and intelligence products • Initial planning guidance “essential” tasks.
• Knowledge products from other Mission Analysis • Initial CCIRs and EEF’s
organisations • Updated IPB and running estimates
• Design concept (if developed) • Assumptions
Warning order

• Mission statement Step 3: • COA statements and sketches

Difference 3: • Initial commander’s intent, planning Course of Action - Tentative task organization
Step 3 COA Dev guidance, CCIRs and EEFIs. (COA) - Broad concept of organizations
contains Qs 4-7 • Updated IPB and running estimates Development • Revised planning guidance
• Assumptions • Updated assumptions

• Updated running estimates • Refined COAs Difference 4:

• Revised planning guidance Step 4: • Potential decision points Step 4 uses war-
• COA statements and sketches COA Analysis • War-game results gaming early for COA
• Updated assumptions (War Game) • Initial assessment measures Analysis.Can be very
• Updated assumptions ‘formal’.

• Updated running estimates • Evaluated COAs

• Refined COAs Step 5: • Recommended COAs
• Evaluation criteria COA Comparison • Updated running estimates
• War-game results • Updated assumptions
Difference 5:
• Updated assumptions
The COA comparison
and approval briefs • Commander-selected COA and
are entire “steps”. • Updated running estimates any modifications.
• Evaluated COAs Step 6: • Refined commander’s intent,
• Recommended COA COA Approval CCIRs and EEFIs.
• Updated assumptions • Updated assumptions
Warning order
• Commander-selected COA with • Approved operation plan
any modifications or order
• Refined commander’s intent, CCIRs Step 7:
and EEFIs Orders Production
• Updated assumptions

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement EEFI essential element of friendly information
COA course of action IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

Figure 10.4. – The US MDMP Steps

10-14. Troop Leading Procedures. Troop Leading Procedures extend the MDMP to all small
unit level. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. It is used at company level
and below.

a. Step 1 - Receive the Mission. The leader may receive the mission in a warning
order, an operation order (OPORD), or a fragmentary order (FRAGO). Analysis begins
immediately using the factors of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time and Civil
Considerations (METT-TC).

b. Step 2 - Issue a Warning Order (WARNORD). The leader provides initial instructions
in a warning order. The warning order contains enough information to begin
preparation as soon as possible.

c. Step 3 - Make a Tentative Plan. The leader develops an estimate of the situation to
use as the basis for the tentative plan. The leader updates the estimate continuously
and refines the plan accordingly. This plan is used as the start point for coordination,
reconnaissance, task organisation (if required), and movement instructions. This
problem-solving sequence is worked through in as much detail as time available allows.
As the basis of the estimate, the leader considers the factors of METT-TC.
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d. Step 4 - Start Necessary Movement. The unit may need to begin movement while
the leader is still planning or forward reconnoitring. The Platoon Sergeant or a Squad
Leader144 may bring the platoon forward, usually under the control of the Company
Executive Officer or First Sergeant. This is where subordinate leaders prepare men,
weapons and equipment for the coming mission.

e. Step 5 - Reconnoitre. If time allows, the leader makes a personal reconnaissance

to verify the terrain analysis, adjust the plan, confirm the usability of routes, and
time any critical movements. When time does not allow, the leader must make
a map reconnaissance. The leader must consider the inherent risk in conducting
reconnaissance forward of friendly lines. Sometimes the leader must rely on others (e.g.
scouts) to conduct the reconnaissance if the risk of contact with the enemy is high.

f. Step 6 - Complete the Plan. The leader completes the plan based on the
reconnaissance and any changes in the situation. The mission is reviewed (as received
from the commander) to ensure that the plan meets the requirements of the mission
and stays within the framework of the commander’s intent.

g. Step 7 - Issue the Order. Platoon and Squad Leaders normally issue oral operations
orders. To aid subordinates in understanding the concept for the mission, leaders
should issue the order within sight of the objective or on the defensive terrain. When
this is not possible, they should use a terrain model or sketch. Leaders must ensure
that subordinates understand the mission, the commander’s intent, the concept of the
operation, and their assigned tasks.

h. Step 8 - Supervise. The leader supervises the unit’s preparation for combat by
conducting rehearsals and inspections.

Allied Planning Processes – French Army Model

10-15. At the strategic and operational levels the French military currently use the Operational
Level Planning Process (OLPP). Most of the time, Divisional HQs use the COPD for planning
issues when they are deployed as the operational land level of command (e.g. as a LCC).
Where the problem is of a more tactical nature (e.g. to develop a specific FRAGO), a
Divisional HQ may use their Methode D’Elaboration D’Une Decision Operationnelle
(MEDO). The MEDO is a planning tool that is used primarily at the tactical level from
brigade and below. British units supporting a French-led Combined Operation should
expect to use the MEDO.

10-16. The MEDO has two main steps, and is initiated by a preliminary phase of situation analysis.
Figures 10.5 and 10.6 refer. The commander formally intervenes three times during the
process to make decisions:

a. Preliminary Phase – Framework of action; context of the mission. A preliminary phase of

situational analysis [corresponding broadly to Q0 / Q1 of the Combat Estimate (7 Qs)].
This phase ends with a formal orientation of the commander (Orientation initial?).

b. Phase 1 – Analysis & Synthesis. Phase 1 is the analysis of the situation, and concludes
with the mission analysis brief (Réunion de synthèse) when the commander decides
what ‘Effet Majeur’ will be adopted. The ‘Effet Majeur’ is the way the battle-winning
idea is expressed, and is how the commander intends to seize and maintain the
initiative.

144 Equates to a UK Section Commander.

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c. Phase 2 – Development of Manoeuvre. Phase 2 is the construction of manoeuvre

through the elaboration and comparison of COAs (friendly and enemy), leading to the
commander’s selection of the COA at the decision brief (Réunion de décision).

10-17. In the written order, the Effet Majeur is expressed succinctly in the commander’s intent in
a format such at that shown in below. The intent is then developed into the concept of
operations.

• In order to….(remind of higher commander’s intent)

• I want to ….Effet majeur (e.g.: to destroy that enemy unit, at that place, before that time)
• To do so ….description of the manoeuvre (The film of the action, = phase 1, 2 ,3…bpt…)
PHASE PREALABLE CADRE DE’ACTION - CONTEXTE DE LA MISSION
DE QUOI S’AGIT-IL? Contex le général
Cadre politique, juridique etc. Contraintes? Impératifs nuveau sup?
CE - Q0/Q1 Quel est le style général de mon action?
Les facteurs essentiels immédiatement perceptiblies (mission, contraintes, terrain, délais, RAPFOR)? 1 Orientation initiale?
En quoi cela sort-it evidemment de la norme?
Présuppositiens?

PHASE 1 ANALYSE ET SYNTHESE

ANALYSE 1 SYNTHESE
Orientation initiale?
POURQUOI? L’esprit de la mission
Quelle place prend ma misson la manoeuvre de chef? Conclusions partielles
Quel est l’effet majeur du chef? Que font mes voisins? - But á atteindre
ETAPE 1

- Impératifs WNG01
CE - Q2/Q3 QUOI? La lettre de la mission
Afin de
- Limitations
- Reformulation mission
Quele effects dois-je réaliser?
- Demandes ETAPE 6
Quelles sont les compassantes de la mission (- táches)?
conclusions
Quelles sont les limitations? Conclusions partielles générates
- Terrain/Délais - rythme &
QUAND? Analyse des délals d’execution de la mission tempo, elangations Réunion de synthèse?
ETAPE 2

2
CE - Q4/Q6 OU? Analyse du terrain physique et humain
- Front/Profondeur etc
- Conditions d’exécution EFFET
- Terrain & moment * ciés* MAJEUR
- Liberté d’action
AVEC QUI, QUOI? Forces amies
ETAPE 4 ETAPE 3

CE - Q5 Adaptation de mes unités aux conditions de la mission?

Quelles unités peuvent exécuter quelies táches?
Conclusions partielles
Je veux
WNG02
- Evolution des RAPFOR
CONTRE QUI, QUOI? Forces adverses quantitatifs et qualitatifs
- Centre de gravité ennemi
CE - Q1 Quel est mon enemi?
Quels sont sa mission, son objectif immédiate et
- Centre de gravité ami
- Capacités, besoins &
Quel devrait étre son depositif de départ? vulnérabilitiés critiques
BALANCE DES POTENTIELS
ETAPE 5

Quantitatifs?
Qualitatifs?
Dans l’espace? Dans le temps. Désequlibres.

PHASE 2 ELABORATION DE LA MANOEUVRE

COMMENT?
ETAPE 1

ETAPE 2

Développement modes d’action enemis COMMENT?

Face á mon action, dans le but de remplir sa mission. Développement modes d’action amis/articulation
L’eni pourrait soit......, soit......
CE - Q5/Q6/Q7 A cet effet...
ETAPE 4

ETAPE 3

ETAPE 5

CONFRONTATION COMPARAISON ANALYSE FONCTIONNELLE

DES MA & ME DES MA (critéres - DES MA -
risques & opportunités avantages & inconvénients avantages, inconvénients, problémes

3 Réunion de décision?
ETAPE 6

Ebouche plan Confrontation INTENTION Plan d’opération ou

MODE D’ACTION
de manoeuvre approfondie Effet majeur & ordre d’opération ou
RETENU
idée de manoeuvre FRAGO

WNG03

Figure 10.5. – The French MEDO Tactical Planning Estimate. Note translation in Para 10-18
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FRENCH MEDO / GENERAL OVERVIEW

TF
Comd
Phase 1: Analysis Phase 2: Manoeuvre

Assigned-implied tasks /
MISSION What? constraints - imperatives How?
ANALYSIS Why? COA
Cdr’s intent
development

Lines of ops
Comd initial intent OPFOR - fdly ECOAs
COG
Historical - political -
Context economic - legal R.O.E Decisive points Blue COAs
factors / people at 1st approach
own forces
Overall timeframe Margin KEY EFFECT COAs
When? for proposal comparison
Operation tempo initiative
General Comd War gaming
Commitment Terrain Key area /
Where? analysis decision
overview points
weather
SITUATIONAL
ENY forces selection:
OVERVIEW Strengths
OPFOR Weaknesses Key Effect selected own
Hostile parties forces COA
Lines of ops
OPFOR - fdly COA decision
Friendly Own Capabilities
forces forces COG brief
limitations
Decisive points
Key timings
Strength and points
ratio for action requirements

ANALYSIS INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSIONS SYNTHESIS CONOPS

WINGO OPLAN / OPORD

Figure 10.6. – The French MEDO Tactical Planning Estimate

10-18. A comparison of the UK Tactical Estimate (6-step) and Combat Estimate (7Qs) with the
French MEDO-T is set out in Table 10.7. The table includes observations to contextualise
the links and differences between each of the processes.

UK TE (6-step) FRENCH MEDO-T UK CE (7Qs) Observations

1. Understand the Preliminary phase - What Q0 - Baseline Preparation Q0 - Baseline Preparation

situation is it all about? and Understanding. and Understanding.
Staff Preparation • What will the general
Understand features of my mission be
the Operating (NEO, combat, …)?
Environment • Essential and immediately
Initial Tactical perceptible factors
Planning Concept (mission, limitations,
Analysis terrain, time, ratio of
Receipt of Orders force)?
Brief (ROOB) • How is it out of the norm?
• Initial orientation
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UK TE (6-step) FRENCH MEDO-T UK CE (7Qs) Observations

2. Understand the Phase 1.1 - Analysis. Q1 What is the situation Whereas the 6 STEP utilises
problem • Etape 1. and how does it affect the Commander early on to
a. What for? The “spirit” me? present the understanding,
Commander : Step or purpose of the the MEDO-T allows both
2A: MA mission. How my Q2 What have I been told Staff and Comd to work
mission will affect the to do and why? independently. Staff present;
Staff : Step 2B: senior commander’s Comd gives his thoughts; a
Evaluate Objects and manoeuvre? What is Q3 What effects do I need much less formal approach.
Factors my senior commander’s to achieve and what Much of the work is
“major effect” (≅ main direction must I give to conducted in the margins,
Commander : Step 2C: effort. develop the plan? with staff cells holding
Comd’s Analysis b. What? The words of the independent briefs to collate
& Guidance mission. Which effects Q4 Where can I best understanding.
should I achieve? What accomplish each action/
are the “components” effect? The French use an
(tasks)? Which operational information
limitations? Q6 Where and when do system (collaborative
• Etape 2. the actions/effects take working system (SICF))
a. When? Time available place in relation to each enabling staff to work
to execute the mission , other? independently whilst
possible steps, phases, etc accessing different cells
b. Where? Terrain analysis Q5 What resources do I working areas.
(physical and human need to accomplish
terrain) each action/effect?
• Etape 3. With what?
Friendly forces adaptation
to the conditions of the
mission? Troop to tasks
analysis?
• Etape 4. Against what?
Adverse Forces. Who/
what is my enemy? His
mission, effects to be
achieved, initial and final
objectives? What should
or could be his initial lay
out?
• Etape 5. Balance of
potentials. Quantitative,
qualitative ; in time, in
space, inbalances.

Phase 1.2 - Synthesis.

• Partial conclusions (keys
to success, mission
statement, major effect
“at first sight”)
• Partial conclusions on
terrain vs time frame,
rhythm & tempo,
distances, front/depth,
key terrain, conditions of
execution.
• Partial conclusions,
ratio of force in time
& space (quantitative
& qualitative), centres
of gravity, critical
capacities, requirements
& vulnerabilities
• Etape 6. General
Conclusions.
• Mission analysis brief :
Commander selects the
Effet Majeur
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UK TE (6-step) FRENCH MEDO-T UK CE (7Qs) Observations

3. Formulate and Phase 2. Development Q5 What resources do I Schematics not used,

consider COA’s • Etape 1. How? Enemy need to accomplish everything is conducted on
Operational Schematic COAs development; facing each action/effect? PowerPoint using the map.
Effects Schematic my action, in order to Q6 Where and when do Risk is not conducted as a
Risk fulfil his supposed mission the actions/effects take formal independent staffing
Set Evaluation Criteria • Etape 2. How? place in relation to each area, unlike the UK process.
Development and other?
selection of friendly COAs Q7 What control measures
do I need to impose?

4. Develop and No parity here as this is not

Validate COA’s developed using COA teams
as in the UK. Plans draws
Develop COAs up the plan, with questions
Validate with FACES posed to cell branches when
Wargame needed.

5. COA evaluation • Etape 3. COAs Much less formal than the

Comparison (advantages COA backbriefs/evaluation
Evaluate and disadvantages) done with the 6 steps.
Textual Analysis • Etape 4. Wargaming
(risks & opportunities)
• Etape 5. COA functional
analysis

6. Commander’s • Etape 6. Decision brief

decision : approved COA and
Comd’s Intent (major
effect & scheme of
manoeuvre)
• Plan or order.

Table 10.7. – Comparison of UK and French Tactical Planning Processes

10-19. While both UK and French processes provide a mechanism to enable decision making and
the development of a plan, the way each is conducted is very different. The UK Tactical
Estimate is much more process driven, where the MEDO-T is more fluid; application of the
MEDO-T tends to be personality driven. More emphasis is placed on the ‘understand’ part
of the planning.145

Allied Planning Processes – German Army Model

10-20. The German Model. The German Army employs two methods for military planning.
At the Operational Level, the Germany Army uses the NATO OLPP. This process is shown
in the NATO section of this chapter. At the tactical level the German Military Decision
Making Process (MDMP) is used.

a. Operational Command. The Operations Planning Process (OPP) is the planning

process for the military-strategic and operational levels of command of NATO and the
EU. It is designed for the systematic estimate of the situation, the development of
military courses of action and the definition of national force contributions. Usually, it
is also applied by the component commanders at the highest tactical level of command
in support of operational planning.

145 Expect 70% of the process to be on phases 1.1 and 1.2: the more the problem is understood, the less time is needed to
understand how to tackle the problem (COA dev).
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b. If the superior level applies the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations
Planning Directive (COPD), headquarters at tactical levels may be required to contribute
to the planning efforts within the scope of parallel/collaborative planning. In this case,
however, they will not be required to work in accordance with the COPD, too. The
purpose of this contribution to the superior level’s planning effort is:

(1) To have the results of their own planning effort controlled by the superior
headquarters.

(2) To coordinate their own planning effort with that of the superior headquarters.

(3) To ensure coordination with other headquarters of the same level of command via
the superior headquarters.

c. For this purpose, the headquarters concerned is expected to submit the following work
results:

(1) Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

(2) If required, Status of Requirements (SOR).

(3) Operation Plan (OPLAN).

d. As a matter of principle, contributions can be prepared based on the tactical decision-

making process.

e. Tactical Command. The German land forces’ decision-making process to exercise

tactical command and control of land forces is based on the supreme leadership
principle of German armed forces, mission command. The freedom of action afforded
to subordinate commanders in executing their orders is reflected in an unmistakably
defined concept of operations and in a mission with clear and realistic objectives. To
this end, they are provided with the necessary assets and given the time required for
planning and implementation.

f. The German land forces’ decision-making process provides for both the planning of
future and the conduct of ongoing operations. It can be used to prepare and make
appropriate decisions in a complex and dynamic operational environment, even in
rapidly changing situations and under pressure of time. It is fundamentally applied
to exercise command and control over German land forces at all tactical levels, at
all levels of intensity and in any missions. It is suitable for the implementation of an
effects-oriented approach also in cooperation with civilian actors. The decision-making
process provides the basis for staff work of all German headquarters. The question of
which procedure will be pursued specifically, however, it will depend on the situation,
the mission, and further parameters.

g. The core element of the decision-making process is the decision-making stage. The
methodology applied to do the groundwork for making a decision structures the
established thought and action processes required for this. Thus, the German land
force decision making-process primarily provides a framework for thought. It helps to
get all commanders to think and act along the same lines and therefore also provides
for better understanding between the levels of command.
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h. The German land forces’ decision-making process is initiated by a new mission, a

fundamental change in the situation, or a development of the situation in an ongoing
operation which requires action. It takes place in a continuous cycle of the following
stages:

(1) Situation assessment and control.

(2) Decision-making stage.

(3) Planning stage.

(4) Issuance of orders, and again.

(5) Situation assessment and control.

Permanent exchange by:

• Warning orders and orientations
Higher level • Reports, requests and input
of command • Mutual exchange of information

ses
trol/As sment
Con the Situation of
M
iss
ge

ion

De lysis the Situatioofn ge

ce of Orders Sta

Ana

cis ion-Making S

Own level of
Estimate

command
uan

ta
De
cis
Iss

ion

Plan n
in g St a g e

Permanent exchange by:

Subordinate • Warning orders and orientations
level of • Reports, requests and input
command • Mutual exchange of information

Figure 10.8. – The German Continuous Estimate Process

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i. In case of a new mission, the entire staff is involved in the command and control
process. In case of situation changes in an ongoing mission, though, the decision is
prepared and implemented in the operations centre, supported by contributions from
the other cells and centres. In case of a fundamentally changed situation, the chiefs of
staff will decide on further courses of action.

j. Within the scope of continuous situation assessment and control, all cells and centres
verify whether the course of the operation and the ordered measures still comply with
planning or should be adapted to it. For this purpose, all information relevant for the
situation assessment is retrieved and represented at the operations centre and the
information from their special functional areas above all in the other cells and centres.

New Mission/
need for Action Situation Assessment and Control

Decision-Making-Stage

Mission Analysis Warning Order,

if applicable

Staff Work Plan

Information Briefing to Initiate Warning Order

the Estimate of the Situation

Estimate of the Situation Part 1

Interim Meeting(s) Warning Orders

(Staff Backbriefs as required)
Orientation

Identify Friendly Courses of Action

Estimate of the Situation Part 2

Decision Briefing Warning Order

Decision

Planning
Develop and prepare operation plan

Issuing of Orders

Prepare Operation Order

Issue Operation Order Issue Orders

Figure 10.9. – The German Estimate Stages

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AFMTitle
Pub
Command Chapter
Chapter11
?
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Chapter
UK Resilience
Title? Operations
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Chapter 11
UK Resilience Operations

Introduction • Introduction
11-01. The National Security Strategy/Strategic • Context and Civil Primacy and
Defence and Security Review of November Direction
2015 identified eight Defence Tasks (DTs). • Military Support to Resilience
The first - DT1 - is to ‘defend and contribute Operations
to the security and resilience of the UK and • Planning and Execution of Resilience
Overseas Territories. This includes deterring Operations
attacks; defending our airspace, territorial • Summary
waters and cyber space; countering terrorism
at home and abroad; supporting the UK civil authorities in strengthening resilience; and
protecting our people overseas’. Defence doctrine for UK Resilience is set out in JDP-02.146

Context and Civil Primacy and Direction

11-02. The UK government has developed and significantly improved the nation’s civil response
capability after a series of challenging resilience events during the early 21st century.
This was achieved primarily through the passing of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
(CCA04) which placed legal duties upon a range of organisations to plan for, and respond
to, disruptive challenges in the UK; CCA04 promotes the concept of ‘civil primacy’. In
addition, devolved administrations have been assigned specific responsibilities, including
in a number of elements of resilience. Under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
(MACA)147, Defence plays a supporting role providing support (niche or generalist) when
the civil authorities’ capacity/capability is overwhelmed by an incident. This can happen
when directed, or when preparing for major national events. MACA activity is frequent,
and occurs across the UK.

11-03. Civil authorities and emergency services are required to provide the first response when
reacting to crises, emergencies and/or major incidents within the UK. Notwithstanding
this, other government departments (OGD) or civil authorities are able to request
military assistance from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Routinely, such requests will
require ministerial authorisation, although where there is imminent threat to life, a need
to alleviate distress or to protect significant property, local military commanders are
authorised to provide immediate assistance recourse to higher authority.148

146 UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security. JDP 02 (3rd Edition) dated Feb 2017.
147 MACA is often referred to as ‘UK Operations’, although there is no recognised military or civilian definition of the latter
term.
148 The procedures for this are set out in JDP 02, Chapter 2. Intentionally the term ‘local military commanders’
is not defined in terms of rank, thus allowing any commander to authorise such activity.
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11-04. The British Army will be required to contribute to DT1 through operations conducted
under the principles of MACA. CCA04 provides the broad framework for civil
protection. It describes how organisations, particularly local responders, prepare and
respond to emergencies in the UK. In essence a civilian-led government department
is always in the lead and Defence is invariably in a supporting capacity. With a few
defined exceptions, Defence ministerial authority must be sought for any request
for military resources under MACA. Under the government’s integrated emergency
management principles our Armed Forces can now expect to be involved in planning
and preparation, responding to emergencies, and recovery tasks. The Defence
contribution to resilience is usually provided by the Armed Services through spare
capacity, and MACA is provided usually in accordance with four criteria when:

a. There is a definite need to act and the tasks the Armed Forces are being asked to
perform are clear.

b. Other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been
discounted.

c. The civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable
or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.

d. The civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or
to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from
MOD.

11-05. MACA. The range of tasks that Defence might undertake under the principles of MACA
is considerable. The National Risk Register of 2015 (NRR15)149 sets out a wider range of
disruptive challenges that are grouped into ‘Threats’ (largely malicious in nature), and
‘Hazards’ (a term used to describe other events). However, Defence should be prepared
for the unexpected.

a. Hazards and Threats. NRR15 describes three types of hazard and threat:

(1) Natural hazards – human disease, animal disease, severe weather and flooding.

(2) Major accidents – major industrial accidents, major transport accidents,

widespread electricity failure, disruptive industrial action and widespread public
disorder.

(3) Terrorist and other malicious attacks – terrorist attacks on crowded places,
infrastructure, transport systems, unconventional terrorist attacks and cyber
security. Lead government departments (LGDs) are responsible for managing
risks assigned to their respective portfolios and for conducting the associated
contingency planning and preparation.

Military Support to Resilience Operations

11-06. In response to requests for military assistance, Defence may contribute in five main roles,
or functions, as follows:

a. Role 1 - Command and Control.

149 Available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/419549/20150331_2015-NRR-

WA_Final.pdf. Note that a successor document – National Risk Register 2017 – is due for publication in May 17.
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b. Role 2 - Liaison.

c. Role 3 - Specialist advice and capability.

d. Role 4 - General and non-specialist support.

e. Role 5 - Education, training and mentoring.

Further detail on these roles can be found in JDP 02, Chapter 3.

11-07. Command and Control of Resilience Operations in the UK. CCA04 promotes the
LGD principle, whilst NRR15 and associated documentation proposes an LGD for each risk
identified; the MOD does not have any resilience-related LGD responsibilities. For events
where no LGD has been assigned, the Cabinet Office will assign lead responsibilities
when required. At all levels of command, control and coordination, Defence will engage
with, and support, the civil authorities as required. At the 3 levels of command150 this
comprises:

a. Strategic. At the strategic level of command, the MOD Operations Directorate (MOD
Ops Dir) is the focus for all resilience operations in the UK. It leads on liaison with LGDs
(including devolved government if required) during periods of routine, and represents
Defence as part of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) mechanism during crises.
Certain limited MACA activity may be authorised by senior staffs within the Ops Dir,
but the default setting is that the Ops Dir will seek the authority of a Defence Minister
for most MACA tasks.

b. Operational. Operational command of assets across Defence will be exercised by the

MOD’s Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)). Commander Home
Command is the SJC(UK)151 and, while he is based in Aldershot, his HQ, comprising
23 joint service staff, is collocated with, but not part of, the Army Directorate for
Operations and Contingencies in Andover.152

c. Tactical. Tactical-level command of Defence capability will be exercised by the Army’s

Regional Points of Command (RPoC) HQs.153 RPoCs have a small core staff which can
be reinforced by reservists from the Resilience Support Teams154 during an emergency.
Additionally, RPoC HQs are established with at least one full-time reservist lieutenant
colonel Joint Regional Liaison Officer who is the primary focus for integration of
Defence activity with the civil authorities within the formation area. The number of
forces assigned under command of RPoCs ranges considerably, with some having very
few indeed.

d. Coordinating authority. The HQ SJC(UK) will execute the role of coordinating

authority over the activities of Defence agencies within boundaries. Specifically, it
oversees the deployment, management and recovery of any assets generated from
Defence agencies.

150 Within Defence, the three levels of command are: strategic, operational and tactical. However, it should be noted that civil
authorities in the UK run with strategic, tactical and operational.
151 GOC Regional Command is the Deputy SJC (UK), although he assumes this role only in the absence of the SJC (UK) and
not on a routine basis.
152 The collocation of the operational-level HQ with the force generator of the majority of personnel for Resilience operations
allows for the rapid delivery of effect.
153 These comprise: HQ LONDIST, HQs 4 Inf, 7 Inf, 11 Inf, 11 Sig, 38 (Irish), 51 Inf and 160 Inf Bdes, as well as the OF-5
commanded HQs NW and SW.
154 These teams were known until recently as District or Brigade Reinforcement Teams (DRTs/BRTs)
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11-08. The United Kingdom Standby Battalion (UKSB). Since 2011 the Army has fielded a
UKSB, the primary purpose of which is to provide a large number of disciplined personnel
at a very high state of readiness to provide generalist support to the civil authorities
when required. Since 2016 the number of UKSBs has increased from one to three, each
assigned notionally to a specific geographic area although, in practice, they may be
employed anywhere in the UK should the need arise.

Planning and Execution of Resilience Operations

11-09. Civil Authority Planning Considerations. Within single agencies (police, fire, ambulance
etc) civil authorities and emergency services recognise and employ the concepts of
command and control. However, in a multi-agency environment, which is the more
likely scenario in which Defence effect will be delivered, the coordination [rather than
command] of effect is more likely. Defence will provide support to, and presence at, the
required levels of coordination through its network of regional liaison officers (JRLOs,
Royal Navy RLOs and Royal Air Force RLOs). For larger events it is possible that the
RPoC commander may be present. This coordination is delivered at three broad levels:

a. Strategic Coordinating Group. At the strategic level, a Strategic Coordinating Group

(SCG)155 will be convened with multi-agency participation to provide the strategic-level
lead and oversight for an event. This level of coordination will always see a Defence
presence if Defence support has been provided. SCGs are chaired usually, although not
exclusively, by senior police officers; and are held usually, although not exclusively, at
the HQs of a police or fire service.

b. Tactical Coordinating Group. At the (civil authority) tactical level a Tactical Co-
ordinating Group (TCG)156 will be convened with multi-agency participation to provide
the tactical-level lead and oversight for an event. This level of coordination will always
see a Defence presence if Defence support has been provided. SCGs are chaired
usually, although not exclusively, by senior or middle-ranking police officers and are
held usually, although not exclusively, at a regional or local HQs of a police or fire
service.

c. Responder Agencies. At the (civil authority) operational level responder agencies157

will be established to direct the multi and single-agency response to an event. They will
usually be ‘on the ground’, and it is unlikely that a Defence presence will be provided
at this level.

11-10. Terminology. Commanders need to be aware that the three tiers of coordination may
often still be referred to as Gold, Silver and Bronze. These terms are obsolete at the joint
level because of the risk of confusion: ‘Silver’ for one emergency responder may be ‘Gold’
for another.

11-11. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).158 The Joint
Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) have been introduced recently in
order to enhance police, fire and rescue service, and ambulance service interoperability in

155 The equivalent in Scotland is Regional Resilience Partnership (RRP).

156 The equivalent in Scotland is Local Resilience Partnership (LRP).
157 In a few areas, such as Cumbria, Operational Co-ordinating Groups (OCGs) may be established. However, in most areas,
civil authorities have chosen to use the single-Service term ‘Bronze’ to describe this level.
158 JESIP Joint Doctrine – The Interoperability Framework, Edition 2 (Jul 2016) available at www.jesip.org.uk
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the early stages of, and during, a response to a major or complex incident. Its purpose is
to provide emergency services’ commanders with a framework to enable them to respond
together as effectively as possible. JESIP is nationally recognised with support from
emergency service chief officers and the Home Office, Cabinet Office and the Department
of Health. JESIP doctrine focuses on the interoperability of the three emergency services
while also acknowledging that emergency response is a multi-agency activity and the
resolution of an emergency will usually involve collaboration with other Category 1 and
2 responders159 and partner organisations. JESIP doctrine is not a prescriptive set of rules,
rather it aims to guide, explain and inform. Specifically, it provides guidance:

a. On how responders should train and operate, by applying common terminology,

principles and ways of working.

b. On responders’ actions in a multi-agency working environment, to achieve the degree

of interoperability that ensures a successful joint response.

c. For commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, on the actions they should undertake
when responding to major and complex incidents.

d. On the Joint Decision Model (JDM) as shown at Figure 11.1.

Gather
information
&
intelligence

Take action Assess Risks

& review Working & develop
what Together a working
happened Saving Lives
strategy
Reducing
Harm

Identify Consider
options powers,
& policies &
contingencies procedures

Figure 11.1. – The JESIP Joint Decision Model

11-12. The Joint Decision Model (JDM). JESIP has developed the JDM Model, effectively
a planning tool. Defence liaison officers and commanders must be aware of the JDM
as it will be used by civil authority commanders as their primary tool to help them
bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and make effective
decisions - together. Like most decision models, the JDM centres around three primary
considerations:

159 CCA04 divides responders into one of two categories: Category 1 and Category 2, and places specific duties upon them
depending upon their categorisation.
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Situation Direction Action

What is happening? What do you want/need to What do you need to do to

achieve in the first hour (the resolve the situation and achieve
desired outcomes)? your desired outcomes?
What are the impacts?
What are the aims and objectives
of the emergency response?
What are the risks?
What overarching values and
priorities will inform and guide
What might happen and what this?
is being done about it?

Table 11.2. – The JDM Primary Considerations

a. Along with a commander’s personal experience and knowledge of any given situation,
the JDM is designed to help commanders make effective decisions together.

b. The overarching aim or purpose for using the JDM is common to all those involved in
emergency response. They are the words in the centre of the JDM – Working Together
– saving lives, reducing harm. All commander and responder staff should remind
themselves of the importance of this purpose when responding to a multi-agency
incident and applying JESIP.

11-13. JESIP Planning Principles. The need for interoperability between emergency services
extends to other agencies that may be expected to operate with them, including our
Armed Forces. Any contribution by military responders should be seen in a supporting role
to the civil responders, who will have primacy throughout. Military responders must be
aware of the JESIP and will be expected to adhere to the procedures wherever possible,
specifically the five core principles:

a. Collocation. Collocation of commanders is essential and allows those commanders

to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face-to-face at a
single and easily identifiable location known as the forward command post. Defence
personnel operating with civil authorities at all levels must be aware of both the use of
the JDM and the civil authorities’ approach to operational record keeping and decision
logging. Responders should identify who is in charge from the other services; this is
made easier by the use of tabards. Defence commanders should make themselves
aware of the tabard identification scheme applicable to the operation that they are
supporting.

b. Communication. The JESIP doctrine does not provide guidance on the technical
solutions that are available to the emergency services.160 The sharing of information,
free of acronyms, across service boundaries is essential to operational success. The
understanding of any information shared ensures the achievement of shared situational
awareness which underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident. During
incidents with a multi-agency response, civil commanders will use emergency services
interoperability talk-groups, especially when collocation proves challenging. To enable
shared understanding, military responders need to be incorporated onto the network.
The mnemonic METHANE will be used by civil authorities over communications

160 A technical solution already exists – Airwave – and is in widespread use by the emergency services and other responders.
The replacement of Airwave is subject to a separate, cross-governmental and emergency service programme.
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networks; military units and personnel will be expected to use this format as required
when dealing with the civil authorities. METHANE is:

M - Major incident declared.

E - Exact location.

T - Type of incident.

H - Hazards present or suspected.

A - Access – routes that are safe to use.

N - Number of casualties.

E - Emergency services present and those required.

c. Coordination. Depending on the nature of the incident one of the emergency services
will generally take the lead role at an incident to ensure an effective response. Any
military contribution will be in a supporting role. It is the duty of the commander of
the military unit to identify themselves at the forward command post and establish
effective coordination with the lead civil responder to ensure tasking is appropriate.

d. Joint Understanding of Risk. Commanders of civil emergency services will ensure

the safety of responders by conducting a joint assessment of risk. This will include
any military assets that are under the control of the civilian agencies. However, this
does not absolve military commanders from their own assessment of the risks and,
where necessary, military commanders must decide for themselves that the risks their
personnel are exposed to are tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable. In the
event of disagreement between the military commander and the civilian commander
on a risk related matter, the military commander must inform the military chain of
command at the first opportunity.

e. Shared Situational Awareness. Critical to success is a common understanding of

the circumstances and immediate consequences of an emergency, together with an
appreciation of available resources and capabilities of all response agencies. To achieve
this emergency services employ the IIMARCH briefing format.161 IIMARCH is:

I – Information.

I – Intent.

M – Method.

A – Administration.

R - Risk assessment.

C – Communications.

H - Humanitarian issues.

161 The IIMARCH briefing template is available at: http://www.jesip.org.uk/IIMARCH-template.

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Summary
11-14. The frequency and scale of Defence support to the civil authorities has increased
in recent years. Whilst the CCA04 sets out clear civilian-led processes and structures for
responding to a disruptive challenge, should Defence support be required it will be done
so under the provisions of MACA, and in accordance with a number of standing criteria.
A clear Defence chain of command for resilience operations has been defined, and at
each level strong links are maintained with civil authority equivalents so that the transition
to crisis management is seamless. Defence staffs operating in support and/or with the civil
authorities must be aware of JESIP as it is the relatively new process that seeks to ensure
that emergency services work together more effectively than might have been the case in
the past.
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