SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

College of Law
Mendiola, Manila

CASE STUDY
IN
LEGAL RESEARCH

Submitted by:
PATRICIA KAYE T. GONGORA
L-1900088
1-H

Submitted to:
ATTY. REMEGIO MORA, JR.

DECEMBER 2019
INSTRUCTIONS: CASE STUDY AND COMMENTARY Each student
much select (1) one case decided by the Supreme Court which the student
believes that could have been decided, in one way or another, differently
by the Supreme Court. The case must have been decided by the Supreme
Court not earlier than January 1, 2010. The case study must, among
others, contain the following:

1. A summary of the case, i.e., a brief and concise summary of the

pertinent facts of the case; the issues involved; and the ruling of the
Supreme Court.

2. Problems or issues in the decision that the student believes that

could have been resolved differently.

3. Analysis of the case and suggested resolution, i.e., detailed

discussion of the legal and factual basis for the alternative decision.

4. Recommendations, including but not limited to suggested revisions

or amendments to the applicable law, rules of procedure or
application of the legal principle involved.
 I. SUMMARY OF THE CASE

NICOLAS S. MATUDAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

and MARILYN B. MATUDAN
G.R. No. 203284 ; November 14, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

On October 26, 1976, petitioner Nicolas Matudan and respondent

Marilyn Matudan contracted marriage by which they begot 4 children.
After obtaining permission to work abroad, Marilyn left the conjugal
dwelling wherein the spouses and the children lost contact with the
former, having no knowledge about her whereabouts.

About 23 years later, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
on the following grounds:

(a.) that before, during, and after, respondent was

psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her obligations as a
wife and mother as proven by the expert evaluation
conducted by Clinical Psychologist Dr. Tayag;

(b.) that she did not give emotional and financial support, care,
love and sustenance during their cohabitation and even so
after leaving for work abroad;

(c.) that she was irresponsible, immature and exhibited irrational

behavior towards petitioner and their children; and

(d.) that she was self-centered, had no remorse and involved

herself in activities defying social and moral ethics.

However, during the cross-examination, petitioner denied the

existence of any marital problems and claimed that he only did so
because of his wife’s abandonment. Because of this inconsistency, both
petitioner and respondent were subjected to a psychological test and
interview which resulted in the discovery that both were afflicted with a
psychological disorder: Nicolas, from Passive-Aggressive Personality
Disorder and Marilyn has Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
Antisocial Traits.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform

her marital obligations according to the provision of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

RULING:

Article 36 of the Family Code must be discussed. Article 36 states

that “a marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” The
landmark case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals confines the definition of
psychological incapacity falling under said Article and is characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. For psychological incapacity to be
appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

The Court finds that the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence

and incurability of the respondent’s incapacity has not been sufficiently
established by the petitoner to grant the nullity of marriage.

First, petitioner’s testimony only contained general statements on

the manifestations of said incapacity and failed to elaborate on the degree
of Marilyn's irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness.

Second, he heavily relied on the abandonment of the respondent as

the reason why he wanted the marriage dissolved which does not
constitute a ground for nullity of marriage but legal separation.

Third, Marilyn never participated in the proceedings. The clinical

psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was
supplied by a one-sided description by the petitioning spouse and Maricel
(their child) who can not be considered as a credible source since she
cannot be expected to know her mother well when she left her at such an
early age.

With all the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.

II. PROBLEMS/ISSUES IN THE DECISION

Judicial decisions involving Article 36 demands the abundance or lack

thereof of a high standard of proof. In the case at bar, the issue is whether
or not the annulment should be granted on the ground of psychological
incapacity on behalf of the respondent to which the ponencia found
insufficient and therefore denied the petition.

Indeed, “what is important is the presence of evidence that can

adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.” The complete
facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.”
Petitioner’s judicial affidavit and testimony during the trial, however, fail
to show gravity and juridical antecedence. While he complained that
Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in “activities defying
social and moral ethics,” and that she was, among others, irrational,
irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to
sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly
the degree of Marilyn’s claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or
selfishness. This is compounded by: (1) the fact that Marilyn did not
actually participate in the proceedings and; (2) the testimony of Dr.
Tayag, the medical expert who diagnosed Marilyn with having a
narcissistic personality is unreliable since she only arrived at this
conclusion on the psychological condition of the respondent based on the
account of Nicolas and to some extent, the spouses’ daughter, Maricel.
Yielding to the latter would not differ from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

However, strict adherence to the rigid interpretation of Article 36 along

with the guidelines established by Santos vs. Court of Appeals and the
Molina doctrine seem to ignore other factual circumstances that should be
held to the same regard and even be enough to supply the insufficiency of
evidence in proving the gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity of the respondent which is most apparent in her abandonment
of the family for thirty-one years and non-fulfillment of essential marital
obligations.
III. ANALYSIS/SUGGESTED RESOLUTION

After careful examination, it is my opinion, that the Petition for

Review on Certiorari must be granted for the following reasons:

First, Marilyn’s psychological incapacity was already sufficiently

established. 
 
        In psychological evaluation, the psychiatric history should be
based on the patient’s actual account but in this case wherein the patient
is not available, information from other sources must be utilized. To
reiterate, Dr. Tayag diagnosed Marilyn with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with Antisocial Traits which is described as grave, severe, long-
lasting and incurable by any treatment available. While one might argue
that it would be unfair to label the psychological findings of Dr. Tayag as
reliable despite all the information supplied by the petitioner, it would
perpetuate an equal-degree of injustice to the petitioner to disregard how
Marilyn’s psychological condition compliments the undisputed fact that
she left the conjugal home and has not contacted her family since
1985. Three decades of non-communication and non-fulfillment of her
essential marital obligations encompassed in Article 68 and 220 of the
Family Code should be sufficient to fill the doubt and warrant the
dissolution of her marriage with Nicolas.
 
Second, Article 36 should not be applied so rigidly when the purpose
of the law is to give rise to a remedy to spouses wherein one of the
contracting parties has been afflicted with the most serious cases of
personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It
contemplates downright incapacity or incompetence to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations. This is expressed in the legal
maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium which means where there is a right, there is
a remedy for violation thereof. Moreover, Article 36 can be likened to a
liberal divorce procedure mingled with Catholic Church doctrine to
appear less distasteful in a conservative society such as ours. History of
the inclusion of said provision shows how the Family Code Revision
Committee deliberately refused to define the term "psychological
incapacity" "to allow some resiliency in [the] application" of the
provision. No examples of psychological incapacity were given in the law
so as not to "limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis."
 
As eloquently said by Justice Leonen in his dissenting opinion,
“The law is an instrument to provide succor. It is not a burden
that unreasonably interferes with individual choices of intimate
arrangements. The choice to stay in or leave a marriage is not for this
Court, or the State, to make. The choice is given to the partners, with
the Constitution provides that "the right of spouses to found a family
in accordance with their religious convictions and demands of
responsible parenthood” Counterintuitively, the State protects
marriages if it allows those found to have psychological illnesses that
render them incapable of complying with their marital obligations to
leave the marriage. To force partners to stay in a loveless marriage,
or a spouseless marriage as in this case only erodes the foundation of
the family.”

While current guidelines for such marriage to be declared null and

void pursuant to this Article may have been established by Santos vs.
Court of Appeals and the Molina doctrine, it is still up to the Supreme
Court’s discretion to grant or refuse the annulment.
 
Third, Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that in case of doubt
in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. There may be an
abundance of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity but Supreme
Court rulings are a testament to the provision’s flexible application. Cases
involving psychological incapacity is a case-to-case basis: shifting, ever-
evolving and relentless process of defining the scope of the term, and
fixing, relaxing, revising and reiterating the procedures by which to prove
it. That said, I am under the contention that the Petition should be granted
in his favor for refusal to grant such would impair the provision stated
above.