Nin Named Sakamoto Ryo Ma, Who Had Fled His Native Tosa To Join The Many Young

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Nor were they content with things at court.

In 1865 Edo dispatched two ro¯ju¯ with 3,000


troops to Kyoto with the goal of exerting more direct control over the court. Hitotsubashi
Keiki, who was considered unreliable and too moderate, was recalled to Edo. They also
backed away from other cooperative ventures. At Hyogo Katsu Kaishu¯ , an innovative
young official (and former student of Sakuma Sho¯zan’s) who had been in charge of the first
steamship sent across the Pacific, had established a naval training school that enrolled spirited
and able young men from all parts of the country, even ro¯nin. Katsu’s assistant was a young
ro¯nin named Sakamoto Ryo¯ma, who had fled his native Tosa to join the many young
activists eager to take part in national politics; he had set out to assassinate Katsu only to be
persuaded that military preparedness made better sense than antiforeign heroics, and helped
Katsu recruit others like him. This sort of thing looked suspicious to Edo conservatives;
Katsu was soon out of his job and Sakamoto a refugee in Satsuma. Each of these retreats
carried a price. The court was not impressed by these measures, and let it be known that the
system of alternate attendance 306 The Making of Modern Japan should not be reestablished.
The “united front” of Satsuma, Aizu, and Edo that had brought Cho¯shu¯ to heel broke up
over the new round of bakufu demands, for few were comfortable with the idea of calling the
Cho¯shu¯ lord and his son to Edo.

It then proved that the Cho¯shu¯ problem had not been solved after all. Before its concession
the Cho¯shu¯ radical government in that domain had been recruiting irregular military units
that included commoners. In practice these were usually sons of the village elite, headmen
and the wealthy farmers, men whose social standing had given them near-samurai status and
whose literacy had made it possible for them to be passionately aware of the national and
domain crisis. The Cho¯shu¯ surrender government now ordered them to disband, but instead
they rose in revolt to strengthen the radical faction and force another change in domain
political leadership. This insurrection, for that is what it was, did not involve disrespect to the
daimyo, for that worthy, something of a political cipher, simply changed his position once
again and continued to head the domain. In view of these developments bakufu
administrators had to rethink their course once more.
Reform-minded men argued the importance of national unity and military growth and
advocated lenient treatment for Cho¯shu¯ and close consultation with the other great
domains, while conservatives argued the case for a second expedition against Cho¯shu¯ , one
led by the young shogun himself. They were confident that the domain would submit a
second time once it saw that overwhelming force was being arrayed against it. They were
wrong. The radicals who had seized power took a firm stand against the bakufu; they knew
they had their backs to the wall and that no compromise was possible. The bakufu had
difficulty getting cooperation from other domains a second time. Satsuma leaders, who had
helped work out the terms of the original compromise settlement, now saw themselves
threatened by the possible subjugation of Cho¯shu¯ and wondered whether they themselves
would be the next targets for a victorious bakufu. There were also alarming indications that
Edo leaders had found promising sources of support for military modernization from the
France of the Second Empire.

Le´on Roches, a diplomat who had won his spurs in Algeria, arrived in Japan in the spring of
1864; before long he had become the senior member of the foreign representatives. Roches
saw opportunities for his country in the Tokugawa eagerness to obtain technology, training,
and equipment.

A bakufu military mission was dispatched to France. Sweeping reforms envisioned


a commoner conscript army. At Yokosuka French technicians were beginning work on an
iron foundry and armory. Since a victorious and united bakufu would be able to command
resources far superior to those available The Tokugawa Fall 307 to any of its vassals, it is not
surprising that leaders of Satsuma were anxious to prevent Edo from becoming too strong.
Satsuma leaders were working more closely with court nobles, and it is probable that they
had their hand
in some of the decrees that countered bakufu policy.

Unfortunately for Edo, Cho¯shu¯ refused to buckle, and a military advance became
necessary. Many elements of the bakufu-led alliance were half-hearted in their participation,
while the Cho¯shu¯ defenders, fighting on their home territory and for their very lives and
honor, were far more motivated. Bakufu attempts to invade Cho¯shu¯ were unsuccessful at
every point. The bakufu was saved from its embarrassment by the death of the shogun
Iemochi, which made a truce inevitable. Tokugawa Iemochi died at the age of twenty in
Osaka, where he had come to “lead” the campaign, as the news of military reverses came in.
This time it was clear that there was no real alternative to Hitotsubashi Keiki as shogun; he
was promptly named successor and invested early the following year. Approval of this
succession was one of the last acts of the Emperor Ko¯mei, who died late in 1866. the
tokugawa fall Keiki was shogun for less than a year. How was it that the man generally
thought to be the most promising political figure of his time had so short a tenure? Granted,
he was not eager for the appointment, realizing its problems; granted also, he was, by general
agreement, indecisive; and granted further that he was distrusted by many of the Edo
“regulars.” Nevertheless problems remain. Within a few months of his accession things
seemed to be going better with the foreign powers. He had plans for a cooperative council of
sorts in which all the great lords would have a voice. The program of military modernization
undertaken with French help was on schedule, and he dispatched his younger brother to
France to represent Japan at an international exhibition with the expectation that he might
succeed him after further seasoning. Yet within months all this was in ruins and Keiki was on
a warship headed for Edo in retreat from his pursuers.

Bakufu miscues in the attempted suppression of Cho¯shu¯ gave strength


to a new program contained in the slogan to¯baku, “overthrow the bakufu!” Exclusion was
clearly no longer possible, but to¯baku could be combined with loyalism, sonno¯, quite as
well as jo¯i exclusionism had been. There was now a new perception among men who had
been animated by antiforeign sentiment that the bakufu, while sobered by its setbacks, was
turning to cooperate with the foreigners; consequently they themselves shifted their animosity
from theforeigners to the bakufu. The brief rally in which bakufu conservatives had 308 The
Making of Modern Japan shown signs of trying to reassert their control then served to
coalesce disparatedomain forces into a united front against the bakufu. This was not an easy
or an obvious choice. The disputes of a decade had raised provincial and domain
consciousness and distrust, and if bakufu leaders found French military advisers less
threatening Satsuma leaders were no lessimpressed by the British guns and ships that had
devastated Kagoshima. Cho¯shu¯ was still beleaguered behind its borders, under sentence
from the court. Yet somehow the changing image of the bakufu began to unite men and
forces that later fell apart. It will be useful to see these events through the eyes of one unusual
figure whose career cuts across all the barriers of status, ideology, politics, and geography
that have been discussed. Sakamoto Ryo¯ma was born a go¯shi (country samurai) in Tosa in
1835. He was a youth when the crisis of Perry’s black ships broke the tedium of life in a
status-bound society. This provided incentive for study in fencing schools in Edo, and from
that came contacts with young braves from other areas. After he returned home he became
one of the young
loyalists who collected around Takechi Zuisan in 1861.

A younger son without family responsibilities, Sakamoto felt himself free to break the
samurai code. He left Tosa illegally and secretly by a mountainous route to savor the
excitement of participation in national affairs. His first goal, direct action, took the form of
trying to assassinate Katsu Kaishu¯ , the bakufu hatamoto charged with setting up a naval
training school. Katsu’s cool response to his youthful would be assailant was to argue with
him about the things that had to be done to make Japan secure against the foreigners.
Converted from enemy to disciple, Sakamoto became a staunch follower, helping to recruit
other ro¯nin for the school.

After Katsu lost his job, Sakamoto, who narrowly escaped an assassination attempt, took
cover in Satsuma, together with a courageous young woman who had helped save his life and
now became his wife. With Satsuma help Sakamoto was now able to launch a small
commercial operation. His Kaientai was something between a primitive navy and cargo
company, and it carried contraband from Nagasaki to Cho¯shu¯ and to Satsuma. As bakufu
leaders stumbled into the second expedition against Cho¯shu¯ ,Sakamoto worked to mediate
the political chasm between Satsuma andCho¯shu¯ . His ro¯nin wanderings had won him
credentials in both camps, andin the early days of 1866 he brokered an alliance between the
two military powerhouses. By its terms Satsuma promised not to join the bakufu in the
second expedition and to intervene with the court to restore Cho¯shu¯ to favor. Clearly, the
bakufu was now the enemy and had to be replaced or at least restructured.Sakamoto’s own
domain of Tosa saw new merit in this ro¯nin with such good connections; Katsu Kaishu¯
intervened with Yamauchi Yo¯do¯ to get him restored to duty.

The next step was a Tosa-Satsuma agreement. Its text stressed the shameful nature of a land
with two governments. “Our first great duty,” it read, “is to seek out the national polity and
structure of the Imperial Country of old so that we may face all nations without shame . . .
There can not be two rulers in a land, or two heads in a house . . . is there anywhere else that
there is a national polity like this? We must reform our regulations and return political power
to the court, form a council of feudal lords, and conduct affairs in line with the desires of the
people in this manner; only then can we face all nations without shame and establish our
national polity . . . Let us elevate the wisdom of the ruler and loyalty of subjects, seeking out
the great peace and carrying out for all the people of the realm a governance of generosity,
humaneness, wisdom, and compassion.”7

This brief examination of one individual’s awakening can suffice to show the speed with
which consciousness changed in a decade of crisis. What began as outrage against intrusive
foreigners had become anger directed at a polity that did not conform to international
standards. The agreement’s references to a “council to be established in Kyoto” show that
Sakamoto had also become aware of ideas of representative government and collegial
cooperation through his contacts with progressive figures in Edo. Central to this was a
proposal he made to the Tosa ro¯ju¯ Goto¯ Sho¯jiro¯ that the Tosa daimyo be persuaded to
submit to the shogun a proposal whereby he could achieve peace with honor in a new
structure that would replace Tokugawa with imperial hegemony. Under its terms a council of
lords would provide a firmer basis for a unified political structure. Sakamoto Ryo¯ma’s
Eight-Point Plan was the basis for the Tosa petition on which the last shogun surrendered his
powers.

1. Political power of the country should be returned to the Imperial Court, and all decrees
issued by the Court.
2. Two legislative bodies, an Upper and a Lower house, should be established, and all
government measures should be decided on the basis of general opinion.
3. Men of ability among the lords, nobles, and people at large should be employed as
councillors, and traditional offices of the past which have lost their purpose should be
abolished.
4. Foreign affairs should be carried on according to appropriate regulations worked out on the
basis of general opinion.
5. Legislation and regulations of earlier times should be set aside and a new and adequate
code should be selected.
6. The navy should be enlarged.
7. An Imperial Guard should be set up to defend the capital.
8. The values of gold, silver and goods should be brought into line with those in other
countries.

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