Sarmiento Vs COMELEC G.R. No. 105628 August 06, 1992 Facts

27.
Sarmiento vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 105628
August 06, 1992
FACTS:
Nine (9) special civil actions for certiorari, hereby jointly resolved, seek to
set aside the resolutions of respondent COMELEC. Petitioners impugn that
the challenged resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion, in that
the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance and decided the appeals
without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the challenged Resolutions (the SPC) as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en
banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring
them to any of its Divisions.
HELD:
Yes. The SC held that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners
without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Pursuant to Section 3,
subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, it expressly provides that:
“The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
28.
National Press Club vs COMELEC
G.R. NO. 102653
March 05, 1992
Facts:
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper,
radio, any person making the use of media to sell or give free of charge of
space or time for political purpose except COMELEC. Petitioners who were
representatives of mass media assails its constitutionality on the ground that
it amounts to censorship because it single’s out for suppression only
publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom of speech of
candidates.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.
Held:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights
which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of
the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be
seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period —
i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity
to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value.
One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section
26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is
whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute
a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an election
period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that
Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11
(b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b)
does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio
or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or
columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and
so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in
fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political
office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements
of particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.

Sarmiento Vs COMELEC G.R. No. 105628 August 06, 1992 Facts

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sarmiento Vs COMELEC G.R. No. 105628 August 06, 1992 Facts

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sarmiento Vs COMELEC G.R. No. 105628 August 06, 1992 Facts

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

27.

Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.

You might also like

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.